Healthy Habits for You and Your Company: File Your Annual Reports, Replace Your Air Filters, and Renew Your DMCA Agent Registration

Businesses and people alike each have recurring routine tasks they need to perform to stay in good shape. Every year we prepare corporate filings, undergo our necessary medical examinations, and file our taxes.1 And starting in December 2019, companies began adding a new task to this checklist: renewing their DMCA Agent registration. Is your company prepared?

The DMCA can protect your website from its users’ copyright infringement.

Anyone with a website that allows users to post content to the site, even in a simple comment section, risks liability for copyright infringement based on those users’ posts. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) helps website owners mitigate that risk. If you operate a site and you comply with the safe harbor criteria, the DMCA shields you from copyright liability. The DMCA isn’t limited to internet service providers; its safe harbor offers websites an immensely valuable protection against costly and lengthy copyright infringement lawsuits. A registered Agent is only one of the many required elements needed for DMCA compliance, but it’s a crucial requirement that’s easy to overlook.

Congress passed the DMCA in 1998 to strike a balance between protecting the dynamic creativity of internet users and enforcing federal copyright protection. And regardless of whether you think Congress managed to find that balance, the DMCA sets the standard for statutory copyright enforcement on the internet—users ignore it at their peril. Websites that don’t comply with the DMCA must2 screen every comment and post submitted to the site by anyone for potential copyright violations, because the site can be held directly liable for any infringing submissions.3 On the other hand, DMCA compliance makes the website essentially immune from its users’ infringement.

Social media networks are the most obvious beneficiaries of DMCA safe harbor protection. Can you imagine if Facebook or Twitter needed to pre-screen every single post or tweet before it went live? In exchange for this safe harbor protection, the DMCA requires businesses to (among other things) create and enforce copyright takedown procedures for copyright holders to use when they spot potentially infringing content on the website.4

The Designated Agent is a key part of DMCA compliance.

Every organization that seeks safe harbor protection needs to designate an Agent as the organization’s point of contact for takedown notices. The designation is submitted to the U.S. Copyright Office, where it’s published on a searchable database. The designated Agent (which can be one person or an entire department) is then responsible for receiving all of the company’s DMCA takedown notices and then ensuring that they are acted upon.

Each Agent designation is effective for three years. Whenever the designated Agent’s information is updated with the Copyright Office, the three-year clock starts over. But if a three-year period ends without an update or renewal, the designation becomes invalid and the organization’s DMCA safe harbor protection ends with it.

You don’t want to forget about your renewal and you shouldn’t wait three years between checkups.

Fortunately, it’s pretty simple to figure out when your company’s Agent designation will expire. You can check the date that your organization’s Agent was last updated by searching the DMCA Designated Agent Directory and clicking on the name of the Service Provider.5 Add three years to the displayed effective date, and that’s your deadline.

You could, in theory, set a calendar reminder for every three years and forget about the DMCA in the interim, but we don’t recommend it. What if your Agent takes a leave of absence or leaves the company? What if your company reorganizes and the designated department is renamed (or gets lost in the transition)? We recommend that you check your Agent’s status at least once a year, just to be safe. It only takes a moment to do.

When in doubt, check with your attorneys to make sure that your rights are still being protected.

There’s much more to DMCA protection beyond Agent registration. Copyright law is constantly evolving—especially when it comes to the internet. DMCA safe harbor protection has many requirements beyond just having a designated Agent, and there’s a lot at risk if your company doesn’t qualify for the safe harbor. You can’t “undo” a gap in safe harbor protection, but you can close the door on future liability. That’s a door you want to keep shut. As your business’s online presence grows, so does its exposure to potential liability.

So when you’re checking your DMCA Agent registration, don’t just tick the box and wait until the next year. Take the time to consider your DMCA protocols. If your company’s DMCA compliance protocols aren’t up to date and compliant, your safe harbor is in jeopardy. What about the company’s future needs? If your company’s online presence will be growing, is your designated Agent capable of handling an increased caseload of takedown notices? This is an area where it’s better to be safe than sorry.

References:

This article is not meant to provide specific legal or medical advice. If you would like more specific legal advice, please contact an attorney. If you’re looking for specific medical advice, you’re reading the wrong article.
Or at least they really, really should.
3 Damages for copyright infringement are no joke. A successful plaintiff can receive their actual damages while also forcing the infringer to disgorge its profits from the infringement, or can alternatively obtain statutory damages of up to $150,000 per infringed work.
4 Many articles could be (and have been) written on abusive and overzealous DMCA takedown notices, especially since the development of automated takedown services that can act without human interaction. For brevity’s sake, this article won’t dive into those deep waters.
5 If you run a website, you should assume that you’re a service provider under the DMCA.


Copyright © 2020 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.

For more on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law section.

FTC Announces 2020 Thresholds for Merger Control Filings Under HSR Act and Interlocking Directorates Under the Clayton Act

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has announced its annual revisions to the dollar jurisdictional thresholds in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (“HSR Act”); the revised thresholds will become effective 30 days after the date of their publication in the Federal Register.  These changes increase the dollar thresholds necessary to trigger the HSR Act’s premerger notification reporting requirements.  The FTC also increased the thresholds for interlocking directorates under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, effective as of January 21, 2020.

Revised HSR Thresholds

Under the HSR Act, parties involved in proposed mergers, acquisitions of voting securities, unincorporated interests or assets, or other business combinations (e.g., joint ventures, exclusive license deals) that meet certain thresholds must report the contemplated transactions to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) unless an exemption applies.  The parties to a proposed transaction that requires notification under the HSR Act must observe a statutorily prescribed waiting period (generally 30 days) before closing.  Under the revised thresholds, transactions valued at $94 million or less are not reportable under the HSR Act.

A transaction closing on or after the date the revised thresholds become effective may be reportable if it meets the following revised criteria:

Size of Transaction Test

The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $376 million;

or

The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $94million but not more than $376 millionand the Size of Person thresholds below are met.

Size of Person Test

One party (including the party’s ultimate parent entity and its controlled subsidiaries) has at least $188 million in total assets or annual sales, and the other has at least $18.8 million in total assets or annual sales. If the acquired party is not “engaged in manufacturing,” and is not controlled by an entity that is, the test applied to the acquired side is annual sales of $188 million or total assets of $18.8 million.

 The full list of the revised thresholds is as follows:

Original Threshold

2019 Threshold

2020 Revised Threshold
(Effective 30 days after publication 
in the Federal Register)

$10 million

$18 million

$18.8 million

$50 million

$90 million

$94 million

$100 million

$180 million

$188 million

$110 million

$198  million

$206.8 million

$200 million

$359.9 million

$376 million

$500 million

$899.8 million

$940.1 million

$1 billion

$1,799.5 million

$1,880.2 million

The filing fees for reportable transactions have not changed, but the transaction value ranges to which they apply have been adjusted as follows:

Filing Fee

Revised Size of Transaction Thresholds

$45,000

For transactions valued in excess of $94 million but less than $188 million

$125,000

For transactions valued at $188 million or greater but less than $940.1 million

$280,000

For transactions valued at $940.1 million or more

Note that the HSR dollar thresholds are only part of the analysis to determine whether a particular transaction must be reported to the FTC and DOJ.  Failure to notify the FTC and DOJ under the HSR Act remains subject to a statutory penalty of up to $43,280 per day of noncompliance.

Revised Thresholds for Interlocking Directorates

Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits one person from simultaneously serving as an officer or director of two corporations if: (1) the “interlocked” corporations each have combined capital, surplus, and undivided profits of more than $38,204,000 (up from $36,564,000); (2) each corporation is engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and (3) the corporations are “by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws.”1

Section 8 provides several exemptions from the prohibition on interlocks for arrangements where the competitive overlaps “are too small to have competitive significance in the vast majority of situations.”2  After the revised thresholds take effect, a corporate interlock does not violate the statute if: (1) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $3,820,400 (up from $3,656,400); (2) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than 2 percent of that corporation’s total sales; or (3) the competitive sales of each corporation are less than 4 percent of that corporation’s total sales.

The revised dollar thresholds for interlocking directorates of $38,204,000 and $3,820,400 will be effective upon publication in the Federal Register; there is no 30-day delay as there is for the HSR thresholds.


1   15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B).

2   S. Rep. No. 101-286, at 5-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4100, 4103-04.


© Copyright 2020 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

For more on Hart-Scott-Rodino thresholds, see the National Law Review Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation section.

Illinois House Bill Requires Corporations to Report to Secretary of State

House Bill 3394, approved by the Governor on August 27, 2019 and effective immediately (Public Act 100-589), amends the Business Corporation Act of 1983 (“BCA”) to add new Section 8.12 and amend Section 14.05.

New BCA Section 8.12 provides that domestic and foreign corporations, as soon as possible but not later than January 1, 2021, to report to the Secretary of State, on its Annual Report:

  1. Whether the corporation is a publicly held domestic or foreign corporation with its principal executive office located in Illinois
  2. Data on specific qualifications, skills and experience that the corporation considers for its board of directors, nominees for the board of directors and executive officers
  3. Whether each member of the corporation’s board of directors self-identifies as a minority person and, if so, which race or ethnicity to which the member belongs
  4. Other information

New BCA Section 8.12 also requires the Secretary to State to make the information public and report the information to the University of Illinois which is to review the reported information and publish, on its website, a report that provides aggregate data on the demographic characteristics of the boards of directors and executive officers of corporations filing an annual report for the preceding year along with an individualized rating (establish by the University of Illinois assessing the representation of women and minorities on corporate boards)  for each such corporation. The University of Illinois’ is also required to identify strategies for promoting diversity and inclusion among boards of directors and corporate executive officers.

BCA Section 14.05 as amended adds new Sections 14.05(k) and 14.05(l).  New BCA Section 14.05(k) requires each corporation or foreign corporation to state on its Annual Report whether the corporation has outstanding shares listed on a major United States stock exchange and is thereby subject to the reporting requirements of new BCA Section 8.12.  New BCA Section 14.05(l) requires corporations subject to new BCA Section 8.12 to provide the information required by new BCA Section 8.12.

It is our understanding that Form 14.05, Illinois Annual Report, is currently being amended to reflect these changes.


© Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered 2020. All Rights Reserved.

For more on corporate reporting requirements, see the National Law Review Corporate & Business Organizations law page.

California Board Gender Quota Law Challenged In Federal Court

Cydney Posner at Cooley LLP wrote last week about a new challenge to California’s Board Gender Quota law.  The lawsuit, Creighton Meland v. Alex Padilla, Secretary of State of California, was reportedly filed in federal district court in California by a shareholder of OSI Systems, Inc.  According to OSI’s most recently filed Form 10-Q, the company is incorporated in Delaware, its principal executive offices are in California, and its shares are traded on The Nasdaq Global Select Market.  The lawsuit alleges violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

As this case progresses, one question might be whether the plaintiff’s claim is direct or derivative.  OSI is not named as a party to the lawsuit and the plaintiff alleges that the law injures his “right to vote for the candidate of his choice, free from the threat that the corporation will be fined if he votes without regard to sex”.  The Delaware Supreme Court’s test for whether a stockholder’s action for breach of fiduciary duty is derivative or direct asks two questions:

“Who suffered the alleged harm–the corporation or the suing stockholder individually–and who would receive the benefit of the recovery or other remedy?”

Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).  Although the corporation will be fined and the fine suffered by all of the stockholders, the plaintiff is alleging that he is being injured by being denied the freedom to vote without regard to sex.  Presumably, that injury would be removed if the law is enjoined.

Interestingly, OSI does not appear in the California Secretary of State’s listing of SB 826 corporations published earlier this year.  According to the proxy statement filed by OSI last month, all of the current directors are men, but a female has been nominated for election at the upcoming meeting.


© 2010-2019 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

More on Corporate Board diversity rules on the Corporate & Business Organizations law page of the National Law Review

How to Write Gender-Neutral Contracts

“Men” is not synonymous to “person”, nor does “he” mean “she.”  It is important for contractual language to be not only precise but also accurate.  Many agreements govern multiple individuals, some of whose gender is unclear or variable.  This article will give you advice and guidance on how to adjust contract language to be gender-neutral.  As society moves towards treating all genders equally, legal contracts should too.

What is gender?

Gender is the socially constructed characteristics of “male” and “female” and includes norms, roles, and relationships of and between groups of men and women.

What is gender-neutral?

Merriam-Webster defines gender-neutral as “not referring to either sex but only to people in general.”

Why it matters:

Conversations around gender and gender-neutrality are becoming more and more mainstream.  Thomson Reuters reported that in the past year (2018), there has been an increase in the number of clients requesting gender-neutral documents.  Startups are at the forefront of change and industry disruption, so it is logical that they stay ahead of the trend.

As you operate business, there are a number of form contracts that you will use regularly.  These form contracts are agreements your attorney drafts with brackets and spaces for you to update depending on each use.  For example, common form contracts include (1) Employee Offer Letters, (2) Confidentiality, Nondisclosure, and Assignment of Inventions Agreements, (3) Equity Incentive Plan, (4) Stock Option Grants, and (5) Restricted Stock Purchase Agreement.

Traditionally, these form contracts used masculine pronouns.  It used to be that progressive contracts simply did not use “he” but rather “she” or “he or she.”  As Thomson Reuters reported:

“In the old days it was almost certain that your senior employees would be men; a contract would be drafted accordingly, and then the ladies would be given a metaphorical pat on the head by including in the boilerplate the reassurance that references to the male gender should be interpreted to include the female.”

Now, the shift towards non-gendered pronouns and away from binary choices of “he” or “she” means attorneys need to adopt new drafting techniques.  As entrepreneurs and leaders of your own business, you can encourage this shift.

What to do:

Replace the masculine pronoun with an article, for example using “the position” in place of “his position”

  1.  Use a neutral word or phrase such as “person” or “individual”

  2. Define the term and repeat that noun

  3. Rewrite the sentence in order to eliminate the pronoun completely

What to be wary of (for now):

  1. Using the singular “they” and its other grammatical forms to refer to indefinite pronouns and singular nouns, for example using “they” in place of “she” and “them,” “themselves,” and “their” in place of “her,” “herself,” and “hers.”

    1. Part of drafting a contract is using precise language.  While there is rising social acceptance of the use of singular “they,” a court has not ruled on its interpretation in contracts.  Likely, it will take legal precedent in Delaware interpreting such use to accept the use of the singular “they.”

    2. This same logic applies to the use of the singular “ze.”

  2. Using the plural “they.”

    1. Similarly, the use of the plural can be misleading.  For an employment offer letter, for instance, the offer is not to a number of people but rather to one individual.

  3. catch-all clause like “Unless the context otherwise requires, a reference to one gender shall include reference to the other genders”

    1. It was offensive when the use of male pronouns were supposed to encompass women and men. Such use effectively reinforced gender stereotypes.  It is equally offensive when it is used to refer to all genders.

Gender neutrality facilitates accurate, precise contracts.  It is important that an individual who is subject to a contract feel as though the contract applies to that individual.  In addition, that individual should also feel respected.


©1994-2019 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

ARTICLE BY Kati I. Pajak of Mintz.

Corporate Closedown Does Not Shield Boss From Potential TCPA Culpability

So, your corporation is sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). One defense strategy if you are the founder and sole owner: cease operations, terminate your employees, close your offices, formally dissolve the corporation and live in British Columbia. No potential individual exposure for TCPA violations in Alabama – right?

Not so fast, said the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in Eric K. Williams v. John G. Schanck. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151778, Case No.:5-15-cv-01434-MHH, decided September 6, 2019. Mr. Williams originally sued Stellar Recovery, Inc., a company founded and solely owned by Schanck, for collection calls made to the plaintiff’s cellphone in Alabama. Mr. Schanck then told the Court in a telephone conference call that “Stellar Recovery had dissolved and did not intend to participate in this lawsuit.” Mr. Williams moved to amend his complaint to add Mr. Schanck individually and Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala granted his motion.

But, wait a minute, countered Mr. Schanck. Service of the amended complaint on me in Vancouver, British Columbia does not afford the Court personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, Mr. Williams is too late because he added me as a defendant after the four-year TCPA statute of limitations had passed. So, Mr. Schanck moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), respectively.

The Court was unconvinced on both counts.

First, on the jurisdictional issue, the Court examined whether Mr. Schanck’s alleged contacts with the State of Alabama were sufficient to satisfy specific jurisdiction (i.e., “contacts within the forum state give rise to the action before the court”). Mr. Williams asserted that Mr. Schanck “guide[d], over[saw], and ratifie[d] all operations of…Stellar” and knew of the “‘violations of the TCPA alleged’ in the complaint and ‘agreed to and ratified such actions of his company.’” Indeed, throughout the complaint, Mr. Williams contended that “Stellar acted on behalf of Defendant Schanck.”

Mr. Schanck did “not challenge the factual allegations concerning his ownership interest in Stellar or his managerial control over the company.” Rather, he contended that the “corporate shield doctrine” precluded the Court from exercising jurisdiction over him. However, Judge Haikala noted that the “express language of the TCPA allows actions against corporate officers who authorize TCPA violations” and Mr. Williams “has alleged just that – that Mr. Schanck directed and authorized the alleged TCPA violations that purportedly occurred in this District.” Motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2) denied.

Second, the Court also dispensed with the statute of limitations issue. The Court concluded that the claim against Mr. Schanck as an individual arose out of the “conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Under such circumstances, the claims in the amended complaint could relate back to Mr. Williams original complaint.

But, Mr. Schanck argued, Mr. Williams knew about him and his status in Stellar yet chose only to sue the latter. Therefore, there could have been no mistake on his part about the “identity” of the proper party (i.e., Mr. Schanck) to sue and the FRCP 15(c) requirements regarding the timing of serving Mr. Schanck as a new defendant were not met.

Correcting Mr. Schanck’s application of that requirement, the Court noted that the issue was not about Mr. Williams knowledge, but “whether Mr. Schanck himself knew or should have known that he would be named as a defendant ‘but for an error’” by Mr. Williams. And at this stage, “if Mr. Williams contentions about Mr. Schanck’s involvement with Stellar prove correct,” then Mr. Schanck “reasonably should have known that he would be named as a defendant but for an error.” Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) denied.

So some TCPAWorld lessons learned about the solidity of the “corporate” shield when one person allegedly runs the company show.


© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

“Broken Link in the Chain of Liability”: MTCA Decision Highlights Intricacies of Corporate Law

Last week, in a decision highlighting the overlay of environmental and corporate law, a Washington federal district court dismissed claims seeking remediation costs, attorneys’ fees, and a declaratory judgment on liability under the Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) by the current owner of a service station in Cle Elem against Chevron Corp., Chevron USA, Inc., and unnamed “predecessor companies and subsidiaries.” Short Stop Shell, LLC v. Chevron Corp., No. 1:19-cv-03103-RMP, Dkt. No. 43 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2019) (Order Granting in Part & Denying in Part Defendants’ Mot. to Dismiss & Denying Plaintiff’s Mot. for Summ. J.). The court rejected the allegation that the Chevron entities were corporate successors to Texaco, Inc., which was believed to be responsible for contamination at the service station.

The court’s findings reflect a limitation on the sweeping liability under MTCA and similar statutes, the relevance of corporate transactions in minimizing such liability, and the potential difficulty of identifying proper corporate defendants before filing lawsuits for cost recovery at contaminated sites.

Site Background – Petroleum Contamination at Service Station

The claims alleged that, until 1984, Texaco owned and operated the service station where contamination had been disposed or released at the property. In 2000, Texaco agreed to indemnify an owner of the service station for “actual petroleum contamination originating from the Property in excess of clean up levels [that] originated from Texaco’s operation of a gasoline … facility … or from deliveries of motor fuels to the station ….” Then, in 2001, Chevron Corp. acquired Texaco in a “reverse triangular merger.”

The plaintiff acquired the property in 2012, decommissioned several underground storage tanks alleged to be leaking, and incurred over $275,000 in remediation costs.

Court Decision – “Broken Link in the Chain of Liability”

Ultimately, the court concluded that the “reverse triangular merger,” in which Texaco merged with a subsidiary of Chevron Corp., did not cause Chevron to assume Texaco’s liabilities. Rather, Texaco remained a “separate entity” as a Chevron subsidiary and Chevron was not a successor to Texaco’s liabilities. The Court found further that suing unnamed defendants was a “disfavored practice” and agreed to strike the “John Doe”-style pleading that included a general reference to the defendants’ “predecessor companies and subsidiaries.”

The court also rejected a judicial estoppel theory that the defendants had already accepted liability “through their actions,” which included interactions between Chevron EMC, a Chevron subsidiary “that manages environmental matters for affiliated companies, including Texaco,” and Ecology. Notably, the court determined that even if, in an ambiguous exchange with Ecology in 2003, Chevron had accepted “potentially liable person status,” that such an acceptance did not amount to a “representation” that the defendants had “expressly assumed Texaco’s liabilities.”

However, litigation is likely to continue. In order to “properly allege a theory of liability,” the court granted the plaintiff leave to incorporate allegations in an amended complaint that the defendants “delivered gasoline products to tanks” that they “knew were leaking.”


© 2019 Beveridge & Diamond PC
For more in environmental contamination, see the National Law Review Environmental, Energy & Resources law page.

Can The Secretary Of State Refuse To Enforce California’s Board Gender Quota Law?

The constitutional infirmities of California’s novel board gender quota law have been remarked on by everyone from former Governor Jerry Brown to the legislative consultants who prepared bill analyses.  Now there is a pending constitutional challenge.  See Legal Challenge To California Board Gender Quota Law Filed.  In the meantime, should Secretary of State continue to expend funds to administer and enforce a law that is constitutionally suspect?

It is doubtful that the Secretary of State may refuse to enforce the law even if he concludes that it is unconstitutional.  The reason lies with Article III, Section 3.5(a) of the California Constitution which provides:

“An administrative agency, including an administrative agency created by the Constitution or an initiative statute, has no power:

(a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a determination that such statute is unconstitutional;”

The California Constitution does not define “administrative agency” and it thus may be argued that this provision does not apply to a constitutional officer per se.  However, a panel of the Court of Appeal has assumed that the Secretary of State is subject to the policy, if not the letter, of Article III, Section 3.5(a). Stirling v. Jones, 66 Cal. App. 4th 277, 288 n.3 (1998).  The California Supreme Court granted, and then withdrew, review of the case.  At the request of the Secretary of State, the Supreme Court ordered the depublication of the case.  Stirling v. Jones, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 6656.


© 2010-2019 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
Read more about board diversity on the National Law Review Corporate & Business Organizations law page.

Delaware, Consent, And The Adequacy Of Email Notice

Since the turn of this century, Delaware has allowed corporations to give notices to stockholders by electronic transmission.  8 Del. Code § 232(a).  However, the statute is conditioned upon the stockholder’s consent.  California has a similar consent requirement in Corporations Code § 20.  Delaware is now proposing to amend Section 232 to permit a corporation to give notice by electronic mail unless the stockholder has objected.  See Senate Bill No. 88.  The bill would also define “electronic mail” for the first time.

As I was pondering these changes, I came across the following observations about the adequacy of email notifications penned by the estimable and eminently quotable Justice William W. Bedsworth of the California Court of Appeal:

“Email has many things to recommend it; reliability is not one of them. Between the ease of mistaken address on the sender’s end and the arcane vagaries of spam filters on the recipient’s end, email is ill-suited for a communication on which a million dollar lawsuit may hinge.  A busy calendar, an overfull in-box, a careless autocorrect, even a clumsy keystroke resulting in a ‘delete’ command can result in a speedy communication being merely a failed one.”

Lasalle v. Vogel, 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 533 (footnote omitted).  Justice Bedsworth’s comments were directed to the adequacy of email notice before taking a default judgment and not the Delaware bill.  Nonetheless, his concerns about the adequacy of email are entirely opposite to stockholder notice.

 

© 2010-2019 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
Read more about Corporate Law on the National Law Review Corporate & Business Law page.

Seller Beware? 4 Key Features of Business Sale Transactions that Sellers Should be Familiar with Before Negotiating

You have prepared your business for sale and have determined an enterprise value with which you are comfortable. Perhaps you have already found a buyer and signed a letter of intent, or at least agreed in principle on the overall purchase price for the business.

While determining the overall value of your company is an important step, negotiating the final terms of the business sale is just as important and oftentimes is far more arduous. Some business owners, especially first-time sellers, are surprised by the complexity of the sale process and are unprepared for negotiating through the many common provisions that affect how, when, and even if the full purchase price is ultimately disbursed to the seller.

This article analyzes key deal terms of a business sale and provisions that affect the timing and ultimate payment of the purchase price. This article also reviews the responsibilities of the parties after the deal closes, so that sellers can anticipate what the buyer is likely to demand and how to negotiate from a position of strength. It is important for sellers to keep in mind that nearly all of the items described here are designed to allocate risk. Buyers want to receive the value they expected from purchasing the business and allocate risk to the seller if there is an unexpected obstacle in the transition to new ownership. Sellers want to avoid business-related risks after closing and retain as much of the full purchase price as possible.

Understanding these key provisions allow sellers to identify early in the process which provisions may be more or less risky based on their understanding of the business, which provisions to prioritize, and how to build a negotiating platform that fits their expectations and goals. Sellers should consult with financial and legal consultants for the most recent market trends and figures related to the topics in this article.

Feature #1: Economic Terms.

Generally, buyers want to avoid going after a seller post-closing to recover funds already disbursed because the funds may no longer be available; to accomplish this, buyers want to maintain control over some portion of the purchase price funds until their window for making claims against the seller has expired. This section outlines common economic terms in purchase agreements that affect the timing of payments to the seller and portion of the overall price ultimately paid by the buyer.

Escrow Holdback. A certain portion of the purchase price will be placed in escrow at closing and held for a period of time in order to fund post-closing claims against the seller without requiring the buyer to go directly after the seller for proceeds already disbursed. The escrow holdback is usually a key provision of the deal and heavily negotiated by both parties given the funds in escrow are at risk and not available to the seller until the escrow holding period expires. The amount of funds held in escrow will vary depending on deal size, industry, business risk, negotiating leverage and other factors.

Escrow Holding Period. In connection with the amount of funds held in escrow, sellers should consider the amount of time that is acceptable to the seller for the escrow funds to be unavailable to the seller at risk for buyer claims. A longer holding period can often be a trade-off on the part of the seller to get a better position on a different priority during negotiations, but the seller must balance their short-term cash needs against the longer holding period. The escrow holding period can range from months to a few years after the closing date.

Target Working Capital. The seller is generally expected to provide working capital to fund the operations of the business immediately after closing, and the seller and buyer should work together to come to a realistic working capital number. At closing, the buyer will calculate the actual working capital in the business using an agreed-upon formula, at which time the parties will “true up” the working capital to match their agreed-upon target number. If the actual working capital at closing is deficient compared to the agreed-upon target working capital, the seller must pay the difference to the buyer. If the actual net working capital is in excess of the targeted amount at closing, the buyer will pay the excess amount to the seller, increasing the seller’s proceeds from the business. Keep in mind that working capital adjustments, unless otherwise agreed to, are generally considered separate from indemnity claims and are usually paid within 90 to 120 days after closing.

Set-off Rights. A purchase agreement may contain broad set-off rights in favor of the buyer, allowing the buyer to set-off funds owed to the seller but still in the buyer’s possession (such as working capital excess, or earned but unpaid earn-outs) against claims the buyer has against the seller. Setoffs are another way for buyers to mitigate risk by controlling funds.  Sellers should be careful that set-off provisions are consistent with indemnity provisions to avoid having more funds at risk than anticipated.

Earn-outs. The parties may agree to pay a portion of the purchase price in future year earn-outs, such as annual bonuses to the seller for meeting certain financial metrics in post-closing business operations. Buyers may favor earn-out provisions if the seller is going to remain an employee of the ongoing business, as it aligns interests in working toward the continued success of the business. For sellers, earn-outs can be a great way to negotiate a better purchase price and push a portion of the seller’s tax liability into future years; however, the benefits must be balanced against the likelihood of meeting the earn-out metrics and the seller’s short-term financial needs. An earn-out can also bridge the gap if the parties disagree about the value of the business.

Feature #2: Indemnification.

Indemnification provisions provide the buyer recourse against the seller for post-closing expenses and liabilities resulting from the seller’s misrepresentations or inaccuracies when providing the buyer with information (or withholding material information) during due diligence. As discussed further below, buyers will often try to expand their indemnity coverage through various legal provisions.

Representations and Warranties (RWs). RWs are assurances that the seller makes and on which the buyer relies when purchasing the business and are the basis for the buyer’s indemnification claims after taking over operations. A seller’s breach of RWs resulting in costs to the buyer triggers indemnification claims to recover the damage caused by the seller’s breach. RWs are generally divided into two types: fundamental and non-fundamental.

  • Fundamental. RWs are critical to the buyer’s willingness to consummate the transaction, and which, if breached, usually call into question the legitimacy or enforcement of the entire business sale. Breaches of fundamental RWs carry higher indemnification liability for the seller in order to place the buyer in a position as if the transaction never occurred. Fundamental RWs commonly include representations regarding ownership of the business equity, authority to enter into the transaction, and non-existence of other ownership claims against the business. They may also include other key issues or risks that the buyer feels are especially important to the deal.

  • Non-fundamental. RWs are statements and disclosures made by the seller that the buyer relies on for a smooth transition of ownership and operations of the business immediately after the closing date; generally, this includes all RWs made by the seller in the purchase agreement that are not fundamental RWs.

Ideally, sellers will want to make as few fundamental RWs as possible; the goal is to (i) limit the seller’s top-end exposure to a handful of statements that the seller is generally comfortable making, and (ii) cap the remainder of its aggregate liability to the indemnity cap amount. Sellers can be creative in reducing the number of fundamental representations they need to make by working with buyers to find alternative ways to mitigate buyer risk and seller liability; for example, exploring insurance options can be a sound strategy.

Indemnity Threshold. The indemnity threshold sets the minimum amount of aggregate damages a buyer must accrue against a seller before the buyer can recover any damages for indemnity claims. There are two main types of indemnity threshold:

  • Deductible. The “deductible” method of indemnity operates much like consumer insurance. The buyer must absorb all aggregate damages up to the “deductible” (indemnity threshold) amount, and the seller indemnifies the buyer for all claims in excess of the indemnity threshold.

  • First Dollar. The first dollar method of indemnity requires the seller to pay all damages once the buyer’s aggregate damages reach the threshold amount. Illustratively, this can be thought of as a tipping bucket. The buyer must “fill” the bucket with damages against the seller. Once the amount of damages fills the bucket (reaches the indemnity threshold amount), the bucket “tips” and all damages down to the “first dollar” become the liability of the seller.

Ideally, sellers want the deductible type of indemnity threshold because it reduces their overall risk. However, sellers may be able to leverage a concession on first dollar indemnity in exchange for a higher threshold amount, which can ultimately produce a better outcome because the likelihood of any liability is reduced as the threshold amount increases. Additionally, sellers should try to negotiate indemnity threshold provisions in tandem with other indemnity provisions.

Indemnity Cap. Whereas the indemnity threshold sets the minimum amount of damages a buyer must accrue before the seller is liable, the indemnity cap limits the maximum amount the buyer can recover due to the seller’s breach of RWs. The indemnity cap is often a heavily negotiated provision, as it caps the risk for the seller, and conversely, raises the cost to the buyer for the most expensive seller breaches. For fundamental representations, the indemnity cap usually equals the full purchase price of the business. For non-fundamental representations, the indemnity cap is commonly a fraction of the deal value. Matching the indemnity cap to the escrow holdback amount can provide benefits to both parties: the buyer does not need to recover any funds directly from the seller; and, barring breach of a fundamental representation, the funds disbursed to the seller at closing are not at risk.

Indemnity Period. The indemnity period is the amount of time that the buyer has to make a claim against the seller for breach of the seller’s RWs. Generally, fundamental representations survive until, at minimum, the statute of limitations expires on the underlying claim. For example, if one of the seller’s fundamental representations is that all taxes have been timely paid, the indemnity period for the seller’s tax representations might be the time limit that the IRS could audit or bring a claim for unpaid tax liability accrued through the closing dates.

Non-fundamental representations often have a much shorter indemnity period, which may match the escrow holding period or expire according to some other defined schedule, usually not longer than a couple of years after closing. Sellers want the shortest possible indemnity period; however, defining which RWs are fundamental versus non-fundamental may be more productive than spending negotiating capital on shortening the indemnity period, where there is often less room to maneuver.

Feature # 3: Legal Provisions.

This section covers terms only a lawyer could love—obscurely worded and buried deep in the bowels of the purchase agreement far removed from the exciting topics like financial terms; however, these legal provisions affect the overall application of the economics and liabilities of the deal, which can have sweeping consequences for the seller if not properly understood and negotiated.

For sellers, ideally both of the terms discussed below – knowledge disclaimers and materiality scrapes – would be removed from any purchase agreement; however, transaction trends show that about half of all purchase agreements contain at least one of these legal provisions, if not both. Depending on the seller’s negotiating leverage, they may have to decide whether to walk away from the deal or get comfortable with these provisions and try to use them as leverage for a better position on other negotiating points.

Knowledge Disclaimers/Sandbagging Provisions. Knowledge disclaimer provisions (commonly referred to as “sandbagging” provisions) generally prescribe that a buyer’s right to recover from a seller is not affected by the buyer’s knowledge, whether by the seller’s disclosure or the buyer’s own due diligence, of the inaccuracy or noncompliance by the seller of a representation or warranty. Stated more simply, the buyer is saying to the seller, “Even though we knew about the inaccuracy of your representations before we closed the deal, we can still sue you for any damages resulting from those misrepresentations after closing.” From the buyer’s point of view, this encourages proper due diligence and may be added protection. From the seller’s perspective, this makes due diligence an expensive but largely meaningless exercise, wherein buyers can identify deal flaws but consummate the transaction anyway and then sue the seller post-closing.

From a practical standpoint, sellers can mitigate this risk by properly disclosing exceptions to their RWs in disclosure schedules, which are incorporated into the purchase agreement and make the seller’s RWs accurate with the incorporated disclosures.

Materiality Scrape. A materiality scrape is a stand-alone provision that purports to eliminate materiality qualifiers from some or all other provisions of the agreement when: determining a breach of a seller representation or warranty; assessing damages for a breach; or both.

Because this concept is a legal art form, the following example will illustrate how this provision operates: The seller represents to the buyer that the company is in material compliance with all required permits at the date of closing. The company requires a permit to store a barrel of industrial cleaning chemicals that the business uses infrequently in its operations. Right before closing the seller files a renewal application for the chemical permit, but the application is filed three days late which results in the buyer being assessed a $20 late application fee after closing when the permit is finally processed and renewed.

Generally, this breach would not be considered material, as the permit is likely not material to operations and the permit is not adversely affected by a late renewal application. Additionally, the damages ($20) would also not be material, as it is a very small amount relative to the business’ day-to-day expenses and operations. Therefore, the seller would not have breached its representation regarding permit compliance. However, if the purchase agreement contains a materiality scrape, then for purposes of determining a breach of the permit compliance representation, we would ignore the word “material” and in theory the buyer would have a claim against the seller for each technical breach of the seller’s RWs, including permit compliance. Additionally, if the materiality scrape also affects the determination of damages, the buyer would include every damage claim, no matter how small (including the $20 late fee in our example above), to its aggregate claims against the seller, potentially filling the indemnity threshold bucket much faster than if only material claims were considered.

In fact, materiality scrapes can have the effect of filling the indemnity threshold quickly, so a seller may want to try to mitigate this risk by pushing for a higher indemnity threshold as a tradeoff.

Feature #4: Ancillary Documents.

Depending on how the business sale is structured, there may be substantial ancillary documentation in connection with the transaction, such as transition agreements, consulting agreements, employment agreements, shareholder agreements, and non-competition/non-solicitation agreements, to name a few. Although an in-depth review of these agreements is outside the scope of this article, it is important for sellers to analyze how the ancillary documentation operates in connection with the purchase agreement and how it affects the financial goals of the seller, such as illiquidity of assets, inability to re-enter the market, ongoing obligations or liabilities, and liquidation event triggers that are out of the seller’s control, among others.

For example, if the seller receives the buyer company’s stock as partial consideration for the sale of the business, the seller will likely be required to execute a shareholders agreement which may contain “black out” periods or call options where a buyer can force the seller to sell their shares. Sellers should not wait until just before closing to review and negotiate the terms of ancillary documentation; instead, sellers should request drafts of and review any other ancillary documentation concurrently with the purchase agreement so that all terms of the deal can be analyzed together in connection with the seller’s overall strategy.

Conclusion

When preparing to sell a business, the big issues, such as finding the right buyer and company valuation, are key considerations; however, the terms of the sale can be just as important for the seller, especially as it relates to ongoing risk and short-term financial planning. Buyers want the benefit of their purchase and prefer to hold back some portion of the purchase price until their window for bringing claims against the seller expires. Sellers want to ultimately receive the full purchase price and feel secure in moving on after closing without the threat of claims against their proceeds.

By preparing for key purchase agreement terms ahead of time, sellers can identify which terms to prioritize, which terms to sacrifice for negotiating leverage, and areas where creative solutions may be appropriate. And perhaps more importantly, sellers can plan the terms of the deal around their financial needs and expectations.

Copyright © 2019 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Jessica Ann Benford and Joshua J. Hencik.