New Mexico Issues a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Revise its State Rural Universal Service Fund

Lewis Roca Rothgerber

This past Wednesday, the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (NMPRC)approved a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) to revise New Mexico’s State Rural Universal Service Fund following numerous workshops and filings by NMPRC staff, the New Mexico Attorney General’s Office, and both wireline and wireless industry participants in Case No. 12-00380-UT. The NOPR will revise 17.11.10 New Mexico Administrative Code (NMAC). The NOPR will be published for comment, with the goal of providing a final rule by October 1, 2014 that will limit the growth of the  State Rural Universal Service Fund (SRUSF), expand telecommunication service to unserved and underserved areas of the state, earmark a portion of the fund for the build out of broadband service, and ensure better accountability for the use of state funds under the program.

The proposed rule was approved 5-0, with two amendments, by the Commission. The NOPR is expected to be filed in Case No. 12-00380-UT on Monday, July 28, 2014. Let’s briefly summarize several key provisions of the proposed NOPR, subject to comments being filed and final approval by the Commission.

First, because many wireline companies have not increased their residential rates in a rate proceeding before the Commission for over 15 years, the benchmark rate for residential customers will increase to $18.09. A company that chooses  not to raise its benchmark would have the difference subtracted from what it would normally receive from the SRUSF.  Second, business rates will be adjusted over a three year period. Third, the formula for reimbursement from the fund will be adjusted to use 2012 voice minutes. Minutes have decreased since the SRUSF statute and rules were established. The decrease has occurred because more people are using wireless phones and other services. This will result in a reduction in payouts from the fund, which is funded by all telephone customers (both wireline and wireless). The end result will be a reduction of about $9 million annually from the current $24 million fund. Because of the size of impact on the payments to the rural local exchange carriers, this would be phased in over several years. Fourth, from the $9 million savings in annual payments, $5 million will be set aside to fund the build out of broadband capable infrastructure as part of the SRUSF. This $5 million broadband fund will be available to both wireline and wireless providers on a project-by-project basis.”. The $5 million must be used for infrastructure, and companies will be required to fund 25 percent of each approved project. 50 percent of the SRUSF project money would be awarded upfront, and the remaining would be provided after progress reports are filed and reviewed by the Commission. Lastly, if a company can demonstrate need, they may come before the Commission for additional funding.

Two additional changes to the proposed NOPR were made by the Commission at the Open Meeting on July 23. First, the Commission approved an annual cap of a 3 percent surcharge on customers phone bills to fund the SRUSF. If expenditures exceed the 3 percent, then the amount of money from the fund will be prorated among recipients. SOLIX, a private company under contract with the Commission, manages the fund for New Mexico. Second, companies will be required to provide detailed information on how they have spent both federal and state universal service funds since the initial rule became effective in 2006. The official comment period and other due dates will be published in an order on Monday, with the goal to have the docket closed by October 15, 2014.

 

Tips on Creating Press Releases Reporters Will Use

The Rainmaker Institute

Business communications firm Greentarget has just released the results of interviews with 100 news reporters and editors in their 2014 Disrupting the Press Release report, and it’s clear what journalists want from firms seeking the news spotlight:  just the facts.

The core findings from this report underscore the need for communicators to understand that journalists want only the vital information, and they want it immediately apparent.  Don’t make them wade through a bunch of legal jargon, boilerplate text or self-serving quotes that sound like no human would ever speak those words.

BIG NEWS. Press Releases

In fact, Greentarget points to a perfect example of the kind of press releases journalists favor:  the ones that come from police departments, who tend to follow TV detective Joe Friday’s maxim of “Just the facts, ma’am.”

And here’s why:  journalists spend less than 60 seconds scanning a press release.  If the value is not immediately apparent, they are on to the next one.  Half the reporters and editors surveyed said that they receive, on average, 50 press releases a week.  The other half said they receive more — up to 100 or more a week.

Beyond writing concise, fact-driven releases, here are some tips on how to grab a reporter’s attention:

  • Email your press releases.  80% said they prefer email.  Not one said they prefer a phone call.
  • Craft a compelling subject line.  79% said a good subject line gets your release opened.
  • Send your release early.  44% said they prefer to get press releases in the morning.
  • Leave out the least important information: boilerplate language, stilted quotations, fluff.
  • Be sure the journalists you are sending your press release to cover that beat and are relevant to their audiences.

The good news is that 88% of journalists said they still find value in press releases, especially those that contain thought leadership (research, surveys, etc.).  Least valuable?  Personnel announcements.

My experience has shown me that many attorneys are notoriously poor press release writers, both in terms of obtuse language and too much filler.  When it comes to press releases journalists will pay attention to, always remember that less is more.  Better yet, have a professional who knows what they are doing write your press releases.

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Sender Beware: How Your Emails or Letters may be Ruled a Binding Contract

Heyl Royster Law firm

Often when we think of a contract, we think of the multi-page document that is plagued with legal jargon and minuscule print, followed by signature lines, and then sometimes followed by even more documents nicknamed “schedules” or “annexes” that in some way modify or supplement everything in the previous pages. But courts do not necessarily require contracts to take on this formal appearance in order to be enforceable.

In order to create a binding contract, courts require the following four elements: (1) an offer, (2) acceptance of that offer, (3) consideration (meaning payment or other benefit to one party or a detriment to another party), and (4) definite certain terms. If there is no formal, written contract, then courts will require a fifth element: demonstration of an intent by the parties to be bound by a contract. This fifth element is an objective standard, so it has nothing to do with what you actually intended, and everything to do with the language actually used by the parties and how a reasonable person (really, a judge) would interpret it. See Alyasmen Group, LLC v. MS Rialto Raintree Village IL, LLC, 2011 IL App (1st) 102875-U. As a result, courts in Illinois and other states have on more than one occasion found all of these required elements to be present in emails or letters sent by unsuspecting business people.

In one somewhat surprising case, business partners exchanged emails about how to close a joint real estate business venture and distribute earnings from completed real estate transactions. Less than one month after the partners reached an agreement by email as to how earnings would be distributed, the partners signed a written contract with terms different than what was agreed to in the emails. One of those business partners later sued to enforce the agreement set forth in the emails. Upon review of the case, the court determined that the business partners expressed the intent to be bound by the emails where one of them stated in his email, “this is final and agreed to,” and even offered to print out and sign a copy of the emails. Furthermore, the terms of the agreement were sufficiently definite and consideration existed such that the judge ruled the emails could constitute a binding contract aside from the actual signed, written contract. Bryant v. Way, C.A. No. 11C-01-164 RRC, 2011 WL 2163606 (Del. Sup. Ct. May 25, 2011).

Courts seem most eager to rule emails are binding contracts when the emails relate to the settlement of an ongoing dispute. An employer was able to enforce an agreement reached through email with an employee regarding settlement of that employees’ employment discrimination claim in Todd v. Kohl’s Department Store, No. 08-CV-3827, 2010 WL 3720265 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2010). Similarly, in Protherapy Associates, LLC v. AFS of Bastian, Inc., No. 6:10CV0017, 2010 WL 2696638 (W.D. Va. July 7, 2010), a judge ruled an email setting forth payment terms in settlement of a dispute between a provider of physical therapy services and nursing homes was enforceable against the nursing homes.

Emails are not the only correspondence exposed to potentially being ruled an enforceable contract. Letters of intent generally are used to express the intent of two parties to enter into a written agreement in the future, but these too could be construed as an enforceable contract. The Illinois Supreme Court found that one letter of intent between a general contractor and subcontractor was ambiguous as to whether the parties intended it to be a binding contract and as a result ruled that the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the letter of intent would in fact be binding. Quake Const., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281 (1990). Regardless of the outcome, the parties most certainly incurred legal fees and expenses for a court to rule on whether a letter was an enforceable contract.

So how can you prevent your emails and letters from becoming your next contractual obligation? If you are negotiating or making an offer to someone via email, include a disclaimer in your email that makes it clear the negotiations or offer are contingent on the parties signing a written contract. Don’t bury this disclaimer at the bottom of the email in fine print; intentionally include it in the body of the email so there is no denying your intent. If you are negotiating by a letter of intent or sending some other correspondence such as an offer of employment, use language to make it clear that the letter is not intended to create a binding contract. And as always, if there is any uncertainty, have an attorney do a quick review of before you sign or hit send – your legal fees will be far less for a precursory review than later if you are sued for breach of contract.

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European Commission Discusses Big Data

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The European Commission (the Commission) recently issued a press release recognizing the potential of data collection and exploitation (or “big data”) and urging governments to embrace the positive aspects of big data.

The Commission summarized four main problems that have been identified in public consultations on big data:

  • Lack of cross-border coordination
  • Insufficient infrastructure and funding opportunities
  • A shortage of data experts and related skills
  • A fragmented and overly complex legal environment

To address these issues, the Commission proposed the following:

  • A public-private partnership to fund big data initiatives
  • An open big data incubator program
  • New rules on data ownership and liability for data provision
  • Mapping of data standards
  • A series of educational programs to increase the number of skilled data workers
  • A network of data processing facilities in different member states

The Commission stated that, in order to help EU citizens and businesses more quickly reap the full potential of data, it will work with the European Parliament and the European Council to successfully complete the reform of the EU’s data protection rules. The Commission will also work toward the final adoption of the directive on network and information security to ensure the high level of trust that is fundamental for a thriving data-driven economy.

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The Walls Shouldn’t Have Ears: Ruling on Eavesdropping Puts Burden of Prevention on Illinois Employers

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Are your employees surreptitiously recording conversations? It’s a frightening thought. But based upon a new Illinois Supreme Court ruling, they are now free to do so. To discourage this behavior, Illinois employers should consider implementing a policy prohibiting such surreptitious recordings.

In People v. Clark, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the state eavesdropping statute, which had made it illegal to record conversations in Illinois without the consent of all parties, was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. The state Supreme Court reasoned that audio and audiovisual recordings are “medias of expression commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of information and ideas and thus are included within the free speech and free press guarantee” of the First Amendment.

Consider for a moment how your employees might use secretly recorded conversations against you. An employee who has previously complained to your human resources department about another employee who made inappropriate sexist or racist comments, may now freely record all conversations with the colleague, and can use those recordings in a lawsuit against the company. Or, an employee might surreptitiously record everything said during an internal investigation of alleged wrongdoing by the company, and could then provide third parties with those recordings.

Given the removal of statutory barriers, Illinois employers are now forced to create their own systems for preventing this objectionable conduct. One such avenue would be to implement a policy prohibiting the recording of conversations absent the consent of all parties.

Under certain circumstances, employers may want to record workplace conversations. However, the employer, not each individual employee, should dictate when recording conversations is appropriate. Company policy should be unequivocal and forbid the recording of any conversations with colleagues or business conversations with third parties, regardless of where such conversations take place, without the consent of all parties to the conversation.

Note that such a policy would not prohibit an employee from using such surreptitious recordings in a lawsuit against the company, or from sharing such recordings with others, because Illinois law no longer requires the consent of all parties. But with clear guidelines in place, Illinois employers would at least have the option of taking disciplinary action against employees who violate the company’s policy. Employees generally don’t want to risk losing their jobs by violating such rules, and may therefore think twice before making secret recordings.

In response to the concerns of employers and others, the Illinois General Assembly is already considering new legislation that would limit the recording of conversations in a way that does not violate the Constitution. And while Illinois employers should monitor the progress of such prospective legislation, adoption of a company policy prohibiting the secret recording of conversations can help reduce the likelihood of such behavior in the interim.

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Price Comparison Advertising – Massachusetts Law

GT Law

Retailers doing business in Massachusetts should ensure that their price comparison advertising complies with Massachusetts law, particularly 940 C.M.R. § 6.05 (Section 6.05). Otherwise, they may face a civil enforcement action by the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General (MA AGO), a putative class action brought by a consumer under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act – Chapter 93A, or even a civil action brought by a competitor alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices.

What is price comparison advertising?

As defined in Section 6.05, price comparison advertising “is a form of advertising used in the sale of products whereby current prices are compared with the seller’s former or future prices, the prices of other sellers, or other stated values to demonstrate price reductions or cost savings.” According to the regulation, which was promulgated by the MA AGO, (1) “price comparisons based on false, arbitrary or inflated prices or values deceive or mislead the public” and (2) “[a]buse also occurs when sellers fail to disclose material information which is important to enable consumers to understand the price comparison.” To protect against this alleged deception and abuse, Section 6.05 regulates price comparison advertising.

Which practices does Section 6.05 deem unfair or deceptive?

Section 6.05 is divided into various sections (as more fully described below) that provide retailers with guidance concerning what the MA AGO deems to be unlawful. Violations of Section 6.05 may be enforced by the MA AGO in a civil enforcement action as well as by consumers, who may seek to assert claims individually and on behalf of all those “similarly situated” under Chapter 93A.  Massachusetts law even supports civil actions brought by competitors harmed by unlawful advertising practices.

Specifically, Section 6.05 provides that the following are unfair or deceptive acts:

  • Unidentified Price Comparisons. Sellers cannot state or imply that they are offering any product savings by making a direct or indirect price comparison, unless they “clearly and conspicuously”1   describe the basis for the comparison; providedhowever, that sellers may claim a savings or make such a comparison (without disclosing the basis) if they are making a comparison to their own “former price” (as determined by Section 6.05(3)).
  • Comparison to Seller’s Own Former Prices. Sellers cannot compare their current price with their own former price for any product, unless such former price is a “bona fide, actual price” that they had offered “openly and in good faith for a reasonably substantial period of time in the recent past” to the public.2
  • Introductory Offers and Future Price Comparisons. Sellers cannot make an introductory offer or compare their current product price with a future product price unless (i) the future price takes effect immediately after the sale and not later than 60 calendar days after “the dissemination date of the introductory offer or price comparison” and (ii) following the effective date of the future price, the product is offered “openly and in good faith” at that price for at least equal to  the period of time offered at the introductory price, but not less than 14 days (except for certain circumstances).3
  • Use of “Sale” Terminology. Sellers cannot use the words “priced for sale,” “on sale,” “sale,” “selling out,” “clearance,” “reduced,” “liquidation,” “must sell,” “must be sacrificed,” “now only $X,” or other terms which state or imply a price savings unless certain specific factors listed in Section 6.05 are met.4
  • Use of “List Price” or Similar Comparisons. Sellers cannot compare their current product price with a “list price,” “manufacturer’s suggested retail price” or similar term, unless the list or manufacturer’s suggested retail price is the price charged for the advertised product by a reasonable number of sellers in the seller’s trade area as of a particular “measurement date” determined by Section 6.05.5
  • Comparison to Other Seller’s Price for Identical Product. Sellers cannot compare their price with another seller’s price for an identical product, unless the stated higher comparative price is at or below the price at which the identical product is being offered in the seller’s trade area as of the “measurement date” or other specifically identified period under certain circumstances.6
  • Comparison to Seller’s Own or Other Seller’s Price for Comparable Product. Sellers cannot compare their price with their own price or another seller’s price for a comparable product unless the comparable product is being offered for sale as of the “measurement date,” or other specifically identified period, at the stated higher comparative price, unless certain factors are met.7
  • Price Comparisons on Price Tickets or Labels. Sellers cannot imprint or attach any ticket or label to a product that contains a fictitious or inflated price which is capable of being used by sellers as a basis for offering fictitious price reductions.8
  • Range of Savings or Price Reduction Claims. Sellers cannot state or imply that any products are being offered for sale at a range of prices or at a range of percentage or fractional discounts unless various factors are met.9
  • Use of Terms “Wholesale” or “At Cost.” Sellers cannot state or imply that any product is being offered at or near a “wholesale” price or “at cost” (or words of similar meaning) unless the price is, in fact, either at or below the price paid by the seller at wholesale, or, in the case of a service, the seller’s cost for the service excluding overhead and profit.
  • Use of Terms “Two for the Price of One” or “Buy One – Get One Free.” Sellers cannot state or imply that products are being offered at the usual price of a smaller number of the same or a different product unless (i) they clearly and conspicuously disclose all material sale conditions being imposed; (ii) the price advertised as the usual price for the smaller number of products is their own “former price”; and (iii) the products are of substantially the same quality, grade, material and craftsmanship as the seller offered prior to the advertisement.
  • Use of Term “If Purchased Separately.”  Sellers cannot make any price comparison based on the difference between the price of a system, set or group of products and the price of the products “if purchased separately” (or words of similar meaning) unless: (i) a reasonable number of sellers in the trade area are currently offering the products as separate items at or above the stated separate purchase price as of the “measurement date”; or (ii) they have actually sold or offered the products for sale as separate items at the stated separate purchase price.
  • Prices for Parts or Units of Sets or Systems. Sellers cannot advertise a price for any product that normally sells as part of a pair, system, or set without clearly and conspicuously disclosing that the price stated is the price per item or unit only, and not the price for the pair, system or set.
  • Gifts. Sellers cannot state or imply that any product is being offered for free or at a reduced price (“a gift”) in conjunction with the purchase of another product unless various factors are met.10
  • Use of Disclaimers. Sellers cannot use a price comparison that is prohibited even if the advertisement contains disclaimers or explanatory language.
  • Are there any other requirements11  that sellers should consider when assessing their price comparison advertising?
  • Record Keeping Requirements. Sellers must maintain records for a period of six months after the last dissemination of subject advertisements and provide those records to the MA AGO, upon request, to substantiate the propriety of such advertisements.12
  • Deceptive Pricing Generally, Examples, and Loss Leaders. Although not contained within Section 6.05 itself, the MA AGO has adopted a more general regulation dealing with “Deceptive Pricing” set forth in 940 C.M.R. § 3.13(2).13  This subsection describes generally what the MA AGO deems deceptive and provides some examples. In addition, related § 3.13(3) prohibits sellers from selling or offering for sale so-called “loss leaders” to induce a buyer to make a purchase of a product sold only in combination with other merchandise on which the seller recovers such loss.
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1 “Clearly and conspicuously” means that “the material representation being disclosed is of such size, color, contrast or audibility and is so presented as to be readily noticed and understood by a reasonable person to whom it is being disclosed.” Section 6.01 provides guidelines for determining if disclosures are proper. 

2 Section 6.05(3) lists various factors that are considered when determining whether a “former price” is a “bona fide, actual price.” Section 6.05(4) provides certain safe harbors for comparison prices.  A complete list of factors and a description of the safe harbors are contained in 940 C.M.R. §§ 6.05(3)(a) and 6.05(4), which are available at  http://www.mass.gov/ago/government-resources/ags-regulations/940-cmr-600.html  (MA AGO’s Website). 

3 These circumstances and exceptions for certain offers limited to certain consumers who are deemed “first time purchasers” as defined in the regulation are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(5), which is available at  the MA AGO’s Website. Also, Section 6.05(5) contains separate requirements for health clubs. 

4 These factors are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(6), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

5 Section 6.05(7) contains separate requirements for manufacturers or franchisors. Also, the “measurement date” is defined in Section 6.01. 

6 These requirements are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(8), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

7 These factors are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(9), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

8 There are certain exceptions for prices that are pre-ticketed by manufacturers or other sellers, as contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(10), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

9 These factors are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(11), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

10 These factors are contained in 940 C.M.R. § 6.05(16), which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

11 This advisory does not contain an all-inclusive list of the MA AGO’s advertising regulations and requirements. Sellers, among other things, should be aware of additional requirements set forth in 940 C.M.R. § 3.00 (General Regulations) and 940 C.M.R. § 6.00 (Retail Advertising). 

12 940 C.M.R. § 6.14 contains specific and detailed record retention requirements for price comparison advertising, which is available at the MA AGO’s Website. 

13 This more general regulation is available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/government-resources/ags-regulations/940-cmr-3-00/940-cmr-300.html. 

Facebook for Attorneys: How to Double Your Likes in No Time

The Rainmaker Institute mini logo (1)

Yesterday’s post detailed how business attorneys can double their connections on LinkedIn, but for consumer attorneys the most likely social media platform for your attention is Facebook.

And just like all social media networks, the lion’s share of the attention goes to those who interact frequently – and genuinely – with followers and fans.

Knowing how valuable and limited your time may be for social media marketing, you need to make efficient use of it to get the maximum benefit.  The infographic below from WhoIsHostingThis.com gives you specific steps you can take to double your Facebook “likes” in just five minutes a day:

Facebook Social Media Likes

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HEARTBLEED: A Lawyer’s Perspective on the Biggest Programming Error in History

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By now you have probably heard about Heartbleed, which is the biggest security threat to the Internet that we have ever seen. The bottom line of Heartbleed is that for the past two years most web sites claiming to besecure, shown by the HTTPS address (the S added to the end of the usual HTTP address was intended to indicate a web secured by encryption), have not been secure at all. Information on those webs could easily have beenbled out by any semi-skilled hacker who discovered the defect. That includes your user names and passwords, maybe even your credit card and bank account information.

For this reason every security expert that I follow, or have talked to about this threat, advises everyone to change ALL of their online passwords. No one knows who might have acquired this information in the past two years. Unfortunately, the nature of this software defect made it possible to steal data in an untraceable manner. Although most web sites have upgraded their software by now, they were exposed for two years. The only safe thing to do is assume your personal information has been compromised.

Change All of Your Passwords

After you go out and change all of your passwords – YES – DO IT NOW – please come back and I will share some information on Heartbleed that you may not find anywhere else. I will share a quick overview of a lawyer’s perspective on a disaster like this and what I think we should do about it.

Rules of the Internet

One of the things e-discovery lawyers like me are very interested in, and concerned about, is data security. Heartblead is the biggest threat anyone has ever seen to our collective online security, so I have made a point of trying to learn everything I could about it. My research is ongoing, but I have already published on detailed report on my personal blog. I have also been pondering policy changes, and changes in the laws governing the Internet that be should made to avoid this kind of breach in the future.

I have been thinking about laws and the Internet since the early 1990s. As I said then, the Internet is not a no-mans-land of irresponsibility. It has laws and is subject to laws, not only laws of countries, but of multiple independent non-profit groups such as ICANN. I first pointed this out out as a young lawyer in my 1996 book for MacMillan, Your Cyber Rights and Responsibilities: The Law of the Internet, Chapter 3 of Que’s Special Edition Using the Internet. Anyone who commits crimes on the Internet must and will be prosecuted, no matter where their bodies are located. The same goes for negligent actors, be they human, corporate, or robot. I fully expect that several law suits will be filed as a result of Heartbleed. Time will tell if any of them succeed. Many of the facts are still unknown.

One Small Group Is to Blame for Heartbleed

The surprising thing I learned in researching Heartbleed is that this huge data breach was caused by a small mistake in software programming by a small unincorporated association called OpenSSL. This is the group that maintains the open source that two-thirds of the Internet relies upon for encryption, in other words, to secure web sites from data breach. It is free software and the people who write the code are unpaid volunteers.

According to the Washington Post, OpenSSL‘s headquarters — to the extent one exists at all — is the home of the group’s only employee, a part timer at that, located on Sugarloaf Mountain, Maryland. He lives and works amid racks of servers and an industrial-grade Internet connection. Craig Timberg, Heartbleed bug puts the chaotic nature of the Internet under the magnifying glass (Washington Post, 4/9/14).

The mistake that caused Heartbleed was made by a lone math student in Münster, Germany. He submitted an add-on to the code that was supposed to correct prior mistakes he had found. His add on contained what he later described as a trivial error. Trivial or not, this is the biggest software coding error of all time based upon impact. What makes the whole thing suspicious is that he made this submission at one minute before midnight on New Year’s Eve 2011.

Once the code was received by OpenSSL, it was reviewed by it before it was added onto the next version of the software. Here is where we learn another surprising fact, it was only reviewed by one person, and he again missed the simple error. Then the revised code with hidden defect was released onto an unsuspecting world. No one detected it until March 2014 when paid Google security employees finally noticed the blunder. So much for the basic crowd sourcing rationale behind the open source software movement.

Conclusion

Placing the reliance of the security of the Internet on only one open source group, OpenSSL, a group with only four core members, is too high a risk in today’s world. It may have made sense back in the early nineties when an open Internet first started, but not now. Heartbleed proves this. This is why I have called upon leaders of the Internet, including open source advocates, privacy experts, academics, governments, political leaders and lawyers to meet to consider various solutions to tighten the security of the Internet. We cannot continue business as usual when it comes to Internet data security.

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Social Media Marketing – New FTC (Federal Trade Commission) Guidance On Generating “Buzz”

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For the first time since it issued its Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising in 2009, the FTC has provided new guidance on the use of social media to generate consumer interest (or “buzz”) in a brand.

Shoe manufacturer Cole Haan had a great social media marketing idea.  They would run a contest through Pinterest.  The winner would get a $1,000 shopping spree courtesy of Cole Haan.  To enter, Pinterest users had to “pin” images of Cole Haan shoes on Pinterest.  They even came up with a great slogan for the campaign: “Wandering Sole.”  Finally, so that people could find the images easily, contestants were required to include the hash tag “#wanderingsole” in their pin descriptions.

This was a great marketing idea.  Lots of Pinterest users would post pictures of Cole Haan’s product on Pinterest and generate buzz about Cole Haan shoes. Here is what one Pinterest page currently looks like:

Cole Haan Pinterest

There was only one problem; the Federal Trade Commission.

The FTC considered the posting of images of Cole Haan shoes by Pinterest users to be endorsements of the product.  To be clear, the issue was not whether the Pinterest users actually intended to endorse the brand.  Rather, the concern was whether viewers of the image might perceive the posting of the images to be endorsements.  As such, the FTC investigated the marketing practice and issued a closing letter to Cole Haan regarding their investigation.

As stated in the closing letter, the FTC thought that the since the Pinterest “pins” constituted an endorsement, there should have been a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure concerning the fact that the “endorsers” (i.e., the Pinterest users entering the contest) were being compensated for their endorsement, namely, the chance to win the $1,000 shopping spree.  The FTC did not believe that the “#Wanderingsole” hash tag was sufficient to provide this required disclosure.  Fortunately, the FTC did not take enforcement action against Cole Haan, recognizing that the FTC had not squarely addressed this issue before.

So finally, we get to the point of this post.  While I understand the FTC’s point (I really do), I think social media marketers will need more specific bright line guidance as to what type of disclosure is required.  The reason is that in the social media context, the amount of text that may be capable of devoting to such disclosure can be very limited.  It is noteworthy that the 2009 guidance issued by the FTC provided numerous examples to help us identify when endorsement disclosure s would be required.  Not one of those examples, however, indicated what would constitute a sufficient disclosure.

In fact, one of the comments submitted (by Heath-McLeod) in connection with the 2009 guidelines requested that the FTC provide “minimum standards for the size and clarity of disclosures.”  The FTC expressly rejected this request saying that:

“advertisers flexibility to meet the specific needs of their particular message is often preferable to attempting to mandate specific language, font, and other requirements applicable across-the-board to all ads.  Advertisers thus have always been free under the Guides to make their disclaimers as large and clear as they deemed appropriate to convey the necessary information to consumers”

That’s good, I suppose.  Advertisers need some freedom to do what they think is appropriate in the context of their marketing.  But how, as a practical matter, are advertisers supposed to get comfortable that the disclosure they give is sufficient?  For example, would it have been sufficient for the Pinterest users to have included the word “sponsored” in their pin description?  How about just the word “ad?”  Would that have been sufficient?  It’s not clear.

Consider, for example, the fact that a similar disclosure having to be made through Twitter or using SMS (i.e., texting) might be very difficult given the 140 character limit.  Now, consider further that the FTC guidelines for endorsements also require an additional disclosure when the person depicted in the endorsement is not a real consumer of the product.  Perhaps Cole Haan’s hash tag should have read:

“#These pins are part of a contest. Contestants may win prize for posting pins of Cole Haan products. Persons in such pins may not be actual consumers of the pinned product”

Darn, that’s 141 characters.  Maybe if I get rid of the “#” ….

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Target Becomes a Target: Proposed California Bill Aims to Make Retailers Liable for Data Breach Incidents

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Following a string of high-profile data breaches and new data suggesting that approximately 21.3 million customer accounts have been exposed by data breach incidents over the past two years, the California legislature has introduced legislation aimed at making retailers responsible for certain costs in connection with data breach incidents.  If passed in its current form, Assembly Bill 1710, titled the Consumer Data Breach Protection Act, would have a substantial impact on retailers operating in California.

Among the major changes proposed in the bill:

  • Stricter Notification Requirements.  The proposed bill would create stricter time-frames and specific requirements for notification of affected consumers following a data breach incident.  In addition to current requirements to notify consumers individually in the most expedient time possible, a retailer affected by a data breach will be required, within 15 days of the breach incident, to provide email notification to affected individuals, post a general notice on the retailer’s web page and notify statewide media.
  • Retailer Liability for Costs Associated with Data Breach Incidents.  A.B. 1710 would amend California’s Civil Code to make retailers liable for reimbursement of expenses incurred in providing the notices described above, as well as the cost of replacing payment cards of affected individuals.
  • Mandatory Provision of Credit Monitoring Services.  If the person or business required to provide notification under the Civil Code is the source of the breach incident, A.B. 1710 will require that person or business to offer to provide identity theft prevention and mitigation services at no cost to affected consumers for not less than 24 months.
  • Prohibitions Against Storing Payment-Related Data.  Under a new section to be added to the Civil Code, persons or businesses who sell goods or services and accept credit or debit card payments would be prohibited from storing payment-related data unless that person or business stores and retains the data in accordance with a payment data retention and disposal policy that limits retention of the data to only the amount of time required for business, legal and regulatory purposes.  In addition, A.B. 1710 imposes further restrictions on the retention and storage of certain sensitive authentication information, such as social security numbers, drivers’ license numbers and PIN numbers.
  • Authorization of Civil Penalties.  As amended by A.B. 1710, the Civil Code would authorize a prosecutor to bring an action in response to a data breach incident to recover civil penalties of up to $500 per violation, or up to $3,000 for a willful or reckless violation.

Historically measures like A.B. 1710 have faced a difficult road.  Similar bills passed by the California legislature were vetoed twice by Governor Schwarzenegger, and the proposal of A.B. 1710 has already caused the California Retailers Association to speak out against the bill.  However, there may be a critical difference in the current climate because consumer awareness of the danger and reality of breach incidents has never been higher and, as shown by the recent Harris Poll, consumers overwhelmingly believe that merchants are to blame.

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