Author: National Law Forum

A group of in-house attorneys developed the National Law Review on-line edition to create an easy to use resource to capture legal trends and news as they first start to emerge. We were looking for a better way to organize, vet and easily retrieve all the updates that were being sent to us on a daily basis.In the process, we’ve become one of the highest volume business law websites in the U.S. Today, the National Law Review’s seasoned editors screen and classify breaking news and analysis authored by recognized legal professionals and our own journalists. There is no log in to access the database and new articles are added hourly. The National Law Review revolutionized legal publication in 1888 and this cutting-edge tradition continues today.

Wisconsin Eliminates Income Tax Disparity on Health Coverage for Adult Children

Posted on November 9, 2011 in the National Law Review an article by attorneys Kelli A. Toronyi, Charles P. Stevens and Kirk A. Pelikan of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP regarding Wis. Act 49.:

On November 4, 2011, Governor Walker signed into law 2011 Senate Bill 203 now known as 2011 Wis. Act 49. The bill, which received large bipartisan support among Wisconsin legislators, exempts from Wisconsin income tax the value of health coverage provided to certain adult children.

Background

Prior to 2010, most employers’ health plans provided coverage for children of employees up to age 19, or up to age 23 if the child was a full time student. Effective January 1, 2010, Wisconsin imposed a new rule requiring insurance carriers and certain self-funded governmental plans to provide eligibility for coverage for children through age 26 (up to the day before the child’s 27th birthday).

On March 23, 2010, the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) was enacted. It required employer health plans to cover older children through age 25 (up to the day before the child’s 26th birthday), effective for calendar year health plans on and after January 1, 2011. Under the then current federal Internal Revenue Code, however, this coverage would be considered taxable income to some parents.

Then a week later on March 30, 2010, Congress amended the federal Internal Revenue Code to exclude from taxable income health coverage that a taxpayer receives for a child up to the end of the calendar year in which the child reaches age 26. Thus, the imputed income problem was solved for federal tax purposes.

In June of 2011, Wisconsin modified its insurance eligibility rules to adopt the federal eligibility rules under PPACA, effective January 1, 2012 (or upon expiration, extension, modification or renewal of an applicable collective bargaining agreement, if later). Thus, under both Wisconsin and federal law health coverage must be made available for children up through age 25. However, Wisconsin did not modify its tax rules, which continued to observe the previous version of the federal Internal Revenue Code, so the coverage of an employee’s child subject to Wisconsin income tax in some circumstances. To the extent such coverage has been taxable for Wisconsin income tax purposes, employers have been required to report this coverage as income on the employee’s W-2 form and to withhold the appropriate amount from wages.

Amendment to Wisconsin Tax Code Eliminates Obligation to Impute Income for Adult Child Health Coverage

With the enactment of 2011 Wis. Act 49, the Wisconsin Tax Code and the federal Internal Revenue Code are again consistent. Wisconsin employees are no longer subject to taxation for this coverage and Wisconsin employers are no longer required to impute as income the value of such coverage for tax withholding and W-2 reporting purposes. The new law is effective retroactive to January 1, 2011. This may result in some over withholding for some employees to date, but with a reduction in taxable income, this provides for a somewhat lower Wisconsin tax liability when tax returns are filed next year.

A copy of 2011 Wis. Act 49 can be found here.

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

OSHA Seeking Comment on SOX Whistleblower Complaint Rules

 

 

 

 

Posted in the National Law Review an article by attorney Virginia E. Robinson of  Greenberg Traurig regarding OSHA  seeking public comment on interim final rules that revise its regulations on the filing and handling of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) whistleblower complaints

GT Law

The U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is seeking public comment on interim final rules that revise its regulations on the filing and handling of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) whistleblower complaints.

OSHA, the entity charged with receiving and investigating SOX whistleblower complaints, issued the interim rules in part to implement the amendments to SOX’s whistleblower protections that were included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Those amendments include an extension of the statute of limitations period for filing a complaint from 90 to 180 days. They also clarify that nationally recognized statistical rating organizations and subsidiaries of publicly traded companies are covered employers under SOX.

In addition to implementing the Dodd-Frank amendments, the interim rules also seek to improve OSHA’s handling of SOX whistleblower complaints, and will permit the filing of oral complaints and complaints in any language.

The planned amendments to those regulations were published in the Nov. 3 Federal Register. Comments must be received by Jan. 3, 2012, and may be submitted online, by mail, or by fax. The Depatment of Labor’s recent news release provides additional details.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

White Collar Crime

The National Law Review would like to advise you of the upcoming White Collar Crime conference sponsored by the ABA Center for CLE and Criminal Justice Section, General Practice,  &   Solo and Small Firm Division:

 

 

Event Information

When

February 29 – March 02, 2012

Where

  • Eden Roc Renaissance Miami Beach
  • 4525 Collins Ave
  • Miami Beach, FL, 33140-3226
  • United States of America
Primary Sponsors

  • Highlight

The faculty includes some of the leading white collar lawyers in the United States.  The keynote panels for the 2012 program will continue to focus on the role of ethics and corporate compliance in today’s business environment.

  • Program Description

Each year the National Institute brings together judges, federal, state, and local prosecutors, law enforcement officials, defense attorneys, corporate in-house counsel, and members of the academic community.  The attendees include experienced litigators, as well as attorneys new to the white collar area.  Attendees have consistently given the Institute high ratings for the exceptional quality of the Institute’s publication, its valuable updates on new developments and strategies, as well as the rare opportunity it provides to meet colleagues in this field, renew acquaintances and exchange ideas.

The faculty includes some of the leading white collar lawyers in the United States.  The keynote panels for the 2012 program will continue to focus on the role of ethics and corporate compliance in today’s business environment.  Once again, we expect excellent representation from the corporate sector.

  • CLE Information

ABA programs ordinarily receive Continuing Legal Education (CLE) credit in AK, AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, GU, HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, ME, MN, MS, MO, MT, NH, NM, NV, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VT, VA, VI, WA, WI, WV, and WY. These states sometimes do not approve a program for credit before the program occurs. This course is expected to qualify for 11.0 CLE credit hours (including TBD ethics hours) in 60-minute-hour states, and 13.2 credit hours (including TBD ethics hours) in 50-minute-hour states. This transitional program is approved for both newly admitted and experienced attorneys in NY. Click here for more details on CLE credit for this program.

Department of Labor Revises Conflict Disclosure Requirements for Labor Union Officials

Barnes & Thornburg LLP‘s Labor and Employment Law Department recently posted in the National Law Review an article about the United States Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Management Standards adopted a final rule revising the information that union officials must disclose on Form LM-30, the Labor Organization Office and Employee Report.:

 

 

On Oct. 26, 2011, the United States Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Management Standards adopted a final rule revising the information that union officials must disclose on Form LM-30, the Labor Organization Office and Employee Report. The new rule reverses the rule published by the agency in 2007 that significantly expanded the financial disclosure requirements of union officials. Effective Nov. 25, 2011, union officials are now required to disclose only payments and interests that involve “actual or likely” conflicts between the official’s personal financial interests and his or her duties to the union. The DOL explains that such conflicts include “payments, interests and transactions involving the employers whose employees the union represents or actively seek to represent, vendors and service providers to such employers, the official’s union or the union’s trust and other employers from which a payment could create a conflict.” The new rule applies to reports required by union officials with fiscal years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2012.

Use of Form LM-30 for reporting purposes began in 1963 pursuant to Section 202 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Although the reporting requirements for Form LM-30 were significantly expanded in 2007, the DOL had issued a non-enforcement policy in 2009 that allowed filers to use either the 2007 expanded version of Form LM-30 or the 1963 version of the Form to disclose potential conflicts.

© 2011 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

CMS Releases its CY 2012 OPPS Final Rule

Posted recently in  the National Law Review by Scott J. Thill of von Briesen & Roper, S.C.  regarding  CY 2012 Outpatient Prospective Pzyment System:

 

CMS has released its CY 2012 Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) Final Rule, effective January 1, 2012.  Notable provisions of the Final Rule include:

  • A market basket update of 1.9%.
  • Adjustment to payment rates for certain cancer hospitals.
  • A process for the APC Panel to evaluate requests for alternative supervision levels for hospital outpatient therapeutic services and issue recommendations to CMS on the same.
  • The addition of three quality measures for hospital outpatient departments to report for purposes of the CY 2014 and CY 2015 payment determinations.  The new measures include: (i) a measure relating to cardiac rehabilitation patient referrals; (ii) a measure relating to the use of a safe surgery checklist; and (iii) a measure relating to hospital outpatient department volume for selected surgical procedures.
  • A reduction in the number of randomly selected hospitals (from 800 to 450) for validating hospital outpatient quality reporting data for the CY 2013 payment determination.
  • Revisions to the hospital value-based purchasing program.
  • A process for physician-owned hospitals to apply for an exception to the federal prohibition on expanding facility capacity in physician-owned hospitals.

Intervening Rights Can Apply to an Original Claim Based on Arguments Made During Reexamination

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Cynthia Chen, Ph.D. of McDermott Will & Emery  regarding the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision to grant injunction and reasonable royalty damages for patent infringement:

 

In reversing and vacating a district court’s decision to grant injunction and reasonable royalty damages for patent infringement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that intervening rights can apply to an original claim based on arguments made by the patentee during reexamination.   Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., Case No. 10-1548 (Fed. Cir., Sept. 26, 2011) (Dyk, J.) (Lourie, J., dissenting).  Intervening rights typically occur where the scope of coverage of a patent changes during reexamination.

Marine Polymer sued HemCon for infringing its patent claiming a biocompatible polymer.   In the ensuing litigation, the district court construed the term “biocompatible” as meaning polymers “with no detectable biological reactivity as determined by biocompatibility tests.”  Meanwhile, in the parallel reexamination proceeding, the examiner construed the term “biocompatible” as meaning polymers with “little or no detectable reactivity” reasoning that certain dependent claims recited a biocompatibility test score that is greater than zero.  Marine Polymer urged the examiner to adopt the district court’s claim construction and canceled all dependent claims reciting a biocompatibility test score greater than zero.  In view of the cancellation of those dependent claims, the examiner adopted the district court’s claim construction, and the remaining claims were issued.

In this appeal from the district court (where HemCon was subjected to a $29 million dollar damages award against it), HemCon argued that it was entitled to intervening rights because Marine Polymer changed the scope of the claims of the asserted patent during reexamination.  Marine Polymer, contended that intervening rights cannot apply because the actual language of the asserted claims was not amended during reexamination.

The Federal Circuit agreed with HemCon and held that Marine Polymer indeed narrowed the scope of the claims by “argument rather than changing the language of the claims to preserve otherwise invalid claims.”   Noting that intervening rights are available if the original claims have been “substantively changed,” the Court emphasized that “in determining whether substantive changes have been made, we must discern whether the scope of the claims [has changed], not merely whether different words are used.”  In particular, those dependent claims that were canceled during reexamination indicated that “the term ‘biocompatible’ must include slight or mild biological reactivity.”  As such, the district court’s claim construction, which required that the polymer show “no detectable biological reactivity,” imposed a new claim limitation that narrowed the scope of the claims. Therefore, intervening rights did apply in this case, as “argument to PTO on reexamination constituted disavowal of claim scope even though ‘no amendments were made.’”

Judge Lourie dissented and argued that the majority went beyond the statutory rules for intervening rights under 35 U.S.C. §§ 307(b) and 316(b).   Judge Lourie believes that, according to the language of the statute, intervening rights should only apply to “amended or new claims.”

Practice Note:   Post-grant proceedings could be a pitfall for patentees seeking to enforce their patents.  A patentee should consider whether it would be better off filing a continuing application before grant of the original patent to leave a vehicle to present new or amended claims.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

Q&A / Fee Disclosure Requirements Top the List of Issues Facing Retirement Plan Sponsors

 Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by  f Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein P.C.  Much Shelist spoke toNorman D. Schlismann (Senior Managing Director) and David H. Dermenjian (Senior Vice President) in the Retirement Plan Advisory Group about current issues facing 401(k) plan sponsors.

 

In today’s turbulent economy, 401(k) defined-contribution plans are under the microscope. Plan participants and government agencies are scrutinizing every element of retirement plans, paying special attention to the fiduciary responsibilities of plan sponsors and the fees being paid to their service providers. As a diversified financial services firm, Mesirow Financial provides a broad range of asset management, investment advisory, broker-dealer and consulting services to institutions and private clients worldwide. Much Shelist spoke toNorman D. Schlismann (Senior Managing Director) and David H. Dermenjian (Senior Vice President) in the Retirement Plan Advisory Group about current issues facing 401(k) plan sponsors.

Much Shelist: What have been some of the primary effects of the economic crisis on employer-sponsored retirement plans and 401(k) plans in particular?

David Dermenjian: Perhaps the greatest effect of the global economic situation is that everyone—from individual plan participants to plan sponsors, investment fund managers and regulatory officials—is looking more closely at fund performance, employee education and the administrative and other costs associated with these plans. This is quite understandable; over the past several years, virtually every retirement plan has experienced at least a temporary decline in value.

Individual plan participants, including employees and executives, tend to focus on the range of funds available in their plans, as well as fund performance and minimizing costs. Plan sponsors are typically interested in ensuring that they are fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities and limiting potential liability. Government regulators want to protect individuals against unnecessary losses by stepping up their use of audits and investigations to uncover and correct potential irregularities in financial reporting, self-dealing or the occasional misuse of employee contributions. Ultimately, all of these steps are being taken in pursuit of the same goal: to help employees make wise decisions regarding their retirement assets and preserve value to the maximum extent possible.

Norm Schlismann: Education is the centerpiece of these efforts. By providing in-person counseling and seminars, online webinars and printed materials that clearly describe the various fund options, rules and fees, employers can help employees make more informed decisions, and plan sponsors can be sure they are meeting their fiduciary obligations.

One example of how education can help is in the area of target-date retirement funds. Typically, these funds are built around an estimated retirement year, say 2030. As the target date approaches and participants near their expected retirement, the fund will shift into a more conservative investment mode, often moving assets from stocks into bonds and money market instruments. What many people don’t realize, however, is that target-date funds may appear to be similar but are actually based on different assumptions. A “to-date” fund assumes that participants will withdraw all of their assets upon retirement, whereas a “through-date” fund assumes that smaller withdrawals will occur over time, perhaps on a monthly basis. Since through-date funds assume that assets will remain in the fund even after retirement, they may take a more risky approach to investment allocations.

MS: Fee disclosures have received significant attention of late. Briefly, what are they?

DD: The concept of fee disclosures has been floating around for a while, but the final rule—described under ERISA Section 408(b)2—will go into full effect April 2012. Under the rule, retirement plan fiduciaries must ensure that “reasonable fees” are being paid to providers for “reasonable services.” Fiduciaries must also obtain information sufficient to enable them to make informed decisions about the costs associated with these providers and must disclose this information to plan participants.

Typical information contained in a disclosure includes benchmarking data (comparing the fees associated with a particular fund or retirement plan to other, similar funds or plans) and fee structures. It’s important to note that higher fees are not necessarily unreasonable. Some providers offer a higher level of service—one-on-one employee counseling, real-time access to complete fund reports, etc.—which can justify the higher costs to participants.

NS: Clarity and transparency are the watchwords of disclosures. For this reason, disclosures should often include information beyond simple fee information. For example, disclosures should also include an assessment of the independence of—and potential conflicts between—service providers, as well as possible conflicts between service providers and fiduciaries. Revenue sharing and finders fees are typical areas of concern.

MS: To that point, what is the difference between a plan fiduciary and a service provider?

NS: Plan fiduciaries are individuals or groups of individuals who use their own judgment in administering and managing the plan or who have the power to actually control the plan’s assets. Service providers, on the other hand, execute the instructions of plan fiduciaries; they may include plan recordkeepers, administrators, custodians, advisors and other financial or investment professionals engaged to operate retirement plans or provide guidance with respect to the plans.

In some cases, a service provider may also act in the role of a fiduciary. For example, a broker-dealer, whose responsibility to the client for suitability and appropriateness of a recommendation ends the moment a sale is made, could be considered a service provider but not a fiduciary. A registered investment advisor, who may be involved in the recommendation of a particular investment option to the plan and who may continue to provide guidance over the life of an investment, is considered both a service provider and a fiduciary.

MS: Where can plan sponsors find the information they need to make proper disclosures?

DD: That’s the $64,000 question! While it is getting easier to obtain this information, plans and their cost structures have grown more complex over the years. Understanding exactly what the data is telling you, vis-à-vis your own plans, can be difficult. This is where the assistance of experienced financial professionals is critical.

In terms of accessing information, the trend today is toward a more open plan architecture, which makes it easier to find the required data. Similarly, a number of third-party providers offer benchmarking data and analytics. Other companies, such as Fi360, offer a more comprehensive range of resources, tools and training to help fiduciaries fulfill their duties.

However, as we’ve already noted, it is often in the best interests of fiduciaries to obtain the services of an experienced investment advisor and fiduciary consultant. In doing so, independence is probably the most important consideration. Consultants should also have proven tools and procedures that enable them to conduct a fiduciary audit (including a detailed analysis) and provide evidentiary documentation in the process.

MS: How do I know if I need this type of fiduciary audit?

NS: The easy answer is that all plan sponsors need information, and they need to fully understand how that information applies to their unique combination of employer-sponsored retirement plans and services. That said, a number of companies—especially small and mid-sized businesses—have let their plans go “dormant” over the years, acting as if nothing has changed. If you can’t clearly articulate your fiduciary process, then you probably don’t have one! And, you are probably at greater risk of failing a Department of Labor audit of your plan.

Plan sponsors may also be concerned about the cost of a consultant. However, the money spent on the services of an experienced consultant is often considerably less than the savings recouped once the plan sponsor has actionable information. The likelihood increases over time that your retirement plan is spending too much on administrative and management fees. We advise plan sponsors to benchmark their plans against comparable averages annually and benchmark against other providers in the market every few years.

The bottom line? Plan sponsors are in a better position to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities, and lower costs mean that more money is preserved in participants’ accounts—which can result in improved returns over time.

For more information on this topic, contact Norm Schlismann (nds@mesirowfinancial.com) or Dave Dermenjian (dhd@mesirowfinancial.com).

This article contains material of general interest and should not be construed as legal advice or a legal opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. Under professional rules, this content may be regarded as attorney advertising.

© 2011 Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C.

ABA Conference: Criminal Tax Fraud and Tax Controversy

The National Law Review wanted to bring your attention to the upcoming 28th Annual National Institute on Criminal Tax Fraude and the Fisrt National Institute on Tax Controversy on December 1-2, 2011 in Las Vegas:

  • Program Description

The  National Institute on Criminal Tax Fraud is the annual gathering of the criminal tax defense bar.  This year, it will be combined with the National Institute on Tax Controversy, bringing together high-level Government representatives, judges, corporate counsel, and private practitioners engaged in all aspects of tax controversy, tax litigation, and criminal tax defense.

The two Institutes will meet each morning of the conference in joint plenary sessions, addressing issues concerning international tax enforcement and ethics.  Participants will then chose break- out sessions that will focus on current civil tax controversy or criminal tax defense topics.

As in past years, these Institutes will offer the most knowledgeable panelists from the government, the judiciary, and the private bar.  Attendees will include attorneys and accountants just beginning to practice in tax controversy and tax fraud defense, as well as highly experienced practitioners.  The break-out sessions will encourage an open discussion of hot topics.  The program will provides valuable updates on new developments and strategies, along with the opportunity to meet colleagues, renew acquaintances and exchange ideas.

The IRS has focused on international enforcement, from its reorganization of its Large Business and International Division to its focus on global high wealth taxpayers and offshore activities, and both Institutes will focus on these issues, in a combined plenary session and in break-out sessions.  The break-out sessions will also include roundtable discussions with senior representatives from the IRS, and the Treasury and Justice Departments, and panels will focus on topics ranging from the nuts-and-bolts of representing clients in examination, at Appeals, at trial and in criminal investigations, to the hottest areas of civil and criminal enforcement.  It promises to be a program that no tax litigator should miss.

  • CLE Information

ABA programs ordinarily receive Continuing Legal Education (CLE) credit in AK, AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, GU, HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, ME, MN, MS, MO, MT, NH, NM, NV, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VT, VA, VI, WA, WI, WV, and WY. These states sometimes do not approve a program for credit before the program occurs. This course is expected to qualify for TBD CLE credit hours (including TBD ethics hours) in 60-minute-hour states, and TBD credit hours (including TBD ethics hours) in 50-minute-hour states. This transitional program is approved for both newly admitted and experienced attorneys in NY. Click here for more details on CLE credit for this program.

How Lessors and Lenders Can Audit the Eurocontrol Accounts of Lessees

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by attorney John I. Karesh of Vedder Price P.C. regarding  lessors will no longer receive an aircraft operator’s statement of account from Eurocontrol via e-mail.

Eurocontrol has implemented a change to the way lessors, lenders and security trustees can audit the Eurocontrol accounts of lessees. Effective September 1, 2011, lessors will no longer receive an aircraft operator’s statement of account from Eurocontrol via e-mail. In an attempt to provide better security, Eurocontrol will now provide such statements only upon the lessor’s request via a secured extranet system called CEFA (Central Route Charges Office Extranet for Airspace Users). We have been advised by Eurocontrol that lenders and security trustees also will be granted access to CEFA under the same protocol. In order to gain access, the requesting party needs to complete an Agreement (available on Eurocontrol’s website). Once the Agreement is completed and received by Eurocontrol, the requesting party can view an operator’s statement of account online 24/7. Access is free. However, requesting parties must obtain approval from each operator whose statement of account they wish to view by having the operator sign an Authorization Letter in the prescribed form.

Because lenders and lessors must execute the Agreement, they should take note that the Agreement contains various noteworthy provisions including the following: Article 4 provides that to the extent permitted by national law, in the event of a dispute, Eurocontrol’s data, including metadata, shall be admissible in court and shall constitute evidence of the facts contained therein unless contrary evidence is adduced. Section 9.2 provides that once a statement of account becomes available on CEFA, it shall be deemed received by the “Leasing Company,” which agrees to proactively and regularly check the CEFA site. Article 13 contains various provisions concerning confidentiality and protection of data. Section 14.2 requires the Leasing Company to indemnify Eurocontrol against any claims for damages made by third parties where the claims or damages are due to a fault of the Leasing Company. Article 15 provides that without prejudice to any mandatory national law, the transmission of electronic data under the Agreement shall be governed by Belgian law. Article 16 provides that any dispute arising out of or in connection with the Agreement shall be referred to the Brussels Court of First Instance (Belgium), which shall have sole jurisdiction.

Also, Section 17.3 provides that the Agreement is for an indefinite period, but either party may terminate it on not less than three months’ written notice, and that Eurocontrol is entitled to terminate or suspend the Agreement in a case foreseen under the confidentiality and protection of data provisions (Section 13.1) or if all authorizations to release Statements of Account to the lessor have been withdrawn. Section 17.4 provides that access to the Statements of Account of an Aircraft Operator will be terminated without notice in case of the withdrawal of the authorization to release such Statements of Account. However, the prescribed form of Authorization Letter provides that it may only be revoked or amended by written instructions from the operator and lessor.

The foregoing is merely a summary of a few of the provisions of the Agreement. All provisions should carefully be reviewed before signing. However, it appears the only way lessors, lenders and security trustees can obtain the statement of an operator’s account is by means of the Authorization Letter and signed Agreement.

© 2011 Vedder Price P.C.

Under The Radar–The Supreme Court, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by attorney  Charles M. English of Ober | Kaler regarding U.S. Supreme Court’s  view of the First Amendment as applied especially to political speech:

Ober

Over the past several years, a great deal has been written about the .  In both the 2010 and 2011 terms the Court in dramatic and well-publicized cases struck down federal (Citizens United) and state (Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC) campaign finance restrictions as applied to corporate political donations and laws supporting public financing of candidates who forgo private donations.  These are of course significant, far-reaching decisions with major impacts on political discourse in the United States.  But even more may be going on in First Amendment jurisprudence when one looks beyond the headline-grabbing cases to less well publicized commercial speech cases.

More often than not the Court moves not dramatically, but in incremental steps as both the law and the Justices evolve and the Court personnel change.   Such an incremental step appears to have been taken by the Court this year with respect to commercial speech regulation – speech intended not for political discourse, but by commercial entities seeking to buy, sell, advertise, market or provide information to each other and consumers.

On June 23, 2011, the Court, in a 6-3 majority, issued Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,No. 10-779, striking down on First Amendment grounds Vermont’s law that prohibited the sale and use of physician prescription data for commercial purposes especially by pharmaceutical companies wishing to use that data to advertise and otherwise reach out to physicians in order to market their drugs.  Having monitored the case closely and attended the Court’s oral argument, I don’t think that the result itself was much of a surprise.  The Court concluded that the regulated activity interfered with the exchange of ideas and was thus speech and then concluded that the protected speech could not be regulated by Vermont in the fashion proposed.

What to many observers was less predictable was the breadth of the decision and the language employed in the majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy and joined both by the four justices normally considered “conservative”, but also joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor.  The majority appears to have applied a stricter standard to the “content and speaker-based” commercial speech restrictions than it has applied in the past.  So the question arises: Is the Court moving, however incrementally, towards a change in how it treats commercial speech under the First Amendment – one that would increase the level of scrutiny applied to restraints on such speech?

While Sorrell received far less coverage than many of other cases decided by the Court in the 2011 Term, commercial speech proponents have been quick to embrace the decision and to assert broader commercial speech rights.  After the Food and Drug Administration adopted new cigarette warning label requirements in the summer of 2011, R.J. Reynolds, together with other tobacco companies and supported by national advertising organizations, were quick to seek court intervention against the new warning label requirements. They relied in no small part on the expansive language found in Sorrell.  That suit, filed in mid-August, is set for a decision on motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment after a hearing before Judge Richard Leon in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on September 21, 2011.

To understand where the Court may be heading, it is important first to know where we have been.  While the First Amendment, which is also applicable to the States, might appear to the casual reader to be absolute  – “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . .”, it in fact has not been so regarded historically by the Court.  In 1942, the Court declared that commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment at all.  The Court reversed course in 1976, declaring that some form of intermediate protection did exist for commercial speech, and established in 1980 a multi-part test (Central Hudson) for evaluating the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions:  In order to regulated non-misleading commercial speech regarding otherwise legal activity, the government must establish that there is a substantial state interest, that the regulation directly advances that state interest, and that the regulation is narrowly tailored to advance that substantial interest.

It doesn’t take a lawyer to conclude that this test is confusing, and not surprisingly, most observers from a wide array of the political spectrum have concluded that the results of the cases decided under Central Hudson are unpredictable and that the test is simply unworkable.  Importantly, Justice Clarence Thomas has repeatedly criticized the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence directly, with some indirect support from others from the Court’s so-called conservative wing.

The majority in Sorrell certainly did not overrule (at least not expressly or entirely)Central Hudson.  However, the majority opinion , however subtly, appears to provide a measurable shift in the First Amendment analysis by the Court by carving out in commercial speech cases types of restrictions to which the majority appears to provide some form of scrutiny greater than the protections found in theCentral Hudson test.   Indeed and perhaps most tellingly the minority opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer accuses the majority of having created a new test, stricter than Central Hudson, for content-based or speaker-based speech that undermines the differentiation of commercial speech from what is often called core First Amendment speech.  If so, the court may have indirectly moved towards Justice Thomas’ assertion that commercial speech should not be treated differently from core speech.

In the short run, we should expect the decision in Sorrell to actually add to the confusion that surrounds Central Hudson.  Will lower courts such as the one now presented with the cigarette warning dispute conclude that there is a new, higher standard?  If so, in which cases will this new standard apply, and how will those cases be decided?  This is not an academic or legalistic point.  Both business and government thrive on certainty in results, and legal uncertainty is simply very expensive for everyone:  When states lose these First Amendment cases, they normally must pay the attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party; meanwhile, businesses subject to regulation of uncertain legality incur costs in complying and challenging such regulation.  Nobody benefits from this kind of uncertainty – well, except for the lawyers of course.

Of course, we may not have long to wait after all.  The case of the FDA regulation of cigarette packaging,  or possible other cases involving other governmental regulation of health-care claims or of health insurance, or new food safety regulation – any one of these could give rise to litigation that provides new guidance, clarity or even another incremental step.  However, when one goes back to the text of the First Amendment and its absolute prohibition on abridging the freedom of speech, examines the Court’s recent dramatic political speech cases in the past two terms, considers the muscular conservative majority, and carefully reads between the lines of Sorrell (decided with six votes in the majority), one must conclude that we are in for interesting times, and that advocates of commercial speech restrictions, including anti-smoking advocates, may now face a greater uphill battle in defending and maintaining what have come to be accepted restrictions in marketing and advertising in the United States.

© 2011 Ober | Kaler