Category: Corporate law

European Commission Aims to Tackle Greenwashing in Latest Proposal

On March 22, the European Commission unveiled a proposal, the Green Claims Directive (Proposal), aimed at combating greenwashing and misleading environmental claims. By virtue of the Proposal, the EC is attempting to implement measures designed to provide “reliable, comparable and verifiable information” to consumers, with the overall high-level goal to create a level playing field in the EU, wherein companies that make a genuine effort to improve their environmental sustainability can be easily recognized and rewarded by consumers. The Proposal follows a 2020 sweep that found nearly half of environmental claims examined in the EU may be false or deceptive. Following the ordinary legislative procedure, the Proposal will now be subject to the approval of the European Parliament and the Council. There is no set date for entry into force at this time.

The Proposal complements a March 2022 proposal to amend the Consumer Rights Directive to provide consumers with information on products’ durability and repairability, as well as to amend the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive by, among other things, banning “generic, vague environmental claims” and “displaying a voluntary sustainability label which was not based on a third-party verification scheme or established by public authorities.” The Proposal builds on these measures to provide “more specific requirements on unregulated claims, be it for specific product groups, specific sectors or for specific environmental impacts or aspects.” It would require companies that make “green claims to respect minimum standards on how they substantiate and communicate those claims.” Businesses based outside the EU that make environmental claims directed at EU consumers will also have to respect the requirements set out in the Proposal. The criteria target explicit claims, such as “T-shirt made of recycled plastic bottles” and “packaging made of 30% recycled plastic.”

Pursuant to Article 3 of the Proposal, “environmental claims shall be based on an assessment that meets the selected minimum criteria to prevent claims from being misleading,” including, among other things, that the claim “relies on recognised scientific evidence and state of the art technical knowledge,” considers “all significant aspects and impacts to assess the performance,” demonstrates whether the claim is accurate for the whole product or only parts of it, provides information on whether the product performs better than “common practice,” identifies any negative impacts resulting from positive product achievements, and reports greenhouse gas offsets.

Article 4 of the Proposal outlines requirements for comparative claims related to environmental impacts, including disclosure of equivalent data for assessments, use of consistent assumptions for comparisons and use of data sourced in an equivalent manner. The level of substantiation needed will vary based on the type of claim, but all assessments should consider the product’s life-cycle to identify relevant impacts.

Pursuant to Article 10, all environmental claims and labels must be verified and certified by a third-party verifier before being used in commercial communications. An officially accredited body will carry out the verification process and issue a certificate of conformity, which will be recognized across the EU and shared among Member States via the Internal Market Information System. The verifier is required to be an officially accredited, independent body with the necessary expertise, equipment, and infrastructure to carry out the verifications and maintain professional secrecy.

The Proposal is part of a broader trend of governmental regulators, self-regulatory organizations, and standard setters across industries adopting a more formalized approach toward greenwashing. For example, as we recently reported, the UK’s Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) published rules on making carbon neutral and net-zero claims. Instances of enforcement actions over greenwashing allegations have also been on the rise. The Securities and Exchange Board of India recently launched a consultation paper seeking public comment on rules to prevent greenwashing by ESG investment funds, and the European Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement regarding European Green Bonds Standards aimed at, among other things, avoiding greenwashing.

Article By Sukhvir Basran and Rachel Rodman of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Click here to visit the National Law Review for more environmental law news.

© Copyright 2023 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Sexual Harassment Prevention Training Deadline Approaches for Chicago Employers

As a reminder to employers in Chicago, anti-sexual harassment training is required by Chicago’s Human Rights Ordinance and must be completed by July 1, 2023.  This requirement applies to all Chicago employers, regardless of size or industry.

The training consists of one (1) hour of anti-sexual harassment training for all non-supervisory employees and two (2) hours of anti-sexual harassment training for supervisory employees.  Regardless of supervisory status, all employees must also undergo one (1) hour of bystander training.  Employers must provide training on an annual basis.  Additional information about training requirements can be found here. Employers who fail to comply may be subject to penalties.

Article By Audrey H. Shinn of Vedder Price

© 2023 Vedder Price

The NLRB Curtails the Scope of Nondisparagement and Confidentiality Provisions in Severance Agreements

On Tuesday, February 21, 2023, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) issued McLaren Macomb, a decision that curtails the permissible scope of confidentiality agreements and non-disclosure provisions in severance agreements. See McLaren Macomb, 372 NLRB No. 58 (2023). Analyzing the broad provisions in the agreements at issue in this case, the Board held that simply offering employees severance agreements that require employees to broadly waive their rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) was unlawful. The Board held:

Where an agreement unlawfully conditions receipt of severance benefits on the forfeiture of statutory rights, the mere proffer of the agreement itself violates the Act, because it has a reasonable tendency to interfere with or restrain the prospective exercise of Section 7 rights, both by the separating employee and those who remain. Whether the employee accepts the agreement is immaterial.

The Board’s decision is part of a broader trend by courts and administrative agencies applying heightened scrutiny to contractual provisions that limit employees’ rights. The decision also provides a crucial reminder to union and nonunion workers alike of the relevance of federal labor law in providing legal protections for most private-sector workers.

Case Background

The case arose when Michigan hospital operator McLaren Macomb permanently furloughed eleven employees, all bargaining unit members of Local 40 RN Staff Council, Office of Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU), AFL-CIO, because it had terminated outpatient services during the COVID-19 pandemic in June 2020. After McLaren Macomb furloughed these employees, it presented them with a “Severance Agreement, Waiver and Release” that offered severance amounts to the employees if they signed the agreement. All eleven employees signed.

The agreements provided broad language regarding confidentiality and nondisparagement. The confidentiality provision stated, “The Employee acknowledges that the terms of this Agreement are confidential and agrees not to disclose them to any third person, other than spouse, or as necessary to professional advisors for the purposes of obtaining legal counsel or tax advice, or unless legally compelled to do so by a court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction.” (emphasis added). The non-disclosure provision provided, in relevant part, “At all times hereafter, the Employee agrees not to make statements to Employer’s employees or to the general public which could disparage or harm the image of Employer…” The employees faced substantial financial penalties if they violated the provisions. The Employer conditioned the payment of severance on Employees’ entering into this agreement.

The NLRB’s Decision

In McLaren Macomb, the Board held that simply offering employees severance agreements that contain these broad confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions violates the NLRA.

The NLRA provides broad protections of employees’ rights to engage in collective action. Section 7 of the NLRA vests employees with a number of rights, including the right “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice (ULP) for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.” As the Supreme Court, federal courts, and the NLRB have repeatedly held and reaffirmed, Section 7 provides broad rights for employees and former employees—union and nonunion alike—to engage in collective action, including discussing terms and conditions of employment and workplace issues with coworkers, a union, and the Board. As the Supreme Court has stated in elaborating on the broad construction of Section 7, “labor’s cause often is advanced on fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance settlement within the immediate employment context.” Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978).

Applying these foundational principles to the severance agreements at hand, the Board reversed Trump-era NLRB precedent and concluded that the employer’s proffer of these broad nondisparagement and confidentiality provisions contravened the employees’ exercise of Section 7 rights, which is an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1). Notably, the Board held that an employer’s merely offering such broad provisions violates the Act—it does not matter whether the employee signs the agreement or not.

The Board determined that the nondisparagement provision substantially interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights on its face. That provision prohibits the furloughed employee from making any “statements to [the] Employer’s employees or the general public which could disparage or harm the image of [the] Employer.” Analyzing this language, the Board reasoned that the provision would encompass employee conduct or critiques of the employer regarding any labor issue, dispute, or term and condition of employment. Accordingly, this proscription sweeps far too broadly—it prohibits employees from exercising their right to publicize labor disputes, a right which is protected by the Act. Moreover, the nondisparagement provision chills employees from exercising Section 7 rights, including efforts to assist fellow employees, cooperate with the Board’s investigation and litigation of unfair labor practices, and raise or assist in making workplace complaints to coworkers, their union, the Board, the media, or “almost anyone else.” As the Board underscored, “Public statements by employees about the workplace are central to the exercise of employee rights under the Act.”

The Board then concluded that the confidentiality provision also interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights in at least two ways. First, the Board explained that because the confidentiality provision prohibits the employee from disclosing the terms of the agreement “to any third person,” the agreement would reasonably tend to coerce the employee not to file a ULP charge with the Board or assist in a Board investigation. (emphasis added). Second, the same language would also prohibit the furloughed employee from discussing the terms of the agreement with former coworkers in similar situations, which would frustrate the mutual support between employees at the heart of the Act. As the Board summarized, “A severance agreement is unlawful if it precludes an employee from assisting coworkers with workplace issues concerning their employer, and from communicating with others, including a union, and the Board, about his employment.”

Takeaways for Employment Lawyers and Plaintiffs

First, while one might assume that labor law is exclusively the province of unions, their members, and their lawyers, McLaren Macomb demonstrates the relevance of the NLRA for employees regardless of union status. Although the workers in this case were unionized, the Section 7 rights at the heart of the NLRA apply to most private-sector employees, including nonunion employees. Indeed, because nonunion workers often have fewer workplace protections than their unionized counterparts, Section 7’s protections are critically important for nonunion employees. Employees who are asked to sign confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions and their attorneys should be aware that broad restrictions on employees’ concerted activity may be illegal.

Second, this decision is part of a broader effort to protect workers from being muzzled by their employers. For instance, the recent federal Speak Out Act establishes that predispute nondisclosure clauses and nondisparagement clauses—often included in employment contracts—are unenforceable in disputes involving sexual assault or sexual harassment. These recent developments in the law should be on the radar of workers and their attorneys who are navigating employer’s contracts, policies, handbooks, and proposed severance agreements.

Article By Kyle Bigley of Katz Banks Kumin LLP

For more labor law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Katz Banks Kumin LLP Copyright ©

Non-Negotiable Arbitration Agreements May Be Required as a Condition of Employment

On February 15, 2023, the Ninth Circuit struck down AB 51, a California statute that imposed criminal and civil penalties against employers who required employees to enter into an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, finding the statute to be an “unacceptable obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. v. Bonta, et al., No. 20-15291 (9th Cir. 2023).

As discussed in our prior post and articles (link here), in August 2022 the Ninth Circuit withdrew its prior decision, which had upheld portions of AB 51, following the United States Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision in Viking River Cruises v. Moriana.

AB 51, embodied in California Labor Code §432.6 effective January 1, 2020, prohibited an employer from entering into a non-negotiable agreement that required the employee to waive “any right, forum, or procedure” for a violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act or the California Labor Code, including “the right to file and pursue a civil action.”  Further, AB 51 imposed harsh penalties for employers who violated the statute, including a fine of up to $1,000 and up to six months’ imprisonment, as well as the potential for civil litigation by the State of California or by private individuals.  In an effort to avoid Supreme Court decisions striking down state laws that improperly targeted arbitration agreements, the California legislature also created the confusing outcome that potentially criminalized the formation of non-negotiable arbitration agreements, but permitted their enforcement once executed.

Noting that arbitration agreements by their very nature require parties to waive their rights to bring disputes in court, and crediting the plaintiffs’ evidence that the possible imposition of civil and criminal penalties deterred employers from attempting to enter into non-negotiable agreements with employees, the court affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction in favor of several trade associations and business groups who sought to block the implementation of the statute.  Relying on principles of preemption and judicial precedent striking down similar state laws or judge-made rules that singled out executed arbitration agreements, the Court found AB 51 improperly “burden[s]” the formation of arbitration agreements in violation of the FAA.

Having written the previous 2-1 decision upholding AB 51, Judge Lucero now found himself dissenting.  Arguing that the majority “misconstrue[d] the jurisprudence” of the Supreme Court, the dissent claimed that arbitration was permissible only if consensual and that AB 51 only applied to conduct occurring prior to the formation of the contract and thus was not an obstacle to the objectives of the FAA.

Employers may require their California employees to sign non-negotiable arbitration agreements to obtain or maintain their employment.  Arbitration agreements may still be unenforceable however if they are procedurally and substantively unconscionable, if the agreement lacks mutual consent because a party was forced to sign by threats or physical coercion or “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Thus, employers should review their agreements to ensure they are in compliance with other California requirements, that the terms are not unfair or one-sided, and, the agreement presented is not unfair, surprising or oppressive.

Article By Sheryl L. Skibbe of Vedder Price

For more arbitration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2023 Vedder Price

Biden Administration Sets New Course on ESG Investing in Retirement Plans

In late 2022, the Department of Labor finalized a new rule titled “Prudence in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,” largely reversing Trump-era guidance that had strictly limited the ability of plan fiduciaries to consider “environmental, social, and governance” (ESG) factors in selecting retirement plan investments and generally discouraged the exercise of proxy voting. In short, the new rule allows a fiduciary to consider ESG factors in selecting investment options, provided that the selection serves the financial interests of the plan and its participants over an appropriate time horizon, and encourages fiduciaries to engage in proxy voting.

The final rule moves away from 2020 Trump-era rulemaking by allowing more leeway for fiduciaries to consider ESG factors in selecting investment options. Specifically, the rule states that a “fiduciary’s duty of prudence must be based on factors that the fiduciary reasonably determines are relevant to a risk and return analysis and that such factors may include the economic effects of climate change and other ESG considerations on the particular investment or investment course of action.” The rule makes clear, however, that there is no requirement to affirmatively consider ESG factors, effectively limiting its scope and effect and putting the onus on fiduciaries to determine whether they want to incorporate ESG factors into their assessments of competing investments.

Overview

  • Similar to the Trump-era guidance, there is no definition of “ESG” or an “ESG”-style fund. Debate continues over what kinds of funds can be considered ESG investments, especially in light of the fact that some companies in industries traditionally thought to be inconsistent with ESG conscious investing are now trying to attract ESG investors (e.g. industrials, energy).
  • Fiduciaries are not required to consider ESG factors in selecting investment options. However, the consideration of such factors is not a presumed violation of a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty or prudence. Unlike the prior rule, which suggested that consideration of ESG factors could only be considered if all other pecuniary factors between competing investments were equal (the “tiebreaker” approach), the new rule allows a fiduciary to consider potential financial benefits of ESG investing in all circumstances.
  • Plan fiduciaries may take into account participant preferences in constructing a fund lineup. Therefore, if participants express a desire for ESG investment options, then it may be reasonable for plan fiduciaries to add ESG funds or to consider ESG factors in crafting the fund lineup.
  • ESG-centric funds may be used as qualified default investments (QDIAs) within retirement plans, reversing the prior outright prohibition on use of such funds as QDIAs.
  • In some situations, fiduciaries may be required to exercise shareholder rights when required to protect participant interests. It is unclear whether the exercise of such rights is only limited to situations that have an economic impact on the plan, or applies to additional situations. The clarification suggests that the exercise of proxy voting is not disfavored as an inefficient use of fiduciaries’ time and resources, as the prior iteration of the rule suggested.

Effective Date and Challenges to the Regulation

The new rule became effective in January 2023, except for delayed applicability of proxy voting provisions. However, twenty five state attorneys general have joined a lawsuit in federal court in Texas that seeks to overturn the regulation. The court is in the Fifth Circuit, which historically has been hostile to past Department of Labor regulations (including Obama-era fiduciary rules overturned in 2018, though the ESG rule is less far-reaching than the fiduciary rule and may survive a challenge even in the Fifth Circuit). Congressional Republicans have also introduced a Congressional Review Act (CRA) review proposal to repeal the regulation that has gained the support of Joe Manchin (D-WV). Although CRA actions are not subject to Senate filibuster rules, they are subject to presidential veto, which President Biden is sure to do if the repeal reaches his desk.

Action Steps

Employers should assume that the ESG rules will remain in effect and engage with plan fiduciaries, advisors, and employees and determine the extent to which ESG considerations should (or should not) enter into fiduciary deliberations when considering plan investment alternatives. Some investment advisors have already begun to include separate ESG scorecards for mutual funds and other investments in their regular plan investment reviews. Fiduciaries should also consider whether and how the approach that is ultimately taken should be reflected in the plan’s investment policy statement. Plans that delegate full control over investments to an independent fiduciary (an ERISA 3(38) advisor) should engage with their advisor to determine whether and the extent to which ESG considerations will be part of that fiduciary’s process, and whether that is consistent with the desires of the plan fiduciaries and participants.

Article By Alex H. Glaser and Timothy Brechtel of Jones Walker LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2023 Jones Walker LLP

Was This The Least Transparent Report In SEC History?

Professor Alexander I. Platt at the University of Kansas School of Law has just released a draft of a forthcoming paper that takes the Securities and Exchange Commission to task for the lack of transparency in its whistleblower program, Going Dark(er): The SEC Whistleblower Program’s FY 2022 Report Is The Least Transparent In Agency History.  As Professor Platt notes in a footnote, I have been complaining about the whistleblower’s lack of transparency since at least 2016.  See Five Propositions Concerning The SEC Whistleblower Program.  Last summer, I observed that “There is certainly no dearth of irony in a federal agency dedicated to full disclosure cloaking in secrecy a billion dollar awards program”.

Professor Platt offers four possible reasons for the SEC’s lack of transparency: (1) resource constraints; (2) lack of respect for public participation and accountability; (3) data problems; and/or (4) an intent to bury something controversial or embarrassing.  My concern is, and has been, that whatever the reason(s), the SEC’s lack of transparency creates an ideal substrate for fraud.  Unless the SEC drops its cloak of secrecy and exposes its whistleblower program to public scrutiny, it is highly likely that the next article will be about how the whistleblower program was used and abused.

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more SEC and securities legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2010-2023 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

New York Adult Survivors Act

New York’s Adult Survivors Act[1] (“ASA” or “the Act”) (S.66A/A.648A) became effective on November 24, 2022. The Act provides a one-year lookback window for people to seek civil remedies for sexual abuse they experienced after they turned 18, regardless of what year the abuse occurred. This law adds critical energy to the ongoing momentum of the #MeToo movement, allowing survivors to file suit against both their abusers and the institutions that enabled them.

The one-year lookback window lasts until November 23, 2023, so as of today, survivors have just over ten months to take advantage of the law. The following guide provides context and recommendations for understanding and using New York’s Adult Survivors Act.

What does the ASA do?

The ASA creates a one-year lookback window for sexual assault survivors to pursue civil claims in court for abuse that may have occurred years earlier, as long as they were over 18 at the time. Previously, a person who experienced sexual abuse only had a few years to file a lawsuit in New York before their claim would be time-barred. This meant that survivors had little time in which to come to terms with the abuse they experienced, find an attorney, prepare a case, and file an action. For those who missed that small window, the ASA reopens the courthouse doors. So until November 23, 2023, whether you experienced abuse in 2015, 2000, or 1985, you can file a claim in court and seek recovery for what happened to you.

What does the law cover?

Sexual offenses covered by the ASA span a wide range of behaviors, including but not limited to forcible touching, rape, sexual assault, sexual misconduct, and other forms of sexual abuse. Not every sexual offense is covered under the ASA,[2] and an attorney can help assess whether your claim falls within its provisions.

Who can you sue?

Another powerful provision of the law is who it allows to be named as a defendant. Survivors are not limited to suing their abusers—they can also hold accountable the institutions that insulated those abusers from justice. These institutions can include entities that had responsibility to keep the survivor safe and to control the actions of the abuser. Claims against the institutions can involve both intentional and negligent acts. If your abuser was part of a larger organization that contributed to or failed to prevent, notice, or stop the abuse, the ASA empowers you to go after that organization.

This provision comes directly from New York’s 2019 Child Victims Act (“CVA”).[3] Over 10,000 people have used the CVA to sue institutions that had a role to play in their abuse, including churches, hospitals, overnight and day camps, and schools. For example, a large number of CVA cases name the Roman Catholic Church and the Boy Scouts of America as institutional defendants. The ASA provides a similar recourse to justice: oftentimes, survivors are subject to abuse by people who hold power over them. For minors, these people could be coaches, religious leaders, teachers, mentors, or other caregivers. For people over 18, those in power may be employers, professors, or community leaders. The ASA enables adult survivors to sue the institutions that gave their abusers power and protected those abusers from answering for their actions.

The institutional defendant provision of the ASA opens significantly larger opportunities for recovery, as institutions oftentimes have deeper pockets than individual abusers. Examples of institutions that could face liability under the ASA include employers, colleges and universities, social organizations such as fraternities and sororities, medical practices, and facilities that house people with disabilities. Any entity that knew about or should have known about and stopped the abuse could be on the hook.

Who is it for?

The ASA opens the courts to people who were over the age of 18 when they experienced sexual abuse but are otherwise unable to file due to missing the statute of limitations. You can use the ASA even if you have previously tried to file but had your suit dismissed as untimely.[4]

It is important to note that if you have resolved or released your claims through a settlement process, you may not file under the ASA. For example, the nearly 150 women who received payment from a settlement with Columbia University Irving Medical Center and New York Presbyterian Hospital based on sexual abuse by Dr. Robert Hadden cannot use the ASA to file new suits as their claims have been fully resolved.

Why do we need this?

The Adult Survivors Act is a game-changer for people who were previously unable to file claims for sexual abuse due to a short statute of limitations. In 2019, New York extended the statute of limitations for certain civil lawsuits related to sex crimes from five to 20 years. But that law did not apply retroactively, so survivors who experienced abuse just a few years prior were still barred from seeking justice.

The ASA honors the lived reality of sexual abuse. Like the CVA before it, the ASA recognizes sexual abuse can take years to process, and those years often extend far beyond the short filing windows New York historically placed on these types of claims.

Survivors have many reasons for waiting to come forward with claims of sexual abuse. Some face retaliation by their abusers, some fear the risk of community backlash, and others lack the resources to seek legal representation. Finally, “[t]rauma takes time,” as New York State Senator and ASA champion Brad Hoylman said when promoting the then-bill. Many sexual assault and sexual abuse survivors need years to process what they endured. This can be particularly true when an abuser uses power, manipulation, or threats to coerce submission to sexual contact, a common tactic of notorious abusers Harvey Weinstein, Kevin Spacey, and Dr. Robert Hadden. Understanding the event as sexual abuse, reconciling yourself with your experience, and deciding how to move forward can take decades. The ASA is an effort to respect this process and empower survivors to hold their abusers accountable.

Why would I file a lawsuit about what happened to me?

For many people, surviving sexual abuse is not something that can be “fixed” by any kind of legal action. But the remedies available through civil suits can serve as a proxy for some measure of justice, and that proxy can enable survivors to move forward.

Successful ASA plaintiffs can recover economic, compensatory, and punitive damages from both the individual abuser and the institution. Many survivors suffer financial loss in addition to the mental, emotional, and physical harm of the abuse itself. If your boss sexually harasses you and then terminates you when you protest, you may find yourself without an income. If a classmate assaults you, you may forfeit tuition money after deciding to leave campus for your safety. Civil courts can make you financially whole and further compensate you for the pain of the experience and the efforts you must make to heal. Courts can also provide other remedies, requiring the people who perpetrated or allowed abuse to do or stop certain behaviors, thereby protecting other potential future targets of abuse and assault.

How do I use the ASA?

The first thing you should do is consult an attorney. These cases can be complicated, and plaintiffs still maintain the burden of proof, so you want the expertise of an experienced lawyer. There are several firms that regularly bring these kinds of actions, and many will provide you with a free consultation. If you decide to move forward with your case after a consultation, your attorney will work with you to determine the best strategy. This strategy may include going to court, or it may involve seeking a resolution that works for you outside of court.

As you go through the process of finding an attorney, please know that you deserve counsel that is compassionate, knowledgeable, and focused on your needs and interests as a client. This is about what happened to you, and your attorney is there to guide you. You should feel heard, understood, and respected.

When do I need to file?

You must file your claim by November 23, 2023.

While the ASA is a powerful effort by New York to support the rights of sexual abuse survivors, it is time-limited. November 23, 2023 is the cutoff date for filing a claim, but if you are interested in seeking recovery under the Act, you should take action now. It may take time to find the right attorney for you, and your lawyer will need additional time to put together your case. If you and your lawyer decide to pursue a resolution without going to court, that process could take even longer.

Ten months sounds like a long time, but in the legal world, it can move very quickly. Start considering whether you want to take advantage of the ASA and reach out to an attorney as soon as possible.

What happens after I file?

This will come down to conversations you have with your attorney. Filing is the first major step in the process. Following that process through might include discovery, more court filings, and hearings before a judge or a jury.

What else should I consider?

Take care of yourself as you think about your next steps. Reach out to trusted loved ones and mental health professionals. It is critical that you ground yourself in what is best for you.

FOOTNOTES

[1] New York Governor Kathy Hochul signed the ASA into law on May 24, 2022. The ASA passed the New York Assembly by a majority vote of 140 in favor to 3 against after receiving unanimous support in the state Senate one month prior.

[2] Article 130 of the New York Penal Law lists offenses covered under the ASA.

[3] The CVA came into effect in 2019, providing a two-year lookback window for people who experienced abuse as minors. The CVA amends N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 (2019) and allows victims to initiate civil action against their abusers and enabling institutions. As to victims where civil actions were barred before the CVA took effect, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-g (2020) creates a lookback period to file a claim. Since 2019, over 10,000 people have filed lawsuits in New York against abusers and the institutions that protected them.

[4] The ASA can revive your claim only if it was dismissed for failure to file by the statutory deadline. If your claim was dismissed for other reasons, this law cannot fix that.

For more labor and employment news, click here to visit the National Law Review. 

Katz Banks Kumin LLP Copyright ©

Structuring the Acquisition of an S Corporation

Introduction

S corporations, or S-corps, are one of the most popular entity choices for businesses. In contemplating the sale of an S-corp, it is important to plan how the transaction is structured from a tax perspective (ideally before an LOI is signed), both to maximize the gain on the sale and avoid pitfalls that can result in liabilities for the selling shareholders.

For corporate purposes, businesses are generally formed as limited liability companies, partnerships, or corporations. For tax purposes, however, entities are taxed as corporations, partnerships, or disregarded entities.[1] Corporations[2] are taxed as either a C corporation or an S corporation. C corporations are taxed at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level.[3] S corporations are corporations that, for federal tax purposes, elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through to their shareholders and are only taxed at the shareholder level.[4]

To qualify as an S corporation, the corporation must meet the requirements of Section 1361,[5] which provides that the corporation not have more than 100 shareholders, not have non-individual shareholders (with the exception of certain types of trusts, estates, and tax-exempt organizations), not have a nonresident alien as a shareholder, not have more than one class of stock, and not be an ineligible corporation (as defined in the Code).[6]

When sellers begin to explore the sale of their business, tax considerations are important to discuss at the outset so that the seller and buyer are on the same page – no one wants to attempt to renegotiate the terms of a deal in the middle of a transaction. For tax purposes, acquisitions of companies are categorized as either an asset purchase or stock purchase. In general, owners prefer to sell their stock (as opposed to the company’s assets) for a few reasons. First, a stock sale results in capital gain to the shareholders because their stock is a capital asset.[7] In an asset sale, however, noncorporate sellers (including S-corp shareholders) recognize ordinary income or capital gain, depending on the type of asset sold. Second, unlike in an asset sale, a stock sale may not require the seller to transfer company assets and licenses or obtain third party consents.

On the other hand, buyers usually want to engage in an asset sale to obtain a step-up in basis of the purchased assets. In a stock acquisition, the buyer gets a carryover basis in the acquired corporation’s assets, without any basis step-up. In an asset purchase, however, the buyer takes a cost basis in the assets, including in the target corporation’s goodwill (which otherwise will generally have a zero basis), and allows the buyer to take higher depreciation deductions to reduce the buyer’s annual tax liability.[8] Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer also does not assume corporate liabilities in an asset sale.

Sellers who agree to engage in an asset sale should negotiate with the buyer to be compensated for the additional tax that the seller may incur for engaging in an asset sale.

There are two additional ways for a buyer to obtain a basis step-up in the seller’s assets. The first is a 338(h)(10) election under Section 338 and the second is an F reorganization pursuant to Section 368(a)(1)(F) and consistent with Revenue Ruling 2008-18.[9]

Making the 338(h)(10) Election

A buyer and seller will sometimes make a 338(h)(10) election, which treats an acquisition of a corporation’s stock as a sale of assets for federal income tax purposes, but a sale of stock for legal purposes.[10] The sale is treated as if buyer and seller engaged in a regular asset sale for income tax purposes (so the buyer obtains a step-up in the tax basis of the assets), yet the seller does not need to re-title each asset.[11] Seller does not have capital gain on the sale of stock. Instead the parties must allocate the sales price among the assets based on each asset’s fair market value.[12] The price paid in excess of the fair market value of the tangible assets of the business is allocated to business intangibles and then to goodwill.[13]

The 338(h)(10) election is only available if a “qualified stock purchase” is made.[14] A “qualified stock purchase” is defined as any transaction (or series of transactions) in which a corporation purchases at least 80% of the stock (both voting and value) from a member of a consolidated group(as defined in 1.1502-1) or from shareholders of a S corporation during a 12 month period.[15] If during diligence it is revealed that the target corporation in fact failed to qualify as an S corporation, the 338 election will be invalid.[16] If the Section 338(h)(10) election is invalid, the transaction will be treated as a straight stock sale and buyer will not receive a basis step-up in the target’s assets.

A section 338(h)(10) election is made jointly by the purchaser and seller on Form 8023.[17] S corporation shareholders who do not sell their stock must also consent to the election. The election must be made not later than the 15th day of the 9th month beginning after the month in which the acquisition date occurs.[18]

If the target failed to qualify as an S corporation (thereby becoming a C corporation), an election can be made to treat the sale of the corporation’s stock as an asset sale under Section 336(e). The election can be made if target is owned by a parent corporation that sells at least 80% of target’s stock.[19] A 336(e) election closely resembles a 338(h)(10) election, but the purchaser does not have to be a corporation.[20] Note that a transaction that qualifies under both 336(e) and 338(h)(10) will be treated as 338(h)(10) transaction.[21]

Consequences of a 338(h)(10) Election

Under the Regulations, the target corporation is treated as making a deemed sale of its assets and liquidating following the deemed asset sale.[22] The transaction is treated as a taxable acquisition of 100% of the target’s assets for income tax purposes.[23] This means that the stock cannot be acquired in a tax free transaction or reorganization (such as a transfer to a controlled corporation, merger or spinoff) or a transaction where the seller does not recognize the entire amount of gain or loss realized on the transaction.[24]

Issues with a 338(h)(10) Election

While the 338 election can be a useful way for a buyer to achieve a basis step-up without burdening the seller to retitle and transfer assets, the following disadvantages of the election should be considered:

  1. The rules under Section 338 require all S corporation shareholders (whether or not they sell their stock) to pay tax on all of the target’s assets, even if selling less than 100% of the target.[25] This effectively eliminates any structuring of a deal on a tax-deferred basis (i.e. where seller only pays tax on the consideration attributable to non-rollover equity). Sellers need to be aware that they will pay tax on all of the target company’s assets regardless of the percentage of assets sold.
  2. The election presents an issue for rollover transactions where the seller rolls over more than 20% of its equity on a pre-tax basis in a Section 721 or Section 351 transaction (in which seller receives equity in buyer, buyer’s parent, a holding company that holds target, or another form of equity). Rolling over more than 20% of equity will invalidate the 338(h)(10) election because it will not meet the “purchase” requirement under Section 338.[26]
  3. If the target company’s S corporation election turns out to be invalid (which happens frequently due to the ease with which S corporation status can be voided), the 338(h)(10) election will be invalid, thereby eliminating any advantage provided by the election.[27] Note that the seller will also be in breach of its representations and warranties under the purchase agreement.

F-Reorganization

An alternative to a 338(h)(10) election is an F reorganization, or F reorg., which allows sellers to avoid the potential issues that come with a 338 election. In an F reorg., the seller recognizes gain only with respect to the assets that it is deemed to have sold, allows the seller to roll over equity on a pre-tax basis, and avoids some of the risk that the target may have not properly qualified as an S-corp (thereby invalidating a Section 338(h)(10) election).

Engaging in an F-Reorganization

The first step in an F reorg. is to engage in a tax free reorganization of the S-corp.[28] Shareholders of the target S-corp (“T”) form a new corporation (“Holdco”) and transfer their shares in T to Holdco in exchange for Holdco shares. As a result of the transaction, T shareholders own all shares of Holdco, which in turn owns all shares of T, making T a fully owned subsidiary of Holdco. Holdco then elects to treat T as a Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary (“QSub”) by making the election on form 8869. For federal tax purposes, T, as a QSub, becomes a disregarded entity and all assets and liabilities of T are treated as part of Holdco.[29] Note that the QSub election made by T also suffices as the S-corp election for Holdco.[30] After T becomes a QSub of Holdco, T converts into a limited liability company (“LLC”) under state law in a nontaxable transaction by converting from one disregarded entity to another.[31] Holdco will need to obtain its own EIN, but T retains its old EIN after the conversion.[32] Once the conversion to an LLC is complete, the shareholders of Holdco can sell some or all of the LLC interests of T; the sale is treated as an asset sale for tax purposes, thereby resulting in a step up in basis for the purchaser.[33] The seller recognizes gain from the deemed sale of each asset of T. If less than 100% of the LLC interests are sold to the buyer, the transaction is treated as the purchase of a proportionate interest in each of the LLC assets, followed by a contribution of the respective interests to a partnership in exchange for ownership interests in the partnership, resulting in a stepped up basis in the assets for buyer.[34] In this scenario, T is no longer a QSub and is converted to a partnership for tax purposes.[35]

Note that a straight conversion of the existing S corporation target from an S-corp to an LLC should not be done because it is treated as a taxable liquidation of the S corporation (i.e. a deemed sale of its assets) resulting in a fully taxable event to the shareholders.[36]

Alternatively, the S-corp could form a new LLC, contribute all its business assets and liabilities to the new LLC in exchange for the LLC interests, and sell the LLC interests to the buyer. However, the transfer of assets might require third party consents; the F reorg. achieves the same result without any potential assignment issues, and even preserves the historical EIN of the S-corp.

Advantages of an F-Reorganization

The F-reorganization is an effective way to avoid the issues that arise with a 338(h)(10) election:

  1. If the acquisition is for less than 100% of the target, the S-corp shareholders will only recognize gain on the portion of the LLC sold by the S-corp parent. Any portion of the LLC interests rolled over will be tax-deferred. Rollover transactions are perfectly suitable in a F reorg. and do not present the issues that come with a 338(h)(10) election.
  2. The converted LLC retains its old EIN number and is essentially the same entity for legal purposes. This can be useful for a target in a regulated industry (such as healthcare, food services, manufacturing, etc.) by possibly avoiding the need to reapply for new permits and licenses.
  3. An F reorg. can be useful for planning purposes under Section 1202 (Qualified Small Business Stock, or QSBS), which allows shareholders of a C corporation to exclude from their taxable income the greater of ten million dollars or ten times the adjusted basis of their stock upon a sale.[37] One requirement is that the stock must be stock of a C corporation, not an S corporation.[38] S corporation shareholders who want to qualify under 1202 can perform an F reorg. and contribute the LLC interests of their operating company to a newly formed C corporation in a tax free exchange under 351. The S corporation (which owns the C corporation which owns the LLC) is now an eligible shareholder of QSBS and will qualify for favorable treatment under Section 1202.[39]

Footnotes

[1] Reg. §301.7701-2. Entities may also be taxed as cooperatives or as tax-exempt organizations if the statutory requirements are met.

[2] For purposes of this article, a corporation includes a limited liability company (LLC) that has elected to be taxed as a corporation.

[3] IRC §11(a).

[4] IRC §1363. For state tax purposes, treatment of S corporation status varies – certain states either conform with the federal treatment or conform with certain limitations and adjustments, while others do not recognize the S election at all and tax S corporations as regular corporations. In particular, California imposes an entity level tax of the greater of $800 or 1.5% of net income.

[5] Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

[6] See IRC §1361 (for example, an insurance company or certain financial institutions). In addition, Form 2553 must be filed to make the S corporation election.

[7] See IRC §1221(a).

[8] See IRC §1012(a) and §167.

[9] A 338(g) election also obtains a basis step-up, but results in two layers of tax and is not generally used for domestic transactions.

[10] IRC 338(a).

[11] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(9).

[12] In accordance with the allocation provisions set forth in IRC 1060 and Reg. 1.338-6 and 1.338-7.

[13] Reg. 1.338-6(b)(vi) and (vii).

[14] IRC 338(a).

[15] IRC 338(d)(3) and Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c). For the purposes of this article, we assume that target is a standalone S-corp.

[16] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(5). However, the transaction may still qualify under Section 336(e). See below.

[17] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3). Form 8883 also needs to be filed. If an F reorg is done, form 8594 will need to be filed.

[18] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3).

[19] Reg. 1.336-2(a). The election is made unilaterally by seller and target. See Reg. 1.336-2(h).

[20] Reg. 1.336-1(b)(2). See Reg. 1.336-1 – Reg. 1.336-5 for the mechanics of making the 336(e) election and what qualifies as a “qualified disposition” under 336.

[21] Reg. 1.336-1(b)(6)(ii)(A).

[22] See Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1 for the tax aspects of the deemed asset sale and liquidation.

[23] A deemed asset sale under Section 338 does not give rise to California sales tax. Cal. Code of Regs. 1595(a)(6).

[24] IRC 338(h)(3). See below for rollover transactions.

[25] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(5).

[26] IRC 338(h)(3)(A)(ii). Beware of situations where the acquiror appears to “purchase” at least 80% of target’s stock (and target rolls over 20% or less of its stock in a 351 transaction), but the acquiror in fact does (or might be deemed to) “purchase” less than 80% of target’s stock, thereby invalidating a 338, 338(h)(10), or 336(e) election. This most commonly occurs where purchaser is a newly formed corporation and target rolls over 20% (or less) of its shares. See Ginsburg, Levin & Rocap, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Buyouts, § 4.06.1.2.2 (relating to redemption of stock held by target’s shareholders and recharacterizing a 351 transaction and cash sale as a single 351 exchange with boot).

[27] See footnote 16.

[28] In accordance with Rev. Rul. 2008-18.

[29] IRC 1361(b)(3).

[30] Rev. Rul. 2008-18. Obviously, Holdco must meet all the requirements of an S-corp. In many cases, the parties will file Form 2553 to treat Holdco as an S corporation as a “belt and suspenders” step.

[31] Upon conversion, T is no longer treated as a QSub per 1361(b)(3). The conversion has no tax consequences; see Reg. 1.1361-5(b)(3), example 2, where the merger of two disregarded entities owned by the same entity is a disregarded transaction for tax purposes because the assets continue to be held by the same entity. The same should apply when one disregarded entity converts to another. The QSub can also merge with a newly formed LLC subsidiary of Holdco to achieve the same result.

[32] Rev. Rul. 2008-18.

[33] Rev. Rul. 99-5; Reg. 1.1361-5(b)(3), example 2.

[34] Rev. Rul. 99-5; see also Rev. Rul. 99-6.

[35] Id. Although not required, a Section 754 election is often required by the Buyer.

[36] IRC 336(a).

[37] IRC 1202(b). See Section 1202 for the requirements to qualify for QSBS.

[38] IRC 1202(c).

[39] The S corporation shares do not qualify as QSBS. The new shares of the C corporation issued after the reorganization qualify as QSBS to begin the 5 year holding period.

Article By Ben Gruen of Stubbs Alderton & Markiles, LLP

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© Copyright 2023 Stubbs Alderton & Markiles, LLP

When Corporate Legal Teams Break

Forward-thinking organizations that refocus their legal teams on the removal of systemic friction and value creation can better detect and forecast risk; however, organizations that have not modernized their legal teams often miss subtleties masking surprisingly deep areas of risk. Recent history shows nothing is too big to fail, but earlier risk detection may have helped avoid some of the most catastrophic losses.

The most recent and notable industry-wide example, of course, was the financial services industry, which triggered the Great Recession from 2007 to 2009.

In the world’s most infamous accounting scandal, Enron imploded in 2001, wiping out $74bn of shareholder funds and the pensions and jobs of thousands of employees. Enron’s auditor also collapsed. The organizations were interconnected and dependent systems. One fell, the other followed. Undetected risk festered and worsened, and the interconnectedness of these organizations and systems created a complex network that made detecting risk more difficult.

As modern society demands more capable systems, they become more interconnected and complex by necessity. As Meltdown: Why Our Systems Fail and What We Can Do About It posits, this staggering complexity means that tiny mistakes or simple accidents can lead to devastating catastrophes that often go undetected. The reasons for failure can stem from very different problems, but the underlying causes are similar.

In accounting scandals with nefarious actors, huge debts are obscured and once revealed, lead to corporate failure. In legal departments with good actors – led by a noble General Counsel (GC) who serves as the defender of the enterprise – business risks are obscured and once revealed, can lead to devastating consequences: bet-the-company litigation, core intellectual property battles, merger & acquisition failure, and crippling regulatory fines, to name a few.

Embracing digital helps identify and expose risk, but organizations set the stage for failure when legal, or other critical functions, don’t keep up, fail to embrace the digital evolution, become disconnected, and lack or lose visibility. Those organizations make decisions without a clear view of the legal implications, and they might not even know it because, for now, they operate with blind trust of the Office of the GC.

Corporations in all industries are “going digital” to remain competitive amidst technological disruption. This focus on digital starts with core products and service offerings, and then is pushed throughout the business to align company to product. The result? Faster moving businesses with a wave of demand pummelling the legal department…if not yet, then soon as digital initiatives across the business mature.

Most corporate legal departments simply do not have the systems required to keep up — providing consistent regulatory counsel, detecting and preventing impending litigation, or simply knowing who is doing what in the legal organization is already a challenge Risk is obscured. A “break” like we’ve never experienced is primed.

If we examine the ecosystem, the warning signs are there.

Catching up to other corporate functions

As demands on legal teams continue to grow and CFOs ask GCs to do more with less, quality suffers amid rising law firm rates and unchecked complexity. Corners get cut. Risks emerge while their likelihood to go undetected rises. Of course, when adding headcount is not an option, revamping processes and technology is often the answer.

In finance, accounting, information technology, and human resource departments, among others, advances in technology have enabled self-service, helped control costs, made it easier to compare costs, and increased quality choices. These corporate functions have embraced systems-level restructuring with artificial intelligence (AI), data analytics, cloud computing and “Big Data” to modernize working practices and improve performance.

In their often siloed and conservative world, most GCs and corporate legal departments, on the other hand, make crucial decisions guided as much by gut instinct as by data and industry benchmarks. For decades, they have resisted change or lacked sufficient resources to enable change in technology, working practices, and corporate culture. Now, with the real-time requirement for speed, scale, and transparency — that era is over.

To retain and increase influence, improve their performance and trim costs as recessionary fears grow, GCs would be wise to more fully modernize their legal departments quickly through an open, digitally-savvy, and collaborative working culture.

Collaborate and listen

Building a data-driven, digital, secure and scalable legal system is an ethical and commercial imperative for GCs. Technology is part of the solution but not the place to start.

To more proactively expose, manage and mitigate risk, executives and their boards need GCs to emphasize the imperative for a more analytical, data-based and efficient approach to corporate legal practice with concrete examples to punctuate the “Why.”

You could start with three actions.

  1. Educate yourself and your colleagues about trends in legal digitization, performance improvement and new working practices. A comprehensive source of information is the Digital Legal Exchange, a global institute of leading thinkers from academia, business, government, technology and law.
  2. Become Modern. Be the change. Lead the change. Make tough decisions about your top leaders and whether they are capable of a data and digital-first mindset and way of working. Change leadership is the prime point of failure for legal modernization efforts.
  3. Be ambitious in the scope of your reforms. Small, pilot projects (ie, e-signature or automated NDAs) won’t make much of an impact and won’t convince your board of the need for bold legal change.

Modernizing the legal system and companies’ legal departments can improve affordability and performance for clients, lawyers, company boards, and shareholders.

Absent modern means of detection, legal risk can proliferate unknown and unseen only to all too often reveal triggers of impending corporate failure when it’s already too late.

Article By Anusia Gillespie of UnitedLex

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© 2022 UnitedLex, All Rights Reserved

Caremark Liability Following the SEC’s New ESG Reporting Requirements

Recent developments in the Court of Chancery concerning a corporate board’s duty to monitor and provide oversight over a corporation’s operations, so-called Caremark claims, are likely to intersect with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) proposed new ESG disclosure obligations to create a new category of corporate risk.  In this article, we discuss the recent trends in Delaware law that have led to a revitalization of Caremark and the SEC’s current proposals for enhanced ESG disclosure, the intersection of which can be expected to result in litigation and other corporate risk, and some commonsense steps corporations can take to mitigate this potential new category of risk.

The “Caremark” Doctrine

One of the more notable developments in Delaware case law in recent years has been the revitalization of “Caremark duty” claims.  Caremark actions traditionally were notoriously difficult to plead—in explaining the doctrine, the Chancery Court famously called it “the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). In recent years, however, the Delaware courts have breathed new life into the Caremark doctrine by allowing these types of claims to proceed to discovery.

Specifically, the Caremark doctrine was returned to potency in 2019 following the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).  Although Marchand did not change the Caremark standard, it demonstrated the Delaware courts’ greater willingness to permit Caremark claims to pass the motion to dismiss phase if they could be plausibly pled.  Marchand ultimately laid the groundwork for a number of subsequent rulings demonstrating the renewed vitality of Caremark claims—not only have at least four Caremark suits survived a motion to dismiss since Marchand, but there are also several ongoing Caremark suits in Delaware.

Under Caremark, there are two distinct types of claims.  The first type concern a board’s failure to implement a system of controls to prevent some unlawful misconduct that occurred.  The second type of claims concern a failure to monitor by the directors.  It is imperative, therefore, that boards focus on:  (1) establishing adequate information and reporting systems to monitor “mission critical” aspects of their company’s business; and (2) monitoring those systems once in place.

The SEC’s Proposed New Climate-Related Disclosures

On March 21, 2022, the SEC proposed new rules requiring companies to report extensive line-item disclosures on climate-related ESG issues, entitled: “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors.”  If implemented as written, the proposed rules would require registrants to make significant additional disclosures regarding the impact of climate-related risks on their business.

Among other things, under the proposed rules, registrants would be required to disclose:

  1. Greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, regardless as to whether those emissions are deemed material by the company.  Emissions would now be reported by “scope” or type.

  2. “Climate-related risks” that are “reasonably likely to have a material impact,” including climate-related conditions and events that impact financial statements, business operations, or value chains.

  3. Governance disclosures related to climate risk, including how the board and management assess and manage these climate-related risks.

  4. Any targets or goals related to the reduction of GHG emissions.

These proposed new rules are part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to “advance consistent, clear, intelligible, comparable, and accurate disclosure of climate-related financial risk.”  Yet the sheer breadth, specificity, and complexity of the proposed rules would result in one of the most profound changes to public companies’ disclosure obligations in the history of the SEC.

Additional Caremark Exposure

The SEC’s climate-related disclosure rules will likely fuel ESG-related Caremark claims.  In particular, heightened disclosure requirements will provide ammunition for derivative or class action lawsuits and may expose companies to specific indirect risks, including heightened exposure to pre-suit discovery and proxy contests.

Direct Litigation Risk

The SEC’s new reporting requirements are likely to create new grounds for investors to assert liability claims against corporations and their boards of directors and management. Shareholders can be expected to leverage the new disclosures to seek to hold companies accountable for failing to properly oversee, mitigate or eliminate climate-related risk.  The revitalized Caremark doctrine is likely to be employed to allege boards and managers failed to oversee so-called “mission-critical” aspects of their business that generate climate-related risk.

In this vein, plaintiffs may choose to use disclosures required by the SEC’s proposed rules as the basis for a breach of duty to monitor or Caremark claim through either a derivative suit, brought on behalf of the company against its directors and officers, or a class action suit, brought on behalf of a class of injured shareholders or investors.  Caremark claims will likely arise if and when a board fails to exercise proper oversight with respect to climate-related risks or to consider proper mitigating steps. This new threat will be amplified for companies that (i) have yet to fully examine how ESG issues factor into their mission-critical operations or (ii) have yet to devote resources and personnel to measuring (using consistent, comparable and reliable data) and analyzing their own ESG-related risks. Companies need to be able to ascertain and address their most pressing ESG-related risks to avoid future Caremark liability.

Indirect Risks

Indirect risks from the proposed new disclosure regime may manifest in a variety of ways..  They can result in the disclosure of embarrassing or harmful information about a company, its board, or managers, and lead to the replacement of key company executives or directors by aggrieved shareholders.  Moreover, they give rise to issues that are expensive and resource-intensive to address.  While these risks are indirect to companies, they pose a direct threat to board members and managers.

Pre-Suit Discovery.  Boards can expect new disclosure requirements to enable shareholders to gain greater access to pre-suit discovery.  Section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporate Law provides shareholders with a qualified right to inspect a company’s books and records for suspected corporate wrongdoing or mismanagement, and need only demonstrate a “credible basis” to proceed.  The new ESG reporting requirements will likely provide shareholders with even more information as ammunition to fuel Section 220 demands.  Opening a company’s books to pre-suit discovery could expose boards, management, or companies to serious reputational harm, as well as provide fodder for future lawsuits against the current board.

Proxy Contests.  New ESG-related disclosures are also likely to generate greater turmoil in the form of proxy battles at the board level.  Historically, shareholder activists have been focused on addressing short-term profit, stock price and total shareholder return.  Yet activist campaigns containing an environmental or social objective have doubled as a proportion of campaigns overall during the five years between 2016 and 2021, including a successful campaign against Exxon to place directors on its board.  The proliferation of new ESG reporting requirements is expected to further fuel these contests, particularly with respect to companies that are perceived to be lagging on ESG commitments or expectations.

Avoiding Environmental-Caremark Claims

Companies should take several steps in preparation for the increased pressure expected to arise from the need to address ESG issues.

First, companies should be aware of the obligations and risks they face with regard to ESG issues.  That means determining what ESG-related risks could detrimentally impact a “mission-critical” aspect of a company’s business.  What is determined to be “mission-critical” will necessarily vary by company.

Second, once companies are cognizant of the ESG-related risks they face, they will need to start implementing appropriate governance structures so that they are aware of, and can take steps to address, ESG risks.  Directors should establish responsible committees and internal information and reporting procedures to ensure board members have proper oversight of these efforts.  This will allow boards to demonstrate their engagement in response to potential Caremark claims, as well as to respond to any ESG risks arising in the company’s operations.

Third, with these governance structures in place, companies must focus on generating, collecting, and analyzing consistent and comparable data on the ESG-related risks they face.  These data should be actively monitored by managers and board members so they can identify and address ESG risks before they result in catastrophic situations and resulting litigation.  And, if Caremark claims ensue, boards will be able to use these governance structures and reporting regimes to demonstrate that they have satisfied their oversight obligations.

Finally, once these systems are in place, companies should take steps to prepare for the adoption of the SEC’s new climate-related disclosure requirements.  The development of governance and reporting structures will undoubtedly aid in the collection of information for these purposes.  While taking these steps, it is advisable that corporate executives and boards seek input from subject matter experts and experienced legal counsel to help design and implement robust compliance and monitoring regimes that can help to discourage or forestall future litigation in the form of Caremark or other claims related to ESG issues.

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