Category: Civil Procedure

Three Individuals Sentenced for $3.5 Million COVID-19 Relief Fraud Scheme

Three Individuals Sentenced for $3.5 Million COVID-19 Relief Fraud Scheme

On February 6, three individuals were sentenced for fraudulently obtaining and misusing Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans that the US Small Business Administration (SBA) guaranteed under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act.

According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, in 2020 and 2021, defendants Khadijah X. Chapman, Daniel C. Labrum, and Eric J.O’Neil submitted falsified documents to financial institutions for fictitious businesses to fraudulently obtain $3.5 million in PPP loans intended for small businesses struggling with the economic impact of COVID-19. Chapman was convicted in November 2023 of bank fraud. Labrum and O’Neil pleaded guilty in 2023 to bank fraud. Following their convictions, Chapman was sentenced to three years and 10 months in prison, Labrum was sentenced to two years in prison, and O’Neil was sentenced to two years and three months in prison.

Read the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) press release here.

False Claims Act Complaint Filed Against Former President and Co-Owner of Mobile Cardiac PET Scan Provider

The DOJ filed a complaint in the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Rick Nassenstein, former president, chief financial officer, and co-owner of Illinois-based Cardiac Imaging Inc. (CII), which provides mobile cardiac positron emission tomography (PET) scans.

The complaint alleges that Nassenstein caused CII to pay excessive, above-market fees to doctors who referred patients to CII for cardiac PET scans. The government alleges that the compensation arrangements violated the Stark Law, which prohibits health care providers from billing Medicare for services referred by a physician with whom the provider has a compensation arrangement unless the arrangement meets certain statutory and regulatory requirements. Claims knowingly submitted to Medicare in violation of the Stark Law also violate the federal FCA.

The complaint alleges that CII provided cardiac PET scans on a mobile basis and paid the referring physicians, usually cardiologists, to provide physician supervision as required by Medicare rules. From at least 2017 through June 2023, Nassenstein allegedly caused CII to enter into compensation arrangements with referring cardiologists that provided for payment to the cardiologists as if they were fully occupied supervising CII’s scans, even though they were actually providing care to other patients in their offices or patients who were not even on site. CII’s fees also allegedly compensated the cardiologists for additional services the physicians did not actually provide. The complaint alleges that CII paid over $40 million in unlawful fees to physicians and submitted over 75,000 false claims to Medicare for services provided pursuant to referrals that violated the Stark Law.

The lawsuit was originally a qui tam complaint filed by a former billing manager at CII, and the United States, through the DOJ, filed a complaint in partial intervention to participate in the lawsuit.

The case, captioned US ex rel. Pinto v. Nassenstein, No. 18-cv-2674 (S.D. Tex.), follows an $85.5 million settlement in October 2023 by CII and its current owner, Sam Kancherlapalli, for claims arising from this conduct.

Read the DOJ’s press release here.

San Diego Restaurant Owner Charged with Tax and COVID-19 Relief Fraud Schemes

On February 2, a federal grand jury in San Diego returned a superseding indictment charging a California restaurant owner with wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, tax evasion, filing false tax returns, conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and failing to file tax returns.

According to the indictment, Leronce Suel, the majority owner of Rockstar Dough LLC and Chicken Feed LLC, conspired with a business partner to underreport over $1.7 million in gross receipts on Rockstar Dough LLC’s 2020 federal corporate tax return. From March 2020 to June 2022, Suel and the business partner then allegedly used this fraudulent return to qualify for COVID-19-related loans pursuant to the PPP and Restaurant Revitalization Funding program. In connection with those loans, Suel also allegedly certified falsely that he used the loan money for payroll purposes only. The indictment alleges that Suel and his business partner laundered the fraudulently obtained funds through cash withdrawals from their business bank accounts and stashed more than $2.4 million in cash in their home.

The indictment further charges that Suel failed to report millions of dollars received in cash and personal expenses paid for by his businesses as income, in addition to reporting false depreciable assets and business losses.

If convicted, Suel faces prison sentences up to 30 years for each count of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 10 years for each count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, five years for tax evasion and conspiracy to defraud the United States, three years for each count of filing false tax returns, and one year for each count of failing to file tax returns.

Read the DOJ’s press release here.

© 2024 ArentFox Schiff LLP
For more on Regulated Industries, visit the NLR Biotech, Food, Drug section.

PFAS MDL Settlements: Red Herrings For Downstream Companies

Leading up to the aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) MDL litigation bellwether trial in June 2023, questions circulated regularly about the end game for the water utilities that had filed lawsuits alleging PFAS contamination to drinking water. With several hundred utilities with pending lawsuits seeking the costs for technology needed to filter PFAS from drinking water, monitoring wells, testing equipment, disposal costs, etc., and potentially thousands of other water utilities with similar potential lawsuits, the damages seemed astronomical. So, too, did the amount of time it would take to litigate each case to get the water utilities monetary relief. These two competing forces, plus the pressure of an actual trial date looming, led Dupont and 3M to announce PFAS MDL settlements in June 2023. At $1.185 billion by Dupont and between $10.3 billion and $12.5 billion by 3M, with the intention of both settlement funds to resolve all pending and potential water utility claims in the United States, it seemed to many that a resolution had been achieved that would address PFAS in drinking water systems without burdening utility customers or the utilities themselves.

The issue, though, is that over 9,000 water utilities were estimated to be in need of treatment technology to meet the EPA’s newly proposed drinking water standards. The American Water Works Association (AMWA) reminded everyone that their own estimates of the costs of compliance to the EPA’s level would cost utilities over $3.2 billion annually. Even buying into the old joke that lawyers are horrible at math, it does not take long for one to realize the significant gap in the proposed settlement amounts and AMWA’s estimates. Water utilities accepting money under the Dupont and 3M settlement funds are not all going to receive 100% of the necessary funding for remediation. How then will this deficit be resolved?

Water utilities will be reluctant to pass on all of the costs to customers, although pricing increases could provide a stopgap measure for water utilities on top of the MDL settlement funds. State or even federal funding may be available under grant, loan or other programs that can also assist. However, when the dust settles, it is likely that water utilities are going to look to a particular group of parties to pursue damages from – companies that discharged PFAS into waterways that fed into the water utility facilities. Lawsuits already abound nationally filed by private citizens against such companies for property damage, bodily injury and medical monitoring. Why then would water utilities finding themselves in need of significant money to properly treat drinking water not take similar legal action? Couple this with pressure water utilities are starting to receive in the form of finding themselves sued in class action lawsuits by private citizens, and the legal notion of contribution begins to ring very true for water utilities looking to minimize their own damages in such lawsuits and find sources of funding for remediation technology.

Companies that have historically discharged effluent into waterways that feed drinking water supplies must therefore keep all of the above in mind and not be lulled into a false sense of complacency that the Dupont and 3M settlements in the MDL are going to mean the end of PFAS drinking water litigation. I predict quite the opposite.

It is of the utmost importance that businesses along the whole commerce chain that have or believe that they might have used PFAS in certain processes take steps now to understand their PFAS risk. Public health and environmental groups urge legislators to regulate PFAS at an ever-increasing pace. Similarly, state level EPA enforcement action is increasing at a several-fold rate every year. Companies that did not manufacture PFAS, but merely utilized PFAS in their manufacturing processes, are becoming targets of costly enforcement actions at rates that continue to multiply year over year. Lawsuits are also filed monthly by citizens or municipalities against companies that are increasingly not PFAS chemical manufacturers. The only way to manage future risk is to fully understand what that risk picture looks like, and companies would be well-advised to invest in proper diligence for the PFAS risk question.

©2024 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.
For more on PFAS, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

Giving Thanks for Thanksgiving

Until President Abraham Lincoln proclaimed a national day of thanksgiving during the Civil War, thanksgiving holidays were a matter of state and local concern.   California mentions Thanksgiving Day in 18 separate statutes, including those in the Code of Civil Procedure, Civil Code, and even the Fish & Game Code.  The last statute, however, has nothing to do with turkeys.  Rather, Fish & Game Code Section 5523 concerns the timing of the opening of the Dungeness crab season.

California may have more than one day of thanksgiving.  Government Code Section 19853 provides that all state employees are entitled to various specified holidays, including  every day appointed by the Governor of this state for a public fast, thanksgiving, or holiday.

© 2010-2023 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

By  Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more news on California Holidays for Employees, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Blunt Rejection of Attorney Fees in Stipulated Dismissal

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of attorney fees, finding that neither inequitable conduct nor a conflict of interest rendered the case exceptional given the limited factual record following a stipulated dismissal in a patent case. United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., Case No. 22-1363 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.).

United Cannabis Corporation (UCANN) sued Pure Hemp for patent infringement. After the litigation was stayed pending bankruptcy proceedings, the parties stipulated to the dismissal. Pure Hemp then sought attorney fees based on alleged inequitable conduct by UCANN during prosecution of the asserted patent due to nondisclosure of a prior art reference used in the patent’s specification and based on a purported conflict of interest by UCANN’s litigation counsel. The district court denied Pure Hemp’s request, finding that the case was not exceptional. Pure Hemp appealed.

Pure Hemp argued that the district court erred by (1) failing to find Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party in the litigation, (2) not concluding that the undisputed facts established inequitable conduct and (3) not recognizing that UCANN’s attorneys had a conflict of interest.

The Federal Circuit found that although the district court erred in not finding Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party, this was a harmless error. The Court explained that by fending off UCANN’s lawsuit with a stipulation dismissing UCANN’s claims with prejudice, Pure Hemp is a prevailing party under § 285. However, the Court concluded that this error was harmless because the district court ultimately concluded that this case was unexceptional.

The Federal Circuit found Pure Hemp’s arguments on inequitable conduct without merit. The Court explained that it had no findings to review because Pure Hemp voluntarily dismissed its inequitable conduct counterclaim and did not seek any post-dismissal inequitable conduct proceedings. Although Pure Hemp argued that it could prevail based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Court disagreed. It explained that even the limited record demonstrated at least a genuine dispute as to both the materiality and intent prongs of inequitable conduct and, therefore, the district court properly determined that Pure Hemp did not demonstrate that this case was exceptional.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Pure Hemp’s argument that copying and pasting portions from the prior art in the patent’s specification (but not disclosing the same prior art references) was inequitable conduct. The Court explained that unlike the nonbinding cases Pure Hemp relied on, the district court here did not find that the copied prior art was material, and the record gave no reason to disbelieve the explanation provided by UCANN’s prosecution counsel. The Court was also unpersuaded by Pure Hemp’s arguments to support inequitable conduct, explaining that the Court was not free to make its own findings on intent to deceive and materiality and, further, the district court was not required to provide its reasoning for its decision in attorney fee cases.

As to Pure Hemp’s argument that the case was exceptional because UCANN’s attorneys suffered from a conflict of interest, the Federal Circuit found that this argument was waived and, in any event, lacked merit because Pure Hemp presented no evidence to support the alleged conflict.

Finally, having sua sponte raised the issue of whether this was a frivolous appeal. The Federal Circuit determined that although it was “not pleased with how Pure Hemp has argued this appeal,” the appeal was nonetheless not frivolous because [Pure Hemp] properly argued that it was the prevailing party.

© 2023 McDermott Will & Emery
For more Intellectual Property Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

New York Adult Survivors Act

New York’s Adult Survivors Act[1] (“ASA” or “the Act”) (S.66A/A.648A) became effective on November 24, 2022. The Act provides a one-year lookback window for people to seek civil remedies for sexual abuse they experienced after they turned 18, regardless of what year the abuse occurred. This law adds critical energy to the ongoing momentum of the #MeToo movement, allowing survivors to file suit against both their abusers and the institutions that enabled them.

The one-year lookback window lasts until November 23, 2023, so as of today, survivors have just over ten months to take advantage of the law. The following guide provides context and recommendations for understanding and using New York’s Adult Survivors Act.

What does the ASA do?

The ASA creates a one-year lookback window for sexual assault survivors to pursue civil claims in court for abuse that may have occurred years earlier, as long as they were over 18 at the time. Previously, a person who experienced sexual abuse only had a few years to file a lawsuit in New York before their claim would be time-barred. This meant that survivors had little time in which to come to terms with the abuse they experienced, find an attorney, prepare a case, and file an action. For those who missed that small window, the ASA reopens the courthouse doors. So until November 23, 2023, whether you experienced abuse in 2015, 2000, or 1985, you can file a claim in court and seek recovery for what happened to you.

What does the law cover?

Sexual offenses covered by the ASA span a wide range of behaviors, including but not limited to forcible touching, rape, sexual assault, sexual misconduct, and other forms of sexual abuse. Not every sexual offense is covered under the ASA,[2] and an attorney can help assess whether your claim falls within its provisions.

Who can you sue?

Another powerful provision of the law is who it allows to be named as a defendant. Survivors are not limited to suing their abusers—they can also hold accountable the institutions that insulated those abusers from justice. These institutions can include entities that had responsibility to keep the survivor safe and to control the actions of the abuser. Claims against the institutions can involve both intentional and negligent acts. If your abuser was part of a larger organization that contributed to or failed to prevent, notice, or stop the abuse, the ASA empowers you to go after that organization.

This provision comes directly from New York’s 2019 Child Victims Act (“CVA”).[3] Over 10,000 people have used the CVA to sue institutions that had a role to play in their abuse, including churches, hospitals, overnight and day camps, and schools. For example, a large number of CVA cases name the Roman Catholic Church and the Boy Scouts of America as institutional defendants. The ASA provides a similar recourse to justice: oftentimes, survivors are subject to abuse by people who hold power over them. For minors, these people could be coaches, religious leaders, teachers, mentors, or other caregivers. For people over 18, those in power may be employers, professors, or community leaders. The ASA enables adult survivors to sue the institutions that gave their abusers power and protected those abusers from answering for their actions.

The institutional defendant provision of the ASA opens significantly larger opportunities for recovery, as institutions oftentimes have deeper pockets than individual abusers. Examples of institutions that could face liability under the ASA include employers, colleges and universities, social organizations such as fraternities and sororities, medical practices, and facilities that house people with disabilities. Any entity that knew about or should have known about and stopped the abuse could be on the hook.

Who is it for?

The ASA opens the courts to people who were over the age of 18 when they experienced sexual abuse but are otherwise unable to file due to missing the statute of limitations. You can use the ASA even if you have previously tried to file but had your suit dismissed as untimely.[4]

It is important to note that if you have resolved or released your claims through a settlement process, you may not file under the ASA. For example, the nearly 150 women who received payment from a settlement with Columbia University Irving Medical Center and New York Presbyterian Hospital based on sexual abuse by Dr. Robert Hadden cannot use the ASA to file new suits as their claims have been fully resolved.

Why do we need this?

The Adult Survivors Act is a game-changer for people who were previously unable to file claims for sexual abuse due to a short statute of limitations. In 2019, New York extended the statute of limitations for certain civil lawsuits related to sex crimes from five to 20 years. But that law did not apply retroactively, so survivors who experienced abuse just a few years prior were still barred from seeking justice.

The ASA honors the lived reality of sexual abuse. Like the CVA before it, the ASA recognizes sexual abuse can take years to process, and those years often extend far beyond the short filing windows New York historically placed on these types of claims.

Survivors have many reasons for waiting to come forward with claims of sexual abuse. Some face retaliation by their abusers, some fear the risk of community backlash, and others lack the resources to seek legal representation. Finally, “[t]rauma takes time,” as New York State Senator and ASA champion Brad Hoylman said when promoting the then-bill. Many sexual assault and sexual abuse survivors need years to process what they endured. This can be particularly true when an abuser uses power, manipulation, or threats to coerce submission to sexual contact, a common tactic of notorious abusers Harvey Weinstein, Kevin Spacey, and Dr. Robert Hadden. Understanding the event as sexual abuse, reconciling yourself with your experience, and deciding how to move forward can take decades. The ASA is an effort to respect this process and empower survivors to hold their abusers accountable.

Why would I file a lawsuit about what happened to me?

For many people, surviving sexual abuse is not something that can be “fixed” by any kind of legal action. But the remedies available through civil suits can serve as a proxy for some measure of justice, and that proxy can enable survivors to move forward.

Successful ASA plaintiffs can recover economic, compensatory, and punitive damages from both the individual abuser and the institution. Many survivors suffer financial loss in addition to the mental, emotional, and physical harm of the abuse itself. If your boss sexually harasses you and then terminates you when you protest, you may find yourself without an income. If a classmate assaults you, you may forfeit tuition money after deciding to leave campus for your safety. Civil courts can make you financially whole and further compensate you for the pain of the experience and the efforts you must make to heal. Courts can also provide other remedies, requiring the people who perpetrated or allowed abuse to do or stop certain behaviors, thereby protecting other potential future targets of abuse and assault.

How do I use the ASA?

The first thing you should do is consult an attorney. These cases can be complicated, and plaintiffs still maintain the burden of proof, so you want the expertise of an experienced lawyer. There are several firms that regularly bring these kinds of actions, and many will provide you with a free consultation. If you decide to move forward with your case after a consultation, your attorney will work with you to determine the best strategy. This strategy may include going to court, or it may involve seeking a resolution that works for you outside of court.

As you go through the process of finding an attorney, please know that you deserve counsel that is compassionate, knowledgeable, and focused on your needs and interests as a client. This is about what happened to you, and your attorney is there to guide you. You should feel heard, understood, and respected.

When do I need to file?

You must file your claim by November 23, 2023.

While the ASA is a powerful effort by New York to support the rights of sexual abuse survivors, it is time-limited. November 23, 2023 is the cutoff date for filing a claim, but if you are interested in seeking recovery under the Act, you should take action now. It may take time to find the right attorney for you, and your lawyer will need additional time to put together your case. If you and your lawyer decide to pursue a resolution without going to court, that process could take even longer.

Ten months sounds like a long time, but in the legal world, it can move very quickly. Start considering whether you want to take advantage of the ASA and reach out to an attorney as soon as possible.

What happens after I file?

This will come down to conversations you have with your attorney. Filing is the first major step in the process. Following that process through might include discovery, more court filings, and hearings before a judge or a jury.

What else should I consider?

Take care of yourself as you think about your next steps. Reach out to trusted loved ones and mental health professionals. It is critical that you ground yourself in what is best for you.

FOOTNOTES

[1] New York Governor Kathy Hochul signed the ASA into law on May 24, 2022. The ASA passed the New York Assembly by a majority vote of 140 in favor to 3 against after receiving unanimous support in the state Senate one month prior.

[2] Article 130 of the New York Penal Law lists offenses covered under the ASA.

[3] The CVA came into effect in 2019, providing a two-year lookback window for people who experienced abuse as minors. The CVA amends N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 (2019) and allows victims to initiate civil action against their abusers and enabling institutions. As to victims where civil actions were barred before the CVA took effect, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-g (2020) creates a lookback period to file a claim. Since 2019, over 10,000 people have filed lawsuits in New York against abusers and the institutions that protected them.

[4] The ASA can revive your claim only if it was dismissed for failure to file by the statutory deadline. If your claim was dismissed for other reasons, this law cannot fix that.

For more labor and employment news, click here to visit the National Law Review. 

Katz Banks Kumin LLP Copyright ©

Patent Infringement Verdict Nixed over Judge’s Stock Ownership

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s opinions and orders and remanded the case for further proceedings before a different district court judge because the original judge had failed to divest all financial interests in the case. Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., Case No. 21-1888 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Cunningham, JJ.)

Centripetal sued Cisco for patent infringement. The original district court judge presided over a 22-day bench trial, which included a more than 3,500-page record, 26 witnesses and more than 300 exhibits. The court heard final arguments on June 25, 2020. While the case was still pending before the district court, the judge learned that his wife owned Cisco stock, valued at $4,687.99. The district court judge notified the parties on August 12, 2020, that he had discovered that his wife owned 100 shares of Cisco stock. He stated that his wife purchased the stock in October 2019 and had no independent recollection of the purchase. He explained that at the time he learned of the stock, he had already drafted a 130-page draft of his opinion on the bench trial, and virtually every issue had been decided. He further stated that the stock did not—and could not have—influenced his opinion on any of the issues in the case. Instead of selling the stock, which might have implied insider trading given his knowledge of the forthcoming order, the judge placed it in a blind trust. Under the terms of the trust, the judge was to be notified when the trust assets had been completely disposed of or when their value became less than $1,000.

Centripetal had no objections. Cisco, however, filed a motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(4). The judge ordered Centripetal to file a response. On October 2, 2020, the court denied Cisco’s motion for recusal. On October 5, 2020, the court issued a 167-page opinion and order containing the judge’s findings that Cisco willfully infringed the asserted claims of the patents-at-issue and awarded Centripetal damages of more than $755 million, pre-judgment interest of more than $13 million and a running royalty of 10%. Cisco moved for amended findings and judgment under Rule 52(b) or a new trial under Rule 59(a)(2). The court denied both motions. Cisco appealed the district court’s findings and asserted that the judge was required to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) absent divestiture under § 455(f) (the only exception to the bright line rule that a federal judge is disqualified based on a known financial interest in a party).

On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed two issues: whether the district court judge was relieved of his duty to recuse under § 455(b)(4) because his wife had divested herself of her interest in Cisco under § 455(f), and, if the requirements of § 455(f) were not satisfied, a determination as to the proper remedy.

The Federal Circuit analyzed whether placement of the stock in a blind trust satisfied the divesture requirement of § 455(f). The Court explained that a blind trust is “an arrangement whereby a person, in an effort to avoid conflicts of interest, places certain personal assets under the control of an independent trustee with the provision that the person is to have no knowledge of how those assets are managed.” Centripetal admitted that there are no cases holding that placement of stock in a blind trust constitutes divestment. The Court next turned to the intent of Congress when it drafted the statute. The Court reasoned that to “divest” was understood at the time to mean “dispossess or deprive,” which is only possible when an interest is sold or given away. The Court also noted that Congress used the present tense—that a judge should not sit when he or she has a financial interest in a party. The Court concluded that while placing the stock in a blind trust removed the judge’s wife from control over the stock, it did not eliminate her beneficial interest in Cisco. The Court also found that the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct had previously ruled that a judge’s use of a blind trust does not obviate the judge’s recusal obligations. Accordingly, the Court found that placing assets in a blind trust is not divestment under § 455(f) and, thus, the district court judge was disqualified from further proceedings in the case.

As for the appropriate remedy, the Federal Circuit considered whether rulings made after August 11, 2020, when the district court judge became aware of his wife’s financial interest in Cisco, should be vacated as a remedy for his failure to recuse. The Court determined that the risk of injustice to the parties weighed against a finding of harmless error and in favor of vacatur. The Court reversed the district court’s opinion and order denying Cisco’s motion for recusal; vacated the opinion and order regarding infringement, damages and post-judgment motions and remanded for further proceedings before a new judge.

Article By Jodi Benassi of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

A Rule 37 Refresher – As Applied to a Ransomware Attack

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) (“Rule 37”) was completely rewritten in the 2015 amendments.  Before the 2015 amendments, the standard was that a party could not generally be sanctioned for data loss as a result of the routine, good faith operation of its system. That rule didn’t really capture the reality of all of the potential scenarios related to data issues nor did it provide the requisite guidance to attorneys and parties.

The new rule added a dimension of reasonableness to preservation and a roadmap for analysis.  The first guidepost is whether the information should have been preserved. This rule is based upon the common law duty to preserve when litigation is likely. The next guidepost is whether the data loss resulted from a failure to take reasonable steps to preserve. The final guidepost is whether or not the lost data can be restored or replaced through additional discovery.  If there is data that should have been preserved, that was lost because of failure to preserve, and that can’t be replicated, then the court has two additional decisions to make: (1) was there prejudice to another party from the loss OR (2) was there an intent to deprive another party of the information.  If the former, the court may only impose measures “no greater than necessary” to cure the prejudice.  If the latter, the court may take a variety of extreme measures, including dismissal of the action. An important distinction was created in the rule between negligence and intention.

So how does a ransomware attack fit into the new analytical framework? A Special Master in MasterObjects, Inc. v. Amazon.com (U.S. Dist. Court, Northern District of California, March 13, 2022) analyzed Rule 37 in the context of a ransomware attack. MasterObjects was the victim of a well-documented ransomware attack, which precluded the companies access to data prior to 2016. The Special Master considered the declaration from MasterObjects which explained that, despite using state of the art cybersecurity protections, the firm was attacked by hackers in December 2020.  The hack rendered all the files/mailboxes inaccessible without a recovery key set by the attackers.  The hackers demanded a ransom and the company contacted the FBI.  Both the FBI and insurer advised them not to pay the ransom. Despite spending hundreds of hours attempting to restore the data, everything prior to 2016 was inaccessible.

Applying Rule 37, the Special Master stated that, at the outset, there is no evidence that any electronically stored information was “lost.”  The data still exists and, while access has been blocked, it can be accessed in the future if a key is provided or a technological work-around is discovered.

Even if a denial of access is construed to be a “loss,” the Special Master found no evidence in this record that the loss occurred because MasterObjects failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it. This step of the analysis, “failure to take reasonable steps to preserve,” is a “critical, basic element” to prove spoliation.

On the issue of prejudice, Amazon argued that “we can’t know what we don’t know” (related to missing documents).  The Special Master did not find Amazon’s argument persuasive. The Special Master concluded that Amazon’s argument cannot survive the adoption of Rule 37(e). “The rule requires affirmative proof of prejudice in the specific destruction at issue.”

Takeaways:

  1. If you are in a spoliation dispute, make sure you have the experts and evidence to prove or defend your case.

  2. When you are trying to prove spoliation, know the new test and apply it in your analysis (the Special Master noted that Amazon did not reference Rule 37 in its briefing).

  3. As a business owner, when it comes to cybersecurity, you must take reasonable and defensible efforts to protect your data.

Article By Gretchen E. Moore of Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

For more cybersecurity and media legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

Are You Being Served? Court Authorizes Service of Process Via Airdrop

In what may be the first of its kind, a New York state court has authorized service via token airdrop in a case regarding allegedly stolen cryptocurrency assets. This form of alternative service is novel but could become a more routine practice in an industry where the identities of potential parties to litigation may be difficult to ascertain using blockchain data alone.

Background on the Dispute

According to the Complaint in the case, the plaintiff LCX AG (“LCX”) is a Liechtenstein based virtual currency exchange. As alleged in the Complaint, on or about January 8, 2022, the unknown defendants (named in the Complaint as John Does 1-25) illegitimately gained access to LCX’s cryptocurrency wallet and transferred $7.94 million worth of digital assets out of LCX’s control. Cryptocurrency wallets are similar in many ways to bank accounts, in that they can be used to hold and transfer assets. In the same way a thief can transfer funds from a bank account if they gain access to that account, thieves can also transfer cryptocurrency assets if they gain access to the keys to the wallet holding digital assets.

Following the alleged theft, LCX and its third-party consulting firm determined that the suspected thieves used “Tornado Cash,” which is a “mixing” service designed to hide transactions on an otherwise publicly available blockchain ledger by using complicated transfers between unrelated wallets. While Tornado Cash and other mixing services have legal purposes such as preserving the anonymity of parties to legitimate transactions, they are also utilized by criminals to launder digital funds in an illicit manner.

Even the use of these mixing services, however, can often also be unwound. This is especially true in transactions of large amounts of cryptocurrency, similar to how transactions utilizing complex money laundering schemes in the international banking system can be unwound. According to the blockchain data platform Chainalysis, although Illicit crypto transactions reached an all-time high of $14 billion in 2021, these suspected nefarious transactions accounted for 0.15% of crypto volume last year, down from 0.62% in 2020.

While the Complaint alleges the suspected thieves used Tornado Cash, LCX believes its hired consultants were able to unwind those mixing services to identify a wallet which is alleged to still hold $1.274 million of the allegedly stolen assets.

Unlike bank accounts which have associated identifying information, there are often no registered addresses or other identifying information connected to digital wallets. This makes it difficult to provide the actual proof of service required to institute an action or obtain a judgement against an individual where the only known information is their digital wallet addresses. Service via token airdrop into those wallet addresses solves that issue.

Service Via Airdrop

Service of lawsuits is traditionally made on the defendant personally at a home or business address via special process servers. In cases where service on the individual is not possible for some reason, many states authorize alternative means of service if the plaintiff can show that the alternative means of service likely to provide actual notice of the litigation to the defendant. For example, courts have historically allowed notice via newspaper publication as an alternative means of service where the defendant cannot be serviced personally.

Here, the Court permitted service via “airdrop” in which a digital token is placed in a specific cryptocurrency wallet, similar to how a direct deposit can place funds in a traditional bank account. This particular token contained a hyperlink to the associated court filings in the case, and a mechanism which allowed the data of any individual who clicked on the hyperlink to be tracked. While this is a novel way to serve notice of a lawsuit, similar airdrops have been used to communicate with the owners of otherwise anonymous cryptocurrency wallet owners. Such was the case recently when actor Seth Green had his Bored Ape non-fungible token (“NFT”) stolen and the unknowing buyer of the stolen NFT was otherwise difficult to locate.

While this type of digital service is new, it could be implemented in many disputes in the future regarding digital assets. Similar to the authorization of service that was seen recently in the Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Act litigation (where notice was served on potential class members via email and directly on the Facebook platform), service via airdrop may be the most efficient way to inform potential lawsuit participants of the pending dispute and how they can protect their rights in that dispute.

This type of airdropped service is not without issues, though. First, transactions on the blockchain are largely publicly available, meaning any individual with the wallet address would also be able to see service of the lawsuit notice. Additionally, many users are hesitant to click on unknown links (such as the one in the airdropped LCX) due to legitimate cybersecurity concerns.

While service via airdropped token is unlikely to replace traditional methods of service, it may be a useful means of serving process on unknown persons where there is a digital wallet linked to the acts which the applicable lawsuit relates.

Article By Bryan M. Westhoff, Daniel L. McAvoy, and Jonathan E. Schmalfeld of Polsinelli PC

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© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Ninth Circuit Reverses Class Certification Order Because Liability Issues, Not Merely Damages, Were Individualized

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed an issue that tends to arise frequently in class certification motion practice: how trial courts should apply the predominance requirement where appellate decisions have said that the need to calculate individualized damages generally is not sufficient on its own to defeat class certification, but some putative class members likely have no damages. On these types of issues, plaintiffs often try to characterize defendants’ arguments in opposition to class certification as raising mere “damages issues” that can be addressed individually at the end of a class case, and defendants often respond that the issues they raise go to liability, not merely damages, and in any event the damages trials would be too complicated and impractical. The Ninth Circuit recently clarified that if determining liability requires highly individualized inquiries, a class should not be certified, and any individualized damages trials would have to be feasible.

In Bowerman v. Field Asset Services, Inc., Nos. 18-16303, 18-17275, — F.4th –, 2022 WL 2433971 (9th Cir. July 5, 2022), the plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to perform preservation services on properties being foreclosed on. They claimed that they should have been classified as employees rather than independent contractors under California law, and therefore should have been paid overtime and reimbursed for business expenses. The district court certified a class, decided certain issues on partial summary judgment in favor of the class, and left for a later damages trial whether a class member worked overtime (and to what extent) and whether the class member was entitled to reimbursement for business expenses (and the amount thereof).

The Ninth Circuit reversed the class certification order. It explained that “We need not decide whether common evidence can prove that [defendant] has a uniform policy of misclassifying its vendors” because “[defendant’s] liability to any class member for failing to pay them overtime wages or to reimburse their business expenses would require highly individualized inquiries on whether that particular class member ever worked overtime or ever incurred any ‘necessary’ business expenses.” (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiffs had “mischaracterize[d] an issue of individualized liability as an issue of individualized damages.” (Emphasis in original.) The Ninth Circuit explained that if the question involves the existence of damages, that is a liability issue, not a damages issue.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that, under its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that damages were “capable of measurement on a classwide basis” because they could not “show that the whole class suffered damages traceable to their alleged misclassification as independent contractors,” even if the amounts of those damages would need to be proven individually. In addition, determining damages would require “excessive difficulty” because there was little documentary evidence, and “using the individual testimony of self-interested class members to calculate the overtime hours they worked and the business expenses they incurred isn’t easy.” In a bellwether trial conducted by the district court, eight trial days had been required to determine damages for a sample of only eleven class members.

This decision helpfully clarifies the perennial debate between what constitutes a “damages” issue versus a “liability” issue. As I’ve often written on this blog, it can be helpful to think about the class certification analysis by analyzing how the named plaintiffs’ or putative class members’ claims would be tried in an ordinary individual case, and what evidence the defendant would be entitled to introduce. Here, the bellwether trial helped the Ninth Circuit determine that this case could not be litigated on a class basis.

Article By Wystan M. Ackerman of Robinson & Cole LLP

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Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

SCOTUS Significantly Narrows Scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for International Arbitrations

The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in ZF Automotive US, Inc., et al., v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, holds that U.S. federal courts cannot order discovery in aid of international commercial arbitrations or investor-state arbitrations.  In a unanimous decision, the Court reasoned that a “foreign tribunal,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, “is best understood as an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority” rather than a private body that is merely located in another country.  Because the private arbitral tribunal in the ZF Automotive case did not exercise governmental authority, the Supreme Court denied discovery in aid of the proceeding under Section 1782.

The decision resolves a circuit split over whether private commercial arbitration panels should be considered “foreign or international tribunals” under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, and thus whether U.S. discovery should be allowed in such private commercial arbitrations.  Section 1782 authorizes a district court to order the production of evidence “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”  The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have previously held that international commercial arbitrations are foreign tribunals under the statute, while the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have held that they are not.  The availability of discovery under Section 1782 is a key issue for the international arbitration community because the scope of discovery allowed under Section 1782 is generally broader than any discovery allowed under institutional arbitral rules or under foreign arbitration laws.

In reaching its decision, the Court found that the word “tribunal” carries a distinctively governmental flavor.  A prior version of Section 1782 covered only “judicial proceeding[s]” in any court in a foreign country, however, Congress later expanded the legislation’s scope to cover proceedings in a “foreign or international tribunal.”  The Court found that while this change broadens the understanding of “tribunal” to include tribunals that are not formal courts, the term is still best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority.  Under the decision, a “foreign tribunal” is a tribunal belonging to a foreign nation while an “international tribunal” is best understood as one that involves two or more nations imbued with governmental authority.  Location of the tribunal or the nature of the parties to the dispute are not determinative in this interpretation.

The Court also noted that extending Section 1782 discovery to cover international arbitrations would conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act, which governs domestic arbitrations.  Thus, interpreting Section 1782 as applying to international arbitration would create a “notable mismatch between foreign and domestic arbitration.”

The Court’s decision came in a consolidated case arising out of appeals in the Sixth and Second Circuits.  The first case involves a dispute between Luxshare, a Hong Kong company and ZF Automotive US Inc., a Michigan-based company, over an allegedly fraudulent sales transaction.  The agreement between the parties provided that all disputes would be resolved by an arbitral panel under the Arbitration Rules of the German Arbitration Institute (DIS).  In preparation for bringing an arbitration, Luxshare filed an ex parte petition under Section 1782 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan seeking information from ZF Automotive and its officers.  The district court granted the petition and ZF Automotive moved to quash, arguing that a panel formed under the auspices of the DIS was not a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782.  The district court denied the motion and the Sixth Circuit denied a stay.

The second case involves AB bankas SNORAS, a Lithuanian bank which was nationalized by Lithuanian authorities.  The Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States, a Russian corporation, commenced an ad hoc arbitration proceeding against Lithuania under a bilateral investment treaty that the country entered with Russia.  The Fund filed a petition under Section 1782 in the district court seeking information from AlixPartners, LLP, a New York-based consulting firm, and one of its officers.  AlixPartners challenged the petition, arguing that the ad hoc panel was also not a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782.  The district court rejected that argument in a decision that was affirmed by the Second Circuit.

The Court’s decision is likely to spark much discussion in the international arbitration community.  There will likely be a significant impact on current and future international arbitrations, with parties having to consider their strategies for discovery in light of the unavailability of a critical information-gathering tool.  On the other hand, for better and for worse, this decision will further streamline the international arbitration process, as many arbitral proceedings will not be delayed by related litigation over discovery in U.S. courts.

Article By Travis A. Gonyou of Binder & Schwartz

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