Top Risks for Businesses in 2024

Just weeks into 2024, it is already clear that uncertainty will be the watchword. Will the economic soft landing of 2023 persist into 2024? Will labor unrest, strong in 2023, settle down as inflation cools? Will inflation remain tamed? Will the U.S. elections bring continuity or a new administration with very different views on the role of the U.S. in the world and in regulating business?

Uncertainty is also fueling a complex risk environment that will require monitoring global developments more so than in the past. As outlined below, geopolitical risks are present, multiple, interconnected and high impact. International relations have traditionally fallen outside the mandate of most C-Suites, but how the U.S. government responds to geopolitical challenges will impact business operations. Beyond additional disruptions to global trade, businesses in 2024 will face risks associated with expanding protectionist economic policies, climate change impacts, and AI-driven disruptors.

Geopolitical Tensions Disrupting Global Trade

The guardrails are coming off the international system that enshrines the ideals of preserving peace and security through diplomatic engagement, respecting international borders (not changing them through military might) and ensuring the free flow of global trade. In 2022, the world was shocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has taken time for the full impact to reverberate through the international system. While political analysts write on a “spillover of conflict,” the more insidious impact is that more leaders of countries and non-state groups are acting outside the guardrails because they are no longer deterred from using military force to achieve political goals, making 2024 ripe for new military conflicts disrupting global trade beyond the ongoing war in Europe.

In October 2023, Hamas launched a war from Gaza against Israel. Thus far, fighting has spread to the West Bank, between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in the north, and to the Red Sea, with Iranian-backed Houthis attacking shipping through the strategic Bab al Mandab strait. Container ships and oil tankers, to avoid the risks, are re-routing to the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks of extra sailing time, with the associated costs. Insurance premiums for cargo ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean have skyrocketed, with some no longer servicing Israeli ports. Companies and retailers with tight delivery schedules are switching to airfreight, which is expected to drive up airfreight rates.

Iran, emboldened by its blossoming relationship with Russia as one of Moscow’s new arms suppliers, is activating its proxy armies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to attack Western targets. In a two-day period in January 2024, the Iran Revolutionary Guards directly launched strikes in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan retaliated with a cross border strike in Iran. While there are many nuances to these incidents, it is evident that deterrence against cross-border military conflict is eroding in a region with deep, festering grievances among neighbors. Iran is in an escalatory mode and could resume harassing shipping in the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about a fifth of the volume of the world’s total oil consumption passes through on a daily basis.

In East Asia, North Korea is also emboldened by the changing geopolitical environment. Pyongyang, too, has become a major supplier of weaponry to Moscow for use in Ukraine. While Russia (and China) in the past have constructively contained North Korean predilection for aggression against its neighbors, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may believe the time is ripe to change the status quo. Ominously, in a Jan. 15 speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea’s parliament), Kim rejected the policy of reunification with South Korea and proposed incorporating the country into North Korea “in the event of war.” While North Korean leaders frequently revert to brinksmanship and aggressive language, Kim’s speech reflects confidence of a nuclear power, aligned with Russia against a shared adversary – South Korea, which is firmly aligned with the G7 consensus on Russia. A war in the Korean peninsula would be felt around the world because East Asia is central to global shipping and manufacturing, disrupting supply chains, as well as the regional economy.

China is also waiting for the right moment to “unite” Taiwan with the mainland. Beijing has seen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine and has been deterred from aiding the Russian war effort. In many ways, China has benefited from these sanctions and the reorientation of global trade. Also, Russia, with its far weaker economy, has proven surprisingly resilient to sanctions, another lesson for China. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese people voted in January and returned for a third time the ruling party that strongly rejects Chinese territorial claims. Tensions are high, with the Chinese military once again harassing Taiwanese defenses. For Beijing, the “right moment” could fall this year should conflict break out on the Korean peninsula, which would tie the U.S. down because of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The uncertainty here is not that there are global tensions, but how the U.S. will respond as they develop and how U.S. businesses can navigate external shocks. Will the U.S. be drawn into a new war in the Middle East? Can the U.S. manage multiple conflicts, already deeply involved in supporting Ukraine? Is the U.S. economy resilient enough to withstand trade disruptions? How can businesses strengthen their own resiliency?

Economic Protectionism Increasing Costs and Risks

Geopolitical tensions, the global pandemic and the unequal benefits of globalization are impacting economic policies of the U.S. and the political discourse around the merits of unrestrained free trade. Protectionist economic policies are creeping in, under the nomenclature of “secure supply chains,” “friend-shoring” and “home-shoring.” The U.S. has imposed tariffs on countries (even allies) accused of unfair trade practices and has foreclosed access to certain technologies by unfriendly countries, namely China.

While the response to some of these trade restrictions are new trade agreements with “friends” to regulate access under preferred terms, in essence creating multiple “friends” trade blocs for specific sectors, other responses are retaliatory, including counter tariffs and export restrictions or outright bans. In 2024, the U.S. economy will see the impact of these trade fragmentation policies in acute ways, with upside risks of new business opportunities and downside risks of supply chain disruptions, critical resource competition, increased input costs, compliance risks and increased reputational risks.

Trade with China, which remains significant and important to the stability of the U.S. economy, will pose new risks in 2024. While Washington and Beijing have agreed to some political and security guardrails to manage the relationship, economic competition is unrestrained and stability in the bilateral relations is not guaranteed. The December 2023 bipartisan report by the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, with its 150 recommendations on fundamentally resetting economic and technological competition with China, if even partially adopted, risks reigniting the trade war.

2024 is a presidential election year for the U.S. A change of control of the executive branch could result in many economic and regulatory policy reversals. The definition of “friend” could shift or narrow. Restrictions on trade with China could accelerate.

Impacts of Climate Change and Sustainability Policies

2023 was the hottest year on record, and El Niño conditions are expected to further boost the warming trend. Many regions experienced record-breaking wildfire activity in 2023, including Canada where 18 million hectares of land burned. Extreme storms caused life-threatening flooding in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 2024 is expected to bring even more climate hazards. The impacts will be physical and financial, including growing insurance losses and adverse impacts on operations and value chain. Analysts expect that in 2024, the economic and financial costs of adverse health impacts from climate change will increase, with risks related to the spread of infectious disease, insufficient access to clean water, and physical harm to the elderly and vulnerable. The direct economic effect will be on health systems, but also loss of productivity due to extreme weather incidents and effects of epidemics.

Energy transition to low-carbon emissions is underway in the U.S., but it is uneven and still uncertain. The financial market is investing in an impressive number of startups and large-scale projects revolving around cleantech. Still, there is hesitancy on the opportunity and risks of sustainability. Thus far, progress towards sustainability goals has been private sector-led and government-enabled. There is a risk that government incentive programs encouraging the transition to low-carbon energy could be reversed or curtailed under a new administration.

In 2024, some companies will face more climate disclosure compliance requirements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to release its final rule on climate change disclosures. The final action has been delayed several times because of pushback by public companies on some of the requirements, including Scope 3 greenhouse gas emission disclosures (those linked to supply chains and end users). California has not waited for the SEC’s final rule: In October 2023, Gov. Gavin Newsom signed into law legislation that will require large companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions. The California climate laws go into effect in 2026, but companies will need to start much earlier to build the capabilities to plan, track and report their carbon footprint. For U.S. companies doing business in the European Union, they will need to comply with the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, with the rules coming into force mid-2024.

Disruptive Technology

In 2023, generative AI was the talk of the town; in 2024, it will be the walk. Companies are popping up with new tools for every imaginable sector, to increase efficiency, task automation, customization, personalization and cost reduction. Business leaders are scrambling to integrate AI to gain a competitive edge, while navigating the everyday risks related to privacy, liability and security. While there are concerns that AI will displace humans, there is a growing consensus that while some jobs will disappear, people will focus on higher value work. That said, new rounds of labor disruptions linked to workforce transition are likely in 2024.

2024 will also bring AI-generated misinformation and disinformation. Bad actors will spread “synthetic” content, such as sophisticated voice cloning, doctored images and counterfeit websites, seeking to manipulate people, damage companies and economies, and foment dissent.

In 2024, around 2 billion people in more than 50 countries will vote in elections at risk of manipulation by misinformation and disinformation, which could destabilize the real and perceived legitimacy of newly elected governments, risking political unrest, violence, terrorism and erosion of democratic processes. Large democracies will hold elections in 2024, including the U.S., the EU, Mexico, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Africa. Synthetic content can be very difficult to detect, while easy to produce with AI tools.

This is not a theoretical threat; synthetic content is already being disseminated in the U.S., targeting New Hampshire voters with robocalls that share fake recorded messages from President Biden encouraging people not to vote in the primary election. The U.S. is already polarized with citizens distrustful of the government and media, a ready vulnerability. Businesses are not immune. Notably, CEOs have stood apart, with higher ratings for trustworthiness and risk being called upon to vouch for “truth” (and becoming collateral damage in the fray).

AI-powered malware will make 2023 cyber risks look like child’s play. Attackers can use AI algorithms to find and exploit software vulnerabilities, making attacks precise and effective. AI can help hackers quickly identify security measures and evade them. AI-created phishing attacks will be more sophisticated and difficult to detect because the algorithms can assess larger amounts of piecemeal information and craft messages that mimic communication styles.

The role of states backing cyber armies to spread disinformation or steal information is growing and is part and parcel of the erosion of the existing international order. States face little deterrence from digital cross-border attacks because there are yet to be established mechanisms to impose real costs.

FTC Announces 2024 Increase in HSR Notification Thresholds and Filing Fees

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has announced the annual revisions to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) thresholds and HSR filing fees, which will become effective on March 6, 2024. The revised thresholds will apply to any merger or acquisition closing on or after the effective date.

The FTC is required to adjust the HSR thresholds annually based upon the change in gross national product. This year, the change in the “size of transaction” threshold has increased from $111.4 million to $119.5 million.

Under the HSR Act, when a deal satisfies the “size of person” and “size of transaction” thresholds, and no exemption from reporting is available, the deal must be reported to the FTC and the US Department of Justice, and the parties must wait for a designated period of time before closing the transaction.

Size of Person. The revised size of person thresholds will generally be met if one party involved in the deal has assets or annual sales totaling $239 million or more and one other party involved in the deal has assets or annual sales of at least $23.9 million. Satisfaction of the size of person thresholds is not required, however, if the transaction is valued at more than $478 million.

Size of Transaction. The revised size of transaction threshold will be met if the buyer will hold an aggregate amount of stock, non-corporate interests and/or assets of the seller valued at more than $119.5 million as a result of the deal.

The notification thresholds applicable to purchases of voting securities will increase as follows:

February 1, 2001 Thresholds (Original) Current Thresholds as of February 27, 2023 New Thresholds Effective March 6, 2024
$50 million $111.4 million $119.5 million
$100 million $222.7 million $239 million
$500 million $1.1137 billion $1.195 billion
25% if worth more than
$1 billion
25% if worth more than $2.2274 billion 25% if worth more than $2.39 billion
50% if worth more than
$50 million
50% if worth more than $111.4 million 50% if worth more than $119.5 million

The thresholds applicable to many exemptions, including those governing foreign acquisitions, also will increase. However, the $500 million threshold applicable to acquisitions of producing oil and gas reserves and associated assets will not change.

The civil penalty for failing to comply with the notification and waiting period requirements of the HSR Act has also increased to up to $51,744 per day for each day a party is in violation.

HSR Filing Fees. Additionally, the HSR filing fee thresholds and filing fee amounts have increased as follows:

Original Filing Fee Original Applicable Size of Transaction 2024 Adjusted Filing Fee 2024 Adjusted Applicable Size of Transaction
$30,000 Less than $161.5 million $30,000 Less than $173.3 million
$100,000 Not less than $161.5 million but less than $500 million $105,000 Not less than $173.3 million but less than $536.5 million
$250,000 Not less than $500 million but less than $1 billion $260,000 Not less than $536.5 million but less than $1.073 billion
$400,000 Not less than $1 billion but less than $2 billion $415,000 Not less than $1.073 billion but less than $2.146 billion
$800,000 Not less than $2 billion but less than $5 billion $830,000 Not less than $2.146 billion but less than $5.365 billion
$2,250,000 $5 billion or more $2,335,000 $5.365 billion or more

The new fees also will become effective on March 6, 2024.

As Three Recent Settlements Demonstrate, Whistleblowers Are the Key to Enforcement of Section 301 Tariffs

The Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-made goods—at the time, known as the Trump Tariffs, although President Biden has embraced them as well—were put in place in 2018. Only recently, more than five years later, have enforcement efforts begun to show up publicly. And, as is often the case, whistleblowers are the tip of the enforcement spear. In particular, over the course of two weeks at the end of 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced settlements of three qui tam cases, brought under the False Claims Act, that alleged evasion of Section 301 tariffs. These are the first such settlements to be made public, but likely signal the beginning of a wave of settlements or litigation in the coming years.

Starting in July of 2018, and pursuant to Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301 through 310, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420), titled “Relief from Unfair Trade Practices,” and often collectively referred to as “Section 301,” the United States imposed additional tariffs on a wide range of products manufactured in China. The Section 301 tariffs were rolled out in tranches, but they fairly quickly covered a majority of all Chinese-made products imported into the United States. The Section 301 tariffs imposed an additional 25% customs duty on those products.

As is always the case when high tariffs are imposed on imported goods, the Section 301 tariffs were met with a mix of responses by importers. In some cases, importers simply paid the additional 25% duties. In some cases, the importers found new sources, outside of China, for the products they wished to import. And in many cases, the importers started cheating—evading the tariffs either by lying to Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) about what was being imported, or engaging to transshipping schemes to make it appear that the products were actually made in some country other than China.

Evasion of customs duties violates the False Claims Act, a federal law that, among other things, outlaws the making of false statements to avoid payment of money owed to the government. Evasion of customs duties will almost always involve such false statements because when goods are imported into the United States, the importer must provide CBP with a completed form, called an Entry Summary (also known as a Form 7501), in which the importer provides information about the nature, quantity, value, and country-of-origin of the goods being imported. To avoid or reduce the payment of duties, the importer will almost always lie on the Entry Summary about one or more of those, thus exposing the importer to liability under the False Claims Act.

The False Claims Act has a qui tam provision, which means that a private person or company may bring a lawsuit in the name of the government against the importer that has evaded payment of duties. If the qui tam lawsuit is successful, most of the money goes to the government. But the person or company that brought the lawsuit typically referred to as a whistleblower or, more technically, as the “relator”—gets an award that is between 15% and 30% of the amount recovered for the government.

When a qui tam case is first filed, it is put “under seal” by the court, meaning that it is secret and not available to the public. The case stays under seal, often for multiple years, as DOJ investigates the claims made in the case. But once DOJ decides to pursue a case, the seal is lifted, and the case becomes public. Often, this happens almost simultaneously with the announcement of a settlement of the case.

That is what happened with three cases that became public in late 2023. The first announcement came on November 29, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia announced a $1.9 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel Chinapacificarbide Inc. v. King Kong Tools, LLC. In that case, the whistleblower that had brought the qui tam lawsuit was a competitor company which alleged that King Kong Tools was manufacturing cutting tools in a factory in China, shipping them to Germany, and then importing them from Germany into the United States, claiming falsely that the tools were made in Germany. The whistleblowing company received an award of $286,861.

The second such announcement came on December 5, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas announced a $2.5 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel. Reznicek et al. v. Dallco Marketing, Inc. In that case, the whistleblowers were two individuals who alleged that the defendants evaded the Section 301 tariffs by underreporting the value of the products they were importing from China into the United States. The whistleblowers received an award of $500,000.

The third such announcement case on December 13, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas announced a settlement of $798,334 in a case captioned United States ex rel. Edwards v. Homestar North America LLC. Like the Dallco Marketing case, the Homestar case was also brought by an individual who alleged that the importer had lied to the government about the value of the goods being imported from China into the United States, in order to avoid payment of Section 301 tariffs. The whistleblower received an award of $151,683.

Accordingly, over the course of just two weeks in late 2023, three Section 301 settlements were publicly announced in quick succession. And notably, all three were whistleblower qui tam cases. This demonstrates the key role that whistleblowers play in the enforcement of customs tariffs and duties. No doubt, many other such cases remain under seal, and will start to become public as DOJ concludes its investigations. And because the Section 301 tariffs remain in place to this day, additional qui tam cases will almost certainly continue to be brought by both individual whistleblowers and competing companies seeking to level the playing field. Accordingly, these three settlements are likely just the early signs of a wave of Section 301 cases that will crest in the coming years.

FTC Announces 2024 Thresholds for Merger Control Filings under HSR Act and Interlocking Directorates under the Clayton Act

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has increased the dollar jurisdictional thresholds necessary to trigger the reporting requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (“HSR Act”), and the dollar value of each of the six filing fee thresholds; the revised thresholds will become effective 30 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register. The daily maximum civil penalty for being in violation of the HSR Act has increased, and is, as of January 10, 2024, $51,744.

The FTC also increased the thresholds for interlocking directorates under Section 8 of the Clayton Act; these revised thresholds are in effect as of January 22, 2024.

Revised HSR Thresholds

Under the HSR Act, parties involved in proposed mergers, acquisitions of voting securities, unincorporated interests or assets, or other business combinations (e.g., joint ventures, exclusive license deals) that meet certain thresholds must report the proposed transaction to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) unless an exemption applies. The parties to a proposed transaction that requires notification under the HSR Act must observe a statutorily prescribed waiting period (generally 30 days) before closing. Under the revised thresholds, transactions valued at $119.5 million or less are not reportable under the HSR Act.

A transaction closing on or after the date the revised thresholds become effective may be reportable if it meets the following revised criteria:

Size-of-Transaction Test The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $478 million;

or

The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $119.5 million but not more than $478 millionand the Size-of-Person thresholds below are met.

Size-of-Person
Test
One party (including the party’s ultimate parent entity and its controlled subsidiaries) has at least $239 million in total assets or annual sales, and the other has at least $23.9 million in total assets or annual sales.

The full list of the revised thresholds is as follows:

Original Threshold 2023 Threshold 2024 Revised Threshold
$10 million $22.3 million $23.9 million
$50 million $111.4 million $119.5 million
$100 million $222.7 million $239 million
$110 million $245 million $262.9 million
$200 million $445.5 million $478 million
$500 million $1,113.7 million $1,195 million
$1 billion $2,227.4 million $2,390 million

The filing fees for reportable transactions and the six filing fee tiers also have been updated, as follows:

Filing Fee Size of Transaction under the Act
$30,000 For transactions valued in excess of $119.5 million but less than $173.3 million
$105,000 For transactions valued at $173.3 million or greater but less than $536.5 million
$260,000 For transactions valued at $536.5 million or greater but less than $1,073 million
$415,000 For transactions valued at $1,073 million or greater but less than $2,146 million
$830,000 For transactions valued at $2,146 million or greater but less than $5,365 million
$2.335 million For transactions valued at $5,365 million or more

The filing fee tiers, introduced in 2023, are adjusted annually to reflect changes in the GNP for the previous year.

The HSR Act’s dollar thresholds are only part of the analysis to determine whether a particular transaction must be reported to the FTC and DOJ; a full analysis requires consideration of exemptions to the filing requirements that may be available to an acquiror. Failure to notify the FTC and DOJ under the HSR Act remains subject to a statutory penalty of up to $51,744 per day of noncompliance.

Revised Thresholds for Interlocking Directorates

Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits one person from simultaneously serving as an officer or director of two corporations if: (1) each of the “interlocked” corporations has combined capital, surplus, and undivided profits of more than $48,559,000 (up from $45,257,000); (2) each corporation is engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and (3) the corporations are “by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws.”1

Section 8 provides several exemptions from the prohibition on interlocks for arrangements where the competitive overlaps “are too small to have competitive significance in the vast majority of situations.”2 A corporate interlock does not violate the statute if (1) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $4,855,900 (up from $4,525,700); (2) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than 2 percent of that corporation’s total sales; or (3) the competitive sales of each corporation are less than 4 percent of that corporation’s total sales. The DOJ has been active recently in identifying and achieving remediation of interlocks that may violate Section 8.3

1 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B).

2 S. Rep. No. 101-286, at 5-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4100, 4103-04.

3 Department of Justice, Two Pinterest Directors Resign from Nextdoor Board of Directors in Response to Justice Department’s Ongoing Enforcement Efforts Against Interlocking Directorates (Aug. 16, 2023); Department of Justice, Justice Department’s Ongoing Section 8 Enforcement Prevents More Potentially Illegal Interlocking Directorates (Mar. 9, 2023); Department of Justice, Directors Resign from the Boards of Five Companies in Response to Justice Department Concerns about Potentially Illegal Interlocking Directorates (Oct. 19, 2022).

Becoming Antitrust Aware in 2024: Top Five Recommendations for the New Year

A new year means resolutions which are often centered around self-improvement measures like weight loss, exercise plans, and other health improvement measures. Companies can also benefit from resolutions. Increasing antitrust awareness is not usually on the resolution list but here we offer some ideas for companies as they embark on a new year.

Treat antitrust as a priority in 2024.

As antitrust lawyers, our viewpoint may be biased, and we certainly appreciate that most companies already have a lengthy list of priorities for their in-house and outside legal teams. Given that all companies, regardless of their size, are subject to the antitrust laws, and given the high stakes involved (including criminal penalties and treble damages awards), antitrust certainly deserves to be on the priority list. One relatively easy way to get the ball rolling is to put fresh eyes on your company’s antitrust policy. When was the last time it was updated? What type of trainings does your company use to teach the concepts contained in the policy? The training doesn’t need to be – and shouldn’t be – boring or esoteric. Instead, trainings should be engaging and tailored to the specific antitrust risks that workgroups may face. For example, the sales team will need different antitrust training than those working on supply chain or environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives. Ask your antitrust lawyer to create easy-to-follow, lively online trainings that can be viewed on demand. And if your company doesn’t have an antitrust policy, we suggest that creating one be moved to the top (or near top) of the legal department’s to-do list in 2024.

Understand the current antitrust enforcement priorities.

2024 will be a significant year for antitrust. It’s an election year, which means 2024 may be the Biden Administration’s last year to execute on plans that have been in the works since President Biden issued Executive Order 14036, “Promoting Competition in the American Economy,” in July 2021. Some of the Administration’s more dramatic plans include significant revisions to the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification process. While we don’t expect all the FTC and DOJ’s sweeping proposals to make it into the HSR final rule, we do expect some changes to be made, and they will likely mean significant additional burdens for filing parties. We also expect to see the FTC’s new rule on non-compete agreements. The FTC’s proposal would ban most non-compete agreements, and some states have already enacted their own prohibitions on non-compete agreements.

If your company engages in M&A, be aware of the new Merger Guidelines.

The newest Merger Guidelines, addressing both horizontal and vertical mergers, were unveiled in December 2023 . One of the most significant changes announced in the 2023 Merger Guidelines are the decreased levels of concentration that will trigger a rebuttable presumption of illegality. Under the new Guidelines, a market share of greater than 30% and a concentration increase of 100 points will be enough to trigger that rebuttable presumption. That is not to say the presumption is the death knell for a transaction, but it does mean that the government enforcement will be aggressive. Also be aware that the 2023 Guidelines introduce new topics, such as labor markets. Early analysis and planning will be critical, requiring involvement of skilled antitrust counsel.

Understand that application of the antitrust laws is constantly evolving.

The language of the core U.S. antitrust laws – the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act, hasn’t changed, but the application of these laws is always evolving. For example, the antitrust enforcers and private plaintiffs are increasingly focused on labor issues, such as “no poach” agreements and wage fixing. Antitrust enforcers are also focused on private equity, as evidenced by the FTC’s recent lawsuit against Welsh, Carson, Anderson, and Stowe and some of the changes contained in the proposed revisions to the HSR Rules. Technology is also a significant factor that provokes interesting questions that don’t have answers, at least not currently. For example, do pricing algorithms lead to price fixing? How will antitrust enforcers deal with artificial intelligence?

Pay attention to state antitrust enforcers.

The federal regulators at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission may get most of the attention, but we must never forget that states have their own antitrust laws and their own antitrust enforcers, who have the power to investigate and bring legal action. Often, the state regulators work collaboratively with their federal counterparts, but the state regulators are free to go their own way, such as those targeting various ESG initiatives. Also bear in mind that states are increasingly blazing new trails, such as bans on non-competes. Thirteen states have also enacted “mini” HSR premerger notification statutes for health care deals. It’s always prudent to check the laws of the state or states where business is conducted to determine if there are any state-specific antitrust considerations.

Updated Merger Guidelines Finalized

On December 18, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) jointly issued a significantly revised version of the Merger Guidelines that describes the frameworks the enforcement agencies use when evaluating potential mergers.

The newly finalized Merger Guidelines are the result of a nearly two-year effort that involved both agencies soliciting public input via listening sessions, written comments, and workshops.

The agencies describe the new Merger Guidelines as necessary to address the modern economy and how firms now do business. The Merger Guidelines are broken into multiple sections: Guidelines 1–6 describe the frameworks the agencies use when attempting to identify a merger that the agencies believe raises a prima facie concern, while Guidelines 7–11 explain how to apply those frameworks in specific settings. The guidelines also identify evidence the agencies will consider to potentially rebut an inference of competitive harm. Finally, these guidelines include a discussion of the tools the agencies use when evaluating the relevant facts, the potential harm to competition, and how to define the relevant markets.

The Merger Guidelines are notable for signaling the FTC’s and DOJ’s desire to pursue a more aggressive enforcement agenda, specifically, by lowering the threshold at which proposed mergers will be deemed presumptively anticompetitive by those enforcement agencies. The new guidelines also seek to address relatively new concerns the agencies have identified, such as cross-market transactions and sequences of smaller transactions.

International Trade, Enforcement & Compliance Recent Developments Update (January 17, 2024)

One of the most consistent messages coming from the U.S. government is that multinational companies need to take control of their supply chains. Forced labor, human trafficking, supply chain transparency, OFAC sanctions, even conflict minerals — all are areas in which the best defense against potential violations is strong compliance and due diligence to ensure that companies properly manage their supply chains, rights down to the last supplier. Today’s mix of enforcement actions and guidance from the U.S. government underscores the importance of doing so.

EXPORT CONTROLS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The Department of Commerce has stated that it has the authority to put companies on the Entity List (requiring special licensing and restrictions) solely for human rights violations. Does your company conduct full due diligence on its suppliers and sub-suppliers to ensure that they are operating in accordance with U.S. forced labor and human trafficking laws?

FORCED LABOR/UFLPA

The Department of Homeland Security continues to add Chinese and other companies to the Uyghur Forced Labor and Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List. Does your organization specifically screen against the UFLPA Entity List, as well as have in place UFLPA compliance and due diligence measures?

FORCED LABOR/UFLPA

The U.S. government has issued a pointed six-agency set of compliance guidelines regarding “the Risks and Considerations for Businesses and Individuals with Exposure to Entities Engaged in Forced Labor and other Human Rights Abuses linked to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” Does your organization maintain a compliance policy, vendor code of conduct, supply chain transparency and due diligence procedures, and other measures designed to ensure your supply chain is free of forced labor, human trafficking, or goods sourced from forced labor in the Xingjian Autonomous Region?

CUSTOMS PENALTY FOR ERRONEOUS USE OF FIRST SALE RULE

Due to the imposition of special Section 301 tariffs on most goods from Customs, many companies have begun to use the first sale rule, which allows the reporting of a lower value where there is a bona fide sale to a middleman. Improper application of the rule, however, can be the basis for substantial penalties, as an apparel company that paid a $1.3 million settlement with the DOJ found out. If your company uses the first sale rule, do you regularly review pricing and relevant circumstances to ensure you are meeting all the requirements for all entries?

EXPORT CONTROLS

Pledging “a new era of trilateral partnership,” the U.S., Japan, and South Korea governments have announced expanded collaboration to fight illegal exports of dual-use products, including high-tech products that might be shipped to China in violation of U.S. export controls. Has your organization performed a recent classification review to confirm it is aware of any restrictions that might adhere to the export of any of its products to sensitive countries, governments, or users?

Privacy Tip #382 – Beware of Fake Package Delivery Scams During Holiday Season

There are lots of package deliveries this time of year. When shopping online, companies are great about telling you when to expect the delivery of your purchase. Fraudsters know this and prey on unsuspecting victims especially during this time of year.

Scammers send smishing texts (smishing is just like phishing, but through a text), that embeds malicious code into a link in the text that can infect your phone or try to get victims to provide personal information or financial information.

It is such a problem, that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently issued an Alert to provide tips to avoid these scams.

The tips include:

What to do

  • If you get a message about an unexpected package delivery that tells you to click on a link for some reason, don’t click.
  • If you think the message might be legitimate, contact the shipping company using a phone number or website you know is real. Don’t use the information in the message.
  • If you think it could be about something you recently ordered, go to the site where you bought the item and look up the shipping and delivery status there.
  • No matter the time of year, it always pays to protect your personal information. Check out these resources to help you weed out spam text messagesphishing emails, and unwanted calls.

These are helpful tips any time of year, but particularly right now.

Algorithmic Pricing Agents and Price-Fixing Facilitators: Antitrust Law’s Latest Conundrum

Are machines doing the collaborating that competitors may not?

It is an application of artificial intelligence (“AI”) that many businesses, agencies, legislators, lawyers, and antitrust law enforcers around the world are only beginning to confront. It is also among the top concerns of in-house counsel across industries. Competitors are increasingly setting prices through the use of communal, AI-enhanced algorithms that analyze data that are private, public, or a mix of both.

Allegations in private and public litigation describe “algorithmic price fixing” in which the antitrust violation occurs when competitors feed and access the same database platform and use the same analytical tools. Then, as some allege, the violations continue when competitors agree to the prices produced by the algorithms. Right now, renters and prosecutors are teeing off on the poster child for algorithmic pricing, RealPage Inc., and the many landlords and property managers who use it.

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LITIGATION

A Nov. 1, 2023 complaint filed by the Washington, DC, Attorney General’s office described RealPage’s offerings this way: “[A] variety of technology-based services to real estate owners and property managers including revenue management products that employ statistical models that use data—including non-public, competitively sensitive data—to estimate supply and demand for multifamily housing that is specific to particular geographic areas and unit types, and then generate a ‘price’ to charge for renting those units that maximizes the landlord’s revenue.”

The complaint alleges that more than 30% of apartments in multifamily buildings and 60% of units in large multifamily buildings nationwide are priced using the RealPage software. In the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria Metropolitan Area that number leaps to more than 90% of units in large buildings. The complaint alleges that landlords have agreed to set their rates using RealPage.

Private actions against RealPage have also been filed in federal courts across the country and have been centralized in multi-district litigation in the Middle District of Tennessee (In re: RealPage, Inc., Rental Software Antitrust Litigation [NO. II], Case No. 3:23-md-3071, MDL No. 3071). The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest and a Memorandum in Support in the case urging the court to deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Even before the MDL, RealPage had attracted the Antitrust Division’s attention when the company acquired its largest competitor, Lease Rent Options for $300 million, Axiometrics for $75 million, and On-Site Manager, Inc. for $250 million.

The Antitrust Division has been pursuing the use of algorithms in other industries, including airlines and online retailers. The DOJ and FTC are both studying the issue and reaching out to experts to learn more.

JOURNALISTS AND SENATORS

Additionally, three senators urged DOJ  to investigate RealPage after reporters at ProPublica wrote an investigative report in October 2022. The journalists claim that RealPage’s price-setting software “uses nearby competitors’ nonpublic rent data to feed an algorithm that suggests what landlords should charge for available apartments each day.” ProPublica speculated that the algorithm is enabling landlords to coordinate prices and in the process push rents above competitive levels in violation of the antitrust laws.

Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Dick Durban (D-IL) and Cory Booker (D-NJ) wrote to the DOJ concerned that the RealPage enables “a cartel to artificially inflate rental rates in multifamily residential buildings.”

Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) also wrote to the Federal Trade Commission with concerns “about collusion in the rental market,” urging the FTC to “review whether rent setting algorithms that analyze rent prices through the use of competitors’ private data … violate antitrust laws.” The Ohio senator specifically mentioned RealPage’s YieldStar and AI Revenue Management programs.

THE EUROPEANS

The European Commission has enacted the Artificial Intelligence Act, which includes provisions on algorithmic pricing, requiring algorithmic pricing systems be transparent, explainable, and non-discriminatory with regard to consumers. Companies that use algorithmic pricing systems will be required to implement compliance procedures, including audits, data governance, and human oversight.

THE LEGAL CONUNDRUM

An essential element of any claimed case of price-fixing under the U.S. antitrust laws is the element of agreement: a plaintiff alleging price-fixing must prove the existence of an agreement between two or more competitors who should be setting their prices independently but aren’t. Consumer harm from collusion occurs when competitors set prices to achieve their maximum joint profit instead of setting prices to maximize individual profits. To condemn algorithmic pricing as collusion, therefore, requires proof of agreement.

It may be difficult for the RealPage plaintiffs to prove that the RealPage’s users agreed among themselves to adhere to any particular price or pricing formula, but not impossible. End users are likely to argue that RealPage’s pricing recommendations are merely aggregate market signals that RealPage is collecting and disseminating. The use of the same information service, their argument will go, does not prove the existence of an agreement for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The parties and courts embroiled in the RealPage litigation are constrained to live under the law as it presently exists, so the solution proposed by Michal Gal, Professor and Director of the Forum on Law and Markets at the University of Haifa, is out of reach. In her 2018 paper, “Algorithms as Illegal Agreements,” Professor Gal confronts the agreement problem when algorithms set prices and concludes that it is time to “rethink our laws and focus on reducing harms to social welfare rather than on what constitutes an agreement.” Academics have been critical of the agreement element of Section 1 for years, but it is unlikely to change anytime soon, even with the added inconvenience it poses where competitors rely on a common vendor of machine-generated pricing recommendations.

Nonetheless, there is some evidence that autonomous machines, just like humans, can learn that collusion allows sellers to charge monopoly prices. In their December 2019 paper, “Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion,” Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolo, and Sergio Pastorello at the Department of Economics at the University of Bologna showed with computer simulations that machines autonomously analyzing prices can develop collusive strategies “from scratch, engaging in active experimentation and adapting to changing environments.” The authors say indications from their models “suggest that algorithmic collusion is more than a remote theoretical possibility.” They find that “relatively simple [machine learning] pricing algorithms systematically learn to play collusive strategies.” The authors claim to be the first to “clearly document the emergence of collusive strategies among autonomous pricing agents.”

THE AGREEMENT ELEMENT IN THE MACHINE PRICING CASE

For three main reasons, the element of agreement need not be an obstacle to successfully prosecuting a price-fixing claim against competitors that use a common or similar vendor of algorithmic pricing data and software.

First, there is significant precedent for inferring the existence of an agreement among parties that knowingly participate in a collusive arrangement even if they do not directly interact, sometimes imprecisely referred to as a “rimless wheel hub-and-spoke” conspiracy. For example, in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2000), the court inferred the necessary concerted action from a series of individual agreements between toy manufacturers and Toys “R” Us in which the manufacturers promised not to sell the toys sold to Toys “R” Us and other toy stores to big box stores in the same packaging. The FTC found that each of the manufacturers entered into the restraint on the condition that the others also did so. The court found that Toys “R” Us had engineered a horizontal boycott against a competitor in violation of Section 1, despite the absence of evidence of any “privity” between the boycotting manufacturers.

The Toys “R” Us case relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), in which movie theater chains sent an identical letter to eight movie studios asking them to restrict secondary runs of certain films. The letter disclosed that each of the eight were receiving the same letter. The Court held that a direct agreement was not a prerequisite for an unlawful conspiracy. “It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it.”

The analogous issue in the algorithmic pricing scenario is whether the vendor’s end users that their competitors are also end users. If so, the inquiry can consider the agreement element satisfied if the algorithm does, in fact, jointly maximize the end users’ profits.

The second factor overcoming the agreement element is related to the first. Whether software that recommends prices has interacted with the prices set by competitors to achieve joint profit maximization—that is, whether the machines have learned to collude without human intervention—is an empirical question. The same techniques used to uncover machine-learned collusion by simulation can be used to determine the extent of interdependence in historical price setting. If statistical evidence of collusive pricing is available, it is enough that the end users knowingly accepted the offer to set its prices guided by the algorithm. The economics underlying the agreement element in the first place lies in prohibition of joint rather than individual profit maximization, so direct evidence that market participants are jointly profit maximizing should obviate the need for further evidence of agreement.

A third reason the agreement element need not stymie a Section 1 action against defendants engaged in algorithmic pricing is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). In that case the Court made clear that arrangements that remove independent centers of decision-making from the market run afoul of Section 1, if the net effect of the algorithm is to displace individual decision-making with decisions outsourced to a centralized pricing agent, the mechanism should be immaterial.

The rimless wheel of the so-called hub-and-spoke conspiracy is an inadequate analogy because the wheel in these cases does have a rim, i.e., a connection between the conspirators. In the scenarios above in which the courts have found Section 1 liability i) each of the participants knew that its rivals were also entering into the same or similar arrangements, ii) the participants devolved pricing authority away from themselves down to an algorithmic pricing agent, and iii) historical prices could be shown statistically to have exceeded the competitive level in a way consistent with collusive pricing. These elements connect the participants in the scheme, supplying the “rim” to the spokes of the wheel. If the plaintiffs in the RealPage litigation can establish these elements, they will have met their burden of establishing the requisite element of agreement in their Section 1 claim.

FTC to Send Nearly $100 Million in Refunds in Vonage Settlement

On October 30, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission announced that it is sending nearly $100 million in refunds to consumers who were harmed as a result of internet phone service provider Vonage’s alleged use of dark patterns and other obstacles that made it difficult for users to cancel their service.

In its November 2022 complaint against Vonage, the FTC alleged that Vonage made its cancellation process more difficult to navigate than its enrollment process. In particular, Vonage allegedly restricted users to a single method of cancellation, charged unexpected early termination fees, continued to charge users after they canceled, and issued only partial refunds for overbilled amounts. Vonage and the FTC subsequently reached a settlement where Vonage agreed to pay $100 million in refunds to consumers harmed by the company’s actions, implement a simple and transparent cancellation process, and stop charging consumers without their consent.

The FTC is now in the process of sending payments to 389,106 consumers. Eligible consumers will receive refunds by check or PayPal.

 

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For more news on Federal Trade Commission Refunds, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.