Author: National Law Forum

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It's Not Easy Being Green: Understanding and Avoiding the Pitfalls of Green Marketing

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Anne E. Viner of Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein P.C. regarding the idenfication of “green” products and services:

A current trend among businesses is to identify their products and services as “green,” “environmentally safe,” “ozone friendly” or otherwise good for the environment. Companies do this to show that they are good stewards of the Earth and to attract customers who are interested in purchasing products that are “environmentally friendly.” But what does that phrase—or similar terminology—really mean? What sort of information must a business have in order to support these kinds of claims? Not surprisingly, there are a number of federal and state regulations, rules and guidelines that govern green marketing.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act prohibits deceptive representations in advertising, labeling, product inserts, catalogs and sales presentations. If statements concerning the environmental benefits of a product or service cannot be substantiated, they may be found to be deceptive by the FTC. Customers, competitors and environmental citizen groups often monitor green marketing and can file administrative complaints with the FTC if a company’s claims are misleading. Such complaints not only hurt businesses monetarily (legal expenses, administrative penalties, etc.), but can also damage the goodwill that the environmental claim was attempting to establish.

Federal Guidance

To help businesses determine when green marketing claims are acceptable and when they have gone too far, the FTC and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have developed guidelines to ensure that environmental marketing claims do not mislead consumers. Advertising, labeling, promotional materials, presentations and other forms of marketing that run afoul of the guidelines created by the FTC and EPA can result in such conduct being declared unlawful under the FTC Act.

The following guidelines apply broadly to all environmental marketing efforts—whether they are consumer-focused claims or business-to-business claims directed at suppliers, affiliated companies, distributors or other customers:

  • Clearly identify whether the advertised environmental benefit is with the product itself, the packaging, a service, or some other portion or component of the product, service or packaging. For example, if a box of aluminum foil is labeled “recyclable” without further elaboration, this claim would be considered deceptive if any part of either the box or the foil cannot be recycled.
  • Avoid overstatements of environmental benefits. For example, a package might be labeled “50% more recycled content than before” after the manufacturer upped the amount of recycled material from 2% to 3%. Although the claim is technically true, it gives a false impression that the amount of recycled material was significantly increased.
  • Be ready to substantiate any comparisons between products. For example, if an ad claims that a package creates “less waste than the leading national brand,” the advertiser must be able to substantiate the comparison with calculations comparing the relative solid waste contributions of the two packages. If it cannot, the ad runs afoul of the FTC Act and may create liability.

The guidelines created by the FTC and EPA also address the following specific environmental claims:

  • Avoid general, unqualified terms (such as “environmentally friendly” and “green”) that cannot be quantified and may convey a wide range of meanings to customers. The broader the term (a brand name like Eco-Safe, for example), the more likely it will be found deceptive by the FTC.
  • Reliable, scientific evidence must support claims that a product or package is degradable, biodegradable or photodegradable, as well as compostable or made with recycled, pre-consumer or post-consumer products. For example, if a shampoo is advertised as “biodegradable” with no qualifications, the manufacturer must have reliable scientific evidence that the product, which is customarily disposed of in sewer systems, will break down and decompose into elements found in nature in a short period of time. These specific terms have precise environmental meanings, and the guidelines give numerous examples of acceptable and deceptive uses of them.

The Guidelines in Action

Assume that a manufacturer wants to identify its entire product line of plastic buckets as being “made of recyclable material.” However, only one type of bucket in the line is made of post-consumer plastic and the post-consumer content averages just 20% annually. How can the manufacturer properly advertise the recycled content of its bucket line? According to the FTC and EPA guidelines, it is deceptive to identify the entire line as “green” or as being “made of recycled materials.” These broad, unquantifiable terms should also be avoided when advertising the one type of bucket that actually is made from post-consumer plastic. However, it is acceptable to use the 20% annual average of recycled material in marketing that particular bucket type. Such averaging is permissible, provided the company’s claims can be substantiated with scientific evidence.

The FTC Act and related guidance is just one example of regulations that are potentially applicable to green marketing claims. The EPA has established additional regulations and guidance under its Consumer Labeling Initiative and EPA Environmentally Preferable Procurement Program. The International Organization for Standardization also has developed environmental labeling criteria for products sold worldwide. Many states have their own environmental disclosure and marketing requirements as well.

Given the numerous requirements associated with environmental marketing, along with the potential risks of being found deceptive, it really isn’t easy being green. So, before your business makes any environmental claims about its products or services, carefully consider how you will state the environmental benefits, whether they can be supported with scientific evidence and what regulations may govern your claims.

© 2011 Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C.  

This (Retractable) Needle Is Going to Sting a Bit: Next Chapter in the Adventures of Post-Phillips Claim Construction

Posted on July 31, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by David M. Beckwith and Paul Devinsky of McDermott Will & Emery regarding how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the claim construction tension between broadly drafted claims and the written description contained in the patent specification:

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the claim construction tension between broadly drafted claims, and the written description contained in the patent specification, revealing a deep split among the panel members. Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson Co., Case No. 07-CV-0250 (Fed. Cir,. July 8, 2011) (Lourie, J.) (Plager, J., concurring) (Rader, J. dissenting-in-part).

Retractable Technologies (RT) sued Becton Dickenson (BD) for infringing three patents related to syringes with retractable needle technology. Following an adverse jury verdict, BD appealed on multiple grounds, including a challenge to the claim construction of the term “body,” which the district court had determined could include a multi-part structure.

The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, specifically rejecting the district court’s broad claim construction the term “body.”  BD argued that the district court erred in ruling the syringe “body” is not limited to a one-piece structure, noting the specifications describes “the invention” as including a one-piece body.  In addition, the background section of the patent criticized prior art syringes that contain a two-piece body.  Finally, BD argued that claim differentiation does not apply in light of the written description’s limiting statements concerning the nature of the invention and the structure of the syringe body.

RT responded that the ordinary meaning of the term “body” should apply and is not limited to a one-piece body.  RT also argued application of the claim differentiation canon based on a dependent claim that included the limitation of a one-piece body.

Judge Lourie wrote for the majority of the panel, agreeing with BD that the claim term “body” is limited to a one-piece structure as described in the specifications. The majority noted that the specification indicates what was invented, holding that the claim language should not be interpreted to extend the invention beyond that set forth in the written description.  The majority also rejected RT’s claim differentiation argument as “weak” in the face of the language of the specification.  The majority noted that no dependent claim recited a non-one piece structure and concluded that the language of the specification that criticized two-piece structures was of greater significance than the dependent claim to a one-piece body.

Judge Plager, concurring, warned courts to turn a deaf ear to the siren song of giving claims wide scope.  In Judge Plager’s opinion, the written description requirement imposes an obligation to make full disclosure of what is actually invented and to claim that and nothing more.  As Judge Plager noted, “I have written elsewhere about the curse of indefinite and ambiguous claims, divorced from the written description, that we are regularly are asked to construe, and the need for more stringent rules to control the curse.”

In dissent, Judge Rader focused on the ordinary meaning of the term “body” and explained that since there was no special meaning provided by the patent specification to supplant the ordinary meaning of the term “body,” it was error to limit the construction to only a one-piece structure.  Rader wrote,  “In this case, neither party contends that ‘body’ has a special, technical meaning in the field of art, and thus claim construction requires ‘little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly used words.’”

Practice Note:  This decision reflects a fundamental division within the Federal Circuit on the importance of the written description as a limitation on claim scope, as compared to the view that the claim language itself should be of paramount importance in construction. Until there is either some post-Phillips en bancclarification or Supreme Court consideration of the issue, the outcome of contested constructions in such a circumstance may demand on the panel hearing the appeal.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

Public Education Teacher Selection Process Not So Simple…

A very interesting article recently posted in the National Law Review  by Denise M. Spatafore of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP regarding WV’s legislature rules for determining who receives both teaching and administrative positions in West Virginia public schools.

If you do a Google search for the “qualities of effective teachers,” 4,920,000 results come up within 15 seconds. Obviously, the placement of the best possible educators in our public schools is important to virtually everyone, but determining how that can be accomplished has been, and continues to be, the subject of much debate and, in West Virginia, the subject of some fairly complex legislation.

Prior to the 1990s, the selection of classroom teachers in West Virginia was required by statute to be based on qualifications. In turn, “qualifications” was not defined, allowing for fairly broad and varied interpretations of what made a teacher qualified. Some believed that the lack of specific criteria allowed for selection decisions based on politics or nepotism, rather than actual teaching skills. Therefore, in 1990, the legislature enacted W. Va. Code § 18A-4-7a, which to this day contains very specific rules for determining who receives both teaching and administrative positions in West Virginia public schools.

There are two sets of seven criteria which are applied to applicants for teaching positions, and the factors used depend upon who the applicants are. If all of the applicants are “new” to the particular county (meaning that they are not currently employed in the county or are substitutes, rather than full-time teachers), the seven criteria applied include:

  1. certification for the position
  2. teaching experience in the subject area
  3. degree level
  4. academic achievement
  5. specialized training
  6. performance evaluations
  7. “other measures or indicators upon which the relative qualifications of the applicant may fairly be judged”

When using this so-called “first set of factors,” county administrators are not required to give any particular factor more weight than others, which allows a lot of discretion in determining which applicant is most qualified for the position. It may be the person who had the best interview, or it might be the teacher with the most relevant experience. As long as each applicant’s qualifications are assessed under each criterion, the board of education may hire whomever they want, absent a totally arbitrary decision that simply can’t be justified.

On the other hand, the “second set of factors,” which is used when any teacher employed in the county applies for a position, must be weighted equally. The second set of criteria contains some of the same categories as the first, including certification, degree level, training and evaluations. However, experience is considered in two separate categories:

  1. total teaching experience (regardless of what subject or grade level)
  2. “existence” of experience in the particular area of the posted position

Therefore, under the second set of factors, a teacher will be given credit for the entirety of his or her teaching experience, regardless of whether it was in the subject area of the position for which they are applying.

Another difference between the two sets of factors is that, when currently employed teachers apply, seniority is considered. There appears to be a common misconception among West Virginians and even among teachers that seniority is the only basis for awarding teaching positions, but this is simply not true. Seniority is only one of seven factors considered, and it must be equally weighted, just like the others. However, a possible source of some of the misconception could be that, in many counties, seniority is used as a tie-breaker when two or more applicants have equal qualifications.

Although school principals do have a statutory right to interview teacher applicants, if the second set of factors is in play, there is simply no legal basis to consider the results of interviews. Whether the legislature intended this or not is unknown, but it is a frustrating provision both for the administrators doing the hiring and for the applicants who may or may not be given the opportunity to demonstrate their attributes during an interview.

Also resulting from the requirements of the second set of factors, when both current employees and outsiders apply for teaching jobs, young or new teachers often have difficulty getting positions. Particularly within the field of elementary education, a very popular certification area for teaching students, young teachers often have to do substitute work for years before being able to “break into” the county system and obtain full-time employment.

While proposed changes to the teacher hiring process have been discussed by the legislature for the past several years, none have been successful to date.

© 2011 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.

 

 

Unsecured Creditors Beware! The Western District of Texas Bankruptcy Court Declares an Unsecured Creditor Cannot Have Its Cake (Unsecured Claim) and Eat It Too (Post-Petition Legal Fees)

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Evan D. Flaschen, Renée M. Dailey, Mark E. Dendinger of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP about the issue of whether an unsecured creditor can recover post-petition legal fees under the Bankruptcy Code:

Bankruptcy courts have long debated the issue of whether an unsecured creditor can recover post-petition legal fees under the Bankruptcy Code. In the recent decision of In re Seda France, Inc. (located here(opens in a new window)), Justice Craig A. Gargotta of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas denied an unsecured creditor’s claim for post-petition fees. In doing so, the Court has once again left the unsecured creditor with a bad taste in its mouth by declaring that an unsecured creditor seeking post-petition fees is asking permission to have its cake (a claim for principal, interest and pre-petition legal fees under applicable loan documents) and eat it too (a claim for post-petition legal fees).

Proponents of the view that an unsecured creditor cannot recover post-petition legal fees point to section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows as part of a creditor’s secured claim the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during the post-petition period, and note the Bankruptcy Code is silent on anunsecured creditor’s right to post-petition legal fees. Essentially, the argument is since Congress provided for post-petition fees for secured creditors, it could have explicitly provided for post-petition fees for unsecured creditors but chose not to. Proponents of the alternative view cite the Second Circuit decision United Merchants and its progeny, where those courts refused to read the plain language of section 506(b) as a limitation on an unsecured creditor’s claim for recovery of post-petition legal expenses. The theory is that while the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly permit the recovery of an unsecured creditor’s claim for post-petition attorneys’ fees, it does not expressly exclude them either. The basic tenant is that if Congress intended to disallow an unsecured creditor’s claim for post-petition legal fees it could have done so explicitly.

In Seda, Aegis Texas Venture Fund II, LP (“Aegis”) timely filed a proof of claim in Seda’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case claiming its entitlement to principal, interest and pre-petition attorneys’ fees under its loan documents with Seda as well as post-petition attorneys’ fees for the duration of the case. Aegis made various arguments in support of the allowance of its post-petition legal expenses including: (1) the explicit award of post-petition fees to secured creditors under section 506(b) does not mean that such a provision should not be implicitly read into section 502(b) (i.e., unim est exclusion alterius (“the express mention of one thing excludes all others”) does not apply), (2) the United States Supreme Court decision in Timbers does not control as Timbers denied claims of anundersecured creditor for unmatured interest caused by a delay in foreclosing on its collateral, (3) the right to payment of attorneys’ fees and costs exists pre-petition and it should be irrelevant to the analysis that such fees are technically incurred post-petition, (4) because the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the disallowance of an unsecured creditor’s post-petition attorneys’ fees, these claims should remain intact, and (5) recovery of post-petition attorneys’ fees and costs is particularly appropriate where, as in Seda, the debtor’s estate is solvent and all unsecured creditors are to be paid in full as part of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan.

The Seda Court rejected Aegis’ arguments and held that an unsecured creditor is not entitled to post-petition attorneys’ fees even where there is an underlying contractual right to such fees and unsecured creditors are being paid in full. With respect to Aegis’ argument on the proper interpretation of sections 506(b) and 502(b), the Court cited the many instances in the Bankruptcy Code where Congress expressed its desire to award post-petition attorneys’ fees (e.g., section 506(b)), and found that Congress could have easily provided for the recovery of attorneys’ fees for unsecured creditors had that been its intent. Regarding Aegis’ argument that Timbers does not control, the Court held that in reaching its decision on the disallowance of a claim for unmatured interest the Timbers Court found support in the notion that section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly permit post-petition interest to be paid to unsecured creditors. The SedaCourt held this ruling should apply equally to attorneys’ fees to prohibit recovery of post-petition fees and expenses by unsecured creditors. The Court further held that section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a court should determine claim amounts “as of the date of the filing of the petition,” and therefore attorneys’ fees incurred after the petition date would not be recoverable by an unsecured creditor. In response to Aegis’ argument that non-bankruptcy rights, including the right to recover post-petition attorneys’ fees should be protected, the Seda Court noted that the central purpose of the bankruptcy system is “to secure equality among creditors of a bankrupt” and that an unsecured creditor’s recovery of post-petition legal fees, even based on a contractual right, would prejudice other unsecured creditors. The Court held this is true even in the case where the debtor was solvent and paying all unsecured creditors in full. The Court noted that a debtor’s right to seek protection under the Bankruptcy Code is not premised on the solvency or insolvency of the debtor and, therefore, the solvency of the debtor has no bearing on the allowance of unsecured creditors’ post-petition legal fees.

Seda is the latest installment in the continued debate among the courts whether to allow an unsecured creditor’s post-petition attorneys’ fees. The Seda Court is of the view that an unsecured creditor cannot recover post-petition legal fees for the foregoing reasons, most notably that the Bankruptcy Code is silent on their provision and public policy disfavors the recovery of one unsecured creditor’s legal expenses incurred during the post-petition period to the prejudice of other unsecured creditors. Depending on the venue of the case, there will undoubtedly be many more instances of unsecured creditors seeking recovery of their post-petition attorneys’ fees in a bankruptcy case until the Supreme Court definitively rules on the issue. Until then, keep asking for that cake . . . .

© 2011 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Eastern Population of Gopher Tortoise Eligible for Endangered Species Act Protection

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article about The United States Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) has released its listing decision for the eastern population of gopher tortoise by Ivan T. Sumner of Greenberg Traurig, LLP.

The United States Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) has released its listing decision for the eastern population of gopher tortoise. The USFWS has determined that listing the eastern population of the tortoise as Threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is warranted, however, it is precluded from doing so at this time due to higher priority actions and a lack of sufficient funds to commence proposed rule development. The western population is already listed as Threatened and will continue to be protected under the ESA. In the interim period of time the USFWS  will place the eastern population of the tortoise on its candidate species list until sufficient funding is available to initiate a proposed listing rule. The USFWS did not provide any time estimate on that front. Candidate species do not receive any statutory protection under the ESA. The gopher tortoise in Florida is still protected under Florida laws and policies implemented  by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Entrepreneur’s Guide to Litigation – Blog Series: Discovery

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by  Joseph D. Brydges of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP regarding the Discovery is a pre-trial phase of litigation.

 

Discovery is a pre-trial phase of litigation during which a party to a lawsuit seeks to “discover” information from the opposing party. Discovery is meant to facilitate the truth-finding function of the courts and, as such, parties to a lawsuit have an automatic right to discovery. From a strategic standpoint, discovery is used to gather and preserve evidence in support or defense of the claims made in the complaint. Further, discovery often helps parties narrow the focus of the litigation in preparation for trial and, in some cases, may lead to a pre-trial settlement. Discovery is an extremely important phase of litigation because the evidence gathered during discovery will serve as the foundation of a motion for summary judgment and/or strategy at trial.

Discovery proceedings are typically governed by state statutes in state court and by the federal rules of civil procedure in federal court. Generally, the scope of discovery permitted under these rules is very broad. Discoverable information may include any material which is reasonably calculated to produce evidence that may later be admitted at trial. However, certain information, including information protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product of an opposing party, is generally protected from discovery. During the discovery period, parties may serve discovery requests upon one another. These discovery requests are made through one of several available discovery mechanisms including interrogatories, requests for admission, document requests and depositions.

Interrogatories are written discovery requests often utilized to obtain basic information such as names and dates. Any party served with written interrogatories must answer the questions contained therein in writing and under oath. Similarly, requests for admission consist of written statements directed towards an opposing party for the purpose of having the opposing party “admit” or “deny” the statements. Often, these statements seek to establish undisputed facts, authenticate documents and pin an opposing party to a particular position. Document requests are an important component of discovery in which a party may be required to make any relevant and nonprivileged documents available for inspection by the opposing party. Document production will be covered in greater detail in the following section entitled “Document Production.”

The lynchpin of discovery proceedings is the deposition. Depositions are used to obtain the out-of-court testimony of a witness with knowledge relevant to the litigation. They allow a party to discover any relevant information known to a witness and are often the only method of discovery available with regard to obtaining information from witnesses that are not a party to the litigation. During a deposition, the witness is questioned under oath and must answer the questions asked truthfully to the extent that the answer would not lead to the disclosure of privileged information. The rules governing depositions also allow for the deposition of an organization or corporation where a party is unable to identify the particular witness within the organization that may have knowledge of the information sought. In that instance, a party may identify the information sought and the organization will be required to designate a representative to testify on its behalf.

A party served with a discovery request must respond to the request within the specified time period or object to the requested discovery and state reasons for its objection. If, for some reason, a party refuses to respond to a discovery request, the party serving the request may move the court to compel a response. It is within the court’s power to compel a response to a discovery request and impose penalties on a party refusing to comply with a discovery request.

Click Below for previous posts from the Entrepreneur’s Guide to Litigation Blog Series:

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

Supreme Court Affirms Clear and Convincing Standard of Patent Invalidity Proof

Posted on July 26, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by Jeremiah Armstrong and Paul Devinsky of  McDermott Will & Emery regarding the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision to  unanimously reject Microsoft’s plea to modify the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof required to invalidate a patent.

Delivering what is likely the final blow to its battle against a $240 million infringement judgment, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously rejected Microsoft’s plea to modify the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof required to invalidate a patent. Microsoft v. i4i, Case No. 09-1504 (Supr. Ct., June 9, 2011) (Justice Sotomayor) (Justices Breyer and Thomas, concurring).

The appeal stems from a 2009 jury verdict that certain versions of Microsoft Word were found to infringe plaintiff i4i’s patent related to editing and formatting XML documents. Microsoft challenged the validity of the patent, based on the §102(b) on-sale bar, citing i4i’s sales of a software product called S4 more than a year before applying for the asserted patent. The S4 product was never presented to the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examiner.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit squarely rejected Microsoft’s argument that the jury should have been instructed to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof to the issue of patent invalidity. The Federal Circuitalso rejected Microsoft’s request to reduce the willful damages award, partially due to Microsoft’s failure to file a pre-verdict judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).

History

Microsoft petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to consider whether an accused infringer that challenges patent validity based on prior art not considered by the USPTO during prosecution must overcome the 35 U.S.C. §282 presumption of validity by “clear and concurring evidence” or whether some lower standard of proof will suffice (see IP Update, Vol. 13, No. 12).

The “clear and concurring” standard of proof has been used by Federal Circuit since its pronouncement in the seminal 1984 case, American Hoist & Derrick v. Sowa & Sons. Prior to the 1982 establishment of the Federal Circuit, most of the regional courts of appeal applied the less differential “preponderance” standard to the issue. However, the Federal Circuit, in setting its rule, took note of the “the deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to have properly done its job.”

Microsoft, in its certiorari petition, was supported for review of the Federal Circuit standard of proof by 11 amici representing major corporations, law professors and trade associations. Most of the amici faulted the deference given to the USPTO examiners who have limited time and resources for the examination of any particular application, who examine applications on a strictly ex parte basis and who only infrequently consider non-patent prior art publication or prior products. The amici also note that juries already tend to give undue deference to the decision of the USPTO in issuing a patent, especially in cases where the technology is complex.

Microsoft and the amici characterized the Federal Circuit rule as inflexible and another “bright line” test, a characterization that has resulted in the reversal of several Federal Circuit rulings in recent history, including the KSR obviousness case; a case in which the Supreme Court, in dicta, noted that the rational for showing deference to the USPTO was “much diminished” where the prior art in issue was not before the examiner.

Supreme Court Decision

In its analysis, the Supreme Court considered whether §282 established the standard of proof for invalidity as requiring clear and convincing evidence given the statutory language that a “patent shall be presumed valid” and “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity … rest[s] on the party asserting such invalidity.” While §282 does not explicitly state an invalidity standard, the Supreme Court explained that the language used when the statute was enacted in 1952 was synonymous with the clear and convincing evidence standard that was part of the recognized common law, as described by Justice Cardozo in Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc. Accordingly, the Supreme Court deferred to the opinion of Judge Rich, a primary author of the 1952 Patent Act, in American Hoist & Derrick, where he wrote that under §282 the “burden is constant and never changes and is to convince the court of invalidity by clear evidence.”

The Supreme Court said this strict invalidity standard always applies, even when evidence before the fact-finder was not previously available to the USPTO during the examination process: “[H]ad Congress intended to drop the heightened standard of proof where the evidence before the jury varied from that before the PTO—and thus to take the unusual and impractical step of enacting a variable standard of proof that must itself be adjudicated in each case —we assume it would have said so expressly.”

However the Supreme Court did suggest the use of tailored jury instructions: “When warranted, the jury may be instructed to consider that it has heard evidence that the PTO had no opportunity to evaluate before granting the patent” and “may be instructed to evaluate whether the evidence before it is materially new, and if so, to consider that fact when determining whether an invalidity defense has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”

Notably, the Supreme Court recognized that new evidence not considered by the USPTO during examination—like the S4 software product in issue here—may “carry more weight” at trial (i.e., “the challenger’s burden to persuade the jury of its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence may be easier to sustain”) and, citing its earlier KSR decision, conceded that where prior art was not before the USPTO, “the rational underlying the presumption—that the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the claim—seems much diminished.” As the Supreme Court explained, “if the PTO did not have all of the material facts before it, its considerable judgment may lose considerable force. And, concomitantly, the challenger’s burden to persuade the jury of its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence may be easier to sustain.”

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

ALJ Upholds OIG’s Eight-Year Exclusion of Company Owner

Posted recently in the National Law Review an article by Meghan C. O’Connor of von Briesen & Roper, S.C. regarding OIG’s use of its exclusionary authority against individuals:

 

In yet another example of the OIG’s use of its exclusionary authority against individuals, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the OIG’s exclusion ofMichael D. Dinkel, the owner and President of a diagnostic imaging company. Dinkel has been excluded from participation in all Federal health care programs for a period of eight years.

The OIG has the authority to exclude individuals and entities from Federal health care programs for presenting or causing to be presented claims for items or services that the individual or entity knows or should know where not provided as claimed, or are otherwise false or fraudulent.

According to the OIG’s press release, Dinkel and his company, Drew Medical, Inc., submitted approximately 9,500 false claims worth $1.6 million to theMedicare and Medicaid programs for services related to venography, a radiology procedure. The OIG found that no venography services had actually been performed. Instead, claims were submitted to Medicare and Medicaid for a corresponding procedural code for MRI and CT procedures with contrast. Prior to Dinkel’s exclusion, a $1,147,564 civil False Claims Act settlement had been entered into with Dinkel and his company.

The ALJ found that Dinkel had a duty “to understand Medicare and Medicaid billing requirements and apply them scrupulously to the claims that he caused to be presented.” Furthermore, Dinkel’s failure to ensure his company properly claimed reimbursement “constituted reckless indifference to the propriety of the claims he cause to be presented.”

The ALJ’s full decision is available by request from the OIG.

©2011 von Briesen & Roper, s.c

D.C. Circuit Invalidates SEC's Proxy Access Rules

Posted on Sunday, July 24, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by John D. Tishler  and Evan Mendelsohn of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP regarding the  United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision invalidating the SEC’s proxy access rules adopted in August 2010:

July 22, in Business Roundtable v. Securities & Exchange Commission, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its decision invalidating the SEC’s proxy access rules adopted in August 2010 with the intention that they be effective for the 2011 proxy season (see our blog here). The Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed the lawsuit in September 2010 challenging the SEC’s adoption of proxy access rules and separately requesting for the SEC to stay implementation of the rules pending the outcome of the lawsuit. The SEC granted the request for stay in October 2010 and issuers were relieved of the burdens of proxy access for the 2011 proxy season. (See our blog posts here and here.)

The Court found that the Commission “neglected its statutory responsibility to determine the likely economic consequences of Rule 14a-11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” The Court also criticized the SEC’s reliance on empirical data that purported to demonstrate that proxy access would improve board performance and increase shareholder value by facilitating the election of dissident nominees, pointing out numerous studies submitted in the rule comment process that reached the opposite result.

The SEC’s proxy access rules also included an amendment to Rule 14a-8 that would authorize stockholder proposals to establish a procedure for stockholders to nominate directors. The SEC stayed implementation of the changes to Rule 14a-8 at the same time it stayed implementation of Rule 14a-11; however, the changes to Rule 14a-8 were not affected by the Court’s decision.

The SEC will now need to decide whether to propose new regulations for proxy access and whether to permit Rule 14a-8 to go effective.  However the SEC decides to proceed, it seems unlikely that public companies will face mandatory proxy access for the 2012 proxy season. 

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Affordable Attorney Marketing

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Margaret Grisdela of Legal Expert Connections about Affordable Attorney Marketing. 

“I am a new attorney in the Northeast looking for a way to get clients. My practice areas are Bankruptcy and litigation. I understand the fundamentals of building a referral base and SEO and are implementing the same now, but those are long term strategies. What is a starving attorney to do in the meantime? This is where I hope you can help me.”

This is a question that came into my inbox this week, and it’s a good one. “Affordable attorney marketing” is the quest when you open a new law practice, or need to rejuvenate an existing one.

Here are a few ideas that come to mind:

1. Join a lawyer referral network. Many local bar associations offer a referral network. While you won’t get rich, you should start to get a few cases coming in. This can give you visibility in the courts and among your peers.

2. Use LinkedIn to build your network and stay connected. Use the “Share an Update” feature from your LinkedIn home page to post an interesting item every 1-2 weeks. This will keep you “top of mind” with those you know.

3. Test a small Google AdWords campaign. While this can be expensive, it is possible to set daily limits on your ad budget and focus on a small geographic area. Also, be sure to filter out terms that don’t apply to you with the negative keywords feature.

4. Start a blog. Demonstrate your knowledge in bankruptcy, litigaion, and other practice areas with an educational blog. WordPress or Blogger allow you to start a blog quickly and easily. Actually the set up is the easy part. Write at least 1-2 blog posts per week, focusing on practice area keywords and also relating stories to your geo area of coverage. Feed the blog posts through other social medial (LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook) using a service like Hootsuite. Select a URL with important keywords to help get online recognition.

5. Consider BNI or similar lead groups. This can help you to meet other professionals and get the word out about your legal services.

Overall, have lots of business cards and network, network, network! Tell everyone you know what you do. Marketing to those you know is your best source of new business fast. Picking a niche for your practice can also help your marketing dollars work smartly.

© Legal Expert Connections, Inc.