Category: Antitrust & Trade Regulation

DOJ, FTC, DOL, and NLRB Join Forces and Announce Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Issues in Merger Investigations

On August 28, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, which enforces the US antitrust laws including the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which enforces the Federal Trade Commission Act and other laws and regulations prohibiting unfair methods of competition (together, Antitrust Agencies), along with the US Department of Labor (DOL) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (together, Labor Agencies), announced that they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Issues in Merger Investigations (MOU).
The MOU took effect on August 28 and expires in five years, unless it is extended or terminated upon written agreement of each of the agencies.

Purpose of the MOU

The MOU outlines a collaborative initiative between the signatory agencies to assist the Antitrust Agencies with labor issues that may arise during the course of antitrust merger and acquisition (M&A) investigations, commenced under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR). The HSR requires that parties to certain large M&As provide information to the Antitrust Agencies prior to the transaction’s consummation, which allows these agencies to analyze the anticipated transaction(s) and provide greater certainty to the parties regarding potential antitrust concerns.

From a labor perspective, these investigations may aim to evaluate whether the effect of a merger or acquisition could substantially lessen competition for labor. The stated goal of this MOU is to protect employees and promote fair competition in labor markets. Specifically, the MOU outlines methods by which the Labor Agencies may aid or advise the Antitrust Agencies on potential labor issues identified during the course of these evaluations. These methods include the following.

1. Labor Information Sharing

The MOU outlines various ways in which the Antitrust Agencies may work with the Labor Agencies to gather information used to evaluate potential impacts of M&As on labor markets. These include:

  1. Soliciting information from relevant worker stakeholders and organizations.
  2. Seeking the production of information and data with respect to labor markets.
  3. Searching publicly available sources of information made available by the Labor Agencies.
  4. Seeking production of non-public information and data related to labor markets from the Labor Agencies.

2. Providing Training and Technical Assistance

Labor Agencies agree to provide technical assistance and training to personnel from the Antitrust Agencies related to subject matter under their jurisdictions. For example, the NLRB will train personnel from Antitrust Agencies on labor-related issues such as the duty to bargain in good faith, successor bargaining obligations, and unfair labor practices. Additionally, the Antitrust Agencies may seek technical assistance on labor and employment law matters in merger reviews, including in the resolution of labor market merger investigations.

3. Collaborative Meetings

The Labor Agencies and Antitrust Agencies will seek to meeting biannually to discuss the implementation and coordination of activities outlined in the MOU.

This MOU expands upon collaborative efforts amongst the agencies and builds upon several MOUs executed in 2022 and 2023. MOUs between the DOJ and DOL, DOJ and NLRB, DOL and FTC, and FTC and NLRB all indicate that the purpose and scope of the agreements are to “strengthen the Agencies’ partnership through greater coordination in information sharing, coordinated investigations and enforcement activity, training, education, and outreach.”

Takeaways

This multi-agency agreement further emphasizes the current administration’s focus on protecting employees from alleged unfair methods of competition. This MOU is further evidence that antitrust regulators are looking at antitrust enforcement from a new perspective. Traditionally, Antitrust Agencies evaluated proposed M&As to identify potential risks of harm to consumers through the reduction of options or increased prices. Now, Antitrust Agencies appear to have turned their focus towards anticompetitive behaviors that may harm employees.

Employers interested or involved in an M&A deal should conduct thorough internal reviews to ensure compliance with both labor-related and fair competition laws. In the event of a review by the DOJ or FTC, employers should partner with experienced labor and employment lawyers to navigate through these investigations.

© 2024 ArentFox Schiff LLP
For more on Merger Investigations, visit the NLR Mergers Acquisitions section

FTC Releases Controversial Interim Staff Report on PBMs’ Purported Impact on Drug Prices

At an Open Commission Meeting on August 1, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) presented a report prepared by its staff entitled Pharmacy Benefit Managers: The Powerful Middlemen Inflating Drug Costs and Squeezing Main Street Pharmacies.

Although characterized as “interim,” the report posits the following observations about pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs):

  • “PBMs have gained significant power over prescription drug access and prices through increased concentration and vertical integration.”
  • “Increased concentration and vertical integration may have enabled PBMs to lessen competition, disadvantage rivals, and inflate drug costs.”
  • “The largest PBMs’ outsized bargaining leverage may operate to the disadvantage of smaller unaffiliated pharmacies.”
  • “PBM and brand drug manufacturer rebate contracts may impair or block less expensive competing products, including generic and biosimilar drugs.”
  • “PBMs lead to higher prices” (a conclusion based on only two case studies).

Commissioner Melissa Holyoak, in dissenting from the release of the report, stated that “the Report was plagued by process irregularities and concerns over the substance—or lack thereof—of the original order. In fact, the politicized nature of the process appears to have led to the departure of at least one senior leader at the Commission.” Commissioner Holyoak added that “[e]ven if the Report’s assertions of increasing concentration are accurate, increased concentration ‘does not prove that competition in that market has declined.’ Though the Report baldly asserts that PBMs ‘have gained significant power over prescription drug access and prices,’ the Report does not present empirical evidence that demonstrates PBMs have market power—i.e., ‘the ability to raise price profitably by restricting output.”’

Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson, although concurring in the release of the report, was likewise critical of the process and its findings. In particular, Commissioner Ferguson found the report to be “especially unusual” in that it “relies, throughout, in large part on public information that was not collected from the PBMs or their affiliates during the 6(b) process.” Furthermore, Commissioner Ferguson was critical of the finding, based on only two case-study drugs, that PBMs lead to higher prices and pleaded with the FTC “to determine whether these findings are representative of market dynamics for other drugs.” He added that “[w]e need to understand whether any anticompetitive or unfair or deceptive acts or practices on the part of PBMs or any other market participants are contributing to these prices.”

©2024 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more on PBMs, visit the NLR Biotech Food Drug section

Be Careful What You Write: What a Heavily Redacted Antitrust Complaint Teaches Us About Creating Problematic Documents in Transactions

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to stop Tempur Sealy’s proposed acquisition of Mattress Firm. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc. and Mattress Firm Group Inc., Case No. 4:24-cv-02508 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 2, 2024). On the same day, the FTC also commenced an administrative proceeding in its own court to block the transaction. See In re Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc. and Mattress Firm Group Inc., Docket No. 9433 (FTC Jul. 2, 2024). According to the complaints, Tempur Sealy is the world’s largest mattress supplier and Mattress Firm is the largest mattress retailer in the United States. Vertical mergers between manufacturers and retailers can often produce procompetitive benefits, but this transaction struck the FTC as anticompetitive. The FTC’s principal concern appears to be that Tempur Sealy would shut off its rivals’ access to Mattress Firm.

Supporting the FTC’s decision to sue, Federal Trade Commissioner Melissa Holyoak said, “Despite the increased likelihood of procompetitive effects from vertical mergers, they may still result in harm in some circumstances. Consistent with these well-established economic principles, I vote in favor of filing this complaint based upon the substantial evidence generated by staff’s thorough investigation, especially the parties’ own ordinary-course documents. I have reason to believe that the effect of Tempur Sealy’s acquisition of Mattress Firm ‘may be to substantially lessen competition.’” (Emphasis added).

What exactly was in these ordinary course documents that caused Holyoak to believe this merger violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act? The short answer is we don’t know. The complaints, which extensively quote some documents, are heavily redacted and the documents themselves, even in redacted form, are not attached to the complaints. Nor would we expect the documents to be attached, as they likely contain competitively sensitive information that ordinarily would not be on the public record. Rather than speculate about the documents themselves, let’s use the allegations in the FTC’s complaints as a tool to remind ourselves how documents are used in antitrust investigations and how lawyers and clients can work together to reduce the likelihood that potentially problematic documents are created.

  1. What’s an “ordinary course” document? As the name suggests, an ordinary course document is one that is created by the parties in the course of their ordinary business activities. It may be a routinely issued report, an email or text exchange by two employees, Slack messages, a slide deck, board minutes or any other form of written communication. Antitrust regulators routinely use these documents to gain insight into how the parties see themselves in relation to the competition, the rationale for a transaction, and how the parties view the likely competitive effects of a transaction. Often regulators will place more emphasis on communications from senior leadership in a corporation as those individuals may have greater knowledge of the transaction and have more authority to “speak” for an entity than lower-level employees. Regulators will use these documents not only to support their own theories and claims, but also to contradict the parties’ advocacy about the procompetitive aspects of a deal.
  2. How does the government obtain these ordinary course documents? In the case of the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction and other high dollar value transactions, the parties were required to file Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification forms. When an HSR filing is required, the parties must produce documents that discuss the transaction in relation to certain specific topics, such as competition, competitors, markets, and market shares. These documents are usually not ordinary course documents as they were created specifically for the deal but are nevertheless critical in the regulators’ review of potential competitive issues. Documents routinely produced in the HSR process, such as Confidential Information Memoranda (CIM) and Management Presentations, may contain statements that could create potential antitrust concerns. Clients should recognize that even the smallest of things in a CIM or Management Presentation have the potential to create big problems, as government regulators will read every page of what is submitted to them. For example, assume that an HSR filing contains a 100-page deck intended to serve as a Management Presentation, and one page of that deck contains a sentence that says: “We [seller] are the dominant player in our industry and we face minimal competition.” The rest of the deck might be completely innocuous, but depending on the circumstances, that one sentence has the potential to ignite regulators’ interest.Some transactions, such as Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm, undergo a Second Request process after HSR is filed. A Second Request is an extensive subpoena requesting documents and data from the parties that goes far beyond the HSR process. The Second Request process is what likely turned up the “ordinary course” documents mentioned in Holyoak’s statement. This included text messages. See, e.g., Paragraph 108 of the federal complaint and Paragraph 99 of the administrative complaint. Judging from the amount of redacted material referenced in the complaints, the FTC appears to believe there are many documents that portray this transaction in an anticompetitive light.

    Clients should also be aware that the government’s authority to review and investigate transactions is not limited to only those transactions that require HSR filings; the government’s authority extends to any transaction that impacts competition in the United States. In addition to HSR filings, the government learns about deals through a variety of sources, such as press reports and third party complaints from customers or competitors. Accordingly, our views about document creation extend to all transactions, not just those requiring HSR premerger notification.

  3. Document creation in transactions is a team sport. That means lawyers and clients should work together as a team to minimize the creation of potentially harmful documents. The team should also include investment bankers and other advisors who are generating documents that analyze the transaction. In ideal circumstances, clients will involve experienced antitrust lawyers early on to understand: 1) whether the transaction potentially raises substantive antitrust concerns, such as when two direct competitors combine; 2) if the transaction will require HSR notification; and 3) whether or not HSR is required, what are the guardrails or best practices the client should observe. Recognizing that we don’t always operate in ideal circumstances and lawyers may only become involved after certain documents are created, lawyers should nevertheless remain vigilant about documents from the time they become involved in a deal. Coaching clients and their advisors about document creation best practices is always critically important.
  4. What are some best practices? Lawyers should proactively educate their clients on what to say (or not say) about the transaction and which words or phrases may be particularly susceptible to raising potential antitrust concerns. For example, words like “dominate” and “control” in relation to competition and competitors may create problems, as could market share statistics that overstate a seller’s prominence in a particular industry. Lawyers should also review drafts of documents such as CIMs, Management Presentations, and teasers to ensure that they are free of harmful verbiage.
  5. Expect statements to be misunderstood or taken out of context: Reading the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm complaints, two things are clear: 1) the government relied on portions of documents to support its allegations; and 2) the context of many of the quoted statements is unknown. It may be the case that some of the statements the FTC found important become less important when the entire document is reviewed and the context of the statement is made clear. Relatedly, there may be other documents not referenced in the complaints that indicate the transaction has procompetitive benefits. Allegations in a complaint are just that – allegations – and the evidence that emerges as the case progresses may or may not support those allegations. That being said, parties are wise to follow the best practices above. Similarly, they are also wise to avoid making exaggerated statements or statements intended to be humorous. These statements may be misunderstood by government regulators who do not know the specific industry or its players as well as clients do.
  6. Follow the general principle of “less is more” when it comes to document creation. Many transactions seem to move at lightning speed, but a moment of self-reflection can be very valuable. Ask yourself: do I need to write this, and if I do, what’s the best way to say it? Some organizations are more document-intensive than others, and there may be other reasons, unrelated to antitrust considerations, that require certain documentation. But in general, more documents are probably created than are truly necessary and more documents create the potential for more problems. Regardless, the key is to remember emails, texts, Slack messages, and slide decks may be read not only by their intended recipients but also by government antitrust regulators.
Copyright ©2024 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
For more news on Antitrust Complaints, visit the NLR Antitrust Trade & Regulation section.

What is Market Manipulation?

The financial market is supposed to be a place where investors put their hard-earned money to work. Market manipulation disrupts the playing field, undermining the integrity of financial systems and causing a great deal of harm to investors. Between 2020 and 2022, the United States recovered $2.7 billion from market manipulation incidents.

What Does Market Manipulation Mean?

The stock market thrives on constant movement as part of a healthy financial ecosystem. However, when someone artificially exploits the supply and demand for securities, the stock market sees a shift in the pricing and value of certain stocks. Market manipulation is an attempt to take advantage of those shifts with insider information, or create false ups and downs to turn a profit. A simple example might be spreading misinformation about a stock in order to cause its price to rise or fall.

How Market Manipulation Works

Market manipulation disrupts the natural flow of supply and demand in a security. For example, a person may attempt to manipulate the stock market in their favor by engaging in a series of transactions designed to make it look like there is a flurry of activity around their stock. This illusion prompts others to buy into such stock, convinced that the company is on the rise because of this artificial energy. This way, the person who began the market manipulation ends up in a better position.

Who Manipulates Stocks?

The stock market is manipulated by any number of bad actors. Investors, company leadership, and anyone who buys and sells securities may attempt to partake in market manipulation.

Why is Market Manipulation Illegal?

If the stock market naturally ebbs and flows, and people are always seeking to profit from it, why is market manipulation illegal?

The answer lies in the importance of honest trading practices and consumer trust. Market manipulation is a method of misleading investors, usually by spreading false information or artificially adjusting prices. Just as you should not sell someone a house by claiming that it has six stories when it is really a shack, similarly you should not manipulate security prices to scam investors.

Who Investigates Market Manipulation?

The US Department of Justice’s Market Integrity and Major Frauds Division (MIMF) investigates claims of securities fraud and market manipulation. The MIMF Division prosecutors can bring criminal charges as well as civil claims for damages against those accused of market manipulation. They utilize data analysis tools and traditional law enforcement techniques to identify and prosecute instances of securities fraud, manipulation, spoofing, insider trading, and more.

How Big Players Manipulate the Stock Market

While more smaller and highly liquid stocks or widely traded securities, are most susceptible to market manipulation, major players can influence the stock market in significant ways. Large financial institutions like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley have a massive hold on how the overall market moves. The 2008 financial crisis is a reminder of how securitization and risky trading of mortgage-backed securities played such a role and led to a ripple effect throughout the market.

Market Manipulation Examples

Stock market manipulation is only limited by the bounds of human ingenuity. Unfortunately, there are a number of ways scam artists attempt to manipulate the market. We have outlined common market manipulation schemes that have emerged over the years:

CRYPTOCURRENCY MARKET MANIPULATION

Although cryptocurrency is less regulated than other investments, it can still be subject to market manipulation. The legal classification of crypto assets as securities is still debatable. However, an August 2023 ruling in Manhattan federal court stated that all cryptocurrencies should be considered securities, regardless of the context in which they are sold. The SEC guidelines on the subject, meanwhile, have hinged on whether or not the particular blockchain is sufficiently decentralized.

The ICO, or Initial Coin Offering, is usually the area where cryptocurrency market manipulation occurs. Crypto is particularly vulnerable to the spread of misinformation on social media, the use of celebrities to artificially inflate an ICO’s value, and pump-and-dump schemes.

HEDGE FUNDS MARKET MANIPULATION

The 2021 GameStop scenario highlighted the upper hand hedge funds often have in the market. In this case, a group of individuals met online and attempted to manipulate the market. Retail investors on Reddit collectively purchased the stock in large quantities after being concerned about the alleged short selling by hedge funds that could devalue GameStop. This surge in buying pressure forced hedge funds to buy back their shares for more money to cover their short sales. However, in the long run, many hedge fund managers profited from the massively increased prices.

FUTURES MARKET MANIPULATION

Attempting to create monopoly power, or “cornering the market” is the primary method of futures market manipulation. This strategy involves a major player artificially creating scarcity in the market by buying up available assets, along with a large stake in a futures contract for delivery at a later date. This is followed by the player refusing to sell at anything except their own price, creating a squeeze on investors who need to buy contracts to fulfill their delivery obligations. Because the futures market hinges upon upcoming deliverables, it forces short sellers to buy contracts at inflated prices from the dominant player.

CROSS-MARKET MANIPULATION

Cross-market manipulation has become more prevalent in recent years, as technology allows trades to happen in real-time and with a higher frequency. Cross-market manipulation is the effort to trade in one venue with the goal of affecting the price of the same security or financial instrument in another market. Cross-market manipulation is also known as inter-trading venue manipulation.

CHURNING MARKET MANIPULATION

Churning is an illegal practice designed to create the illusion of activity and generate commission fees. It involves an excessive amount of trading in a brokerage account solely to generate commissions for the broker from each sale, and not for the client’s benefit.

WHAT IS SPOOFING MARKET MANIPULATION?

Order spoofing, or spoofing, is a method of market manipulation designed to generate interest in a security. One or more players place multiple buy or sell orders on a stock to adjust its price, only to cancel them once other traders accordingly adjust their activities. Thus, the bids are “spoofs,” and therefore, never meant to be followed through.

WHAT IS COORDINATED PRICE MANIPULATION IN THE STOCK MARKET?

Coordinated price manipulation involves agreements between competitors to artificially inflate or deflate stock market prices. For instance, short selling, while legal on its own as a strategy, can cross the line into market manipulation by generating fear around securities to unnaturally lower its price.

WHAT IS LAYERING MARKET MANIPULATION?

Layering is a form of spoofing that involves placing a series of orders designed to be eventually canceled. However, in layering market manipulation efforts, the bids are all placed at different price points, setting the market price somewhere in the middle of the fake trades. This way, the manipulator achieves a better understanding of the market price based on their fake activity, and can trade on the other side of the market to turn in a profit while canceling extraneous offers.

FRONT-RUNNING MARKET MANIPULATION

Front running is often done by an individual broker who has insider information about a future development that will impact stock price. For example, a broker who is ordered to sell a large amount of stock instead goes to their own account before executing the trade and dumps their stock in the same company, now knowing the market price is predicted to plummet. Here, the broker has “run out in front” of natural market fluctuations to illegally sell their stock.

SHORT SELLING MARKET MANIPULATION

Short selling can become market manipulation in the event of cross-market manipulation or coordinated price manipulation.

Naked short selling is the illegal practice of selling shares in an asset before acquiring them, or ensuring that they can in fact be purchased or acquired. The goal here is the same as in usual shorting; however, in short selling, shares must be borrowed before they can be offered to other investors.

PUMP-AND-DUMP SCHEMES

Pump-and-dump schemes typically involve spreading misinformation about a stock in order to “pump up” a frenzy of orders and investments. The perpetrators then “dump” their stocks at the new and artificially inflated price point. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) warns that microcap securities are particularly vulnerable to pump-and-dump schemes because of limited publicly available information.

How Do You Tell if a Stock is Being Manipulated?

Opportunities for market manipulation have become more widespread with mobile trading apps, AI algorithms and bot activity enabling trading to happen in the blink of an eye from anywhere. Traders must examine stock market activity more thoroughly, keeping an eye out for possible warning signs of market manipulation:

  • Unlikely performance compared to company indexes: The stock market cannot tell the full picture of a company’s well-being. It is better to compare market prices against other metrics like revenue, growth potential, and capitalization. When a company’s stock prices remain low even as other signs point to growth, it may be a sign that artificial market activity is at play.
  • Fake news on social media: The spread of bot-led accounts designed to appear like genuine human activity on social media points toward the potential for misinformation. False information often plays a key role in market manipulation and price-adjusting efforts.
  • Flurries of activity: Churning, spoofing, and layering all involve sudden onsets of orders not related to genuine developments. A sudden rush can indicate that a stock is being manipulated. Likewise, a large volume of activity without matching price action can be a warning sign of wash trading.

How Do You Stop Market Manipulation?

Here are some tips to protect yourself from stock market manipulators:

  • Understand your risk appetite and ensure you have an exit strategy for your investments
  • Verify claims that seem too good to be true
  • Avoid excessively large bids or “limited time offers”
  • Review your account activity on a regular basis and report any suspicious activity in your account

SEC MARKET MANIPULATION

The SEC runs the Office of the Whistleblower, which allows whistleblowers to come forward to anonymously report market manipulation. The SEC Office of the Whistleblower has awarded over $1 billion to whistleblowers who have shared information leading to a recovery after a stock market manipulation scheme.

CFTC MARKET MANIPULATION

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) relies heavily on tips and whistleblower information to ensure fair trading practices in the commodity and futures markets. The CFTC Whistleblower Program offers rewards for information as well as protection against retaliation.

How Do You Prove Market Manipulation?

A whistleblower attorney can be your strongest ally to help you gather proof of market manipulation, including:

  • Proof of intent to defraud: Emails, text messages, social media posts, and sworn testimonies to private conversations
  • Refutation of legitimate business purposes: Internal memos, monthly reports, notes from meetings, staff emails, etc. to show that the suspicious activity was not in pursuit of legitimate business purposes
  • Records of trades, monthly account statements, canceled checks, wire transfers, stock transfers, and more: All of these documents can help present a bigger financial picture to illustrate the motive to manipulate market prices

What Are the Consequences of Market Manipulation?

Market manipulation undermines fair and stable markets, and erodes investors’ trust in financial systems. When investors fear manipulation, they may become less confident and willing to invest in diverse portfolios. Market manipulation also creates an uneven playing field, hurting fair competition when scam artists profit at the expense of investors who may lose savings and watch their assets dissolve.

Rewards for Reporting Market Manipulation

You may qualify as a protected whistleblower under the following statutes:

How Are Whistleblowers Protected After Reporting Market Manipulation?

Whistleblowers can anonymously report suspected market manipulation through the SEC Whistleblower Program and have their identity redacted even from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Whistleblowers who have been retaliated against by their employers can sue for the following actions:

  • Reinstatement to former seniority level
  • Payment of double back pay, with interest
  • Payment of front pay, in cases where reinstatement is not possible
  • Attorney fees and legal costs
  • Additional damages

Biggest Market Manipulation Cases

New market manipulation cases are constantly coming to light, as whistleblowers step forward to reveal wrongdoings in the stock market. Some of the biggest market manipulation settlements include:

  • $1.186 billion against Glencore International AG: The CFTC ordered Glencore to pay $1.186 billion to settle accusations that the energy and commodities trading firm strategically manipulated at least four US-based S&P Global Platts physical oil benchmarks from 2007 to 2018.
  • $920 million from JP Morgan for spoofing: The 2020 settlement ordered JP Morgan Chase to pay $920.2 million to settle allegations of at least eight years of spoofing in precious metals and US Treasury futures contracts.
  • $249 million from Morgan Stanley and former executive Pawan Passi: In 2024, the SEC charged Morgan Stanley and its former executive Pawan Passi for executing block trades and acting on insider information. The firm agreed to pay $249 million to settle allegations of multi-year wrongdoing.

What is the SEC Doing about Market Manipulation?

The SEC relies on tips from whistleblowers to take out insider trading rings, spoofing attempts, pump-and-dump schemes, and other kinds of market manipulation attempts. If you have information about such tactics, you may be able to take part in the SEC Whistleblower Program. A whistleblower lawyer with Tycko & Zavareei LLP can help make sure your claim is as strong as possible before you bring it to the SEC. Remember, information once reported is no longer eligible for a reward.

Market Manipulation: FAQs

IS MARKET MANIPULATION ILLEGAL?

Yes. While everyone wants to “get ahead” on the stock market, manipulating the market is an illegal activity that can result in criminal penalties like jail time, as well as the imposition of civil fines and damages.

WHAT IS A REAL-LIFE EXAMPLE OF MARKET MANIPULATION?

One of the most notorious examples of market manipulation is the 2001 Enron scandal. When the energy company was found to have altered and misrepresented financial statements to inflate its stock price, it went bankrupt and multiple executives were indicted for the fraud.

WHO DOES MARKET MANIPULATION HURT?

Market manipulation hurts investors who lose money on investments that are either illegitimate or inaccurately represented. At the same time, its negative impact may also be felt throughout the economy, the 2008-2009 Great Recession being a case in point.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARKET ABUSE AND MARKET MANIPULATION?

Market manipulation is a specific tactic within the larger issue of market abuse. Market manipulation focuses on artificially controlling prices to secure unearned profit, whereas market abuse encompasses various schemes with the aim of disadvantaging investors for personal gain.

© 2024 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more news on Market Manipulation, visit the NLR Criminal Law & Business Crimes section.

It Takes More than an Algorithm to Prove an Agreement: An Analysis of Gibson v. Cendyn Group

On May 8, 2024, Chief Judge Miranda Du of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice the complaint in Gibson v. Cendyn Group, LLC, Docket No. 2:23-cv-00140-MMD-DJA, an antitrust case alleging that hotel operators on the Las Vegas Strip used algorithms to inflate room prices in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act. The court’s reasoning provides litigants on both sides with a framework for future cases.

Plaintiffs claimed that Caesars Entertainment, Inc., Treasure Island, LLC, and Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC (hereinafter, the “Hotel Operators”) charged supercompetitive prices for rooms through GuestRev (individual rooms) and GroupRev (rooms for groups), which are shared-revenue management systems licensed by the Cendyn Group. Cendyn allegedly spearheaded a hub-and-spoke conspiracy[1] through an algorithm that used price and occupancy data to recommend room rates. The algorithm’s “optimal” rate was visible to individual hotel operators, who were discouraged by system prompts from overriding the recommendation. To establish anticompetitive effects in the relevant market, the plaintiffs relied on third-party economic analyses of revenue and price trends as well as circumstantial evidence known as “plus factors”—e.g., the motive and opportunity to conspire, market structure, the interchangeability of hotel rooms, and inelastic demand.

Before the court entered judgment in favor of defendants, Judge Du closely scrutinized plaintiffs’ claims. In an October 23, 2023 order dismissing plaintiff’s original complaint with leave to amend, the court asked plaintiffs to address: (i) when the conspiracy began and who participated; (ii) whether the Hotel Operators colluded to adopt a shared set of pricing algorithms; (iii) whether the Hotel Operators must accept the price recommendations; and (iv) whether the algorithm facilitated the exchange of non-public information.[2]

In its 2024 decision, the court ruled that plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to meet these threshold requirements. First, the court disagreed with plaintiffs’ contention that the initial timing of the conspiracy was irrelevant because the Hotel Operators renewed their licensing agreements every year. Because defendants started using Cendyn’s technology at various points in time over a 10-year period, there was “no existing agreement to fix prices that a late-arriving spoke could join” and “a tacit agreement among [the Hotel Operators] was implausible.”[3]

Nor did plaintiffs allege that the Hotel Operators “agreed to be bound by [Cendyn’s] recommendations, much less that they all agreed to charge the same prices.”[4] To the contrary, plaintiffs maintained that Cendyn had difficulty getting customers to accept the recommendations. Even drawing all inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, the court determined that the Hotel Operators were independently reacting to similar pressures within an interdependent market, consistent with lawful conscious parallelism.

Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the Hotel Operators used Cendyn to exchange confidential information or, in the alternative, that Cendyn used machine learning and algorithms to facilitate the exchange of confidential information. The court reasoned that without more evidence, “using data across all your customers for research does not plausibly suggest that one customer has access to the confidential information of another customer—it instead plausibly suggests that Cendyn uses data from various customers to improve its products.”[5] The Cendyn dismissal will not be the last word on the “relatively novel antitrust theory premised on algorithmic pricing.”[6] Pricing algorithms are the focus of three class action lawsuits pending in different jurisdictions.[7] As algorithms become a mainstream tool for pricing, more are certain to follow.

[1] A hub-and-spoke antitrust conspiracy consists of (i) a leading party (“the hub”); (ii) co-conspirators (“the spokes”); and (iii) connecting agreements (“the rim”).

[2] See generally Order, Gibson v. Cendyn Group, Inc., 2:23-cv-00140-MMD-DJA (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2023).

[3] Order, Gibson v. Cendyn Group, Inc., 2:23-cv-00140-MMD-DJA at 4 (D. Nev. May 8, 2024).

[4] Id. at 6.

[5] Id. at 10.

[6] Id. at 5.

[7] See Cornish-Adebiyi v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., 1:23-cv-02536-KMW-EAP (D. N.J. filed Mar. 28, 2024); Duffy v. Yardi Sys. Inc., 2:23-cv-01391-RSL (W.D. Wash. filed on Mar. 1, 2024); In re: RealPage, Rental Software Antitrust Litig., 3:23-md-03071 (M.D. Tenn. filed on Nov. 15, 2023).

Copyright © 2024 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.
For more news on Algorithmic Price Inflation Lawsuits, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation.

China’s Supreme People’s Court Releases Two Recent Patent-Related Typical Anti-Monopoly Cases

On June 24, 2024, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) released five recent typical anti-monopoly cases, two of which relate to patents. The SPC stated that the cases were released so that Courts can “correctly apply the revised Anti-Monopoly Law and accurately understand the new judicial interpretation of anti-monopoly civil litigation issued today, fairly and efficiently hear monopoly cases, ensure the correct implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and maintain fair competition in the market.”

Explanations from the SPC regarding the two cases follows:

Case No.:【案号】（2020）最高法知民终1140号

[Basic facts of the case] Yang XX Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as Yang) are the manufacturers of the anti-allergic drug desloratadine citrate tablets with the trade name “Beixue.” Hefei Yi XX Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. owns the relevant patents for desloratadine citrate. The company and its subsidiaries and affiliated companies (collectively referred to as Yi) are the only suppliers of the desloratadine citrate API required for the production of “Beixue”. In addition to producing desloratadine citrate API, Yi also produces desloratadine citrate hard capsules. Yi and Yang are both the supply and demand parties of the desloratadine citrate API involved in the case, and are also competitors in desloratadine citrate preparations. Yang believed that Yi used its dominant position in the market of desloratadine citrate API to restrict Yang to only purchase the API involved in the case from it, significantly raised the price of the API involved in the case, and threatened to stop supplying the API involved in the case to force Yang to accept other commercial arrangements unrelated to the API transaction involved, causing huge losses to Yang and therefore constituting an abuse of market dominance. Yang requested that Yi stop abusing its market dominance and compensate Yang for losses and reasonable expenses of 100 million RMB. The court of first instance found that Yi had abused its market dominance by restricting transactions, setting unfair high prices, and attaching unreasonable transaction conditions, and ordered it to immediately stop the above-mentioned behaviors and compensate Yang more than 68 million RMB. Both parties were dissatisfied and appealed to the Supreme People’s Court.

The Supreme People’s Court held in the second instance that Yi has a dominant market position in the desloratadine citrate API market in China, but its dominant market position has been weakened to a certain extent due to the strong indirect competition constraints from the downstream second-generation antihistamine preparation market. Based on the existing evidence, it is difficult to determine that it has abused its dominant market position. First, desloratadine citrate falls within the scope of protection of Yi’s patent rights. The time and scope of Yi’s restriction that Yang can only purchase the patented API involved in the case from it do not exceed the scope of the legitimate exercise of patent rights, and the resulting market blocking effect does not exceed the statutory exclusive scope of patent rights, so it does not constitute a restricted transaction behavior that abuses the dominant market position. Second, considering the internal rate of return after the price increase and the matching degree of price and economic value, it is more likely that the initial price of the patented API involved in the case is a promotional price, and the subsequent large price increase is likely to be a reasonable adjustment from the promotional price to the normal price. The fact that the price increase is significantly higher than the cost increase is not enough to determine that there is an unfair high-price behavior that abuses the dominant market position. Third, the existing evidence is insufficient to prove that Yi has explicitly or implicitly bundled the sales of the patented API involved in the case with unrelated products, so it is difficult to determine that there is an act of attaching unreasonable transaction conditions. Therefore, the judgment was revoked and the first-instance judgment was changed to dismiss Yang’s lawsuit request.

[Typical Significance] This case is the first monopoly civil lawsuit in China involving raw material pharmaceuticals. The judgment clarified the consideration of indirect competition constraints from the downstream market when judging the market dominance of intermediate input operators, the relationship between the market blocking effect of limited trading behavior and the statutory exclusive scope of patent rights, and the basic ideas and specific methods for judging unfair high prices. It has positive significance for promoting the accurate application of the Anti-Monopoly Law and effectively maintaining fair competition in the pharmaceutical market.

【案号】（2021）最高法知民终1482号

[Basic facts of the case] Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. is an enterprise engaged in the production of sintered NdFeB materials in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. A Japanese metal company has more than 600 sintered NdFeB patents in the field of rare earth materials worldwide. After licensing eight companies in China to implement its patented technology, it decided not to add new licensees. From March 2014 to March 2015, Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. repeatedly requested a license from the Japanese metal company but was rejected. Therefore, it filed a lawsuit in December 2014, requesting that the Japanese metal company stop the abuse of market dominance such as refusal to trade and compensate Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. for economic losses of 7 million RMB. The court of first instance determined that the Japanese metal company had a dominant position in the patent licensing market for essential patents for sintered NdFeB and that its refusal to trade had no legitimate reason. Therefore, it ordered the Japanese metal company to stop abusing its market dominance by refusing to trade and compensate Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. for economic losses of 4.9 million RMB. The Japanese metal company was dissatisfied with the decision and filed an appeal.

The Supreme People’s Court held in the second instance that the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove that the sintered NdFeB patent of a Japanese metal company was irreplaceable, nor was it sufficient to prove that there was an independent licensing market for patents necessary for the production of sintered NdFeB. Therefore, it was difficult to determine that the relevant market in this case was the patent licensing market for patents necessary for the production of sintered NdFeB owned by the Japanese metal company. In this case, based on the demand substitution of sintered NdFeB material production technology, the relevant market in this case should be defined as the global sintered NdFeB material production technology market, including patented technologies and non-patented technologies with close substitution. Given that sintered NdFeB material production technology is used to produce sintered NdFeB materials, and the market share of sintered NdFeB materials (products) and other conditions can more accurately and conveniently reflect the market conditions of sintered NdFeB production technology, the market power of the technology owner in the relevant market involved in the case can be evaluated through the market share of the sintered NdFeB material market. Taking into account the evidence in the case, the Japanese metal company does not have a dominant position in the global sintered NdFeB material production technology market. Therefore, the court ruled to revoke the first-instance judgment and dismiss the lawsuit filed by the Ningbo magnetic company.

[Typical Significance] This case is a typical case in which intellectual property rights and antitrust are intertwined, and has received widespread attention. The second-instance judgment properly handled the relationship between the exercise of patent rights and antitrust, and through scientific and reasonable definition of the relevant market, revised the judgment in accordance with the law to determine that the foreign right holder’s refusal to license the patent involved did not constitute monopoly behavior. The judgment in this case demonstrates the judicial concept of Chinese courts to equally protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese and foreign parties and the trial ideas of antitrust cases involving intellectual property abuse in accordance with the law, and actively responded to the concerns of the industry at home and abroad.

The original text including three additional cases is available here (Chinese only).

© 2024 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on Chinese Patent Litigation, the NLR Intellectual Property section.

Mid-Year Recap: Think Beyond US State Laws!

Much of the focus on US privacy has been US state laws, and the potential of a federal privacy law. This focus can lead one to forget, however, that US privacy and data security law follows a patchwork approach both at a state level and a federal level. “Comprehensive” privacy laws are thus only one piece of the puzzle. There are federal and state privacy and security laws that apply based on a company’s (1) industry (financial services, health care, telecommunications, gaming, etc.), (2) activity (making calls, sending emails, collecting information at point of purchase, etc.), and (3) the type of individual from whom information is being collected (children, students, employees, etc.). There have been developments this year in each of these areas.

On the industry law, there has been activity focused on data brokers, those in the health space, and for those that sell motor vehicles. The FTC has focused on the activities of data brokers this year, beginning the year with a settlement with lead-generation company Response Tree. It also settled with X-Mode Social over the company’s collection and use of sensitive information. There have also been ongoing regulation and scrutiny of companies in the health space, including HHS’s new AI transparency rule. Finally, in this area is a new law in Utah, with a Motor Vehicle Data Protection Act applicable to data systems used by car dealers to house consumer information.

On the activity side, there has been less news, although in this area the “activity” of protecting information (or failing to do so) has continued to receive regulatory focus. This includes the SEC’s new cybersecurity reporting obligations for public companies, as well as minor modifications to Utah’s data breach notification law.

Finally, there have been new laws directed to particular individuals. In particular, laws intended to protect children. These include social media laws in Florida and Utah, effective January 1, 2025 and October 1, 2024 respectively. These are similar to attempts to regulate social media’s collection of information from children in Arkansas, California, Ohio and Texas, but the drafters hope sufficiently different to survive challenges currently being faced by those laws. The FTC is also exploring updates to its decades’ old Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.

Putting It Into Practice: As we approach the mid-point of the year, now is a good time to look back at privacy developments over the past six months. There have been many developments in the privacy patchwork, and companies may want to take the time now to ensure that their privacy programs have incorporated and addressed those laws’ obligations.

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Copyright © 2024, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.
For more on Privacy, visit the NLR Consumer Protection section.

Update on FTC Noncompete Ban: Court Challenges Begin

On April ­­23 we reported on the Federal Trade Commission’s vote to ban almost all non-competition agreements in the United States. Within hours of that vote, Ryan LLC, a global tax consulting firm headquartered in Dallas, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas challenging the FTC’s authority to issue such a rule.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been allowed to intervene in that case and will join in the challenge to the FTC ban.

Ryan’s claims are that:

  1. The FTC lacks the legal authority to promulgate such a rule.
  2. Even if Congress had granted that authority by statute, such a grant would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch, in violation of Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution.
  3. The FTC Act is unconstitutional because it limits the president’s authority to remove subordinates (in this case, FTC Commissioners).
  4. The FTC promulgated the rule in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act because it failed to establish a factual basis for the rule.
  5. The rule is retroactive in purporting to invalidate all existing non-competition agreements, but the FTC has no authority to issue retroactive rules.

Based on our review of the pleadings filed thus far in the case, we think that the U.S. Chamber and its allies agree that these are the correct arguments and that they will file a brief supporting them.

Ryan is asking the court for two things: a stay of the effective date of the rule, and preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the FTC from enforcing it. The case is on an expedited schedule, with briefing to be completed by June 12 and a ruling expected on the pending motion by July 3.

Given that the rule’s effective date is September 4, if the court can meet that schedule, employers should have sufficient time to take the necessary steps to comply, if the court allows the rule to go into effect.

However, we would advise employers to start identifying all employees who are subject to an existing non-competition agreement, so they can move quickly to meet the notice requirements over the summer, should that become necessary.

©2024 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.
For more on the FTC Noncompete Ban, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

The FTC Has Banned Non-Competes: What Do Employers in the Energy Space Do Now?

When is the FTC’s rule effective?

The FTC’s non-compete ban is not in effect yet. It does not become effective until 120 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register of the final rule. The Federal Register is expected to publish the final rule next week, likely making the effective date around the beginning of September 2024.

Has litigation already been filed to challenge the non-compete ban?

The FTC’s non-compete ban is subject to at least two existing legal challenges seeking to have it invalidated. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division (Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 6:24-cv-00148 (E.D. Tex. filed April 24, 2024); see also Ryan, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 3:24-cv-986 (N.D. Tex. filed April 23, 2024)). We don’t know whether these legal challenges will be successful, but we will provide updates when we know more.

What if the legal challenges are unsuccessful?

If the legal challenges are not successful and the rule goes into effect 120 days from next week (again, approximately early September 2024), here are steps that employers can take to get ready for the effective date:

  • Review existing agreements to determine if they are now “unfair methods of competition”:
    • One issue to analyze is whether an individual with a non-compete is a “worker” or a “senior executive.”
      • If a “senior executive,” then a non-compete in place that pre-exists that effective date can still be enforced.
      • If not a “senior executive,” then any non-compete clause that pre-dates the effective date for a worker is banned by the rule.
      • If an independent contractor (or another non-employee worker), any non-compete clause is banned.
    • Another issue to consider is whether non-solicitation, non-disclosure, or reimbursement provisions could be subject to the FTC ban. A provision that prevents a worker from seeking or accepting work in the U.S. with a different person or from operating a business in the U.S., then it is a “non-compete clause” that is subject to the rule. Depending on the wording and the factual circumstances, an obligation not to solicit customers could be considered a prohibited non-compete. For example, if an obligation not to solicit certain clients keeps a worker from accepting any job in the Permian Basin, it is arguable that the provision operates as a non-compete and violates the rule.
  • Determine whether notice is required: After reviewing which non-compete clauses are not in compliance with the FTC rule, prepare a notice for workers who are currently subject to a non-compete clause banned by the rule. The FTC put out model language on the notification, which informs the worker that the non-compete clause is no longer valid as of the effective date.
  • Update any form agreements: As part of the review of existing non-compete agreements, take the opportunity to update form agreements to remove now unenforceable non-compete (and possibly non-solicit) provisions. It is always a good idea to review and update the agreement generally to make sure that it reflects your current business and definition of confidential information.
  • Enter into non-compete agreements with “senior executives”:
    • The FTC ban permits non-compete agreements with “senior executives” that pre-exist the effective date to continue after the effective date. After the effective date, an employer may not require a senior executive to sign a new non-compete.
    • The term “senior executive” refers to officers earning more than $151,164 with “policy-making authority.” As so defined, the FTC estimates that senior executives represent less than 0.75% of all workers.
    • “Policy-making authority” means “final authority to make policy decisions that control significant aspects of a business entity or common enterprise and does not include authority limited to advising or exerting influence over such policy decisions or having final authority to make policy decisions for only a subsidiary of or affiliate of a common enterprise.”
    • Energy company officers of companies that are part of a common enterprise or joint venture will want to analyze whether senior executives have final authority that qualifies for a non-compete under the rule.
    • As always, any employer should make sure that a non-compete complies with existing state laws to assist in any enforcement efforts.
  • Take note of violations before the effective date: The FTC’s noncompete ban does not apply where a cause of action related to a noncompete clause accrued before the effective date. So, if a worker is violating a noncompete that would otherwise be banned under the FTC rule, an employer may want to consider whether to initiate legal action against that worker before the effective date to fall under this exception.
© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on the FTC Noncompete Ban, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Buy American and Buy European

The Buy American Act was originally passed by Congress in 1933 and has undergone numerous changes across several presidential administrations. While the core of the Act has essentially remained the same, requiring the U.S. government to purchase goods produced in the U.S. in certain circumstances, the domestic preference requirements have changed over the years. While the Buy American Act applies to direct government purchases, the separate (but similarly named) Buy America Act passed in 1982 imposes similar U.S. content requirements for certain federally funded infrastructure projects. Generally, the Buy American Act’s “produced in the U.S.” requirement ensures that federal government purchases of goods valued at more than $10,000 are 100% manufactured in the U.S. with a set percentage of the cost of components coming from the U.S. As of 2024, that set percentage has been increased to 65%. Therefore, the cost of domestic components must be at least 65% of the total cost of components to comply with the rule. Under the existing rules, the threshold will increase to 75% in 2029. These planned changes are consistent with the trend of increasing preferences for domestic goods over time (a trend that has continued across administrations from both sides of the political spectrum).

Unsurprisingly, protectionist policies favoring American production can produce similar protectionist measures enacted by foreign countries. The European Union’s (EU) European Green Deal Industrial Plan (sometimes referred to as the Buy European Act), which includes the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), were both formally adopted within the last few months. The NZIA, which was agreed upon in February, is aimed at the manufacture of clean technologies in Europe and sets two benchmarks for such manufacturing in the EU: (1) that 40% of the production needed to cover the EU will be domestic by 2030; and (2) that the EU’s production will account for at least 15% of the world’s production by 2040. The NZIA contains a list of net-zero technologies, including wind and heat pumps, battery and energy storage, hydropower, and solar technologies. The CRMA, adopted on March 18, sets forth objectives for the EU’s consumption of raw materials by 2030: that 10% come from local extractions; 40% to be processed in the EU; and 25% come from recycled materials. The CRMA also provides that “not more than 65% of the Union’s annual consumption of each strategic raw material at any relevant stage of processing from a single third country.”[1] While Europe’s new acts are perhaps more geared towards raw materials and clean technology, the U.S. and Europe’s concerted efforts to focus on domestic production will be something to watch for years to come. In particular, it is worth watching whether the recent EU measures generate a response from U.S. lawmakers. If so, it could accelerate the already increasing stringency of Buy American and Buy America requirements.

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-industrial-policy/

by: Kevin P. Daly, Jeffrey J. White , Sabrina M. Galli of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more news on the Buy American Act and the European Green Deal Industrial Plan, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.