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OFAC Settles Alleged Sanctions Violations for $88.3 million

Posted in the National Law Review an article by Thaddeus Rogers McBride and Mark L. Jensen of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP regarding OFAC’s settlements with financial institutions:

On August 25, 2011, a major U.S. financial institution agreed to pay the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) $88.3 million to settle claims of violations of several U.S. economic sanctions programs. While OFAC settlements with financial institutions in recent years have involved larger penalty amounts, this August 2011 settlement is notable because of OFAC’s harsh—and subjective—view of the bank’s compliance program.

Background. OFAC has primary responsibility for implementing U.S. economic sanctions against specifically designated countries, governments, entities, and individuals. OFAC currently maintains approximately 20 different sanctions programs. Each of those programs bars varying types of conduct with the targeted parties including, in certain cases, transfers of funds through U.S. bank accounts.

As reported by OFAC, the alleged violations in this case involved, among other conduct, loans, transfers of gold bullion, and wire transfers that violated the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515, the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560, the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 538, the Former Liberian Regime of Charles Taylor Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 593, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, and the Reporting, Procedures, and Penalties Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 501.

Key Points of Settlement. As summarized below, the settlement provides insight into OFAC’s compliance expectations in several ways:

1. “Egregious” conduct. In OFAC’s view, three categories of violations – involving Cuba, in support of a blocked Iranian vessel, and incomplete compliance with an administrative subpoena – were egregious under the agency’s Enforcement Guidelines. To quote the agency’s press release, these violations “were egregious because of reckless acts or omissions” by the bank. This, coupled with the large amount and value of purportedly impermissibly wire transfers involving Cuba, is likely a primary basis for the large $88.3 million penalty.

OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines indicate that, when determining whether conduct is “egregious,” OFAC gives “substantial” weight to (i) whether the conduct is “willful or reckless,” and (ii) the party’s “awareness of the conduct at issue.” 31 C.F.R. Part 501, App. A. at V(B)(1). We suspect that OFAC viewed the conduct here as “egregious” and “reckless” because, according to OFAC, the bank apparently failed to address compliance issues fully: as an example, OFAC claims that the bank determined that transfers in which Cuba or a Cuban national had interest were made through a correspondent account, but did not take “adequate steps” to prevent further transfers. OFAC’s emphasis on reckless or willful conduct, and the agency’s assertion that the bank was aware of the underlying conduct, underscore the importance of a compliance program that both has the resources to act, and is able to act reasonably promptly when potential compliance issues are identified.

2. Ramifications of disclosure. In this matter, the bank voluntarily disclosed many potential violations. Yet the tone in OFAC’s press release is generally critical of the bank for violations that were not voluntarily disclosed. Moreover, OFAC specifically criticizes the bank for a tardy (though still voluntary) disclosure. According to OFAC, that disclosure was decided upon in December 2009 but not submitted until March 2010, just prior to the bank receiving repayment of the loan that was the subject of the disclosure. Although OFAC ultimately credited the bank for this voluntary disclosure, the timing of that disclosure may have contributed negatively to OFAC’s overall view of the bank’s conduct.

This serves as a reminder that there often is a benefit of making an initial notification to the agency in advance of the full disclosure. This also serves as reminder of OFAC’s very substantial discretion as to what is a timely filing of a disclosure: as noted in OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines, a voluntary self-disclosure “must include, or be followed within a reasonable period of time by, a report of sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of an apparent violation’s circumstances.” (emphasis added). In this regard, OFAC maintains specific discretion under the regulations to minimize credit for a voluntary disclosure made (at least in the agency’s view) in an inappropriate or untimely fashion.

3. Size of the penalty. The penalty amount—$88.3 million—is substantial. Yet the penalty is only a small percentage of the much larger penalties paid by Lloyds TSB ($350 million), Credit Suisse ($536 million), and Barclays ($298 million) over the past few years. In those cases, although the jurisdictional nexus between those banks and the United States was less clear than in the present case, the conduct was apparently more egregious because it involved what OFAC characterized as intentional misconduct in the form of stripping wire instructions. The difference in the size of the penalties is at least partly attributable to the amount of money involved in each matter. It also appears, however, that OFAC is distinguishing between “reckless” conduct and intentional misconduct.

4. Sources of information. As noted, many of the violations in this matter were voluntarily disclosed to OFAC. The press release also indicates that certain disclosures were based on information about the Cuba sanctions issues that was received from another U.S. financial institution (it is not clear whether OFAC received information from that other financial institution). The press release also states that, with respect to an administrative subpoena OFAC issued in this matter, the agency’s inquiries were at least in part “based on communications with a third-party financial institution.”

It may not be the case here that another financial institution (or institutions) blew the proverbial whistle, but it appears that at least one other financial institution did provide information that OFAC used to pursue this matter. Such information sharing is a reminder that, particularly given the interconnectivity of the financial system, even routine reporting by financial institutions may help OFAC identify other enforcement targets.

5. Compliance oversight. As part of the settlement agreement, the bank agreed to provide ongoing information about its internal compliance policies and procedures. In particular, the bank agreed to provide the following: “any and all updates” to internal compliance procedures and policies; results of internal and external audits of compliance with OFAC sanctions programs; and explanation of remedial measures taken in response to such audits.

Prior OFAC settlements, such as those with Barclays and Lloyds, have stipulated compliance program reporting obligations for the settling parties. While prior agreements, such as Barclay’s, required a periodic or annual review, the ongoing monitoring obligation in this settlement appears to be unusual, and could be a requirement that OFAC imposes more often in the future. (Although involving a different legal regime, requirements with similarly augmented government oversight have been imposed in recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act settlements, most notably the April 2011 settlement between the Justice Department and Johnson & Johnson. See Getting Specific About FCPA Compliance, Law360, at:http://www.sheppardmullin.com/assets/attachments/973.pdf).

Conclusions. We think this settlement is particularly notable for the aggression with which OFAC pursued this matter. Based on the breadth of the settlement, OFAC seems to have engaged in a relatively comprehensive review of sanctions implications of the bank’s operations, going beyond those allegations that were voluntarily self-disclosed to use information from a third party. Moreover, as detailed above, OFAC adopted specific, negative views about the bank’s compliance program and approach and seems to have relied on those views to impose a very substantial penalty. The settlement is a valuable reminder that OFAC can and will enforce the U.S. sanctions laws aggressively, and all parties—especially financial institutions—need to be prepared.

Guilty Plea for Altering HSR Documents

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Jonathan M. Rich and Sean P. Duffy of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP about penalties for dishonesty in Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) filings:

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has provided a jarring reminder of the penalties for dishonesty in Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) filings. On August 15, the DOJ announced that Nautilus Hyosung Holdings Inc. (NHI) agreed to plead guilty to criminal obstruction of justice for altering documents submitted with an HSR filing. NHI agreed to pay a $200,000 fine, but the DOJ can still pursue criminal prosecution—and potential incarceration—of an NHI executive.

Companies must make HSR filings with the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and observe a waiting period before closing to enable the agencies to evaluate the likely impact of the transaction on competition. Item 4(c) of the HSR notification form requires parties to provide copies of “all studies, surveys, analyses and reports which were prepared by or for any officer or director . . . for the purpose of evaluating or analyzing the acquisition with respect to market shares, competition, competitors, markets, potential for sales growth or expansion into product or geographic markets.” Such “4(c) documents” provide the agencies with their first insight into the potential impact of a transaction on competition.

NHI, a manufacturer of automated teller machines (ATMs), made a filing in August 2008 in connection with its proposed acquisition of Trident Systems of Delaware (Trident), a rival ATM manufacturer. According to the plea agreement filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, an unnamed NHI executive altered 4(c) documents to “misrepresent and minimize the competitive impact of the proposed acquisition on markets in the United States and other statements relevant and material to analyses . . . by the FTC and DOJ.”

Despite the altered documents, the DOJ initiated a merger investigation and requested additional documents from NHI, including copies of preexisting business plans and strategic plans relating to the sale of ATMs for the years 2006-2008. The company submitted the requested materials in early September 2008. According to the plea agreement, an NHI executive altered the business and strategic plans to misrepresent statements concerning NHI’s business and competition among vendors of ATMs.

In early 2009, NHI told the DOJ that an executive had altered 4(c) and other documents produced to the government. NHI and Trident abandoned the proposed transaction shortly thereafter. According to the plea agreement, NHI provided substantial cooperation with the DOJ’s obstruction of justice investigation.

According to the DOJ, the recommended fine of $200,000-$100,000 for each count-takes into account the nature and extent of the company’s disclosure and cooperation. NHI could have faced a maximum fine of up to $500,000 per count of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c). The plea agreement reserves the DOJ’s right to pursue criminal prosecution of the executive involved in the alterations.

Federal Authorities Warn of Terrorism: Three Steps Toward Comprehensive Risk Management for the Hotel Industry

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Richard J. Fildes of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. – news about a recent federal government terror alert involving hotels and resort properties:

Quality service, prime amenities, ideal locations and excellent accommodations are the repertoire of successful hotels. In light of a recent warning issued by federal authorities to the U.S. hotel industry, that checklist may need to expand, according to the American Hotel & Lodging Educational Institute. Though Mumbai-style attacks have thankfully not come to fruition on American soil in recent years, the need for vigilance is ever-present. Based on intelligence reports gathered by the U.S. government, terror plots on the hotel industry are a looming threat;however, a panic-free plan for potentially devastating crises can easily be developed.

Attacks of terrorism and natural disasters can often share the same elements of surprise, chaos, structural destruction and health-related concerns. Just as hotels should plan for before, during, and after a storm (more details), there should be a similarly structured program for staff and guests when dealing with terrorist attacks. Combining the consideration of both events can streamline the process of training employees and increasing familiarity with risk management in the aftermath of such events. Some considerations are as follows:

• Lobbies tend to be the most dangerous part of hotels because they are typically unsecured open areas where guests congregate. If finances permit, have plain clothed security personnel in the lobby. The presence of uniformed security guards can create a perception of safety; however, non-uniformed guards can be more attuned as the eyes and ears of hotel security.

• Staff should be trained to spot potentially dangerous activities. All employees who may have contact with guests, including housekeeping, maintenance, front desk, guest services, food and beverage, transportation, and parking should be given detailed instructions on what types of activity should be reported to hotel security.

• Staff should also have equally detailed instructions on panic control and ways to manage the turmoil of natural disasters.

• Record keeping is also vital, especially with health related issues. Knowing which employees have medical ailments or potential concerns will help reduce health risks stemming from natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Though some guests may not want to disclose such information, consider asking guests whether they have any heart conditions, diabetes or other issues that would be necessary for the staff to know in case of an emergency. Such inquiries should be phrased “as non-intrusive” inquiries geared toward providing the best possible customer care and service in the rare chance that something may happen.

• Keeping both paper and electronic copies of records, including which guests are checked into the hotel at any given time, is also key to minimizing confusion and chaos when responding to an emergency.

• Develop specific evacuation plans. The standard “in-case-of-a-fire” evacuation route may not be helpful during a chemical weapon attack, bombing or hurricane.

• Have designated evacuation areas equipped (or readily able to be equipped) with vital supplies. Back up energy sources, medical supplies and non-perishable foods, and bottled waters are all necessary to keep guests safe and calm.

• Make the evacuation routes easy to follow, and ensure that the staff knows exactly where guests should be located during the different emergencies.

Being vigilant, heightening security efforts, and ensuring staff preparedness will help reduce the stress, commotion and devastating aftermath of natural disasters and terrorist related incidents.

* Tara L. Tedrow is co-author of this article. She is a rising third year law student and has not been admitted to the Florida Bar.

To read the press release issued by the American Hotel & Lodging Association, please click on the following : AHLEI PR_TerrorWarningReinforcesNeedVigilanceTraining.pdf

New York’s Highest Court Reinstates $5 Billion Lawsuit By Big Banks Against MBIA

Posted recently at the National Law Review by Michael C. Hefter and Seth M. Cohen of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP news about New York’s highest court reinstating a $5 billion lawsuit brought by a group of banks, including Bank of America and Wells Fargo, against MBIA.

New York’s highest court yesterday reinstated a $5 billion lawsuit brought by a group of banks, including Bank of America and Wells Fargo, against insurance giant MBIA. ABN AMRO Bank, et al. v. MBIA Inc., et al., — N.E. 2d –, 2011 WL 2534059, slip op. (June 28, 2011). The Plaintiffs-banks sought to annul MBIA’s 2009 restructuring, which separated the insurer’s municipal bond business from its troubled structured finance unit, on the grounds that the transactions left the insurer incapable of paying insurance claims in violation of New York’s Debtor and Creditor Law. The Superintendent of Insurance in New York approved the transactions that effectuated the split of MBIA’s business in 2009.

The Court of Appeals’ decision represents a victory for Wall Street banks in one of the many battles being fought in connection with the collapse of the financial markets. Those banks saw their fraudulent transfer claims against MBIA dismissed earlier this year by the Appellate Division, First Department. The intermediate appellate court determined that the banks’ fraudulent transfer claims were a “collateral attack” on the Superintendent’s authorization of the restructuring and that an Article 78 proceeding challenging that authorization was the sole remedy available to the Plaintiffs. The banks’ remedies under Article 78 – a procedure entitling aggrieved parties to challenge agency decisions – would be limited compared to those remedies available in state or federal court under a fraudulent transfer theory.

At issue for the Court of Appeals was whether the Plaintiffs-banks had the right to challenge the restructuring plan in light of the Superintendent’s approval. Plaintiffs argued that the restructuring was a fraudulent conveyance because MBIA Insurance siphoned approximately $5 billion in cash and securities to a subsidiary for no consideration, thereby leaving the insurer undercapitalized, insolvent and incapable of meeting its obligations under the terms of the respective insurance policies. MBIA countered that, as held by the First Department, Plaintiffs’ claims were impermissible “collateral attacks” on the Superintendant’s approval of the restructuring.

In a 5-2 decision, the Court of Appeals modified the First Department’s decision and reinstated the Plaintiffs’ breach of contract, common law, and creditor claims. In an opinion authored by Judge Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick, the Court held that NY Insurance Law does not vest the Superintendent with “broad preemptive power” to block the banks’ claims. MBIA Inc., 2011 WL 2534059, slip op. at 16.

“If the Legislature actually intended the Superintendent to extinguish the historic rights of policyholders to attack fraudulent transactions under the Debtor and Creditor Law or the common law, we would expect to see evidence of such intent within the statute. Here, we find no such intent in the statute.” Id.

Critical to the Court’s holding was that Plaintiffs had no notice or input into the Insurance Department’s decision to approve MBIA’s restructuring. “That the Superintendent complied with lawful administrative procedure, in that the Insurance Law did not impose a requirement that he provide plaintiffs notice before issuing his determination, does not alter our analysis,” Judge Ciparick wrote. “To hold otherwise would infringe upon plaintiffs’ constitutional right to due process.” MBIA Inc., 2011 WL 2534059, slip op. at 21. Moreover, the Court noted that Plaintiffs’ claims could not be properly raised and adjudicated in an Article 78 proceeding. Id.

The Court’s decision re-opens claims by multiple financial institutions that MBIA instituted the restructuring in order to leave policyholders without financial recourse.

The case is ABN AMRO BANK NV. et al., v. MBIA Inc., et al, 601475-2009 (N.Y. State Supreme Court, New York County.)

Interview with C. David Morris, Senior Counsel International at Northrop Grumman Corporation

Recently postd at the National Law Review by Michele Westergaard of marcus evans an interview with a Senior in house Counsel of Northrop Grumman about FCPA compliance issues:

With the steady increase in enforcement, organizations need to now move beyond FCPA compliance and embrace a global anti-corruption compliance program. Global companies should assess their existing anti-corruption compliance programs and adjust them to meet potentially more stringent requirements.

C. David Morris, Senior Counsel International at Northrop Grumman Corporation is a speaker at the 6th FCPA & Anti-Corruption Compliance Conference taking place on June 22-24, 2011 in Washington, DC.

Mr. Morris is Senior Counsel in the Northrop Grumman Corporation International Law Department located in Linthicum, MD. His practice focuses on international regulatory compliance and cross-border transactions involving the corporation’s domestic and international businesses and joint ventures. David answered a series of questions on how to enhance FCPA and anti-bribery initiatives to adapt to heightened global anti-corruption enforcement.

What is the importance for companies to conduct regular compliance training for FCPA and foreign anti corruption laws?

DM: From a legal perspective, the U.S. Government has made it clear through many Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission settlement agreements and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that regular training is an essential component of a corporate compliance program for companies that conduct business with foreign government entities. As such, a company’s history of conducting anti-corruption training can be viewed as either a mitigating or aggravating factor should a company find itself in litigation on a FCPA matter. Likewise, the Guidance to the UK Bribery Act also identifies training as a key component to the corporate defense of having adequate compliance procedures. In this regard, the failure to provide training could be detrimental to the statutory defense. From a business perspective, anti-corruption training is a wise investment as part of a preventative law program. Regular anti-corruption training helps to reinforce and shape a corporation’s ethical culture and standards of business conduct. When clear policies and expectations are communicated, a culture for ethical behavior becomes engrained throughout the enterprise.

**How can companies not only meet the minimal expectationsforFCPA compliancebut also exceed them?**

DM: Two features of a robust compliance program that companies can undertake to achieve top tier status are to conduct benchmarking activities relative to their industry peer companies and to regularly conduct comprehensive internal risk assessments on a periodic basis. Collaboration with outside experts on these activities can be particularly helpful because they can bring an independent perspective to aid in the decision making process. In addition, there are numerous webinars, conferences, and bar association committees that provide useful practice tips and networking opportunities to stay abreast of best practices. Finally, the OECD published guidance in this area last year with their Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance, which is often cited by enforcement authorities as a model for companies to embrace.

What are the effects of non-compliance on share price, organizational reputation etc?

DM: The effects of a corruption related enforcement action can be devastating on all of a company’s constituencies. For shareholders, it is fairly common to see a company’s market capitalization decline following the announcement of a government investigation or a financial reserve set aside to cover potential fines and penalties. In 2010 alone, there were five settlements with the DOJ and SEC in excess of $100M. For customers and trading partners, uncertainties about the reliability of a company undergoing an enforcement action can be problematic because of the possibility of suspension, debarment, and/or revocation of export privileges in some cases. For employees, morale can take a hit when they observe their leaders prosecuted for criminal activity. Lastly, the enterprise as a whole can suffer because the lifecycle of a typical enforcement action (investigation, litigation, consent decree, and compliance monitor) can consume management focus for many years.

How can existing anti corruption programs be strengthened to take account of emerging global anti-corruption trends?

DM: Given the extra-territorial reach of the FCPA, the jurisdictional reach of the UK Bribery Act, and the level of inter-country prosecutorial cooperation, companies need to review their policies, procedures, and internal controls to ensure their anti-corruption compliance program is in lock-step with their corporate footprint. As with any business activity, capital, human, and technological resources need to be deployed where they will be most effective and adjusted as the business evolves. An internal risk assessment and procedural gap review are two features of a healthy continuous improvement program. Lastly, I would add that partnering with Internal Auditors, Country Managers, Ethics Officers, Finance personnel and others with an anti-corruption focus can be a beneficial way to leverage and extend the reach of existing resources.

How best can red flags of possible FCPA violations be identified?

DM: The FCPA’s accounting and internal controls provisions require companies to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in accordance with management’s authorization and are recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for assets. In addition, there are Sarbanes-Oxley requirements for management to provide a statement of the effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. As such, procedures and controls should be established for entering into third party commitments, making payments, and cash disbursements to detect red flags which may require additional due diligence. In addition to periodic internal risk assessments and related interviews of key personnel, it is a good practice to provide awareness training on red flags and to require those involved with international transactions to certify if they are aware of red flags or adverse information at milestones throughout a business transaction. The establishment of an anonymous hot line to report ethical concerns is also often cited as a best practice to detect red flags. In terms of identifying red flags of external trading partners, periodic media searches can reveal a wealth of information. The commercial attaché of the US Embassy of the country in question can also be a valuable red flag identification resource, as well as in-country employees and outside counsel.

Standing and In Pari Delicto Issues Arising in Bankruptcy Cases

Congrats to Rui Li of the The University of Iowa College of Law -one of winners of the Spring 2011 National Law Review Student Legal Writing Competition: Rui’s topic addresses whether a bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring a suit on behalf of the debtor corporation against attorneys who allegedly helped that corporation’s management with the fraud.

1. Introduction

Corporate and managerial fraud is pervasive in today’s economic climate. When fraud leaves a company insolvent and forced to seek protection under the Bankruptcy Code, oftentimes bankruptcy trustees commence legal actions against attorneys to generate recoveries for the benefit of the debtor’s estate. A common scenario goes something like this: A company is in dire financial straits before the fraud or is created as a vehicle for the fraud. The defendant is the corporation’s attorney, who assists the corporation in the fraud. The attorney is hired to ensure the company’s compliance with existing law. The attorney does the bidding of the company’s management in pursuance of their fraud. After the company’s collapse, the bankruptcy trustee sues the attorney for fraud, aiding and abetting fraud and legal malpractice.

Drawing upon the equitable defense that bars recovery by a plaintiff bearing fault with the defendant for the alleged harm, common law principles of agency imputation, and the Constitutional requirement that a plaintiff has standing to sue, a defendant may move to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that the bankruptcy trustee lacks standing to sue.

This Note provides an analysis of the issue whether the bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring a suit on behalf of the debtor corporation against attorneys who allegedly helped that corporation’s management with the fraud.

**2. The In Pari Delicto Doctrine**

a) Background

In pari delicto means “at equal fault.” It is a broadly recognized equitable principle and common law defense that prevents a plaintiff who has participated in wrongdoing from recovering damages resulting from the wrongdoing.[1] The policy behind this doctrine is to prevent one joint wrongdoer from suing another for damages that resulted from their shared wrongdoing.[2] Therefore, if a bankruptcy trustee brings a claim against an attorney on behalf of the corporation, and if the corporation is involved in the corporation’s wrongful conduct which serves as the basis for the claim, the in pari delicto may bar the claim.

The use of the doctrine against bankruptcy trustees emerged in the wave of corporate frauds in the last few decades. This novel application required the introduction of an important new element: agency law. Under agency principles, if the principal acted wrongfully through an agent in the scope of that agency relationship, then the wrongdoing of the agent is attributed to the principal. Because the acts of corporate managers in the course of their employment are imputed to the corporation, and because a bankruptcy trustee “stands in the shoes” of a debtor corporation, the fraudulent acts of the debtor’s former managers will be imputed to the trustee—unless the trustee can show that management was acting entirely on its own interests and “totally abandoned” those of the corporation to break the chain of imputation.[3]

An analysis of the equitable defense in pari delicto at issue is separable from a standing analysis.[4] “Whether a party has standing to bring claims and whether a party’s claims are barred by an equitable defense are two separate questions, to be addressed on their own terms.”[5]

b) The Second Circuit’s Approach

In Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991), the Second Circuit adopted the controversial approach of treating in pari delicto as a question of standing rather than an affirmative defense. Specifically, the standing analysis in the Second Circuit begins with the issue of whether the trustee can demonstrate that the third party professional injured the debtor in a manner distinct from injuries suffered by the debtor’s creditors.[6] In many jurisdictions, the question of the trustee’s standing ends here.[7] In Wagoner, the Second Circuit went further and added a second inquiry that incorporates the equitable defense ofin pari delicto.[8] By combining these two issues, the Wagoner rule blends the in pari delicto question into a rule of standing.

In Wagoner, the sole stockholder, director, and president of a corporation had used the proceeds of notes to finance fraudulent stock trading.[9] After the corporation became insolvent, the trustee brought claims against the defendant, an investment bank, for breach of fiduciary duty in allowing the company’s president to engage in inappropriate transactions.[10] The court held that because the president participated in the alleged misconduct, his misconduct must be imputed to the corporation and the bankruptcy trustee. This rationale derives from the agency principle that underlies the application of in pari delicto to corporate litigants: the misconduct of managers within the scope of their employment will normally be imputed to the corporation.[11] The court ruled that the trustee lacked standing to sue the investment bank for aiding and abetting the president’s alleged unlawful activity.[12] By adopting the Wagoner rule, the Second Circuit upped the ante by making an equitable defense a threshold question of standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage, rather than an affirmative defense better resolved on summary judgment or at trial.

c) Approaches of Other Circuits

Although the Wagoner rule still prevails in the Second Circuit, a majority of other courts have declined to follow it, including the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. These circuits have “declined to conflate the constitutional standing doctrine with the in pari delicto defense.”[13] “Even if an in pari delictodefense appears on the face of the complaint, it does not deprive the trustee of constitutional standing to assert the claim, though the defense may be fatal to the claim.”[14]

The Eighth Circuit held that in pari delicto cannot be used at the dismissal stage.[15] On a motion to dismiss, the court is generally limited to considering the allegations in the complaint, which the court assumes to be true in ruling on the motion.[16] Because in pari delicto is an affirmative defense requiring proof of facts that the defendant asserts, it is usually not an appropriate ground for early dismissal.[17] An in pari delicto defense may be successfully asserted at the pleading stage only where “the facts establishing the defense are: (1) definitively ascertainable from the complaint and other allowable sources of information, and (2) sufficient to establish the affirmative defense with certitude.”[18] Thus, the in pari delicto defense is generally premature at this stage of the litigation, and the court must deny the motion to dismiss.

The existence of a possible defense does not affect the question of standing.[19]Standing is a constitutional question, and all a plaintiff must show is that they have suffered an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and that the requested relief will likely redress the alleged injury. In this matter, the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits’ approach is more convincing. Those courts hold that whether a trustee has standing to bring a claim and whether the claim is barred by the equitable defense of in pari delicto are two separate questions and that the in pari delicto defense is appropriately set forth in responsive pleadings and the subject of motions for summary judgment and trial.

3. Standing Issues The Trustees Face

a) Background

The next question is whether the bankruptcy trustee fulfills the constitutional requirement of standing. Article III specifies three constitutional requirements for standing. First, the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury. Second, he must allege that the injury is traceable to the defendant’s conduct. Third, the plaintiff must show that a favorable federal court decision is likely to redress the injury.[20]

A critical issue in evaluating whether a trustee or receiver has standing to sue is whether the claim belongs to the corporate debtor entity or to the individual investors of the corporate debtor. The Supreme Court held in Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1972), that a bankruptcy trustee has standing to represent only the interests of the debtor corporation and does not have standing to pursue claims for damages against a third party on behalf of one creditor or a group of creditors. Although the line is not always clear between the debtor’s claims, which a trustee has statutory authority to assert, and claims of creditors, which Caplin bars the trustee from pursuing, the focus of the inquiry is on whether the trustee is seeking to redress injuries to the debtor that defendants’ alleged conduct caused.[21]

b) The Shifting Focus of the Second Circuit

In Wagoner, the Second Circuit held that the corporation and the trustee did not have standing to bring a claim because a “claim against a third party for defrauding a corporation with the cooperation of management accrues to creditors, not to the guilty corporation.”[22] The rationale for this rule is “though a class of creditors has suffered harm, the corporation itself has not.”[23] Without cognizable injury, the trustee representing the debtor corporation failed to meet the constitutional standing requirement.

Commentators have criticized the Wagoner rule that there is no separate injury to the corporation on several grounds. First, the court’s finding that a corporation is not harmed when its assets are squandered effectively ignores the existence of the corporation during the bankruptcy process.[24] Furthermore, the Wagonercourt seems to acknowledge the trustee’s right to sue the guilty managers for damages done to the corporation. Such a construction leads to the absurd result that when management and its accomplices defraud a corporation, management can be sued on behalf of the corporation for the harm caused to the corporation, but the accomplices cannot be sued on behalf of the corporation because the corporation was not harmed.[25] Recognizing the faults of this rule, the Second Circuit recognized that there was “at least a theoretical possibility of some independent financial injury to the debtors” as a result of the defendant’s aid in the fraud.[26] Nevertheless, the court denied the plaintiff’s standing, relying on the observation that any damage suffered by the debtor was passed on to the investors, and “there was likely to be little significant injury that accrues separately to the Debtors.”[27] In other words, most of the alleged injuries in Hirsch were suffered by third parties, not by the debtors themselves. The Second Circuit shifted the focus of the Wagoner rule from lack-of-separate-injury (the first inquiry of theWagoner rule) to the in pari delicto (the second inquiry) in Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, 336 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2003). In that case, the court denied the trustee standing, holding that even if there was damage to the corporation, the trustee lacked standing because of the debtor’s collaboration with the corporate insiders.[28]

c) Approaches of Other Circuits

In Lafferty, the creditors’ committee brought an action against the debtor’s officers, directors and outside professionals, alleging that through participation in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme, the defendants wrongfully prolonged the debtor’s life and incurred debt beyond the debtor’s ability to pay, ultimately forcing the debtor into bankruptcy.[29] The Lafferty court articulated different kinds of harms to the corporation: (1) fraudulent or wrongful prolongation of an insolvent corporation’s life, (2) prolongation that causes the corporation to incur more debt and become more insolvent, and (3) diminution of corporate value had prolongation not occurred.[30] Recognizing that conduct driving a corporation deeper into debt injures not only the corporate creditors, but the corporation itself, the Third Circuit held the committee had standing to sue the outsiders on behalf of the debtor.[31]The court also noted that although the Tenth and Sixth Circuits had applied the in pari delicto doctrine to bar claims of a bankruptcy trustee, those courts assumed that the bankruptcy trustee at least has standing to bring the claim.[32]

The Eighth Circuit held that a trustee who had alleged sufficient injury traceable to the actions of the defendants had standing to sue.[33] The court held that the defendant law firm and attorneys participated in stripping the corporation’s assets and that the injury was traceable to the activities of the lawyers who engineered the transaction to the detriment of their client.[34] In addition, the Eighth Circuit noted that the Third Circuit in Lafferty and the Ninth Circuit (in Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP 421 F.3d at 1004) rejected the argument that a cause of action for harm to an insolvent corporation belongs to the creditors rather than the corporation. The Eighth Circuit adopted the rationale of Lafferty that simply because the creditors may be the beneficiary of recovery does not transform an action into a suit by the creditors.[35]

The Ninth Circuit found that the trustee had standing to pursue breach of contracts and duties against attorneys, auditors and investment bankers where, if defendants had not concealed the financial condition of debtor, the debtor might have filed for bankruptcy sooner and additional assets might not have been spent on a failing business.[36] “This allegedly wrongful expenditure of corporate assets qualifies as an injury to the firm which is sufficient to confer standing upon the Trustee.”[37] The court stated that “We rely only on the dissipation of assets in reaching the conclusion that the debtor was harmed.”[38] “A receiver has standing to bring a suit on behalf of the debtor corporation against third parties who allegedly helped that corporation’s management harm the corporation.”[39]

To sum up, when a director or officer enlists the help of attorneys to misstate the financial health of a company, it causes significant harm to a corporation. Harms include: (1) the fraudulent and concealed accrual of debt which can lessen the value of corporate property, (2) legal and administrative costs of bankruptcy, (3) operational limitations on profitability, (4) the undermining of business relationships, and (4) failed corporate confidence.

If court were to afford standing to trustee, third parties would be deterred from negligent, reckless, or other wrongful behavior. It will provide a means for increasing attorneys’ liability for the wrongs they commit. While limitless liability for attorneys is not the solution, increasing liability will require attorneys to answer in court when they fail to detect fraud or manipulation on the part of directors and officers that a reasonable attorney would discover.

4. Conclusion

Attorneys are equipped with the tools to prevent fraud. An attorney may always report fraud to the appropriate authority or refuse to participate in the fraud. However, attorneys may not want to jeopardize important client relationships unless the consequence of inaction makes reporting more beneficial. Given the turmoil of the financial markets since 2008, increased liability for attorneys could help alleviate corporate fraud and bolster consumer confidence in this distressed market.

For the above reasons, the bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring a suit on behalf of the debtor corporation against attorneys who allegedly helped that corporation’s management with the fraud.

[1] Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir.1997).

[2] In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

[3] Wight v. Bank American Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000).

[4] See generally Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: the In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has Nothing to Do with What is Section 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21 Emory Bankr.Dev. J. 519 (2005); Gerald L. Baldwin, In Pari Delicto Should Not Bar a Trustee’s Recovery, 23-8 Am. Bankr.Inst. J. 8 (2004); Tanvir Alam, Fraudulent Advisors Exploit Confusion in The Bankruptcy Code: How In Pari Delicto Has Been Perverted To Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors, 77 Am. Bank. L.J. 305 (2003); Robert T. Kugler, The Role of Imputation and In Pari Delicto in Barring Claims Against Third Parties, 1 No. 14 Andrews Bankr.Litig. Rep. 13 (2004);Making Sense of the In Pari Delicto Defense: “Who’s Zoomin’ Who?” 23 No. 11 Bankr. Law Letter 1 (Nov.2003).

[5] Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,267 F.3d 340, 346-47 (3d Cir.2001).

[6] Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 118.

[7] R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d at 340.

[8] Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 118.

[9] Id. at 116.

[10] Id. at 116-17.

[11] Wight, 219 F.3d at 86.

[12] Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 120.

[13] In re Senior Cottages of America LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases).

[14] Id. at 1004.

[15] Id. at 1002.

[16] Wilchombe v. Tee Vee Toons. Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009).

[17] Knauer v. Jonathon Roberts Financial Group, Inc., 348 F.3d 230, 237 n. 6 (7th Cir. 2003).

[18] Gray v. Evercore Restructuring, LLC, 544 F.3d 320, 325 (1st Cir. 2008).

[19] Novartis Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 190 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1999).

[20] Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-58 (1984).

[21] Smith v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2005).

[22] Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 120.

[23] Id.

[24] Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has Nothing to Do with What Is § 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 519, 525 (2005).

[25] Id. at 527.

[26] Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1995).

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at 100.

[29] Lafferty Co., 267 F.3d at 348-49.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 354.

[32] Id. at 358.

[33] In re Senior Cottages Of America, LLC, 482 F.3d 997.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at 1001.

[36] Smith v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 421 F.3d at 1003 (9th Cir. 2005).

[37] Id.

[38] Id. at 1004.

[39] Id.

Anti-Money Laundering Strategies and Compliance Conference May 9-11 New York, NY

Anti-money laundering officers, professionals, and in-house counsel should attend this conference to better understand the changing environment of the financial industry, learn how companies are adapting to these changes, and to identify new measures in which criminals are laundering money through the United States financial system. With technological advancements and the introduction of money laundering into new financial entities, it is important that anti-money laundering professionals and in-house counsel who oversee anti-money laundering compliance to stay abreast of current AML issues and best practices for preventing money laundering and suspicious activities from occurring in their organizations.

The Anti-Money Laundering conference is a highly intensive, content-driven event that includes case studies, presentations, and panel discussions over two full days. This conference targets industry leaders in AML, and Financial Compliance roles in order to provide an intimate atmosphere for both delegates and speakers.

key conference topics include:

Explore the Office of Foreign Assets Control Sanctions Program and updates to the Iranian Sanctions

Evaluate the increasing correlation between fraud and money laundering

Discuss potential risks that emerging technological products pose to the financial industry

Investigate the increase in money laundering through the US from Narcotics Trade and Human Trafficking

Registration, Location & Details…..

May 9-11 Doubletree Metropolitan, New York City, NY, USA
To Register and for More information – please click here:

Highlights of the UK Bribery Act Guidance: What It May Mean For Your Company

Recently posted by Bracewell & Giuliani LLP – a great overview of the recently passed UK Bribery Act:

On March 30, 2011, the UK Ministry of Justice issued its highly anticipated guidance (Guidance) for the UK Bribery Act (the Act), a criminal anti-corruption statute that will become effective July 1, 2011.¹ The Act covers both commercial and official bribery, within and sometimes outside the UK, and a company may be criminally liable for failing to prevent bribes from being offered or paid by its employees, agents or subsidiaries.

Following a brief overview of the new Guidance, in this Update we review:

The jurisdictional reach of the Act
The impact of extended liability for business organizations
Six fundamental principles that can form a full defense for companies
Facilitation payments, which are considered illegal bribes under the Act
The treatment of hospitality and promotional expenses

Overview

The newly-released Guidance offers some assistance to commercial companies doing business in the UK seeking to implement “adequate procedures” – both to prevent violations and serve as an affirmative defense against liability under the Act. For United States companies doing business in the UK, both the Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) form essential components of a comprehensive global anti-corruption compliance program.

The Guidance sets out six fundamental principles (see below), but one overarching theme is clear: Companies would be wise to fully evaluate and understand their entire business operations – how and where they do business — assess the differing risks they face and tailor common sense programs to address those specific risks. In pursuing a risk-based approach, companies may be afforded reasonable flexibility (depending on the size, structure, and complexity and the sophistication of their operations) to implement appropriate, and varying, programs.

Jurisdictional Reach Over US and Other Companies

The Act’s jurisdictional reach extends to business organizations that are incorporated or formed in the UK, and also to those that conduct business in the UK (wherever they are incorporated or formed). Whether a business is deemed to “carry on” business, or even part of its business, for the purposes of the Act – and be rendered a “relevant commercial organisation” — will be a fact-sensitive determination, which the Guidance submits will be based on a common-sense approach. Ultimately, the courts will make the final determination based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The Guidance provides two examples which in and of themselves will not confer jurisdiction on the company: (1) where the company’s securities are listed and may be traded on the London Stock Exchange; and (2) where it merely has a UK subsidiary (which “may act independently of its parent or other group companies”).

Extended Liability for Business Organizations

A “relevant commercial organization” risks prosecution if the government determines there is sufficient evidence to establish that an “associated person” bribed someone else with the intent to obtain or retain business or an advantage for that business entity. The associated person — someone who merely needs to “perform[] services” for or on behalf of the company — is not required to be prosecuted as a predicate for the company’s prosecution. Nor is the associated person required to have a close connection with the UK. Moreover, the determination of who performs such services is to be based on a broad interpretation. Employees are presumed to perform services, agents and subsidiaries qualify, and contractors and suppliers may also qualify depending on the circumstances. Titles and position are not determinative; far more important are the underlying conduct and the practical realities.

In addition to liability for failing to prevent bribery from occurring, the business organization may also be prosecuted if the government can prove that the bribe giving or receiving (or offering, encouraging or assisting) took place by someone “representing the corporate ‘directing mind.'” JPG.

An Adequate Compliance Program Is A Full Defense: Six Fundamental Principles

The Act creates a full defense for companies that can demonstrate they have implemented “adequate procedures” to prevent associated persons from engaging in bribery (even if a case of bribery has been proved). The affirmative defense is required to be proved by “the balance of probabilities.” In deciding whether to proceed with its case, the government will also consider the adequacy of compliance procedures, which can turn on the case-by-case facts and circumstances, including the level of control exercised over the conduct of the relevant associated persons and the degree of risk for which mitigation is required.

Six core principles have been set out in the Guidance and accompanying commentary to help advise companies in devising and implementing adequate procedures to prevent bribery:

Proportionality of response to the bribery risks that the organization faces and to the nature, scale and complexity of the organization’s activities
Commitment of top-level management to prevent bribery by associated persons (e.g., effectively communicating no tolerance policy from top to bottom)
Risk Assessment (to promote periodic, informed and documented assessment proportionate to the company’s size and structure and to the nature, scale and location of its operations)
Due Diligence: Demanding that companies investigate and are aware of who is acting on their behalf in order to mitigate bribery risks
Communication (and training): Ensure that policies and programs are “embedded and understood” throughout the company through internal and external communication.
Monitoring and Review: Undertake systematic review to assess changed circumstances and new risks and implement improved procedures where deemed appropriate

Facilitation Payments Constitute Illegal Bribes Under the Act

Unlike the FCPA, the Act prohibits facilitation payments – small grease payments to low-level government officials to perform or expedite routine, non-discretionary services (e.g., processing immigrations or customs forms, turning on the electricity, etc.)… Nonetheless, the Guidance makes clear that the UK government appreciates that given the realities in certain global regions and in certain sectors, overnight elimination is not feasible. Moreover, “eradication” of facilitation payments is recognized as a “long-term objective.” However, the JPG identifies factors tending in favor of and against prosecution:

Factors in favor of prosecution: (i) large or repeated payments; (ii) planned or accepted payments that may reflect standard operating procedure; (iii) payments reflective of an official’s corruption; and (iv) the failure to follow the organization’s facilitation payment policies and procedures

Factors against prosecution: (i) a single small payment; (ii) payment identified as part of genuinely proactive approach involving self-reporting and remedial action; (iii) adherence to the organization’s clear and appropriate procedures for facilitation payment requests; and (iv) the particular circumstances placed the payer in a vulnerable position

Hospitality and Promotional Expenses Are Not Prohibited by the Act

Like the promotional expense exception under the FCPA, the Act does not criminalize bona fide hospitality and promotional expenses, as long as there is no improper intent. Specifically, the guidance makes clear that providing tickets to sporting events or taking clients to dinner to promote and continue good relations, or paying for reasonable travel expenses in order to demonstrate your company’s goods or services, if reasonable and proportionate, will not run afoul of the Act. However, where hospitality expenses are made to mask an intent to bribe or improperly induce advantageous business conduct, the authorities can be expected to view the expense payment as an illegal bribe under the Act. The extent of the hospitality and promotional expenses offered, the way in which they were provided and the level of influence the client exercised or could exercise in the business decision will all be examined.

Current Considerations

The next three months, until July 1, when the Act goes into effect, will provide a special opportunity for U.S. and other companies doing business in the UK to re-evaluate their operations and take a fresh look at the effectiveness, or “adequacy,” of their anti-corruption policies and procedures. Conducting a measured, proportionate and risk-based assessment makes eminent good sense in light of the UK Bribery Act, the FCPA and an evolving global propensity for strict anti-corruption enforcement.

The Ministry of Justice Guidance can be found here.

_______________________

¹Also issued that same day is the Joint Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions (JPG), which provides some insight into the Directors’ views as to “prosecutorial decision-making” regarding violations of the Act.

China Adopts Amendment to the Criminal Law to Outlaw Bribery of Foreign Officials

Recent guest bloggers at the National Law Review from Squire Sanders & Dempsey (US) LLP.…Nicholas Chan, Zijie (Lesley) Li, Amy L. Sommers, and Laura Wang outline some of the recent changes in Chinese law related to bribery of foreign officials:

On February 25, 2011 the PRC adopted Amendment No. 8 of the PRC Criminal Law, criminalizing bribery of foreign government officials and “international public organizations” to secure illegitimate business benefits. This amendment goes into effect on May 1, 2011.

The PRC did not have any law addressing cross-border bribery before and this law will be the first law to condemn bribery of foreign officials. This amendment is the PRC’s effort to comply with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption to which the PRC is a signatory.

The amendment was made to Article 164 of the PRC Criminal Law prohibiting entities or individuals from offering bribes to employees of companies and enterprises who are not government officials. With the amendment, it is a criminal act to bribe foreign government officials or international public organizations.

According to this Article 164, if the payor is an individual, depending on the value of the bribes, he or she is subject to imprisonment up to 10 years; if the payor is an entity, criminal penalties will be imposed against the violating entity and the supervisor chiefly responsible and other directly responsible personnel may also face imprisonment of up to 10 years. Penalties may be reduced or waived if the violating individual or entity discloses the crime before being charged. According to the PRC Supreme Procuratorate issued in 2001, individuals offering bribes of more than RMB10,000 and entities offering bribes of more than RMB 200,000 may be prosecuted under Article 164.

Unlike other bribery-related crimes in the PRC, which focus on the receipt by the briber of ”illegitimate benefits,” bribery of foreign officials or international organizations prohibits securing illegitimate business benefits. In advance of the release of judicial interpretation of what may be “illegitimate business benefits,” the current legal understanding of what is “to secure illegitimate benefits” means in other bribery-related crimes may provide a reasonable basis for understanding this amendment.

The law refers to “officials of foreign countries and international public organizations,” but does not define these terms. For example, it is not clear whether international public organization includes foreign non-governmental organizations.

As of this Alert, no judicial interpretation or administrative regulations regarding the implementation of this provision has been promulgated. It is not clear whether foreign companies may also be subject to jurisdiction under the PRC Criminal Law with respect to this new amendment. We will continue to closely monitor future development related to this amendment.

Category: Criminal Law

OFAC Settles Alleged Sanctions Violations for $88.3 million

Key Points of Settlement. As summarized below, the settlement provides insight into OFAC’s compliance expectations in several ways:

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Guilty Plea for Altering HSR Documents

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New York’s Highest Court Reinstates $5 Billion Lawsuit By Big Banks Against MBIA

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