Category: Administrative & Regulatory

EEOC Sues Wal-Mart for Age and Disability Discrimination – Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

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Keller Store Manager Harassed and Then Fired Because of His Age; Also Denied a Reasonable Accommodation for His Diabetes, Federal Agency Charges

Wal-Mart Stores of Texas, LLC discriminated against a store manager by subjecting him to harassment, unequal treatment and discharge because of his age, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged in a lawsuit filed in federal court today. The EEOC’s suit also alleges that Wal-Mart violated federal anti-discrimination law when it refused the manager’s request for a reasonable accommodation for his disability.

The EEOC charges in its suit that David Moorman, the manager of a Keller, Texas Walmart store, who was 54 at the time, was ridiculed with frequent taunts from his direct supervisor including “old man” and the “old food guy.” The supervisor also derided Moorman with ageist comments such as, “You can’t teach an old dog new tricks.” The EEOC further alleges that, after enduring the abusive behavior for several months, Moorman reported the harassment to Wal-Mart’s human resources department. The EEOC contends that not only did Wal-Mart fail to take any corrective action, but the harassment, in fact, increased, and the store ultimately fired Moorman because of his age.

The suit also alleges that Wal-Mart unlawfully refused Moorman’s request for a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Following his diagnosis and on the advice of his doctor, Moorman, a diabetic, requested reassignment to a store co-manager or assistant manager position. Wal-Mart refused to consider his request for reassignment, eventually rejecting his request without any dialogue or consideration.

Such alleged conduct violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) which prohibits discrimination on the basis of age 40 or older, including age-based harassment. It also violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which protects employees from discrimination based on their disabilities and requires employers to provide disabled employees with reasonable accommodations. The EEOC filed suit, Case No. 3:14-CV-00908-M, in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas after first attempting to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process.

The EEOC seeks injunctive relief, including the formulation of policies to prevent and correct age and disability discrimination. The suit also seeks damages for Moorman, including lost wages and an equal amount of liquidated damages for Wal-Mart’s willful conduct. The EEOC will also seek damages for harms suffered as a result of the non-accommodation.

“Employers should be diligent about preventing and correcting conduct that can amount to bullying at the workplace,” said EEOC Senior Trial Attorney Joel Clark. “They have an obligation to stop ageist harassment after it is reported. The company’s failure to take remedial action to stop the harassment, as well as the denial of a reasonable accommodation for a disability, and the ultimate termination of the discrimination victim demonstrate a disregard for equal opportunity laws. The EEOC is here to fight for the rights of people like Mr. Moorman.”

Robert A. Canino, regional attorney for the EEOC’s Dallas District Office, added, “The open mockery and insulting of experienced employees who have committed themselves to work for a company are totally unacceptable. It’s unfortunate when supervisors and managers lose sight of the importance of valuing employees. But we are hopeful that a constructive resolution which promotes the common goal of achieving a respectful work environment will emerge from this process.”

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U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

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U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Bittersweet Ending for Plaintiffs in Chocolate Price-Fixing Litigation

In a February 26, 2014 Memorandum, Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment for three defendants Mars, Inc., Nestlé USA, Inc., and The Hershey Company in a detailed opinion. The plaintiffs filed suit against chocolate manufacturers nearly six years ago, claiming that they conspired to fix the prices of various chocolate products. The decision is helpful for defendants as precedent that even lock-step price increases are not enough to survive summary judgment in a price-fixing case, at least in a market with few competitors. Judge Conner’s decision also demonstrates for defendants the value of developing and shepherding a comprehensive record to support the argument that their decisions were independent and economically and rationally defensible.

The plaintiffs relied on circumstantial evidence and an inference that parallel price increases were the result of a tacit agreement to engage in collusive behavior, “actuated” by a conspiracy in Canada that resulted in at least one guilty plea by a Canadian chocolate manufacturer. Judge Conner relied in part on a finding that the Canadian conspiracy made a similar conspiracy in the United States more plausible in denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 538 (M.D. Pa. 2009).

Judge Conner found at the summary judgment stage, however, that there was no evidence that executives responsible for pricing in the United States were aware of any anticompetitive activity in Canada, and concluded that the rest of the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to preclude summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs had no direct evidence of conspiracy, so they were required to show both that the defendants consciously raised prices in parallel as well as sufficient evidence of “plus factors.” In this case, the court considered three plus factors: (1) the defendants’ motive and market factors; (2) whether the defendants’ behavior was against their self-interest; and (3) traditional conspiracy evidence. The plaintiffs’ evidence of parallel pricing was the strongest part of their case. The court concluded that Mars, Nestle, and Hershey raised prices in parallel because¾three times over the course of five years¾Mars initiated a price increase, and both Hershey and Nestle followed in quick succession (within one to two weeks) with nearly identical price increases (varying only once, and even then only by two-tenths of a penny).

The court recognized, however, that parallel price increases were not sufficient, especially in a market controlled by a few competitors (or an oligopoly) to support an inference of antitrust liability. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants acted against their own self-interest as required by the second plus factor. In reaching this conclusion, the court first pointed to evidence that the defendants increased prices in anticipation of cost increases, stating “it is rational, competitive, and self-interest motivated behavior to increase prices for the purpose of mitigating the effect of anticipated cost increases.” Judge Conner also cited to what he described as “extensive” internal communications before each increase in which each defendant unilaterally discussed whether they could raise prices as evidence of “independent and fiercely competitive business conduct,” not collusion. Finally, the court agreed with Nestle’s argument that widely supported economic principles supported its decision as the defendant with the smallest market share to follow the price increases of its competitors. In doing so, the court likely rejected an argument¾often made by plaintiffs¾that it was in Nestle’s best interest to cut prices and gain market share.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ traditional evidence of conspiracy was insufficient to satisfy the third plus factor. The plaintiffs relied on three pieces of evidence to satisfy this factor: (1) the Canadian conspiracy; (2) the defendants’ possession of competitors’ pricing information; and (3) the defendants’ opportunity to conspire at trade association meetings. While the court accepted that the Canadian conspiracy could, in theory, facilitate a conspiracy in the United States, it found the facts did not support the application of the theory in this case because there was no evidence that U.S. decision-makers had knowledge of the Canadian conspiracy and there was no tie between the pricing activities in the two countries. From the court’s opinion, it appears the plaintiffs had little traditional conspiracy evidence beyond the supposed connection to Canada. The court rejected an argument that a “handful” of documents suggesting that the defendants were aware of competitors’ price increases before they were made public supported an inference of conspiracy. There was no evidence that the pricing information came from competitors, and the court concluded that this exchange of advance price information was as consistent with independent competitive behavior as it was with collusion. Finally, the court ruled that the presence of company officers at trade meetings¾without any evidence that they discussed prices there¾was insufficient to permit an inference that the price increases were the result of collusive behavior. Reviewing the record as a whole, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had produced no evidence tending to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted independently.

Judge Conner’s opinion is a relatively straightforward application of the standard for ruling on summary judgment in antitrust cases set forth in the Supreme Court’s Matsushita decision and for parallel pricing cases as set forth in the Third Circuit’s Baby Food and Flat Glass opinions. If appealed, Chocolate Confectionary is unlikely to result in a decision changing these standards significantly.

On the bright side for the plaintiffs, they reached a settlement with at least one defendant, Cadbury, before the summary judgment motion was ruled upon, so they will not be left empty handed.

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Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

United Auto Workers (UAW) and Volkswagen (VW) Efforts to Establish First Works Council in the U.S. Fails

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The United Auto Workers (UAW), which already represents most of the largest carmakers in the United States, was unsuccessful in its efforts to unionizeVolkswagen’s (VW) plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee. What makes this noteworthy is that leading up to the February 14th representation election, the German company was actually campaigning for the UAW not against it in an employer-union alliance seldom seen in this country.

While the “big three” American carmakers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) are all unionized, foreign carmakers have avoided unionization by locating their plants in Southern states with strong Right to Work laws. Volkswagen, however, considers the creation of a so-called “works council” a crucial element of its business. Works councils are common under German law, and Volkswagen has established works councils at all its foreign plants, with the exception of Chattanooga and China.

Under these works councils, all workers in a factory regardless of position and whether they are unionized or not, help decide things like staffing schedules and working conditions, while the union bargains on wages and benefits. They also have the right to review certain types of information about how the company is doing financially, which means that they tend to be more sympathetic towards management’s desire to make cutbacks during tough financial times. Each Volkswagen plant throughout the world sends its delegates to a global works council that influences which products the company makes and where. This arrangement would have represented a new experience for the UAW, unlike its relationship with Chrysler, General Motors and Ford, which would have involved sharing control with the works council.

A tough question for Volkswagen and the UAW is whether a works council would be legal in the United States without a union. There is no provision in the NLRA for the kind of German-style works council Volkswagen seeks. Volkswagen’s best option for creating a works council would have been for its workers to accept UAW representation. Volkswagen must now rethink its options in seeking a way to create a works council. Options include talking with a different union that might be more popular with its workers or encouraging workers to organize their own independent union. Another option would be moving ahead without a union and risking an NLRB challenge.

After the UAW was defeated by a 712-626 vote in its bid to represent workers at the Volkswagen plant, the UAW promptly requested a new election claiming Tennessee politicians and outside organizations coordinated and vigorously promoted a coercive campaign to sow fear and deprive Volkswagen workers of their right to join a union. Senior state officials including United States Senator Bob Corker, TennesseeGovernor William Haslam, State House Speaker Beth Harwell, and State House Majority Leader Gerald McCormick, made statements in an effort to convince the workers to reject the UAW. The UAW’s alleges this was part of an unlawful campaign which included publicly announced and widely disseminated threats by elected officials that state-financed incentives would be withheld if workers exercised their right to join the UAW’s ranks. However, on February 25, 2014, a group of Volkswagen workers sought to intervene in the UAW‘s bid, and argued that the election results should stand.

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Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

Facebook Post Breaches Confidentiality Provision of Settlement Agreement

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A Florida appellate court has ruled that a teenaged daughter’s post on Facebookmentioning her father’s confidential settlement of an age discrimination claim breached a confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement, barring the father from collecting an $80,000 settlement. Gulliver Schools, Inc. v. Snay, No. 3D13-1952 (Fla 3d DCA Feb. 26, 2014).

The plaintiff, Patrick Snay, was a headmaster of Gulliver, a private school in the Miami area. After his contract was not renewed, he sued for age discrimination. The parties reached a settlement pursuant to a written agreement, which included a detailed confidentiality provision. The provision stated in part:

13. Confidentiality . . . [T]he plaintiff shall not either directly or indirectly, disclose, discuss or communicate to any entity or person, except his attorneys or other professional advisors or spouse any information whatsoever regarding the existence or terms of this Agreement. . . A breach . . . will result in disgorgement of the Plaintiff’s portion of the Settlement Payments.

A couple of days after the agreement was signed, Snay’s daughter, who had recently been a student at Gulliver, posted the following on her Facebook page:

Mama and Papa Snay won the case against Gulliver. Gulliver is now officially paying for my vacation to Europe this summer. SUCK IT.

Snay’s daughter had about 1,200 Facebook friends, many of whom were current or former Gulliver students. Gulliver notified Snay of the breach and refused to tender the $80,000 to Snay under the terms of the settlement. (Snay’s attorneys received their portion). Snay moved to enforce the agreement. Limited discovery revealed that Snay and his wife notified their daughter “that the case was settled and they were happy with the result.” Snay denied ever discussing a trip to Europe. The district court held that Snay’s actions did not violate the terms of the agreement, but the appellate court reversed, noting that Snay was prohibited from “directly or indirectly” disclosing even the “existence” of the settlement.

The decision offers lessons for counsel, litigants, and parents. Counsel and litigants need to remember that these types of confidentiality provisions with disgorgement penalties are taken seriously by the courts and can be enforced. Parents need to remind their children to be mindful of what they post on social media, because it might have adult consequences.

Article by:

V. John Ella

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Jackson Lewis P.C.

California District Court Holds that Providing Cellphone Number for an Online Purchase Constitutes “Prior Express Consent” Under TCPA – Telephone Consumer Protection Act

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A federal district court in California recently ruled that a consumer who voluntarily provided a cellphone number in order to complete an online purchase gave “prior express consent” to receive a text message from the business’s vendors under the TCPA. See Baird v. Sabre, Inc., No. CV 13-999 SVW, 2014 WL 320205 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014).

In Baird, the plaintiff booked flights through the Hawaiian Airlines website. In order to complete her purchase, the plaintiff provided her cellphone number. Several weeks later she received a text message from the airline’s vendor, Sabre, Inc., inviting the plaintiff to receive flight notification services by replying “yes.” The plaintiff did not respond and no further messages were sent. The plaintiff sued the vendor claiming that it violated the TCPA by sending the single text message.

The central issue in Baird was whether, by providing her cellphone number to the airline, the plaintiff gave “prior express consent” to receive autodialed calls from the vendor under the TCPA. In 1992, the FCC promulgated TCPA implementing rules, including a ruling that “persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.” In re Rules & Reg’s Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8769 ¶ 31 (1992) (“1992 FCC Order”). In support of this ruling, the FCC cited to a House Report stating that when a person provides their phone number to a business, “the called party has in essence requested the contact by providing the caller with their telephone number for use in normal business communications.” Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102–317, at 13 (1991)).

The court found that, while the 1992 FCC Order “is not a model of clarity,” it shows that the “FCC intended to provide a definition of the term ‘prior express consent.’” Id. at *5. Under that definition, the court held that the plaintiff consented to being contacted on her cellphone by an automated dialing machine when she provided the number to Hawaiian Airlines during the online reservation process. Id. at *6. Under the existing TCPA jurisprudence, a text message is a “call.” Id. at *1. Furthermore, although the plaintiff only provided her cellphone number to the airline (and not to Sabre, Inc., the vendor), the court concluded that “[n]o reasonable consumer could believe that consenting to be contacted by an airline company about a scheduled flight requires that all communications be made by direct employees of the airline, but never by any contractors performing services for the airline.” Id. at *6. The Judge was likewise unmoved by the fact that the plaintiff was required to provide a phone number (though not necessarily a cellphone number) to complete the online ticket purchase. Indeed, the court observed that the affirmative act of providing her cellphone number was an inherently “voluntary” act and that, had the plaintiff objected, she could simply have chosen not to fly Hawaiian Airlines. Id.

Baird does not address the October 2013 TCPA regulatory amendments that require “prior express written consent” for certain types of calls made to cellular phones and residential lines (a topic that previously has been covered on this blog). See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(2), (3) (emphasis added). “Prior express written consent” is defined as “an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorized such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.” 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8). Whether the Baird rationale would help in a “prior express written consent” case likely would depend on the underlying facts such as whether the consumer/plaintiff agreed when making a purchase to be contacted by the merchant at the phone number provided, and whether the consumer/plaintiff provided an electronic signature. See 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8)(ii).

Nonetheless, Baird is a significant win for the TCPA defense bar and significantly reduces TCPA risk for the defendants making non-telemarketing calls (or texts) to cellphones using an automated dialer (for which “prior express consent” is the principal affirmative defense). If that cellphone number is given by the consumer voluntarily (and, given the expansive logic of Baird, we wonder when it could be considered “coerced”), the defendant has obtained express consent. Baird leaves open a number of questions worth watching, including how far removed the third-party contractor can be from the company to whom a cellphone number was voluntarily provided. Judge Wilson seemed to think it was obvious to the consumer that a third-party might be utilized by an airline to provide flight status information, but how far does that go? We’ll be watching.

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Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

USCIS Strictly Enforcing the Statutory Provisions in Adjudicating H-1B Petitions Filed Under the 20,000 Advanced Degree Cap

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A separate cap of 20,000 H-1B’s is allotted for those foreign nationals who were awarded advanced degrees in the U.S. However, not all degrees qualify under this provision. Recently, USCIS has been enforcing this provision very strictly, issuing requests for evidence, denials, and even initiating revocation proceedings for previously approved petitions under the advanced degree cap.

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 214(g)(5)(c) provides that those foreign nationals who earned a master’s or higher degree from a United States institution of higher education can file under the 20,000 cap, which is separate from the 65,000 cap reserved for all other H-1B petitions, with the exception of colleges, universities, and qualifying affiliated institutions who are exempt from the cap altogether. This section further states that only degrees awarded by those institutions which fit the definition set forth in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)). This section of the law, in turn, defines a U.S. institution of higher education as a public or other non-profit institution accredited by a “nationally recognized accrediting agency or association” or “granted a pre-accreditation status”. Degrees received from institutions which do not fit this definition, though located in the U.S. and award advanced degrees, do not qualify an H-1B petition to be filed under the 20,000 cap.

In the past USCIS has been liberal in reading this section, rarely rejecting filings made under this cap where the foreign national held an advanced degree awarded in the U.S. However, recently, in following its new policy of strict interpretation and observance of the immigration laws and regulations, USCIS has begun to closely scrutinize these filings, issuing requests for evidence, and even denials where it finds that the institution does not fit within the requisite definition to qualify. What’s more, Greenberg Traurig has been informed that USCIS has begun revocation proceedings for previously approved H-1B petitions, where it determined that it previously approved H-1B petitions under the advanced degree cap in error.

This year’s H-1B filings are once again expected to surpass the amount allotted under both caps within the first week, with USCIS conducting a random lottery to choose H-1B petitions for adjudication, similarly to last year. If a petition is filed erroneously requesting adjudication under the advanced degree cap and is rejected by USCIS, with both caps having been exhausted within the first week of the filing season, it is unlikely to be re-filed for the same fiscal year. Therefore, it is very important to provide all of the academic credentials in connection with the H-1B filing to your GT business immigration and compliance attorney and make sure to speak with them about the requirements involved with the H-1B petition cap filings.

Article by:

Nataliya Rymer

Of:

Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Federal Court Upholds Validity of 2011 H-2B Prevailing Wage

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The Temporary Non-agricultural Employment 2011 H-2B Wage Rule for calculating the prevailing wage rates (“Rule”) has cleared one of the last hurdles to implementation by the U.S. Department of Labor, with a ruling by a federal appeals court in Philadelphia upholding the regulation.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on February 5 that the DOL has authority to make rules regulating the H-2B program, that the Rule was lawfully promulgated and that it did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act or the Immigration and Naturalization Act.  The lawsuit was brought by employer associations that recruit H-2B workers and stand to face higher labor costs as a result of the Rule.  The case is La. Forestry Ass’n v. Sec’y United States DOL, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2167 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2014).

The Rule (76 Fed. Reg. 3,452 (Jan. 19, 2011) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 655.10)) eliminated the “four-tier wage methodology” in favor of the mean Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) wage for each occupational category, and established a wage calculation regime wherein the prevailing wage is the highest of the applicable collective bargaining agreement(s), the rate established under the DBA[???] or Service Contract Act, or the OES mean.  It also barred use of employer-submitted surveys if the prevailing wage can be determined based on OES data or the rates established under the DBA or SCA. According to DOL’s estimates, “the change in the method … will result in a $4.83 increase in the weighted average hourly wage for H-2B workers and similarly employed U.S. workers[,]” and a total annual transfer cost of $847.4 million.

This Third Circuit decision is welcomed by DOL, which has faced numerous court challenges in its efforts to promulgate new H-2B rules since 2008.  The 2011 H-2B Wage Rule was published in response to an August 2010 court order enjoining the agency from implementing its 2008 H-2B wage rule on the ground that it violated the APA, promulgated without seeking public comment.   The court ordered the DOL to promulgate new, APA-compliant rules.

Even though DOL published the 2011 Rule within the time ordered, its implementation has been held up by court action and by Congressional “appropriations concerns” denying DOL funding.  DOL continued to use its 2008 rule.  This was challenged and in March 2013, a federal district court vacated the 2008 wage rule and permanently enjoined the agency form implementing it (see www.globalimmigrationblog.com/2013/03).  The court gave the DOL 30 days to comply.  As a result, DOL and USCIS published a joint interim final rule in April 2013 that established a new methodology for calculating H-2B prevailing wages (seewww.globalimmigrationblog.com/2013/04), which DOL indicated would be effective only until the 2011 H-2B Wage Rule took effect.

Since Congress lifted the appropriations ban on the Rule when it enacted the DOL Appropriations Act, 2014 (see Pub. L. 113-76, Div. H, Title I (2014)), we anticipate DOL will now apprise the public of the status of H-2B prevailing wages and the effective date of the Rule by publishing a notice in the Federal Register.

The Third Circuit recognized its decision may lead to  a rift in the courts of appeals.   In Bayou Lawn & Landscape Servs. v. Sec. of Labor, 713 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 2013), the Atlanta court affirmed an injunction barring implementation of the interim rule preliminarily, finding DOL had no rulemaking authority over the program.  The Third  Circuit cautioned, however,   that Bayou may not be the last word on the subject from its sister circuit: “The three-member panel in Bayou opined only on whether the District Court abused its discretion…, not on whether the DOL actually has that authority or not….”

Article by:

Otieno B. Ombok

Of:

Jackson Lewis P.C.

 

Dewonkify – Risk Corridors Re: Affordable Care Act

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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act –commonly referred to as “the ACA”—is a law that reformed nearly twenty-percent of the economy through modifications to regulations and changes to existing law. Its primary goals were to expand health care coverage and control rising costs. Among a number of reforms, the ACA mandated that all citizens have health insurance for a minimum of nine months of the year (or face a penalty); allowed children to remain on their parents plan until the age of 26; created health insurance market places where anyone can shop for health insurance; and banned insurance companies from denying coverage on the basis of pre-existing conditions.

Word: Risk Corridors

Used in a sentence: “Risk corridors, a provision of the ACA, limits both the amount of money that a health-insurance plan can make and lose during the first three years it is sold on the new health-care exchanges. Related programs that mitigate risk for insurance companies are also being targeted by conservative Republicans.” –Rep. Tom Cole quoted in The Washington Post.

Definition: Risk corridors are a component of the ACA that limit the risk borne by qualified health plans on the insurance marketplaces. Risk Corridors are a mechanism to minimize the year-end losses of insurers who covered a disproportionate share of sicker, often older, insured customers. The federal government, through the Department of Health and Human Services, agrees to cover 50% of the excess costs borne by insurers if those costs exceeded premiums by 3-8%. In the event those losses amount to greater than 8%, the government will defray 80% of those losses. However, if insurance companies see similar gains then the situation is reversed and the federal government is the beneficiary of those excess funds. This is the risk adjustment portion of the ACA where “healthier” insurance companies help ones shouldering more expensive populations.

History: Ideally, insurance is a system whereby a company manages risk by distributing moneys from a sizeable portion of healthy participants—needing minimal to moderate medical services—to a much smaller portion of sicker participants that need a lot more medical services. This results in a margin or profit where premiums exceed the medical costs of the consumers participating in a given plan. This is a simplified way of explaining what actuaries do every year. They take consumers in a given plan and compare their likelihood to use medical services with the expected revenues from monthly insurance premiums and other out-of-pocket costs like yearly deductibles. However, the advent of the ACA brought on this new frontier of health insurance marketplaces where no one could be denied care due to pre-existing conditions: previous surgery, diabetes, HIV, cancers, benign tumors, hypertension, etc.

Although, risk was managed by mandating that everyone be covered, this did not completely allay the fears of private insurers. Actuaries remained nervous. Anyone from the individual market—usually those not eligible for Medicaid/Medicare or employer sponsored coverage—could enter the exchanges and purchase insurance coverage. This uncertainty could have resulted in excessive premiums to consumers. To mitigate that risk and help with the possibility that consumers would be sicker and older—and thus more likely to use many costly medical procedures—the authors of the law created risk corridors. This would be a temporary program to help insurers on the insurance market places for three years.

Article by:

José Woss

Of:

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

It’s That Time of the Year Again Re: Wisconsin Property Taxes

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It’s time to open up the unwelcome envelope with your property tax bill inside. Property taxes are necessary, of course, for roads and schools and all of the other services your property receives, but you should take some time to make sure that you are not paying more than your fair share of these taxes.

Wisconsin’s State Constitution has a provision requiring that all real estate be taxed “uniformly.” Regular real estate and personal property is taxed by the local municipality. Property which is used for manufacturing purposes, is taxed by the State of Wisconsin, in an effort to make sure that manufacturing property throughout the State is taxed in the same manner. Land which is in agricultural use enjoys a separate “use value assessment” system, which not only allows a lower assessment for land in that use, but also requires a per-acre penalty if that land is removed from the ag use, as defined by those statutes.

Of course, each of those taxing categories is controlled by pages of regulations containing definitions and limitations which are too complicated to insert into this article. Be aware that if you bought a parcel during calendar year 2013, your tax assessment may rise next year to the sale price named on the Transfer Tax Return filed with that deed, and you will receive a notice next spring of that increased assessment. The notice will tell you the procedure for contesting that new higher assessment and the time period, usually very short, during which you must file an appeal or lose the opportunity for another year. However, if your tax assessment should have been reduced and was not, you might not receive a notice at all, which means you must affirmatively seek out the date for filing the tax challenge and the forms needed to preserve the right to challenge. You must affirmatively notify the assessor if you demolished a building, lost a tenant, suffered a casualty loss, signed new leases for lower rents or had to offer rent concessions to renew a lease, or moved a parcel of land into or out of ag use, if you want to be sure the tax assessment is properly calculated for the actual use of the land and actual income from it. We can help you evaluate behind the scenes if the property is accurately assessed, and if it is not, file and defend a claim for you. We often charge a nominal amount for the investigation and then take the tax challenge on a contingency basis so you are only billed if we secure a tax savings for you.

Article by:

Nancy Leary Haggerty

Of:

Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

FDA (Food and Drug Adminsitration) Releases Final Electronic Medical Device Reporting (eMDR) Rule and Deadline for Compliance

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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced and is promulgating today the Final Rule on Electronic Medical Device Reporting (eMDR). Originally proposed in 2009, the rule is now final and a deadline for compliance has been identified. The rule impacts device manufacturers and importers and mandates electronic submission of individual medical device adverse event reports. User facilities may continue to submit only written reports.

As of August 14, 2015, postmarket medical device adverse event reports by manufacturers and importers must be submitted only electronically to the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health via the Electronic Submissions Gateway (ESG). The ESG is used for all forms of electronic filing to the FDA; information specific to medical device submissions is available here. Guidance about the eMDR is available here.

It is recommended you review your current system for submitting reports, and if you are not already utilizing the ESG for all reporting, develop a plan now for integrating the electronic process into your operations.

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Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.