Health Care Reform Update – Week of July 29, 2013

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Senate HELP Updates Track-and-Trace, Compounding Proposals

On July 24th, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee released updates to its drug compounding and track and trace legislation. Committee Chairman Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Ranking Member Lamar Alexander (R-TN) say they hope the Senate will pass the measure by unanimous consent in the near future. On July 25th, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)indicated the bill would have virtually no impact on the federal budget.

House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee Advances SGR Bill

On July 24th, the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health passed by voice vote a bill to repeal the sustainable growth rate (SGR) Medicare physician payment method. The bill now moves to the full committee, which will consider a repeal of the SGR on July 31st. Rep. Michael Burgess (R-TX) suggested the committee will support the bill, but he said the legislation could become part of larger budget negotiations near the end of 2013.

Implementation of the Affordable Care Act

On July 22nd, Republicans on the House Ways and Means Committee sent a letter to Treasury Secretary Lew requesting information regarding a delay of the ACA employer mandate. The letter criticizes testimony provided by Treasury official Mark Iwry in previous committee hearings, stating he failed to provide sufficient information.

On July 22nd, House and Senate Republicans sent a letter to HHS Secretary Sebelius that urges a release of information regarding health insurance premiums in 34 states taking part in the ACA federal and federal-state partnership exchanges.

On July 23rd, while speaking with members of the National Council of La Raza, First Lady Michelle Obama urged supporters to go out and inform their families and friends about the facts regarding the implementation of the ACA.

On July 23rd, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on pre-ACA base insurance premium rates. The report was requested by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT).

On July 24thRep. Diane Black (R-TN) introduced H.R. 2775, a bill to prohibit ACA subsidies from being provided to Americans until a system is in place to verify the financial standing of individuals applying for subsidies.

On July 24th, the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Hospital Association (AHA) called on HHS to delay Stage Two requirements relating to the development of meaningful use of electronic health records (EHRs). The AMA and AHA suggest Stage Two should be delayed by one year to provide flexibility to small and rural providers.

On July 25th, during a Senate Small Business Committee hearing on the implementation of the ACA, Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA)said she understands some business owners are harmed by coverage mandates of the law. Senator Landrieu said she is open to exploring ACA changes that will avoid harming business owners.

On July 25th, Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) said no decision has been made on if Republicans will use a continuing resolution to block additional funding for ACA implementation and enforcement.

On July 26th, CMS announced a moratorium on enrollment of home health agencies in Miami and Chicago and a temporary halt on ambulance suppliers in Houston.

On July 26thMaryland released premium rates for individual health insurance to be sold on the state’s ACA exchange. Nine carriers will offer plans through the exchange.

Other HHS and Federal Regulatory Initiatives

On July 22nd, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provided Teva Pharmaceuticals exclusive rights until 2016 to sell its Plan B One-Step emergency contraception over the counter and without age restrictions.

On July 22nd, CMS announced the suspension of the National Average Retail Prices (NARP) survey, which provided pricing information on over 4,000 common drugs.

On July 23rd, the U.S. District Court of Appeals for D.C. ruled that the HHS Secretary is able to delegate his or her authority to outside contractors.

On July 23rd, HHS issued a final rule that orders discounts for orphan drugs, which are often used to treat rare conditions, to apply when used to treat non-orphan conditions.

On July 26th, the FDA released two proposed rules to regulate the safety of imported food. The first rule is available here, and the second rule can be found here.

Other Congressional and State Initiatives

On July 24th, the House Appropriations Labor-HHS Subcommittee delayed a markup of the FY 2014 appropriations bill that was scheduled for July 25th. A spokesperson for the full committee indicated scheduling conflicts resulted in the delay.

On July 25th, the CBO wrote a letter noting the Senate’s immigration bill, S. 744, will reduce deficits largely because of cash flows related to Social Security and Medicare Part A.

Other Health Care News

On July 24th the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a report on the variation in health care spending among Medicare beneficiaries.

Hearings and Mark-Ups Scheduled

Senate

On July 30th, the Senate Budget Committee will conduct a hearing to examine containing health care costs.

On July 31st, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee will conduct a hearing to examine toxic chemical threats and public health protections.

House of Representatives

On July 30th, the House Energy and Commerce Committee will conduct a markup of legislation to reform the sustainable growth rate (SGR) Medicare physician payment method. The markup is scheduled to continue on July 31st.

On July 31st, the House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee will hold a hearing to analyze the Obama administration’s authority to offer tax credits through the ACA exchanges.

On July 31st, the House Science Research and Technology Subcommittee will hold a hearing on the frontiers of human brain research.

On August 1st, the House Ways and Means Committee will hold a hearing to analyze the implementation of the ACA.

On August 1st, the House Energy and Commerce Committee will hold hearing to understand the latest issues relating to the implementation of the ACA. 

David Shirbroun also contributed to this update.

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Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) Clarifies 340B Orphan Drug Exception But 340B Audit Enforcement Remains Murky

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Recently, HRSA publicly announced the issuance of a final rule clarifying when 340B covered entities can purchase and distribute orphan drugs through the 340B Drug Pricing Program.  Separately, HRSA quietly posted a report on its completed audits of 340B covered entities through July 12, 2013.  While the new rule does shed light on when 340B entities can purchase orphan drugs at 340B discounted prices, the new audit report keeps 340B entities in the dark on HRSA enforcement of established regulatory violations.

Orphan Drugs

The Orphan Drug Act specifies that drugs used to treat a specific rare condition or disease, such as ALS or Huntington’s disease, qualify as orphan drugs, and provides incentives for manufacturers of such drugs.  The FDA designates which drugs qualify as orphan drugs.

The Affordable Care Act excludes orphan drugs from 340B pricing, but does not provide specifics on the breadth of the exclusion.  The new 340B rule, which will go into effect October 1, 2013, specifies that the orphan drug exclusion only applies to three types of qualified 340B covered entities:

  • Free standing cancer hospitals
  • Critical access hospitals, and
  • Rural referral and sole community hospitals.

Other types of covered entities can still purchase orphan drugs at 340B prices, as long as the entity is in compliance with other conditions of the 340B program.

Under the final rule, the orphan drug exception is only applicable to the three types of entities if the drug at issue is designated as orphan by the FDA and is being transferred, prescribed or sold for the rare condition or disease for which it was designated as orphan by the FDA.  So, for example, if drug X is designated as orphan for treatment of ALS, but is also FDA-approved to treat anorexia, it may be purchased at 340B discounts to dispense to anorexia patients.

A word of warning – providers can potentially qualify as a 340B covered entity under more than one of the eligibility classifications.  Going forward, HRSA will require that each covered entity designate itself as a single type of covered entity and abide by all governing regulations specific to that type of entity.   Providers will want to consider the applicability of the orphan drug exception when deciding which type of entity they will be for 340B purposes.

Audit Update

HRSA did not announce that it posted a report on completed FFY 2012 program audits through July 12, 2013.  While there is some interesting information in the report, the report is more striking for what it doesn’t say.

The report reflects:

  • HRSA completed a total of 34 FFY 2012 audits.
  • HRSA conducted audits of 340B covered entities in 20 different states:  5 audits in Texas, 3 in Georgia and Illinois, and 2 in California, Florida, Kentucky, Washington and Wisconsin, and multiple states had only 1 reported audit.
  • Half of the audits had no adverse findings and half had 1 or more adverse findings.
  • The most common adverse finding was dispensing drugs to ineligible patients, this included situations involving ineligible sites and or use of ineligible providers.
  • The second most common finding was a violation of the duplicate discount prohibition through Medicaid billings.
  • The third most common adverse finding was inaccurate record entries, involving incorrect addresses, listing of closed facilities, or use of an unlisted contract pharmacy.

The report does not reflect the total number of entities audited during FFY 2012 or how many audits are yet to be completed.

In several audits where the only listed violation involved an incorrect record regarding a site or contact, no sanction was imposed and corrective action was either limited to correction of the database or is pending.  But where the inaccurate record included use of an unlisted contract pharmacy, or where there were other findings regarding ineligible patients or duplicate discounts, sanctions are reported as “to be determined” and corrective action remains “pending.”

So we know HRSA is actively auditing 340B entities and the activities it finds problematic, but we still don’t know what they are going do about those activities.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Spells Out Requirements in New Rule for Consumer Helpers in Insurance Exchanges

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Amid ongoing political debate about implementation of the Affordable Care Act and the ability of average Americans to understand the complexities of the health reform law, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services on July 12, 2013 released a final rule that sets forth requirements for different types of entities and individuals who will aide consumers in learning about and enrolling in health coverage plans on insurance marketplaces created by the law, called exchanges.

The rule distinguishes between three categories of consumer helpers: “navigators,” “non-navigator assistance personnel,” and “certified application counselors.” All three types, which may include community nonprofit organizations and their staffs, and other entities and individuals, will perform similar functions, such as helping consumers establish their eligibility for coverage on an exchange and enrolling them where eligible. The primary differences lie in how they are funded and in the exchanges in which they will provide assistance. Navigators will provide assistance in all exchanges—federal exchanges, state exchanges, and federal-state partnership exchanges—and will be funded by federal and state grants. Non-navigator assistance personnel will provide assistance in federal-state partnership exchanges and optionally in state exchanges, and will be funded through separate state-administered grants or contracts. Certified application counselors will provide assistance in all exchanges and will not receive exchange-related funds (although they may receive funds from other federal programs).

The rule lays out standards with which navigators and non-navigator assistance personnel must comply. These standards include conflict-of-interest standards that limit affiliations with insurance companies and standards governing certification, recertification, and training in particular subjects. The rule establishes additional standards to ensure that the services of navigators and non-navigator assistance personnel are culturally and linguistically appropriate and also accessible to the disabled.

As to certified application counselors, the rule authorizes exchanges to designate an organization to certify its staff members or volunteers as application counselors, or to directly certify these individuals, who in both cases must comply with certification standards similar to those applicable to navigators and non-navigator assistance personnel. Correspondingly, the rule requires withdrawal of an organization’s designation or a counselor’s certification in the event of noncompliance with the rule. Finally, the rule requires that certain information about certified application counselors be available to health coverage applicants, and it prohibits the imposition of any charge on applicants for application or other exchange-related assistance.

The rule takes effect on August 12, 2013.

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Municipal Bankruptcies: An Overview and Recent History of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code

Katten Muchin

The City of Detroit filed for protection under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 18, 2013,[1] becoming the largest municipality to ever file for bankruptcy. Detroit’s bankruptcy filing presents numerous complicated issues, which will be resolved over the course of the case.

This advisory provides an overview and history of chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, beginning with a discussion of the various substantive provisions that govern (i) chapter 9’s eligibility requirements, (ii) case administration issues that arise in chapter 9 cases and (iii) the requirements for confirming a chapter 9 plan of adjustment. Next, the advisory discusses significant chapter 9 cases since the Orange County bankruptcy case in 1994—the largest municipal bankruptcy at the time. Finally, since many municipal bonds are insured, the advisory provides an update on the major monoline insurance companies—most of which have been placed into rehabilitation proceedings due to their own financial challenges. At the end of this advisory is a chart that compares the key provisions of chapter 9 to counterparts of chapter 11.

I.            Chapter 9 Case Issues

a.       Eligibility Requirements (§ 109(c))

Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the requirements to be eligible to file as a chapter 9 debtor. Specifically, a debtor must establish that it (i) is a municipality, (ii) has specific authorization to file, (iii) is insolvent, (iv) wants to adjust its debts through a plan and (v) meets one of four creditor-negotiation requirements.[2]

i.      Authorization to File (§ 109(c)(2))

Section 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that in order to be a chapter 9 debtor a municipality must be “specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter.”

The degree to which state laws permit chapter 9 filings varies from state to state.[3] Twelve states specifically authorize chapter 9 filings, while 12 others permit bankruptcy filings given a further action to be taken by a state, official or other entity.[4] In addition, three other states authorize a limited subset of municipalities to file for bankruptcy. The remaining 23 states do not authorize municipal bankruptcy filings.

ii.      Negotiation with Creditors (§ 109(c)(5)(A)-(D))

Section 109(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that chapter 9 eligibility requires some element of pre-petition negotiation with creditors, which can be satisfied by complying with one of four alternative provisions. The first alternative is that the chapter 9 debtor “obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class, that [the debtor] intends to impair under a plan in a case under [chapter 9].”[5]Significantly, in order to satisfy this requirement, the chapter 9 debtor must obtain the creditors’ consent to the actual plan as filed, and, thus, the debtor cannot simultaneously file an amended plan of adjustment and satisfy the first alternative.[6]

The second alternative is that the chapter 9 debtor “has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that [the debtor] intends to impair.”[7] In In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal District,[8] the bankruptcy court interpreted this provision to require that the debtor present to creditors a comprehensive, but not formal, workout plan that the debtor can implement in its chapter 9 case.[9] The negotiations must also “revolve around the negotiating of the terms of a plan that could be effectuated if resort is required to [c]hapter 9.”10Chapter 9 debtors do not have to show that they have fully levied taxes to the maximum allowed by law.[11] However, bankruptcy courts have found that municipal debtors have not acted in good faith where the debtors never exercised their assessment powers prior to initiating proceedings in bankruptcy court.[12]

The third alternative is that the chapter 9 debtor demonstrate that it “is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable.”[13] This alternative was inserted in the statute to deal with the problems created by major municipalities, whose bonds are numerous and are frequently in bearer form. Under such circumstances, negotiation is difficult at best, because of the difficulty in identifying the creditors with whom the municipality must negotiate.

The fourth alternative is that the debtor “reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a preference.”[14] As discussed below, pursuant to section 926(b) of the Bankruptcy Code it is important to note that payments on account of a bond or a note may not be avoided as a preference under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, a chapter 9 debtor cannot avoid entering into negotiations with its bondholders on the basis that the bondholders are attempting to obtain a preference.

b.      Chapter 9 Case Administration

i.      Automatic Stay of Enforcement of Claims Against the Debtor (§ 922)

Section 922(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for a stay of actions against entities other than the debtor itself. The additional stay is meant to supplement, and not replace, the automatic stay granted under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The additional stay prohibits a creditor from taking actions against an officer or inhabitant of the city. Accordingly, a creditor cannot bring a mandamusaction against an officer on account of the creditor’s claims against the debtor, nor can a creditor seek to collect its debt by commencing an action against an inhabitant of the debtor for collection of taxes that are owed to the municipality. Similarly, any attempt by a creditor to enforce a lien on taxes owed to the municipality is also stayed under section 922(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 922(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides an exception to the additional stay for pledged funds. Specifically, under section 922, if an indenture trustee or paying agent is in possession of pledged funds from special revenue bonds, the trustee or agent may apply the pledged funds to payments as they come due and/or distribute the funds to the bondholders. In addition, a chapter 9 debtor’s voluntary payment of such funds to an indenture trustee or paying agent on account of the special revenue bonds, and the application thereof, does not violate the stay and does not require court approval. In Jefferson County, however, the bankruptcy court allowed Jefferson County to withhold payment (at least on an interim basis) of special revenues pending determination of the scope of the county’s interest in the special revenues and the county’s actions in connection with its restructuring efforts.

ii.      Avoidance Powers

Section 901 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, among other things, that a chapter 9 debtor has most of the avoidance powers granted to a chapter 11 debtor, including the ability to avoid preferences and fraudulent transfers.[15] Further, section 926(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[i]f the debtor refuses to pursue a cause of action under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549(a), or 550 of [the Bankruptcy Code], then on request of a creditor, the court may appoint a trustee to pursue such cause of action.” Notwithstanding a chapter 9 debtor’s ability to commence an avoidance action, section 926(b) provides that a transfer on account of a bond or a note may not be avoided as a preference under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.

iii.      Bankruptcy Judge (§ 921(b))

Pursuant to section 921(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he chief judge of the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district in which the case is commenced shall designate the bankruptcy judge to conduct the case.” The provision is designed to remove politics from the case of a major municipality and to ensure that the case is presided over by a competent judge.[16] The provision also gives the chief judge the flexibility to appoint a retired judge or a judge who sits in a district other than the one where the case is pending, which allows the chief judge to manage the flow of judicial business in the various parts of the circuit.[17]

iv.      Collective Bargaining Agreements (§ 365)

Like a chapter 11 debtor, a chapter 9 debtor has the power to assume and reject contracts under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. In chapter 11, if a debtor wishes to reject a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor must comply with the requirements of section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, which affords various protections to the union that is the counterparty to the collective bargaining agreement. Section 1113, however, does not apply in a chapter 9 case. Instead, section 365, as informed by the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,[18] applies when determining whether a chapter 9 debtor may reject or modify a union contract. Bildisco, which was decided prior to the enactment of section 1113, held that under section 365, a debtor could unilaterally reject or modify a collective bargaining agreement without complying with applicable state law.

Two California bankruptcy courts have clarified the ramifications of Congress’s decision not to incorporate section 1113 in chapter 9 cases. InOrange County,[19] a coalition of county employee organizations brought an action against the debtor to enforce their various labor agreements.[20] In connection with their action, the coalition also sought an emergency injunction enjoining the debtor from permanently laying off county employees represented by the various organizations composing the coalition.[21] Although the Orange County court held that the standard articulated in Bildisco was applicable to the rejection of the labor agreements in chapter 9, the court also agreed with the coalition that the debtor should also be required to satisfy the standards of California law “if not as a legal matter, certainly from an equitable standpoint.”[22] Accordingly, the Orange County court concluded that even under Bildisco, municipalities may only modify their labor contracts as a matter of last resort.

In City of Vallejo,[23] the debtor moved to reject its collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) less than a month into the case. Agreeing with Orange County court, the Vallejo court held that section 1113 is inapplicable to a chapter 9 debtor’s motion to reject a CBA and that the correct standard is the one set forth in Bildisco.[24] The Vallejo court, however, was far less deferential to California state labor law than the Orange County court had been. The court emphasized that under section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code, states “act as gatekeepers to their municipalities’ access to relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”[25] Accordingly, the court reasoned that when a state authorizes its municipalities to file chapter 9 petitions, “it declares that benefits of chapter 9 are more important than state control over its municipalities” and, therefore, “must accept chapter 9 in its totality.”[26] Thus, if a state authorizes a municipality to file under chapter 9, the municipality “is entitled to fully utilize [section] 365 [of the Bankruptcy Code] to accept or reject its executory contracts.”[27] While the California law allowing Vallejo to file for bankruptcy purported to require that municipalities comply with state law while in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court held that that portion of the law was preempted by the Bankruptcy Code.[28] Ultimately, the bankruptcy court did not grant Vallejo’s motion.[29] Instead, the court encouraged the parties to reach a settlement, which they did approximately five months later.

Ultimately, bankruptcy courts have consistently held that section 1113 does not apply in a chapter 9 case. Instead, section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, as such section is applied in Bildisco, governs the rejection of CBAs in chapter 9. These courts, however, have issued inconsistent opinions as to whether the chapter 9 debtor must comply with state law when seeking to reject or modify a CBA.

v.      Official Committees (§ 901(a))

Section 901(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that section 1102 applies in a chapter 9 case. Accordingly, official committees can be formed in a chapter 9 case. As discussed below, however, a chapter 9 debtor is not technically obligated to pay for the fees and expenses of an official committee through the debtor’s plan of adjustment.

c.       Plan of Adjustment Requirements

i.      Confirmation Requirements (§ 943)

A chapter 9 plan of adjustment is simply the document that provides for the treatment of the various classes of creditors’ claims against the municipal debtor. Similar to a chapter 11 debtor, a chapter 9 debtor submits a disclosure statement that describes the plan and related matters, and the disclosure statement is sent with a ballot to each impaired creditor with an opportunity to vote on the plan. Similar to a chapter 11 plan of reorganization, in order to be confirmed, the plan of adjustment must be accepted by a majority of creditors and two thirds in amount of claims within each class of claims that is impaired under the plan.

In addition to the voting requirements, the Bankruptcy Code contains several other requirements that a plan of adjustment must meet to be confirmed by the bankruptcy court. The requirements include the following: (i) the chapter 9 debtor must not be prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan; (ii) all post-petition administrative expense claims must be paid in full; (iii) the chapter 9 debtor must have obtained all of the regulatory and electoral approvals necessary to consummate the plan; and (iv) the plan must be feasible. Importantly, the plan of adjustment must also be in the best interest of creditors. Since a chapter 9 debtor is ineligible to be a debtor in a chapter 7 liquidation, however, this test has been interpreted to mean that a plan of adjustment need only be “better than alternatives,” such as the dismissal of the chapter 9 case.

If an impaired class of creditors votes against a chapter 9 debtor’s plan of adjustment, the bankruptcy court can still confirm the plan through a “cram down” of the dissenting class (or classes) if the plan meets all of the other confirmation requirements set forth in section 943 of the Bankruptcy Code. In order to accomplish such a cram down, the debtor must show that at least one impaired class has accepted the plan and that the plan is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly among creditors. In chapter 11, the fair and equitable requirement, often referred to as the “absolute priority rule,” requires that the debtor establish that no junior class of creditors is receiving any distribution under the plan of reorganization on account of its claims unless all senior classes of claims are paid in full. In chapter 9, however, a plan of adjustment is considered “fair and equitable” if the amount to be received by the dissenting class is “all they can reasonably expect to receive under the circumstances.”

If a plan of adjustment is not approved, the bankruptcy court may dismiss the chapter 9 case, thereby stripping the municipality of the protections of the Bankruptcy Code. A bankruptcy court may also dismiss a chapter 9 case for a variety of other reasons, such as the failure of a debtor to prosecute the case, unreasonable delay, the non-acceptance of a plan by creditors or a material default or termination of a plan.

ii.      Professional Fees (§ 943(b)(3))

Section 943(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that “all amounts to be paid by the debtor or by any person for services or expenses in the case or incident to the plan have been fully disclosed and are reasonable.” As such, a chapter 9 debtor must disclose any and all fees and expenses being paid to professionals. Section 943(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, however, does not require the municipality to pay the fees and expenses of committee professionals. “Absent the debtor’s consent, there is nothing in chapter 9 that automatically requires a debtor to pay the fees and costs of an official committee, professionals employed by the committee or professionals employed by members of an official committee.”[30]

II.            Noteworthy Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Cases

Municipal bonds are traditionally viewed as safe investments because defaults are rare. From 1970 to 2012, only 71 rated municipal bond defaults occurred, and only five of those were by general purpose municipalities (i.e., cities, villages, towns or counties).[31] In fact, 78 percent of all municipal bond defaults came from health care- and housing-related projects issued by special entities.[32]

Given this low default rate, it is hardly a surprise that municipal bankruptcies are also rare. Only 636 municipal bankruptcy cases have been filed since such cases were first authorized by Congress in 1937.[33] Moreover, only approximately 250 municipalities have filed under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code,[34] as compared to the approximately 1.2 million individuals who filed personal bankruptcy proceedings in 2012 alone.[35]Only 17.5 percent of chapter 9 filings between 1980 and 2007 were by general purpose municipalities.[36] Approximately 61.8 percent of chapter 9 cases involved utilities and special purpose districts.[37] The remaining 20.7 percent of chapter 9 cases mainly involved schools, public hospitals and transportation authorities.[38]

Historically, bondholders have fared well in chapter 9 cases, experiencing, at worst, some payment delays or relatively minor haircuts. Recently, however, the assumption that bondholders will be paid in full (or at least the vast majority of their claims) in a bankruptcy case has been called into question.[39] Below is a discussion of the major municipal bankruptcies from the past 20 years.

a.       Orange County, California (1994)

In 1994, Orange County, California, was the fifth-largest county in the United States with an operating budget in excess of $3.7 billion. Increasing demand for high-quality public services strained the county’s finances since the California Constitution restricted the ability of local governments, including Orange County, to raise tax revenue. The County Treasurer tried to solve Orange County’s financial problems by pooling the county’s money with funds from nearly 200 local public agencies through an entity known as the Orange County Investment Pool (OCIP) and investing those funds. In particular, the OCIP used the pooled funds to borrow more money (the OCIP borrowed $2 for every $1 on deposit) to invest in derivatives and high-yield, long-term bonds. As a result of adverse market conditions, the OCIP lost $1.64 billion by November 1994.[40]

In December 1994, Orange County and the OCIP both filed for chapter 9 after many Wall Street investment firms commenced legal actions to seize their collateral. The bankruptcy court dismissed the OCIP’s case after determining that such an entity did not qualify as a “municipality” under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, was ineligible to be a chapter 9 debtor. Although the dismissal allowed the creditors to continue their actions against the OCIP, the bankruptcy court enjoined such creditors from enforcing against the OCIP’s funds, thereby preventing severe financial stress being placed on Orange County (and the other local agencies that had invested in the fund).[41]

Orange County initially submitted a plan of adjustment that called for a sales tax increase of one half of one percent, which would require voter approval under California law. As such, the voters of Orange County would effectively be voting on the plan. After the voters rejected the tax increase, it became apparent that the debtor’s initial plan would not be confirmed. The bondholders, who risked having the debtor default on its principal payment obligation, agreed to rollover the county’s debt for another year in exchange for increased interest payments. The county then developed another plan under which (i) the county would divert tax funds from other county agencies and use those funds to pay bondholders; (ii) the local governments that lost money would agree to wait for full payment until the county won the lawsuits it filed against Wall Street firms alleging that such firms were culpable as a result of their actions surrounding the bankruptcy; and (iii) the county would issue $880 million in 30-year bonds that were insured by a municipal bond insurer to pay the debt on existing bonds, refinance other debt and pay for bankruptcy litigation and other expenses.[42]

Orange County emerged from bankruptcy 18 months after it filed. From a fiscal perspective, the county’s bankruptcy was very successful in that it reduced the county’s debt to an affordable level. Indeed, Orange County was able to access the lending markets a mere two years after its bankruptcy. Seven years after the filing, Orange County had a AA bond rating.[43]

b.      Prichard, Alabama (1999 and 2009)

Prichard, Alabama, which experienced a population decline of approximately 50 percent over the past 50 years, filed for bankruptcy in 1999 after it was unable to pay approximately $3.9 million in delinquent bills. In addition to the unpaid bills, Prichard also admitted to not making payments to its employees’ pension funds and, even though the city had withheld taxes from employees’ paychecks, the city failed to submit such withholdings to the state and federal governments.[44]

During the bankruptcy case, Prichard was able to make some progress enhancing social, financial and technological growth, as well as economic development. Its 2001 budget predicted a four percent increase in revenue over its 2000 budget, and the city exited from bankruptcy in 2001.[45]

While in bankruptcy, the city successfully revised its budget so that it no longer operated at a deficit. However, Prichard was still unable to meet its pension obligations. In 2009, Prichard filed for bankruptcy for the second time in order to stay a pending suit brought by its pensioners after it failed to make pension payments for six months. In its chapter 9 petition, the city claimed that during the previous year it had operated a $600,000 deficit on its $10.7 million budget. Further, Prichard had failed to make a $16.5 million payment to its pension fund under its previous plan of adjustment.[46]

In August 2010, the bankruptcy court dismissed Prichard’s chapter 9 case because the court held that the city was ineligible to be a chapter 9 debtor. In particular, the bankruptcy court determined that the Alabama statute authorizing chapter 9 filings only enabled permitted municipalities with bonded debt to file. Since Prichard did not have bond debt, the bankruptcy court found that it was ineligible to file.[47] Prichard appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the district court, which in turn certified the eligibility question to the Alabama Supreme Court.[48] In April 2012, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that municipalities did not need bond debt in order to file. The district court therefore reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision and remanded the case.[49] The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision has been viewed as opening the door for Jefferson County’s bankruptcy case— which is discussed below in greater depth—because Jefferson County’s debt was in the form of warrants, not bonds.[50]

c.       City of Vallejo, California (2008)

The City of Vallejo, with 120,000 residents, filed for bankruptcy in May 2008. Unlike most general purpose municipalities that file for bankruptcy, Vallejo’s financial distress was not caused by excessive debt. Rather, the city’s financial problems resulted from a budget issue. Vallejo’s finances had a long-term structural imbalance resulting from a declining tax base, decreasing revenues from property and sales taxes, state funding cuts and satisfying its expensive labor contracts. The city’s tax revenues decreased by $20 million between 2007 and 2011 as a result of the recession and decreasing home values that caused property taxes to decrease. Vallejo’s largest debt resulted from the city’s pension liabilities and financial obligations under its various labor contracts. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Vallejo attempted to negotiate with several of its labor unions, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement.[51]

Shortly after Vallejo filed for bankruptcy, the city filed a plan of adjustment that it thought was feasible at the time and sought to adjust its labor contracts. As discussed below, the labor unions objected to the plan on the ground that it impermissibly abrogated the unions’ collective bargaining agreements. The bankruptcy court held that the labor agreements could be rejected under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the court’s encouragement, the parties negotiated new labor agreements. However, Vallejo’s finances continued to deteriorate during the chapter 9 case, causing the original plan of adjustment to no longer be feasible.[52]

Three years and five months after Vallejo filed its bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy court approved the city’s new plan of adjustment. As part of the confirmed plan, the city closed fire stations, reduced public services, cut staffing requirements, laid off city workers, required new city workers to contribute more to their pensions and all employees to contribute more for their health insurance and sought new revenue.[53]

It was noteworthy that during the bankruptcy proceedings, Vallejo continued to make all payments on its bond debt, which totaled approximately $62 million, on time and in full. Likewise, the city’s plan of adjustment did not adjust the city’s bond debt. Under the plan, general unsecured claims received between 5 and 20 percent of their claims over a period of two years.[54]

d.      Westfall, Pennsylvania (2009)

Westfall, Pennsylvania, a small town with a population of 2,400 and a $1.5 million operating budget in 2009, filed for bankruptcy in April 2009. The impetus for the bankruptcy filing was a $20 million civil rights judgment obtained by a property developer against the town. Westfall and the developer entered into negotiations to settle the developer’s claim, which proved unsuccessful.[55]

The bankruptcy court ultimately approved Westfall’s plan of adjustment, which reduced the developer’s claim to $6 million and provided that the claim would be paid over 20 years without interest. In order to pay for the settlement, the town raised the property tax rate by 48 percent (the property tax would gradually decrease each year over the 20-year period).[56]

It is likely that the developer ultimately agreed to the plan of adjustment because he was concerned that the bankruptcy court would approve a less favorable plan. Specifically, the developer was aware that one class of the town’s creditors would vote to confirm the plan, which would allow the debtor to cram down the plan over the developer’s objection.[57]

e.      Jefferson County, Alabama (2011)  

Jefferson County, the second-largest county in Alabama, filed for chapter 9 in November 2011, which at the time was the largest municipal bankruptcy case in US history, in order to resolve the indebtedness of the county’s sewer system (a special purpose vehicle). In 1994, Jefferson County began a sewer restoration and rehabilitation program. Although the project was originally estimated to cost $1 billion, the costs eventually ballooned to $3.2 billion. In order to service its debt, the county increased sewer rates by 400 percent. In addition, the county lowered the costs of its debt service by entering into swap agreements under which the county would swap long-term fixed higher interest rate debt into short-term variable rate debt. The 2008 financial crisis destabilized the market for such swap agreements, which caused the county’s debt service to increase. In 2008, Jefferson County defaulted on its debt obligations, which resulted in the acceleration of the debt.[58]

Over the next several years, Jefferson County considered a chapter 9 filing. The county opted, however, to enter into a forbearance agreement in 2009, which allowed the county to negotiate with its creditors. The parties’ negotiations revolved around (i) the creditors forgiving a portion of the sewer debt, (ii) the parties restructuring the remaining debt at fixed rates and (iii) the county limiting sewer rate increases to the rate of inflation.[59]

In June 2013, Jefferson County reached an agreement on a plan of adjustment, which still needs to be approved by the bankruptcy court, under which the county will pay its creditors $1.84 billion, or 60 percent of what they are owed. JPMorgan Chase & Co., seven hedge funds and a group of bond insurers, which together hold $2.4 billion, or approximately 78 percent, of the sewer debt, agreed to support the plan. Under the plan, JPMorgan, which holds $1.22 billion of debt, will forgive $842 million. Taken together with a previous settlement, the bank will have agreed to pay the county and waive sewer obligations totaling $1.57 billion. Under the plan, the county will increase sewer rates by 7.4 percent annually for four years. The plan provides that Jefferson County will exit bankruptcy by the end of the year.[60]

f.       Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (2011)

The city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the state capital, guaranteed debt issued by a special purpose vehicle that was formed in order to finance the construction of an incinerator plant. The construction and operation of the plant went over budget, and the original forecasts of the revenues that would be generated from the plant proved to be overly optimistic. Consequently, the special purpose vehicle defaulted triggering the city’s guaranty of the bond debt. In 2010, Harrisburg owed $68 million in interest payments—an amount that was $3 million in excess of the city’s yearly operating budget.[61]

Harrisburg sought a forbearance agreement with its creditors, which would permit the parties to negotiate a settlement. During this time, the city also began considering a chapter 9 filing in the face of the city mayor’s resistance to such a filing. Notwithstanding the ongoing negotiations, in October 2011, the Harrisburg city council authorized the city to file for bankruptcy. The filing was met with disagreement from the mayor, the dissenting city council members and elected state officials.[62]

In November 2011, the bankruptcy court dismissed the chapter 11 petition, holding that the city was not properly authorized to file under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, was ineligible to be a chapter 9 debtor. Following the dismissal, Pennsylvania’s governor commenced an action in state court seeking to have a receiver appointed for the city pursuant to the state intervention procedures for municipalities in fiscal distress.[63]

g.      Stockton, California (2012)

The City of Stockton, a city of 296,000 residents, filed for bankruptcy in June 2012, which at the time was the largest city ever to file for bankruptcy. Stockton was hard hit by the 2008 financial crisis. The collapse of the real estate market resulted in significant declines to the city’s property and sales tax revenues. In addition, the city experienced budgetary stress as 75 percent of Stockton’s general fund was used for the public safety payroll and to service debt, and satisfying pension obligations accounted for nearly 13 percent of the city’s overall spending. These budgetary problems were exacerbated by Stockton’s inability to generate new tax revenue, which was limited by California law. Stockton could not raise property taxes, and if the city wanted to levy a sales tax, like Orange County, it would need two-thirds voter approval in a special election.

At the time Stockton filed, the city stopped making debt service payments on its appropriation and pension obligation bonds. These bonds were, and still are, unsecured general fund obligations and have no specified tax revenues pledged for debt service. Stockton, however, has no general obligation bonds, which typically have better protections for bondholders.

Stockton has proposed to significantly reduce its bond debt while leaving its pension obligation owed to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the pension fund for public workers in California, unimpaired. While bondholders have suffered minor losses or delayed payments in previous chapter 9 cases, if Stockton’s case proceeds as planned, it would mark the first time that a municipality significantly impaired its obligations to bondholders.

Facing large losses, Assured Guaranty Corp., the monoline insurance company that insured Stockton’s bonds, and other capital market creditors objected to Stockton’s bankruptcy filing, arguing that Stockton had not negotiated with them in good faith. Specifically, the monoline argued that Stockton’s demands fell “short of the fairness requirements of chapter 9.” The bankruptcy court, however, overruled the objection, finding that the capital market creditors, not Stockton, had not negotiated in good faith prior to the bankruptcy filings when they “chose to take a we-have-nothing-to-talk-about position once the City indicated that it was not proposing to impair its obligations to CalPERS.”[64] Stockton’s bankruptcy case remains ongoing.

h.      San Bernardino, California (2012)

San Bernardino, a city of 210,000 residents, filed for bankruptcy in July 2012 because of a $48.5 million budget deficit that threatened the city’s ability to make payroll. Prior to filing, the city obtained $10 million in concessions from city employees and slashed its workforce by 20 percent over four years. Notwithstanding these efforts, San Bernardino’s fiscal problems that resulted from a variety of issues including accounting errors, deficit spending, lack of revenue growth and increases in pension and debt costs, remained unresolved. In addition, following the 2008 economic crisis, San Bernardino’s tax revenues declined by as much as $16 million annually, primarily because of drops in sales and property taxes. At the time of filing, 73 percent of the city’s general fund was being used to pay for public safety services.

In October 2012, CalPERS preliminarily objected to San Bernardino’s bankruptcy filing, arguing the city could not demonstrate that it was eligible to be a chapter 9 debtor. In particular, the pension fund argued that San Bernardino could not demonstrate that it (i) desired to effectuate a plan of adjustment, or (ii) negotiated with its creditors in good faith prior to the bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court ordered the parties to conduct discovery in respect of the eligibility issue. A hearing on the eligibility issue is scheduled for August 2013.

After filing for bankruptcy, San Bernardino, unlike Stockton, ceased making payments to CalPERS on account of the city’s pension obligations. San Bernardino submitted a pendency plan, which would defer $35 million of payments to CalPERS, which is necessary in light of the city’s budget deficit. San Bernardino has indicated that it intends to resume making payments. Such payments, however, will not include any payments on account of the $33 million owed to CalPERS in respect of the city’s unpaid post-petition obligations.

III.            Monoline Municipal Bond Insurers

In 2007, there were six AAA monolines that insured municipal bond debt. These companies, however, experienced various degrees of financial distress as a result of their structured finance obligations. Below is a brief summary of the current financial status of each company.

a.       Ambac Assurance Corporation (“Ambac”)

As of November 2007, Ambac had $556 billion of insured obligations outstanding. In 2008, Ambac’s financial condition began to be adversely affected by the effects of problems arising from mortgage lending practices in the United States because Ambac underwrote (i) direct financial guaranties of RMBS obligations and (ii) CDS on collateralized debt obligations backed primarily by RMBS. On March 24, 2010, at the request of the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, Ambac formed a segregated account, which is a separate insurer from Ambac, and filed a petition for rehabilitation that limited the rehabilitation to only the segregated account, while leaving most policies in the general account with Ambac. Ambac’s municipal bond obligations remained in the general account and, therefore, were not affected by the rehabilitation proceeding.

b.      CIFG Guaranty (CIFG)

As of November 2007, CIFG had $85 billion of insured obligations outstanding. Like Ambac, CIFG experienced financial strains as a result of the company guaranteeing large amounts of RMBS. On January 22, 2009, the New York Insurance Department approved two transactions meant to keep CIFG out of a rehabilitation proceeding. The transactions involved a commutation of approximately $12 billion in troubled credit default swaps and reinsurance of $13 billion of municipal bonds. As part of the transaction, Assured Guaranty Corp. (AGC) acquired the investment grade portion of now-defunct CIFG’s municipal exposure through a reinsurance agreement. Most former CIFG bonds now carry the Aa3/AA+ ratings of AGC.

c.       Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (FGIC)

As of November 2007, FGIC had $315 billion of insured obligations outstanding. On June 28, 2012, the Court  signed a rehabilitation order appointing the Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York as rehabilitator of FGIC. On June 11, 2013, the New York state court entered an order approving FGIC’s plan of rehabilitation. Under the plan of rehabilitation, FGIC will make an initial payment of 17.5 percent on allowed claims, and make later payments totaling 40 percent of the allowed claims. While the court confirmed the plan of rehabilitation, the plan has not yet become effective and will not do so until mid-August 2013, at the earliest.

d.      Assured Guaranty Corp. (f/k/a Financial Security Assurance) (AGC)

As of November 2007, AGC had $414 billion of insured obligations outstanding. In 2009, AGC’s parent Assured Guaranty Ltd. acquired Financial Security Assurance and subsequently renamed it Assured Guaranty Municipal (AGM), thus combining under the same ownership the two most highly rated bond insurers at that time. Both monolines were rated AAA at the time of the acquisition, but were subsequently downgraded to AA in 2010. As a result of the real estate market deterioration, the RMBS portion of AGC’s consolidated exposure was hit with significant claims in recent years. However, on a percentage basis the exposure was not as large as that of other insurers such as MBIA and Ambac, and fewer claims have resulted. As such AGM and AGC have retained their high investment grade ratings. The addition of the insured book of CIFG has increased the percentage of exposure accounted for by municipal bonds.

e.       MBIA Insurance Corporation (MBIA)

As of November 2007, MBIA had $652 billion of insured obligations outstanding. Like many of the other monolines, MBIA’s credit rating was downgraded because of its RMBS exposure. Recently, however, the company’s bond rating was upgraded from B- to BBB. More importantly, MBIA’s municipal debt guaranty business unit, National Public Finance Guarantee Corp. (NPFGC), was upgraded from BBB to A. While MBIA retained Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP as restructuring counsel in April 2013,[65] such reports indicate that the firm’s retention was part of an effort to avoid a possible rehabilitation of MBIA’s structured finance unit, and not the municipal bond unit. There is no indication that a rehabilitation proceeding will be commenced against NPFGC.

f.       Syncora Guarantee Inc. (f/k/a XL Capital Assurance (XLCA))

As of November 2007, Syncora, then known as XLCA, had $143 billion of insured obligations outstanding. Unlike many of the other monoline insurers, Syncora has remained solvent. Syncora, however, is not underwriting any new policies.

Appendix A – Comparing Chapter 9 and Chapter 11


[1] The bankruptcy court docket for Detroit, including copies all documents filed in the case, is available without charge to the public athttp://www.kccllc.net/Detroit.

[2] See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶109.04[1] (16th ed.).

[3] Mike Maciag, “How Rare Are Municipal Bankruptcies?” Governing, Jan. 24, 2013.

[4] Michigan is one of the states that conditionally authorizes chapter 9 filings. Specifically, MCL 141.1558 authorizes a local government for which an emergency manager has been appointed to become a chapter 9 debtor if the governor approves the emergency manager’s recommendation that the local government commence a chapter 9 case. The statute further provides that “[t]he governor may place contingencies on a local government in order to proceed under chapter 9.” Id.

[5] 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 900.02[2][e][i] (16th ed.).

[6] Id. (“In New Smyrna-DeLand Drainage District v. Thomas, in which the debtor filed an ‘amended plan,’ but relied on prior consents to the original plan, the court of appeals upheld the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that the plan was a new plan, and that the prior consents to one plan could not be counted toward the new plan.”).

[7] Id. ¶ 900.02[2][e][ii].

[8] 165 B.R. 60 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994).

[9] Id. at 78.

[10] Id. (citing In re Cottonwood Water & Sanitation Dist., 138 B.R. 973, 974, 979 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).

[11] Id.In re Villages at Castle Rock Metropolitan Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 84 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 900.03.

[12] Sullivan County, 165 B.R. at 78.

[13] 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 900.02[2][e][iii] (16th ed.).

[14] Id. ¶ 900.02[2][e][iv].

[15] Specifically, sections 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549(a), 549(c), 549(d), 550, 551, 552, 553, 555, 556, 557, 559, 560, 561, 562 of the Bankruptcy Code apply in a chapter 9 case.

[16] 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 921.03 (16th ed.) (citing S. Rep. No. 94–458, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975)).

[17] Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94–686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975)).

[18] 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The three-part test articulated in Bildisco requires a debtor to establish that (a) the labor agreement burdens the estate; (b) after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of contract rejection; and (c) “reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made, and are not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution.”Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526.

[19] In re County of Orange, 179 B.R. 177 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).

[20] Id. at 179.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 184.

[23] 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009).

[24] Id. at 78.

[25] Id. at 76.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at 76–77.

[29] Id. at 78.

[30] 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 901.04[13][c] (16th ed.).

[31] National Governors’ Association et al., Facts You Should Know: State and Local Bankruptcy, Municipal Bonds, State and Local Pensions 2 (2013).

[32] National Governors’ Association et al., Facts You Should Know: State and Local Bankruptcy, Municipal Bonds, State and Local Pensions 2 (2011).

[33] Michael De Angelis & Xiaowei Tian, “United States: Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy—Utilization, Avoidance, and Impact” 323 (2011).

[34] Id. at 321.

[35] See American Bankruptcy Institute, Quarterly Non-business Filings by Chapter (1994–2012).

[36] Id. at 321–22.

[37] Id. at 322.

[38] Id.

[39] See Steven Church, “Stockton Threatens to Be First City to Stiff Bondholders,” Bloomberg, June 30, 2012.

[40] See De Angelis & Tian, supra note 33, at 324.

[41] See id. at 325.

[42] See id. at 325–26.

[43] See id. at 326.

[44] See id. at 331.

[45] See id.

[46] See id.

[47] See id.

[48] See Katherine Sayre, “Alabama Supreme Court Ruling Allows Prichard Bankruptcy to Move Forward,” April 20, 2012.

[49] See id.

[50] See id.

[51] See De Angelis & Tian, supra note 33, at 326–27.

[52] See id. at 327.

[53] See id. at 327–28.

[54] See id.

[55] See id. at 330.

[56] See id.

[57] See id. at 330–31.

[58] See id. at 328.

[59] See id. at 328–29.

[60] See Steven Church, Margaret Newkirk and Kathleen Edwards, “Jefferson County, Creditors Reach Deal to End Bankruptcy,” Bloomberg, June 5, 2013.

[61] See De Angelis & Tian, supra note 33, at 329.

[62] See id. at 329–30.

[63] See id. at 330.

[64] In re City of Stockton, Slip-Op Case No. 12-32118-C-9 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 12, 2013).

[65] See, e.g., Shayndi Raice, “MBIA Hires Law Firm,” The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2013, at B2.

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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Settles with HTC America Over Charges it Failed to Secure Smartphone Software

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Smartphone manufacturer HTC agreed in February to settle Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charges that the company failed to take reasonable steps to secure software it developed for its mobile devices including smartphones and tablet computers. In its complaint, the FTC charged HTC with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act.  On July 2 the FTC approved a final order settling these charges.

trade FTC smartphone HTC

The FTC alleged HTC failed to employ reasonable security measures in its software which led to the potential exposure of consumer’s sensitive information. Specifically, the FTC alleged HTC failed to implement adequate privacy and security guidance or training for engineering staff, failed to follow well-known and commonly accepted secure programming practices which would have ensured that applications only had access to users’ information with their consent. Further, the FTC alleged the security flaws exposed consumers to malware which could steal their personal information stored on the device, the user’s geolocation information and the contents of the user’s text messages.

HTC is a manufacturer of smartphones but it also installs its own proprietary software on each device. It is this software that the FTC targeted. While HTC smartphones run Google’s Android operating system, the HTC software allegedly introduced significant vulnerabilities which circumvented some of Android’s security measures.

As part of the settlement consent order, HTC agreed to issue security patches to eliminate the vulnerabilities. HTC also agreed to establish a comprehensive security program to address the security risks identified by the FTC and to protect the security and confidentiality of consumer information stored on or transmitted through a HTC device. HTC further agreed to hire a third party to evaluate its data and privacy security program and to issue reports every two years for the consent order’s 20 year term. The implication of the FTC’s policy makes it clear that companies must affirmatively address both privacy and data security issues in their custom applications and software for consumer use.

White House Highlights the Need For Educated Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Employees

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The Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) highlighted the need for immigration reform in a recently published blog post. Over 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies, including GE, Ford, Yahoo and Google, were founded by immigrants or children of immigrants. According to the OSTP, the recently passed bipartisan Senate bill would enact some of the President’s key priorities for retaining the skilled workers.

Specifically, the bill would remove visa caps for immigrants with a PhD or Master’s degree in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (“STEM”). A recent article from Forbes.com highlighted the continuing need for STEM graduates. The median pay for STEM graduates with less than three years of work experience was $88,700. However, STEM jobs remain unfilled because of the lack of qualified candidates.

The Senate bill would also create a new startup visa for Immigrant Entrepreneurs. Qualified Entrepreneurs would have to invest no less than $100,000 in a U.S. business, create no fewer than three jobs and generate at least $250,000 in annual revenue from business conducted in the United States. A “Qualified Entrepreneur” would be an individual who has a significant ownership interest in a U.S. business entity, is employed in a senior executive position of that U.S. business entity, submits a business plan to USCIS and has a substantial role in the founding or early stage development of such entity.

Additionally, the bill would eliminate the existing backlogs for employment-based visas. This change would permanently expand the availability of visa numbers for high-skilled workers by exempting relatives of these skilled workers from the annual cap. These are important, necessary and critical changes to our broken immigration system. All eyes are now focused on the House to see if these important immigration reform steps will be passed into law and how the new bill would impact the EB-5 program.

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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Requires Filing of Additional Oil Pipeline Rate Base Information

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On July 18th, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) approved a final rule that makes substantive changes to the components of FERC Form 6, which interstate oil pipelines are required to file each year.[1] The rule requires additional reporting of the figures underlying pipelines’ rates of return and is intended to make it easier for both FERC and oil pipeline shippers to evaluate whether a given transportation rate complies with the law.

The new rule pertains to page 700 of Form 6, which provides information designed to show the pipeline’s cost of service, including O&M expenses, rate base, rate of return, total cost of service, revenues, and throughput. The purpose of this reporting is to provide a preliminary screen for determining whether a pipeline’s rates are “just and reasonable” as required by the Interstate Commerce Act.

In the final rule, FERC added new fields to page 700 that are intended to allow shippers to more easily calculate an oil pipeline’s actual rate of return on equity. The new required information, which FERC anticipates is already being developed in the preparation of the rate base and rate of return information required on existing page 700, is outlined briefly and at a high level below.

Interestingly, the Commission was asked by commenters to include additional changes to Form 6 in this rulemaking, including requiring companies that file Form 6 for multiple oil pipeline systems to file separate page 700s for each segment, service, or rate schedule. The Commission declined to do so in this proceeding as it was beyond the scope, but it should be noted that the consolidated Form 6’s and page 700’s that many companies currently file are alleged to mask the cost of service and rate of return for individual pipelines and services, and the comments in this proceeding suggest that shippers may continue to press FERC to require individualized page 700 filings in the future.

The changes to page 700 will take effect for the annual Form 6 filing for calendar year 2013, which is due April 18, 2014. These changes could enable new scrutiny of pipeline rates and complaints and challenges both to existing rates and to proposed annual rate increases under FERC regulations in the near future.

Outline of Page 700 Changes:

– Rate Base: While current page 700 requires the pipeline to report its rate base for each year, the revised page 700 will require this number to be broken out into three new components: Depreciated Original Cost; Unamortized Starting Rate Base Write-Up; and Accumulated Net Deferred Earnings.  The sum of these three components will equal the rate base number that was already required.

– Rate of Return: The existing rate of return percentage reported on page 700 is a weighted cost of capital; the new page 700 will require reporting of the cost of equity, costs of debt, and capital structure supporting the rate of return.

– Return on Rate Base: Currently, page 700 requires reporting of the return on rate base, combining the real return on equity and the portion of the return allocated to paying the pipeline’s cost of debt.  The revised page 700 requires breaking the return of rate base into separate debt and equity components.

– Composite Tax Rate: The revised page 700 will require pipelines to report the adjusted sum of the pipeline’s applicable state and federal income tax rates.

The stated purpose of the page 700 changes is to better enable the calculation of the actual return on equity of the pipeline, as adjusted for taxes, inflation and depreciation.  The final rule states that this calculation “is particularly useful information when using page 700 as a preliminary screen to evaluate whether additional proceedings may be necessary to challenge rates.”[2]


[1] Revisions to Page 700 of FERC Form No. 6, 144 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2013).

[2] Id. at P 36

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Further Postponements of Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FATCA) Effective Dates Announced

DrinkerBiddle

Once again, the IRS has pushed back FATCA effective dates due to further delays in the process of finalizing FATCA materials.

Under Notice 2013-43, released July 12, 2013, several key effective dates have been deferred another six months, to July 1, 2014.  That date is now:

  • the first date on which FATCA withholding will apply to US-source payments;
  • the cut-off date for grandfathering of existing obligations; and
  • the date by which withholding agents generally will be required to implement new FATCA-compliant account opening procedures.

The process of foreign financial institutions registering with, and reporting to, the IRS as participating foreign financial institutions (PFFIs) has also been deferred:

  • The online registration mechanism that was to have been in place by the beginning of this month is now expected to become available in mid-August, and online registrations will not actually become effective before January 1, 2014.
  • The first reports that PFFIs will be required to begin filing in 2015 with respect to their U.S. accounts will be required to cover just the 2014 calendar year (rather than including the 2013 calendar year, as had previously been the case).

The notice also touches on procedures relating to the intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) that the US is still in the process of negotiating with a number of foreign countries.  These IGAs will be designed to facilitate FFIs’ compliance with FATCA through reporting of US accounts to the tax authorities in their home countries rather than having to register with the IRS as PFFIs.

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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Orders $435 Million Civil Penalty to Barclays Bank and $1-15 Million to Four Traders

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On July 16, 2013, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ordered Barclays Bank PLC to pay one of the largest civil penalties in its history — $435 million, 144 FERC ¶ 61.041 (2013). Four traders were also assessed penalties — $15M for trader Scott Connelly, and $1M each to traders Daniel Brin, Karen Levine and Ryan Smith. The Commission also found that Barclays should disgorge $34.9M, plus interest, in unjust profits. Barclays and the traders had elected FERC procedures that require FERC to assess the penalty without formal administrative adjudication, and then pursue enforcement of its assessment in an action in federal district court. The district court action includes a de novo review of the Commission’s findings. Early reports indicate that Barclays will fight the penalty in court.

These penalties were issued after FERC found that Barclays and its traders violated the Commission’s Anti-Manipulation Rule, 18 CFR §1c.2 (2012). The Commission found that Barclays and the traders manipulated California energy markets from November 2006 to December 2008 at the four most liquid trading points in the western U.S. — Mid-Columbia, Palo Verne, North Path 15 and South Path 15, Order at 2. Specifically, the Commission found that Barclays and the traders built a “significant volume of monthly index or fixed-price physical products” at a trading point “in a direction — long or short — opposite to fixed-for-floating financial swaps they held at that point.” The Commission noted that establishing these positions “had the effect of creating physical delivery or receipt obligations which Barclays was unable to meet in actual practice,” and that Barclays and the traders were able to “flatten” these positions (“achieve zero net physical obligations”) at the end of each day through the use of next-day fixed-price or cash physical products traded on the Intercontinental Exchange platform. FERC found that the trading activity at issue was “intended to move the Index rather than respond to market fundamentals and was generally uneconomic.” Order at 4.

The Commission further concluded that Barclays and the traders not only engaged in this manipulative trading scheme, but “they did so with the intent to commit fraud.” The Commission identified seven facts found during its investigation to support its conclusions:

  1. Barclays’ and the traders’ consistent pattern of building substantial positions directionally opposite their large swap positions and the subsequent flattening which would tend to move prices to benefit those swap positions;
  2. how the trading behavior in the “Manipulation Months” differed from months where there was no alleged manipulation;
  3. traders’ communications which discuss and describe the fraudulent scheme;
  4. Barclays and the traders responding to certain allegations, but completely failing to respond to FERC Office of Enforcement staff allegations regarding the building of positions as a manipulative scheme;
  5. the uneconomic nature of the trading;
  6. inconsistency in trader testimony and trader explanations presented in submissions;
  7. the failure of economic, statistical and legal analysis provided by Barclays and the traders to otherwise explain or defend the positions, swaps or trading.

In addition, FERC noted that it “considered various evidence to reach its conclusion concerning intent,” and provided examples of some of the compelling “speaking” evidence that it found demonstrates that the traders understood that they were making the trades to “drive price,” “protect” their positions and ”move” or “affect the Index.”

The parties have 30 days to pay the civil penalties assessed after which, the Commission can pursue enforcement of its assessment in federal district court. The parties continue to have the opportunity to settle the matter with the Commission. Absent a settlement, and unlike the DC Circuit’s decision in Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013), this case may produce the first fully-adjudicated case on the merits of the Commission’s market manipulation theories.

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Virtual Communications with Real Consequences: Terminations for Social Media Posts Continue to Draw the Attention of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)

Michael Best Logo

In the late autumn of 2012, an otherwise innocuous private Facebook discussion amongst employees of Skinsmart Dermatology (Skinsmart) suddenly devolved into an expletive-laced tirade. At one point during the conversation an employee boasted that she told her supervisor to “back the freak off,” called her employer “full of sh**,” and dared Skinsmart to “fire” her and “[m]ake [her] day.”

Notably, none of the other participants in the Facebook chat directly responded to the employee’s comments. One of those participants, however, reported the employee’s remarks to Skinsmart, who promptly fired her after concluding that it was “obvious” she did not want to continue working there.

Following her termination, the employee filed an Unfair Labor Practice Charge (ULP) with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) claiming that Skinsmart fired her in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA prohibits an employer from interfering with or restraining an employee’s right to engage in “protected concerted activities.”

As background, “protected” activities include discussing wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment with coworkers. “Concerted” activities include: (1) when an individual employee seeks to “initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action”; (2) where an individual employee brings “truly group complaints” to management’s attention; and (3) where employees discuss “shared concerns” among themselves prior to any specific plan to engage in group action.

After analyzing the evidence, the NLRB’s Division of Advice recommended dismissal of the employee’s ULP Charge. First, it found the terminated employee’s Facebook comments were “an individual’s gripe” rather than an expression of “shared concerns” over working conditions among employees. Second, it found there was no evidence that the terminated employee’s coworkers viewed her remarks as an assertion of shared concerns regarding employment conditions. Consequently, the Division of Advice concluded that the employee did not participate in concerted activity, and therefore Skinsmart did not illegally fire her in response to her Facebook comments.

Significantly, before recommending dismissal of the ULP Charge, the Division of Advice also considered whether the terminated employee’s comments constituted “inherently concerted” activity that deserved protection under the NLRA.[1] While the Division of Advice ultimately ruled that they were not, its consideration of “inherently concerted” activity suggests that it will continue to interpret “protected concerted activity” as broadly as it can.

Under the “inherently concerted” analysis, an employee’s expressions may be considered protected concerted activity if those expressions involve “subjects of such mutual workplace concern” like wages, schedules, and job security, even if there was no contemplation of group action. Because the employee’s posts did not relate to any of those mutual workplace concerns, the Division of Advice concluded, the employee did not engage in “inherently concerted” activity.

In light of Skinsmart, before taking any adverse action against an employee for inappropriate social media communications, an employer should scrutinize the employee’s comments to determine whether they constitute an individual gripe or protected concerted activity. Because the NLRB has targeted “Facebook firings” as infringing on employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity, we recommend that employers undertake this analysis with the benefit of counsel to minimize their exposure to a ULP Charge or other legal action.


[1] The term, “inherently concerted,” arose out of an earlier NLRB decision in 2012. See Hoodview Vending Co., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (2012).

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