Category: Administrative & Regulatory

SEC Revises Tick Size, Access Fees and Round-Lot Definition and Takes Steps to Disseminate Odd-Lot and Other Better Priced Orders

On September 18, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission) adopted amendments to Rule 612 (Tick Sizes) and Rule 610 (Access Fees) under Regulation NMS under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Regulation NMS).1 The SEC also added and amended definitions and other rules under Regulation NMS to address round-lot and odd-lot sizing and dissemination. We address each category of revisions below and highlight at the outset that the SEC did not adopt the controversial provision that would have prevented market centers from executing orders at prices less than the current or revised tick sizes. That is, the minimum tick size continues to address only the minimum price increment at which a market center can publish a quotation for a security. This is significant, as adopting such a prohibition would have prevented broker-dealers and other market centers from providing price improvement at prices finer than the quotation tick sizes.

The SEC also took a measured approach to other aspects of the rule. As explained more fully below, the Commission adopted only one additional minimum quotation size (rather than the three proposed), narrowed the scope of securities that might be subject to the smaller minimum quotation size, reduced the frequency with which primary listing exchanges must calculate tick sizes and round-lot sizes, and expanded the amount of data to be evaluated for these calculations from one month’s worth to three months’ worth.

Tick Sizes/Minimum Pricing Increments

Rule 612 of Regulation NMS regulates the price increments (that is, the “tick size”) at which a market center can display a quotation and at which a broker-dealer can accept, rank, or display orders or indications of interest in NMS stocks. Currently, for NMS stocks priced at or above $1.00 per share, broker-dealers and market centers can accept orders or quote in one-penny ($0.01) price increments and at a much smaller increment ($0.0001) for NMS stocks priced less than $1.00 per share.

The SEC and other market participants had observed that many stocks were “tick constrained” — that is, bids, offers, and other orders in those stocks might regularly allow for quotation spreads narrower than $0.01, but the penny spread requirement of Rule 612 constrained such narrower quoting. Determining the “right” quote size for a security can be complicated: on the one hand, a narrower spread reduces transaction costs for investors. On the other hand, too narrow a quotation spread allows other market participants to “step ahead” of a quotation — that is, obtain better priority — by entering an order that is priced only slightly better. Obtaining priority by quoting for an economically insignificantly better price disincentivizes those offering liquidity or price improvement to the market. Stated simply, a market participant has little incentive to expose its order to the market if another participant can easily get better priority over that order at an insignificant cost. Accordingly, the Commission sought to balance the two competing concerns of spread size and fear of stepping ahead.

Tick sizes are also relevant in the competition between exchange and non-exchange trading venues. Due to their market structure, exchanges generally execute orders at the prices they quote, but cannot execute at prices within the quoted spread. Narrower spreads provide better opportunities for exchanges to execute at the higher bids or lower offers represented by those narrower spreads. In short, narrower spreads allow exchange venues to be more competitive with off-exchange venues.

In December 2022, the SEC proposed to add three minimum tick sizes for NMS stocks priced $1.00 or more: one-tenth of a cent ($0.001), two-tenths of a cent ($0.002), and five-tenths (or one-half) of a cent ($0.005). Public comment suggested that this proposal was too complicated and the smaller price increment of $0.001 might also have been too small, thereby facilitating stepping ahead.

The adopted rule provides for only one new tick size for certain NMS stocks priced at or above $1.00 per share: $0.005. This half-penny minimum quotation size will apply for those NMS stocks priced at or above $1 that have a “time-weighted average quoted spread” (a metric defined in the rule) of $0.015 during a three-month Evaluation Period (as described in the table below) occurring twice a year.[1] “Time-weighted average quoted spread” seeks to estimate tick constraint and identify those securities that are quoted on average at close to a one-cent spread. Specifically, under the revised rule, primary listing exchanges must calculate the time-weighted average spread over the months of January, February, and March and July, August, and September. The results of the first (Q1) calculation determines which securities are subject to the half-penny tick size for the business days between May 1 and October 31 of that year. The results of the second (Q3) calculation determines which securities are subject to the half-penny tick size for the business days between November 1 of that year and April 30 of the following year.

The following chart shows the applicable tick sizes and calculations:

The SEC’s policy rationale for adopting these amendments is that they relax existing restrictions on tick sizes, which should reduce transaction costs and provide for better price discovery for certain NMS stocks. Additionally, smaller tick sizes for NMS stocks that merit them should improve liquidity, competition, and price efficiency.

Access Fees

Securities exchanges generally charge access fees to those who take liquidity and rebate a portion of that access fee to those who provide liquidity. As the SEC explains, “the predominant exchange fee structure is maker-taker, in which an exchange charges a fee to liquidity takers and pays a rebate to liquidity providers, and the rebate is typically funded through the access fee.”3 Rule 610(c) of Regulation NMS limits the fee that an exchange can charge for accessing protected quotations4 pursuant to Rule 611 of Regulation NMS. Currently, the access fee is capped at 30 cents per 100 shares (or “30 mils” per share) for NMS securities priced at or above $1. The access fee is capped at 0.3% of the quotation price for NMS stocks priced below $1.

With a smaller minimum quotation size, the SEC took the opportunity to revise the access fee cap, which some market participants believed had been set too high. Like the tick size changes, the access fee amendment ultimately adopted was modified from what was originally proposed. Originally, the SEC proposed to reduce access fee caps (a) from 30 mils to 10 mils per share for NMS stocks priced at or over $1 that would have been assigned a tick size larger than $0.001 and (b) to 5 mils per share for NMS stocks priced at or over $1 that would have been assigned a $0.001 tick size. For protected quotations in NMS stocks priced under $1.00 per share, the Commission originally proposed to reduce the 0.3% fee cap to 0.05% of the quotation price.

Ultimately, the Commission adopted a more simplified reduction in access fee caps. Because it added only one tick size to Rule 612, the SEC adopted only one reduction in access fee caps, from 30 mils to 10 mils per share for protected quotations in NMS stocks priced $1.00 or more. For such quotations priced less than $1.00, the Commission reduced the access fee cap from 0.3% to 0.1% of the quotation price per share. In addition, the SEC adopted (as proposed) new Rule 612(d), requiring all exchange fees charged and all rebates paid for order execution to be determinable at the time of execution. Currently, such exchange fees are subject to complex fee schedules that apply tiered and other discounts at month-end. As a result, market participants would not necessarily know intra-month whether their broker might access a higher tier later in the month, which would adjust the fee charged for the subject order. The new rule ends this uncertainty.

Setting the revised access fee cap at 10 mils per share was somewhat controversial, with Commissioners Peirce and Uyeda questioning the manner in which 10 mils was determined, whether another rate should have been used (15 mils? 5 mils? 12 mils?) and whether the Commission should be in the rate-setting business at all. The Commissioners ultimately voted in favor of the proposal based upon a pledge (discussed below) that the SEC staff will, by May 2029, “conduct a review and study the effects of the amendments in the national market system.”5

Required Staff Review and Study

The Adopting Release requires that the Commission staff conduct a “review and study” by May 2029 of the effects of the amendments on the national market system. The details of such study are not clearly defined, but the Adopting Release provides that:

[s]uch a review and study might include, but would not be limited to, an investigation of: (i) general market quality and trading activity in reaction to the implementation of the variable tick size, (ii) the reaction of quoted spreads to the implementation of the amended access fee cap, and (iii) changes to where market participants direct order flow, e.g., to exchange versus off-exchange venues, following the implementation of the amendments.6

Compliance Dates and Timelines

The amendments described above become effective 60 days after the publication of the SEC’s Adopting Release in the Federal Register. The date by which exchanges, broker-dealers, and other market participants must comply with the rule amendments is generally in November 2025 but, in some instances, in May 2026, as described more fully below. Specifically, the Compliance Date:

  • for the tick size amendments (half-penny quoting for “tick-constrained” stocks) of Rule 612 is “the first business day of November 2025,” or November 3, 2025.
  • for the 10 mils per share access fee cap amendment of Rule 610 and the new requirement under Rule 612(d) that exchange fees be known at time of execution in each case, is also November 3, 2025.
  • for the new round-lot definition (100 shares, 40 shares, 10 shares, or 1 share) is November 3, 2025.
  • for the dissemination of “odd-lot information,” including the new BOLO data element, is six months later, to allow broker-dealers and others to program systems accordingly. These changes will take effect on “the first business day of May 2026,” or May 1, 2026.

Closing Thoughts

The tick size and access fee amendments, and the other provisions adopted, appear to reflect negotiated concessions and a reasonable approach to addressing tick-constrained securities while avoiding the complex framework originally proposed. The decision not to prevent executions at prices within the minimum quotation size is appropriate and preserves the ability of market participants to provide price improvement to investors. While there can be some lingering debate about the appropriate level to which to reduce the access fee cap and whether 10 mils is an appropriate level, the net cumulative effect of these amendments appears reasonable. The planned “review and study” of the effect of the amendments may come too late if conducted towards the outer limit of “by May 2029,” but the overall effect of the amendments should serve to narrow spreads and increase quotation transparency through sub-penny quoting, reduced round-lot sizes, and the inclusion of odd-lot information.

1 Release No. 34-101070, Regulation NMS: Minimum Pricing Increments, Access Fees, and Transparency of Better Priced Orders, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 18, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/34-101070.pdf (the “Adopting Release”).
2 The SEC modified of these requirements in the final rule. For example, the SEC had originally proposed smaller tick sizes for stocks with a time-weighted average quoted spread of $0.04 (rather than $0.015). The proposal also sought to evaluate tick-sizes 4 times per year rather than twice a year and based on monthly data rather than quarterly data.
3 Adopting Release at 15.
4 A protected quotation is defined in Rule 600(b)(82) of Regulation NMS as “a protected bid or protected offer.” 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(82). A protected bid or protected offer is defined as “a quotation in an NMS stock that: (i) is displayed by an automated trading center; (ii) is disseminated pursuant to an effective national market system plan; and (iii) is an automated quotation that is the best bid or best offer of a national securities exchange, or the best bid or best offer of a national securities association.” 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(81)
5 Adopting Release at 288.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
©2024 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
For more news on Rule 612 and Rule 610 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

A Study in THC-O: Unpacking the Recent Anderson Case

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit handed the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) a big loss when it comes to hemp. In Anderson v. Diamondback Investment Group, LLC, the court ruled that the DEA’s interpretation, which classified a host of hemp-derived products as illegal, was incorrect.

I’ve previously written about the impact of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo on cannabis and hemp in this blog, and Anderson is one of the first cases to show how courts will handle cannabis law post-Chevron. In Loper, the Supreme Court ended the long-standing doctrine of Chevron deference. That doctrine required federal courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, so long as it was “reasonable,” even if the court didn’t agree with it. Now, courts don’t have to give the DEA (or any agency) that kind of leeway. If the agency’s interpretation isn’t the best reading of the statute, it is merely persuasive material at best.

This reminds me of my days of clerking on the Court of Common Pleas. Oftentimes, lawyers would cite other non-binding Common Pleas decisions, and the judge would merely say he would consider them but did not view them as binding. It’s almost like déjà vu for me now with Loper, on a grander scale.

Since Loper was decided, everyone has had theories about how it could impact things like cannabis rescheduling or the legality of hemp-derived cannabinoids. In particular, the DEA has been flexing its muscles with opinion letters about what it considers to be legal or illegal cannabinoids. This is where Loper comes into play. In theory, the DEA can still issue its opinions, but the courts aren’t going to roll over and accept those interpretations without question anymore. That’s exactly what happened in Anderson.

Without getting into the weeds of the case too much, here’s the gist: an employee was fired after drug tests allegedly showed cannabis use. She sued her employer, claiming she was using legal hemp-derived products. The court said she didn’t provide enough evidence to prove those products contained less than 0.3% Delta-9 THC—the magic number that separates hemp from cannabis under federal law. So, in the district court’s view, she did not have a case.

But the important part for us is what the court said about the 2018 Farm Bill and the DEA’s interpretation of cannabinoids like THC-O. THC-O is a synthetic compound made from hemp derivatives, and there’s been a long debate about whether products like THC-O or Delta-8 THC fall under the “hemp” umbrella.

The DEA considers synthetic cannabinoid-controlled substances, and they’ve argued that products like THC-O are illegal. The Ninth Circuit took on this issue a few years ago in AK Futures LLC v. Boyd Street Distro, LLC, where they ruled that Delta-8 THC products derived from hemp with less than 0.3% Delta-9 THC were legal under the 2018 Farm Bill.

In Anderson, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s logic, holding that “we think the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the 2018 Farm Act is the better of the two.” The court went even further, rejecting the DEA’s argument outright, thanks to the post-Loper world we now live in, where the DEA’s interpretation no longer gets automatic deference.

Here’s the key takeaway: according to the Fourth Circuit, if a product is derived from hemp and doesn’t contain more than 0.3% Delta-9 THC, it’s legal—even if it’s been processed into something like Delta-8 THC. But if a cannabinoid is made entirely from synthetic materials, it’s not hemp, and it’s not protected by the 2018 Farm Bill.

Now, before anyone starts thinking this is an all-clear for hemp products, there’s still a lot to unpack. While Anderson pushes back against the DEA’s overreach, it doesn’t mean every hemp-derived product is automatically legal. The 0.3% Delta-9 THC threshold is still critical, and businesses need to make sure they’re playing by the rules. Plus, this ruling doesn’t mean states won’t have their own say about what’s legal within their borders.

To sum it all up, the Anderson decision is important because it reinforces that courts are not bound by the DEA’s interpretations, especially post-Loper. This decision helps the hemp-derived cannabinoid market. As always, businesses must stay compliant with both federal and state laws to avoid legal headaches.

©2024 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved
For more news on Hemp Classification Litigation, visit the NLR Biotech, Food, and Drug section.

EPA Bans Ongoing Uses of Chrysotile Asbestos

On March 28, 2024, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final rule under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to address to the extent necessary the unreasonable risk of injury to health presented by chrysotile asbestos based on the risks posed by certain conditions of use (COU). 89 Fed. Reg. 21970. According to the final rule, the injuries to human health include mesothelioma and lung, ovarian, and laryngeal cancers resulting from chronic inhalation exposure to chrysotile asbestos. The final rule prohibits the manufacture (including import), processing, distribution in commerce, and commercial use of chrysotile asbestos for chrysotile asbestos diaphragms in the chlor-alkali industry; chrysotile asbestos-containing sheet gaskets in chemical production; chrysotile asbestos-containing brake blocks in the oil industry; aftermarket automotive chrysotile asbestos-containing brakes/linings; other chrysotile asbestos-containing vehicle friction products; and other chrysotile asbestos-containing gaskets. It also prohibits the manufacture (including import), processing, and distribution in commerce for consumer use of aftermarket automotive chrysotile asbestos-containing brakes/linings; and other chrysotile asbestos-containing gaskets. The final rule specifies the compliance dates for these prohibitions. The final rule also includes disposal and recordkeeping requirements for these COUs. The final rule will be effective May 28, 2024.

Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in Commerce, and Commercial Use of Chrysotile Asbestos Diaphragms in the Chlor-alkali Industry

As of the effective date of the final rule, all persons are prohibited from the manufacture (including import) of chrysotile asbestos, including any chrysotile asbestos-containing products or articles, for diaphragms in the chlor-alkali industry. Beginning five years after the effective date of the final rule, all persons are prohibited from processing, distribution in commerce, and commercial use of chrysotile asbestos for diaphragms in the chlor-alkali industry, except as provided in 40 C.F.R. Section 751.505(c) and (d).

Section 751.505(c) permits a person to process, distribute in commerce, and commercially use chrysotile asbestos for diaphragms in the chlor-alkali industry at no more than two facilities until eight years after the effective date of the final rule, provided that they meet certain conditions.

Section 751.505(d) permits a person who meets all of the criteria of that paragraph to process, distribute in commerce, and commercially use chrysotile asbestos for diaphragms in the chlor-alkali industry at not more than one facility until 12 years after the effective date of the final rule, provided that they meet certain conditions.

Certification of Compliance for Chlor-alkali Industry

A person who processes, distributes in commerce, or commercially uses chrysotile asbestos for diaphragms in the chlor-alkali industry between five years and eight years after the effective date of the final rule must certify to EPA their compliance with all requirements of Section 751.505(c) and provide the following information to EPA: identification of the facility (or facilities) at which, by five years after the effective date of the final rule, the person has ceased all processing, distribution in commerce, and commercial use of chrysotile asbestos; identification of the one or two facilities (no more than two facilities) at which the person will after five years after the effective date of the final rule continue to process, distribute in commerce, and commercially use chrysotile asbestos diaphragms while the facility or facilities are being converted to non-chrysotile asbestos membrane technology; and the name of the facility manager or other contact.

A person who processes, distributes in commerce, or commercially uses chrysotile asbestos for diaphragms in the chlor-alkali industry between eight and 12 years after the effective date of the final rule must certify to EPA their compliance with all requirements of Section 751.505(d) and provide the following information to EPA: identification of the facility at which the person has ceased all processing, distribution in commerce, and commercial use of chrysotile asbestos after five years after the effective date of the final rule but no later than eight years after the effective date of the final rule; identification of the facility at which the person will between eight years after the effective date of the final rule and no later than 12 years continue to process, distribute in commerce, and commercially use chrysotile asbestos diaphragms while the facility is being converted to non-chrysotile asbestos membrane technology pursuant to Section 751.505(d); and the name of the facility manager or other contact.

Other Prohibitions of and Restrictions on the Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in Commerce, and Commercial Use of Chrysotile Asbestos

Prohibition on Manufacture (Including Import), Processing, Distribution in Commerce, and Commercial Use of Chrysotile Asbestos for Chrysotile Asbestos-Containing Sheet Gaskets in Chemical Production

Beginning two years after the effective date of the final rule, all persons are prohibited from manufacturing (including importing), processing, distributing in commerce, and commercial use of chrysotile asbestos, including any chrysotile asbestos-containing products or articles, for use in sheet gaskets for chemical production, except as provided in Section 751.509(b) and (c). Any sheet gaskets for chemical production that are already installed and in use as of the applicable compliance date are not subject to this distribution in commerce and commercial use prohibition, however.

Section 751.509(b) allows the commercial use of chrysotile asbestos sheet gaskets for titanium dioxide production past the general two-year prohibition; any person may use chrysotile asbestos sheet gaskets for titanium dioxide production until five years after the effective date of the final rule. EPA notes that this provision applies only to commercial use; manufacturing (including import), processing, and distribution in commerce must cease after two years, pursuant to Section 751.509(a).

Section 751.509(c) allows the commercial use of chrysotile asbestos sheet gaskets for processing of nuclear material past the general two-year prohibition: any person who meets the applicable criteria in the paragraph may commercially use chrysotile asbestos sheet gaskets for processing nuclear material until five years after the effective date of this final rule. At the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site, use may continue until the end of 2037. EPA notes that this provision applies only to commercial use; manufacturing (including import), processing, and distribution in commerce must cease after two years. Section 751.509(c) requires that, beginning 180 days after the effective date of the final rule, all persons commercially using chrysotile asbestos sheet gaskets for processing nuclear material must have in place exposure controls expected to reduce exposure of potentially exposed persons to asbestos, and provide potentially exposed persons in the regulated area where chrysotile asbestos sheet gasket replacement is being performed with a full-face air purifying respirator with a P-100 (HEPA) cartridge (providing an assigned protection factor of 50), or other respirators that provide a similar or higher level of protection to the wearer.

Prohibition on Manufacture (Including Import), Processing, Distribution in Commerce, and Commercial Use of Chrysotile Asbestos-Containing Brake Blocks in the Oil Industry; Aftermarket Automotive Chrysotile Asbestos-Containing Brakes/Linings; Asbestos-Containing Vehicle Friction Products; and Other Asbestos-Containing Gaskets

Beginning 180 days after the effective date of the final rule, all persons are prohibited from manufacturing (including importing), processing, distribution in commerce, and commercial use of chrysotile asbestos, including any chrysotile asbestos-containing products or articles, for commercial use of: oilfield brake blocks; aftermarket automotive brakes and linings; other vehicle friction products; and other gaskets. Any aftermarket automotive brakes and linings, other vehicle friction products, and other gaskets that are already installed and in use as of 180 days after the effective date of the final rule are not subject to this distribution in commerce and commercial use prohibition.

Prohibition on Manufacture (Including Import), Processing, and Distribution in Commerce for Aftermarket Automotive Chrysotile Asbestos-Containing Brakes/Linings and Other Asbestos-Containing Gaskets for Consumer Use

Beginning 180 days after the effective date of the final rule, all persons are prohibited from the manufacturing (including importing), processing, and distribution in commerce of chrysotile asbestos, including any chrysotile asbestos-containing products or articles, for consumer use of: aftermarket automotive brakes and linings; and other gaskets. Any aftermarket automotive brakes and linings and other gaskets that are already installed and in consumer use as of 180 days after the effective date of the final rule are not subject to this distribution in commerce prohibition.

EPA notes that this prohibition does not apply to the consumer use of any chrysotile asbestos-containing aftermarket automotive brakes and linings and other gaskets. EPA states that its authority to regulate commercial use under TSCA Section 6(a)(5) does not extend to consumer use of chemical substances or mixtures. According to EPA, the prohibition on the upstream manufacturing, processing, and distribution of chrysotile asbestos aftermarket automotive brakes and linings and other gaskets for consumer use “will remove these products from the consumer market and over time eliminate their use as these products wear out and are replaced, or the vehicles in which they are components are retired from use.”

Interim Workplace Controls of Chrysotile Asbestos Exposures

For most of the COUs where, pursuant to the final rule, the prohibition on processing and industrial use will take effect in five or more years after the effective date of the final rule, EPA requires owners or operators to comply with an eight-hour existing chemical exposure limit (ECEL), beginning six months after the effective date of the final rule. EPA notes that this requirement applies to the following COUs:

  • Processing and industrial use of chrysotile asbestos in bulk form or as part of chrysotile asbestos diaphragms used in the chlor-alkali industry; and
  • Industrial use of chrysotile asbestos sheet gaskets for titanium dioxide production.

Once a facility has completed the phase-out of chrysotile asbestos and no longer uses chrysotile asbestos in its operations, the interim requirements no longer apply.

EPA states that its intention “is to require interim workplace controls that address the unreasonable risk from chrysotile asbestos to workers directly handling the chemical or in the area where the chemical is being used until the relevant prohibitions go into effect.” EPA notes that its 2020 Risk Evaluation for Asbestos, Part 1: Chrysotile Asbestos (Asbestos Part I) “did not distinguish between employers, contractors, or other legal entities or businesses that manufacture, process, distribute in commerce, use, or dispose of chrysotile asbestos. For this reason, EPA uses the term “owner or operator” to describe the entity responsible for implementing the interim workplace controls in any workplace where an applicable COU subject to the interim workplace controls occurs. The term includes any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises such a workplace. EPA has proposed to amend 40 C.F.R. Section 751.5 to add a definition of “owner or operator” consistent with this description as part of its proposed TSCA Section 6(a) rules to regulate methylene chloride and perchloroethylene. In this final rule, EPA uses the same definition of “owner or operator” to apply to where it appears in the regulatory text for chrysotile asbestos.

EPA notes that, as mentioned in the proposed rule, TSCA risk management requirements could incorporate and reinforce requirements in Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards. For chrysotile asbestos, EPA states that its approach for interim controls seeks to align, to the extent possible, with certain elements of the existing OSHA standard for regulating asbestos under 29 C.F.R. Sections 1910.1001 and 1926.1101. According to EPA, the OSHA permissible exposure limit (PEL) and ancillary requirements “have established a long-standing precedent for exposure limit threshold requirements within the regulated community.” EPA acknowledges that it is applying a “lower, more protective” ECEL derived from Asbestos Part I. EPA notes that it is not establishing medical surveillance requirements based on the ECEL to align with those under 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.1001, however, and that companies must continue to follow the medical surveillance requirements established by OSHA at 0.1 fiber per cubic centimeter of air as an eight-hour time-weighted average (TWA) level.

Disposal

EPA states that it is implementing the disposal provisions in the proposed rule without significant changes. EPA notes that the disposal provisions at Section 751.513 cross reference existing EPA and OSHA regulations that address asbestos-containing waste disposal. EPA requires that for the chrysotile asbestos diaphragm COU, as well as oilfield brake blocks, other vehicle friction products, and any commercial use of other gaskets and aftermarket automotive brakes and linings COUs, regulated entities must adhere to waste disposal requirements in OSHA’s Asbestos General Industry Standard in 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.1001, including Section 1910.1001(k)(6) requiring waste, scrap, debris, bags, containers, equipment, and clothing contaminated with asbestos that are consigned for disposal to be disposed of in sealed impermeable bags or other closed, impermeable containers. For the chrysotile asbestos sheet gaskets in the chemical production COU, regulated entities must adhere to waste disposal requirements described in OSHA’s Asbestos Safety and Health Regulations for Construction in 29 C.F.R. Section 1926.1101.

EPA notes that additionally, for the chrysotile asbestos diaphragm COU, as well as oilfield brake blocks, other vehicle friction products, and any commercial use of other gaskets and aftermarket automotive brakes and linings, the final rule cross-references the disposal requirements of Asbestos National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart M) at 40 C.F.R. Section 61.150. EPA states that the asbestos NESHAP reduces exposure to airborne asbestos “by generally requiring sealing of asbestos-containing waste material from regulated activities in a leak-tight container and disposing of it in a landfill permitted to receive asbestos waste.” According to EPA, it is not cross-referencing this same NESHAP waste disposal provision for the disposal of chrysotile asbestos-containing waste from sheet gasket processing and use “because EPA did not find unreasonable risk for the disposal of sheet gaskets.”

EPA also requires that each manufacturer (including importer), processor, and distributor of chrysotile asbestos, including as part of products and articles for consumer uses subject to the final rule, dispose of regulated products and articles in accordance with specified disposal provisions. EPA states that these consumer uses are aftermarket automotive brakes and linings and other gaskets. EPA notes that these consumer use supply chain disposal requirements are consistent with those for disposers of aftermarket automotive brakes and linings and other gaskets intended for commercial use. EPA states that it “does not generally have TSCA section 6(a) authority to directly regulate consumer use and disposal, but under TSCA section 6(a) EPA may nonetheless regulate the disposal activity of suppliers of these products, including importers, wholesalers and retailers of asbestos-containing aftermarket automotive brakes and linings, and other gaskets.” The disposal requirements at Section 751.513 will take effect 180 days after the effective date of the final rule.

Recordkeeping

A general records provision at 40 C.F.R. Section 751.515(a) of the final rule requires that, beginning 180 days after the effective date of the final rule, all persons who manufacture (including import), process, distribute in commerce, or engage in industrial or commercial use of chrysotile asbestos must maintain ordinary business records, such as invoices and bills-of-lading related to compliance with the prohibitions, restrictions, and other provisions of this rulemaking and must make them available to EPA for inspection. Section 751.515(b) addresses recordkeeping for certifications of compliance for the chlor-alkali industry required under Section 751.507 of the rule: persons must retain records for five years to substantiate certifications required under that provision and must make them available to EPA for inspection.

Section 751.515(c) of the final rule requires retention of records for interim workplace controls of chrysotile asbestos exposures. The final rule requires owners or operators subject to the exposure monitoring provisions of Section 751.511(c) to document and retain records for each monitoring event. Additionally, Section 751.515(c) requires that owners or operators subject to the interim workplace controls described in Section 751.511 retain certain records.

Section 751.515(d) requires the retention of disposal records. Each person, except a consumer, who disposes of any chrysotile asbestos and any chrysotile asbestos-containing products or articles subject to Section 751.513, beginning 180 days after the effective date of the final rule, must retain in one location at the headquarters of the company, or at the facility for which the records were generated: any records related to any disposal of chrysotile asbestos and any chrysotile asbestos-containing products or articles generated pursuant to, or otherwise documenting compliance with, regulations specified in Section 751.513. All records under this rule must be retained for five years from the date of generation.

Commentary

Bergeson & Campbell, P.C. (B&C®) acknowledges the historic nature of the rule, but it must also be placed into context. First, the rule applies to the few, limited ongoing uses of chrysotile asbestos that were not banned in the 1980s. It does not apply to the asbestos types that may already be in place, such as in old buildings. A ban on the manufacture, import, processing, and use of chrysotile asbestos cannot erase other types of asbestos, including chrysotile asbestos, that are and have been in place for decades. EPA’s Asbestos Part 2 risk evaluation will address the potential risk from such legacy uses and associated disposal activities. That work is underway. Second, EPA concluded that for the limited, ongoing uses of chrysotile asbestos, the only way to mitigate the risk of ongoing import, processing, use, and disposal is to ban chrysotile asbestos, except for the narrow use in brakes on specialized, large cargo aircraft operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

In its risk evaluation, EPA concluded that the use of chrysotile asbestos in chlor-alkali production does not present an unreasonable risk if protective measures are used, such as engineering controls, glove boxes, and personal protective equipment (PPE). In the final risk management rule, EPA nevertheless argues that chrysotile asbestos must be banned because the necessary PPE may not be used correctly. If this logic prevails, EPA may be in the awkward situation of needing to ban every substance that it determines as presenting an unreasonable risk when PPE is not used, meaning that EPA will have to ban nearly every substance it reviews under TSCA Section 6 (at least for the foreseeable future) because it is likely that all substances that EPA will review in the next several decades will be sufficiently hazardous for EPA to conclude that the chemical substances present an unreasonable risk from routine, unprotected inhalation and/or dermal exposures. EPA seems to be saying that someone, somewhere, under some circumstances, may decide not to wear protective measures, or not wear PPE correctly and that because of this instance, EPA cannot reduce an unreasonable risk by imposing workplace protective measures. EPA might view asbestos as a special case, but EPA did not qualify its argument in the rule.

EPA’s cost benefit analysis is surprising: EPA estimates benefits from avoided cancer cases to be between $3,000 and $6,000 per year. This is surprising in that a hazardous chemical apparently leads to so little economic benefits if asbestos is banned. The modest value would appear to be evidence that ongoing uses of chrysotile asbestos are largely not a significant health risk. In comparison, EPA’s economic analysis estimated costs ranging from $34 million to $43 million per year of implementing the rule.

EPA’s progress with advancing its TSCA Section 6 rulemaking activities on chrysotile asbestos is commendable. There are, however, several issues with EPA’s Asbestos Part I that are still unresolved and will likely resurface as the bases for any potential challenges to EPA’s rule. The first issue is EPA’s use of the now rescinded 2018 Application of Systematic Review in TSCA Risk Evaluations (the 2018 SR Document). We previously discussed our concerns with EPA’s use of this approach in Asbestos Part I. The crux of the issue is that the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) reviewed the 2018 SR Document and concluded that “The OPPT approach to systematic review does not adequately meet the state-of-practice.” This conclusion supports that EPA did not fulfill its obligations of complying with the scientific standards under TSCA Section 26. For further discussion, see our memorandum dated April 7, 2022.

The second related issue is EPA’s derivation of an inhalation unit risk (IUR) for chrysotile asbestos and its subsequent use of the IUR for establishing an ECEL. EPA derived the IUR on textile worker populations from two facilities and stated the following in Asbestos Part I: “The epidemiologic studies that are reasonably available include populations exposed to chrysotile asbestos, which may contain small, but variable amounts of amphibole asbestos.” EPA’s use of these studies was controversial and included criticisms in the peer-reviewed literature with one group of experts pointing out that “All 8 cases of pleural cancer and mesothelioma in the examined populations arose in facilities where amphiboles were present.” The same group of experts also stated that “the suggested inhalation unit risk (IUR) for chrysotile asbestos was far too high since it was not markedly different than for amosite, despite the fact that the amphiboles are a far more potent carcinogen.”

It is unclear if EPA’s study selection for deriving the IUR and exclusion of other studies was due to a flawed systematic review process or other issues, such as favoring a pre-determined outcome. The same group of experts mentioned above stated the following about EPA’s peer review on the draft version of Asbestos Part I:

[A] key limitation of the EPA meeting was that the questions that the panelists were asked to address, termed “charge questions,” did not focus on the most pertinent aspects of the document. Thus, by asking questions that avoided the thorny topics regarding chrysotile asbestos which were often poorly focused, the EPA failed to obtain relevant topical insight from the advisory panel.

Readers may find the above statements implausible, yet EPA’s sponsored peer-review activities on formaldehyde supports that they are not. On August 9, 2023, NASEM issued its report titled Review of EPA’s 2020 Draft Formaldehyde Assessment. NASEM stated the following in its report:

The committee…was not charged with commenting on other interpretations of scientific information relevant to the hazards and risks of formaldehyde, nor did its statement of task call for a review of alternative opinions on EPA’s formaldehyde assessment.

The concern with limiting the scope of a peer review is that doing so, at a minimum, creates an appearance of favoring a pre-determined outcome and may ultimately undermine the integrity of the science used in EPA’s decision-making. Either outcome is inconsistent with the scientific standards under TSCA Section 26 and EPA’s recently updated draft Scientific Integrity Policy.

The third issue relates to EPA’s unreasonable risk determination in Asbestos Part I. EPA referenced its 1994 Guidelines for Statistical Analysis of Occupational Exposure Data (the 1994 Guidelines) as the justification for evaluating monitoring samples that were below the limit of detection (LOD). EPA stated that the 1994 Guidelines “call for replacing non-detects with the LOD or LOQ [limit of quantification] divided by two or divided by the square root of two, depending on the skewness of the data distributions.” EPA also stated that “more than half of the samples were non-detectable.” The approach in the 1994 Guidelines conflicts with EPA’s 2008 Framework for Investigating Asbestos-Contaminated Superfund Sites (the 2008 Framework), which states “[w]hen computing the mean of a set of asbestos measurements, samples that are ‘nondetect’ should be evaluated using a value of zero, not ½ the analytical sensitivity [footnote omitted].” EPA did not state its rationale for not using the 2008 Framework recommendations (i.e., replacing non-detects with zero). EPA is, however, aware of the 2008 Framework, as evidenced by its use of the 2008 Framework for estimating cancer risks for less than lifetime exposure from inhalation of chrysotile asbestos.

It is not clear whether the rule will be challenged, but B&C would not be surprised if impacted industries, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholder groups bring suit. The scientific methods and documents supporting this rule have been publicly challenged specifically, as discussed above, and generally by other expert academics in the field. This is, after all, the first final rule under TSCA Section 6(a) and will be precedent setting for other risk management rules. This rule is not just about asbestos; it reflects how EPA will manage risks for existing chemical substances EPA identifies as high-priority substances under TSCA Section 6. Stay tuned.

©2024 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

USCIS Improvements Cut Naturalization Processing Time

USCIS is processing naturalization cases faster than they have in years, and the agency is managing to cut down on its naturalization backlog. Given the current average timing, eligible green card holders who applied early in the summer 2024 might be sworn in in time to vote in the upcoming November elections.

Of course, field offices vary in processing times, but USCIS stated it was effectively eliminating the net backlog of naturalization applications and reducing the median processing time from 10.5 months to as little as five months. This is a 50 percent drop in processing time since 2022, achieving the agency’s longstanding goal and significantly reducing waiting times for most individuals seeking U.S. citizenship. Naturalization has always been a target of note in the agency’s backlog reduction effort. This was achieved by increasing capacity, improving technology, and expanding staffing.

Naturalization cases often increase ahead of elections. Voting is not the only personal benefit of citizenship. Immigrants who become U.S. citizens may also serve on juries, travel on a U.S. passport, bring family members to the U.S. more easily, apply for certain federal jobs, run for federal office, become eligible for certain federal grants, scholarships and benefits, and, importantly, have the right to remain in the U.S. that cannot be taken away. Beyond that, findings show that naturalized citizens have higher employment rates and earn between 50 and 70 percent more than noncitizens. Increasing the number of citizens also helps the economy in general. It leads to an increase in tax revenue and greater home ownership.

When President Joe Biden came into office, he issued an executive order to reduce naturalization barriers to strengthen the integration of new Americans. About 100,300 naturalization petitions were denied in FY 2023, a 10 percent drop from the 111,600 petitions denied in FY 2022. The Biden Administration also made the naturalization application shorter and, while it raised the naturalization fee, a number of discounts are available.

Eligibility requirements for naturalization include age, continuous residence, physical presence, jurisdiction, knowledge of U.S. history, civics, and English, and good moral character.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024
For more on USCIS, visit the NLR Immigration section

Don’t Let the Power Go Sour – Pitfalls of Powers of Appointment

Powers of appointment are among the most versatile tools in estate planning. They are often underutilized due to a lack of understanding of their benefits and limitations. At their core, a power of appointment allows an individual, designated by a legal instrument (the “donee” or receiver of the power of appointment), to determine who will receive certain property or interests in the future. The donor, who creates this power, retains flexibility in managing and distributing their estate.

However, caution is necessary when structuring powers of appointment, particularly in the context of the marital deduction. Improperly crafted powers can inadvertently invalidate the marital deduction, leading to significant estate tax consequences. For instance, if a power of appointment does not allow the donee (often the surviving spouse) to appoint property to themselves or their estate, the property may fail to qualify for the marital deduction. This is typically the case with a special (or limited) power of appointment. In contrast, a properly structured general power of appointment can ensure that the property qualifies for the marital deduction, deferring estate taxes until the surviving spouse’s death

Clarification – Donor and Donee Examples

A wealthy individual, the donor of the power of appointment, sets up a trust for their children. The trust includes a special power of appointment allowing the spouse (the donee) to distribute the trust’s assets among their children or grandchildren after the donor’s death. The spouse can decide which child receives what portion of the assets, giving flexibility to address changing family dynamics. This type of power is often chosen to retain control within the family while protecting the assets from the spouse’s creditors and excluding the assets from the spouse’s taxable estate.

A woman (the donor) creates a will that gives her husband (the donee) a general power of appointment over certain assets. This power allows the husband to decide who will inherit those assets upon his death, including the ability to appoint them to himself, his estate, or creditors. This flexibility can be particularly useful in managing taxes and ensuring the estate is distributed according to the most current family needs. However, because the assets are included in the husband’s estate for tax purposes, this power may also increase the taxable estate, potentially leading to higher estate taxes.

Types of Powers of Appointment

Powers of appointment are classified into several categories:

  1. Imperative vs. Non-Imperative Powers: Imperative powers must be exercised by the donee, while non-imperative powers are optional.
  2. Exclusive vs. Non-Exclusive Powers: Exclusive powers allow the donee to exclude certain eligible appointees, while non-exclusive powers require the donee to allocate some property to each appointee.
  3. General vs. Nongeneral (Special) Powers: General powers allow the donee to appoint property to themselves, their estate, or their creditors. In contrast, nongeneral powers restrict the donee from appointing property to these entities.
  4. Presently Exercisable vs. Postponed Powers: Presently exercisable powers can be used immediately, while postponed powers can only be exercised at a future date, often upon the donee’s death.

When to use General vs. Limited Powers of Appointment

General Power of Appointment: Best used in Marital Trusts (QTIP) or Revocable Trusts when flexibility, step-up in basis, and marital deduction eligibility are the primary goals, even though the assets will be included in the donee’s taxable estate.

Limited (Special) Power of Appointment: Best used in Irrevocable Trusts, Dynasty Trusts, Bypass Trusts, and Generation-Skipping Trusts where asset protection, tax minimization, control over distribution, and maintaining favorable tax treatment are the main objectives.

Estate Planning Goal/Consideration General Power of Appointment Limited (Special) Power of Appointment
Asset Protection Not recommended. Assets are exposed to the donee’s creditors. Recommended. Assets are protected from the donee’s creditors.
Typical Trusts  Rarely used in asset protection trusts.  Common in Irrevocable Trusts, Dynasty Trusts, and Spendthrift Trusts.
Inclusion in Donee’s Taxable Estate Recommended when a step-up in basis is desired. Not recommended. Assets are generally excluded from the donee’s taxable estate.
Typical Trusts Marital Trusts (QTIP) for step-up in basis. Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts (ILITs), Generation-Skipping Trusts.
Eligibility for Marital Deduction Recommended. Ensures property qualifies for the marital deduction, deferring estate taxes. Not recommended. May disqualify property from the marital deduction.
Typical Trusts QTIP Trusts, Marital Trusts.  Not typically used in marital deduction trusts.
Control over Ultimate Distribution Provides flexibility but less control over final asset distribution. Recommended. Allows the donor to set clear boundaries on asset distribution.
Typical Trusts Marital Trusts, Family Trusts. Family Trusts, Bypass Trusts, Generation-Skipping Trusts.
Minimizing Estate Taxes for Donee Not recommended. Assets are included in the donee’s taxable estate. Recommended. Helps reduce the size of the donee’s taxable estate.
Typical Trusts Marital Trusts (when step-up is more beneficial). Bypass Trusts, Generation-Skipping Trusts.
Avoiding Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax (GSTT) Not recommended. May trigger GSTT if assets are transferred to skip generations. Recommended. Allows for strategic distribution to avoid GSTT.
Typical Trusts Marital Trusts (with no intent to skip generations). Generation-Skipping Trusts, Dynasty Trusts.
Flexibility for Changing Family Needs Recommended if flexibility to appoint to any individual or entity is desired. Provides some flexibility within the confines set by the donor.
Typical Trusts Revocable Trusts, Marital Trusts. Irrevocable Trusts, Family Trusts.
Retaining Favorable Tax Treatment in Trusts Not recommended. Could disrupt the trust’s tax status. Recommended. Helps maintain the trust’s favorable tax status, particularly for pre-existing trusts.
Typical Trusts  Rarely used in older trusts with favorable status. Grandfathered Trusts, Irrevocable Trusts.
When to Use in Marital Trusts (QTIP) Recommended if the intent is to qualify for the marital deduction. Not recommended for QTIP trusts as it may disqualify the trust.
Typical Trusts QTIP Trusts, Marital Trusts. Bypass Trusts, Family Trusts (outside of QTIP).

Table 1. General Overview of the suse of General and Limited(Special) Powers of Appointment in differnt estate plang contexts.

Exercising Powers of Appointment

The exercise of powers of appointment involves several considerations:

  • Class of Appointees: The group eligible to receive the property, which can range from specific individuals to broad categories like “descendants.”
  • Manner and Methods of Exercise: Powers can be exercised through various methods, including specific or blanket clauses. The intention to exercise must be clear and comply with any conditions set by the donor.
  • Capacity to Exercise: The donee must have the legal capacity to exercise the power, similar to the capacity required for property disposition.

Tax Implications

The tax consequences of powers of appointment are significant and complex. Please refer also to Table 1.

  1. Estate and Gift Tax: A general power of appointment can result in the inclusion of property in the donee’s estate, subjecting it to estate tax. The exercise or release of a general power is treated as a gift for tax purposes.
  2. Generation-Skipping Transfer (GST) Tax: Exercising a power of appointment can trigger GST tax if it involves skipping generations, though careful planning can mitigate this.
  3. Income Tax: Under Section 678 of the Internal Revenue Code, the exercise of a general power can result in the donee being treated as the owner of the trust for income tax purposes.

Planning Opportunities

Powers of appointment offer various strategic benefits in estate planning:

  • Flexibility: They allow the donee to adapt the distribution of property based on changing circumstances, providing tailored solutions for beneficiaries.
  • Extending Trust Terms: Powers can be used to extend the duration of a trust, potentially postponing tax consequences and providing long-term asset protection.
  • Generation Jumping: Powers can be used to skip generations, reducing the impact of GST tax by directly benefiting more remote descendants.

Selected Case Law and IRS Private Letter Rulings

The following cases and Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) illustrate the application and interpretation of powers of appointment, particularly general powers of appointment, in the context of federal estate tax law. Specifically, the cases address the tax implications of these powers concerning the marital deduction under Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code and whether certain powers of appointment qualify as general powers under Section 2041. Additionally, the cases and rulings explore the implications of trust reformation, particularly how state court modifications of trust instruments may or may not be recognized for federal tax purposes and how these reforms affect the classification and taxability of powers of appointment.

Estate of Kraus v. C.I.R, 875 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1989)

Issue

The primary issue in Estate of Kraus v. Commissioner is whether the reformation of a trust by a lower Illinois state court, which corrected a scrivener’s error that omitted a general power of appointment necessary for the marital deduction under Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code, should be recognized by the federal Tax Court for estate tax purposes.

Rule

Federal courts, including the Tax Court, are not bound by decisions of lower state courts when interpreting state law for federal tax purposes. According to the precedent established in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, only a state’s highest court can issue rulings on state law that are binding on federal courts. Federal courts are required to give “proper regard” to lower state court rulings but are not obligated to follow them if they conflict with federal tax law principles.

Application

In this case, Arthur S. Kraus amended his insurance trust in 1977, inadvertently converting a general power of appointment into a special power due to a scrivener’s error. This error prevented the estate from qualifying for the marital deduction under Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code. After Kraus’s death, the estate sought reformation of the trust in an Illinois state court, which granted the reformation, restoring the general power of appointment.

The estate argued that the reformed trust should be recognized by the Tax Court to allow the marital deduction. However, the Tax Court ruled that the state court’s reformation was not binding for federal tax purposes and determined that the trust, as amended in 1977, did not qualify for the marital deduction. The Tax Court found that the estate had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that the omission of the general power of appointment was a mistake warranting reformation under Illinois law.

Furthermore, the Tax Court noted that the decedent, Arthur S. Kraus, was aware of the language necessary to include a general power of appointment, and the amended trust explicitly created a special power instead. This finding was based on the court’s review of stipulated facts, the testimony of attorney Rotman (who drafted the trust amendment), and the original and amended trust documents.

The estate later discovered new evidence that corroborated the claim of a scrivener’s error. The Tax Court initially denied the estate’s motion for reconsideration based on this newly discovered evidence. However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the newly discovered evidence was material and likely to change the outcome of the case. The appellate court ruled that the Tax Court abused its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s decision to uphold the deficiency assessment, agreeing that the original reformation by the state court was not binding for federal tax purposes. However, the appellate court reversed the Tax Court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration, holding that the newly discovered evidence should be admitted and that the case should be reconsidered in light of this evidence. The case was remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings.

This case illustrates the principle that federal tax courts are not bound by lower state court decisions regarding the reformation of legal instruments when determining federal tax liabilities. It emphasizes the importance of a state’s highest court in issuing binding interpretations of state law for federal purposes.

LTR 9303022 IRS Private Letter Ruling

Issue:

In this case, the issue is whether the reformation of a will by a state court, which retroactively removes a general power of appointment granted to certain beneficiaries, should be treated as a release of that power under Sections 2041 and 2514 of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby subjecting the property to estate and gift taxes.

Rule:

According to Sections 2041(a)(2) and 2514(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, the exercise or release of a general power of appointment is considered a transfer of property and may result in the inclusion of that property in the gross estate of the individual holding the power. See, however, above. Per Estate of Bosch v. United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is not bound by decisions of lower state courts unless those decisions are consistent with the rulings of the state’s highest court.

Application:

In this case, the Husband and Wife created testamentary trusts that inadvertently granted their Son and Daughter 1 general powers of appointment over their respective trusts, allowing them to invade the trust principal for purposes not limited by an ascertainable standard. This mistake occurred due to an oversight by the law firm drafting the wills, as it failed to include a provision that would restrict the exercise of discretionary powers by beneficiaries who are also trustees.

After the Wife’s death, the Husband petitioned the probate court to reform the trusts to retroactively limit the exercise of the discretionary powers to an independent trustee, thereby preventing the Son and Daughter 1 from holding general powers of appointment. The probate court issued a conditional order to this effect.

The IRS examined whether this reformation constituted a “release” of a general power of appointment, which would trigger estate and gift tax consequences under Sections 2041 and 2514. The IRS concluded that the reformation did not constitute a release because the intent of the Husband and Wife was clearly to prevent their children from holding such powers. The IRS reasoned that, in a bona fide adversarial proceeding, the highest state court would likely deny the Son and Daughter 1 the general powers of appointment before they could become exercisable.

Therefore, the reformation by the lower court would not be considered a release of a general power of appointment under Section 2514, and the trust property would not be included in the taxable estates of the Son or Daughter 1 under Section 2041. Additionally, the reformation did not alter the trust’s status as irrevocable before September 25, 1985, for the generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.

Conclusion:

The IRS ruled that the reformation of the will to limit the discretionary powers of the Son and Daughter 1 did not constitute a release of a general power of appointment. Consequently, the reformation would not cause the inclusion of the trust property in the taxable estates of the Son or Daughter 1, nor would it impact the treatment of the trusts for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. This ruling was based on the specific facts and applicable law at the time of the request and would not be retroactively applied if there were material fact or law changes.

LTR 9516051 IRS Private Letter Ruling

Issue:

Does the power held by the trustee of a testamentary trust, which allows the trustee to distribute principal to herself as a beneficiary, constitute a general power of appointment under Section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code?

Rule:

Under Section 2041(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, the value of any property over which the decedent has a general power of appointment is included in the gross estate for estate tax purposes. A general power of appointment is defined under Section 2041(b)(1) as a power exercisable in favor of the decedent, the decedent’s estate, creditors, or the creditors of the decedent’s estate. However, if the power is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent, it is not considered a general power of appointment.

Application:

In this case, the decedent was the trustee of a trust created by her deceased spouse’s will, with the power to distribute principal to herself as the beneficiary if, in her sole discretion, it was deemed “requisite or desirable.” This power would generally constitute a general power of appointment under Section 2041, as it allows the trustee to distribute principal to herself without restriction.

However, North Carolina General Statute 32-34(b) imposes limitations on a fiduciary’s power to exercise such discretion. Specifically, the statute prohibits a trustee from exercising a power in favor of themselves, their estate, their creditors, or the creditors of their estate unless the trust document explicitly overrides this limitation. Since the trust document in this case did not override the statute, the decedent, as trustee, did not have a general power of appointment under North Carolina law.

The IRS recognizes that state law governs the creation of legal rights and interests in property, including the scope of powers of appointment. Consequently, under North Carolina law and similar IRS precedents (Rev. Rul. 76-502 and Rev. Proc. 94-44), the decedent’s power as trustee did not qualify as a general power of appointment for federal estate tax purposes.

Conclusion:

The power held by the decedent as trustee of her spouse’s testamentary trust does not constitute a general power of appointment for purposes of Section 2041. Therefore, the value of the trust property is not included in the decedent’s gross estate for estate tax purposes under Section 2041.

Leahy Guiney v. United States of America 425 F.2d 145

Issue:

Does the language in Item Second of Arthur Hamilton Leahy’s will grant his widow a “general power of appointment” sufficient to qualify for the marital deduction under Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code?

Rule:

Under Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, a marital deduction is allowed if the surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest in the property and has a general power of appointment over the property. A general power of appointment is defined under Section 2041(b)(1) as a power exercisable in favor of the decedent, the decedent’s estate, creditors, or the creditors of the decedent’s estate. The interpretation of whether a power qualifies as a general power of appointment is determined according to the applicable state law.

Application:

In this case, Arthur Hamilton Leahy’s will included language that explicitly stated his intention to grant his widow a “general power of appointment” over the trust assets to ensure that one-half of his estate qualified for the marital deduction. The key issue was whether this language effectively granted the widow the power to appoint the trust principal to herself or her estate, as required by Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code.

The IRS Commissioner initially denied the marital deduction, arguing that under Maryland law, the language used in the will did not grant the widow a general power of appointment that would allow her to appoint the trust principal to herself or her estate. The District Court upheld the Commissioner’s decision, relying on prior Maryland case law that had narrowly construed similar language as not granting a general power of appointment.

However, upon appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered more recent developments in Maryland law, particularly the decision in Frank v. Frank and the prior decision in Leser v. Burnet by the same court. The appellate court recognized that Maryland courts had evolved to a more modern interpretation that allowed for a general power of appointment when the testator’s intent to grant such power was clear. The court found that the language in Mr. Leahy’s will, which explicitly referred to the “general power of appointment” and the marital deduction under the Internal Revenue Code, was more precise and explicit than the language in previous cases where the power had been found lacking.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the language used in Mr. Leahy’s will was sufficient to grant his widow a general power of appointment that met the requirements of Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby qualifying the estate for the marital deduction.

Conclusion:

The language in Item Second of Arthur Hamilton Leahy’s will effectively granted his widow a general power of appointment over the trust principal, sufficient to meet the requirements for the marital deduction under Section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded the case for the entry of judgment in favor of the taxpayer.

Special Issues for Fiduciaries and Creditors

Fiduciaries and creditors have specific considerations when dealing with powers of appointment:

  • Creditor Rights: Generally, property subject to a nongeneral power is protected from the donee’s creditors. However, property under a general power may be vulnerable, depending on the circumstances.
  • Fiduciary Responsibilities: Fiduciaries must carefully manage and exercise powers of appointment, balancing the donor’s intentions with the donee’s interests and tax implications.

Powers of Appointment and Decanting

Decanting, the process of transferring assets from one trust to another, can be facilitated through powers of appointment. This allows for the modification of trust terms, potentially reducing tax burdens and enhancing the trust’s effectiveness.

Conclusion

Powers of appointment are powerful and flexible tools in estate planning, offering both opportunities and potential pitfalls. When structured properly, they can achieve various planning goals, such as securing the marital deduction, ensuring flexibility in asset distribution, and protecting assets from creditors. However, the complexity surrounding the different types of powers—general versus limited—requires careful consideration and precise drafting to avoid unintended tax consequences. The discussed cases and rulings highlight the critical importance of understanding how powers of appointment are treated under both federal tax law and state law, particularly in the context of trust reformation. As illustrated, the reformation of trusts by state courts may not always be recognized for federal tax purposes, emphasizing the need for estate planners to carefully navigate these issues to ensure that the donor’s intentions are fulfilled and tax benefits are preserved. In summary, while powers of appointment are versatile tools, their effective use in estate planning necessitates a thorough understanding of their implications, meticulous drafting, and, where necessary, appropriate legal reformations.

Further Reading

Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Kim Kamin & Jeffrey M. Bergman, Estate Planning’s Most Powerful Tool: Powers of Appointment Refreshed, Redefined, and Reexamined, https://perma.cc/AQ6W-PH72.

© 2024 wealthcarelawyer.com. All rights reserved.
 For more news on Powers of Appointment, visit the NLR Estates & Trusts section.

DOJ, FTC, DOL, and NLRB Join Forces and Announce Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Issues in Merger Investigations

On August 28, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, which enforces the US antitrust laws including the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which enforces the Federal Trade Commission Act and other laws and regulations prohibiting unfair methods of competition (together, Antitrust Agencies), along with the US Department of Labor (DOL) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (together, Labor Agencies), announced that they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Issues in Merger Investigations (MOU).
The MOU took effect on August 28 and expires in five years, unless it is extended or terminated upon written agreement of each of the agencies.

Purpose of the MOU

The MOU outlines a collaborative initiative between the signatory agencies to assist the Antitrust Agencies with labor issues that may arise during the course of antitrust merger and acquisition (M&A) investigations, commenced under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR). The HSR requires that parties to certain large M&As provide information to the Antitrust Agencies prior to the transaction’s consummation, which allows these agencies to analyze the anticipated transaction(s) and provide greater certainty to the parties regarding potential antitrust concerns.

From a labor perspective, these investigations may aim to evaluate whether the effect of a merger or acquisition could substantially lessen competition for labor. The stated goal of this MOU is to protect employees and promote fair competition in labor markets. Specifically, the MOU outlines methods by which the Labor Agencies may aid or advise the Antitrust Agencies on potential labor issues identified during the course of these evaluations. These methods include the following.

1. Labor Information Sharing

The MOU outlines various ways in which the Antitrust Agencies may work with the Labor Agencies to gather information used to evaluate potential impacts of M&As on labor markets. These include:

  1. Soliciting information from relevant worker stakeholders and organizations.
  2. Seeking the production of information and data with respect to labor markets.
  3. Searching publicly available sources of information made available by the Labor Agencies.
  4. Seeking production of non-public information and data related to labor markets from the Labor Agencies.

2. Providing Training and Technical Assistance

Labor Agencies agree to provide technical assistance and training to personnel from the Antitrust Agencies related to subject matter under their jurisdictions. For example, the NLRB will train personnel from Antitrust Agencies on labor-related issues such as the duty to bargain in good faith, successor bargaining obligations, and unfair labor practices. Additionally, the Antitrust Agencies may seek technical assistance on labor and employment law matters in merger reviews, including in the resolution of labor market merger investigations.

3. Collaborative Meetings

The Labor Agencies and Antitrust Agencies will seek to meeting biannually to discuss the implementation and coordination of activities outlined in the MOU.

This MOU expands upon collaborative efforts amongst the agencies and builds upon several MOUs executed in 2022 and 2023. MOUs between the DOJ and DOL, DOJ and NLRB, DOL and FTC, and FTC and NLRB all indicate that the purpose and scope of the agreements are to “strengthen the Agencies’ partnership through greater coordination in information sharing, coordinated investigations and enforcement activity, training, education, and outreach.”

Takeaways

This multi-agency agreement further emphasizes the current administration’s focus on protecting employees from alleged unfair methods of competition. This MOU is further evidence that antitrust regulators are looking at antitrust enforcement from a new perspective. Traditionally, Antitrust Agencies evaluated proposed M&As to identify potential risks of harm to consumers through the reduction of options or increased prices. Now, Antitrust Agencies appear to have turned their focus towards anticompetitive behaviors that may harm employees.

Employers interested or involved in an M&A deal should conduct thorough internal reviews to ensure compliance with both labor-related and fair competition laws. In the event of a review by the DOJ or FTC, employers should partner with experienced labor and employment lawyers to navigate through these investigations.

© 2024 ArentFox Schiff LLP
For more on Merger Investigations, visit the NLR Mergers Acquisitions section

You Are Sponsoring a Foreign National Employee for Permanent Residency, Can You Clawback Some of the Fees?

Companies usually hire a foreign national who requires visa sponsorship because they cannot find a U.S. worker with those skill sets, which is frequently in the STEM fields. However, visa sponsorship comes with significant costs to the employer. Employers may be able to recover a portion of the immigration sponsorship fees by implementing what are called “clawback” provisions into their employment agreements. Clawback provisions are terms in the employment agreements that, in the event of a resignation by the employee before a certain date, require the employee to reimburse the employer for a portion of the costs or fees associated with his or her visa sponsorship.

Not All Visa Fees Can Be Clawed Back

But first, it’s important to understand which sponsorship fees and costs are potentially recoverable and which are prohibited from being “clawed back.”

  • H-1B Petition: Because these visas have a prevailing wage set by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) a H-1B employer may not clawback any attorney fees or government filing fees used to obtain the H-1B petition approval by U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS).
  • Other Visas: The same restriction applies to the Australian E-3 visa and the Singapore/Chile H-1B1 visas as well as the H-2A, H-2B, and J-1 visas.
  • PERM Labor Certification Sponsorship for Permanent Residency: PERM Is the most common method for an employer to sponsor a foreign national employee for permanent residency (green card). It is done by conducting recruitment and proving to DOL that no qualified U.S. worker applied for the position. An employer is required to pay for all of the fees and costs associated with the PERM process.
  • I-140 Immigrant Petition: After DOL certifies the PERM application and agrees that no qualified U.S. worker is available, the employer must file an I-140 immigrant petition with USCIS. The attorney fees and costs for the I-140 may be clawed back. The purpose of the I-140 immigrant petition is for the employer to prove to USCIS that the foreign national has the required education, experience and special skills outlined in the PERM filing with DOL. In addition, the I-140 includes financial documents showing that the employer has the ability to pay the offered wage.
  • I-485 Adjustment of Status to Permanent Resident filing: The employer may clawback the fees and costs associated with the I-485 adjustment of status application (green card).

Practice Pointers

  • Still At Will: The clawback provisions should be in writing. It should also indicate that the employment is still at will, if applicable.
  • Final Paycheck: The majority of states, including California, do not allow an employer to deduct anything from a final paycheck without the express consent of the employee. This includes fees and costs pursuant to the clawback provision.
  • Deterrence: Given that an employer cannot clawback from the final paycheck and suing a former employee to collect the amount in controversy is not always practical, a clawback provision can be used as a deterrence for early departure.

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Copyright © 2024, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Major Changes Coming for Medicare Drug Program: Negotiated Prices, Cap on Out of Pocket and Creditable Coverage

Some major changes are on the way for Medicare beneficiaries regarding drug costs. Due to the Inflation Reduction Act, the federal government now will have the ability to negotiate the prices of drugs for Medicare beneficiaries. After an initial set of negotiations, new lower prices have been announced for 10 expensive drugs. The discounts for some blood thinners and drugs for arthritis, cancer, diabetes, and heart failure result in costs as much as 79% lower. The new drug prices will go into effect starting in 2026. Just these 10 drugs make up about 20% of the program’s drug spending, so the impact is huge for the medicinal market. The federal government will turn to negotiating another batch of drugs in 2025, with 15-20 drugs targeted annually.

Another major change under the Inflation Reduction Act will be the out-of-pocket maximum under all Medicare Part D plans of $2,000 per year beginning January 2025. Beneficiaries will be able to prorate the cost monthly or pay it as the costs are incurred. This will be a game changer for many Medicare beneficiaries with high drug costs. In addition, certain drugs covered by Part B (typically those administered in a doctor’s office or hospital) might incur a co-pay of less than the standard 20% if the prices have increased faster than inflation. The drugs subject to reduced copays will be published quarterly.

These changes may have an unintended consequence for Medicare-eligible individuals who are still working and therefore enrolled in employer plans, or other individuals enrolled in retiree or other private plans. Those who are Medicare eligible but are enrolled in non-Medicare plans must show that they have “creditable” coverage under Medicare standards. A plan is “creditable” if coverage is at least as good as or better than the Medicare drug benefit. Creditable coverage is based on a test that measures whether the expected amount of paid claims is at least as much as the standard Part D benefit. Non-Medicare plans must advise enrollees if their coverage is considered “creditable.” It is crucial for coverage to be considered “creditable;” otherwise, the Medicare beneficiary can be subject to a Late Enrollment Penalty (LEP) for each month they are not enrolled in a plan providing creditable coverage.

It is unclear whether the $2,000 cap coming to Part D plans or other changes in drug coverage will mean that non-Medicare plans that do not match the changes will continue to be considered creditable in the future. Beneficiaries need to be aware of this important issue when considering their coverage options.

©2024 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved
For more on the Medicare Drug Program, visit the NLR Health Law Managed Care section

(Employee) Therapy Anyone?

The recent WSJ article about employer-provided in-office therapy sessions raises some good points about destigmatizing mental health in the workplace and promoting overall wellness generally. But the article also reminds us about the risks of blurring lines between an employee’s personal and professional life and the potential dangers inherent in the spillover of confidential (personal, medical, and other information) in the workplace. I have written previously about the beneficial role performance evaluations may have as “talk therapy” in an employee’s career based upon the learning that comes with balanced feedback. But it seems to me that true talk therapy – undertaken by a licensed and trained professional in an appropriate diagnostic setting – does not belong in the workplace.

The article features an employer who provides an annual benefit of a dozen free on-site therapy sessions to its employees. While it is commendable to care about the whole employee, providing on-site therapy touches upon a few somewhat sensitive employment topics. The first concerns confidentiality of health information, which includes an employee’s decision to seek (or even not seek) medical treatment. The employer in the article was reported to have taken steps to provide a separate location for the therapy sessions so employees did not encounter each other during on-site therapy visits, as well as other privacy preservation measures. But the simple fact is that confidentiality is hard to guarantee for on-site employment activities. And even though GenX employees (and the generation of workers who follow them) do think differently about mental health and wellness than the generations preceding them, there is a real risk that an employee’s use of this benefit will become the topic of what used to be known as water cooler – now Slack – talk.

The other employment risk on-site therapy poses is the potential use of information that is disclosed during a therapy session. Ethical, licensing and medical rules govern what a therapist must and must not do with information learned about a patient, but what about information the therapist learns about an employer? This is particularly a concern if the information source and content is confirmed by several different employees and might be information that merits action (such as information suggesting that a manager is engaging in harassing or other actionable or illegal conduct). There is a reason employers follow guidelines when reports or complaints are made concerning such conduct. It is unclear how those guidelines should be followed if the contents of a therapy session are supposed to remain confidential, for good legal, therapeutic and ethical reasons.

It seems to me a far better approach for employers wishing to explore this benefit is to provide employees with a set amount of money (perhaps as part of a tax-advantaged benefit plan ) that the employee is encouraged to use at the employee’s discretion as part of well-being program designed to support all aspects of health (mental, physical and even financial fitness). That way therapy can be encouraged and supported, but kept separate in all other respects from the workplace. Therapy for all may be an excellent idea, but conducting it outside the confines of the workplace seems like a better one.

©1994-2024 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
For more news on Employer Provided Therapy, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Boeing Whistleblower Continues to Raise Concerns

At the National Whistleblower Day celebration held on Capitol Hill on July 30, a Boeing whistleblower announced new documents which he claims further demonstrate shortcomings by Boeing around the manufacturing of the 737 Max which crashed in Ethiopia on March 10, 2019.

During his speech, Ed Pierson, the Executive Director of The Foundation for Aviation Safety, an aviation industry watchdog group, stated “since it’s Whistleblower Day, I thought I’d do some whistleblowing.”

Pierson went on to detail three sets of documents which he said Boeing employees had recently shared with him. The documents include the production records for the Ethiopian Airlines 737-8 MAX airplane, which according to the Foundation for Aviation Safety “paint a clear picture of the confusing and chaotic production operations going on at the 737 factory when this airplane was being manufactured.”

The documents also include information about a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) investigation into whistleblower complaints about alleged loss of quality control at Boeing’s Electrical Systems Responsibility Center (ESRC) in Everett, Washington. According to Pierson, this investigation occurred the same week that the Ethiopian Airlines 737-8 MAX airplane was being manufactured in nearby Renton, Washington.

Lastly, the documents include communication between Boeing and Ethiopian Airlines about an uncommanded roll that plane had allegedly taken within three weeks of being delivered to Ethiopia.

In recent months, a number of Boeing whistleblowers have come forward alleging both safety concerns as well as a culture of retaliation at the company.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
by: Geoff Schweller of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section