Category: Civil Rights

District Court Rules Most Plaintiffs in Case Do Not Have Standing to Block Florida Stop W.O.K.E. Act

There are two key cases pending before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on Florida’s “Stop W.O.K.E. Act”: the Falls, et al. v. DeSantis, et al., matter (No. 4:22-cv-00166) and the Honeyfund.com, et al. v. DeSantis, et al., matter (No. 4:22-cv-00227). The Northern District of Florida has issued its first order on the Act, which went into effect on July 1, 2022.

In an Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, in Part, in the Falls matter, the court concluded that the K-12 teachers, the soon-to-be kindergartner, and the diversity and inclusion consultant who sued Governor Ron DeSantis and other officials to block the Stop W.O.K.E. Act did not have standing to pursue preliminary injunctive relief. The court reserved ruling pending additional briefing on the question of whether the college professor, who also sued, has standing.

Stop W.O.K.E. Act

The Stop W.O.K.E. Act expands an employer’s civil liability for discriminatory employment practices under the Florida Civil Rights Act if the employer endorses certain concepts in a “nonobjective manner” during training or other required activity that is a condition of employment.

Court Order

In the Falls case, a diverse group of plaintiffs claiming they were regulated by the Stop W.O.K.E. Act filed a lawsuit challenging the Act on the grounds that it violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to free expression, academic freedom, and to access information.

The court, however, did not reach the question of constitutionality. It also did not determine whether the case can move forward, an issue that will be decided when the court rules on the defendants’ pending motion to dismiss.

Instead, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction on the threshold question of standing. It found the plaintiffs (other than the college professor) did not show they have suffered an injury-in-fact that is traceable to DeSantis or another defendant that can likely be redressed by a favorable ruling.

The court found the consultant is not an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act. Therefore, she could not assert standing on that basis. Instead, she argued she has third-party standing to assert the rights of the employers who would otherwise hire her, and she is harmed by the Act because employers will no longer hire her. The court rejected both theories, finding the consultant-employer relationship is not sufficiently “close” to create standing; employers are not hindered in raising their First Amendment rights on their own; and, based on the evidence presented, the court could not reasonably infer that the consultant has lost or will lose business because of the Act.

Importantly, the court specifically held that it was not ruling on the legality of the Act, whether it was moral, or whether it constituted good policy.

Private Employer

The court highlighted that the sister case pending in the Northern District of Florida (Honeyfund.com) involves a private employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In that case, the plaintiffs allege the Stop W.O.K.E. Act violates their right to free speech by restricting training topics and their due process rights by being unconstitutionally vague. Honeyfund.com, Inc. and its co-plaintiffs request that the court enjoin enforcement of the law. The case has been transferred to District Court Judge Mark Walker. The Honeyfund.com case will likely have the largest effect on Florida employers and questions surrounding the enforceability of the Act as to diversity and inclusion training.

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Since the Stop W.O.K.E. Act took effect, employers are understandably unclear how to proceed with training. Employers should continue to train their employees, but review their training programs on diversity, inclusion, bias, equal employment opportunity, and harassment prevention through the lens of the new law. Employers should also ensure they train the trainers who are conducting these important programs. Finally, employers should understand potential risks associated with disciplining or discharging employees who refuse to participate in mandatory training programs, even if employers do not consider the programs to violate the new law.

Article By Stephanie L. Adler-Paindiris, Samia M. Kirmani, Amanda Simpson, and Lindsay Dennis Swiger of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

Five Administrative Law Takeaways From Recent Supreme Court Decisions

The US Supreme Court’s decisions of late have been consequential. While headline-grabbing decisions deal with religious liberties, privacy, and gun control, the Court’s impact on administrative law will have major consequences as well. Administrative law decisions stemmed from cases involving how the executive shaped policy related to climate change, health care, immigration, and public health. Administrative actions are tied together by procedural rules derived from the constitutional separation of powers and the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Below, we discuss five major trends derived from this term’s decisions related to administrative law and the separation of powers:

  1. The “major questions doctrine,” and how it can limit executive-branch authority;
  2. How spending can be used to shape behavior in situations where executive-branch authority might otherwise be limited;
  3. The fate of “Chevron deference” – i.e., the judiciary’s willingness to defer to the executive branch’s interpretations of statutes agencies are tasked to administer;
  4. What discretion executive agencies have to change policies, and what steps they need to defend such changes; and
  5. When the Supreme Court will intervene in cases that are moot or which otherwise lower court decision-making might simplify the Court’s resolution of involved issues.

Major Questions Doctrine

The facts that would support a “major questions” analysis of executive actions became clearer with this term’s decisions. The doctrine drove decisions in major cases related to climate change and public health – NFIB v. OSHA, dealing with the federal vaccine mandate, and West Virginia v. EPA, which addressed greenhouse gas regulations. In sum, the Court says that administrative actions with significant economic and political impact require a close look at authorizing legislation to determine if Congress has authorized the action taken.

Some background on these cases. NFIB v. OSHA – decided first – grappled with whether OSHA exceeded its authority when it sought to require certain employers and their employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine or be subject to frequent testing requirements. (We discussed this case individually in-depth here.) OSHA based its mandate on its authority to relate workplace hazards. Because the vaccine mandate for businesses with over 100 employees would impact roughly 84 million Americans, the Supreme Court accepted that it was a “major question” that involved “great economic and political significance” and therefore was subject to the major questions doctrine. Accordingly, the executive branch was required to point to specific authority supporting the mandate. Because the executive branch could not point to where Congress gave them the power to enforce a vaccine mandate, the Court overturned it.

This decision either reaffirmed the importance of checks and balances or demonstrated that the “major questions doctrine” could be used to prevent the executive branch from flexibly using “old” public health law to address novel issues associated with an airborne pandemic.

The “major questions doctrine” appeared next in West Virginia v. EPA, which we discussed here. To address the issue of climate change, US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed the Clean Power Plan to address carbon dioxide emissions from power plants that relied on owners shifting from fossil fuels to zero-emitting fuels in 2015. This required closures of fossil fuel generating stations and significant investments from the electric generation sector. After the Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan, the Trump Administration proposed a different rule that mandated actions solely at the fossil fuel-fired units and, simultaneously, declared that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the far-reaching legal rationale of the Clean Power Plan.

After addressing some unique procedural issues, which we will discuss below, the Court characterized the Clean Power Plan as effectively remaking the national energy markets. Applying the major questions doctrine, the Court held that such a broad change to the energy sector required a clear congressional mandate, which was not present in the Clean Air Act. In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch argued that deferring to agencies on matters of great economic or political significance would amount to “Permitting Congress to divest its legislative power to the Executive Branch. . .”

How Spending Can Be Used to Shape Behavior

Whereas the two decisions above illustrate limits on executive power, in Biden v. Missouri, the Supreme Court allowed the executive branch to use spending to compel COVID vaccinations of employees in certain medical establishments. A vaccine mandate in this context was consistent with past policies because Medicare and Medicaid facilities are routinely forced to follow protocols to receive funding.

Clearly, one takeaway from Biden v. Missouri is that the executive is not without power to influence private behavior, so long as spending is involved. The Court found that in the healthcare space, it would be counterintuitive for effective administration of a “facility that is supposed to make people well to make them sick with COVID-19.”

The Fate of the Chevron Doctrine

A third issue worth discussing is the fate of the “Chevron doctrine.” Our takeaway is that the “Chevron” doctrine may have little force at the Supreme Court level, even if parts of its analysis live on. We base this conclusion on the fact that both American Hospital Association v. Becerra and West Virginia v. EPA feature limited deference to the executive vis-à-vis the courts. But, neither case discusses Chevron at all. Why?

The “Chevron doctrine” has been fundamental to modern administrative law while existing in a policy-wonk backwater. The Chevron doctrine was born in the 1984 Supreme Court decision Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council. It provides federal agencies with the ability to interpret the statutes they are tasked to administer without heavy-handed court intervention. Under the traditional Chevron analysis, courts will defer to the federal agency when the relevant statute is ambiguous, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.

Two major cases seemed to ignore the doctrine, however:

  • In Becerra, the Court signaled some unwillingness to find statutes “ambiguous.” Becerra involved the US Department of Health and Human Services’ interpretation of the Medicare statute governing hospital reimbursement rates. While the DC Circuit Court of Appeals below found significant ambiguity in the highly technical statute, a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed and held that the plain language of the statute clearly precluded the agency’s interpretation. The fact that the Supreme Court found clarity where the DC Circuit saw ambiguity suggests that the Court has significantly raised the bar for the level of ambiguity necessary for it to adopt an agency’s interpretation.
  • Where Becerra limited the impact of Chevron based on the text of the statute, West Virginia v. EPA established an entire class of cases where Chevron will not apply based on the practical impact of the regulation. By embracing the “major questions doctrine” discussed above, the Court signaled that it will not defer to federal agencies on novel issues unless Congress clearly stated an intent to delegate to the agency. The Court focused on the sweeping impact of EPA’s proposed emissions regulations, in stark contrast to the DC Circuit’s textual analysis of the statutes at issue (and also to the Court’s own textual analysis in Becerra).

While it appears that the Chevron doctrine may currently be gathering cobwebs at the Supreme Court level, it remains to be seen what will happen at the district and appellate levels. Maybe the Chevron doctrine will continue to exist as a sorting mechanism below — scholars have noted that Chevron was far more likely to determine outcomes in the lower courts. But at the very least, the Supreme Court has given federal judges powerful tools to avoid deferring to agency interpretations where they are so inclined.

How and When Agencies Can Change Preexisting Policies

A fourth issue worth highlighting may be found in Biden v. Texas, which involves the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s Remain in Mexico policy.

First, some policy background: Government agencies have broad discretion in setting and changing policies so long as they follow the appropriate procedures. Generally, these procedures are set forth in the APA, a statute that we discuss with great regularity. Under the APA, the executive’s decisions can only be justified or challenged based on the agency’s administrative record. The regulated community can sometimes request that the Court look beyond the administrative record by showing that the agency acted in bad faith or in a procedurally improper manner. The Court’s last significant decision in this area – Department of Commerce v. New York, which we summarized here – evaluated the Commerce Secretary’s attempts to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. In Department of Commerce, extra-record discovery revealed that the Secretary planned to add the question all along and had, in fact, solicited the request for the question from the US Department of Justice (DOJ). The Supreme Court determined that the Voting Rights Act rationale was “contrived” and affirmed the lower court’s decision to bar the US Department of Commerce from asking the question.

Regarding this case: Biden v. Texas, which involved the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s “Remain in Mexico” immigration program – also called the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) – evaluated whether the Biden Administration acted appropriately when it rescinded the program. Some background on Biden v. Texas:

  • In January 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to implement MPP. Under MPP, certain non-Mexican persons arriving by land from Mexico were returned to Mexico to await the results of their immigration cases. After it took office, the Biden Administration first suspended the program and later terminated it.
  • Texas and Missouri challenged the rescission on the grounds that it violated federal immigration law as well as the APA. A Texas federal court accepted the states’ arguments on the grounds that immigration law required DHS to either detain arrivals in the US or in contiguous territory – as MPP did – and that DHS lacked the resources necessary to house arrivals in the US, so a program like MPP was required by statute. The district court entered an injunction requiring the government to “enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capacity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under [immigration law] without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention resources.”
  • On appeal, the Secretary of DHS released a second explanation for terminating MPP and sought to vacate the injunction. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s analysis that the injunction was required and rejected DHS’s second explanation for why the program should be terminated on the grounds that it did not constitute a new or separately reviewable “final agency action,” which triggers APA review.

The Court upheld the rescission of MPP on two grounds: first, because federal immigration law used the word “may” in defining what DHS may do regarding confining persons arriving over land from Mexico. “May” gives the government discretion and establishes contiguous-territory return such as was required by MPP as a tool that the agency “has the authority, but not the duty” to use. Congress could have – but did not – construct the immigration provisions to require MPP.

Additionally, upholding the program required the Court’s consideration of DHS’s during-litigation explanation for why the program should be terminated. The Court accepted the during-litigation explanation because it constituted a wholly new explanation of why the MPP should be terminated. The during-litigation explanation explained that it “superseded” and “rescinded” the earlier termination and then offered “new reasons” that had not been included in the prior rescission. Both the pre-litigation and during-litigation memoranda were separate “final agency actions.”

Finally, because DHS did not rest on its pre-litigation MPP termination, it was permitted to provide additional justifications for its actions, so long as the agency complied with APA-imposed requirements for taking “new” actions. The Court rejected the states’ charge that there was a “significant mismatch between” the rescission and DHS’s explanation for it. DHS’s “ex-ante preference for terminating MPP – like any other feature of an administration’s policy agenda – should not be held against” its actions. Accordingly, DHS’s rescission of MPP was upheld.

An Increase in Procedurally Irregular Case Resolutions? 

A final trend we wanted to highlight is that the Supreme Court appears increasingly willing to wade into disputes at earlier procedural phases than would be typical. Historically, nearly every Supreme Court case has made it to the Court having been fully and finally resolved in lower federal courts. (To be sure, there are some exceptions – most notably the limited class of cases for which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, which involve mainly disputes between the states or disputes between ambassadors.) This term, the Court was increasingly willing to wade into disputes which were either arguably moot or have not yet completed their run through lower courts. Three examples:

  • Mootness. In West Virginia v. EPA, during the pendency of litigation, the Biden Administration indicated it would not enforce the regulations at issue and instead would pursue a new rulemaking. The Court found that EPA’s representation that “voluntary cessation does not moot a case” unless it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not be expected to recur.” For the government to moot the case, it would have to suggest that it would not re-impose limitations based on generation shifting – something that it did not do.
  • No lower court finding regarding jurisdiction. In Biden v. Texas, four of the nine justices signed a dissent indicating that lower courts should review whether federal courts had “jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of” certain immigration laws in light of the Court’s recent decision in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which addressed similar issues. While a majority of the court favored reaching a merits decision, four members of the Court favored remanding the case to lower courts for an evaluation of how Aleman Gonzalez might alter jurisdictional issues in the case.
  • The Court’s Use of its “Shadow Docket.” In Ardoin v. Robinson, the Supreme Court, in an unsigned order with no explanation, reinstated a district voting map in Louisiana that has previously been deemed discriminatory and harmful to minority voting rights. This case was decided under what has been coined the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket” because it refers to cases decided outside normal procedural regularity: off the regular docket, without oral arguments or written briefs, and before lower courts have fully and finally decided the issue. The Court’s use of its “shadow docket” appears to be occurring with increasing frequency. As the Court is likely to remain polarized next term, we may see additional consequential decisions at the “shadow docket” phase then.

This was clearly a major term with significant decisions in many areas, including administrative law. The Court’s next arguments begin in October. We will keep an eye out for new cases relevant to administrative law.

Article By J. Michael Showalter, Samuel A. Rasche, and Rachael A. Bryan of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

Abortion-Related Travel Benefits Post-Dobbs

Immediately following the Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson returning the power to regulate abortion to the states, a number of large employers announced that they would offer out-of-state travel benefits for employees living in states where abortion-related medical care is unavailable. Employers considering offering abortion-related travel benefits have several key considerations to keep in mind. The law currently allows health plans to provide reimbursement for travel primarily for and essential to medical care. Although this area of the law is evolving, employers with self-funded medical plans may amend their existing medical plans to provide abortion-related travel benefits while those with fully insured medical plans may face more obstacles in providing such benefits.

In Dobbs v. Jackson, an abortion clinic challenged a Mississippi law that would ban abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions. In establishing the constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court restricted states in their ability to limit or ban abortions before viability of the fetus, or 24 weeks from the time of conception. In upholding the Mississippi law, the Supreme Court overturned Roe and held that the protection or regulation of abortion is a decision for each state.

Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Dakota have already banned or made abortion illegal pursuant to trigger laws which went into effect as of the Supreme Court decision on June 24, 2022.  Also, a number of additional states are expected to soon have similar legislation in effect, either by virtue of expected legislative action or trigger laws with slightly delayed effective dates.  In response, a number of employers have announced that they will reimburse all or a portion of abortion-related travel expenses for employees in states where abortions are banned or otherwise not available.

Under Section 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, the definition of “medical care” includes transportation that is both “primarily for and essential to” the medical care sought by an individual. These types of travel benefits have historically been utilized in connection with certain specialized medical treatments, such as organ transplants.  However, Section 213(d) is not limited to particular types of procedures, and thus forms the framework for providing abortion-related travel benefits through existing medical plans.

Although Code Section 213(d) applies to both self-insured and insured medical plans, the substantive coverage provisions of insured medical plans will generally be governed by the state insurance code of the state in which the insurance policy is issued.  Coverage for abortion services or any related travel benefits may not be permitted under the insurance code of the state in which the policy is issued, or an insurer may not offer a travel benefit for such services even if permitted to do so.  Self-insured plans, by contrast, provide employers more flexibility in plan design, including control, consistent with existing federal requirements, over the types and levels of benefits covered under the plan. As noted above, existing plans may already cover travel-related benefits for certain types of medical procedures.

Employers with high-deductible health plans tied to health savings accounts (HSAs) will need to consider the impact of adding abortion-related travel benefits to such plans.  Travel-related benefits of any type would not appear to be eligible for first dollar coverage, and thus may be of minimal benefit to participants enrolled in high-deductible health plans.

Employers with fully insured medical plans that do not cover abortion-related travel benefits may be able to offer a medical travel reimbursement program through an integrated health reimbursement arrangement (HRA).  An integrated HRA is an employer-funded group health plan from which employees enrolled in the employer’s traditional group medical insurance plan are reimbursed for qualifying expenses not paid by the traditional plan.

Another potential option for employers with fully insured medical plans may be to offer a stipend entirely outside of any established group health plan. Such reimbursement programs may result in taxable compensation for employees who receive such reimbursements. Also, employers would need to be sensitive to privacy and confidentiality considerations of such a policy, which should generally be minimized if offered in accordance with the existing protections of HIPAA through a medical plan and under which claims are processed by an insurer or third-party administrator rather than by the employer itself.

Additionally, some state laws may attempt to criminalize or otherwise sanction so-called aiding and abetting actions related to the procurement of abortion services in another state.  This is an untested area of the law, and it is unclear whether any actions brought under such statutes would be legally viable.  In this regard, Justice Kavanaugh stated as follows in his concurring opinion in Dobbs:  “For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel.” (Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion, page 10.)  This is an area that will require continual monitoring by employers who offer abortion-related travel benefits.

Article By Thomas G. Hancuch, Philip L. Mowery, and Amal Rafiq of Vedder Price

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Vedder Price

Why ‘Don’t Say Gay’ Bills are Antithetical to an Equitable and Inclusive Education

According to a 2019 GLSEN national survey of LGBTQ+ students, nearly 60% of surveyed students reported they felt unsafe at school because of their sexual orientation and 43% because of their gender expression. Within the same survey, nearly all (98.8%) LGBTQ+ students reported hearing “gay” used in a negative way at school, 95% heard other homophobic remarks, and 87% heard transphobic remarks.

When I was an educator, it was essential to my practice that all my students felt safe. If I were to hear any negative remarks about a student or become aware one of my students felt unsafe due to their identity, it would be my ethical, and moral, obligation to do something to create a safer and more inclusive learning environment; a core part of my role as an educator was to teach empathy and compassion in my students. This could be as simple as having a classroom discussion about the choices of language and how using words such as “gay” with a negative connotation can be hurtful to their classmates. This could also mean sharing my own identity as a queer man so my LGBTQ+ students knew they had someone they could turn to for support, and to normalize queer identities for all my students and their families. Either of these actions would require I discuss the importance of accepting all sexual orientations and gender identities.

In other words, I would have to say “gay.” But in six states — as of now — I would not have been able to do this.

The state of Florida attracted national attention earlier this year with the adoption of H.B. 1557, the “Parental Rights in Education” bill, more commonly known as the “Don’t Say Gay” bill. The bill, which has since been signed into law, dictates classroom instruction by “school staff” on “sexual orientation or gender identity may not occur in kindergarten through grade 3 or in a manner that is not age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate for students.” Five other states, according to the Movement Advancement Project, have similar laws enacted and several more have bills pending in their state legislatures. Some proponents of these bills argue the legislation is necessary to ensure parents have greater say when, if, and how LGBTQ+ issues are discussed with their children.

Yet these laws are designed to ensure only some parents have greater say, as the parents of LGBTQ+ children are certainly not reflected in these efforts.

At a time when youth mental health is reaching a crisis, state legislatures are advancing bills that would perpetuate, and arguably exacerbate, harmful school-based experiences for LGBTQ+ youth and worsen their well-being. A 2022 survey by the Trevor Project found 45% of LGBTQ+ youth seriously considered attempting suicide in the past year, and over half of transgender and nonbinary youth considered suicide. The 2019 GLSEN survey also found LGBTQ+ students who experienced forms of victimization based on their sexual orientation or gender identity (e.g., being bullied, hearing homophobic or transphobic remarks, etc.) had lower levels of self-esteem, higher levels of depression, and were less likely to say they belonged in school.

Some may argue “Don’t Say Gay” bills would not preclude educators from addressing instances of homophobia or transphobia in their classrooms and try to suggest that prohibitions on such actions are not the intent of the bills. However, regardless of intent, these bills often have the insidious impact to “chill” educators’ actions out of fear they may run afoul of the law and open themselves to reprimands, including being terminated.

All students deserve to have a safe, supportive, and affirming learning environment. All educators should be empowered to protect their students, and not feel afraid to step in when they notice a student being bullied because of their identity. And every parent should have the resources to be a partner in their child’s education. Unfortunately, state laws such as the “Don’t Say Gay” bills will only stand in way of these notions from becoming realities.

It is impossible to support all students when LGBTQ+ children continue to be targeted merely because of their identities.

Article By Sean A. Worley of Nelson Mullins

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Copyright ©2022 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

U.S. Supreme Court Sides with Public High School Coach in Free Speech/Freedom of Religion Case

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling which will have wide-ranging effects on the ability of governmental entities to react to religious and other speech of public employees. In Kennedy v. Bremerton Schools, the Court ruled that a public high school could not discipline or disfavor a football coach for his practice of kneeling on the 50-yard line and praying at the conclusion of each game, eventually growing to include most of the football team and opposing players as well. The school district had attempted to accommodate the coach’s desire for prayer, but concerns mounted when one parent complained that her son felt compelled to participate despite being an atheist. The coach was eventually placed on administrative leave and not extended an offer to return to coaching the next school year. Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the coach’s First Amendment challenges.

With a 6-3 majority, the Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the Court first found a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.  The Court discounted the school district’s stated concerns that the coach’s practice could violate the Establishment Clause or interfere with students’ right of free exercise. The Court held that absent evidence of “direct” coercion the Establishment Clause was not implicated and then concluded that the coach’s position of authority over the players was insufficient to constitute direct coercion.  The Court distinguished earlier cases involving prayers at football games and civic meetings, by emphasizing that the speech for which the coach was disciplined was not publicly broadcast or recited to a captive audience. Additionally, students were not required or formally expected to participate.

With respect to the Free Speech issue, the Court concluded that the coach’s prayers were not unprotected “government speech,” and in doing so applied a restrictive view of what could be considered “government speech.”  The Court held that because the coach’s job duties did not include leading prayers, the fact that the speech occurred on the field immediately after the game was insufficient to transform it from private speech to government speech.  “To hold differently,” the Court stated, “would be to treat religious expression as second-class speech and eviscerate this Court’s repeated promise that teachers do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”

The decision, together with Shurtleff v. Boston decided earlier this Term, suggests a sharp break with past Court jurisprudence on the balance between the dictates of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  Government entities should review their policies on religious activity on government property or by employees in connection with their positions in light of these two decisions.

Article By Ahmad Chehab, Scott R. Eldridge, and Robert T. Zielinski of Miller Canfield

For more civil rights legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Preparing Corporate Messaging in the Wake of Dobbs

The United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”), in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, has held that there is no constitutional right to abortion, overruling Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood.

Employers, who increasingly are finding themselves on the front lines of many societal issues, will need to decide quickly whether and how they might address the Dobbs decision, as public reaction has been and is likely to remain strong. Board members, employees, and shareholders may advocate for corporations to take a visible stand on the issue of abortion and reproductive rights. And employees may want to speak up themselves (possibly via employer social media accounts).

It is important to remember that company communication decisions and actions regarding the Dobbs ruling, as well as other political and social issues, can have practical and legal implications.

The first question is whether your company will comment on Dobbs. If you decide to comment, there are many factors to consider. Your message is an important starting point. Who is your intended audience? Will your employees consider it an opportunity to join in the conversation? What will you say? Even if your message is internal, keep in mind that it may not stay that way, given the nature of social media. And before you think, “I’ll just stay out of it,” remember that some will view silence or neutrality as a statement in and of itself. If you choose not to speak, are you prepared to deal with any potential reaction from customers, employees, or shareholders?

Internally, employees may have questions about health benefits or other terms and conditions of employment because of Dobbs. It will be important to arm all key stakeholders, including leadership, corporate communications, and human resources, with tools to consistently manage these communications and responses.

Whether it’s internal or external communications, expect feedback! How that feedback is handled is as important as the initial communication (or lack thereof).

Certain industries, like healthcare and insurance, may also feel compelled to make an affirmative statement if the Dobbs decision has a direct impact on services and/or products. In those cases, the need to consider all implications is even more pressing.

In thinking through these decisions, employers should also consider who may need to approve any messaging. The board of directors, senior executives, legal, and marketing and communications teams are among the key stakeholders who may need to be consulted. And don’t forget that your public-facing employees may bear the brunt of your response. Are they prepared?

Employers should also keep in mind various laws that may govern their reaction, including those they might otherwise not consider. For example, the National Labor Relations Act protects employees’ rights to collectively discuss terms and conditions of employment at work and off duty – and that applies to employers with and without a unionized workforce. The current Biden-appointed General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has taken an expanded view of topics that are connected to the workplace. Moreover, some states, including California and New York, have enacted off-duty conduct laws that prohibit employers from disciplining employees for lawful conduct outside of work, which may include political advocacy. There may also be anti-discrimination laws and potential civil and criminal liability associated with your statements, depending on their wording.

Reactions to the Dobbs decision may vary. Some reaction may be comparable to what we’ve seen with respect to other recent political and/or social justice movements, such as Black Lives Matter and #MeToo; others may react differently, or not at all. In these rapidly changing times, companies — particularly publicly traded and consumer-facing ones — need to be make informed decisions. Clear, consistent messaging is key to establishing confident and consistent responses to potential concerns by employees and other stakeholders.

Article By M. Carter DeLorme, Frank C. Morris, JR, Susan Gross Sholinsky, Jennifer Barna, and Erin E. Schaefer of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more civil rights legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Roe and Casey: What This Decision Means for Employers

As many expected based on the draft opinion that was leaked months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court has held the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to obtain an abortion. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (June 24, 2022).

Dobbs overturns nearly 50 years of precedent from the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood Pennsylvania v. Casey on the issue.

The impact of Dobbs will vary, as states are now at liberty to enforce and create abortion legislation without restrictions arising out of constitutional protections.

What does this mean for employers?

As pressure mounts on this issue, some employers may be considering what, if anything, they can or should do. Many states have enacted legislation that restricts individual abortion rights and potentially third parties who assist individuals who seek abortions. To the extent any state laws were not enforced because of the Court’s holding in Roe or Casey, states can move forward now to implement and enforce those laws.

Laws often referred to as “trigger laws,” those that are in place but unenforceable due to overriding federal restrictions, become enforceable once those federal restrictions are lifted. As a result of Dobbs, abortion-related “trigger laws” previously unenforceable can take effect, creating new standards for individuals and others that will redefine the national abortion law landscape.

Some existing state laws and trigger laws may affect employers and put employers at risk of violating state law if they implement policies to assist employees seeking an abortion or even continue to cover abortions under group health plans. For example, a state law may create liability for anyone who “aids or abets” a person who obtains an abortion. Employers also must be cognizant of how they apply their leave policies, who may seek accommodations based on a sincerely held religious belief, and whether certain provisions of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act apply to women who are seeking or who have had an abortion.

In addition, the Court’s ruling may affect employee benefit plans. Many employers are considering additional benefits for their employees, and their covered dependents, such as travel reimbursement for seeking an abortion outside of the local jurisdiction due to state law restrictions. There are many legal issues to consider in connection with the coverage of abortion-related services under employee benefit plans. (For additional guidance on the issue, see our article, Group Health Plan Considerations in the Face of (Potentially) Changing Abortion Laws.) Depending on how the state laws are enacted, there also may be issues with relying on ERISA preemption provisions to avoid these obligations.

Corporate management and directors should plan for changes and be aware of policies and fiduciary responsibilities. This can include preparing for public and employee reactions (for and against), legislative and law enforcement threats, social media posts, and other employee demonstrations. Pressure from a variety of groups to take a corporate public opinion also may occur.

Whether changes to leave policies, employee benefits, travel reimbursement, or handling accommodation requests, employers considering policies or benefit offerings in response to Dobbs must carefully review and consider federal and state laws, including state abortion-related legislation to evaluate the risk of potential liability.

Article By Patricia Anderson Pryor, Joy Napier-Joyce, Melissa Ostrower, and Tasos C. Paindiris of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Is Coming… Are You Ready? CBP Issues Hints at the Wave of Enforcement To Come

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.

What to Know

  • US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.
  • The new guidance imposes tighter timelines and a higher burden of evidence on importers to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor. If CBP does not make a decision within specific timeframes, goods will automatically be deemed excluded.
  • CBP is expected to issue additional technical guidance at the end of May or early June. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is also expected to issue guidance closer to June 21, 2022.
  • CBP is scheduled to host informational webinars detailing their UFLPA guidance in the coming weeks.

What’s New: Tighter Timelines  

While US importers were eagerly anticipating the issuance of technical guidance regarding implementation of the UFLPA from CBP last week, which is now expected this week, CBP did post a new guidance document summarizing the UFLPA and forced labor Withhold Release Orders (WRO) enforcement mechanisms. Specifically, CBP’s authority to detain merchandise under the UFLPA will be pursuant to 19 CFR § 151.16, which provides for a much different timeline for the detention of merchandise than the WRO process. Under this process, if Customs does not make a timely decision regarding admissibility, goods are automatically excluded.

UFLPA Timeline Enforcement under 19 CFR § 151.16

Number of Days

Actions
5 Days from Presentation for Examination

CBP must decide whether to release or detail merchandise

  • If the merchandise is not released, it is detained
5 Days after Decision to Release or Detain

CBP will issue a notice to importer advising them of:

  • The initiation of detention
  • Date merchandise examined
  • Reason for detention
  • Anticipated length of detention
  • Nature of tests and inquiries to be conducted
  • Information to accelerate disposition
  Upon written request, CBP must provide importer with testing procedures, methodologies used, and testing results
Within 30 Days of Examination

CBP will make a final determination as to the admissibility of merchandise

  • If CBP does not make a determination within the 30-day period, the merchandise will be deemed excluded
  • This means any submission to rebut the presumption should be made before this 30 day period
Within 180 Days of CBP Determination/Exclusion Importers may protest CBP’s final determination
Within 30 Days After Protest Submitted The protest is deemed denied if CBP does not grant or deny the protest within 30 days
Within 180 Days after the Date the Protest is Denied

The importer may commence a court action contesting the denied protest (28 U.S.C. § 1581(a))

  • In a court action, CBP must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an admissibility decision has been reached for good cause
  • Customs can decide to grant the protest after the deemed denial but before a court case is filed

This is a much shorter timeline than the WRO process. Importantly, a company contesting CBP’s detention of merchandise pursuant to the UFLPA would be required to submit documentation to rebut the presumption within the 30-day period that CBP is assessing admissibility, whereas the WRO process permits 90 days. Like the WRO process, the importer may also file a protest 180 days after CBP makes its final determination regarding the exclusion.

CBP Listening Session: A Higher Burden of Evidence 

On Tuesday, May 24, 2022, CBP provided information regarding the publication of guidance and enforcement of the UFLPA:

  • CBP Publication of Guidance. CBP’s guidance regarding its enforcement of the rebuttable presumption and the UFLPA is scheduled to be published the week of May 30.
  • DHS Publication of Guidance. DHS guidance will be published on or about June 21, 2022, which will include information relating to supply chain due diligence, importer guidance, and the entity lists.
  • Clear and Convincing Evidence Required to Rebut the Presumption that Merchandise was Produced with Forced Labor. It was confirmed that the UFLPA will have a much higher burden of evidence required to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor than that of a WRO. Any exception to the rebuttable presumption must be reported to Congress, and thus the level of evidence that will be required to overcome the rebuttable presumption is very high. As a practical matter, it appears that very few detained entries will be released. Importers are advised to start conducting due diligence on supply chains in order to ensure that they will be able to obtain documentation should merchandise be detained once the rebuttable presumption goes into effect. Importantly, products that are subject to an existing WRO from Xinjiang will now be enforced under the UFLPA process instead of the WRO process.
  • Evidence Required if Merchandise is Detained. The forthcoming guidance will set forth information regarding how an importer may meet the exception to the rebuttable presumption and to demonstrate that merchandise was not produced with forced labor, by meeting the following three criteria:
    • Demonstrate compliance with the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force/DHS strategy;
    • Demonstrate compliance with CBP’s guidance and any inquiries that CBP raises; and
    • Provide clear and convincing evidence that the supply chain in question is free of forced labor.
  • Binding Rulings. Importers may apply for a binding ruling to confirm or request an exception to the rebuttable presumption under the UFLPA. Although CBP is still finalizing the process for importers to apply for a binding ruling, importers would be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that merchandise is not produced with forced labor. If the ruling is granted, it applies to future shipments for the specific supply chain in question.
  • Known Importer Letters and Detention Notices. Going forward, CBP will not issue Known Importer letters, and CBP will notify importers that merchandise is subject to the UFLPA through the issuance of detention notices.
  • Detention of Merchandise. If goods are detained by CBP because they are suspected of having a nexus to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), importers may either provide clear and convincing evidence that merchandise was not produced with forced labor or export the products. If detained products that fall under the UFLPA are comingled with other products that are not subject to the UFLPA, importers may request the segregation of the merchandise that is not subject to the UFLPA.
  • Chain of CBP Review for Importer Submissions Relating to Detained Merchandise. Chain of CBP review for the request of an exception to the rebuttable presumption has not been finalized yet. However, importers will be required to submit evidence that rebuts the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor to the applicable CBP Port Director. For the moment, the CBP Commissioner is the final individual who can ultimately make an exception to the rebuttable presumption, but CBP is deciding if it will delegate this responsibility to any additional persons.

Upcoming CBP Informational Webinars

CBP will be holding three webinar sessions, all covering the same material, to discuss and review its guidance relating to the UFLPA. The dates of the webinars and the registration links are listed below.

Article By Angela M. Santos, Christine E. Hintze, and Jodi Tai of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more immigration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

How to Create an Impactful and Authentic Pride Month Social Media Campaign for Your Company

June is Pride Month, which offers companies of all kinds a unique opportunity to celebrate, show support and raise awareness for LGBTQIA+ rights on their social media channels.

Businesses of all kinds and sizes can get involved, raise awareness and give back for Pride Month regardless of their budget or reach.

While Pride is most definitely a celebration, an impactful Pride campaign should include education, awareness, and center around people.

Celebrating Pride and showing your support for the LGBTQIA+ community is not a trend— and it shouldn’t be treated as such.

Here’s how to create and implement an impactful and genuine Pride Month social media campaign at your company.

The Do’s and Don’ts of Pride Month social media planning

Before you dive head-first into planning your corporate Pride initiatives, it’s important to get a wide range of employees involved in the planning process.

If your company has an LGBTQIA+ affinity group or diversity committee, collaborate with them or if you don’t have a group, consider convening a committee of employee volunteers of diverse backgrounds to serve as a sounding board and provide their input as your plans begin to take shape.

Please note: these volunteers should be compensated for their time and efforts in some meaningful way (vacation time, bonuses, gift cards, etc.). While it may be too late to do this for this year’s campaign, activate or assemble the group now for your 2023 initiative.

Don’t: Exploit social initiatives and conversations as a means to reach business goals.

Celebrating Pride and showing your support for the LGBTQIA+ community is not a trend— and it shouldn’t be treated as such.

If you’re simply posting rainbow-branded imagery (rainbow washing) during the month or posting about your commitment to the cause without having any real initiatives or actions to back it up, you’re just paying lip service to and perhaps exploiting yet another social initiative. Make sure your company can really walk the walk before you talk the talk. Performative allyship can backfire, alienating your employees, your clients, recruits, and others.

Remember that everyone (employees, clients, and the general public) is watching what you post online, even if they don’t actually like or comment on it.

Do: Ask yourself why you’re supporting this initiative and have a clear purpose.

Before publishing Pride-related content, ask yourself, are we actually adding value to this conversation? What are we hoping to gain from inserting ourselves into this conversation? What are our motivations? Is our company an actual safe space or inclusive environment that includes active and engaged allies?

Remember, Pride Month should not be about your business goals. You also don’t have to have accomplished all of your LGBTQIA+ related inclusion goals to commemorate Pride, but your efforts should be more than surface level.

Do: Support LGBTQIA+ initiatives year-round.

If you don’t already take steps to support the LGBTQIA+ community year-round, take the opportunity to discuss doing so with management and staff before Pride. June is only one month out of the year, a month where it’s arguably the “most acceptable” to show support for the LGBTQIA+ community. To be a true ally, it’s important to show this level of support year-round. Work to ensure that your company’s policies and practices are inclusive and address the needs of your LGBTQIA+ employees.

In addition to internally focused actions, consider how your true commitment can be reflected externally. There are many organizations to which you can donate and volunteer. Solicit voluntary feedback from your LGBTQIA+ employees and clients to ensure that they feel involved and included in the process.

Do: Educate yourself and those around you on the origins and history of Pride Month.

Pride Month has a rich, political history that companies often fail to understand and recognize as they participate in Pride Month. Pride Month is celebrated in June to honor the 1969 Stonewall Uprising in Manhattan — a tipping point for the Gay Liberation Movement in the United States.

Not only is Pride a time to recognize the progress that’s been made since the Stonewall Riots, but it’s just as important to acknowledge how far we still must go as a society, particularly considering recent efforts to overturn or narrow the progress that has been made. A successful Pride campaign should have education and awareness at its core.

Do: Make education and awareness the core of your campaign.

Ideas for content for your Pride Campaign can include educating your followers on the meaning behind the Pride flag, using posts to tell the history of the Pride flag, and what Pride means to your employees, and run their answers in Q&A posts.

Another idea is to create posts to help followers better understand Pride Month and provide resources to help people better educate themselves on the cause and support those of the LGBTQIA+ community.

In addition, spotlighting members of the LGBTQIA+ community is a helpful way to educate your followers and amplify the contributions of individuals.

No matter what you choose, create a campaign that is rooted in improving awareness and education amongst your community.

Do: Let inclusivity be at the core of your all campaigns.

Inclusivity should be an active mission as part of your Pride campaign, and for your future marketing efforts too. Aim to have better representation on social media for your community — that means including people of all marginalized or otherwise underrepresented voices.

If you really want to reach, represent, and support your diverse community, it’s time to make active shifts towards better inclusive marketing year-round. It’s less about what you need to do for Pride today and instead, how are you supporting LGBTQIA+ folks year-round?

Do: Put your money (and time) where your mouth is.

Instead of treating Pride like a marketing campaign, put your efforts toward an activity that will positively impact the LGBTQIA+ community.

While monetary donations can be helpful, volunteering at community events or spending time with LGBTQIA+ advocacy organizations can be more impactful for your employees.

Consider hosting or taking part in LGBTQIA+ programming and donating to local charities doing work in your community to support LGBTQIA+ initiatives.

Do: Use the right hashtags to be discovered

  • #lgbtqia
  • #lgbtqpride
  • #lgbtqhumanrights
  • #equality
  • #pridemonth
  • #loveislove
  • #pride

Every organization that wants to support Pride on social media can find a way to do so, we challenge you to do it in a way that is authentic, genuine, and impactful to your brand and most importantly, to your employees and your clients. The world is watching you, so challenge yourself by doing the right thing.

This article was authored by Stefanie Marrone of Stefanie Marrone Consulting, and Paula T. Edgar, Esq, the CEO of PGE Consulting Group LLC, a firm that provides training and education solutions at the intersection of professional development and diversity, equity and inclusion. 

For more legal marketing and law office management news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Stefanie M. Marrone. All Rights Reserved.

Illinois Department of Labor Publishes Guidance for Employers Seeking Equal Pay Registration Certificate

Effective March 24, 2022, the Illinois Equal Pay Act (IEPA) was amended to require private businesses with more than 100 employees in Illinois to obtain an Equal Pay Registration Certificate (EPRC) by March 23, 2024, and every two years thereafter.

To apply for the EPRC, businesses must submit the following to the Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL): (1) a filing fee; (2) an equal pay compliance statement; (3) a copy of the employer’s most recently filed EEO-1 report; and (4) a list of employees separated by gender and the race and ethnicity categories as reported in the employer’s most recently filed EEO-1 report, and the total wages paid to each employee during the past calendar year.

The IDOL recently updated its Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for the EPRC, addressing, among other things, the application and submission processes, fee requirements, recertification, publicly available data, and penalties for employer noncompliance.  Here are key takeaways:

  • All employees based in Illinois, including those working remotely, should be included in the total employee count for reporting purposes. An employer’s total employee count includes the total number of people employed who worked in or were based out of Illinois on December 31 of the 12-month calendar year immediately prior the year the employer is required to submit an EPRC application.
  • For reporting purposes, “wages” means any compensation paid to an employee by an employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the two parties, including wages, salaries, earned commissions, earned bonuses, stocks and ownership shares. This does not include retirement health insurance benefits, or other fringe benefits.
  • If an employer’s submitted wage data in its EPRC application shows that the employer is paying unequal wages to male and female employees or to African-American and non-African American employees, the IDOL may initiate its own investigation pursuant to Sections 10(a) and 15(c) of the IEPA and Section 320.200 of the IEPA regulations.
  • Before any fines may be imposed for a violation of the IEPA, the IDOL will provide notice to an employer that violates the IEPA and inadvertently fails to file an initial EPRC application or recertification that they have 30 calendar days to submit the application or recertification. If the employer fails to do so, it shall be fined up to $10,000.
  • An employer that falsifies or misrepresents data on an EPRC application faces suspension or revocation of the EPRC and civil penalties up to $10,000.
  • Current employees subject to the IEPA may request anonymized data from the IDOL regarding their job classification or title and the pay for that classification.

Illinois employers should audit their pay practices to ensure that any differences in wages amongst employees of similar job classifications are justified by legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more articles covering labor law updates, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.