Category: Antitrust

FTC Announces 2020 Thresholds for Merger Control Filings Under HSR Act and Interlocking Directorates Under the Clayton Act

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has announced its annual revisions to the dollar jurisdictional thresholds in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (“HSR Act”); the revised thresholds will become effective 30 days after the date of their publication in the Federal Register.  These changes increase the dollar thresholds necessary to trigger the HSR Act’s premerger notification reporting requirements.  The FTC also increased the thresholds for interlocking directorates under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, effective as of January 21, 2020.

Revised HSR Thresholds

Under the HSR Act, parties involved in proposed mergers, acquisitions of voting securities, unincorporated interests or assets, or other business combinations (e.g., joint ventures, exclusive license deals) that meet certain thresholds must report the contemplated transactions to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) unless an exemption applies.  The parties to a proposed transaction that requires notification under the HSR Act must observe a statutorily prescribed waiting period (generally 30 days) before closing.  Under the revised thresholds, transactions valued at $94 million or less are not reportable under the HSR Act.

A transaction closing on or after the date the revised thresholds become effective may be reportable if it meets the following revised criteria:

Size of Transaction Test

The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $376 million;

or

The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $94million but not more than $376 million, and the Size of Person thresholds below are met.

Size of Person Test

One party (including the party’s ultimate parent entity and its controlled subsidiaries) has at least $188 million in total assets or annual sales, and the other has at least $18.8 million in total assets or annual sales. If the acquired party is not “engaged in manufacturing,” and is not controlled by an entity that is, the test applied to the acquired side is annual sales of $188 million or total assets of $18.8 million.

 The full list of the revised thresholds is as follows:

Original Threshold

2019 Threshold

2020 Revised Threshold
(Effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register)

$10 million

$18 million

$18.8 million

$50 million

$90 million

$94 million

$100 million

$180 million

$188 million

$110 million

$198  million

$206.8 million

$200 million

$359.9 million

$376 million

$500 million

$899.8 million

$940.1 million

$1 billion

$1,799.5 million

$1,880.2 million

The filing fees for reportable transactions have not changed, but the transaction value ranges to which they apply have been adjusted as follows:

Filing Fee

Revised Size of Transaction Thresholds

$45,000

For transactions valued in excess of $94 million but less than $188 million

$125,000

For transactions valued at $188 million or greater but less than $940.1 million

$280,000

For transactions valued at $940.1 million or more

Note that the HSR dollar thresholds are only part of the analysis to determine whether a particular transaction must be reported to the FTC and DOJ.  Failure to notify the FTC and DOJ under the HSR Act remains subject to a statutory penalty of up to $43,280 per day of noncompliance.

Revised Thresholds for Interlocking Directorates

Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits one person from simultaneously serving as an officer or director of two corporations if: (1) the “interlocked” corporations each have combined capital, surplus, and undivided profits of more than $38,204,000 (up from $36,564,000); (2) each corporation is engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and (3) the corporations are “by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws.”1

Section 8 provides several exemptions from the prohibition on interlocks for arrangements where the competitive overlaps “are too small to have competitive significance in the vast majority of situations.”2  After the revised thresholds take effect, a corporate interlock does not violate the statute if: (1) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $3,820,400 (up from $3,656,400); (2) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than 2 percent of that corporation’s total sales; or (3) the competitive sales of each corporation are less than 4 percent of that corporation’s total sales.

The revised dollar thresholds for interlocking directorates of $38,204,000 and $3,820,400 will be effective upon publication in the Federal Register; there is no 30-day delay as there is for the HSR thresholds.

1   15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B).

2   S. Rep. No. 101-286, at 5-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4100, 4103-04.

© Copyright 2020 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

ARTICLE BY Joel Mitnick and Ngoc Pham Hulbig of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.
For more on Hart-Scott-Rodino thresholds, see the National Law Review Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation section.

DOJ Seeking to End Movie Studio and Theater Antitrust Decrees amidst Streaming Competition – A New Opportunity in Theatrical Distribution?

For the film and media distribution industries, this year has been action-packed.  Production budgets are skyrocketing and new digital services have been announced or are launching with each passing month. The streaming wars are upon us. Moreover, the FCC recently voted to treat streaming services as “effective competition” to traditional cable providers (or MVPDs), thereby triggering basic cable rate de-regulation in parts of Hawaii and Massachusetts.

The distribution landscape took yet another unexpected legal twist this week. On November 18, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim announced that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice would ask a federal court to terminate the “Paramount Consent Decrees” (the “Decrees”), which have prohibited movie studios from engaging in certain distribution practices with movie theaters since the 1940s. The DOJ filed a motion to terminate the Decrees in federal court in the Southern District of New York on November 22, 2019.  Notably, the DOJ cites streaming services and new technology as a few of the many reasons that the Decrees may no longer be necessary in what the DOJ official sees as today’s highly competitive, consumer-driven content market. Given the volatility of the content licensing space, film licensors and licensees will have to carefully consider how the DOJ’s actions will affect their content rights and options going forward.

By way of background, the Decrees emerged out of the landmark 1948 Supreme Court antitrust case, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. Prior to the case, top Hollywood studios frequently owned movie theaters (thus, owning both the means of production and distribution). This vertical integration led to lower distribution costs for the studios and gave them pricing power and the ability to discriminate about which theaters distributed their films. Not surprisingly, smaller, independent theaters struggled to survive.  The problem was exacerbated by studios engaging in practices such as “block-booking” (requiring theaters to distribute all or none of the studio’s slate of films) and overbroad “clearances” (restrictions on the time which must elapse between particular runs of a film), as well as alleged horizontal conspiracies between the studios and theaters on matters like minimum ticket pricing. As part of the Decrees, the defendant studios were restricted or prohibited from engaging in these practices and were required to divest certain interests in their theaters.

The DOJ’s November 22nd motion may not come as a surprise, as the DOJ first announced that the Decrees were under review in August 2018, after which several industry players, including the National Association of Theatre Owners (NATO), submitted comments. In particular, NATO argued, despite how streaming and technology might increase competition, that block-billing would still adversely impact independent or local chains that exhibit fewer films and may not be able to afford larger blocks of films.

Delrahim summed up the DOJ’s position, stating, “the [D]ecrees, as they are, no longer serve the public interest, because the horizontal conspiracy – the original violation animating the decrees – has been stopped. […] Changes over the course of more than half a century also have made it unlikely that the remaining defendants can reinstate their cartel.” In particular, the DOJ argued that the competitive concerns of the 1940s no longer exist because the movie marketplace has changed so drastically, citing how film distributors have become less reliant on theatrical distribution with the advent of streaming. According to the DOJ, colluding to limit theatrical film distribution in today’s market “would make no economic sense.”  In addition to streaming services, Delrahim also cited new theatrical release business models (such as flat-fee multi-ticket pricing) as increasing competition and innovation in film distribution.

The DOJ acknowledged NATO’s concerns in part and asked the court to implement a two-year sunset on block-booking and circuit dealing (licensing to all theaters under common ownership, as opposed to on a theater-by-theater basis). Whether terminating the Decrees would decrease innovation, neither the motion papers nor Delrahim venture to guess. Delrahim noted that antitrust enforcers need not predict the future but need only recognize that changes are occurring. He added that practices covered by the Decrees would not become per se lawful, but would rather be subject to review under the rule of reason standard.

Commentators are split on whether termination of the Decrees that have shaped Hollywood for decades will lead to any significant change for the movie business. One thing that is important to note is that the Decrees did not outright prohibit vertical integration of studios and theaters – the defendant studios could (and did) acquire theaters after proving that such acquisitions would not unreasonably restrain trade. Further, only those studios party to the Decrees remain subject to their restrictions, meaning many of today’s top studios (that now typically own a vast portfolio of traditional and digital entertainment properties) were non-existent or much smaller in the 1940s and have not been subject to the Decrees.

While it remains to be seen how this development will play out, it is noteworthy for digital providers because it may breathe extra life back into the theatrical release window. With mammoth streaming deals inked every week, the value of the theatrical release window was seemingly diminishing for some films. But now that many studios are forgoing third-party licensing fees and instead retaining their content for their own streaming platforms, studios may begin to ask whether added revenues from ownership of a theater chain could be a potential new source of revenue and a way to gain additional control of the theatrical window. Meanwhile, the effect of lifting the Decrees may not necessarily lead to a flurry of acquisitions, as other studios involved in direct-to-consumer streaming campaigns may not have the capital or desire to exploit the termination of the Decrees. Major theater chains will likely seek to strengthen relationships with studios, while independent theaters will look for ways to succeed despite potentially rising costs.

With all of these developments, studios and media platforms will also need to carefully consider how to protect their interests when handling their licensing arrangements, given the volatility in this space and keeping in mind the two-year sunset (assuming the DOJ succeeds) on block-booking and circuit dealing. While some distributors may be looking for long-term, exclusive content deals as they roll-out their streaming services, studios and content providers may seek flexibility as their distribution options are changing day-to-day.

© 2019 Proskauer Rose LLP.

More on entertainment distribution on the National Law Review Entertainment, Art & Sports law page.

Spurned by HP Board of Directors, Xerox Gets Hostile, and is Spurned Again

Case raises a unique antitrust question.

Copy equipment giant HP Inc. turned down the much smaller Xerox Holdings Corp.’s acquisition overtures twice in one week as the exchange of statements between corporate leadership grows increasingly hostile. From an anticompetition perspective, the case raises the interesting question of how the “failing firm” defense could come into play.

A deal would bring together the world’s second largest copier company, HP, a company whose leadership position was once so strong that its very brand name, derived from the word “xerographic” in 1938, became a verb used more often than the word “copy” itself. Xerox is also credited with innovations that brought us tools like the mouse and ethernet networks.

But Xerox, which has long since fallen from the top of the copier industry, was met with a flat-out rejection of its offer to get its mojo back by acquiring HP. Xerox offered HP $17.00 in cash and 0.137 Xerox shares for each HP share or $22 per share, or $27 billion overall. Skeptics wondered whether Xerox could execute such a deal, given it is “only” a $9.2 billion business, a third the size of HP. The skeptics were right. On Nov. 17 the HP Board of Directors informed Xerox that its offer was not in the best interests of shareholders as it “significantly undervalues” the HP business.

In its letter to Xerox Vice Chairman and CEO John Visentin, HP wrote that its board was concerned about the “potential impact of outsized debt levels on the combined company’s stock.” While saying it remained “ready to engage” with Xerox to better understand its business and its thinking around a merger, the HP board rejected the bid unanimously.

“We recognize the potential benefits of consolidation, and we are open to exploring whether there is value to be created for HP shareholders through a potential combination with Xerox. However,” the HP letter to Visentin continued, “… we have fundamental questions that need to be addressed in our diligence of Xerox. We note the decline of Xerox’s revenue from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, which raises significant questions for us regarding the trajectory of your business and future prospects. In addition, we believe it is critical to engage in a rigorous analysis of the achievable synergies from a potential combination. With substantive engagement from Xerox management and access to diligence information on Xerox, we believe that we can quickly evaluate the merits of a potential transaction.”

Xerox had said it could generate $2.3 billion by selling its 25% share in the joint venture, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., to FUJIFILM Holdings Corp. In a Nov. 8, 2019, statement, Xerox also said it was selling to a Fuji Xerox affiliate Xerox’s 51% stake in Xerox International Partners, a joint original-equipment-manufacturer venture between Xerox and Fuji Xerox. The companies also agreed to end the $1 billion lawsuit FUJIFILM filed against Xerox after last year’s terminated merger. “Total after-tax proceeds to Xerox from the transactions, which included accrued but unpaid dividends through closing, are approximately $2.3 billion. Xerox expects to use the proceeds opportunistically to pursue accretive M&A in core and adjacent industries, return capital to shareholders and pay down its $554 million December 2019 debt maturity,” according to Xerox.

Xerox did not take HP’s rejection well.

“We were very surprised that HP’s Board of Directors summarily rejected our compelling proposal ….” Xerox CEO Visentin responded, “claiming our offer ‘significantly undervalues’ HP. Frankly, we are confused by this reasoning in that your own financial advisor, Goldman Sachs & Co., set a $14 price target with a ‘sell’ rating for HP’s stock after you announced your restructuring plan on October 3, 2019. Our offer represents a 57% premium to Goldman’s price target and a 29% premium to HP’s 30-day volume weighted average trading price of $17.” Visentin added that the offer was not, as HP said, “highly conditional” or “uncertain.” “There will be NO financing condition to the completion of our acquisition of HP,” the Xerox CEO said.

Xerox gave HP until today (Monday, Nov. 25) to accept the offer, otherwise it would take the case directly to HP’s shareholders. “The overwhelming support our offer will receive from HP shareholders should resolve any further doubts you have regarding the wisdom of swiftly moving forward to complete the transaction,” Visentin said.

But HP didn’t need the whole weekend. Yesterday, on Sunday, Nov. 24, it rejected Xerox again via a letter signed by HP Chairman and CEO Enrique Lores and HP Board Chair Chip Bergh. They repeated that Xerox is undervaluing the company, adding that Xerox did not address HP’s concerns about Xerox’s ability to raise the cash or handle such a substantial debt burden. Lores and Bergh didn’t seem to appreciate Visentin’s attitude, either.

“It is clear in your aggressive words and actions that Xerox is intent on forcing a potential combination on opportunistic terms and without providing adequate information,” the HP leaders wrote. “When we were in private discussions with you in August and September, we repeatedly raised our questions; you failed to address them and instead walked away, choosing to pursue a hostile approach rather than continue down a more productive path. But these fundamental issues have not gone away, and your now-public urgency to accelerate toward a deal, still without addressing these questions, only heightens our concern about your business and prospects. Accordingly, we must have due diligence to determine whether a Xerox combination has any merit.”

And yet, things had seemed to be going so well. In June, Xerox and HP announced they were expanding their relationship. Xerox was to begin sourcing certain products from HP, many of which used Xerox software, and supplying toner for HP for these and other products. These printers use laser printing technology HP acquired from Samsung in 2017. Xerox and HP also agreed to partner in the Device as a Service (DaaS) market. Xerox said it would sell HP PCs and peripherals to its commercial customers under a DaaS model, and HP would make Xerox cloud-based content management available to its commercial PC customers in the United States.

As the HP leaders said, the relationship started to sour at least as early as August.

HP questions Xerox’s resources and innovation.

HP offered additional specifics as to why it didn’t find the deal attractive:

  • Xerox has missed consensus revenue estimates in four of the last five quarters.
  • Xerox’s revenue has fallen from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, and this is expected to continue. Xerox management projects revenue declines of 6% in fiscal 2019.
  • Given how much of the Xerox business is based on contractual revenue, HP is concerned about the decline in customer Total Contract Value (TCV) in excess of revenue declines, which suggests Xerox’s revenues may decline even faster in future years. HP noted that the TCV of enterprise signings (including renewals) in 2018 was down 13.9% in constant currency and Xerox’s churn for 2018 was 18%, both data points which Xerox has stopped providing publicly since the end of 2018.
  • After a review of synergies based on public information and the “limited information” Xerox provided, HP said it does not agree with the value of potential synergies. “[I]t appears that your assumptions include significant savings that are already included in each company’s independently announced cost reduction plans,” HP wrote.
  • When Xerox exited the Fujifilm joint venture, Xerox essentially “mortgaged its future for a short-term cash infusion.” HP feels this has “left a sizeable strategic hole” in the Xerox portfolio.
  • HP also took a shot that has to sting the once-heralded leader of innovation. “[W]e have concerns as to the state of Xerox’s technology resources, research and development pipeline, future product programs, and supply continuity and capability.
  • HP said Xerox has not accessed the great potential of the Asia Pacific market.

The ‘failing firm’ defense

What’s intriguing from an antitrust perspective is how the parties might use the “failing firm” defense in a hostile takeover scenario. The failing firm defense argues that a merger that substantially lessens competition is less harmful to competition than one party’s failure and exit from the market. The defense requires a showing that the acquired company cannot meet its financial obligations, would not be able to successfully reorganize in bankruptcy, has been unsuccessful efforts to elicit other reasonable offers, and is succumbing to the only available purchaser.

We would expect to see that defense raised here given the high post-merger market share and years-long decline of both parties. But how will Xerox make the required showing without the cooperation of HP management? And, in this case the acquirer is arguably the greater “failure” risk of the two firms, making this use of a “failing firm” case a rarity, if not a first.

Copier industry landscape.

Xerox’s global annual revenue was at $20.64 billion in 2011, $19.54 billion in 2014, and $9.83 billion in 2018. It’s now a $9.2 billion company, with revenues generated from a combination of services and equipment. In 2016, Xerox services accounted for roughly a third of the company’s global revenue. From 2012 to 2014 services generated more revenue than technology. That flipped in 2015 when service revenue dropped to a third of prior years.

HP’s net revenue from its printing business was at a high of $29.6 billion in 2008. It fell to $18.26 in 2016 and bounced up to $20.8 billion in 2018.

Worldwide, Canon is the market leader, with 24% of the market. HP is close behind with more than 21% of the market. Xerox has been in the low single digits for the past two years. After Canon and HP, market leaders are Brother (11%), Epson (10%), Kyocera (7%), NEC (5.6%), Ricoh (2.5%). Some 18.5% of the market is attributed to “other” companies.

Statistics provided by Statista based on data from IT Candor. Additional statistics from HP and Xerox.

© MoginRubin LLP

ARTICLE BY Dan Mogin and Jennifer M. Oliver of MoginRubin, edited by Tom Hagy.

Colleges, Students Tell DOJ McGraw-Hill/Cengage Merger Would Create a Textbook Duopoly

Two of the three dominant college textbook publishers – McGraw-Hill Education, Inc. and Cengage Learning Holdings II, Inc – have agreed to merge, creating a virtual duopoly in the college textbook market and setting the stage for a potential antitrust fight with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. McGraw-Hill and Cengage claim the new company will generate global growth, improve margins, and produce efficiencies that will lead to more affordable education materials for students.

But several student and consumer groups disagree, arguing the merger will lead to decreased competition and higher prices for college textbooks. They also claim the post-merger entity will implement digital strategies (e.g., all-access digital subscriptions) that will: (1) force smaller competitors out of the market; (2) eliminate the secondary textbook market, which provides students a lower cost option for purchasing or renting textbooks; and (3) allow the two dominant publishers to collect and monopolize certain types of student data, including data showing students’ learning styles, students’ understanding of core concepts, students’ need additional assistance, and/or students’ risk of dropping out.

The Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition (SPARC) has been one of the loudest critics of the merger. On August 14, 2019, SPARC sent a letter to the DOJ urging it to block the merger, arguing that it will “significantly decrease competition in a market already rife with anti-consumer behavior.”

In its section titled “The Textbook Market is Broken,” SPARC explains that college textbooks are sold in a “captive market” because students are forced to purchase the materials selected by their professors. This system “effectively hands the three major companies who currently dominate the market a blank check to develop expensive materials without regarding the preferences, needs, or financial circumstances of students. The textbook industry’s current state of dysfunction results from years of consolidation, unsustainable practices, and lack of price competition.” SPARC points to textbook pricing as an example of this dysfunction, as prices “have increased 184% over the last two decades — three times the rate of inflation.”

In a separate letter sent to the DOJ at the end of July, U.S. PIRG Education and student leaders from colleges across the country raised similar concerns. Specifically, the students explain they have “directly felt the impacts of skyrocketing textbook prices, further exacerbated by Cengage and McGraw-Hill’s efforts to remove cost-cutting options for students by undermining used book markets,” and that “[t]o maintain profit margins, publishers have put out custom or frequent new editions to make it difficult to find a used book for our classes ….” Citing a rather shocking statistic, the students claimed that “65% of students have skipped buying a book at some point in their college career because of cost despite 94% of them knowing it would hurt their grade.”

The students also identified several specific harms caused by “innovative” digital models employed in the textbook industry:

  • The publishers issue expiring access codes to paid online platforms that students must also use to submit homework and test answers, destroying the used book market;
  • Students cannot sell their materials at the end of the course or keep them or future reference, harming students who already cannot afford books;
  • Automatic billing or so-called “inclusive access” means that students are automatically charged for materials, eliminating their ability to price shop; and
  • Based on contracts proposed at some schools, publishers will continue to raise prices at the same rate that has led to the current affordability crisis.

The potential anticompetitive impacts of this merger are obvious and significant. Assuming the relevant market is the U.S. college textbook market, the merger is between two entities that each control more than 20% of an already highly concentrated market. Under relevant case law and the DOJ’s/FTC’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the merger presumptively increases market power for the post-merger entity and violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Moreover, the merging entities have made clear they intend to develop an all-access digital subscription service that, if adopted en masse, will likely eliminate both smaller competitors and the secondary market for college textbooks. Finally, by creating a virtual duopoly, the merger increases the likelihood of coordination among rivals. Considering these issues, the DOJ must take a very close look at this merger and implement conditions that address these issues if the merger is approved.

© MoginRubin LLP

ARTICLE BY Timothy Z. LaComb of MoginRubin.
Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP

DOJ Gets Involved in Antitrust Case Against Symantec and Others Over Malware Testing Standards

The U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division has inserted itself into a case that questions whether the Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization, Inc. (AMTSO) and some of its members are creating standards in a manner that violates antitrust laws.

AMTSO says it is exempt from such per se claims by the Standards Development Organization Act of 2004 (SDOA). Symantec Corp., an AMTSO member, says the more flexible “rule of reason” applies – that it must be proven that standards actually undermine competition, which the recommended guidelines do not.

Malware BugNSS Labs, Inc., is an Austin, Texas-based cybersecurity testing company which offers services including “data center intrusion prevention” and “threat detection analytics.”

In addition to Symantec, AMTSO members include widely recognized names like McAfee and Microsoft, as well as names known well in cybersecurity circles: CarbonBlack, CrowdStrike, FireEye, ICSA, and TrendMicro. NSS Labs also is a member, but says it is among a small number of testing service providers. The organization is dominated by product vendors who easily outvote the service providers like NSS, AV-Comparatives, AV-Test and SKD LABS, NSS maintains, claims disputed by the organization.

On Sept. 19, 2018, NSS Labs filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against AMTSO, CrowdStrike (since voluntarily dismissed), Symantec, and ESET, alleging the product companies used their power in AMTSO to control the design of the malware testing standards, “actively conspiring to prevent independent testing that uncovers product deficiencies to prevent consumers from finding out about them.” The industry standard requires a group boycott that restrains trade, NSS Labs argues, hurting service providers (NSS Labs v. CrowdStrike, et al., No. 5:18-cv-05711-BLF, N.D. Calif.).

The case is before U.S. District Judge Beth Labson Freeman in Palo Alto, who has presided over a number of high-profile matters.

AMTSO moved to dismiss NSS Labs’ suit, citing its exemption from per se antitrust claims because of its status as a standards development organization (SDO). Further, it argues that the group is open to anyone and, while there are three times more vendors than testing service providers in the organization, that reflects the market itself.

On June 26, the DOJ Antitrust Division asked the court not to dismiss the case because further evidence is needed to determine whether the exemption under the SDOAA is justified.

AMTSO countered that the primary reason the case should be dismissed has “nothing to do” with the SDOAA. NSS failed to allege that AMTSO participated in any boycott, the organization says. All the group has done is “adopt a voluntary standard and foster debate about its merits, which is not illegal at all, let alone per se illegal,” the group says, adding that the Antitrust Division is asking the court to “eviscerate the SDOAA.”

Symantec first responded to the suit with a public attack on NSS Labs itself, criticizing its methodology and lack of transparency in its testing procedures, as well as the company’s technical capability and it’s “pay to play” model in conducting public tests. NSS Labs’ leadership team includes a former principal engineer in the Office of the Chief Security Architect at Cisco, a former Hewlett-Packard professional who established and managed competitive intelligence network programs, and an information systems management professional who formerly held senior management positions at Deloitte, IBM and Aon Hewitt.

On July 8, Symantec responded to the Antitrust Division’s statement of interest. It argued that the SDOAA does not provide an exemption from antitrust laws. Instead, it offers “a legislative determination that the rule of reason – not the per se rule” to standard setting activities. “That simply means the plaintiff must prove actual harm to competition, rather than relying on an inflexible rule of law,” Symantec says.

The company wrote that the government may have a point, albeit a moot one. “Symantec does not believe so, but perhaps the Division is right that there is a factual question about whether AMTSO’s membership lacks the balance the statute requires for the exclusion from per se analysis to apply,” Symantec says. Either way, the company argues, it doesn’t matter to the motions for dismissal because the per se rule does not apply.

Judge Freeman has set deadlines for disclosures, discovery, expert designations, and Daubert motions, with a trial date of Feb. 7, 2022.

Commentary

The antitrust analysis of standards setting is one of the sharpest of two-edged swords: When it works properly, it reflects a technology-driven process of reaching an industry consensus that often brings commercialization and interoperability of new technologies to market. When it is undermined, however, it reflects concerted action among competitors that agree to exclude disfavored technologies in a way that looks very much like a group boycott, a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Accordingly, the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (SDOAA) recognizes that, when they are functioning properly, exempting bone fide standards development organizations (SDOs) from liability for per se antitrust violations can promote the pro-competitive standard setting process. But, when do SDOs “function properly”? The answer is entirely procedural, and is embodied in the statutory definition of SDO: an organization that “incorporate[s] the attributes of openness, balance of interests, due process, an appeals process, and consensus … “

The essential claim in the complaint by NSS Labs, therefore, is that the rules and procedures followed by AMTSO do not provide sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that the organization arrives at a pro-competitive industry consensus rather than a group boycott for the benefit of one or a few industry players dressed in the garb of standard setting.

This is a factual inquiry that cannot be countered by a legal defense that simply declares the defendant is an SDO and, therefore, immune to suit under the statute. Whether the AMTSO is an SDO under the law or not depends on how it conducts itself, the make-up of its members, and its fidelity to the procedural principles embodied in the statute. The plaintiff’s claim is that AMTSO has not followed the procedural principles required to qualify as an SDO under the Act. This is a purely factual issue and, as such, cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

The DOJ should be commended for urging the court to proceed to discovery to adduce the necessary facts to distinguish between legitimate standard setting and an unlawful group boycott and it should continue to be vigilant in the face of SDOs and would-be SODs that might be tempted to use the wrong side of the standard setting sword to commit anticompetitive acts instead of the right side to produce welfare-enhancing industry consensus.

This is particularly true in vital industries like cybersecurity. Government agencies, businesses, and consumers are constantly and increasingly at risk from ever-evolving cyber threats. It is therefore imperative that the cybersecurity market remains competitive to ensure development of the most effective security products.

© MoginRubin LLP
This article was written by Jonathan Rubin and Timothy Z. LaComb of MoginRubin & edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin.
For more DOJ Antitrust activities, see the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation page.

Why Correctly Understanding Antitrust Risk is Crucial to Properly Addressing Brand Dilution in the E-Commerce Age

“Run a Google search for the phrase ‘minimum advertised price policy’ and you will find hundreds of policies, posted on a variety of manufacturers’ websites.  Interest in minimum advertised price (‘MAP’) policies has skyrocketed in recent years.”  That is what one of my colleagues wrote in a prescient article in 2013.[i]  Since 2013, the interest in MAP policies has exploded.  But much of the online guidance regarding MAP policies is misguided and clearly has not been crafted or vetted by antitrust counsel.  Manufacturers should proceed with caution and consult with antitrust counsel before adopting a MAP policy.

  1. What is a MAP Policy?

MAP policies impose restrictions on the price at which a product or service may be advertised without restricting the actual sales price.  In the context of print advertising, MAP policies usually concern only off-site advertising, such as in flyers or brochures.  They do not restrict the in-store advertising or sales price offered at the retailer’s “brick and mortar” locations.  In the context of internet advertising, MAP policies often concern pricing advertised by an internet retailer on its website.  But with internet advertising, the distinction between an advertised price and a sales price is often blurry and requires special attention.

  1. What has been driving all the recent interest in MAP?

The e-commerce boom has been one key driver.  Although e-commerce has been a financial boon for some by allowing products to reach broader audiences and conveniently connecting consumers to highly discounted and diversified products, other manufacturers are concerned that they are losing control over their brands and the advertising of their products.  Once premium branded products might be discounted to the point of being considered cheap.  As margins are squeezed, service may suffer and consumers ultimately lose out.

This phenomenon, and how to address it, has attracted massive recent attention, including from the popular press.  In 2017, the Wall Street Journal published an article headlined, Brands Strike Back:  Seven Strategies to Loosen Amazon’s Grip, reporting that a growing number of brands are pushing back on large online retailers by adopting MAP policies.[ii]  The article reported that instituting MAP policies can be effective in decreasing online discounting.  A recent Forbes article similarly recommended that manufacturers adopt MAP policies in response to the emergence of e-commerce sites.[iii]

  1. Popular Misconceptions About MAP.

Public interest in MAP has been great for drawing attention to the usefulness of MAP policies in addressing brand dilution.  But much of the popular discourse about MAP fails to account for the critical legal considerations attendant to adopting and enforcing a MAP policy, and would steer the unwary into legally risky territory.  For example, a sampling of articles online—which will go unattributed—offer the following characterizations in promoting MAP policies:

  • A “MAP policy is an agreement between manufacturers and distributors or retailers”;
  • In a MAP policy, “authorized sellers agree to the policy and in return, the brand agrees to enforce their pricing”;
  • To prevent “margin erosion,” “manufacturers and retailers work together to set a minimum advertised price”;
  • MAP should be “enforced by both” the manufacturer and reseller; and
  • Brands should “control sellers” through “enforceable agreements.”

These suggestions to implement MAP through an “agreement” or in “cooperation” with resellers, and to use MAP to enforce product pricing, may have intuitive appeal.  And in fact, several MAP templates available online are styled as “agreements” between the manufacturer and reseller.  But be warned—these suggestions, if carried out, could pose significant antitrust risk that could subject companies to serious and expensive liability.  The next section explains why.

  1. Quick Antitrust Legal Guide to MAP.

When most people think of illegal antitrust conspiracies, they think of agreements among competitors to fix prices or restrict competition, which are per se illegal.  But in general, manufacturers also may not require their resellers—either distributors or retailers—to resell at (or above) a set price.  This is known as minimum resale price maintenance (“RPM”) and it is also per seillegal under antitrust laws in several states.

Although RPM may be per se illegal under certain state laws, MAP policies are generally analyzed under a more lenient legal framework called the “rule of reason.”  But a MAP policy must be crafted with care to avoid being treated as RPM.  For example, agreements with resellers concerning the minimum advertised price may be viewed, depending on the circumstances, as actually having the effect of setting the minimum sales price, converting the MAP policy into RPM.  A MAP policy also must be adopted free from any agreement with a manufacturer’s horizontal competitors, which could be found to be an unlawful horizontal conspiracy.  In one prominent example, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) brought an enforcement action against five major competing compact disk (“CD”) distributors challenging their MAP policies as violating federal antitrust laws.[iv]  All five major CD distributors had adopted MAP policies around the same time, allegedly at the urging of retailers, and the policies each prohibited all advertising below a certain price, including in-store advertising.  The FTC viewed the policies under those circumstances as horizontal agreements among the distributors, and thus per se illegal.

  1. Practical Antitrust Pointers for MAP.

Several guiding principles can help minimize antitrust risk in adopting a MAP policy:

  • Advertising Only.  A retailer should remain free to sell a product at any price, so that the restriction on advertising is deemed to be a non-price restraint.  In the context of online sales, adhering to this principle can require special care, as some might try to argue that there is little distinction between an advertised price and a sales price.  MAP policies that concern internet advertising thus often include provisions that allow internet retailers to communicate an actual sales price in a different manner—such as “Call for Pricing” or “Add to Cart to See Price.”
  • No Agreement.  A MAP policy should be drafted as a unilateral policy—i.e., a policy that the manufacturer creates on its own (in consultation with antitrust counsel), without input from or agreement with its own competitors or with its downstream resellers.  The policy should expressly state that it is a unilateral policy that does not constitute an agreement.
  • Broad Application.  Policies that apply to all off-site advertising, no matter the form, are more likely to be upheld than policies that are specifically directed at internet retailers.
  • Clarity.  A MAP policy should be user-friendly and easy to understand.  One best practice is to include a Frequently Asked Questions guide to clarify how the policy works.

Antitrust risk must be kept in mind not just when a MAP policy is created, but throughout its implementation and enforcement.  The manner in which a MAP policy is enforced could risk converting the unilateral policy into conduct that could be viewed as a tacit agreement, even if no written agreement is ever signed.  For example, enlisting or “working with” resellers to enforce the policy, as suggested by articles online, could be viewed as evidence that a manufacturer is coordinating with resellers as part of an overall agreement.  Working with competitors to coordinate strategies for MAP enforcement would also pose significant legal risk.  For that reason, manufacturers that are adopting MAP policies should resist communications with resellers or competitors about MAP and continue to work with antitrust counsel through implementation and enforcement.

To be sure, some may believe that coordination, for example, between manufacturers and retailers, is helpful in stamping out e-commerce discounting.  But even if such coordination between manufacturers and retailers could be effective in addressing such discounting, it carries significant legal risks.  And potentially risky agreements with resellers are not a manufacturer’s only option in addressing how its products are advertised in e-commerce.  Other tools are also available and can be adopted in conjunction with MAP and other policies.  As just one example, a unilateral distribution policy, in which a manufacturer unilaterally suspends resellers that sell through unauthorized e-commerce sites, can be a powerful complement to a MAP policy.  It also may present a more direct way to address the e-commerce channels through which goods are (or are not) sold.  Because such policies do not involve prices, if appropriately created and implemented, U.S. courts are likely to also assess them under the lenient “rule of reason.”  It is therefore unsurprising that such policies are gaining in popularity.  One recent study surveying over 1,000 European retailers found that policies precluding or limiting e-commerce sales are widely in place with approximately 18% of respondents reporting that manufacturers limit their ability to sell through online marketplaces or platforms and 11% reporting that manufacturers restrict their online sales to their own website.[v]

Ultimately, addressing brand dilution is critical in the e-commerce age.  It is also highly fact specific and typically requires custom solutions tailored to a company’s commercial and legal objectives.  Adopting an “off the rack” MAP policy and simply hoping for the best is unwise and could lead to expensive litigation or, worse yet, liability and costly penalties.  But antitrust lawyers are here to help companies navigate the legal landscape to come up with commonsense solutions that work while minimizing legal risk.

[i] Erika L. Amarante, A Roadmap to Minimum Advertised Price Policies, 16 The Franchise Lawyer 4 (2013), https://www.wiggin.com/erika-l-amarante/publications/a-roadmap-to-minimum-advertised-price-policies/.

[ii] Ruth Simon, Brands Strike Back:  Seven Strategies to Loosen Amazon’s Grip, Wall St. J., (Aug. 7, 2017),  https://www.wsj.com/articles/brands-strike-back-seven-strategies-to-loosen-amazons-grip-1502103602.

[iii] Danae Vara Borrell, Why Manufacturers Can’t Afford to Ignore Minimum Advertised Price Policies, Forbes Tech. Council (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/10/17/why-manufacturers-cant-afford-to-ignore-minimum-advertised-price-policies/#167f8d5417ec.

[iv] See In re Sony Entertainment, Inc., No. C-3971, 2000 WL 1257796 (F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2000).

[v] See European Commission, Final Report on the Ecommerce Sector Inquiry, staff working document paragraph 461, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_swd_en.pdf.

© 1998-2019 Wiggin and Dana LLP

Antitrust Law Post Antonin Scalia

gavel scales of justice blueWith the untimely passing of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, perhaps the best known and most controversial Justice on the Court, commentators, including this one, have been called upon to assess his legacy – both immediate and long term – in various areas of the law.

Justice Scalia was not known primarily as an antitrust judge and scholar. Indeed, in his confirmation hearing for the Court, he joked about what he saw as the incoherent nature of much of antitrust analysis. What he was best known for, of course, is his method of analysis of statutes and the Constitution: a literal textualism with respect to statutes and a reliance on “originalism” with respect to the Constitution.

Probably his most influential antitrust opinion was the 2004 decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP which limited antitrust plaintiffs’ ability to hold a company with monopoly power liable for failing to cooperate with rivals.

Taking a literalist view of the Sherman Act, Justice Scalia wrote that there was a good reason why Section 2 claims required a showing of anti-competitive conduct, not just a monopoly.

The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system,” he wrote. “The opportunity to charge monopoly prices — at least for a short period — is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk-taking that produces innovation and economic growth.

Thus, Justice Scalia fashioned a majority in holding that the competitive conduct of a monopolist that had earned its hegemony was not inherently suspect. This has come to be a dominant view generally in the antitrust field, but critics have argued that the decision entrenches power and judicial liberals who might succeed Justice Scalia could take a more restrictive, less literal view of the law.

In 1991, Justice Scalia led a majority in Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising Inc., a case in which a competitor had claimed that an advertising rival and a municipality had conspired in passing an ordinance favoring the incumbent. In ruling against the plaintiff, Justice Scalia wrote that there was no “conspiracy exception” to Parker v. Brown, the 1943 Supreme Court case that established antitrust immunity for anti-competitive restraints imposed by state governments. On the other hand, in the recent North Carolina Dentists litigation with the FTC, Justice Scalia joined a majority that held the state action exemption did not apply to certain guild behavior where there was no active supervision by the state – again, a literalist approach.

Justice Scalia was influential in limiting class actions, enforcing arbitration agreements and requiring strict rules of pleading plausible causes of action. Cases like the antitrust actions in AT&T v. Concepcion and American Express v. Italian Colors, backing enforcement of arbitration agreements that blocked class treatment of claims, and the now often-cited cases of Twombley and Iqbal with respect to pleading currently rule the entry gate for large-case litigation, particularly antitrust.

For all of his conservative rulings, Justice Scalia was not a results-oriented judge determined to put antitrust plaintiffs in their place, I think that he would have argued that he was strictly neutral on the merits and didn’t care whether business prevailed or whether the class action plaintiffs prevailed. Whether, the conservative majority that adopted his methods will continue to hold, or whether some of these methods will be superseded by a more-elastic interpretive mode of judging will be at the forefront of the confirmation hearing of the next Justice.

Article By Stuart M. Gerson of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Ninth Circuit Rules NCAA Violates Antitrust Law-Strikes Down Proposed Remedy

A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in San Francisco, affirmed in part and reversed in part Judge Claudia Wilken’s August 2014 district court decision that NCAA rules restricting payment to athletes violate antitrust laws.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge Wilken’s conclusion that NCAA rules restricting payment to athletes violated antitrust laws and authorized NCAA schools to provide athletic scholarships that cover the full cost of attendance. However, the Ninth Circuit rejected a key component of Judge Wilken’s decision which authorized the payment of $5,000 per year in deferred compensation for the use of individual athletes’ names, images and likenesses.

The opinion, written on behalf of the panel by Judge Jay Bybee, stated,

“NCAA is not above the antitrust laws, and courts cannot and must not shy away from requiring the NCAA to play by the Sherman Act’s rules….In this case, the NCAA’s rules have been more restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of amateurism in support of the college sports market.”

A more detailed analysis of the decision and its potential impact will be posted shortly.

Article By Gregg E. Clifton & Benjamin A. Tulis of Jackson Lewis P.C.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

March (Appellate) Madness re: O'Bannon NCAA Antitrust Case

Womble Carlyle Sandridge Rice, PLLC

It has been a few months since we updated on the O’Bannon antitrustcase, where federal judge Claudia Wilken ruled last summer that theNCAA’s amateurism rules violated federal antitrust laws. But this week, as the rest of the country filled out their brackets and geared up for the start of the NCAA tournament, the NCAA was getting ready for another battle – in the Ninth Circuit.  On Tuesday, the appeals court heard oral argument from both the NCAA and plaintiffs’ counsel, as the parties debated the lower court’s decision, which allowed limited compensation for the use of athletes’ name, image, and likenesses.

Central to the parties’ argument was the interpretation of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, a 1984 case regarding football television rights. While the NCAA lost that case, one statement in that case has become central to the NCAA’s current “amateurism” defense:  “To preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid.”  In Tuesday’s arguments, some of the judges seemed skeptical of the NCAA’s shifting definition of “pay,” they were also concerned about opening the door to “pay for play.”

We can expect a ruling in the upcoming months, though this is unlikely to be the final appeal in the case.

ARTICLE BY

Amanda Norris Ames
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

March (Appellate) Madness re: O’Bannon NCAA Antitrust Case

Womble Carlyle Sandridge Rice, PLLC

It has been a few months since we updated on the O’Bannon antitrustcase, where federal judge Claudia Wilken ruled last summer that theNCAA’s amateurism rules violated federal antitrust laws. But this week, as the rest of the country filled out their brackets and geared up for the start of the NCAA tournament, the NCAA was getting ready for another battle – in the Ninth Circuit.  On Tuesday, the appeals court heard oral argument from both the NCAA and plaintiffs’ counsel, as the parties debated the lower court’s decision, which allowed limited compensation for the use of athletes’ name, image, and likenesses.

Central to the parties’ argument was the interpretation of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, a 1984 case regarding football television rights. While the NCAA lost that case, one statement in that case has become central to the NCAA’s current “amateurism” defense:  “To preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid.”  In Tuesday’s arguments, some of the judges seemed skeptical of the NCAA’s shifting definition of “pay,” they were also concerned about opening the door to “pay for play.”

We can expect a ruling in the upcoming months, though this is unlikely to be the final appeal in the case.

ARTICLE BY

Amanda Norris Ames
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC