Category: Administrative & Regulatory

Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) New Chairwoman Ramirez Says Health Care Continues To Be Top Priority

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In remarks made this week at the International Competition Network annual conference, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Edith Ramirez stated that health care will continue to be a top priority for the FTC.   Referring to health care and hospital mergers in particular, she said that the Commission will “guard[] against what we consider to be consolidation that may end up having adverse consequences for consumers.”  The Chairwoman’s comments indicate that the recent leadership change at the FTC from former Chairman Jon Leibowitz to Chairwoman Ramirez has not altered the Commission’s priorities.

Recent months have seen a flurry of FTC activity in the courts related to health care.  For example, two FTC cases came before the U.S. Supreme Court this term — the FTC’s challenge to Phoebe Putney’s acquisition of Palmyra Park Hospital in Georgia and the FTC’s challenge to “pay-for-delay” patent infringement litigation settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.

In February, the Supreme Court ruled that the state action doctrine did not immunize Phoebe Putney’s hospital transaction from federal antitrust scrutiny, and the FTC has subsequently filed renewed motions in federal district court to stop further integration of the two hospitals even as it prepares for a full administrative hearing on the merits that will begin in August.

A decision on the “pay-for-delay” case is expected in June.  The Supreme Court’s ruling may have a large impact on further FTC efforts against what it perceives as anticompetitive efforts to delay generic drug entry.

Health care clients considering acquisitions are advised to consult antitrust counsel early in the transaction process.  Given the FTC and DOJ’s close scrutiny of health care transactions, early advocacy before the antitrust agencies is often critical to a deal closing on schedule.

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Automation of U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP) Form I-94 and Release of New Immigration Form I-9

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Visitors to the United States May Need to Print Form I-94 Arrival/Departure Records

U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP) will begin a new program on April 30, 2013 that will end issuance of paper Form I-94 Arrival/Departure Records for many visitors. Foreign visitors arriving in the United States via air or sea who need to prove their lawful immigration status will be required to access their arrival information online and print their own Form I-94 Arrival/Departure Records (Form I-94). A hard copy of Form I-94 is required to begin employment, apply for a Social Security Number, and obtain a driver’s license or identification document.

CBP indicated that it expects this automation to save the government an estimated $15.5 million per year. Because advance information is transmitted only for air and sea travelers, CBP will continue to issue paper Forms I-94 at land border ports of entry.

CBP will phase in the I-94 automation at air and sea ports of entry in April and May. Foreign visitors will continue to receive a paper I-94 until the automated process arrives at their port of entry. If a visitor does not receive a paper Form I-94 record to verify immigration status or employment authorization, the record number and other admission information will be available here. A CBP officer will stamp the travel document (passport) of each arriving nonimmigrant traveler showing the date of admission, class of admission and the date until which the traveler is admitted. The visitor will not need to print Form I-94 to provide to the government upon departure. A CBP Fact Sheet may be found here.

All U.S. Employers Required to Use New Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 as of May 7, 2013

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will require all U.S. employers to use its revised Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 as of May 7, 2013. All employers are required to complete an Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 (Form I-9) for each new employee hired in the United States. The updated Form (Revision Date 03/08/13) includes new information fields and has been expanded to two pages. USCIS has stated that the new formatting will reduce errors and provide clearer instructions for both employees and employers. The List of Acceptable Documents has not changed.

Employers should NOT require current employees to complete the new Form I-9. The new Form will be used only for new employees or when reverifying the work authorization for current employees. The new employee may complete the Form after acceptance of the job offer, and no later than the first date of hire. The new instructions confirm that an employer has three business days to complete the Form; in the case of reverification, the employer must re-verify the document(s) before the work authorization expires.

The new Form I-9 does NOT change any requirements relating to remote hires. USCIS’s position is that the employer representative who signs the attestation must be the same person who physically examines each original document to determine if it reasonably appears to be genuine and relates to the employee. An employer with remote hires may delegate the verification to a person who serves as an agent of the employer, but that agent must examine the documents and complete Section 2 or Section 3 of the Form I-9. The employer retains the liability for the actions of the agent.

A Spanish language version of the new Form is also available on the USCIS website for use in Puerto Rico only. Spanish-speaking employers and employees in the 50 states, Washington, DC, and other U.S. territories may refer to the Spanish version but must complete the English-language version of the Form.

Employers may receive monetary fines for all substantive and uncorrected technical Form I-9 violations. Penalties for these violations, which include failure to utilize the correct version of the Form I-9, range from $110 to $1,100 per violation.

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Early Patent Trial and Appeal Board Orders Demonstrate Differences Between America Invents Act (AIA) Patent Trials and District Court Trials

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Patent practitioners are still absorbing some of the differences and advantages that are unique to litigation in the PTAB as opposed to district court litigation.  For example, PTAB proceedings only decide questions of validity and are not directed to rule on questions of infringement or damages, as is the practice in traditional litigation.  Another example is that PTAB trials require that the petitioner provide a lot of technical arguments and factual evidence in the original petition, as opposed to traditional litigation where parties make sure they have a good faith basis to sue and then rely on discovery to later develop the case.  Thus, a petition for review of patentability in PTAB practice is more akin to a summary judgment motion than a complaint in trial practice.  But a PTAB petition is still very different than a summary judgment motion.  And these differences can be exploited to more inexpensively and quickly resolve validity issues.

In considering summary judgment, a judge must decide if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” as set forth in FRCP Rule 56.  In contrast, the technical patent judges on the Board can decide technical disputes instantly and can resolve disputes of technical and legal nature.  PTAB panels use their technical and patent law experience to quickly identify dispositive issues and focus the parties on how their respective positions are being viewed by the Board early in the proceedings.  This means that PTAB trials will put a premium on identification of technical defects in patents early in the proceedings, as opposed to traditional litigation approaches that favor discovery before attempting summary judgment or that shy away from summary judgment as a mechanism for resolution of complex technical disputes.

Examples of the Board’s unique capabilities are already being demonstrated in recent orders.  For example, in an inter partes review by Chimei Innolux Corporation against Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co.,Ltd. concerning U.S. Patent No. 8,068,204 (IPR2013-00068), the Board squarely addressed technical disputes between what the petition asserted versus what the patent owner’s preliminary statement set forth when the Board decided to institute trial.

The Board took great care to understand and sift through extremely technical differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art as it was characterized by the parties.  This is a highly complicated task, because the patent relates to improvements for substrate bonding and electrical connections in liquid-crystal displays and because the parties were advancing very technical arguments on both sides of the validity issue.  In this early order to institute trial the Board construed a phrase from the claims and used that construction to decide the merits of the positions taken by the petitioner and patent owner.  The Board then considered technical arguments made by both parties, such as whether a reference used in combination in an obviousness challenge teaches away from the combination (page 15), or whether it would have been obvious to employ a known (contact) structure (page 18).  The Board decided that certain arguments were not persuasive and used the order to focus the parties on the issues it ruled upon.  The following excerpt from pages 19-21 of the the order instituting trial demonstrates the attention to detail that the Board is devoting to these proceedings:

SEL responds that “[. . .] a person of ordinary skill in the art does not know whether an insulating film (first insulating film) is formed between the bottom layer of the first wiring line 127 (formed in the step of forming the scanning lines Yj) and the top layer of the first wiring line 127 (formed in the step of forming the data lines Xi).” (Prelim. Resp. 31.) According to SEL, Shiba’s “‘two-layered structure’” might be “sequentially stacked” without an insulating layer therebetween. (Id.) As noted, claim 31 requires such an intervening insulating layer.

SEL’s argument is not persuasive. Shiba implies or suggests that the two wiring layers in the two-layered structure 127, formed in the same manner as the two-layered scanning and data lines as the quoted passage shows, have an insulating layer therebetween just like the scanning and data lines. [cite omitted]  [. . .  .]  Skilled artisans also would have understood that overlapping portions readily could have been “partially connected” together by known methods, including using a connecting hole through such an insulating layer. [cite omitted]

Because the two-layered structure in Shiba’s lines 127 connect to pad 751, SEL maintains that under various hypothetical scenarios, pad 751 also must have a two-layered structure, and as such, with Sukegawa’s transparent layer modified to be on Shiba’s pad as CMI proposes in its ground of unpatentability, the pad structure would become a three-layered structure. . . .  SEL also argues that the Petition inconsistently conflates or interchanges Sukegawa’s transparent layer and the top layer of Shiba’s two-layered wiring structure 127, and thereby fails to show how the combination renders obvious the external connection line and transparent conductive film as recited in claims 31 and 54. (See Prelim. Resp. 25-26.)

It is clear from the analysis set forth by the Board that it is not afraid to weigh in on very technical issues and clarify how it perceives the arguments.  Of course, the preliminary response by the patent owner is considered a first initial response and is not a comprehensive response with evidence.  Therefore, the Board’s institution of trial is based on limited argument and is well before the patent owner has had an opportunity to fully respond.  But this process focuses the parties on issues that the Board (at least initially) perceives to be negative to the patent.  It is a preliminary ruling on the disputed issues by the Board that will shape discovery to come, as opposed to traditional litigation where discovery often leads and shapes the issues brought before the court.

Parties who believe that an asserted patent has validity issues may find it difficult to challenge disputed technical issues in summary judgment motion practice.  Validity issues are frequently accompanied with fact questions and in litigation there is a clear and convincing standard for invalidity that makes it hard to prove invalidity.  And it is unlikely that counsel will recommend a motion for summary judgment before conducting at least some discovery.  In contrast, in patent reviews and reexaminations the burden of proof is based on a preponderance of the evidence and can be done without discovery.  Given the different standards and the costs of e-discovery, there are significant advantages to the PTAB patent review option for defendants with genuine validity arguments.  But one must be careful to choose the PTAB trial option carefully to avoid estoppel should the proceeding not result in destruction of the relevant patent claims.

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Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) Liability And Private Equity Firms

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Last month’s decision out of the Delaware District Court in Woolery, et al. v. Matlin Patterson Global Advisers, LLC, et al. was an eye opener for private equity firms and other entities owning a controlling stake in a faltering business.  Breaking from the norm, the Court refused to dismiss private equity firm MatlinPatterson Global Advisers, LLC (“MatlinPatterson”) and affiliated entities from a class action WARN Act suit alleging that the 400-plus employees of Premium Protein Products, LLC (“Premium”), a Nebraska-based meat processer and MatlinPatterson portfolio company, hadn’t received the statutorily-mandated 60 days advance notice of layoffs.

According to the plaintiffs, Premium’s performance began to decline in 2008 and, upon the downturn, the defendants became more and more involved in Premium’s day-to-day operations, including by making business strategy decisions (e.g., to enter the kosher food market), terminating Premium’s existing President, and installing a new company President.  Things got bad enough that, in June 2009, the defendants decided to “furlough” all of Premium’s employees with virtually no notice and close the plant.  The defendants then, in November 2009, converted the furlough to layoffs, and Premium filed for bankruptcy.  According to the plaintiffs, Premium’s head of HR raised WARN Act concerns back in June, when the decision to close the plant and furlough the employees was made, and the defendants ignored the issue.

With Premium in bankruptcy, the plaintiffs, unsurprisingly, turned to MatlinPatterson and the other defendants as the targets of their WARN Act claim, asserting that they and Premium were a “single employer.”  The Court then applied the Department of Labor’s five-factor balancing test, namely (1) whether the entities share common ownership, (2) whether the entities share common directors or officers, (3) the existence of de facto exercise of control by the parent over the subsidiary, (4) the existence of a unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source, and (5) the dependency of operations between the two entities.  This test often favors private equity firms, and on balance it did so in Woolery too, with the Court finding that the plaintiffs had made no showing as to three of the five factors.  The Court nevertheless refused to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint alleged that the defendants had exercised de facto control over Premium and then essentially giving that factor determinative weight.

No one should be surprised by the decision given the plaintiffs’ allegations, which had to be accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage.  They presented an ugly picture of a private equity firm dictating the most critical decisions (to close plant, layoff employees) and then attempting to duck the WARN Act’s dictates. The decision is nevertheless a cautionary tale for private equity firms and at first blush it presents a catch 22: (a) do nothing and watch your investment sink or (b) get involved and risk WARN Act liability.

So what is a private equity firm, lender or majority investor to do?  Obviously, the best scenario is to build in the required 60-day notice period or, if applicable, utilize WARN Act exceptions, including the “faltering company” and “unforeseen business circumstances” exceptions.  Even where that’s not possible, private equity firms and other controlling investors need not take a completely hands off approach.  They would, however, be best-served (at least for WARN Act purposes) to do the following:

  • Provide only customary board-level oversight and allow the employer’s officers and management team to run the employer’s day-to-day operations
  • Although Board oversight and input can occur, continue to work through the management team on major decisions, including layoffs and potential facility closures
  • Avoid placing private equity firm or lender employees or representatives on the employer’s management team
  • Have the employer’s management team execute employment contracts with the employer, not the private equity firm or lender, and have the contracts, for the most part, create obligations only to the employer
  • Allow the employer to maintain its own personnel policies and practices, as well as HR oversight and function

What the courts are primarily concerned with in these cases are (a) a high degree of integration between the private equity firm or lender and the actual employer, particularly as to day-to-day operations, and (b) who the decision-maker was with regard to the employment practice giving rise to the litigation (typically the layoff or plant closure decision).  Private equity firms and lenders that have refrained from this level of integration have had, and should continue to have, success in avoiding WARN Act liability and returning the focus of the WARN Act discussion to the actual employer.

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No “Safe Harbor” for BitTorrent Website Operator

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment ruling in favor of seven film studios finding that the defendant induced third parties to download infringing copies of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., et al.  v. Gary Fung, et al., Case No. 10-55946 (9th Cir., Mar.21, 2013) (Berzon, J.).

Seven film studios—including Columbia Pictures, Disney and Twentieth Century Fox—sued Gary Fung and his company isoHunt Technologies, claiming that Fung induced third parties to download infringing copies of the studios’ copyrighted works through Fung’s websites, such as torrentbox.com and isohunt.com—websites that help users find copies of videos to download and stream through a type of peer-to-peer file sharing network.

The district court found Fung liable for contributory copyright infringement for inducing others to infringe the studios’ copyrights and also found that Fung was not entitled to protection from damages liability under the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  After a permanent injunction was issued, Fung appealed.

On appeal, Fung challenged the full holding, including the scope of the injunction claiming that it was vague, punitive and an impediment to free speech.  The 9th Circuit, citing the Supreme Court decision in Grokster III (which also dealt with peer-to-peer file sharing technology), analyzed the facts of the present case under the four elements of the Grokster III inducement principle:  the distribution of a device or product, acts of infringement, an object of promoting its use to infringe copyright and causation.

Inducement Liability Under Grokster III

With respect to the first element of the Grokster III inducement liability standard, Fung argued that he did not develop or distribute products, nor did he develop the BitTorrent protocol used by his websites.  The 9th Circuit, however, distinguished copyrights as expression that are not necessarily in the form of products or devices. Thus, the court concluded that a copyright can be infringed through “culpable actions resulting in impermissible reproductions of copyrighted expression,” even if such actions are the provision of services used in accomplishing the infringement.

Fung was not able to rebut the second “acts of infringement” Grokster III factor after the studios presented evidence that Fung’s services were widely used to infringe copyrights by allowing uploading and downloading of copyrighted material. Accordingly, the court found for the studios on the second factor, noting that the “predominant use” of Fung’s services was for copyright infringement.

As to the third Grokster III factor, the court agreed with Fung that mere knowledge of a potential to infringe, or knowledge of actual infringing uses of a product or service, is not enough for liability.  Nevertheless, the court found there was more than enough evidence that Fung offered his services with the object to promote their use to infringe copyrighted material.  Specifically, the court found that the evidence showed Fung actively encouraged uploading files of specific copyrighted material; he provided links for certain movies and urged users to download those movies; he affirmatively responded to requests for help in locating and playing copyrighted materials; and, he even personally instructed users on how to burn infringing files to DVDs.  The court also referenced two points of circumstantial evidence raised by the Grokster III opinion, namely, that Fung took no steps to develop filtering tools to diminish infringing activity and that he generated revenue by selling advertising space on his websites.

Finally, as to causation, the court adopted the studios’ interpretation of causation and held that the acts of infringement by third parties need only be caused by the product distributed or services provided.  This was contrary to Fung’s theory of causation (which was also joined by amicus curiae, Google) wherein Fung claimed that the infringement must be directly caused by a defendant’s inducing messages.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act “Safe Harbor” Provisions

Fung also asserted affirmative defenses under three of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions, 17 U.S.C. §512(a), (c) and (d). Although the studios argued that there can never be a DMCA safe harbor defense to contributory copyright liability inducement, the 9th Circuit disagreed, noting that the safe harbor provisions do not exclude vicarious or contributory liability from its protections. Even so, the court denied all of Fung’s safe harbor defenses.

In particular, the court concluded that Fung did not qualify for protection under §512(a) for transitory digital network communications because Fung’s torrent file trackers, not the third party users, were responsible for selecting the copyrighted data to be transmitted.

The court also concluded that § 512(c), relating to information residing on networks or systems at the direction of the users, was also not applicable because Fung had actual and “red flag” knowledge of infringing activity on his system due to his own active encouragement of infringement, as well as the fact that Fung did not dispute evidence that he personally used his isohunt.com website to download infringing material.

According to the 9th Circuit, Fung did not qualify for protection under §512(c) or §512(d) (for providers of information location tools) because Fung received a “financial benefit” from his services by selling ad space and because he had the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity, which was shown through evidence that Fung exerted substantial influence on the activities of the users of his websites.

Finding no available defenses under the DMCA safe harbors, the court affirmed summary judgment for the studios on the issue of liability under contributory copyright infringement.  However, the court found various terms of the lower court’s permanent injunction to be vague and unduly burdensome and remanded to the district court to modify certain employment prohibitions and to provide more specific language for several terms in the injunction.

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Recent Social Media Developments Impacting Employers

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NLRB: Latest Decisions Addressing Social Media Policies and Activities

Within the past several months, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB“) has issued four precedent-setting opinions addressing the legality of an employer’s use of social media as a basis for taking adverse employment action. These decisions apply to both unionized and non-unionized workforces.

The key issue in each of these cases was whether the employer’s actions compromised the right of employees to engage in “protected concerted activities” for the purpose of their “mutual aid and protection.” However, as noted in a prior alert, recent federal case law could void all NLRB decisions dating back to January 4, 2012 (including those discussed below). Until there is clarity the NLRB decisions continue to be significant in shaping social media use, policy and practice.

On April 19, 2013, the NLRB, in Design Technology Group, LLC, found that an employee’s Facebook posts that criticized a manager’s handling of employee concerns were a “classic connected protected activity” under the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”).

In that case, workers had approached their manager about closing the store they worked in at 7 PM instead of 8 PM, because of safety concerns. The manager advised that she would discuss those concerns with corporate officials, but the issue was never resolved. Subsequently, two employees posted messages on Facebook that were critical of how the manager handled that issue. Another employee showed the manager those posts and six days later, both employees who made the critical Facebook posts were fired by the manager.

The NLRB determined that the Facebook posts were part of the employees’ efforts to convince their employer to close the store earlier in the evening, based on their concerns about working late in an unsafe neighborhood. The NLRB found that those posts were protected under the Act and that the employees’ terminations constituted unfair labor practices.

Design Technology comes on the heels of three other NLRB social media rulings issued late last year.

In Hispanic United of Buffalo (December 14, 2012), the NLRB held that the termination of five employees for violating an employer’s policies on the basis of their social media activity was unlawful. In that case, five employees posted comments on Facebook that were critical of a co-worker who was scheduled to meet with and complain to management about their work performance. The employer terminated the five employees for “bullying and harassing” the co-worker in violation of its policies.

Hispanics United of Buffalo applied settled NLRB law regarding oral communications among co-workers to the social media context. Under NLRB precedent, employees’ comments regarding the terms and conditions of their employment are protected if their comments are “concerted” — meaning they are “‘engaged in, with or on the authority of other employees,” not only by “one employee on behalf of himself.” Finding the actions of these employees to be protected, the NLRB set a relatively low threshold for interpreting social media activity as protected concerted activity under the Act.

The Hispanics United decision is especially controversial because it may conflict with an employer’s competing obligation under federal and state discrimination laws to prevent workplace harassment. And, the decision may ultimately be in conflict with workplace anti-bullying laws in those states where such legislation is being actively considered. In Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. (September 28, 2012), the NLRB ordered another employer to rescind its social media policy. In that case, the employer terminated the employee for multiple reasons, including violation of the employer’s “Courtesy” rule requiring employees to be “courteous, polite and friendly” to customers, vendors, suppliers and fellow employees and not to use “language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership.”

The NLRB held that the “Courtesy” rule violated the NLRA because employees could “reasonably construe its broad prohibition against ‘disrespectful’ conduct and ‘language’ which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership as encompassing Section 7 activity.” However, the NLRB upheld the employee’s termination, finding it was not motivated by protected concerted activity, but rather was solely based on the employee’s Facebook postings that did not relate to the terms and conditions of his or any other employee’s employment. The NLRB did not address whether other posts would be protected by the Act.

In Costco Wholesale Corp. (September 7, 2012), the NLRB ruled that an employer’s overbroad social media policy violated the National Labor Relations Act because it prohibited employees from posting statements “that damage the Company, defame any individual or damage any person’s reputation or violate the policies outlined in the Costco Employee Agreement.” The NLRB ordered Costco to rescind the policy based on its finding that the policy inhibited employees from engaging in protected concerted activity.

NJ Legislative Update: Proposed Law Seeks to Protect Employee and Job Applicant Passwords

A-2878, a bill that prohibits employers from requiring, or requesting, a current or prospective employee to reveal, as a condition of employment, his or her user name, password or other means of accessing the employee’s personal social media account, has passed both houses of the NJ Legislature and is awaiting further action by Governor Chris Christie. While it is not clear as of this writing whether Governor Christie will sign or veto this bill, the implications to employers of this potential new law are far reaching.

If enacted, this bill would prohibit employers from even asking an employee or prospective employee whether he or she has a profile on a social media site. In addition, the bill would prohibit employers from requiring prospective employees to waive or limit any protection granted to them under the law as a condition of applying for or receiving an offer of employment. It provides for a $1,000 civil penalty for the law’s first violation and $2,500 for each subsequent violation. If Governor Christie signs this bill into law, New Jersey would join other states that have enacted legislation preventing employers from requesting social media access information, including Arkansas, California, Delaware, Illinois, and Michigan, though it would be the first state to prevent employers from inquiring if employees or applicants have a social media account.

Notably, the bill does not prevent employers from performing their own online search to determine if a prospective or current employee is on a social media site. Accordingly, if a social media account is publically available, an employer would not run afoul of this proposed law by independently viewing an employee’s or prospective employee’s social media account. This type of activity could have other potential pitfalls associated with it however, such as learning protected class information about applicants.

We will continue to monitor the signing status of this bill.

What These Decisions and the Prospective NJ Statute Mean to Employers

In light of the foregoing, we recommend the following:

  • Employers should review and consider revising social media polices and hiring practices to address the NLRB decisions, the new NJ legislation, if enacted, and EEO issues associated with searches on applicants.
  • With respect to policies, employers should ensure that prohibitions placed on employees’ communications do not prohibit employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity.
  • Employers should continue to exercise caution when disciplining or terminating any employee based on his/her social media activities and should also consider training its managers in this area so that they do not inadvertently run afoul of these laws.
  • It is important to consult with counsel to consider whether an employee’s comments or posts would be deemed to be protected concerted activity under the Act before any disciplinary action is taken by the employer based on those comments or posts.
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Where Do Your Interests Lie Under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code?

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Determining a foreign debtor’s “center of main interests” and its effect on creditors’ rights

When doing business with a foreign company, it is important to identify the company’s “center of main interests” (“COMI”) as creditors may find themselves bound by the laws of the COMI locale. If a company initiates insolvency proceedings outside the U.S., it must petition a U.S. court under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code for recognition of the foreign proceeding. If the foreign proceeding is found to be a “foreign main proceeding” (i.e., a proceeding pending where the debtor has its COMI), Chapter 15 provides certain automatic, nondiscretionary relief, including an automatic stay of all proceedings against the debtor in the U.S. Therefore, when faced with a foreign insolvency proceeding, U.S. creditors’ rights will often be determined in the jurisdiction where the debtor’s COMI is located. However, despite its significance, COMI is left undefined by the statute, which prompted the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7608 (2nd Cir. April 16, 2013) to determine the relevant factors for locating a COMI and the appropriate time frame to consider those factors.

In Morning Mist, Miguel Lomeli and Morning Mist Holdings Limited (collectively, “Morning Mist”) filed a derivative action in New York state court against Fairfield Sentry Limited (the “Debtor”). The Debtor was one of Bernie Madoff’s largest “feeder funds,” having invested over $7 billion in the scheme. Shortly after the commencement of the derivative action, the Debtor initiated liquidation proceedings in the British Virgin Islands (the “BVI”). Then, in accordance with Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor petitioned the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York for recognition of the BVI liquidation proceeding. The bankruptcy court granted the Chapter 15 petition, recognizing the BVI liquidation as a “foreign main proceeding” and imposing an automatic stay on all proceedings against the Debtor in the U.S., including the derivative action. The district court upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision, and Morning Mist appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that the lower courts improperly found the BVIs to be the Debtor’s COMI.

To determine the Debtor’s COMI, the Second Circuit examined which factors should be considered and over what time period. Tackling the temporal element first, the Court concluded that the Chapter 15 petition filing date is the relevant review period, subject to an inquiry into whether the process has been manipulated. To offset a debtor’s ability to manipulate its COMI, a court may also review the period between the initiation of the foreign liquidation proceeding and the filing of the Chapter 15 petition. The Court squarely rejected Morning Mist’s suggestion that courts must consider a debtor’s entire operational history.

As for the appropriate factors to consider in locating a COMI, the Second Circuit held that any relevant activities, including liquidation activities and administrative functions, may be considered in a COMI analysis. Elaborating, the Court held that Chapter 15 creates a rebuttable presumption that the country where the debtor has its registered office will be its COMI, but recognized that courts have focused on a variety of other factors as well, including the location of the debtor’s headquarters, the location of those who actually manage the debtor, the location of the debtor’s primary assets, the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors or the majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case, and/or the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes. However, the Second Circuit emphasized that consideration of these factors is neither required nor dispositive.

Finally, Morning Mist argued that Chapter 15’s public policy exception (“Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.”) applied because the BVI proceedings were confidential and therefore “cloaked in secrecy.” The Second Circuit quickly dismissed this argument explaining that the public policy exception should be read restrictively and invoked only under exceptional circumstances concerning matters of fundamental importance for the enacting State. Recognizing that court pleadings can be sealed in U.S. cases, including bankruptcy cases, the Second Circuit found that the confidentiality of the BVI bankruptcy proceedings did not offend U.S. public policy.

The Morning Mist case adds some clarity to a significant issue in cross border insolvencies by highlighting the importance of understanding the internal operations and structure of foreign companies—factors that could affect the ability of U.S. creditors to seek redress in U.S. courts.

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The Good Angel Investor (Part 1): Doing the Deal

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At a time when lean startups often require considerably less than $1 million dollars to develop the proverbial minimum viable product and even validate the same with some customers, angel investors are playing an increasingly important role in startup financings.  And that’s a good thing, particularly in places outside of the major venture capital centers, where institutional venture capital is scarce.

Most startups successfully launched with angel capital will want to tap deeper pools of capital later on, often from traditional venture capital investors.  That being the case, entrepreneurs and their angel investors should make sure that the structure and terms of angel investments are compatible with the likely needs of downstream institutional investors.  Herewith, some of the issues entrepreneurs and angels should keep in mind when they sit down and negotiate that first round of seed investment.

  1. Don’t get hung up on valuation.  Seed stage opportunities are difficult to put a value on, particularly where the entrepreneur and/or the investor have limited experience.  Seriously mispricing a deal – whether too high or too low – can strain future entrepreneur/investor relationships and even jeopardize downstream funding.  If you and your seed investor are having trouble settling in on the “right” price for your deal, consider structuring the seed round as convertible debt, with a modest (10%-30%) equity kicker.  Convertible debt generally works where the seed round is less than one-half the size of the subsequent “A” round and the A round is likely to occur within 12 months of the seed round based on the accomplishment of some well-defined milestone.
  1. Don’t look for a perfect fit in an off-the-shelf world.  In the high impact startup world, probably 95% of seed deals take the form either of convertible debt (or it’s more recent twin convertible equity) or “Series Seed/Series AA” convertible preferred stock (a much simplified version of the classic Series A convertible preferred stock venture capital financing).  Unless you can easily explain why your deal is so out of the ordinary that the conventional wisdom shouldn’t apply, pick one of the two common structures and live with the fact that a faster, cheaper, “good enough” financing is usually also the best financing at the seed stage.
  1. On the other hand, keeping it simple should not be confused with dumbing it down.  If the deal is not memorialized in a mutually executed writing containing all the material elements of the deal, it is not a “good enough” financing.  The best intentioned, highest integrity entrepreneurs and seed investors will more often than not recall key elements of their deal differently when it comes time to paper their deal – which it will at the A round, if not before.  And the better the deal is looking at that stage, the bigger those differences will likely be.
  1. Get good legal advice.  By “good” I mean “experienced in high impact startup financing.”  Outside Silicon Valley, the vast majority of reputable business lawyers have little or no experience representing high impact entrepreneurs and their investors in financing transactions.  When these “good but out of their element” lawyers get involved in a high impact startup financing the best likely outcome is a deal that takes twice as long, and costs twice as much, to close.  More likely outcomes include unconventional deals that complicate or even torpedo downstream financing.  This suggestion is even more important if your deal is perchance one of those few that for some reason does need some custom fitting.
  1. Finally, a pet peeve.  If you think your startup’s future includes investments by well regarded institutional venture capital funds, skip the LLC tax mirage and just set your company up as a Delaware “C” corporation.  If you want to know why, ask one of those “experienced high impact startup lawyers” mentioned in point 4 above.
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Top Five Traps for the Unwary in Spin-Offs

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A wave of corporate breakups has swept through the United States over the last few years as investors have taken notice of the fact that smaller companies focused on a single business tend to outperform their more diversified peers.  A primary vehicle for these breakups has been the spin-off transaction, in which a publicly traded parent company distributes the shares of the spin-off company (spinco) to its own shareholders, creating a new, independent publicly traded entity.  The New York Times, citing Dealogic, reported that there were 93 spin-off transactions worth $128 billion in 2011, and that 2012 kept pace with 85 spin-off transactions worth $109 billion.  The rationale for a spin-off often is to unlock the value in a business or division that is trapped in a larger corporate bureaucracy.  Conglomerates tend to spread capital across all of their divisions rather than focusing on the individual opportunities within each business that are the most promising.  Holding company structures also can make decision-making more cumbersome and equity incentives less incentivizing for division management who feel as though their hard work is being diluted by the underperformance of other divisions or businesses.

Spin-offs, however, are complicated transactions that require a great deal of advance planning.  In many cases, an announcement that a parent company is considering the spin-off of one of its businesses is actually the start of a “dual-track” process wherein the parent company considers and plans for a spin-off while also remaining open to potential bids from third parties to acquire the business.  In even more complicated cases, a parent company agrees to sell a business to an acquirer in connection with a spin-off transaction.

The vast majority of spin-off transactions are designed to qualify under the rules of the Internal Revenue Code as “tax free” to the parent company and the shareholders who receive the spinco stock.

With this in mind, any company considering spinning off a division or business should keep in mind the following five potential traps.

1.  Tax-Free Qualification – Legitimate Business Purpose 

The spin-off must satisfy a legitimate business purpose in order to qualify under both the tax-free rules of the Internal Revenue Code and the Securities Act of 1933.  The tax authorities require that the spin-off be motivated in whole or in substantial part by one or more legitimate corporate business purposes in order to ensure that the purpose of the transaction is not simply “tax avoidance.”  The business purpose requirement is one of many requirements under the tax laws to qualify for a tax-free spin-off.  Because the costs of triggering tax in a spin-off transaction often are very high, most parent companies obtain a legal opinion from outside counsel and obtain a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service as a condition to completing a spin-off transaction.  As discussed in relation to trap number five below, a legitimate business purpose for the spin-off also is required under the securities laws in order for the distribution of the spinco stock to not be treated as a “sale” of securities by the parent company or the spinco requiring Securities Act of 1933 registration and the strict liability standard of care that comes with such a registration.  See the article entitled, “Five Key Tax Considerations for Spin-Off Transactions” for a more in depth discussion of tax issues raised in spin-offs.

2.  Separation of Assets and Liabilities

Before a business or a division can be spun off, both its assets and its liabilities must be separated.  Large companies with long operating histories often find that the process of separating out the spinco business is not straightforward, because the legal entities that house the business might also house other businesses and divisions that share assets, services, products, employees, vendors and customers with the spinco business.  The pre-spin separation transactions should avoid triggering contractual defaults and remedies under commercial agreements, financing agreements, intellectual property licensing agreements, collective bargaining agreements, employment contracts, benefit plans, etc.  Often the spinco and the parent company or another legacy business must enter into complex sharing or licensing agreements or joint ventures relating to valuable intellectual property, such as trade names, trademarks or patents, as well as employee matters.  See the article entitled “Trademark, Domain Name and Other IP Considerations for Spin-Offs” for a more in depth discussion of IP issues raised in spin-offs and see the article entitled, “Employee Benefit Issues in a Spin-Off” for a more in depth discussion of employee benefit issues raised in spin-offs.

The sharing of liabilities is often the most complicated endeavour because of the slew of legal obligations that are triggered.  In allocating liabilities to the spinco, the parent company must evaluate the impact such allocation will have on the solvency of the parent and the spinco.  Parent company directors can face personal liability under state corporate law for making an unlawful dividend because the company lacked sufficient capital to make such a dividend or for rendering the parent company insolvent by distributing out the spinco business, and the parent company itself can face claims of constructive fraudulent conveyance—i.e., the parent company received less than equivalent value, and either the parent or spinco was rendered insolvent (assets do not exceed liabilities), the parent and/or spinco was left with unreasonably small capital to run its respective business, or the parent or spinco was left with debts that exceed its respective ability to pay those debts as they become due.  Parent company directors can rely on legal experts and financial advisors to assist them in satisfying their duty of care.  A solvency opinion from a nationally recognized provider of such opinions is often a condition to the consummation of a spin-off transaction.  Such an opinion may be helpful to the directors of the parent company and spinco for a variety of reasons: (i) it can help to show that the directors properly exercised their duty of care in determining to enter into the spin-off transaction; (ii) it can assist in rebutting a fraudulent conveyance claim; and (iii) it can assist in rebutting a claim that the company had insufficient capital to make such a dividend.

3.  Transition Services

While one of the key rationales for spinning off a business or division is to allow the enterprise to operate independently, the reality in most cases is that, at least during the first year or so post-spin, a spinco must rely on its former parent company to provide many key administrative and operational services during the spinco’s transition period to a self-sufficient, independent public company.  During the pre-spin planning period, companies should consider, among other things, which transition services will be required, how they will be provided, for how long and under what pricing terms.  Typical transition services include legal, internal auditing, logistics, procurement, quality assurance, distribution and marketing.  These arrangements often have durations that last between six and 24 months.  Many parent companies agree to provide such transition services purely on a cost basis, while others will use a “cost plus” or “market” rate.

4.  Spinco Management and Board of Directors

Again, while independence from the former parent company is a key benefit for most spincos, having corporate managers with institutional knowledge and history with the enterprise is an important factor in assisting the spinco to successfully transition to independence.  Many spinco management teams include members who have served as executives at the former parent company.  In many cases, these are managers who served as division leaders who reported to the parent company CEO or CFO and are now ready to step into executive roles on their own.  It is also common for between one and three members of the parent company board to agree to take seats on the spinco board to provide the new public company board with a source of the company’s history and culture to ensure a smooth transition.  However, because of the competing fiduciary duties that these directors will face if they hold seats on both the parent and spinco boards, it is important for the spinco board to also have a majority of truly independent directors.  Spinco directors who are former executive officers of the parent also must be aware that the stock exchanges and influential shareholder services firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services will not view them as being truly independent from a corporate governance standpoint for some time after the completion of the spin-off.  This will inhibit their ability to serve on key board committees of the spinco.

5.  Preparation of the Disclosure 

Under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s rules, a spin-off of the shares of a subsidiary to a parent company’s shareholders does not involve the sale of securities by either the parent company or the subsidiary as long as the following conditions are met: (i) the parent company does not provide consideration for the spun-off shares; (ii) the spin-off is pro rata to the parent company shareholders; (iii) the parent company provides adequate information about the spin-off and the subsidiary to its shareholders and to the trading markets; and (iv) the parent has a valid business purpose for the spin-off.

To meet the adequate public information requirement, parent companies are required to prepare and disseminate detailed “information statements” that effectively look like initial public offering registration statements for the spinco.  These information statements are filed with the spinco’s Form 10 registration statement, which is required in order to register the spinco’s shares under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and to permit listing of such shares on a national securities exchange.  The preparation of the spinco information statement can take up to three or four months and requires a great deal of effort and cooperation among the lawyers, the business leaders, the finance department, the human resources/employee benefits department and the auditors.  In addition, under New York law, a spin-off of all or substantially all of a company’s assets may require a vote of such company’s shareholders, while under Delaware law, such a requirement is much less likely.

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Pregnancy and Disability Discrimination the Focus of EEOC Enforcement Activity

Poyner SpruillSince Congress’ enactment of amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 2008, making it easier to establish disability status under that law, the EEOC has directed more of its attention to claims of pregnancy and disability discrimination and accommodation of pregnancy-related limitations. In its 2012 Strategic Enforcement Plan, the Commission identified the investigation and pursuit of this type of claim as a national priority.  This enforcement initiative was recently demonstrated in a lawsuit filed by the EEOC against an employer which allegedly denied accommodations to an employee who suffered from complications arising from her pregnancy. The suit, EEOC v. Engineering Documentation Systems, Inc.,settled for $70,000 before a judgment on the merits was reached. However, the case serves as a reminder to employers that the issue of pregnancy-related disability is now being targeted by the EEOC.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), prohibits discrimination against employees or job applicants on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. The EEOC takes the position that Title VII and the PDA require employers to treat pregnant employees in the same manner as other employees with temporary medical conditions. For example, according to the EEOC, if an employer provides leaves of absence or light duty to employees with short-term medical conditions which render those employees unable to work, then an employee unable to work due to her pregnancy must also be afforded the same treatment.1   But Title VII is not the only potentially applicable law in this circumstance. The ADA requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodation” to an employee with an actual (or record of) disability. This raises the question whether a pregnant employee has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA.

Under the ADA, a disability is defined in part as a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits a major life activity. Prior to the amendments to the ADA, temporary medical conditions generally were not found by the courts to constitute disabilities, on the grounds that short-term impairments were not “substantially limiting.” However, the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) has led to a more expansive interpretation of the term “disability.” Specifically, the EEOC’s regulations implementing the ADAAA state that an impairment may be substantially limiting of a major life activity, and thus a disability, even if it is of a duration of less than six months. While the EEOC still considers pregnancy itself not to constitute a disability (See EEOC’s “Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008”), it recognizes that certain impairments resulting from pregnancy may be disabilities if they substantially limit a major life activity. As stated on the EEOC’s webpage regarding pregnancy discrimination, this could include short term complications of pregnancy such as gestational diabetes or preeclampsia.

With the possibility that more medical conditions and complications arising from pregnancy will now fall within the definition of disability under the ADAAA, employers must be more cognizant of when an obligation to consider and provide reasonable accommodation to employees with a pregnancy-related disability arises. Such accommodations might include leaves of absence, job reassignment, light duty, or job modifications, unless such accommodations would result in an undue hardship to the employer. It is also imperative that employers engage in the “interactive process” with such employees to identify reasonable accommodation. The failure to take such proactive measures can result in liability for an employer, particularly given that the EEOC is now focused on this area of enforcement.

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