Quite often a shareholders’ agreement or operating agreement will contain a provision establishing the company’s value in the event of a buyout of one of the owners. Sometimes the agreement requires a valuation to be performed at the end of every year – possibly by the company accountant – and may even set forth a formula that is to be followed annually, or at least utilized as a guideline. Many small companies, of course, are run in such a way that it is not surprising in the slightest that this yearly valuation is often not done. In fact, I can count on one hand the number of companies that I have seen actually follow this mandate to value itself yearly.
So, what happens when there is now conflict among the owners? One of them wants to leave, and the other owners would rather let him go than get involved in costly business divorce litigation. Sometimes the only dispute in such a case comes down to the dollars, not whether there will be a departure. Likewise, the majority owners may want a minority owner to leave who also doesn’t have the stomach for a fight. The shareholder’s agreement may have a formula set forth – from 20 years ago – as to how to value the company. But the called-for annual valuation was never done. Or, it was done for 3 years, and then it stopped. How does the company get valued now?
There is no single right answer to this question, unfortunately. What a court might do is likely going to be very fact dependent. If all the owners were aware of the obligation to value the company annually and they all ignored it, a judge may deem the requirement to have been effectively “written out” of the agreement. But what if you were a minority owner who had no ability to control whether the valuation was done and you complained in the early years about this provision being ignored? You certainly have a better argument, but you still failed to do anything formal to assert your right to be governed by such a valuation.
It also depends on the circumstances of the current buyout. If the departure is voluntary, then of course the parties are free to agree to have the valuation done now that was supposed to have occurred for the past 20 years. But if shareholder dispute litigation is in play, as a voluntary buyout seems not a viable option, then one can argue that the formula should not apply at all. If one is arguing for a buyout under the shareholder oppression statute, one may argue that “fair value” – the value set forth in the New Jersey statute that governs business divorce litigation – should apply. This is an especially powerful argument if the agreement contains a formula that does not yield a value as high as fair value. Why should majority shareholders be permitted to act improperly toward the minority and then be rewarded with a discounted value?
But, as with many things, there is no clear-cut answer that applies in all circumstances. At least one judge in the past has determined that the parties’ agreement set forth the parties’ reasonable expectation as to value and applied it in an oppression setting. So, while there is no iron-clad answer, be sure you are represented by an experienced shareholder dispute attorney who understands the issues and can make the best argument for value possible for you.
17 October 2024. In a qui tam whistleblower settlement, Jeffrey Madison, the former CEO of Little River Healthcare in Rockdale, Texas, has agreed to pay over $5.3 million to resolve alleged violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute. This successful whistleblower lawsuit illustrates the critical role of whistleblowers in uncovering fraudulent schemes and upholding ethical standards within the healthcare industry. The corporate whistleblower in this qui tam action, STF LLC, could be rewarded between 15-25% of the government’s recovery.
Understanding the Case
The allegations against Madison stem from violations of the False Claims Act, specifically linked to illegal payments made to physicians to induce laboratory referrals. These actions contravened the Anti-Kickback Statute, a federal law designed to ensure that medical decisions, particularly those about Medicare, Medicaid, or TRICARE beneficiaries, are based on patient welfare rather than financial incentives.
Key Allegations:
Kickback Scheme: The lawsuit alleged that between January 2015 and June 2018, Little River Healthcare, under Madison’s leadership, engaged in a scheme involving paying commissions to recruiters. These recruiters, using management service organizations (MSOs), funneled kickbacks to physicians who referred laboratory tests to Little River.
False Certifications: Madison was accused of knowingly falsely certifying compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute in Medicare cost reports, resulting in fraudulent claims to federal healthcare programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE.
Disguised Payments: An additional component involved Dr. Doyce Cartrett Jr., who was allegedly paid $2,000 monthly to refer his laboratory testing business to Little River. These payments were allegedly disguised as “medical director fees” despite Dr. Cartrett rendering no medical director services.
The Importance of the Anti-Kickback Statute
Violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute can significantly harm patients by distorting medical decision-making priorities and eroding trust in healthcare providers. When healthcare decisions are influenced by financial incentives rather than patient welfare, there is a risk that unnecessary or substandard care is administered, potentially leading to adverse health outcomes. Patients may receive treatments not based on their individual needs but on the financial gains of unscrupulous providers. This not only affects the quality of care but also contributes to rising healthcare costs, ultimately burdening patients and taxpayers financially. Upholding the statute is crucial in ensuring that patient care is determined by medical necessity and clinical expertise.
The Role of Whistleblowers
This case underscores the vital role of whistleblowers in identifying and exposing fraudulent activities. By coming forward, whistleblowers not only protect taxpayer dollars but also ensure that healthcare decisions remain focused on patient care. As the Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Services, Southwest Field Office said about the case, “Our nation’s uniformed military service members and their families should never have to question the integrity of their healthcare providers. Medical decisions influenced by greed destroy the fundamental element of trust in patient care.” Healthcare fraud whistleblowers reporting unlawful kickback schemes under the False Claims Act can help restore that trust.
Moore concerned whether US Congress and the IRS could tax US shareholders of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) on those corporations’ earnings even though the earnings were not distributed to the shareholders. The case specifically focused on the so-called “mandatory repatriation tax” under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 965, a one-time tax on certain undistributed income of a CFC that is payable not by the CFC but by its US shareholders. Some viewed the case as hinging upon whether Congress has the power to tax economic gains that have not been “realized.” (i.e., In the case of a house whose value has appreciated from $500,000 to $600,000, the increased value is “realized” only when the house is sold and the additional $100,000 reaches the taxpayer’s coffers.)
However, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, rejected that position on the ground that the mandatory repatriation tax “does tax realized income,” albeit income realized by a CFC. On this basis, they reasoned that the question at issue was whether Congress has the power to attribute realized income of a CFC to (and tax) US shareholders on their respective shares of the undistributed income. This group of justices ultimately decided Congress does have the power.
The majority went out of its way to avoid expressing any opinion as to whether Congress can tax unrealized appreciation, with Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s concurrence and Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent asserting that it cannot. Perhaps the Court was signaling a distaste for the Billionaire Minimum Income Tax proposed by US President Joe Biden, which would impose a minimum 20% tax on the total income of the wealthiest American households, including both realized and unrealized amounts, among other Democratic proposals.
Practice Point: We previously noted that certain taxpayers should consider filing protective refund claims contingent on the possibility that Moore would be decided in favor of the taxpayers. In light of the case’s outcome, however, those protective claims are now moot.
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) recently issued a direct final rule that eliminates self-certification for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs). The SBA’s final rule — which implements a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (NDAA 2024) — is effective August 5, 2024.
Background
To be awarded an SDVOSB set-aside or sole source contract, firms must be certified by SBA through the Veteran Small Business Certification (VetCert) Program.
Currently, firms that do not seek SDVOSB set-aside or sole source contracts but that meet the VetCert Program eligibility requirements may self-certify their SDVOSB status, receive prime contract or subcontract awards that are not SDVOSB set-aside or sole source contracts, and be counted toward an agency’s SDVOSB small business goals or a prime contractor’s subcontracting goal for SDVOSB awards.
Section 864 of the NDAA 2024 amends the SDVOSB requirements so that, effective October 1, 2024, each prime contract award and subcontract award counted for the purpose of meeting the goals for participation by SDVOSBs in procurement contracts for federal agencies or federal prime contractors shall be entered into with firms certified by VetCert under Section 36 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 657f).
Section 864 also creates a grace period so that firms that file an application for certification with SBA by December 22, 2024, may continue to self-certify for such federal government contracts and subcontracts until the SBA makes a final decision.
SDVOSBs that do not file an application for certification with SBA by December 22, 2024, or are not certified by SBA’s VetCert program and do not file an application by the deadline, will not be eligible to self-certify for such federal government contracts or subcontracts after December 22, 2024.
To implement the statutory language of Section 864 of the NDAA 2024, SBA is amending parts 125 and 128 of its regulations.
Over the past few decades, modern whistleblower award programs have radically altered the ability of numerous U.S. agencies to crack down on white-collar crime. This year, the Department of Justice (DOJ) may be joining their ranks, if it incorporates the key elements of successful whistleblower programs into the program it is developing.
On March 7, the Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced that the DOJ was launching a “90-day policy sprint” to develop “a DOJ-run whistleblower rewards program.” According to Monaco, the DOJ has taken note of the successes of the U.S.’s whistleblower award programs, such as those run by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS), noting that they “have proven indispensable.”
Monaco understood that the SEC and IRS programs have been so successful because they “encourage individuals to report misconduct” by “rewarding whistleblowers.” But how any award program is administered is the key to whether or not the program will work. There is a nearly 50-year history of what rules need to be implemented to transform these programs into highly effective law enforcement tools. The Justice Department needs to follow these well defined rules.
The key element of all successful whistleblower award programs is very simple: If a whistleblower meets all of the requirements set forth by the government for compensation the awards must be mandatory and based on a percentage of the sanctions collected thanks to the whistleblower. A qualified whistleblower cannot be left out in the cold. Denying qualified whistleblowers compensation will destroy the trust necessary for a whistleblower program to work.
It is not the possibility of money that incentives individuals to report misconduct but the promise of money. Blowing the whistle is an immense risk and individuals are only compelled to take such a risk when there is real guarantee of an award.
This dynamic has been laid clear in recent legislative history. There is a long track record of whistleblower laws and programs failing when awards are discretionary and then becoming immensely successful once awards are made mandatory.
For example, under the 1943 version of the False Claims Act awards to whistleblowers were fully discretionary. After decades of ineffectiveness, in 1986, Congress amended the law to set a mandate that qualified whistleblowers receive awards of 15-30% of the proceeds collected by the government in the action connected with their disclosure.
“The new percentages . . . create a guarantee that relators [i.e., whistleblowers] will receive at least some portion of the award if the litigation proves successful. Hearing witnesses who themselves had exposed fraud in Government contracting, expressed concern that current law fails to offer any security, financial or otherwise, to persons considering publicly exposing fraud.
“If a potential plaintiff reads the present statute and understands that in a successful case the court may arbitrarily decide to award only a tiny fraction of the proceeds to the person who brought the action, the potential plaintiff may decide it is too risky to proceed in the face of a totally unpredictable recovery.”
In the nearly four decades since awards were made mandatory, the False Claims Act has established itself as America’s premier anti-fraud law. The government has recovered over $75 billions of taxpayer money from fraudsters, the vast majority from whistleblower initiated cases based directly on the 1986 amendments making awards mandatory.
Similar transformations occurred at both the IRS and SEC where ineffective discretionary award laws were replaced by laws which mandated that qualified whistleblowers receive a set percentage of the funds collected thanks to their whistleblowing. Since these reforms, the whistleblower programs have revolutionized these agencies’ enforcement efforts, leading directly to billions of dollars in sanctions and creating a massive deterrent effect on corporate wrongdoing.
Most recently, Congress reaffirmed the importance of mandatory whistleblower awards when it reformed the anti-money laundering whistleblower law. The original version of the law, which passed in January 2021, had no set minimum amount for awards, meaning that they were fully discretionary. After the AML Whistleblower Program struggled to take off, Congress listened to the feedback from whistleblower advocates and passed the AML Whistleblower Improvement Act to mandate that qualified money laundering whistleblowers are awarded.
Monaco states that the DOJ has long had the discretionary authority to pay whistleblower awards to individuals who report information leading to civil or criminal forfeitures and has “used this authority here and there — but never as part of a targeted program.”
The most important step in turning an underutilized and ineffective whistleblower award law into an “indispensable” whistleblower award program has been made clear over the past decades. Qualified whistleblowers must be guaranteed an award based on a percentage of the sanctions collected in connection with their disclosure.
By administering its whistleblower program in a way that mandates award payments, the DOJ would go a long way towards creating a whistleblower program which revolutionizes its ability to fight crime. The Justice Department has taken the most important first step – recognizing the importance of whistleblowers in reporting frauds. It now must follow through during its “90-day sprint,” making sure reforming the management of the Asset Forfeiture Fund works in practice. Whistleblowers who risk their jobs and careers need real, enforceable justice.
Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
Vacation homes offer a retreat from daily life, providing a sanctuary to relax and create cherished family memories. Many owners envision passing down their vacation home for future generations to enjoy, but the lack of proper planning can often lead to intra-family disputes. Leaving a vacation home outright to children or other family members may be the easiest option, but the potential for discord over the control and usage of the property only increases as ownership is passed from one generation to the next. A limited liability company (LLC) can mitigate the risk of conflict and provide a tailored solution to the meet the specific needs of a family.
When a vacation home is owned by an LLC, the membership interests in the LLC are passed down to younger generations, which allows for the continued use and enjoyment of the property by the family. The structure also provides a framework for management through an operating agreement, which governs the LLC. An operating agreement allows the original owner to create a plan for how the property will be used and managed as additional owners are added. The agreement can determine who is responsible for property management, how expenses should be proportioned and paid, how decisions should be made and provide guidelines for scheduling family usage. By establishing clear rules and procedures, an LLC can reduce the likelihood of disputes and encourage fairness among different generations.
Another benefit of an LLC is the ability to prevent unwanted transfers of ownership thus ensuring that the property stays in the family. A well-drafted operating agreement can prohibit membership interests from being transferred to third parties, protecting the family as a whole from an individual’s divorce or creditor problems. The LLC can also hold additional assets, including rental income and deposits of other funds earmarked for property expenditures, which facilitates the proper management and use of resources to cover expenses.
An LLC offers an efficient structure to avoid intra-family turmoil and preserves the spirit of the family vacation home for generations to come.
As Varnum’s government investigations team has previously discussed, (link) the COVID-era Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) resulted in millions of businesses receiving emergency loans. The PPP’s hurried implementation, coupled with confusion among recipients over eligibility requirements, created an environment ripe for both fraud and the issuance of loans to ineligible recipients. Over the past few years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has focused on fraud by among other things, opening civil investigations under the False Claims Act and bringing criminal charges against PPP loan recipients who misused loan proceeds on luxury items. But recently, the DOJ has shifted its focus to a new category of PPP recipients: social clubs that may have been technically ineligible for the loans they received.
The opportunity for improper loans to social clubs comes about because of a technical wrinkle in how Congress wrote the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. In this Act, Congress made social clubs (i.e. golf clubs, tennis clubs, yacht clubs) organized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) eligible for PPP loans. However, Congress incorporated an agency regulation that prohibited loans to “private clubs and businesses which limited the numbers of memberships for reasons other than capacity.” The result is that social clubs that limit their number of members for any reason besides capacity were technically ineligible for PPP loans.
In recent months, the DOJ has issued Civil Investigation Demands (CIDs) to clubs that it believes might not have been eligible for PPP loans. These CIDs are demands for documents and interrogatory answers and often relate to employment records, income statements, the membership admission process, prospective members’ applications, the club’s governance, and membership information. CIDs are expansive and the government can use the club’s answer in future civil or criminal proceedings.
Given the DOJ’s new focus, clubs should review their PPP paperwork now and consult with an attorney to determine whether their loan was properly issued. If the clubs find technical violations, proactively approaching the government through counsel may be beneficial. If a club receives a CID, it should immediately contact an attorney to begin preparing the appropriate response.
On March 6, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted regulations[1] that will require public companies to file mandatory climate-related disclosures with the SEC beginning in 2026. First proposed in March 2022, the climate-related disclosure rules were finalized after consideration of over 24,000 comment letters and active lobbying of the SEC by business and public interest groups alike. These new rules are aimed at eliciting more consistent, comparable, and reliable information for investors to make informed decisions related to climate-related risks on current and potential investments.
The new rules require a registrant to disclose material climate-related risks and activities to mitigate or adapt to those risks; information about the registrant’s oversight of climate-related risks and management of those risks; and information on any climate-related targets or goals that are material to the registrant’s business, results of operations, or financial condition. In addition, these new rules require disclosure of Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions with attestation by certain registrants when emissions are material; and disclosure of the financial effects of extreme weather events.
Unlike the initial proposal, the EU Climate Sustainability Reporting Directive (“CSRD”) and the California Climate Data Accountability Act, the new rules do not require disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions. The new rules require reporting based upon financial materiality, not the double-materiality (impact and financial) standard utilized by the EU under the CSRD. Whether registrants will ultimately be required to comply with the new rules depend upon the outcome of anticipated challenges, such as the challenge to the SEC’s authority to promulgate the rule filed in the Eleventh Circuit on March 6th by a coalition of ten states.
Highlights of the New Rule
In the adopting release, the SEC notes that companies are increasingly disclosing climate-related risks, whether in their SEC filings or via company websites, sustainability reports, or elsewhere; however, the content and location of such disclosures have been varied and inconsistent.[2] The new rules not only specify the content of required climate-related disclosures but also the presentation of such disclosures.
The new rules amend the SEC rules under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), creating a new subpart 1500 of Regulation S-K and Article 14 of Regulation S-X. As a result, registrants, companies that are registered under the Exchange Act, will need to:
File climate-related disclosures with the SEC in their registration statements and Exchange Act annual reports;
Provide the required climate-related disclosures in either a separately captioned section of the registration statement or annual report, within another appropriate section of the filing, or the disclosures may be included by reference from another SEC filing so long as the disclosure meets the electronic tagging requirements; and
Electronically tag climate-related disclosures in Inline XBRL.
The rules require a registrant to disclose:
Climate-related risks that have had or are reasonably likely to have a material impact on the registrant’s business strategy, results of operations, or financial condition;
The actual and potential material impacts of any identified climate-related risks on the registrant’s strategy, business model, and outlook;
Specified disclosures regarding a registrant’s activities, if any, to mitigate or adapt to a material climate-related risk including the use, if any, of transition plans, scenario analysis, or internal carbon prices;
Any oversight by the board of directors of climate-related risks and any role by management in assessing and managing the registrant’s material climate-related risks;
Any processes the registrant has for identifying, assessing, and managing material climate-related risks and, if the registrant is managing those risks, whether and how any such processes are integrated into the registrant’s overall risk management system or processes;
Information about a registrant’s climate-related targets or goals, if any, that have materially affected or are reasonably likely to materially affect the registrant’s business, results of operations, or financial condition. Disclosures would include material expenditures and material impacts on financial estimates and assumptions as a direct result of the target or goal or actions taken to make progress toward meeting such target or goal;
For large accelerated filers (“LAFs”) and accelerated filers (“AFs”) that are not otherwise exempted, information about material Scope 1 emissions and/or Scope 2 emissions;
For those required to disclose Scope 1 and/or Scope 2 emissions, an assurance report at the limited assurance level, which, for an LAF, following an additional transition period, will be at the reasonable assurance level;
The capitalized costs, expenditures expensed, charges, and losses incurred as a result of severe weather events and other natural conditions, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, drought, wildfires, extreme temperatures, and sea level rise, subject to applicable one percent and de minimis disclosure thresholds, disclosed in a note to the financial statements;
The capitalized costs, expenditures expensed, and losses related to carbon offsets and renewable energy credits or certificates (“RECs”) if used as a material component of a registrant’s plans to achieve its disclosed climate-related targets or goals, disclosed in a note to the financial statements; and
If the estimates and assumptions a registrant uses to produce the financial statements were materially impacted by risks and uncertainties associated with severe weather events and other natural conditions or any disclosed climate-related targets or transition plans, a qualitative description of how the development of such estimates and assumptions was impacted, disclosed in a note to the financial statements.
Highlights of what did not get adopted
In its adopting release, the SEC described various modifications it made to its March 2022 proposed rules. The SEC explained that it made many of these changes in response to various comment letters it received. Some of the proposed rules that did not get adopted are:[3]
The SEC eliminated the proposed requirement to provide Scope 3 emissions disclosure.
The adopted rules in many instances now qualify the requirements to provide certain climate-related disclosures based on materiality.
The SEC eliminated the proposed requirement for all registrants to disclose Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions in favor of requiring such disclosure only by large accelerated filers and accelerated filers on a phased in basis and only when those emissions are material and with the option to provide the disclosure on a delayed basis.
The SEC also exempted emerging growth companies and smaller reporting companies from the Scope 1 and Scope 2 disclosure requirement.
The SEC modified the proposed assurance requirement covering Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions for accelerated filers and large accelerated filers by extending the reasonable assurance phase in period for LAFs and requiring only limited assurance for AFs.
The SEC eliminated the proposed requirements for registrants to disclose their GHG emissions in terms of intensity.[4]
The SEC removed the requirement to disclose the impact of severe weather events and other natural conditions and transition activities on each line item of a registrant’s financial statements. The SEC now requires disclosure of financial statement effects on capitalized costs, expenditures, charges, and losses incurred as a result of severe weather events and other natural conditions in the notes to the financial statements.
The adopted rules are less prescriptive than certain of those that were proposed. For example, the former now exclude in Item 1502(a) of Regulation S-K negative climate-related impacts on a registrant’s value chain from the definition of climate-related risks required to be disclosed. Similarly, this definition no longer includes acute or chronic risks to the operations of companies with which a registrant does business. Also, Item 1501(a) as adopted omits the originally proposed requirement for registrants to disclose (a) the identity of board members responsible for climate-risk oversight, (b) any board expertise in climate-related risks, (c) the frequency of board briefings on such risks, and (d) the details on the board’s establishment of climate-related targets or goals. Along the same lines, Item 1503 as adopted requires disclosure of only those processes for the identification, assessment, and management of material climate-related risks as opposed to a broader universe of climate-related risks. The rule as adopted does not require disclosure of how the registrant (a) determines the significance of climate-related risks compared to other risks, (b) considers regulatory policies, such as GHG limits, when identifying climate-related risks, (c) considers changes to customers’ or counterparties’ preferences, technology, or market prices in assessing transition risk, and (d) determines the materiality of climate-related risks. In the same vein, the adopted rules, unlike the proposed rules, do not require disclosure of how the registrant determines how to mitigate any high priority risks. Nor do the new rules retain the proposed requirement for a registrant to disclose how any board or management committee responsible for assessing and managing climate-related risks interacts with the registrant’s board or management committee governing risks more generally.
The SEC eliminated the proposal to require a private company that is a party to a business combination transaction, as defined by Securities Act Rule 165(f), registered on Form S-4 or Form F-4, to provide the subpart 1500 and Article 14 disclosures.
Timing of Implementation
The new rules will become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. Compliance with the rules will not be required until much later, however.
Consistent with its earlier proposal, and in response to comments that the SEC received concerning the timing of implementing the proposed rule, the new rules contain delayed and staggered compliance dates that vary according to the registrant’s filing status and the type of disclosure.
The below table from the SEC’s new release summarizes the phased-in implementation dates.[5]
FILING STATUS
Large Accelerated Filers (“LAFs”)—a group whom the SEC believed most likely to be already collecting and disclosing climate-related information—will be the first registrants required to comply with the rule. The earliest that an LAF would be required to comply with the climate-disclosure rules would be upon filing its Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025, which would be due no later than March 2026.[6]
Accelerated Filers (“AFs”) are not required to comply with the new rules for yet another year after LAFs. Climate-related disclosures for AFs must be included upon filing a Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2026, due no later than March 2027. Smaller Reporting Companies (“SRCs”), Emerging Growth Companies (“EGCs”), and Non-Accelerated Filers (“NAFs”) have yet another year to meet the first compliance deadline for climate-related disclosures. These types of filers need not include their climate-related disclosures until filing their Form 10-Ks for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2027, which, again, would be due no later than March 2028.
TYPES OF DISCLOSURES
The new rules also phase in the requirements to include certain disclosures over time. The requirements to provide quantitative and qualitative disclosures concerning material expenditures and material impacts to financial estimates or assumptions under Items 1502(d)(2), 1502(e)(2), and 1504(c)(2) are not applicable until the fiscal year immediately following the fiscal year in which the registrant’s initial compliance is required. LAFs, for example, are not required to report these qualitative and quantitative disclosures until filing a Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2026, due in March 2027. That should be one year after an LAF files its first Form 10-K with climate-related disclosures. The SEC adopted this phased-in approach to respond to commentators’ concerns regarding the availability (or current lack thereof) of policies, processes, controls, and system solutions necessary to support these types of disclosures.
Likewise, the new rules provide for a further phased-in compliance date for those registrants required to report their Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions and an even later date for those filers to obtain limited or reasonable assurance for those emissions disclosures. An LAF, for example, is not required to disclose its Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions until filing its Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2026, due in March 2027. And those disclosures would not be required to be subject to the limited-assurance or reasonable-assurance requirements until filing the Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2029 or December 31, 2033, respectively.
In accordance with the table above, AFs, SRCs, EGCs, and NAFs have even more time to meet these additional disclosure requirements, if they are required to meet them at all.
It should be noted that the SEC recognized that registrants may have difficulty in obtaining GHG emission metrics by the date their 10-K report would be due. As a result, the rule contains an accommodation for registrants required to disclose Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, allowing domestic registrants, for example, to file those disclosures in the Form 10-Q for the second fiscal quarter in the fiscal year immediately following the year to which the GHG emissions disclosure relates. This disclosure deadline is permanent and not for a transition period.
Liability for Non-Compliance
In the introduction to the adopting release, the SEC explains that requiring registrants to provide certain climate-related disclosures in their filings will, among other things, “subject them to enhanced liability that provides important investor protections by promoting the reliability of the disclosures.”[7] This enhanced liability stems from the treatment of the disclosures as “filed” rather than “furnished” for purposes of Exchange Action Section 18 and, if included or otherwise incorporated by reference into a Securities Act registration statement, Securities Act Section 11.[8] According to the SEC, “climate-related disclosures should be subject to the same liability as other important business or financial information” that registrants include in registration statements and periodic reports and, therefore, should be treated as filed disclosures.[9]
In an attempt to balance concerns about the complexities and evolving nature of climate data methodologies and increased litigation risk, the SEC, in the adopting release, emphasizes certain modifications made in the new rules including:
limiting the scope of the GHG emissions disclosure requirement;
revising several provisions regarding the impacts of climate-related risks on strategy, targets and goals, and financial statement effects so that registrants will be required to provide the disclosures only in certain circumstances, such as when material to the registrant; and
adopting a provision stating that disclosures (other than historic facts) provided pursuant to certain of the new subpart 1500 provisions of Regulation S-K constitute “forward-looking statements” for the purposes of the PSLRA safe harbors.[10]
Registrants are subject to liability under Securities Act Section 17(a), Exchange Act Section 10(b), and/or Rule 10b-5 for false or misleading material statements in the information disclosed pursuant to the new rules.[11]
Observations
Consistent with its recent trajectory, the SEC continues to be a kinder, gentler regulator on climate disclosure requirements. Although the new rules will apply broadly to publicly traded companies, their scope is less demanding than the requirements under recent similar laws enacted in California or the EU. Under the California Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act (the “CCDA”), companies with annual revenues in excess of $1 billion and “doing business in California”[12] will be required to publicly disclose Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions beginning in 2026, and Scope 3 emissions beginning in 2027. And because the California law applies to all companies, not just those that are publicly traded, it is also more broadly applicable and will trigger assessments and compliance for companies that are not subject to the SEC’s rule. The CCDA is currently the subject of legal challenge that includes questions of whether the required disclosures violate the First Amendment right to free speech, as well as possible federal preemption. As a result, there is a chance that the CCDA may yet be diluted or found unconstitutional. But in light of the imminent timeline for compliance, many companies subject to the CCDA are already developing programs to facilitate and ensure timely compliance with the requirements.
Similarly, the EU has broader reporting obligations under the CSRD than the SEC’s new rules. Compliance with the CSRD is required for both public and private EU companies as well as for non-EU companies with certain net annual turnovers, certain values of assets, and a certain number of employees. Under the CSRD, companies must publish information across a wide spectrum of subjects, including emissions, energy use, diversity, labor rights, and governance. Initial reporting under the CSRD begins to phase-in in 2025.
A key takeaway here is that although the SEC rules may have taken a lighter approach to climate disclosures, many large companies are likely to be subject to more stringent requirements under either the CCDA or the EU CSRD. And as some companies begin to comply to provide this information and data, the market may drive demand and an expectation that other companies, not otherwise subject to these various reporting regimes, follow suit. While the SEC rules may be a slimmed down version of what could have been, it is likely that the trend toward transparency and disclosure will continue to be driven by other regulatory bodies and market forces alike.
[1] Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, 17 CFR 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, and 249, adopting release available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/33-11275.pdf.
[2] Id. at 48.
[3] Id. at 31-33.
[4] Id. at 225.
[5] Id. at 589.
[6] The new rules’ compliance dates apply to annual reports and registration statements. But, in the case of registration statements, compliance is required beginning with any registration statement that is required to include financial information for the full fiscal year indicated in the table above.
[7] Id. at 13.
[8] Id. at 584. At a high level, Section 18 imposes liability for false and misleading statements with respect to any material fact in documents filed with the SEC under the Exchange Act and Section 11 imposes liability for material misstatements or omissions made in connection with registered offerings conducted under the Securities Act.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 803.
[11] Id.
[12] A term which is not defined in the law, but is likely intentionally very broad, and is expected to be interpreted in that way.
In recent years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has rolled out a significant and increasing number of carrots and sticks aimed at deterring and punishing white collar crime. Speaking at the American Bar Association White Collar Conference in San Francisco on March 7, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced the latest: a pilot program to provide financial incentives for whistleblowers.
While the program is not yet fully developed, the premise is simple: if an individual helps DOJ discover significant corporate or financial misconduct, she could qualify to receive a portion of the resulting forfeiture, consistent with the following predicates:
The information must be truthful and not already known to the government.
The whistleblower must not have been involved in the criminal activity itself.
Payments are available only in cases where there is not an existing financial disclosure incentive.
Payments will be made only after all victims have been properly compensated.
Money Motivates
Harkening back to the “Wanted” posters of the Old West, Monaco observed that law enforcement has long offered rewards to incentivize tipsters. Since the passage of Dodd Frank almost 15 years ago, the SEC and CFTC have relied on whistleblower programs that have been incredibly successful. In 2023, the SEC received more than 18,000 whistleblower tips (almost 50 percent more than the previous record set in FY2022), and awarded nearly $600 million — the highest annual total by dollar value in the program’s history. Over the course of 2022 and 2023, the CFTC received more than 3,000 whistleblower tips and paid nearly $350 million in awards — including a record-breaking $200 million award to a single whistleblower. Programs at IRS and FinCEN have been similarly fruitful, as are qui tam actions for fraud against the government. But, Monaco acknowledged, those programs are by their very nature limited. Accordingly, DOJ’s program will fill in the gaps and address the full range of corporate and financial misconduct that the Department prosecutes. And though only time will tell, it seems likely that this program will generate a similarly large number of tips.
The Attorney General already has authority to pay awards for “information or assistance leading to civil or criminal forfeitures,” but it has never used that power in any systematic way. Now, DOJ plans to leverage that authority to offer financial incentives to those who (1) disclose truthful and new information regarding misconduct (2) in which they were not involved (3) where there is no existing financial disclosure incentive and (4) after all victims have been compensated. The Department has begun a 90-day policy sprint to develop and implement the program, with a formal start date later this year. Acting Assistant Attorney General Nicole Argentieri explained that, because the statutory authority is tied to the department’s forfeiture program, the Department’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section will play a leading role in designing the program’s nuts and bolts, in close coordination with US Attorneys, the FBI and other DOJ offices.
Monaco spoke directly to potential whistleblowers, saying that while the Department will accept information about violations of any federal law, it is especially interested in information regarding
Criminal abuses of the US financial system;
Foreign corruption cases outside the jurisdiction of the SEC, including FCPA violations by non-issuers and violations of the recently enacted Foreign Extortion Prevention Act; and
Domestic corruption cases, especially involving illegal corporate payments to government officials.
Like the SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs, DOJ’s program will allow whistleblower awards only in cases involving penalties above a certain monetary threshold, but that threshold has yet to be determined.
Prior to Monaco’s announcement, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York launched its own pilot “whistleblower” program, which became effective February 13, 2024. Both the Department-wide pilot and the SDNY policy require that the government have been previously unaware of the misconduct, but they are different in a critical way: the Department-wide policy under development will explicitly apply only to reports by individuals who did not participate in the misconduct, while SDNY’s program offers incentives to “individual participants in certain non-violent offenses.” Thus, it appears that SDNY’s program is actually more akin to a VSD program, while DOJ’s Department-wide pilot program will target a new audience of potential whistleblowers.
Companies with an international footprint should also pay attention to non-US prosecutors. The new Director of the UK Serious Fraud Office recently announced that he would like to set up a similar program, no doubt noticing the effectiveness of current US programs.
Corporate Considerations
Though directed at whistleblowers, the pilot program is equally about incentivizing companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct in a timely manner. Absent aggravating factors, a qualifying VSD will result in a much more favorable resolution, including possibly avoiding a guilty plea and receiving a reduced financial penalty. But because the benefits under both programs only go to those who provide DOJ with new information, every day that a company sits on knowledge about misconduct is another day that a whistleblower might beat them to reporting that misconduct, and reaping the reward for doing so.
“When everyone needs to be first in the door, no one wants to be second,” Monaco said. “With these announcements, our message to whistleblowers is clear: the Department of Justice wants to hear from you. And to those considering a voluntary self-disclosure, our message is equally clear: knock on our door before we knock on yours.”
By providing a cash reward for whistleblowing to DOJ, this program may present challenges for companies’ efforts to operate and maintain and effective compliance program. Such rewards may encourage employees to report misconduct to DOJ instead of via internal channels, such as a compliance hotline, which can lead to compliance issues going undiagnosed or untreated — such as in circumstances where the DOJ is the only entity to receive the report but does not take any further action. Companies must therefore ensure that internal compliance and whistleblower systems are clear, easy to use, and effective — actually addressing the employee’s concerns and, to the extent possible, following up with the whistleblower to make sure they understand the company’s response.
If an employee does elect to provide information to DOJ, companies must ensure that they do not take any action that could be construed as interfering with the disclosure. Companies already face potential regulatory sanctions for restricting employees from reporting misconduct to the SEC. Though it is too early to know, it seems likely that DOJ will adopt a similar position, and a company’s interference with a whistleblower’s communications potentially could be deemed obstruction of justice.
On March 8, 2024, just days before it was set to take effect, U.S. District Judge J. Campbell Barker of the Eastern District of Texas vacated the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB’s”) recent rule on determining the standard for joint-employer status.
The NLRB issued the ruleon October 26, 2023. It established a seven-factor analysis, under a two-step test, for determining joint employer status. Under the new standard, an entity may be considered a joint employer if each entity has an employment relationship with the same group of employees and the entities share or codetermine one or more of the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment which are defined exclusively as:
Wages, benefits and other compensation;
Hours of working and scheduling;
The assignment of duties to be performed;
The supervision of the performance of duties;
Work rules and directions governing the manner, means and methods of the performance of duties and grounds for discipline;
The tenure of employment, including hiring and discharge; and
Working conditions related to the safety and health of employees.
Set to take effect on March 11, 2024, the NLRB’s decision would have rescinded the 2020 final rule which considered just the direct and immediate control one company exerts over the essential terms and conditions of employment of workers directly employed by another firm. The new rule would have expanded the types of control over job terms and conditions that can trigger a joint employer finding.
In the lawsuit, filed by the United States Chamber of Commerce and a coalition of business groups, the Chamber and coalition claimed that the NLRB’s rule is unlawful and should be struck down because it is arbitrary and capricious. Judge Barker agreed as he held that the NLRB’s new test is unlawfully broad because an entity could be deemed a joint employer simply by having the right to exercise indirect control over one essential term. Judge Barker faulted the design of the two-step test which says an entity must qualify as a common-law employer and must have control over at least one job term of the workers at issue to be considered a joint employer, finding that the test’s second part is always met whenever the first step is satisfied. The Court vacated the new standard and indicated it will issue a final judgment declaring the rule is unlawful.
The NLRB quickly responded to the Court’s ruling. In a statement on March 9, 2024 NLRB Chairman Lauren McFerran said the “District Court’s decision to vacate the Board’s rule is a disappointing setback but is not the last word on our efforts to return our joint-employer standard to the common law principles that have been endorsed by other courts.” According to the NLRB, the “Agency is reviewing the decision and actively considering next steps in this case.”
What Employers Need to Know
The legality of the NLRB’s joint-employer standard has been a contested issue since the October 2023 announcement. The rule will not go into effect as scheduled, but Judge Barker’s decision is unlikely to be the final word on the matter.
