Category: Criminal Law

DOJ Confirms Moving Marijuana to Schedule III; Sidesteps Anticipated Impact on State Cannabis Markets

On May 16, 2024, the Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated the formal rulemaking process to move marijuana to Schedule III of the Controlled Substances Act. The DOJ’s notice of proposed rulemaking unfortunately sidesteps the hard questions about the impact of rescheduling on the existing state adult-use and medical cannabis markets.

Summary of Content

The 92-page notice of proposed rulemaking primarily summarizes and comments on last year’s recommendations by the Department of Health and Human Services to reschedule marijuana, as well as related legal concerns such as compliance with international treaty obligation. The DOJ emphasizes that if marijuana is transferred to Schedule III, “the manufacture, distribution, dispensing, and possession of marijuana would also remain subject to applicable criminal prohibitions under the CSA [Controlled Substances Act],” and that marijuana would remain subject to applicable provisions of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.

With respect to the critical question of impact on the cannabis markets, however, the DOJ is silent and merely states that it is “seeking comment on the practical consequences of rescheduling marijuana.”

By way of explanation, the DOJ offers:

“DOJ recognizes this action may have unique economic impacts. As stated above, marijuana is subject to a number of State laws that have allowed a multibillion dollar industry to develop. DOJ acknowledges that there may be large impacts related to Federal taxes and research and development investment for the pharmaceutical industry, among other things. DOJ is specifically soliciting comments on the economic impact of this proposed rule. DOJ will revise this section at the final rules stage if warranted after consideration of any comments received.” (Emphasis added.)

Robust Public Comments Expected

For an industry that has been eagerly awaiting to hear how the DOJ will approach rules that address the interplay between existing state cannabis laws and the complex web of federal laws around Schedule III drugs, the DOJ’s notice is disappointing and may not bode well for a smooth rulemaking process. DOJ will accept public comments for 60 days once the notice of proposed rulemaking has been published in the Federal Register. We can expect robust commentary from cannabis businesses, state regulators, trade organizations and ancillary industries.

Regardless of the outcome of the final rulemaking, it seems apparent that clarity through congressional action is needed more than ever.

Justice Department has Opportunity to Revolutionize its Enforcement Efforts with Whistleblower Program

Over the past few decades, modern whistleblower award programs have radically altered the ability of numerous U.S. agencies to crack down on white-collar crime. This year, the Department of Justice (DOJ) may be joining their ranks, if it incorporates the key elements of successful whistleblower programs into the program it is developing.

On March 7, the Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced that the DOJ was launching a “90-day policy sprint” to develop “a DOJ-run whistleblower rewards program.” According to Monaco, the DOJ has taken note of the successes of the U.S.’s whistleblower award programs, such as those run by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS), noting that they “have proven indispensable.”

Monaco understood that the SEC and IRS programs have been so successful because they “encourage individuals to report misconduct” by “rewarding whistleblowers.” But how any award program is administered is the key to whether or not the program will work. There is a nearly 50-year history of what rules need to be implemented to transform these programs into highly effective law enforcement tools. The Justice Department needs to follow these well defined rules.

The key element of all successful whistleblower award programs is very simple: If a whistleblower meets all of the requirements set forth by the government for compensation the awards must be mandatory and based on a percentage of the sanctions collected thanks to the whistleblower. A qualified whistleblower cannot be left out in the cold. Denying qualified whistleblowers compensation will destroy the trust necessary for a whistleblower program to work.

It is not the possibility of money that incentives individuals to report misconduct but the promise of money. Blowing the whistle is an immense risk and individuals are only compelled to take such a risk when there is real guarantee of an award.

This dynamic has been laid clear in recent legislative history. There is a long track record of whistleblower laws and programs failing when awards are discretionary and then becoming immensely successful once awards are made mandatory.

For example, under the 1943 version of the False Claims Act awards to whistleblowers were fully discretionary. After decades of ineffectiveness, in 1986, Congress amended the law to set a mandate that qualified whistleblowers receive awards of 15-30% of the proceeds collected by the government in the action connected with their disclosure.

The 1986 Senate Report explained why Congress was amending the law:

“The new percentages . . . create a guarantee that relators [i.e., whistleblowers] will receive at least some portion of the award if the litigation proves successful. Hearing witnesses who themselves had exposed fraud in Government contracting, expressed concern that current law fails to offer any security, financial or otherwise, to persons considering publicly exposing fraud.

“If a potential plaintiff reads the present statute and understands that in a successful case the court may arbitrarily decide to award only a tiny fraction of the proceeds to the person who brought the action, the potential plaintiff may decide it is too risky to proceed in the face of a totally unpredictable recovery.”

In the nearly four decades since awards were made mandatory, the False Claims Act has established itself as America’s premier anti-fraud law. The government has recovered over $75 billions of taxpayer money from fraudsters, the vast majority from whistleblower initiated cases based directly on the 1986 amendments making awards mandatory.

Similar transformations occurred at both the IRS and SEC where ineffective discretionary award laws were replaced by laws which mandated that qualified whistleblowers receive a set percentage of the funds collected thanks to their whistleblowing. Since these reforms, the whistleblower programs have revolutionized these agencies’ enforcement efforts, leading directly to billions of dollars in sanctions and creating a massive deterrent effect on corporate wrongdoing.

Most recently, Congress reaffirmed the importance of mandatory whistleblower awards when it reformed the anti-money laundering whistleblower law. The original version of the law, which passed in January 2021, had no set minimum amount for awards, meaning that they were fully discretionary. After the AML Whistleblower Program struggled to take off, Congress listened to the feedback from whistleblower advocates and passed the AML Whistleblower Improvement Act to mandate that qualified money laundering whistleblowers are awarded.

Monaco states that the DOJ has long had the discretionary authority to pay whistleblower awards to individuals who report information leading to civil or criminal forfeitures and has “used this authority here and there — but never as part of a targeted program.”

The most important step in turning an underutilized and ineffective whistleblower award law into an “indispensable” whistleblower award program has been made clear over the past decades. Qualified whistleblowers must be guaranteed an award based on a percentage of the sanctions collected in connection with their disclosure.

By administering its whistleblower program in a way that mandates award payments, the DOJ would go a long way towards creating a whistleblower program which revolutionizes its ability to fight crime. The Justice Department has taken the most important first step – recognizing the importance of whistleblowers in reporting frauds. It now must follow through during its “90-day sprint,” making sure reforming the management of the Asset Forfeiture Fund works in practice. Whistleblowers who risk their jobs and careers need real, enforceable justice.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on DOJ Whistleblower Programs, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Is the SEC’s Shadow Trading Win Proof That There is a Federal Common Law of Crime After All?

Last week, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission‘s Director of Enforcement celebrated a jury verdict in its insider trading case against Matthew Panuwat:

As we’ve said all along, there was nothing novel about this matter, and the jury agreed: this was insider trading, pure and simple. Defendant used highly confidential information about an impending announcement of the acquisition of biopharmaceutical company Medivation, Inc., the company where he worked, by Pfizer Inc. to trade ahead of the news for his own enrichment. Rather than buying the securities of Medivation, however, Panuwat used his employer’s confidential information to acquire a large stake in call options of another comparable public company, Incyte Corporation, whose share price increased materially on the important news.”

I disagree, many have described the SEC’s theory of shadow trading as “novel”. More importantly, you won’t find it in Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the ostensible bases for insider trading prosecutions. I have long decried the “make it up as you go along” aspect of insider trading jurisprudence:

Notably, Rule 10b-5 itself doesn’t explicitly mention insider trading. It would be more than a half century before the SEC finally adopted a rule, Rule 10b5-1 defining just one element of insider trading – when a purchase or sale constitutes trading “on the basis of” material non public information. It is no surprise then that federal courts have struggled to define who can be guilty of insider trading and why. The result is that the crime of insider trading has a decidedly “make it up as you go along” quality. Individuals don’t know where the lines are until the courts draw them and then convict. Consequently, people have gone to prison even as courts have adopted the theories for their convictions. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court is still defining the crime more than seven decades after Mr. Freeman cobbled together Rule 10b-5 suggests that the definition of insider trading has been too inchoate to support criminal convictions. However “well tuned to an animating principle” a theory might be, I simply don’t think due process exists when a crime is only defined after a conviction.

If Congress truly believes that insider trading should be a crime, it should define the exact elements of the crime rather than leave it to the courts to make up the rules as they send people to prison. The California legislature has in fact done just that in Corporations Code Section 25402. For more on Section 25402, see my article, California’s Unique Approach to Insider Trading Regulation, 17 Insights 21 (July 2003).

Why Bassam Salman Should Not Have Been Convicted.

The willingness of federal courts to send people to prison based on a crime that isn’t expressed, much less defined, in any federal statute is at odds with the principle that only the people’s elected representatives in the legislature are authorized to make an act a crime. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34, 11 U.S. 32, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812). While the SEC’s case against Mr. Panuwat was civil, I expect that this novel theory will soon be applied in a criminal prosecution.

© 2010-2024 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
For more news on SEC Insider Trading Cases, visit the NLR Securities & SEC section.

Department of Justice Ramps Up Investigations of Private Clubs that Received PPP Loans

As Varnum’s government investigations team has previously discussed, (link) the COVID-era Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) resulted in millions of businesses receiving emergency loans. The PPP’s hurried implementation, coupled with confusion among recipients over eligibility requirements, created an environment ripe for both fraud and the issuance of loans to ineligible recipients. Over the past few years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has focused on fraud by among other things, opening civil investigations under the False Claims Act and bringing criminal charges against PPP loan recipients who misused loan proceeds on luxury items. But recently, the DOJ has shifted its focus to a new category of PPP recipients: social clubs that may have been technically ineligible for the loans they received.

The opportunity for improper loans to social clubs comes about because of a technical wrinkle in how Congress wrote the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. In this Act, Congress made social clubs (i.e. golf clubs, tennis clubs, yacht clubs) organized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) eligible for PPP loans. However, Congress incorporated an agency regulation that prohibited loans to “private clubs and businesses which limited the numbers of memberships for reasons other than capacity.” The result is that social clubs that limit their number of members for any reason besides capacity were technically ineligible for PPP loans.

In recent months, the DOJ has issued Civil Investigation Demands (CIDs) to clubs that it believes might not have been eligible for PPP loans. These CIDs are demands for documents and interrogatory answers and often relate to employment records, income statements, the membership admission process, prospective members’ applications, the club’s governance, and membership information. CIDs are expansive and the government can use the club’s answer in future civil or criminal proceedings.

Given the DOJ’s new focus, clubs should review their PPP paperwork now and consult with an attorney to determine whether their loan was properly issued. If the clubs find technical violations, proactively approaching the government through counsel may be beneficial. If a club receives a CID, it should immediately contact an attorney to begin preparing the appropriate response.

© 2024 Varnum LLP
by: Ronald G. DeWaard, Regan A. Gibson, Gary J. Mouw, Neil E. Youngdahl of Varnum LLP

For more news on Paycheck Protection Program Fraud Enforcement, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

UNDER SURVEILLANCE: Police Commander and City of Pittsburgh Face Wiretap Lawsuit

Hi CIPAWorld! The Baroness here and I have an interesting filing that just came in the other day.

This one involves alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703, et seq., and the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, et seq.

Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703, et seq., a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he:

(1) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or oral communication;

(2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication; or

(3) intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication.

Seven police officers employed by the City of Pittsburg Bureau of Police team up to sue Matthew Lackner (Commander) and the City of Pittsburgh.

Plaintiffs, Colleen Jumba Baker, Brittany Mercer, Matthew O’Brien, Jonathan Sharp, Matthew Zuccher, Christopher Sedlak and Devlyn Valencic Keller allege that beginning on September 27, 2003 through October 4, 2003, Matthew Lacker utilized body worn cameras to video and audio records Plaintiffs along with utilizing the GPS component of the body worn camera to track them.

Yes. To track them.

Plaintiffs allege they were unaware that Lacker was utilizing a body worn camera to video and auto them and utilizing the GPS function of the body worn camera. Nor did they consent to have their conversations audio recorded by Lacker and/or the City of Pittsburgh.

Interestingly, Lackner was already charged with four (4) counts of Illegal Use of Wire or Oral Communication pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703(1) in a criminal suit.

So now Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, including actual damages or statutory damages, punitive damages, and reasonably attorneys’ fees.

This case was just filed so it will be interesting to see how this case progresses. But this case is an important reminder that many states have their own privacy laws and to take these laws seriously to avoid lawsuits like this one.

Case No.: Case 2:24-cv-00461

© 2024 Troutman Amin, LLP
For more news on Wiretap Lawsuits, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

DOJ Plan to Offer Whistleblower Awards “A Good First Step”

The Department of Justice (DOJ) will launch a whistleblower rewards program later this year, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, announced today. Monaco stated that other U.S. whistleblower award programs, such as the SEC, CFTC, IRS and AML programs, “have proven indispensable” and that the DOJ plans to offer awards for tips not covered under these programs.

“This is a good first step, but the Justice Department has miles to go in creating a whistleblower program competitive with the programs managed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),” said Stephen M. Kohn.

“We hope that the DOJ will follow the lead of the SEC and CFTC and establish a central Whistleblower Office that can accept anonymous and confidential complaints. Such a program has been required under the anti-money laundering whistleblower law for over three years, but Justice has simply failed to follow the law,” added Kohn, who also serves as Chairman of the Board of the National Whistleblower Center.

According to Monaco, “under current law, the Attorney General is authorized to pay awards for information or assistance leading to civil or criminal forfeitures” but this authority has never been used “as part of a targeted program.” The DOJ is “launching a 90-day sprint to develop and implement a pilot program, with a formal start date later this year,” she stated.

While the specifics of the program have yet to be announced, Monaco did state that the DOJ will only offer awards to individuals who were not involved in the criminal activity itself.

“The Justice Department’s decision to exclude persons who may have had some involvement in the criminal activity is a step backwards and demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding as to why the Dodd-Frank and False Claims Acts work so well,” continued Kohn. “When the False Claims Act was signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863 it was widely understood that the award laws worked best when they induced persons who were part of the conspiracy to turn in their former associates in crime. Justice needs to understand that by failing to follow the basic tenants of the most successful whistleblower laws ever enacted, their program is starting off on the wrong foot.”

Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on the DOJ’s Whistleblower Award Program, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

The Race to Report: DOJ Announces Pilot Whistleblower Program

In recent years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has rolled out a significant and increasing number of carrots and sticks aimed at deterring and punishing white collar crime. Speaking at the American Bar Association White Collar Conference in San Francisco on March 7, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced the latest: a pilot program to provide financial incentives for whistleblowers.

While the program is not yet fully developed, the premise is simple: if an individual helps DOJ discover significant corporate or financial misconduct, she could qualify to receive a portion of the resulting forfeiture, consistent with the following predicates:

  • The information must be truthful and not already known to the government.
  • The whistleblower must not have been involved in the criminal activity itself.
  • Payments are available only in cases where there is not an existing financial disclosure incentive.
  • Payments will be made only after all victims have been properly compensated.

Money Motivates 

Harkening back to the “Wanted” posters of the Old West, Monaco observed that law enforcement has long offered rewards to incentivize tipsters. Since the passage of Dodd Frank almost 15 years ago, the SEC and CFTC have relied on whistleblower programs that have been incredibly successful. In 2023, the SEC received more than 18,000 whistleblower tips (almost 50 percent more than the previous record set in FY2022), and awarded nearly $600 million — the highest annual total by dollar value in the program’s history. Over the course of 2022 and 2023, the CFTC received more than 3,000 whistleblower tips and paid nearly $350 million in awards — including a record-breaking $200 million award to a single whistleblower. Programs at IRS and FinCEN have been similarly fruitful, as are qui tam actions for fraud against the government. But, Monaco acknowledged, those programs are by their very nature limited. Accordingly, DOJ’s program will fill in the gaps and address the full range of corporate and financial misconduct that the Department prosecutes. And though only time will tell, it seems likely that this program will generate a similarly large number of tips.

The Attorney General already has authority to pay awards for “information or assistance leading to civil or criminal forfeitures,” but it has never used that power in any systematic way. Now, DOJ plans to leverage that authority to offer financial incentives to those who (1) disclose truthful and new information regarding misconduct (2) in which they were not involved (3) where there is no existing financial disclosure incentive and (4) after all victims have been compensated. The Department has begun a 90-day policy sprint to develop and implement the program, with a formal start date later this year. Acting Assistant Attorney General Nicole Argentieri explained that, because the statutory authority is tied to the department’s forfeiture program, the Department’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section will play a leading role in designing the program’s nuts and bolts, in close coordination with US Attorneys, the FBI and other DOJ offices.

Monaco spoke directly to potential whistleblowers, saying that while the Department will accept information about violations of any federal law, it is especially interested in information regarding

  • Criminal abuses of the US financial system;
  • Foreign corruption cases outside the jurisdiction of the SEC, including FCPA violations by non-issuers and violations of the recently enacted Foreign Extortion Prevention Act; and
  • Domestic corruption cases, especially involving illegal corporate payments to government officials.

Like the SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs, DOJ’s program will allow whistleblower awards only in cases involving penalties above a certain monetary threshold, but that threshold has yet to be determined.

Prior to Monaco’s announcement, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York launched its own pilot “whistleblower” program, which became effective February 13, 2024. Both the Department-wide pilot and the SDNY policy require that the government have been previously unaware of the misconduct, but they are different in a critical way: the Department-wide policy under development will explicitly apply only to reports by individuals who did not participate in the misconduct, while SDNY’s program offers incentives to “individual participants in certain non-violent offenses.” Thus, it appears that SDNY’s program is actually more akin to a VSD program, while DOJ’s Department-wide pilot program will target a new audience of potential whistleblowers.

Companies with an international footprint should also pay attention to non-US prosecutors. The new Director of the UK Serious Fraud Office recently announced that he would like to set up a similar program, no doubt noticing the effectiveness of current US programs.

Corporate Considerations

Though directed at whistleblowers, the pilot program is equally about incentivizing companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct in a timely manner. Absent aggravating factors, a qualifying VSD will result in a much more favorable resolution, including possibly avoiding a guilty plea and receiving a reduced financial penalty. But because the benefits under both programs only go to those who provide DOJ with new information, every day that a company sits on knowledge about misconduct is another day that a whistleblower might beat them to reporting that misconduct, and reaping the reward for doing so.

“When everyone needs to be first in the door, no one wants to be second,” Monaco said. “With these announcements, our message to whistleblowers is clear: the Department of Justice wants to hear from you. And to those considering a voluntary self-disclosure, our message is equally clear: knock on our door before we knock on yours.”

By providing a cash reward for whistleblowing to DOJ, this program may present challenges for companies’ efforts to operate and maintain and effective compliance program. Such rewards may encourage employees to report misconduct to DOJ instead of via internal channels, such as a compliance hotline, which can lead to compliance issues going undiagnosed or untreated — such as in circumstances where the DOJ is the only entity to receive the report but does not take any further action. Companies must therefore ensure that internal compliance and whistleblower systems are clear, easy to use, and effective — actually addressing the employee’s concerns and, to the extent possible, following up with the whistleblower to make sure they understand the company’s response.

If an employee does elect to provide information to DOJ, companies must ensure that they do not take any action that could be construed as interfering with the disclosure. Companies already face potential regulatory sanctions for restricting employees from reporting misconduct to the SEC. Though it is too early to know, it seems likely that DOJ will adopt a similar position, and a company’s interference with a whistleblower’s communications potentially could be deemed obstruction of justice.

© 2024 Bracewell LLP
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

EPA Emphasizes its Criminal Enforcement Program

This Alert Update supplements a recent VNF alert analyzing the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) enforcement priorities for fiscal years (FY) 2024-2027. EPA recently announced that its criminal program helped to develop the Agency’s national enforcement compliance initiatives and strongly suggested that it would look to pursue criminal cases under each initiative.

Previously announced National Enforcement and Compliance Initiatives (NECIs) for FY 2024-2027 include climate change, coal ash landfills and impoundments, a new focus on contaminants such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), and environmental justice initiatives. Current NECIs address aftermarket defeat devices for mobile sources, hazardous air pollutant (HAP) emissions, and compliance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program.

EPA’s head of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), David Uhlmann, stated the agency is “promoting far greater strategic coordination between our criminal and civil enforcement programs” when speaking to the American Legal Institute-Continuing Legal Education’s (ALI-CLE) Environmental Law 2024 meeting on February 22, 2024.

Uhlmann highlighted that some prior cases handled civilly should have been potentially handled criminally, and that this may change moving forward. The practical implications for companies of the shift to a more active EPA criminal program may include significantly higher penalties and potential jail time for violations. Uhlmann also noted that “EPA will continue to reserve criminal enforcement for the most egregious violations.” His comments suggest that “egregiousness” will be evaluated based on the adverse effects of the violation, particularly on disproportionately overburdened communities, and the degree of intent. Uhlmann also added that companies could avoid criminal prosecution if they are “honest with the government” and have “strong ethics, integrity, and sustainability programs.”

The U.S. Justice Department’s Environment and National Resources Division (ENRD) litigates both civil and criminal cases for EPA and closely coordinates on enforcement initiatives. The Assistant Attorney General of ENRD, Todd Kim, also spoke during the February 22 ALI-CLE panel, and focused some of his remarks on the enforcement of environmental laws in the online marketplace. He cautioned that “online companies, just like brick-and-mortar companies, would do well to take pains to ensure that they are complying with environmental laws in selling and distributing products,” because EPA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) will enforce such laws in all market settings.

Both Uhlmann and Kim highlighted “21st century” challenges and opportunities, with NECIs addressing challenges and new opportunities such as data availability and analysis allowing EPA and DOJ to better enforce environmental laws and regulations in a targeted and effective manner. Some of the newest data and data analytics are being used to advance EPA’s environmental justice priorities. “So again, companies would do well to think about the ways we use data and to be talking with their neighbors to ensure that they’re doing what they can to ensure that disproportionately overburdened communities are getting the help they need,” Kim stated.

These EPA and DOJ statements clearly signal a potential increase in criminal environmental enforcement actions, creating additional risks for companies that run afoul of regulatory requirements. These corporate risks, which also may also be borne by executives and other employees, may be mitigated through the prompt detection and reporting of non-compliant conduct and through the development and maintenance of robust compliance programs. The ability to conduct prompt and thorough internal investigations and compliance audits should be a central part of an effective corporate compliance program.

© 2024 Van Ness Feldman LLP
by: Arthur “A.J.” Singletary , Paul Libus , Britt Speyer Fleming , Michael D. Farber of Van Ness Feldman LLP

For more news on Environmental Protection Enforcement, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

The False Claims Act in 2023: A Year in Review

In 2023, the government and whistleblowers were party to 543 False Claims Act (FCA) settlements and judgments, the highest number of FCA settlements and judgments in a single year. As a result, collections under the FCA exceeded $2.68 billion, confirming that the FCA remains one of the government’s most important tools to root out fraud, safeguard government programs, and ensure that public funds are used appropriately. As in recent years, the healthcare industry was the primary focus of FCA enforcement, with over $1.8 billion recovered from matters involving hospitals, pharmacies, physicians, managed care providers, laboratories, and long-term acute care facilities. Other areas of focus in 2023 were government procurement fraud, pandemic fraud, and enforcement through the government’s new Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative.

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© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on the False Claims Act, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

FinCEN’s Proposed Streamlined SAR — The Real Estate Report

On February 16, 2024, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued a proposed rule addressing “Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Residential Real Estate Transfers.” The proposed rule would, among other things, require certain persons involved in real estate closings to maintain records regarding non-financed residential real estate transfers and to submit “streamlined SARs” (suspicious activity reports), called Real Estate Reports, to FinCEN. “The persons subject to these reporting and recordkeeping requirements would be deemed reporting persons for purposes of the proposed rule and . . . [t]he information required to be reported in the Real Estate Report would identify the reporting person, the legal entity or trust to which the residential real property is transferred, the beneficial owners of that transferee entity or transferee trust, the person that transfers the residential real property, and the property being transferred, along with certain transactional information about the transfer.”

As FinCEN describes in the Federal Register notice including the proposed rule, the Bank Secrecy Act has generally required that real estate transaction information falls within the categories of transactions that are subject to appropriate money laundering controls since 1970. However, “for many years, FinCEN has exempted such persons from comprehensive regulation under the BSA and has issued a series of time-limited and geographically focused ‘geographic targeting orders’ (“GTOs”) to the real estate sector in lieu of more comprehensive regulation.” In particular, in 2016, FinCEN specifically extended a Residential Real Estate GTO to “require title insurance companies to file reports and maintain records concerning non-financed purchases of residential real estate above a certain price threshold by certain legal entities in select metropolitan areas.” As a result of that 2016 GTO, the information received has indicated to FinCEN that more comprehensive regulation is necessary, when it comes to non-financed real estate transactions. The goal of this permanent rule would be to “connect non-financed residential real property purchases by certain legal entities with the true beneficial owners making the purchases, thereby decreasing the ability of criminals to hide their identities while laundering money through real estate.”

Effectively, the proposed rule would require that at least one person involved in the real estate transaction would have to submit the Real Estate Report. And, that one person would not need to exercise any discretion regarding whether to file the Real Estate Report (unlike when traditional SARs are filed) and the proposed rule would not require confidentiality to be maintained by any of the persons involved in the filing of the Real Estate Report (again, unlike the confidentiality covered institutions must maintain regarding whether they have filed a SAR). While there is a hierarchy in terms of which person would, under the rule, be obligated to submit the Real Estate Report, the parties may also sign a “designation agreement” that would designate a particular person identified in the hierarchy as being the reporting person. Primarily, that person should be “the person listed as the closing or settlement agent on a settlement (or closing) statement.” If there is no agent on the closing statement, then the person that has prepared the closing statement should submit the Real Estate Report. If there is no closing statement, then the person that underwrites the title policy should submit the Real Estate Report. And, if there is no title policy underwritten, then reporting should be done by the “person that disburses the greatest amount of funds in connection with residential real property transfer”, meaning disbursement from an escrow account, a trust account or from a lawyer’s trust account, but excluding direct transfers between transferees. If there is no person disbursing on behalf of the transferees, then the person who prepares an evaluation of the title should submit the Real Estate Report. And, if all else fails, then the person that prepares the deed for the transaction should submit the Real Estate Report. This so-called “reporting cascade” is designed to “capture both sales of residential real estate and non-sale transfers of residential real estate . . . to ensure uniform coverage of non-financed transfers and to ensure that nominees do not purchase homes for criminal actors and then transfer the title on free of charge to a legal entity or trust.”

There are three elements that determine whether a transaction is a “reportable transaction”:

1) Is the kind of property involved in the transaction covered by the rule?

2) Is any transferee considered a “transferee entity” or “transferee trust”?

3) Is the transaction not covered by any of the following exceptions?

  1. Transaction is financed;
  2. Transaction is low-risk because it involves an easement, death, divorce or bankruptcy; or
  3. Transaction involves transfer directly to an individual person.

In terms of the transactions that would be subject to being reported through the Real Estate Report, FinCEN cast an intentionally broad net. “The proposed rule is meant to broadly capture residential real property such as single-family houses, townhouses, condominiums, and cooperatives, as well as apartment buildings designed for one to four families. These properties would be captured even if there is also a commercial element to the property, such as a single-family residence that is located above a commercial enterprise.” Further, many kinds of land-only transactions would be reportable.

In terms of the types of transferees involved, as mentioned, any transfer directly to an individual, even if that transfer was not financed and was not deemed to be low-risk, would not result in a reportable transaction. But, if the transferee is any person other than an individual and that transfer is not financed or is not low-risk, then the transfer would most likely be deemed a reportable transaction. The definition of “transferee entity” generally means “any person other than a transferee trust or an individual.” The definition of “transferee trust” generally means “any legal arrangement created when a person . . . places assets under the control of a trustee for the benefit of one or more persons . . . or for a specified purpose, as well as any legal arrangement similar in structure or function[,] whether formed under the laws of the United States or a foreign jurisdiction.” There are specific exemptions to both of these transferee definitions, including statutory trusts and trusts that are securities reporting issuers, and for the most part, FinCEN points to protocols described in its rules under the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”), especially its Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rule, as being applicable to defining which entities and trusts may or may not be exempt from these transferee definitions. Having said that, the inclusion of most trusts involved in non-financed transactions is especially interesting.

In addition to the proposed rule provisions, FinCEN lists no less than 50 questions for comment from interested parties. These questions include everything from how likely “designation agreements” are likely to be used to concerns that may arise in transactions that are partially non-financed to whether concerns relating to non-financed real estate transactions extend to commercial real estate, as well. Comments are due to FinCEN on or before April 16, 2024.

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For more on FinCEN, visit the NLR Financial Institutions & Banking section.