Corporate Transparency Act— Nationwide Injunction Update and Key Considerations

On December 3, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas issued a nationwide injunction halting enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”).1 In response, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) confirmed it will comply with the injunction while also appealing the decision. FinCEN also states on its website that reporting companies are not required to file beneficial ownership information during the injunction and will not incur penalties for failing to do so.

For so long as the injunction remains in place, it is safe not to make CTA filings. On the other hand, it is impossible to know whether and when the injunction may be lifted. And if it is lifted, there may be limited time for filings to be made before penalties accrue. Filers who choose not to file now may wish to assemble their information so they are ready to file on short notice should the need arise. We also recommend that filers who do not have particular privacy or other concerns consider filing notwithstanding the injunction to ensure that they are compliant no matter the outcome of the lawsuit.Ultimately, the decision to file is a personal and business decision that will vary by client.

Below are key points to consider:

  1. If you have already applied for a FinCEN Identifier, your sensitive information is already submitted, so there is less risk in proceeding with the filing.
  2. If privacy and business concerns are minimal, consider filing now to avoid a potential rush if the injunction is lifted and filings become due immediately.
  3. For entities formed in 2024 with a non-12/31 filing deadline, consider filing if privacy is less of a concern. Although FinCEN may provide an extension in these situations, penalties remain steep and the outcome is uncertain.

1See Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Merrick Garland, et al.

2We previously published some advisories on the general application of the CTA and its specific application for those with entities for estate planning purposes and the rules and guidelines are largely unchanged.

Federal District Court Issues Nationwide Preliminary Injunction Barring Enforcement of Corporate Transparency Act

In Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al., a federal district court judge issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”), finding that the CTA likely exceeds Congress’s powers. Therefore, at present, a reporting company is not obligated to comply with the CTA and the government is enjoined from enforcing the CTA’s reporting requirements. As expected, on December 5, 2024, the government entered a notice of appeal of the preliminary injunction and may still seek a stay of the preliminary injunction pending the appeal. If a stay is granted by the Court of Appeals, the reporting obligations would once again be in effect. The Court of Appeals could also decide to keep the preliminary injunction in place while an appeal is pending.

At this time, companies are not required to file Beneficial Ownership Information (“BOI”) reports, although they are free to do so should they choose. Indeed, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued guidance after the entry of the notice of appeal, stating as much: “In light of a recent federal court order, reporting companies are not currently required to file beneficial ownership information with FinCEN and are not subject to liability if they fail to do so while the order remains in force. However, reporting companies may continue to voluntarily submit beneficial ownership information reports.” (available at https://www.fincen.gov/boi.)

At present, it is unknown how long companies would be given to file if the preliminary injunction is stayed, modified or the law is ultimately upheld. However, FinCEN’s statement suggests that a reasonable extension of time for filing can be expected, though that is not a certainty. Of course, if the CTA is ultimately struck down, no filing would be required.

FCA Enforcement & Compliance Digest — Fall 2024 False Claims Act Newsletter

Welcome to the Fall 2024 issue of “FCA Enforcement & Compliance Digest,” our quarterly newsletter in which we compile essential updates on False Claims Act (FCA) enforcement trends, litigation, agency guidance, and compliance tips. We bring you the most recent and significant insights in an accessible format, concluding with our main takeaways — aka “And the Fox Says…” — on what you need to know.

In this Fall 2024 edition, we cover:

  1. Enforcement Trends: Manufacturers challenge AKS intent requirement as reflected in recent denials of OIG Advisory Opinion requests.
  2. Litigation Developments: Implications of Florida judge’s ruling that the FCA qui tam provision is unconstitutional.
  3. Compliance Corner: What health care companies need to know about AI.
  4. ICYMI: Federal Court Permits Investors to Resume Kickback Suit Against Teva

1. Enforcement Trends

Do Violations of the AKS Require a ‘Corrupt’ Intent? Manufacturers Challenge the OIG’s Interpretation of the Statute

In a series of recent lawsuits filed by the pharmaceutical industry against the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), manufactures are challenging the OIG’s interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Statue (AKS), arguing that violations of the statute require a corrupt intent. While courts have so far ruled in OIG’s favor, should a court accept this argument, the AKS regulatory landscape could be upended, providing health care providers and suppliers the opportunity to develop and implement arrangements that have historically been prohibited by the OIG.

The challenges to OIG’s interpretation of the AKS come in the context of OIG Advisory Opinion requests submitted by the manufacturers (or a related charity) proposing various forms of patient assistance programs under which the manufacturers or their related charities offer financial assistance to patients on the manufacturers’ products. The OIG denied each of the Advisory Opinion requests, finding that the proposed forms of patient assistance would constitute remuneration intended to induce patients to purchase the manufacturers’ drugs in violation of the AKS.

The OIG has consistently reiterated its opposition to manufacturer-operated patient assistance programs, with both the OIG’s 2005 Special Advisory Bulletin: Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees and the 2014 Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance Programs noting that manufacturers cannot provide co-pay assistance to federal health care program beneficiaries, as doing so would constitute a kickback. However, the guidance also described the parameters under which independent charities can provide co-pay assistance, including assistance to federal health care program beneficiaries (i.e., Medicare beneficiaries). One of the key factors with respect to the operation of charitable patient assistance programs, is the independence of the charities operating the programs. While the independent charities are primarily funded by manufacturers, to be considered independent for OIG’s purposes, the charities must retain independence from donors. This means the donors cannot influence the design or operation of the patient assistance programs, and the programs cannot favor patients on the donor’s drug (e.g., assistance cannot be contingent upon the patient being prescribed a donor’s drug).

In three separate litigations, Pfizer Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human ServicesVertex Pharmaceuticals Incorporated v. United States Department of Health and Human Services et al., and Pharmaceutical Coalition for Patient Access v. United States of America et al., manufacturers are challenging OIG’s long-held position that manufacturers cannot provide patient assistance, including co-pay assistance, to federal health care program beneficiaries. In doing so, the goal of the manufacturers is to provide assistance to patients, including co-pay support, either directly or through a charity that is not considered independent by OIG’s standards due to the relationship of the proposed charities to the manufactures and the level of influence by the manufacturers over the proposed charities. In each litigation, the manufacturer or, in the case of the Pharmaceutical Coalition for Patient Access (PCPA), the charity controlled by the manufacturers, is challenging an unfavorable Advisory Opinion issued by OIG concluding that the proposed patient assistance programs would constitute remuneration intended to induce patients to use a particular manufacturer’s products.

Under the arrangements proposed by Pfizer and PCPA, the proposed charities would be funded exclusively by manufacturers and would only provide support to patients on those funders’ drugs. In Pfizer’s Advisory Opinion request, the company proposed two potential co-pay assistance programs: (1) a direct co-pay assistance program and (2) a Pfizer-supported charity co-pay assistance program. Similar to the proposed Pfizer-supported charity co-pay assistance program, PCPA, an organization funded by manufacturers of Part-D-covered oncology drugs, proposed to create its own patient assistance program that would provide co-pay assistance to patients who meet certain qualifying criteria and then invoice each participating manufacturer for “the total amount of cost-sharing subsidies provided to eligible Part D enrollees.”

Vertex’s Advisory Opinion request focused on a proposed “Fertility Preservation Program” under which Vertex would pay fertility providers through a third-party vendor for the treatments provided to patients enrolled in the program. While this proposed program involved coverage of related treatment costs (i.e., the costs of the fertility treatments) rather than coverage of the co-pay costs associated with the Vertex drug itself, OIG nonetheless applied the same reasoning as in the Pfizer and PCPA opinions, concluding that the program would constitute remuneration to the patients in violation of the AKS.

In each litigation, the manufacturer (or, in the case of PCPA, the manufacturer-related charity) is challenging OIG’s position that the manufacturer’s subsidies constitute “remuneration” meant “to induce” patients to purchase manufactures’ products. The manufacturers argue that the AKS criminalizes conduct that “leads or tempts to the commission of crime” through “remuneration” that corrupts medical decision-making, as part of a quid pro quo transaction. In other words, according to the manufacturers, “to induce” requires a corrupt intent. Therefore, because the manufactures’ efforts to assist patients with meeting Medicare co-pay obligations or gaining access to Medicare-covered treatments (or treatments otherwise covered by the federal health care programs) are not done with malice or corrupt intent, such programs would not violate the AKS.

To date, no court has agreed with the manufacturers’ position. While Vertex is still pending trial in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled against Pfizer, noting that “the law is clear that absent an express carve-out, the Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits any remuneration intended to induce someone to purchase or receive a drug or medical service.” Similarly, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled against PCPA, concluding that HHS OIG’s “interpretation of the AKS adheres faithfully [to] the statute’s plain text, comports with its context, and does not offend its history.” On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision in Pfizer, finding that an AKS violation does not require “corrupt intent.” Pfizer then appealed to the US Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. PCPA’s case is currently on appeal with the Fourth Circuit.

Should the Vertex court or a court of appeals agree that the statutory terms “induce” and “remuneration” should be construed more narrowly and require a corrupt intent to violate the AKS, AKS regulatory interpretation and much of OIG’s guidance could be called into question. Arrangements that have historically been viewed as suspect by the OIG could be considered compliant to the extent the parties lacked a corrupt intent to violate the law.

And the Fox Says… Ongoing efforts challenging OIG’s statutory interpretation of the AKS demonstrate manufacturers’ interests in narrowing the scope of prohibited activities under the law. Providers and suppliers should continue monitoring the ongoing litigation and any future efforts to challenge OIG’s interpretation of the AKS, as any judicial narrowing of the interpretation could provide opportunities to develop innovative arrangements that may be beneficial to patients. Regardless, developing compliant arrangements to benefit patients can be complicated, and legal counsel can help to ensure you remain apprised of all relevant developments and assist in structuring compliant arrangements.

2. Litigation Developments

What Is the FCA Without Its Qui Player? A Look Into Zafirov’s Future Implications and the Enforceability of the FCA Without a Qui Tam Device

As we previously discussed, a Florida federal district court recently held in Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates LLC that the FCA qui tam provision is unconstitutional. The court reasoned that a relator who litigates an FCA lawsuit on behalf of the United States is not a properly appointed “officer” under Article II of the US Constitution and, thus, does not have the authority to serve in that position. This article examines several questions: What does FCA enforcement look like without a qui tam device? What questions did Zafirov leave unresolved? And what should one expect in the coming years as this issue is litigated on appeal and among other courts?

Can the government successfully enforce the FCA without a qui tam device? If, in the end, the qui tam provision is voided, that does not spell doom for the FCA. This is because the government still has the authority to file FCA actions itself and could hire many more attorneys to investigate and prosecute them. The government also has other mechanisms to entice whistleblowers to come out of the woodwork and inform it of wrongdoing. For example, recently, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the “Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program.” This enforcement program compensates whistleblowers who inform the DOJ of original and truthful information concerning corporate misconduct. If the information leads to a successful forfeiture of over $1 million, the whistleblower is compensated. Currently, however, the program does not cover FCA claims. But the DOJ or US Congress could theoretically expand this program, or create a new one, to attract whistleblowers who have information concerning FCA violations. Under such a program, the government’s litigation of FCA claims would not be all that different from what happens currently. Rather than intervene in a meritorious FCA case brought by a relator, the government would file its own case based on information provided by a whistleblower. This would avoid the constitutional pitfalls identified in Zafirov. A post-qui tam landscape will certainly see fewer FCA claims being filed overall, but the government would likely file more FCA claims than it does now.

Still, many questions remain unresolved under Zafirov concerning the extent to which relator suits are constitutionally permissible. In Zafirov, the relator was litigating an FCA suit in which the United States declined to intervene. But what happens if the United States does intervene and takes over the case? Are those suits permissible? Does the relator act as an “officer” if her role is just limited to filing a lawsuit? Could the government get around Zafirov by intervening in more cases? Or are all FCA lawsuits filed by a relator invalid ab initio even if the government intervenes? If so, would Congress have to create a mechanism to appoint a relator as an officer for FCA purposes? In short, it is unclear how broadly Zafirov will be read. On one hand, it could be read to only apply to non-intervened cases. On the other hand, the very act of filing a complaint on behalf of the United States may require a constitutional appointment, and the government’s intervention would not cure that taint. These questions will remain unresolved until they are addressed by the Supreme Court.

Only time will tell what will happen as this issue percolates in the courts. Already, several circuit courts have upheld the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions. In the district courts located in circuits that have not yet addressed this issue, defendants are filing dispositive motions arguing that the relator’s appointment is unconstitutional. Though the decision in Zafirov is currently an outlier, it soon may not be as more courts consider arguments that rely on Zafirov’s reasoning.

And the Fox Says… Zafirov is significant because it may be the first blow to a significant enforcement mechanism on which the government heavily relies. But the qui tam provision’s fate is not set in stone. The relator in Zafirov will almost certainly appeal the decision to the Atlanta-based Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. That court’s decision may then be appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeals process for Zafirov may take years before the Supreme Court grants certiorari on the issue (if it does at all). In the meantime, the issue is not going away, and Zafirov is unlikely to be a one-off case. Those who are in the throes of an FCA investigation or litigation should raise this issue as a possible litigation risk or as an affirmative defense. The best possible time to raise this issue amid litigation is on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Even if a case is past this point, Zafirov supports the position that such an argument is not waived, given that the issue goes to the relator’s very authority to bring the suit. So, defendants litigating a case brought by a relator should raise this issue as soon as possible. We at ArentFox Schiff will continue to monitor developments to help our clients navigate this ever-changing legal landscape.

3. Compliance Corner

AI Under the DOJ Microscope: How Health Care Companies Should Respond

Many companies, including health care companies, have incorporated artificial intelligence (AI) into their business practices. While historically, AI has largely been unregulated, that is starting to change. Recently, state governments have begun regulating the use of AI in the health care setting, as our colleagues summarized here regarding recently passed California legislation requiring health care facilities, clinics, and physician practices in the state to disclose the use of AI in communications regarding patient clinical information. Now, AI has the attention of the DOJ.

This past March, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco indicated the DOJ’s interest in AI, stating at the American Bar Association’s 39th National Institute on White Collar Crime that “fraud using AI is still fraud.” Following Monaco’s statement, in September, the Criminal Division of the DOJ updated its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) guidelines to require DOJ prosecutors to consider whether a company’s compliance program safeguards against misuse of AI or other emerging technologies. As a brief primer, the ECCP is a DOJ document that prosecutors use to evaluate the effectiveness of a corporate compliance program in determining whether to criminally charge a company. The document is published publicly and provides helpful insight into the DOJ’s expectations for companies as they build and implement their corporate compliance programs.

Under the updated guidance, the DOJ emphasizes that companies need to assess AI-related risks as part of their overall enterprise risk management systems. Specifically, a corporate compliance program must consider whether it has specific policies and procedures to prevent “any potential negative or unintended consequences” resulting from the use of AI in its business practices and compliance program. Additionally, a company should proactively conduct risk analyses of its use of AI and mitigate the potential for “deliberate or reckless misuse of technologies” by company insiders. Other key considerations are whether the company trains its employees on the use of AI, whether there is a baseline of human decision-making used to assess AI-generated content, and how the company implements accountability over the use of AI.

In its September update, the DOJ also revised a section of the ECCP, asking whether compliance personnel have access to relevant data sources to allow for “timely and effective monitoring and/or testing” of policies, controls, and transactions. A key consideration is whether the assets, resources, and technology available to compliance programs are comparable to those available elsewhere in the company. An imbalance in access to technology and resources may indicate a compliance program’s inability to detect and mitigate risks, particularly if a business unit is given unfettered access to AI tools while compliance lags behind.

Compliance officers at health care companies should take steps now to ensure that the implementation and use of AI within their organizations do not raise any compliance red flags. Consider the recent Texas Attorney General settlement with Pieces Technologies, a company that markets generative AI products, which resolved allegations that the company made misleading statements regarding the accuracy of its products. As part of the settlement, Pieces agreed to provide more explicit disclosures to customers related to how the company’s products should be used and the potential harm that could result from the products.

Providers using such technologies may encounter data privacy and security risks, including cybersecurity risks such as ransomware and malware attacks, bias and fairness concerns with respect to the training of the AI systems that may result in preference for a particular drug or treatment, and reliability and accountability concerns affecting a health care professional’s ability to provide patient care. With that being said, the DOJ could conduct investigations similar to the Pieces investigation against health care providers that use AI without considering these risks.

To help mitigate the risks associated with AI, including in the event of a DOJ investigation, compliance officers should be involved during all stages of discussions around AI initiatives, including through implementation and use. Compliance officers should ensure their companies have appropriate policies and procedures governing the use of AI once it is introduced to their organizations and provide training to employees both on the AI technology and on the policies governing its use. Finally, compliance officers should ensure they have the necessary access to AI systems to conduct compliance oversight measures. Such oversight measures may include assessing AI-related risks as part of their organization’s annual risk assessment, conducting AI-related auditing, and monitoring to help identify potential issues with the technology as they arise.

And the Fox Says… The DOJ’s AI-focused compliance guidance is a call to action for companies to proactively address the legal and regulatory implications of AI technologies, reminding them that the age of AI requires more than just innovation — it demands robust compliance strategies. Companies that conduct regular risk assessments of their practices must consider the use of AI, update policies and procedures to address its use, provide compliance teams with equal data access, and regularly update training on the lawful use of these technologies. Empowering compliance personnel and working with outside compliance experts to make these regular updates will put a company in a good position to meet these new standards. By embracing these guidelines, companies can mitigate legal and regulatory risks while leveraging the capabilities of AI technologies.

4. In Case You Missed It

Our most popular blog post from the last quarter: Federal Court Permits Investors to Resume Kickback Suit Against Teva.

BREAKING: Federal Court Enjoins Government from Enforcing Corporate Transparency Act

On December 3, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that enjoins the federal government from enforcing the Corporate Transparency Act (the CTA).

The CTA, which went into effect January 1, 2024, requires “reporting companies” in the United States to disclose information about their beneficial owners — the individuals who ultimately own or control a company — to the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

A group of six plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in May 2024 claiming that Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution in passing the CTA. In a 79-page order issued by United States District Judge Amos L. Mazzant, the Court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and, although the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on behalf of only themselves and their members, the Court issued a nationwide injunction instead.

The Court’s order states that neither the CTA nor the implementing rules adopted by FinCEN may be enforced and that reporting companies need not comply with the CTA’s upcoming January 1, 2025 deadline for filing beneficial ownership reports.

The Court’s order is a preliminary injunction only and not a final decision. The Court’s order temporarily pauses enforcement of the CTA on a nationwide basis, but enforcement could resume if the Court’s order is overturned on appeal or the Government ultimately prevails on the merits.

Disregarded Entity Eligibility for the CTA Large Operating Company Exemption

Summary: As discussed in detail below, the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) provides an exemption to its reporting requirements for certain large operating companies (the Large Operating Company Exemption or “LOC Exemption”). In order to qualify for the LOC Exemption, a reporting company must, among other requirements, “have filed a Federal income tax or information return in the United States in the previous year demonstrating more than $5,000,000 in gross receipts or sales.” Certain reporting companies are “disregarded entities” (DREs) for Federal tax purposes and, as such, do not themselves directly have a Federal tax filing obligation or ability. However, based upon guidance from FinCEN and the IRS, support exists for the proposition that the Federal tax filing of a DRE’s sole individual owner or sole parent entity constitutes the filing referenced in the LOC Exemption, and that a DRE reporting company is not, per se, disqualified from utilizing the LOC Exemption.

* * * * *

Certain business entities may elect (including through default attribution under the Internal Revenue Code, (IRC) to be treated as “disregarded” from their individual owner or parent entity for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Such entities include limited liability companies (LLCs) who have a single member (unless such an LLC has elected on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 8832 to be taxed as a “corporation”), or certain wholly owned subsidiaries of “S-corporations” where the parent S-corporation has made an election (referred to as a “Q-Sub election”) on IRS Form 8869 to treat the subsidiary as a qualified subchapter S subsidiary (QSub), whereby such Q-Sub is deemed to be liquidated (for federal tax purposes only) into the parent S-corporation.

These entities, often referred to simply as “disregarded entities” do not, as a distinct, juridical person, file a federal income tax return per se. Instead, DREs have their taxable income and loss reflected, on an aggregated basis, on the federal income tax return of their individual owner or (direct or indirect) parent entity. In fact, when reporting the taxpayer identification number (TIN) of a DRE on an IRS Form W-9 (Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification), the DRE provides the federal employer identification number (FEIN) of a parent entity or a social security number (SSN) of an individual owner, rather than a TIN of the DRE itself. This is true even if the DRE has filed for, and has received from the IRS, its own FEIN.

Further to this point, some DREs do not, and are not required to, file for their own FEIN. As such, not all DREs possess their own FEIN or other entity distinct TIN.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), in its Frequently Asked Question F.13 issued July 24, 2024, acknowledged this fact as follows:

“An entity that is disregarded for U.S. tax purposes—a “disregarded entity”—is not treated as an entity separate from its owner for U.S. tax purposes. Instead of a disregarded entity being taxed separately, the entity’s owner reports the entity’s income and deductions as part of the owner’s federal tax return. …

Consistent with rules of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regarding the use of TINs, different types of tax identification numbers may be reported for disregarded entities under different circumstances:

  • If the disregarded entity has its own EIN, it may report that EIN as its TIN. If the disregarded entity does not have an EIN, it is not required to obtain one to meet its BOI reporting requirements so long as it can instead provide another type of TIN….
  • If the disregarded entity is a single-member limited liability company (LLC) or otherwise has only one owner that is an individual with a SSN or ITIN, the disregarded entity may report that individual’s SSN or ITIN as its TIN.
  • If the disregarded entity is owned by a U.S. entity that has an EIN, the disregarded entity may report that other entity’s EIN as its TIN.
  • If the disregarded entity is owned by another disregarded entity or a chain of disregarded entities, the disregarded entity may report the TIN of the first owner up the chain of disregarded entities that has a TIN as its TIN.

As explained above, a disregarded entity that is a reporting company must report one of these tax identification numbers when reporting beneficial ownership information to FinCEN.i

While the above FAQ is not offered by FinCEN specifically in the context of the LOC Exemption, this FAQ does have important implications for the LOC Exemption. In stating that a DRE is not required to obtain an FEIN merely for purposes of having such a number for purposes of filing a beneficial ownership information report (BOIR) under the CTA, and acknowledging that a DRE may provide a SSN of an individual owner, or an FEIN of a parent entity, in satisfaction of the DRE’s requirement to provide a tax identification number as required in FinCEN’s form for filing BOIRs, FinCEN has recognized that the same TIN required by the IRS to be disclosed on a Form W-9 in respect of a DRE is recognized by FinCEN as an appropriate TIN in respect of the DRE for purposes of such entity’s BOIR filing.

As such, the federal tax return filing associated with such a TIN is, therefore, the tax return associated with the DRE reporting such TIN on its BOIR filing. In other words, the fact that an individual owner or a parent entity has made a prior year’s federal tax return filing, which filing includes the U.S. generated gross receipts or sales of the DRE, should be sufficient to satisfy the DRE’s prior year’s federal tax return filing status with respect to such revenue.

As stated in FAQ F.13 above, “a DRE—is not treated as an entity separate from its owner for U.S. tax purposes…, the entity’s owner reports the entity’s income and deductions as part of the owner’s federal tax return…”

* * * * *

With this background, we next analyze the associated implications to a DRE that may qualify for the LOC Exemption.

For purposes of clarity, the requirements for an entity to qualify for the LOC Exemption is that the entity satisfy all three parts of the following three-part test:

“[A]n entity must have more than 20 full-time employees in the United States, must have filed a Federal income tax or information return in the United States in the previous year demonstrating more than $5,000,000 in gross receipts or sales, and must have an operating presence at a physical office in the United States.”ii

The CTA itself provides more specificity in this regard. The CTA provides that the term “reporting company” does not include any entity that:

“(I) employs more than 20 employees on a full-time basis in the United States; (II) filed in the previous year Federal income tax returns in the United States demonstrating more than $5,000,000 in gross receipts or sales in the aggregate, including the receipts or sales of (aa) other entities owned by the entity; and (bb) other entities through which the entity operates; and (III) has an operating presence at a physical office within the United States.”iii

Although FinCEN has, to date, issued no formal acknowledgment or interpretation with regard to the applicability of the above “revenue prong” specifically in the DRE context, for the reasons outlined above, a reasoned and supported proposition in the DRE situation may be that the “filed Federal income tax or information return” referenced in the LOC Exemption is the federal tax return filing of the reporting company’s individual owner or parent entity, as applicable.

Further to the revenue prong, it appears that if the DRE itself generates U.S. generated gross receipts or sales in excess of five million dollars as reported on the prior year’s federal tax return filing, that the DRE meets the revenue prong of the LOC Exemption. However, based on the above analysis, it may also be a colorable position that the DRE MAY be able to assert that ALL of the U.S. generated gross revenue appearing on the individual owner’s or parent entity’s federal tax return filing may be attributable to the revenue test prong of the LOC Exemption, because all of such revenue is associated with that tax return. This situation is notionally similar to FinCEN’s interpretation that all members of a consolidated corporate taxed group (including each subsidiary) may share in credit for the aggregated gross receipts or sales of the entire group in meeting each of their respective, individual revenue requirements under the LOC Exemption. Here, both the individual and DRE or the parent entity and disregarded subsidiary would be relying upon the same federal tax return, in the individual or partnership tax context.

* * * * *

For purposes of clarity and completeness, we acknowledge a countervailing position espoused by some commentators in the marketplace. That position holds that a DRE is ab initio ineligible to qualify for the LOC Exemption merely because of such reporting company’s status as a DRE (i.e., that it, itself, as a business entity, does not directly cause the filing of its own, independent federal tax return). For the reasons outlined herein, we find this position less compelling than the proposition that disregarded entities have a filed Federal income tax or information return when filed by their individual owner or parent entity.

* * * * *

With respect to exemptions from the reporting obligations under the CTA, each such exemption is “self-executing.” In other words, if an exemption applies to a reporting company, that reporting company has no filing obligation to FinCEN under the CTA. As such, there is no BOIR filing on record documenting that the DRE is relying on its individual owner’s SSN or its parent entity’s FEIN, and, derivatively, the associated federal tax return filing, in establishing compliance with the revenue prong of the LOC Exemption test. We recommend that each DRE making such a reliance-based exemption determination maintain a record of their CTA diligence, analysis and exercise of business judgment made upon a fully informed basis, that underpins the substantiation of the DRE’s satisfaction of all parts of the LOC Exemption test.iv Such substantiation may be needed in the future if FinCEN or one of the DRE’s financial institutions requests substantiation of the DRE’s asserted position that such DRE is not required to file a BOIR under the CTA.

* * * * *

Conclusion. The compliance requirements under the CTA went live on January 1, 2024, and you have only the remainder of this year to take any action to prepare for your compliance position. Now is the time to discuss the CTA with your Polsinelli legal team for guidance.

[i] See FinCEN CTA FAQs F.13 (issued July 24, 2024)(https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs)

[ii] See FinCEN CTA FAQs L.7 (issued April 18, 2024)(https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs)

[iii] U.S.C. § 5336 (a)(11)(B)(xxi).

[iv] Note that there are other factors of the LOC Exemption that must be met in order to rely on that exemption, and such other factors are required to be met directly by the DRE. This discussion is not intended to suggest that the DRE may rely, for example, on employee counts of affiliated entities or impermissible U.S. physical address locations in qualifying for the LOC Exemption.

Unlike a Fine Wine, Tax Issues Do Not Get Better with Age

In a recent decision, the New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) upheld notices of deficiency issued by the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (the “Department”) totaling approximately $15 million in additional tax, plus interest and penalties for tax years dating as far back as 2002. In the Matter of the Petition of Cushlin Limited, DTA No. 829939 (TAT Oct. 10, 2024). The notices of deficiency came on the heels of an audit that lasted a decade and at the end of which the Department computed additional corporation franchise tax due “based on the information it had available” inasmuch as the information provided by the company over the 10-year audit was “incomplete and/or unsubstantiated.” This case is a cautionary tale for taxpayers and a reminder that tax issues do not get better with age, and delaying or putting off addressing known issues only makes the situation worse in the end.

The company was a corporation organized under the laws of The Isle of Man and was in the business of acquiring and refurbishing three- and four-star hotels. The company also owned equity interests in 13 limited liability companies (“LLCs”) that were doing business in New York. In 2008, the Department began an audit of one of the LLCs and discovered that it had sold real property in New York but did not file a New York State partnership tax return. As a result of its ownership interest in the LLCs, the Department determined that the company was required to file New York corporation franchise tax returns on which it was required to report the gains and losses of the LLCs. The audit of the company initially covered the tax years 2002 through 2006 and was later expanded to include 2007 through 2009.

From 2010 through 2013, the company and the Department communicated multiple times, and the company repeatedly stated that it was preparing tax returns for the audit years for the LLCs and the company and that it required more time to prepare those returns. In 2013, the company provided the Department with draft tax returns for the company and the LLCs. In May 2016, after another three years passed without final tax returns being filed, the Department informed the company that it was assessing additional corporation franchise tax computed based on the amounts in the draft returns plus interest and penalties. In June 2016, the company filed final tax returns for all of the audit years, and the final returns reflected income and deductions that were larger than the amounts previously included in the draft returns.

The Department then issued three information document requests over the next two years that requested information substantiating the deductions claimed on the filed returns. In response to these requests, the Tribunal found that the company “provided only partial responses that lacked any externally verifiable substantiation” and repeated Department requests were “met with partial, inconclusive responses.” Finally, in 2018, the Department issued the notices of deficiency that assessed the amount of additional corporation franchise tax that the Department had previously computed using the company’s draft returns plus updated additional interest and penalties. The company appealed and the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) sustained the notices finding: (1) that the company had failed to meet its burden of proving that the notices were incorrect; and (2) that penalties were properly imposed as the company also failed to demonstrate that its failure to file timely returns was a result of reasonable cause and not willful neglect.

The Tribunal agreed with the ALJ, concluding that there was a rational basis for the notices because “[w]orking without returns or supporting documentation more than six years after it began, the [Department] used the available information provided by petitioner, verified by other information contained in the [Department’s] own database, to arrive at a computation of tax due from petitioner.” Moreover, the Tribunal reasoned, the Department provided the company with numerous opportunities to substantiate the amounts that the company reported on its filed returns and the company’s failure to provide substantiating information left the Department with “little choice” but to “use another method to arrive at a determination of tax liability.” Finally, the Tribunal concluded that the ALJ correctly determined that penalties were properly imposed as the company did not meet its burden to demonstrate reasonable cause.

Shorter Path to Green Card: New USCIS Guidance for EB-1 Eligibility for Foreign Nationals With Extraordinary Ability

For foreign nationals with “extraordinary ability” in the sciences, arts, education, business or athletics, the path to a green card normally has a much shorter route. The EB-1 extraordinary ability category is a type of employment-based, first-preference visa that has several advantages for a “small percentage of individuals” positioned to prove their expertise within a specific area. As indicated by the elite immigrant visa category, an extraordinary amount of documentation is required to meet the high threshold for EB-1 eligibility.

To provide an example of the evidentiary criteria, this category reserved for individuals with extraordinary ability requires that individuals demonstrate extraordinary ability through sustained national or international acclaim. To do so, applicants must meet at least three of the 10 criteria, or provide evidence of a major one-time achievement, such as a Pulitzer Prize, Oscar, or Olympic medal. In addition, applicants must provide evidence showing that they will continue to work in the area of expertise.

More specifically, the applicant must provide evidence of at least three of the following:

  • Receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence
  • Membership in associations in the field which demand outstanding achievement of their members
  • Published material about the candidate in professional or major trade publications or other major media
  • Judgment of the work of others, either individually or on a panel
  • Original scientific, scholarly, artistic, athletic, or business-related contributions of major significance to the field
  • Authorship of scholarly articles in professional or major trade publications or other major media
  • Display of work at artistic exhibitions or showcases
  • Performance of a leading or critical role in distinguished organizations
  • Command of a high salary or other significantly high remuneration in relation to others in the field
  • Commercial successes in the performing arts

While U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has been consistent in detailing the criteria to be demonstrated, the specific evidence deemed acceptable has evolved over the lifetime of this visa category. Last September, USCIS updated its policy manual on employment-based first-preference (EB-1) immigrant petitions in the Extraordinary Ability classification. Specifically, USCIS provided examples of comparable evidence and the way in which USCIS will “consider any potentially relevant evidence.”

To further clarify the acceptable types of evidence, USCIS issued another policy manual update on Oct. 2. The most recent update provided additional clarification, stating:

  • “Confirms that we consider a person’s receipt of team awards under the criterion for lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence in the field of endeavor;
  • Clarifies that we consider past memberships under the membership criterion;
  • Removes language suggesting published material must demonstrate the value of the person’s work and contributions to satisfy the published material criterion; and
  • Explains that while the dictionary defines an “exhibition” as a public showing not limited to art, the relevant regulation expressly modifies that term with “artistic,” such that we will only consider non-artistic exhibitions as part of a properly supported claim of comparable evidence.

These clarifications likely will provide more consistency in the adjudication process.

This article was co-authored by Tieranny Cutler, independent contract attorney.

You See Health, Whistleblower Saw Fraud: Uncovering a $23 Million Healthcare Fraud Scheme

A whistleblower’s vigilance has led to the revelation of alleged Medicare and TRICARE fraud involving UCHealth, a healthcare system with locations throughout the state of Colorado. University of Colorado Health agreed to a $23 million settlement to resolve allegations of improper coding for emergency room visits subsequently billed to government-funded healthcare programs. The qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act empower whistleblowers—individuals with non-public knowledge of fraud against the government—to file a lawsuit on behalf of the government. The qui tam whistleblower in this case will receive $3.91 million or 17% of the settlement.

Summary of the Allegations

According to court documents, from November 1, 2017, through March 31, 2021, certain UCHealth hospitals allegedly engaged in a fraudulent practice concerning Evaluation & Management (E/M) emergency department facility claims. These claims, submitted to both Medicare and TRICARE, are intended to compensate hospitals for resources associated with patient visits, including medical evaluations and management.

UCHealth’s alleged fraudulent activity centered around the misuse of Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes, specifically CPT 99285. This code represents the “highest level of severity” in emergency department visits and requires comprehensive medical evaluations and examinations, and high-complexity decision-making. However, UCHealth reportedly manipulated the coding process by automatically assigning the highest severity code, CPT 99285, based on the frequency of vital sign monitoring rather than the actual severity of the patient’s condition or resource utilization. According to the settlement agreement, employees had complained about the overuse of the highest severity code, and the hospital system had been flagged by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) as being a “High Outlier” for that CPT code as well.

Upcoding Fraud Scheme

Upcoding and improper billing to Medicare and TRICARE are forms of healthcare fraud that involve misrepresenting the services provided to obtain higher reimbursements than justified. Upcoding occurs when a healthcare provider submits claims for more expensive services or procedures than were actually performed, such as billing for a comprehensive exam when only a basic consultation was provided. Improper billing includes practices such as double billing for the same service, billing for services not rendered, or charging for medically unnecessary procedures. These fraudulent activities exploit government-funded programs, increasing costs for taxpayers and undermining the integrity of healthcare systems.

The Whistleblower’s Journey

The case began when Timothy Sanders, a concerned individual, filed a qui tam lawsuit on April 28, 2021, under the False Claims Act. This legal action initiated an investigation into UCHealth’s billing practices. Whistleblowers are integral in exposing fraudulent activities within healthcare systems, as they possess insider knowledge that can lead to substantial recoveries for the government. By filing a qui tam lawsuit, individuals, such as the healthcare fraud whistleblower in this case, can bring fraudulent activities to light, potentially leading to significant financial repercussions for the involved parties. With whistleblowers, as the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General said, “We will pursue health care providers that defraud the taxpayers by knowingly submitting inflated or unsupported claims.”

SEC Enforcement Director Highlights Increased Penalties for Violations of Whistleblower Rule

Recently, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increased enforcement efforts around the whistleblower protection rule Rule 21F-17(a) which prohibits companies from impeding the ability of individuals to blow the whistle on potential securities law violations to the Commission. Most notably, the rule prohibits overly broad non-disclosure agreements and other employment agreements which restrict whistleblowing.

In remarks delivered November 6 at Securities Enforcement Forum D.C. 2024, Sanjay Wadhwa, the SEC’s Acting Director of the Division of Enforcement noted the importance of these enforcement efforts and highlighted the increased penalties levied by the Commission in Rule 21F-17(a) cases.

“The SEC’s whistleblower program plays a critical role in our ability to effectively detect wrongdoing, protect investors and the marketplace, and hold violators accountable.” Wadhwa said. “But that program only works if whistleblowers have unfettered ability to share with the SEC information about possible securities law violations. However, all too often we have seen, for example, confidentiality agreements and employment agreements by various advisory firms and public companies that impede that ability, including by limiting customers’ ability to voluntarily contact the SEC or by requiring employees to waive the right to a monetary award for participating in a government investigation. So this past fiscal year, and the year prior, the Commission brought a series of enforcement actions to address widespread violations.”

“There was a similar series of actions addressing this issue some years back,” Wadhwa continued. “And I think for a while there was better compliance, but then things slipped and we’re back here. So, this time around the Commission authorized what I view to be fittingly robust remedies, including the largest penalty on record for a standalone violation of the whistleblower protection rule. It is my hope that these enforcement actions will have a significant deterrent effect and will lead to greater and sustained proactive compliance.”

The record penalty referenced by Wadhwa was an $18 million penalty levied against J.P. Morgan in January. According to the SEC, J.P. Morgan regularly had retail clients sign confidential release agreements which did not permit clients to voluntarily contact the SEC.

In enforcing Rule 21F-17(a), the SEC has found illegal language in severance or separation agreements, employee contracts, settlement agreements and compliance manuals. Language in the various types of contracts found to violate Rule 21F-17(a) has included requiring the prior consent of the company before disclosing confidential information to regulators, preventing the employee from initiating contact with regulators, requiring the employee to waive their right to awards from whistleblowing award programs, including a “non-disparagement clause” that specifically included the SEC as a party the employee could not “disparage” the company to, and requiring the employee to inform the company soon after reporting information to the SEC.

The CTA Filing Deadline is Approaching. Is Your BOIR Filed Yet?

The clock is ticking—just 49 days remain until the one-year filing deadline for the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA)! Entities established before January 1, 2024, must submit a beneficial owner information report (BOIR) by December 31, 2024.

The CTA is a new reporting requirement that came into effect on January 1, 2024. The CTA requires any entity created by or registered to do business by the filing of a document with a secretary of state, or another similar office, to report its information and its beneficial owners to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which is a bureau of the United States Treasury. The goal is to decrease money laundering and fraud.

We previously published advisories on the general application of the CTA and its specific application to entities created for estate planning purposes. The rules and guidelines about which we previously reported are largely unchanged. A reporting company still needs to report its legal name, all trades and d/b/a names, address, and beneficial owners. Beneficial owners are those with substantial control or who own or control 25% or more of the reporting company, directly or indirectly. The reporting company needs to report each beneficial owner’s name, date of birth, residential address, and an identifying number and image from one of four acceptable identification documents.

Although the CTA was declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in Alabama, the ruling only prevents the CTA’s enforcement on the parties directly involved in the case. The court did not issue a nationwide ruling to prevent the law from being enforced. Thus, other companies are expected to continue filing BOIRs. The Alabama case is currently on appeal and oral arguments were held at the end of September 2024.

FinCEN has been periodically updating its Frequently Asked Questions to provide some clarification since the CTA became effective. We outline the most relevant guidance below:

General Updates:

  1. Entities that are created before January 1, 2024, even if dissolved sometime in 2024 before the December 31, 2024, deadline, must still report their information and beneficial owners by December 31, 2024.
  2. Entities that are created in 2024 have 90 days to file the BOIR. Entities created on or after January 1, 2025, will have 30 days to file the BOIR. Entities that are created in 2024 but are wound up, dissolved, or otherwise cease to exist must still file the BOIR with FinCEN.
  3. Beneficial ownership is determined in the aggregate. This means that companies need to analyze each beneficial owner to determine if he or she indirectly/directly substantially controls or owns 25% or more of a reporting company. For example, Individual X owns 10% of Company Y. Individual X is also trustee of a trust that owns 20% of Company Y. Individual X needs to be reported as a beneficial owner because he owns an aggregate 30% of the company.
  4. Beneficial owners may now apply for a FinCEN Identifier here. This allows the beneficial owners to report their information to FinCEN directly, obtain an Identifier number, and simply provide the Identifier to those reporting companies of which he or she is a beneficial owner. This prevents a beneficial owner from having to share personal and sensitive information with a company. This also streamlines the process for any change in the beneficial owner’s information. Each beneficial owner can log into FinCEN and simply update the information within 30 days of the change rather than first providing it to the reporting company and then the company filing a new BOIR to update the information.

a. In order to create a FinCEN Identifier, an individual will have to create a login.gov account. This is the account that the federal government is using to streamline many of its services, such as, global entry and applying for federal jobs.

5. Reporting companies may complete and submit a BOIR online here. A company could also submit a PDF of the report at the same link if it chose to complete a paper copy. There is no fee to submit online. There are also many vendors offering a service to assist with the process and submit the report for a fee.

Real Estate/Corporate Updates:

6.FinCEN clarified that the subsidiary exemption applies when a subsidiary’s ownership interests are entirely controlled or wholly owned, directly, or indirectly, by any of the following types of exempt entities: (1) Securities reporting issuer; (2) Governmental authority; (3) Bank; (4) Credit union; (5) Depository institution holding company; (6) Broker or dealer in securities; (7) Other Exchange Act registered entity; (8) Investment company or investment adviser; (9) Venture capital fund adviser; (10) Insurance company; (11) State-licensed insurance producer; (12) Commodity Exchange Act registered entity; (13) Accounting firm; (14) Public utility; (15) Financial market utility; (16) Tax-exempt entity; or (17) Large operating company. Further, if a reporting company’s ownership interests are controlled or wholly owned by more than one exempt entity, the reporting company may still qualify for the subsidiary exemption if the entities are unaffiliated; however, every controlling or owning entity must itself be an exempt entity in order for the reporting company to qualify for the subsidiary exemption.

Trusts and Estates Updates:

7.If there is a corporate trustee, the reporting company will be reporting those individual beneficial owners that indirectly own or control at least 25% of the ownership interests of the reporting company through the ownership in the corporate trustee. This will be determined by multiplying the percentage of ownership of the corporate trustee with the trust’s ownership/control of the reporting company. For example, if Individual A owns 70% of the corporate trustee of a trust, and that trust holds 30% of the reporting company, Individual A holds or controls 21% of the reporting company (70% x 30 = 21). If Individual A owned 90% of the corporate trustee, then it would own/control 27% of the reporting company (90% x 30 = 27) and the company must report Individual A as a beneficial owner. There may be other beneficial owners if someone else at the corporate trustee exercises substantial control over the reporting company.

A reporting company may submit the corporate trustee’s information in lieu of each beneficial owner’s information only if all of these conditions are met:

a. The corporate entity is an exempt entity from the reporting requirements.

b. The individual owns or controls 25% of the reporting company only through the corporate trustee.

c. The individual does not exercise substantial control over the reporting company.

A company can obtain its own FinCEN Identifier when it submits an initial BOIR for its beneficial owner(s). This way, such company may be reported as a beneficial owner, such as a corporate trustee that meets the above requirements. For example, when LLC A reports Individual A as its beneficial owner, LLC A has the option of clicking a button to obtain its own FinCEN Identifier.

8. An individual who has the power to remove a trustee, remove and replace a trustee, and/or appoint an additional trustee is deemed to have substantial control through the power to change the person who makes decisions for the trust, and thereby, the reporting company. While this is not explicit in the Frequently Asked Questions, it is consistent with FinCEN’s position that someone who has the power to remove a senior officer of a reporting company is a beneficial owner.

While this is an extensive list, it is by no means an exhaustive list, and various circumstances not discussed above may change how the CTA applies in a particular case.