Category: Constitutional Law

Treasury Department Recognizes All Legal Marriages for Tax Purposes

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On August 29, 2013, the Treasury Department issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17, Internal Revenue Bulletin 2013-38, which states that same-sex couple legally married in jurisdictions that recognize their marriage will be treated as married for ALL federal tax purposes. As a result, legally married same-sex couples are treated the same as legally married opposite-sex couples for federal tax purposes if the state of ceremony of their marriage recognizes same-sex marriage even if their state of residence does not recognize same-sex marriage.

This Ruling has significant impact for legally married same-sex couples and their tax advisors. However, it does not impact state law rules regarding the definition of marriage and may complicate income tax filings for same-sex couples legally married but living in a state that does not yet recognize their marriage, like Wisconsin and Illinois.

Background Leading Up to the Ruling

The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was enacted by President Clinton in 1996. Section Two of DOMA says states do not have to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states. Section Three of DOMA defined marriage for all federal purposes as only between one man and one woman.

On June 26, 2013, in Windsor v. United States (Windsor), the United States Supreme Court held that Section Three of DOMA was unconstitutional. Therefore, any same-sex married couple that lives in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage is to be treated the same for all purposes as any other married couple, and thereby are entitled to all of the 1,138 rights and privileges under federal law that are granted to married persons, which includes federal tax law.

Section Two of DOMA was unaffected by Windsor. Therefore, a same-sex couple that marries in one of the thirteen states that recognizes same-sex marriage who then moves to one of the thirty-seven states that does not recognize same-sex marriage would not be treated as married if the state of residence determines whether a couples is considered married, as opposed to the state of ceremony determining if a couple is married.

Absent guidance from the Treasury Department, a same-sex couple legally married in a recognition jurisdiction who then move to a state that does not recognize same-sex marriage, would most likely not be treated as married for federal tax law purposes. This is because the majority of federal tax laws are determined by a couple’s state of residence, not the state of ceremony of their marriage.

State of Ceremony Versus State of Residence

Consider the following examples to illustrate Windsor and this Ruling:

Britney and Jason are married in a drive-through chapel by an Elvis impersonator in Las Vegas and then go home to California. Their opposite-sex marriage is recognized for federal tax law purposes in California (and all other states) because California recognizes legal Nevada marriages. Sadly, Britney and Jason’s marriage only lasted 55 hours.

Mitchell and Cam are a same-sex couple married in New York (New York being a state of ceremony that recognizes same-sex marriage) and move back to Milwaukee (Wisconsin being a state of residence that does not recognize same-sex marriage). Prior to the Revenue Ruling, Mitchell and Cam are not married for federal law purposes, even though their marriage would be recognized if they stayed in New York. This is because Article Two of DOMA says that Wisconsin does not have to recognize New York marriages.

After the Revenue Ruling, with an effective date after September 16, 2013, Mitchell and Cam in Wisconsin will be treated as married for federal tax law purposes just like Britney and Jason in California. Mitchell and Cam will be able to utilize all federal tax laws Britney and Jason would be able to utilize (if Britney and Jason had respected the sanctity of their marriage).

Federal Tax Impact of Ruling

As a result of the Revenue Ruling, regardless of a couple’s state of residence, if they are married in a state that legally recognizes their marriage, the couple will be entitled to the following federal tax law benefits (among others): filing status as married filing jointly, claiming personal and dependency exemptions, taking the standard deduction, employee benefits, contributing to an IRA, spousal rollovers of IRA’s, unlimited marital deduction for estate and gift tax purposes, gift tax splitting, and estate tax exemption portability.

The Revenue Ruling does not apply to registered domestic partnerships, civil unions, or similar formal relationships recognized under state law that are not considered “marriage” under state law.

Legally married same-sex couples must file their 2013 income tax returns as either “married filing jointly” or “married filing separately.” They may also, but are not required to, file amended returns for open years (generally 2010, 211, and 2012) to be treated as married for federal tax law purposes.

Also, if an employee purchased health insurance coverage from their employer on an after-tax basis for their same-sex spouse, they may now treat the amounts paid for that coverage as pre-tax and excludable from their income, and file amended returns for a refund for open years. Further, if their employer paid Medicare and Social Security tax on those taxable benefits to the employee, the employer may file for a refund for both the employee and employer portions of those overpayments for open years.

Continuing Issues in Non-Recognition States

As of August 30, 2013, the District of Columbia and thirteen states (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington) recognize same-sex marriage. Therefore, clients who get married in those states or have employees who get married in those states, but subsequently reside in a non-recognition state, need to be aware of the new federal tax law benefits and obligations.

Even though married same-sex couples may now file as “married filing jointly” for federal income tax purposes, states like Wisconsin and Illinois that do not recognize same-sex marriage would still require those couples to either file as single or as married filing separately on their federal returns. This is because most state income tax forms use federal income tax amounts as the starting point for preparing the state return, and most state returns require the federal return to be attached to the state return. Without further guidance from state tax authorities, this could complicate income tax filings for same-sex married couples in non-recognition states.

Estate, gift, and generation skipping transfer tax laws now treat all legally married same-sex couples the same as opposite-sex couples, but, like opposite-sex couples, the Revenue Ruling does not mitigate the need for same-sex married couples to prepare estate plans. Many property law issues are driven by whether someone is classified as a “spouse” under state law, including who inherits under intestacy and other survivorship rights, all of which can be controlled by a will or trust in non-recognition states (like Wisconsin and Illinois). Finally, some states (like Illinois) have state estate and gift tax exemptions that are lower than the current federal estate and gift tax exemptions, which requires careful estate tax planning for all married couples, be they opposite-sex or same-sex.

The impact of Windsor and how same-sex couples are recognized for federal and state laws is a fast changing arena, and additional federal and state guidance will be required.

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U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Clarifies Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) Leave Entitlement for Same-Sex Spouses

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In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Windsor decision, employers should review and, if necessary, revise their FMLA policies and procedures to ensure compliance.

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) recently clarified that same-sex spouses are now covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to the extent that an employee’s marriage is recognized in the state in which the employee resides. This clarification, which follows the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor,[1] is consistent with the existing FMLA regulatory language defining a “spouse” for purposes of FMLA coverage.

The DOL did not issue any new formal, stand-alone guidance but instead revised several existing FMLA guidance documents to remove references to the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). It also affirmatively stated in a newly released Field Operations Handbook section on the FMLA that “[s]pouse means a husband or wife as defined or recognized under state law for purposes of marriage in the State where the employee resides, including common law marriage and same sex marriage.”

Moving forward, FMLA spousal leave will only be available to employees who reside in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage, given that the existing FMLA regulatory language tied spousal coverage to the place of residence prior to the Windsor decision. However, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which has jurisdiction over FMLA rights for federal employees, recently issued post-Windsor guidance that extends FMLA leave rights to the spouses of federal employees without regard to states of residence.[2] OPM’s approach could eventually be followed by DOL for private sector employees and those employees otherwise covered by DOL rules but likely would require regulatory changes that would involve a notice and comment period.

It is worth noting that, while DOL’s clarification reflects a general increase in federal FMLA leave rights available to same-sex couples, in some circumstances, the availability of FMLA leave rights could mean a decrease in a given employee’s overall leave entitlement. For example, same-sex spouses residing in states recognizing same-sex marriage will now be subject to the FMLA’s restrictions on the combined amount of leave that spouses working for the same employer can use in certain circumstances. Similarly, an employee might have been entitled pre-Windsor to leave pursuant to state (but not federal) law to care for a same-sex spouse, which meant that the employee’s state and federal leave entitlements could not be exhausted concurrently.

Conclusion

In light of DOL’s updated guidance, employers should make sure that their FMLA policies allow spousal leave for employees in a same-sex marriage that is lawful in the state in which the employee resides. Employers, however, will need to think carefully about how they will administer such policies to avoid both employee relations issues and sexual orientation discrimination claims. For example, if an employer does not request documentation from an employee in an opposite-sex marriage as to whether the employee’s marriage is recognized in the state in which he or she resides, issues may arise if this information was requested of an employee in a same-sex marriage. While some employers may choose simply to grant FMLA leave to all employees regardless of domicile, employers need to be aware that such time may not be recognized as statutory FMLA leave. Employers should also pay close attention to future developments in this area as more states consider recognizing same-sex marriages.

[1]. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

[2]. See U.S. Office of Personnel Admin., Benefits Administration Letter No. 13-203, Coverage of Same-Sex Spouses (July 17, 2013).

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First Post-Supreme Court Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Case Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Spouse

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In one of the first post-Supreme Court DOMA cases, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, applying Illinois state law, held that the surviving same-sex spouse of a deceased participant in an employer sponsored pension plan was entitled to the spousal death benefit offered under the plan. See Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, Civil Action No. 11-0045; 2013 WL 3878688 (E.D. Pa., July 29, 2013).

This case is significant because it is the first case after the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) to grapple with choice of law in determining whether a marriage is valid for purposes of obtaining spousal benefits under an ERISA-covered plan. While Windsor ruled that Section 3 of DOMA defining marriage only as between persons of the opposite sex unconstitutional for purposes of applying federal law, it did not address or invalidate Section 2, which permits states to decline to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.

Case Background

In 2006, Sarah Farley and Jean Tobits were married in Canada. Shortly after they were married, Ms. Farley was diagnosed with cancer, and she died in 2010. At the time of her death, Ms. Farley was employed by the law firm of Cozen O’Connor and a participant in the firm’s profit sharing plan (the Plan). The Plan provided that a participant’s surviving spouse would receive a death benefit if the participant died before the participant’s retirement date. If the participant was not married or the participant’s spouse waived his or her right to the death benefit, the participant’s designated beneficiary would be entitled to the death benefits. The Plan defined “Spouse” as “the person to whom the Participant has been married throughout the one-year period ending on the earlier of (1) the Participant’s annuity starting date or (2) the date of the Participant’s death.”

Ms. Farley’s parents and Ms. Tobits both claimed a right to the Plan’s death benefits. Ms. Farley’s parents claimed that they had been designated as the beneficiaries, but it was undisputed that Ms. Tobits had not waived her rights to the death benefits. Cozen O’Connor filed an interpleader action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asking the court to determine who was entitled to the benefits. Therefore, the case focused on whether Ms. Tobits qualified as a “Spouse” under the Plan and thus was entitled to the death benefits.

The Court’s Ruling

The court noted that Windsor “makes clear that where a state has recognized a marriage as valid, the United States Constitution requires that the federal laws and regulations of this country acknowledge that marriage” irrespective of whether the marriage is between a same-sex couple or a heterosexual couple. With Windsor’s emphasis on states’ rights to define marriage, lower courts are left with the complicated task of deciding which state law applies when determining whether a same-sex spouse is entitled to benefits under federal law in those instances, as in Cozen, where multiple jurisdictions with different laws on same-sex marriage are implicated.

Apparently, because Cozen O’Connor is headquartered in Pennsylvania, the Plan is administered there, and the Plan’s choice of law provision references Pennsylvania law, the Farleys asked the court to apply Pennsylvania state law to determine the validity of the marriage. Pennsylvania’s mini-DOMA statute expressly defines marriage as between a man and a woman. The court concluded that ERISA preempted Pennsylvania law. It reasoned that if courts were required to look at the state in which the plans were drafted, plan administrators might be encouraged to forum shop for states with mini-DOMA laws to avoid paying benefits to same-sex couples. The court thought this kind of forum shopping would upset ERISA’s principle of maintaining national uniformity among benefit plans. Without further analysis, the court concluded Pennsylvania state law was not an option for determining Ms. Tobits’ status as a spouse within the meaning of the Plan.

Instead, the court applied Illinois law, the state where Ms. Farley and Ms. Tobits had jointly resided until Ms. Farley’s death. It was undisputed that Ms. Farley and Ms. Tobits had a valid Canadian marriage certificate. The court concluded that the marriage was valid in Illinois and that Ms. Tobits was Ms. Farley’s spouse within the Plan’s definition. Accordingly, the court held that Ms. Tobits was entitled to the Plan’s death benefit. Although not entirely clear, the court presumably came to this conclusion based on Illinois’ civil union statute (even though it was enacted after Ms. Farley’s death). The statute provides that (i) same-sex marriages and civil unions legally entered into in other jurisdictions will be recognized in Illinois as civil unions and (ii) persons entering into civil unions will be afforded the benefits recognized by Illinois law to spouses. See 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. An. 75/5 and 75/60 (West 2011).

Impact of Cozen on ERISA Benefit Plans

Cozen is the first ruling in the wake of Windsor to address which state law might apply when there are conflicting state laws as to whether a valid marriage is recognized for the purpose of being a “spouse,” and therefore whether the spouse is entitled to benefits under an ERISA-covered plan. In Cozen, Ms. Farley and Ms. Tobits were lawfully married in Canada, and the court ruled that Illinois’s civil union law recognizes lawful marriages performed in other jurisdictions. The court applied the law of the domicile state to support its holding that Ms. Tobits was a surviving spouse entitled to the Plan’s death benefit.

The Cozen decision may have little value outside of cases where a valid same-sex marriage is performed in one state (the “state of celebration”) and the state where the couple is domiciled recognizes same-sex marriages. In other situations, faced with a choice of law where the law of the state of domicile conflicts with the law of the state of celebration, the outcome could be different, because Section 2 of DOMA survives after the Windsor decision. Unless the federal government creates a uniform method of determining the choice of law question, ERISA cases raising benefit entitlement questions in the context of same-sex marriages are likely to continue to complicate plan administration, and ERISA’s goal of maintaining national uniformity in the administration of benefits will remain elusive.

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Imperfect Fit: Abercrombie Store Threatens Location In Tailored-Clothing Mecca Savile Row

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We’ve all heard the various means of describing the inappropriate place for an otherwise benign thing, rendering the otherwise benign thing a hazard or a liability or just plain offensive.  In 1855, the author Robert De Valcourt referred to, “An awkward man in society is like a bull in a china shop, always doing mischief.”  Robert De Valcourt, The Illustrated Manners Book: A Manual of Good Behavior and Polite Accomplishments (1855).  In 1926, Justice Sutherland opined, “A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place — like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”  Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

Village of Euclid, of course, upheld the constitutionality of the zoning concept, a replacement of single purposes ordinances and private litigation for land use management.  See David Owens, Land Use Law In North Carolina (2d ed. 2011).

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“Late Ming dynasty, kaolin and pottery stone foundation, cobalt firing enamelling with Arabic lettering.  If only I could find a well-tailored suit and some skinny jeans to go with this vase.” 

Well, the “pig” or the “bull” in one particular instance is anticipated to be an Abercrombie and Fitch children’s store in the heart of London.

The “china shop” or the “parlor”?  Well, that may be Savile Row, legendary collection of fine British tailors and suitmaker to the rich and famous.  Consider this quote from Mark Henderson, chairman of “heritage tailor Gieves & Hawkes”, reported by CNBC about objection to the Abercrombie store:

“Opening a kids store on Savile Row is a somewhat bizarre thing to do. It’s a fairly narrow street, it’s got its own atmosphere to it.  It’s just fundamentally a mistake from Abercrombie – they don’t get everything right.”

We don’t purport to know the land use laws in London, we’ll leave that to the Ealing Common Land Use Barrister blog, but it’s always interesting to see just how common and universal land use issues can be.

It’s also interesting to see how different motives underpin all land use issues.  For example, one might assume the “hubub” over the Abercrombie store is a degradation of the historical nature of the narrow street, as Mr. Henderson alludes.  Well, maybe the distaste is different for another, even another from a seemingly similar perspective.  Consider this worry about “higher rents”, from John Hitchcock of “bespoke tailor Anderson & Sheppard” (man, I love the British):

“One or two of the tailors are concerned it might put the rents up, and it will do, I suppose.  There’s only so much rent we can pay. Our costs are already high as we make every suit by hand – unlike the big chains which don’t make their products on the premises.”

The Lesson of the Day

Land use decisions are nuanced legally but they are also very nuanced politically.  In this one space, one street within one small universe of British tailors, we have two very distinct motives for refusing the Abercrombie store.  Yes, both are opposed to the store, but each is opposed for a different reason, which means a political salve must address, at least, two distinct concerns.

One must fully and fairly understand the forces against which one is working, before success is at hand.  I think Sun Tzu, the Zhou Dynasty Land Use Litigator, said that.

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Picture This: The National Labor Relations Board’s Division of Advice Wants to Sue Employer for Issuing Social Media Policy with Photo/Video Ban

Michael Best Logohe National Labor Relations Board’s Division of Advice (the Division) recently recommended that the Board issue a complaint against Giant Foods for implementing its social media policy without first bargaining with two unions, and for maintaining a social media policy that included unlawful provisions. Although the Division analyzed several social media policy provisions, its criticism of two provisions in particular—a ban on using photo and video of company premises, and restrictions on employees’ use of company logos and trademarks—makes it very difficult for employers to protect their brands while at the same time complying with federal labor laws.

Giant Foods’ social media policy forbade employees from using company logos, trademarks, or graphics without prior approval from the company. The policy also prohibited employees from using photographs or video of the “Company’s premises, processes, operations, or products” without prior approval as well.

The Division concluded that these provisions were unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and that the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) should issue a complaint against Giant Foods for implementing them. As employers are becoming keenly aware, the NLRA safeguards employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity. Such activity includes group discussions and some comments by individual employees that relate to their wages, hours, and other terms conditions of employment.

The Division concluded that banning employees from using company logos or trademarks was unlawful because: (1) employees should be allowed to use logos and trademarks in online communications, including electronic leaflets or pictures of picket signs with the employer’s logo; and (2) those labor-related interests did not raise the concerns that intellectual property laws were passed to protect, such as a business’ interest in guarding its trademarks from being used by competitors selling inferior products.

Additionally the Division concluded that restricting employees from using photo and video of company premises unlawfully prevented them from sharing information about participation in protected concerted activities, such as snapping a picture of a picket line.

Unfortunately, the Board’s expansive view will likely hamper companies’ ability to prevent damage to their brand and reputation.  Not allowing employers to ban the taking of videos and photos on their premises, or restricting the use of company logos/trademarks could lead to public relations nightmares such as the one Subway Foods recently endured after it was revealed that an employee posted a graphic picture on Instagram of his genitalia on a sub, with the tag line “I will be your sandwich artist today.”

Given the prevalence of cell phones with photo and video capabilities, and the ease of uploading photos and videos to the internet, a company that cannot control its employees’ use of those devices on their premises will be one bad employee decision away from public embarrassment.

What else can be gleaned from the Giant Foods Advice Memorandum? That the Board’s General Counsel will continue to prod employers to eliminate blanket bans on certain kinds of employee conduct from their social media policies and replace those bans with provisions that include specific examples of what employee conduct the policy prohibits. The Board and its General Counsel have previously found social media policies that restricted employee use of confidential information and complaints about an employer’s labor practices as unlawful; Giant Foods makes clear that the agency is also scrutinizing other kinds of policy provisions that potentially could infringe on an employee’s right to engage in protected concerted activities.

Accordingly, employers should review their policies with counsel so that they can tailor them to restrict employee conduct that will damage the company and its brand, but not be “reasonably” read to restrict employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activities.

New Requirements for Illinois Businesses under Concealed Carry Act

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Illinois employers may be surprised to learn what action items may be necessary for their businesses following enactment of Illinois’ new Concealed Carry Act.

Facing a deadline imposed by the Seventh Circuit’s 2012 ruling that the state’s concealed carry ban was unconstitutional, on July 9 the Illinois state legislature overrode Governor Quinn’s amendatory veto to enact Public Act 98-0063, which includes the new Firearm Concealed Carry Act (“Act”) and related laws and amendatory legislation. The Act makes Illinois the 50th state to enact legislation allowing concealed carry, and permits Illinois residents and non-residents who meet specified qualifications to apply for a license to carry a “concealed firearm” — defined as a concealed loaded or unloaded handgun carried on or about a person or within a vehicle — in the state. Among other provisions, the Act specifies qualifications, procedures and content of applications for licenses and areas where those holding licenses will be prohibited from carrying firearms. Individuals cannot apply for a concealed carry license in Illinois until the Department of State Police issues the applications (the Department has up to 180 days to do so).

Required Postings for “Prohibited Areas”

The Act prohibits authorized licensees from carrying a firearm into “prohibited areas” and further mandates clear notices at entrances of such venues that firearms are prohibited. (Required signage and accompanying rules will be issued by the Department of State Police and are not yet available.) Among others, the following are types of establishments subject to these requirements that must post clear notices prohibiting the carrying of firearms:

  • Areas controlled by public or private hospitals or their affiliates, mental health facilities, nursing homes, public or private elementary or secondary schools, pre-schools, and child care facilities.
  • Areas under the control of an establishment serving alcohol on its premises, if more than 50% of the establishment’s gross receipts within the prior 3 months is from the sale of alcohol. (The Act further provides that owners of such establishments who fail to prohibit concealed firearms are subject to penalties up to $5000.)
  • Buildings, classrooms, laboratories, clinics, hospitals, artistic, athletic or entertainment venues and other areas under the control of a public or private community college, college, or university.
  • Events authorized by Special Event Retailer’s license during the time alcohol will be sold.
  • Areas under the control of a gaming facility licensed under the Riverboat Gambling Act or the Illinois Horse Racing Act of 1975.
  • Public gatherings or special events conducted on property open to the public that requires the issuance of a government permit.
  • Any stadium, arena, or the property or areas under the control of a stadium, arena, or any collegiate or professional sporting event.
  • Areas under the control of a museum, amusement park, zoo, or airport.
  • Any areas owned, leased, controlled or used by a nuclear energy storage, weapons, or development site.
  • Buses, trains, or other forms of transportation paid in whole or in part with public funds, and any areas controlled by a public transportation facility.
  • Areas where firearms are prohibited under federal law.

Prohibition by Other Owners Desiring to Maintain Gun-Free Facilities

Employers and other property owners can still prohibit the carrying of concealed firearms on property under their control that is not among the enumerated “prohibited areas” provided they post the state-approved sign indicating that firearms are prohibited. (Owners of private residences desiring to prohibit firearms need not post the sign.) Because this provision of the Act applies to owners of “private real property” however, it raises questions for businesses operating on leased premises who desire to ban firearms. At a minimum, such businesses should ensure that their landlord’s concealed carry policy is consistent with their own.

Special Provisions for Parking Areas

Note that while the carrying of concealed firearms may be prohibited in buildings, facilities and properties — including parking areas — authorized licensees can still drive with concealed firearms into the parking areas, and can store the firearms and ammunition in a case in their locked vehicle or in a locked container out of plain view. Thus while licensed employees and visitors may be prohibited from bringing a firearm into a business or venue, they cannot be prohibited from keeping the firearm in their car. Employers must be sure that any policies or procedures governing handguns in the workplace do not infringe on the rights of employees to keep authorized handguns locked in their cars, even if in employer-owned parking lots.

An Evolving Area of Law

This area of the law continues to evolve. On July 16, Chicago’s City Council unanimously voted to strengthen the City’s assault weapons ban with measures that prohibit more weapons, add stricter penalties for violations, and outline student safety zones in order to meet a 10-day deadline imposed by companion amendments within Public Act 98-0063.

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Michigan Supreme Court Won’t Give Advisory Opinion on Right-to-Work

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Saying simply that “we are not persuaded that granting the request would be an appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion,” the Michigan Supreme Court on Friday denied Gov. Rick Snyder’s request that the high court render an advisory opinion about the constitutionality of Michigan’s new right-to-work law.

Relying upon the provision in the state’s constitution’s that allows the governor to request the “opinion of the supreme court on important questions of law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality of legislation after it has been enacted into law but before its effective date,” the Governor had asked the Court for a ruling largely because the state’s public workers’ collective agreements are set to expire at the end of 2013. In a brief filed in support of the request for an advisory opinion, Michigan Solicitor General John Bursch said that an advisory opinion would prevent an “impasse at the negotiating table.”

Notwithstanding the Court’s decision, six lawsuits continue challenging the Act. Two of them are brought by unions or labor coalitions. Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Callaghan has been brought in federal court and challenges the constitutionality of the Act as to private sector workers. UAW v. Green, currently pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals, challenges the constitutionality as it applies to public sector workers. Here’s a helpful link to a chart describing the pending litigation.

SG Bursch also said in his filing with the Supreme Court that barring Supreme Court action, the state would consider filing a motion seeking an expedited ruling in the Green case.

The Detroit Free Press coverage on the court’s decision can be found here.

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Defense of Marriage Act’s Demise (DOMA) – What it Means for Canadian Residents with U.S. Ties

Altro Levy LogoLast week, the US Supreme Court issued an historic and landmark ruling in the case of US v. Windsor. It has been hailed in the media as the demise of the Defense Of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), and celebrated as an extension of more than 1,000 federal benefits to same-sex couples.

In US v. Windsor, Edith Windsor brought suit against the US government after she was ordered to pay $363,000 in US estate tax upon the death of her wife Thea Spyer. Edith and Thea were legally married in Canada in 2007, but the US federal government did not recognize their marriage when Thea passed away in 2009. Under DOMA gay marriage was not recognized, even if it was legal in the jurisdiction where it was performed. This lack of recognition meant that Edith could not take advantage of the marital deduction that would have allowed her to inherit from her wife without paying US estate tax.

In its ruling on June 26th, the US Supreme Court ruled that the US federal government could not discriminate against same-sex married couples in the administration of its federal laws and benefits as previously dictated by DOMA. Same-sex couples, who are legally married in one of the 13 states that recognize gay marriage, or a country like Canada, now have access to the same federal protections and benefits as a heterosexual married couple.

Tax Benefits

The demise of DOMA will bring with it a multitude of changes under US tax law. We will not attempt to enumerate all of them here, though we will provide a brief overview of key changes for our Canadian and American clients.

i. US Estate Tax

The case of US v. Windsor was based on the US estate tax, which is imposed by the US federal government on both US citizens and residents, as well as non-residents who own US assets worth more than $60,000 USD. Currently US citizens and residents with less than $5.25 Million USD in worldwide assets do not owe US estate tax on death. Canadians with worldwide assets of $5.25 Million USD or less receive a unified credit under the Canada-US Tax Treaty that works to eliminate any US estate tax owed on their US property.

Under federal law a US citizen may pass his entire estate to his US citizen spouse tax-free upon death. Up until last week this rollover was unavailable to same-sex couples.

Canadian same-sex couples should now benefit from the Canada-US Tax Treaty provisions that provide a marital credit to the surviving spouse. This allows for a doubling up of credit against any potential US estate tax due on US property. Now a Canadian same-sex spouse can inherit a worldwide estate worth up to $10.5 Million USD and should see little to no tax on US assets due upon the death of the first spouse.

ii. Gift Tax

The US imposes a tax on gifts if they exceed $14,000 USD per recipient per year. There is an exemption for gifts between spouses, which are generally not taxable.

Gifts made in the US between non-US citizen non-resident spouses are taxable, but the annual exemption is $139,000 USD instead of $14,000 USD. Canadian spouses who gift each other US property, US corporate stocks, etc. may gift up to $139,000 USD per year without incurring US gift tax.

These exemptions have now been extended to same-sex couples, expanding their ability to use gifting for tax and estate planning.

iii. US Income Tax

Many Canadians move to the US each year, in part because of the lower personal tax rates. In the US spouses are allowed to engage in a form of income splitting by filing a joint income tax return. By filing jointly, married couples are also generally able to take advantage of further credits and deductions not afforded to individual or single filers. Being able to file jointly can be highly tax advantageous.

Previously, same-sex couples had to file either separately or as head of household. Now they have the option of filing jointly as spouses, and gaining access to the aforementioned income splitting, credits and deductions.

Couples may file up to three years of amended US Income Tax returns if they believe that they would have been entitled to a larger tax return by filing jointly in those years.

iv. Other Tax Benefits

In the US most individuals receive health insurance through their employer at least up until they qualify for US Medicare at age 65. Previously, if the employer sponsored health insurance plan covered the same-sex spouse as well, then it was considered a taxable benefit. Such coverage will now also be tax-free for same-sex couples.

Retirement Benefits

Among the many benefits now extended to same-sex couples are a variety of “Retirement Benefits.”

i. Social Security and Medicare Benefits

With the end of DOMA, same-sex couples may now qualify for retirement, death, and disability Social Security benefits based on their spouse’s qualifying US employment history. For example, same-sex couples that do not have the required US employment history to qualify for US Social Security benefits on their own may now qualify for spousal Social Security benefits based on their spouse’s qualifying employment history. These spousal Social Security benefits are typically equal to 50% of the Social Security benefits received by the spouse with the qualifying employment history.

Additionally, spouses can qualify for US Medicare based on only one spouse’s qualifying US employment. This allows access to premium-free, or reduced-premium, health coverage in retirement.

Previously these important retirement benefits were not available to same-sex spouses.

ii. Individual Retirement Accounts

Important changes to the rights and recognition of spouses under US retirement savings plans result from the end of DOMA. Same-sex couples will now be recognized under 401(k), 403(b), IRA, Roth IRA, and similar plans. Spouses will be required to give their consent for any non-spouse beneficiary designations for these accounts. They will be treated as spouses for purposes of determining required distributions. For example, an inheriting same-sex spouse will not have to begin IRA distributions until age 70 ½, whereas previously he would have had to begin required distributions immediately as would any non-spouse beneficiary.

Immigration

One of the biggest questions after the US Supreme Court’s ruling on DOMA was whether there would be immediate changes to US immigration policy. Previously the US government did not recognize same-sex couples for immigration purposes. This meant that a US citizen spouse could not sponsor his husband for immigration to the US as a permanent resident (a.k.a. green card holder).

Last week, shortly after the ruling on DOMA, Alejandro Mayorkas, the director of US Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) announced at the American Immigration Lawyers Association annual conference that the USCIS would begin issuing green cards to qualifying same-sex couples.

As of Friday, June 29, 2013, USCIS began issuing green cards to same-sex spouses. USCIS has stated that it has been keeping a record of spousal green card petitions denied only due to a same-sex marriage for the past two years. It is expected to reopen and reconsider these spousal sponsorship petitions that were previously denied due to same-sex marriage.

Conclusion

The demise of DOMA is exciting news for Americans, and Canadians with US ties. It provides same sex couples a wealth of new tax and estate planning opportunities, not to mention new opportunities for retirement and immigration planning. It is not too early to review your current planning, and take advantage of these changes.

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What Windsor Means for Same-Sex Married Couples Seeking U.S. Immigration Benefits

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On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Windsor that Section 3 of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is unconstitutional. This Section of DOMA prohibited the U.S. government from conferring any federal benefits to same-sex couples who were married in any jurisdiction in the world.

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What does the Windsor decision mean for same-sex couples seeking immigration benefits?

On the immigration front, DOMA has been the main obstacle prohibiting married same-sex couples from accessing any immigration benefits that would otherwise flow to a spouse. For example, a U.S. citizen may sponsor a spouse who is a foreign national for permanent residence, and that foreign national spouse is considered an “immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen and exempt from annual numerical limitations on immigrants. Before Windsor, this option of “immediate relative” sponsorship did not exist for same-sex couples. Same-sex spouses also were not able to qualify for derivative nonimmigrant visas, or to qualify as dependents in an employment-based immigrant visa or adjustment of status process. Windsor has permanently shifted this landscape, with same-sex married couples being recognized as married and therefore able to access immigration benefits, provided they can demonstrate eligibility under the law for the specific benefits sought.

What marriages are valid under Windsor?

Generally, if a couple’s marriage is valid where it is performed, it is valid for purposes of immigration law. If you and your foreign national spouse were married in one of the 12 U.S. states that recognize same-sex marriage or in a foreign country that recognizes same-sex marriage, such as Canada, your green card sponsorship and application process should be treated exactly like the application of a different-sex couple. In fact, Edie Windsor, the plaintiff in Windsor, married her wife in Canada. To determine the validity of the marriage, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) focuses on the place where the marriage took place, not the location where one or both spouses live. This same principle is applied by other agencies within the Department of Homeland Security as well as at U.S. Embassies and Consulates.

Recent Guidance from the Federal Government

We expect government agencies to implement the Windsor decision swiftly. This means that immediately we will see changes at the various federal agencies that process applications for immigration benefits and visas. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a statement following the Court’s decision. She directed USCIS “to review immigration visa petitions filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse.” Recent Department of Homeland Security guidance is now clear that family-based immigrant visas will no longer “be automatically denied as a result of the same-sex nature of your marriage.” Following the Court’s decision, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the Department of State (DOS) will work with the Department of Justice and other agencies “to review all relevant statues as well as benefits administered” by DOS. We expect to see guidance from U.S. Consulates in the coming weeks.

Conclusion

Same-sex couples who are married now have equal access to immigration benefits. The scope of the Windsor decision extends to same-sex spouses of individuals pursuing employment-based immigration benefits, such as green card and nonimmigrant visa sponsorship. We will continue to monitor developments in the law and provide guidance on immigration options for LGBT families.

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In a Pro-Employee World, U.S. Supreme Court Rulings Offer Employers Hope

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In a pair of important opinions released last week, both of which are helpful to employers, the U.S. Supreme Court raised the bar for employees asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. _, No. 12-484 (2013), the Court ruled that an employee claiming retaliation must do more than show that retaliatory animus was a “motivating factor” for discipline – it must be the “but-for” cause.  In Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. _, No. 11-556 (2013), the Court ruled that for employers to be held vicariously liable for the actions of a “supervisor,” the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “supervisor” had power to take a “tangible employment action,” such as transferring or terminating the employee. Authority merely to direct aspects of the employee’s work will not suffice.

Nassar and Vance represent significant victories for employers faced with Title VII retaliation and discrimination claims. The heightened requirements that charging employees now face should enhance an employer’s prospects for obtaining summary judgment and, failing that, impose a more rigorous hurdle for plaintiffs at trial.

Nassar Imposes More Stringent “But-For” Causation Test for Title VII Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff in Nassar was a physician of Middle Eastern descent. The defendant university hired him as a member of its medical faculty, and under the terms of the university’s affiliation agreement with a local hospital, the plaintiff also worked at the hospital as a staff physician. The plaintiff alleged that the University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine harassed him because of her discriminatory “bias against Arabs and Muslims.” The plaintiff ultimately resigned from the university faculty, and accused his superior of discriminatory bias in his letter of resignation, which he sent to the university’s chair of Internal Medicine and other faculty members. The chair was allegedly dismayed by the public accusations of discrimination, and said that the chief must “be publicly exonerated” of the charges against her. When he learned that plaintiff had been offered a staff physician position at the hospital, the chair objected that the affiliation agreement required all staff physicians to also be faculty members, and the hospital therefore withdrew its offer to plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging that he had been constructively discharged by reason of the chief’s discriminatory harassment, and that the chair subsequently allegedly retaliated against him for complaining of that harassment. A jury found for plaintiff on both claims, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed only as to the retaliation claim, holding that retaliation claims under Title VII required a showing merely that retaliation was a “motivating factor” for an adverse employment action rather than its “but-for” cause.

The Supreme Court vacated that decision, concluding that “the text, structure and history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation claim … must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” The Court reasoned that because Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision appears in a different section from the status-based discrimination ban, which utilizes the lesser “motivating factor” causation test, the “but-for” standard applies to Title VII retaliation claims. Accordingly, “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” To establish a retaliation claim, employees must now show that their employer would not have taken the challenged employment action but for the employee’s protected activity.

Vance Limits “Supervisors” to Those with Power to Take a Tangible Employment Action

In a second critical decision for employers, plaintiff in Vance, an African-American woman, worked in the university’s Banquet and Catering Division of Dining Services. Plaintiff alleged that a fellow employee, a white woman named Davis, harassed and intimidated her because of her race.  Plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging that her white co-worker created a racially hostile work environment. “The parties vigorously dispute[d] the precise nature and scope of Davis’ duties, but they agree[d] that Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance.”

The District Court granted defendant summary judgment, holding the university was notvicariously liable for Davis’s alleged actions because she could not take tangible employment actions against the plaintiff and therefore was not a “supervisor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “who qualifies as a ‘supervisor’” under Title VII. The Court held that “an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII [only] if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim” and affirmed.

In analyzing when an employer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, the Court defined “tangible employment actions” to include effecting “‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” The Court specifically rejected the EEOC’s definition of “supervisor,” which tied “supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another’s daily work[,]” as “a study in ambiguity.” Hence, under Title VII, if an employee is not authorized to impose tangible employment actions against another, the employer cannot be vicariously liable for the subject employee’s alleged harassment.

Vance enhances an employer’s ability to limit the company’s responsibility for harassment. Employers should remain mindful of the duties of their employees, ensuring that only key management and supervisory personnel possess the power to effect a “significant change in employment status”. Clear definitions of an employee’s responsibilities should greatly limit any future claims of vicarious liability against employers. This more precise definition of “supervisor” should, like Nassar, increase the likelihood of dismissal at the summary judgment stage and help obtain favorable in limine and trial rulings.

Conclusion

Nassar and Vance afford significant advantages to employers defending against discrimination and retaliation claims.  Importantly, although the decisions themselves were concerned with claims arising under federal anti-discrimination (not just Title VII) laws, the Court’s reasoning may well find acceptance among state courts, which frequently apply the Title VII analysis to claims asserted under analogous state laws. Nassar and Vance are likely to prove valuable tools to employers defending against claims of discrimination and/or retaliation, increasing both the prospects of obtaining summary judgment and, if necessary, the odds of success at trial.

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