Author: jschaller@natlawreview.com

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Foreign Account Keeps Three-Year Statute of Limitations Open

In Fairbank v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2023-19 (Feb. 23, 2023), the Tax Court ruled that the three-year statute of limitations did not bar assessment. On April 12, 2018, the IRS issued to Leigh and Barbara Fairbank a notice of deficiency for tax years 2003-2009. Because the Fairbanks timely filed their tax returns, they asserted that the three-year statute of limitations barred assessment. The case was determined based on an analysis of IRC Section 6501(c)(8). Section 6501(c)(8) provides that the statute of limitations shall not expire until three years after the date on which information is reported to the IRS for a foreign trust.

Barbara Fairbank was previously married to Mr. Hagaman, who was in the business of oil trading. He held financial accounts in Liechtenstein, New Zealand and Switzerland. Mr. Hagaman failed to file tax returns for years 1980-1982 and the IRS asserted he had a tax liability of $14.7 million. The IRS awarded Barbara innocent spouse relief.

In 1981, Barbara and Mr. Hagaman separated and a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage was granted on May 21, 1982 by the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Pursuant to an Agreement of Interim and Partial Distribution of Community Property, Mr. Hagaman was to pay Barbara child support and certain lump sum payments. These payments were made to a UBS account in the name of Xavana Establishment, an entity formed in Switzerland or Liechtenstein.

In 2008, the IRS issued a “John Doe” summons to UBS requesting information relating to U.S. accountholders with undisclosed foreign accounts. In 2010, UBS advised Barbara that it provided information on Xavana Establishment to the IRS. Thereafter, the Fairbanks’ returns were selected for audit. On July 18, 2012, the Fairbanks provided the IRS revenue agent with all documents related to the UBS account for Xavana Establishment, including bank statements. The Fairbanks then filed FBARs to report the foreign account. However, the Fairbanks never filed Forms 3520 or 3520-A. Forms 3520 and 3520-A are required to be filed under Section 6048 for an owner of a foreign account (Form 3520-A) and recipient of foreign gifts (Form 3520).

The Fairbanks argued that the three-year statute of limitations started on July 18, 2012 when they provided all information on the UBS account to the IRS revenue agent. However, the Court ruled that the statute of limitations does not start until the IRS forms, Forms 3520 and 3520-A, are filed. The Court also ruled that because the Fairbanks never advised their CPA about the foreign account, they were not eligible for abatement of penalties due to reasonable cause.

In general, the three-year statute of limitations bars assessment, but the statute of limitations may be extended in certain circumstances including the failure to report a foreign account.

Article By David B. Shiner of Chuhak & Tecson, P.C.

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© 2023 Chuhak & Tecson P.C.

Court Rules on When Checks are Considered Completed Gifts

In Estate of DeMuth v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2022-72 (Aug. 1, 2022), the Tax Court ruled on when checks are considered completed gifts. There, on September 6, 2015, decedent’s son, under power of attorney, wrote 11 checks totaling $464,000 from decedent’s checking account. Decedent died on September 11, 2015. The estate tax return reported the value of decedent’s checking account excluding the value of all 11 checks. However, only one check cleared prior to decedent’s death. Three other checks were deposited to the payees’ respective depository banks on September 11, 2015, but not paid until September 14, 2015.

The Tax Court determined that a check written before death is not considered a completed gift and is includible in the gross estate where the decedent dies before the drawee bank accepts, certifies or makes final payment on the check. The court reasoned that so long as the drawer of the check can make a stop-payment order on the check, the donor has not parted with dominion and control and therefore has not made a completed gift. Accordingly, only the check that cleared the bank prior to death was properly excluded from the gross estate.

In prior Tax Court cases, the court considered whether it could apply a “relation back doctrine” to a check. If the check was paid, the relation back doctrine would deem the gift complete as of the date the check was delivered to the donee; notwithstanding the date the check cleared the bank.

In Estate of Metzger v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 204 (1993), the Tax Court applied the relation back doctrine. There, checks equal to the annual exclusion were issued to four donees in December 1985, deposited on December 31, 1985, and cleared the bank on January 2, 1986. Checks for the same amount and to the same four people were issued in 1986. The court ruled that the relation back doctrine applied so that the checks deposited on December 31, 1985, were considered completed gifts in 1985 and the donor did not make double annual exclusion gifts in 1986.

In contrast, in Newman v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 81 (1998), the Tax Court determined that the relation back doctrine did not apply where checks were written, but not cashed prior to donor’s death. Unlike Metzger, the relation back doctrine did not apply because the donor was not alive when the checks were cashed. DeMuth is consistent with the prior cases in not applying the relation back doctrine because the donor died before the checks were cashed.

Article By David B. Shiner of  Chuhak & Tecson, P.C.

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© 2023 Chuhak & Tecson P.C.

How to Succeed in Environmental Marketing Claims

Environmental marketing claims often present something of a Catch-22—companies that are doing actual good for the environment deserve to reap the benefits of their efforts, and consumers deserve to know, while at the same time, heightened scrutiny from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the National Advertising Division (NAD), state regulators and the plaintiffs’ bar have made such claims increasingly risky.

In 2012, the FTC issued the Green Guides for the use of environmental marketing claims to protect consumers and to help advertisers avoid deceptive environmental marketing. Compliance with the Green Guides may provide a safe harbor from FTC enforcement, and from liability under state laws, such as California’s Environmental Marketing Claims Act, that incorporate the Green Guides. The FTC has started a process to revise the Green Guides, including a request for comments about the meaning of “sustainable.” In the meantime, any business considering touting the environmental attributes of its products should consider the following essential takeaways from the Green Guides in their current form:

    • Substantiation: Substantiation is key! Advertisers should have a reasonable basis for their environmental claims. Substantiation is the support for a claim, which helps ensure that the claim is truthful and not misleading or deceptive. Among other things, substantiation requires documentation sufficient to verify environmental claims.
    • General benefit claims: Advertisers should avoid making unqualified claims of general benefit because substantiation is required for each reasonable interpretation of the claim. The more narrowly tailored the claim, the easier it is to substantiate.
    • Comparative claims: Advertisers should be careful and specific when making comparative claims. For example, a claim that states “20% more recycled content” begs the question: “compared to what?” A prior version of the same product? A competing product? Without further detail, the advertiser would be responsible for the reasonable interpretation that the product has 20% more recycled content than other brands, as well as the interpretation that the product has 20% more recycled content than the advertiser’s older products.
    • General greenwashing terms: Advertisers should be very cautious when using general environmental benefit terms such as “eco-friendly,” “sustainable,” “green,” and “planet-friendly.” Those kinds of claims feature prominently in many complaints alleging greenwashing, and they should only be used where the advertiser knows and explains what the term means, and can substantiate every reasonable interpretation of the claim.

Putting it into Practice: Given the scrutiny that environmental claims tend to attract, advertisers should exercise care when making environmental benefit claims about their products and services. They should narrowly tailor their claims to the specific environmental attributes they want to promote, and perhaps most important, they should ensure they have adequate backup to substantiate their claims. While the FTC Green Guides are due for a refresh (which we will surely report on), for the time being, they will continue to serve as important guidance for advertisers seeking to inform consumers without exposing their business to FTC scrutiny or class action litigation.

G7 Sanctions Enforcement Coordination Mechanism and Centralized EU Sanctions Watchdog Proposed

On Feb. 20, 2023, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Wopke Hoekstra gave a speech titled “Building a secure European future” at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium where he made a plea to “(…) sail to the next horizon where sanctions are concerned.” The Dutch Foreign Minister said European Union (EU) “(…) sanctions are hurting the Russians like hell (…)” but at the same time the measures “(…) are being evaded on a massive scale.” Hoekstra believes this is in part because the EU has too little capacity to analyze, coordinate, and promote the sanctions. However, arguably, there is also a lack of capacity at the EU Member-State level to enforce sanctions.

Against this background the Dutch Foreign Minister proposed to set up a sanctions headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, i.e., a novel watchdog or body to tackle the circumvention of EU sanctions. Such a body might represent the nearest EU equivalent to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC both implements and enforces U.S. economic sanctions (issuing regulations, licenses, and directives, as well as enforcing through issuing administrative subpoenas, civil and administrative monetary penalties, and making criminal referrals to the U.S. Department of Justice). In Hoekstra’s words:

“A place where [EU] Member States can pool information and resources on effectiveness and evasion. Where we do much more to fight circumvention by third countries. This new HQ would establish a watch list of sectors and trade flows with a high circumvention risk. Companies will be obliged to include end-use clauses in their contracts, so that their products don’t end up in the Russian war machine. And the EU should bring down the full force of its collective economic strength and criminal justice systems on those who assist in sanctions evasion. By naming, shaming, sanctioning, and prosecuting them.”

The Dutch Foreign Minister’s proposal – which is also set out in a separate non-paper – apparently is backed and supported by some 10 or so EU Member States, including Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.

Additionally, on Feb. 23, 2023, the press reported the international Group of Seven (G7) is set to create a new tool to coordinate their enforcement of existing sanctions against the Russian Federation (Russia). The aim of the tool, tentatively called the Enforcement Coordination Mechanism, would be to bolster information-sharing and other enforcement actions.

Background

Like other Members of the G7, the EU has adopted throughout 2022 many economic and other sanctions to target Russia’s economy and thwart its ability to continue with its aggression against Ukraine. Nevertheless, currently EU Member States have different definitions of what constitutes a breach of EU sanctions, and what penalties must be applied in case of a breach. This could lead to different degrees of enforcement and risk circumvention of EU sanctions.

As we have reported previously, on Nov. 28, 2022, the Council of the EU adopted a decision to add the violation of restrictive measures to the list of so-called “EU crimes” set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which would uniformly criminalize sanctions violations across EU Member States. This proposal still needs the backing of EU Member States, which have traditionally been cautious about reforms that require amendments to their national criminal laws.

Next steps

The decision on when and how to enforce EU sanctions currently lies with individual EU Member States, who also decide on the introduction of the EU’s restrictive measures by unanimity. As such, the Dutch Foreign Minister’s proposal requires the backing and support of more EU Member States. If adopted, the new proposed body could send cases directly to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), assuming the separate “EU crimes” legislative piece was also adopted.

Notably, the Dutch Foreign Minister’s proposal appears to suggest a stronger targeting of third countries, which are not aligned with the EU’s sanctions against Russia or help in their circumvention (e.g., Turkey, China, etc.).

Whether or not an EU sanctions oversight body is established, the Dutch proposal signals the current appetite for enhanced multilateral coordination on economic sanctions implementation and tougher, more consistent enforcement of economic sanctions violations. The G7’s proposed Enforcement Coordination Mechanism points in the same direction.

©2023 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

New York Adult Survivors Act

New York’s Adult Survivors Act[1] (“ASA” or “the Act”) (S.66A/A.648A) became effective on November 24, 2022. The Act provides a one-year lookback window for people to seek civil remedies for sexual abuse they experienced after they turned 18, regardless of what year the abuse occurred. This law adds critical energy to the ongoing momentum of the #MeToo movement, allowing survivors to file suit against both their abusers and the institutions that enabled them.

The one-year lookback window lasts until November 23, 2023, so as of today, survivors have just over ten months to take advantage of the law. The following guide provides context and recommendations for understanding and using New York’s Adult Survivors Act.

What does the ASA do?

The ASA creates a one-year lookback window for sexual assault survivors to pursue civil claims in court for abuse that may have occurred years earlier, as long as they were over 18 at the time. Previously, a person who experienced sexual abuse only had a few years to file a lawsuit in New York before their claim would be time-barred. This meant that survivors had little time in which to come to terms with the abuse they experienced, find an attorney, prepare a case, and file an action. For those who missed that small window, the ASA reopens the courthouse doors. So until November 23, 2023, whether you experienced abuse in 2015, 2000, or 1985, you can file a claim in court and seek recovery for what happened to you.

What does the law cover?

Sexual offenses covered by the ASA span a wide range of behaviors, including but not limited to forcible touching, rape, sexual assault, sexual misconduct, and other forms of sexual abuse. Not every sexual offense is covered under the ASA,[2] and an attorney can help assess whether your claim falls within its provisions.

Who can you sue?

Another powerful provision of the law is who it allows to be named as a defendant. Survivors are not limited to suing their abusers—they can also hold accountable the institutions that insulated those abusers from justice. These institutions can include entities that had responsibility to keep the survivor safe and to control the actions of the abuser. Claims against the institutions can involve both intentional and negligent acts. If your abuser was part of a larger organization that contributed to or failed to prevent, notice, or stop the abuse, the ASA empowers you to go after that organization.

This provision comes directly from New York’s 2019 Child Victims Act (“CVA”).[3] Over 10,000 people have used the CVA to sue institutions that had a role to play in their abuse, including churches, hospitals, overnight and day camps, and schools. For example, a large number of CVA cases name the Roman Catholic Church and the Boy Scouts of America as institutional defendants. The ASA provides a similar recourse to justice: oftentimes, survivors are subject to abuse by people who hold power over them. For minors, these people could be coaches, religious leaders, teachers, mentors, or other caregivers. For people over 18, those in power may be employers, professors, or community leaders. The ASA enables adult survivors to sue the institutions that gave their abusers power and protected those abusers from answering for their actions.

The institutional defendant provision of the ASA opens significantly larger opportunities for recovery, as institutions oftentimes have deeper pockets than individual abusers. Examples of institutions that could face liability under the ASA include employers, colleges and universities, social organizations such as fraternities and sororities, medical practices, and facilities that house people with disabilities. Any entity that knew about or should have known about and stopped the abuse could be on the hook.

Who is it for?

The ASA opens the courts to people who were over the age of 18 when they experienced sexual abuse but are otherwise unable to file due to missing the statute of limitations. You can use the ASA even if you have previously tried to file but had your suit dismissed as untimely.[4]

It is important to note that if you have resolved or released your claims through a settlement process, you may not file under the ASA. For example, the nearly 150 women who received payment from a settlement with Columbia University Irving Medical Center and New York Presbyterian Hospital based on sexual abuse by Dr. Robert Hadden cannot use the ASA to file new suits as their claims have been fully resolved.

Why do we need this?

The Adult Survivors Act is a game-changer for people who were previously unable to file claims for sexual abuse due to a short statute of limitations. In 2019, New York extended the statute of limitations for certain civil lawsuits related to sex crimes from five to 20 years. But that law did not apply retroactively, so survivors who experienced abuse just a few years prior were still barred from seeking justice.

The ASA honors the lived reality of sexual abuse. Like the CVA before it, the ASA recognizes sexual abuse can take years to process, and those years often extend far beyond the short filing windows New York historically placed on these types of claims.

Survivors have many reasons for waiting to come forward with claims of sexual abuse. Some face retaliation by their abusers, some fear the risk of community backlash, and others lack the resources to seek legal representation. Finally, “[t]rauma takes time,” as New York State Senator and ASA champion Brad Hoylman said when promoting the then-bill. Many sexual assault and sexual abuse survivors need years to process what they endured. This can be particularly true when an abuser uses power, manipulation, or threats to coerce submission to sexual contact, a common tactic of notorious abusers Harvey Weinstein, Kevin Spacey, and Dr. Robert Hadden. Understanding the event as sexual abuse, reconciling yourself with your experience, and deciding how to move forward can take decades. The ASA is an effort to respect this process and empower survivors to hold their abusers accountable.

Why would I file a lawsuit about what happened to me?

For many people, surviving sexual abuse is not something that can be “fixed” by any kind of legal action. But the remedies available through civil suits can serve as a proxy for some measure of justice, and that proxy can enable survivors to move forward.

Successful ASA plaintiffs can recover economic, compensatory, and punitive damages from both the individual abuser and the institution. Many survivors suffer financial loss in addition to the mental, emotional, and physical harm of the abuse itself. If your boss sexually harasses you and then terminates you when you protest, you may find yourself without an income. If a classmate assaults you, you may forfeit tuition money after deciding to leave campus for your safety. Civil courts can make you financially whole and further compensate you for the pain of the experience and the efforts you must make to heal. Courts can also provide other remedies, requiring the people who perpetrated or allowed abuse to do or stop certain behaviors, thereby protecting other potential future targets of abuse and assault.

How do I use the ASA?

The first thing you should do is consult an attorney. These cases can be complicated, and plaintiffs still maintain the burden of proof, so you want the expertise of an experienced lawyer. There are several firms that regularly bring these kinds of actions, and many will provide you with a free consultation. If you decide to move forward with your case after a consultation, your attorney will work with you to determine the best strategy. This strategy may include going to court, or it may involve seeking a resolution that works for you outside of court.

As you go through the process of finding an attorney, please know that you deserve counsel that is compassionate, knowledgeable, and focused on your needs and interests as a client. This is about what happened to you, and your attorney is there to guide you. You should feel heard, understood, and respected.

When do I need to file?

You must file your claim by November 23, 2023.

While the ASA is a powerful effort by New York to support the rights of sexual abuse survivors, it is time-limited. November 23, 2023 is the cutoff date for filing a claim, but if you are interested in seeking recovery under the Act, you should take action now. It may take time to find the right attorney for you, and your lawyer will need additional time to put together your case. If you and your lawyer decide to pursue a resolution without going to court, that process could take even longer.

Ten months sounds like a long time, but in the legal world, it can move very quickly. Start considering whether you want to take advantage of the ASA and reach out to an attorney as soon as possible.

What happens after I file?

This will come down to conversations you have with your attorney. Filing is the first major step in the process. Following that process through might include discovery, more court filings, and hearings before a judge or a jury.

What else should I consider?

Take care of yourself as you think about your next steps. Reach out to trusted loved ones and mental health professionals. It is critical that you ground yourself in what is best for you.

FOOTNOTES

[1] New York Governor Kathy Hochul signed the ASA into law on May 24, 2022. The ASA passed the New York Assembly by a majority vote of 140 in favor to 3 against after receiving unanimous support in the state Senate one month prior.

[2] Article 130 of the New York Penal Law lists offenses covered under the ASA.

[3] The CVA came into effect in 2019, providing a two-year lookback window for people who experienced abuse as minors. The CVA amends N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 (2019) and allows victims to initiate civil action against their abusers and enabling institutions. As to victims where civil actions were barred before the CVA took effect, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-g (2020) creates a lookback period to file a claim. Since 2019, over 10,000 people have filed lawsuits in New York against abusers and the institutions that protected them.

[4] The ASA can revive your claim only if it was dismissed for failure to file by the statutory deadline. If your claim was dismissed for other reasons, this law cannot fix that.

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Katz Banks Kumin LLP Copyright ©

The Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege Over Dual-Purpose Communications

The Supreme Court will evaluate the scope of attorney-client privilege when applied to communications shared between counsel and client that involve both legal and non-legal advice (“dual-purpose communications”). The decision of the highest court will have long-lasting implications for both business organizations and their retained counsels. The potential outcome of this case cannot be understated.

In this matter, the grand jury issued subpoenas to an anonymous law firm seeking documents related to the government’s investigation of the firm’s client. The law firm had provided both legal and business services to the client by advising on tax-related legal issues and preparing the client’s annual tax returns. When the law firm and client (“Petitioners”) withheld certain correspondence on the grounds that they were protected by attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, the government moved to compel the production of those documents. The district court held that, while the correspondence contained a “dual-purpose,” they were not protected by attorney-client privilege because the primary purpose of the correspondence was to obtain business tax advice and not legal advice.

On appeal, Petitioners argued that the appellate court should apply the “because of” test rather than the “primary purpose” test. The “because of” test asks whether the dual-purpose correspondence was made because of a need for legal advice. The application of this test would expand the scope of attorney-client privilege and protect the correspondence at issue. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected Petitioners’ argument and affirmed the district court’s decision. Petitioners appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 3, 2022.

The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Grand Jury 21-1397 will be of particular significance for in-house counsels who regularly provide both business and legal advice to their employers. For outside counsels, the outcome of this case will shed light on the standard to be applied for asserting privilege over dual-purpose communications. Oral argument occurred on January 9, 2023 at the Supreme Court.

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© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

FDA Finalizes FSVP Guidance for Importers of Human and Animal Food

On January 10, the FDA issued a final guidance for the Foreign Supplier Verification Programs (FSVP) for Importers of Food for Humans and Animals. As our readers know, under the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), FSVP requires that importers verify that the food which they import provides the same level of public health protection as the preventive controls or produce safety regulations (as appropriate) in the U.S. and to ensure that supplier’s food is not adulterated and is not misbranded with respect to allergen labeling.

The guidance is intended to assist importers in developing and implementing FSVP records, and following FSVP requirements for each food they import. The guidance includes recommendations on the requirements to analyze the hazards in food; how to evaluate a potential foreign supplier’s performance and the risk posed by the food; ways to determine and conduct appropriate foreign supplier verification activities; and how importers of dietary supplements or very small importers can meet modified FSVP requirements.

The guidance finalizes a 2018 draft guidance, and addresses comments received regarding what food the FSVP regulation applies to, what information must be included in the FSVP, and who must develop and perform the FSVP activities.

For more Biotech, Food, and Drug Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2023 Keller and Heckman LLP

IP Rights in Virtual Fashion: Lessons Learned in 2022 and Unanswered Questions

There was a lot of talk and much hype about the “metaverse” in 2022. While some were skeptical and stayed on the sidelines to watch, many companies began offering virtual counterparts to their real-world products for use by avatars in the metaverse, including virtual clothing and accessories. For example, Tommy Hilfiger live-streamed a virtual fashion show on Roblox as part of the New York Fashion Week, and Decentraland hosted a Metaverse Fashion Week. Many companies also introduced NFTs into fashion product lines, such as Alo’s NFT offering.

The emergence of virtual goods has generated novel questions about how to protect and enforce IP rights in virtual fashion, and how those strategies might differ from IRL (meaning “in real life”) fashion. Although many questions remain unanswered, this article sets out important considerations for how companies might use various IP laws to protect virtual fashion goods in the United States.

I. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VIRTUAL FASHION AND IRL FASHION

Before diving into the IP discussion, it’s worth highlighting some distinctions between virtual fashion and IRL fashion outside the legal context, beyond the obvious fact that virtual fashion is worn by avatars. IRL clothing and accessories are worn primarily for protection against the elements, to conform to societal standards, to conform with a specific event’s dress requirements, to communicate via express messages on clothing or accessories, or to express oneself through the style or design of the clothing.

Virtual fashion can also serve each of those purposes for an avatar, and in some cases the person behind the avatar. But, because it is comprised of software code, the possibilities for virtual fashion utility are endless. For example, a particular piece of virtual clothing can also grant access to certain virtual spaces or events or give the avatar special powers within virtual worlds. If tied to an NFT (non-fungible token), virtual clothing can also provide benefits on and off virtual platforms, including exclusive access to sales promotions and IRL events.

Unlike IRL clothing, however, virtual fashion items currently face compatibility limitations, as the ability to use any virtual fashion item across all virtual platforms is unlikely.

To muddy the waters, as virtual and augmented reality technologies are becoming more popular, they can blur the lines between IRL and virtual fashion. For example, an IRL sweatshirt, when viewed through an appropriate lens, could feature virtual components.

II. IP PROTECTION FOR VIRTUAL FASHION

Because there are no IP laws specific to virtual fashion items, we must seek protection from laws that have traditionally applied to real-life clothing, namely, trademark, trade dress, copyright, and design patent. But the application of these laws can sometimes differ in the virtual context. Each is addressed below.

A. TRADEMARK

Trademark law protects source identifiers such as words, names, logos, and slogans. Obtaining trademark rights specifically in virtual goods, whether acquired through use in commerce or federal registration, is generally straightforward and similar to marks covering IRL fashion. This is evidenced by many marks that were registered in 2022 and specifically cover virtual goods.

That said, even if a company does not have trademark coverage specifically for its virtual goods, the owner of a trademark covering IRL fashion items should have strong arguments that such trademark rights extend to their virtual counterparts. To that point, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) has refused registration of marks covering virtual goods and services based on prior registrations for the identical marks covering the corresponding IRL goods and services. See, e.g., the refusals of Application No. 97112038 for the mark GUCCI and Application No. 97112054 for the mark PRADA, each of which were filed by parties unrelated to the famous brands.

However, for purposes of enforcement outside of the USPTO context, if a defendant’s goods are virtual, it would have a stronger argument that such goods are not commercial products, but rather expressive works protected by the First Amendment. If a court accepts such an argument, it must then weigh the plaintiff’s trademark rights against the defendant’s First Amendment right of free expression, meaning it would be more challenging for a brand owner to enforce its trademark rights.

In this regard, please see our earlier alert regarding the Hermès v. Rothschild case, in which the court deemed NFTs tied to images of bags called “MetaBirkins” subject to First Amendment protection. [1] In denying Rothschild’s motion to dismiss, the court acknowledged in a footnote that virtually wearable bags (i.e., as opposed to virtual fashion that is displayable but not wearable) might not be afforded First Amendment protection. But we suspect defendants will argue even virtually wearable items should be afforded First Amendment protection, especially given that video games have received such protection. [2]

On balance, companies should consider seeking federal trademark registration specifically for virtual goods and services, for a few reasons:

More direct coverage could help a company in an enforcement action against infringing virtual goods, even if the defendant successfully argues it should be entitled to First Amendment protection. For instance, if the plaintiff has direct coverage for virtual goods, it may be easier to prove the defendant’s use of the mark was “explicitly misleading” under the Rogers test. [3]

Certain platforms featuring virtual fashion items may only honor a takedown request if the complainant company has a federal registration covering goods that are the same or nearly identical to the allegedly infringing virtual goods.

The registration will provide a presumption of valid trademark rights nationwide, and it may serve as a deterrent to third parties wishing to use confusingly similar marks in virtual worlds.

B. TRADE DRESS

U.S. trademark law also protects certain source-identifying elements of a product’s aesthetic design, configuration/shape, and packaging, often referred to as “trade dress.” To obtain trade dress protection, such elements must be (1) non-functional and (2) distinctive (either inherently or acquired through use). There are a couple of interesting nuances with respect to acquiring trade dress protection in the virtual context.

First, although we have not yet seen any case law specifically addressing this, companies will likely have stronger arguments that virtual shape or design elements (as opposed to IRL elements) are non-functional. Specifically, the non-functionality requirement means the relevant elements must not be essential to the use or purpose or affect the cost or quality of the article. For real-life fashion items, this can be difficult to meet due to the inherently functional nature of many aspects of clothing or accessories. However, because virtual fashion items are essentially software code with endless possibilities, in many instances the fashion item will not require any particular design or shape to function.

Second, some virtual fashion items could receive more favorable treatment from a distinctiveness perspective. The distinctiveness requirement has historically been a difficult barrier for protecting IRL fashion. Specifically, case law prior to 2022 established that, while packaging can sometimes be inherently distinctive, product design and configuration/shape can never be, meaning companies must prove such elements have acquired distinctiveness. Proving acquired distinctiveness is burdensome because the company must have used the elements extensively, substantially exclusively, and continuously for a period of time. Often, by the time a company can acquire distinctiveness in the design, the design is no longer in style. Or, if a design is popular and copied by third parties, it can be difficult for the company to claim it used the design substantially exclusively.

If, however, a virtual fashion item provides the user with benefits that go beyond merely outfitting the avatar, such as by providing access to other products or services, one might argue that those items should be construed as packaging, or some new category of trade dress, for such other products or services, in which case the elements could possibly be deemed inherently distinctive with respect to those other products or services.

That said, if a company already has trade dress protection for IRL fashion goods, it should have good arguments that the protection extends to any virtual counterpart. On the flipside, given the difficulties companies typically face in seeking trade dress protection in IRL fashion, to the extent they can obtain trade dress protection in a virtual counterpart more easily, perhaps it can argue the rights in any virtual goods should also extend to the physical counterpart. Or, if a company introduces a physical design and virtual design simultaneously, it could possibly acquire distinctiveness in both sooner, as the simultaneous use would presumably create greater exposure to more customers and reinforce the source-identifying significance of the alleged elements.

With respect to enforcement, like traditional marks, defendants are more likely to raise a successful First Amendment defense for any virtual products allegedly infringing trade dress. The Hermès case is again an example of this, as Hermès alleged infringement of both its BIRKIN word mark and the trade dress rights in the design of its handbags, and the court held that the defendant’s MetaBirkin NFTs were entitled to the First Amendment protection.

Finally, although obtaining trade dress protection is typically more difficult than obtaining trademark protection for traditional marks such as words and logos, companies should also consider seeking registration for trade dress in virtual goods, particularly for important designs that are likely to carry over from season to season, for the same reasons discussed in the trademark section above.

C. COPYRIGHT

Copyright protects original works of authorship that contain at least a modicum of creativity, which is a relatively low bar. However, copyright does not protect useful articles. In effect, for IRL fashion items, copyright generally extends only to those designs that would be entitled to copyright protection if they were extracted or removed from the clothing or viewed on a different medium, and not to the shape of the fashion item itself.

Like trade dress protection, copyright protection should provide companies with greater protection for virtual fashion items than would be available for IRL items, particularly because the software behind the virtual fashion can theoretically create an infinite number of clothing shapes that are creative and not necessarily “useful.” Nonetheless, if a virtual clothing item is merely shaped like its IRL counterpart that lacks originality (e.g., a virtual t-shirt shaped like a basic real-life t-shirt), it may also fail to qualify for copyright protection based on a lack of creativity.

Unlike trade dress protection, however, copyright protection arises immediately upon creation of the work and its fixation in a tangible medium of expression, so it can be a useful tool for protecting virtual fashion without having to spend the time and resources required to seek registration as trade dress and establish acquired distinctiveness.

In addition, unlike IRL fashion, a separate copyright protects the underlying source code for virtual clothing items, which could provide owners with an additional, though likely limited, claim against unauthorized source code copycats.

A copyright registration will provide owners with the ability to sue for copyright infringement, but companies should balance:

  • the benefits of seeking potentially broader copyright protection in virtual fashion items (apart from the code) than it would for IRL items with the risks of conceding that virtual fashion items are works of art entitled to First Amendment protection, which would make trademark and trade dress enforcement more difficult; and
  • the benefits of obtaining any copyright registration for source code with the benefits of keeping the source code secret (although the Copyright Office permits some redactions, significant portions are required to be deposited into the public record).

We are unaware of any 2022 case law specifically addressing copyright in virtual fashion. However, the following cases are worth watching:

  • Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith[4]: In October 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments regarding whether Andy Warhol’s “Prince Series” silk screen prints and pencil drawings based on a photograph infringed the photographer’s copyright, or whether they were sufficiently “transformative” to constitute fair use. The outcome of this case could affect a copyright owner’s ability to enforce copyrights against unauthorized digital reproductions of its work, especially if the original work is fixed in a physical medium (e.g., enforcing copyright in a physical clothing item against a third party’s digital reproduction).
  • Thaler v. Perlmutter[5]: Filed in June 2022, the plaintiff is suing the U.S. Copyright Office for refusing registration of an AI-created image because there was no human author. The outcome of this case will necessarily implicate virtual fashion incorporating any AI-generated work.

D. DESIGN PATENT

Design patents protect the ornamental appearance or look of a unique product. Specifically, they protect any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture. Traditionally, this law was interpreted to require that the article of manufacture is a physical or tangible product. Thus, in the fashion industry for example, one can file a design patent application directed to a unique shoe, handbag, or jewelry design. Historically, an image or picture would not qualify for design patent protection.

However, the USPTO is currently assessing design patents with respect to new technologies such as projections, holograms, and virtual and augmented reality. In December 2020, the USPTO issued a request for public comment regarding a potential rule change to the “article of manufacture” requirement and whether U.S. law should be revised to protect digital designs. Public opinion was mixed, and in April 2022, the USPTO issued a summary of this requested information.

Although the USPTO has not yet formally revised the rules, it has issued guidelines over the years that provide examples of non-physical products that could be protected by a design patent, suggesting changes may ultimately be coming to U.S. design patent law. For example, in 1995, the USPTO released guidelines for design patent applications claiming computer-generated icons. In general, to be eligible for protection, the computer-generated icon must be embodied in a computer screen monitor, or other display monitor. The USPTO has also issued guidance allowing type font to be protectable by design patents. However, it is still unclear whether the USPTO will set forth design patent guidance specific to digital designs or virtual fashion.

Notwithstanding the possibility of obtaining a design patent specifically on such virtual goods, courts have been reluctant to find that a virtual product infringes the design patent for an IRL product. For example, in 2014, in P.S. Products, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,[6] P.S. Products accused Activision of infringing its design patent directed to a stun gun by depicting a virtual weapon in its video game that P.S. Products claimed resembled its patent-protected IRL product.

The court found there was no infringement because “no ordinary observer would be deceived into purchasing a video game believing it to be plaintiffs’ patented stun gun.” This case may have come out differently if the virtual gun was sold separately from the video game and could be used across various platforms rather than being one component of a particular video game. Although there are still software compatibility restrictions for virtual goods, portability of virtual goods is likely to grow as technology evolves and companies respond to consumer demands.

While we wait for further USPTO guidance that ultimately may have application to virtual fashion, parties seeking design patent protection may consider simultaneously filing one application to protect the work as a digital design on a display screen, like a patentable computer-generated icon, and a second, traditional design patent application to protect the design as a tangible product. That said, companies should consider other options for protecting any designs created by AI, as the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2022 that AI cannot qualify as an inventor for purposes of obtaining a patent.[7]

III. Virtual Fashion in Practice

Contracts relating to virtual fashion are analogous to contracts for IRL fashion and should be structured accordingly. For instance, companies should ensure that contracts with IP contributors include an assignment of all IP rights, or at least a sufficiently broad license. In the virtual context, this includes rights to the software code itself. Likewise, downstream licensing should generally address ownership, licensee rights, and if applicable, confidentiality for any trade secrets in the source code. In addition, for both IP contributors and licensees, if AI software is used in any part of the creative process, companies should give thought to allocation of ownership.

In addition, some designers or marketing teams may prefer to encourage a brand’s customer base to copy its designs or create derivative works. Although this seems counterintuitive (especially to an IP lawyer), many players in the Web3 space encourage others to build off their own designs. For example, the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC), known for issuing NFTs tied to images of apes, grants owners of its NFTs the rights to use the images of apes, including for commercial purposes.[8] For example, one purchaser of a Bored Apt NFT created a Bored Ape-themed restaurant.

In the virtual fashion context, if a marketing team wants customers to build off the brand’s virtual designs but wants to retain ownership of its own designs (and perhaps derivatives), it should implement standard licensing terms relating to ownership, customer licensee rights, and other provisions. However, it’s important to consider how the terms are presented and how customers indicate assent to maximize the prospects of enforceability.

From a business perspective, companies can also now use NFTs and smart contracts to receive automatic royalties in any downstream sales or licenses. And because NFTs use blockchain technology, which provides an immutable chain of title, third parties will be able to trace such designs to the original source. This means companies can encourage the sharing of designs and receive royalties in connection with the downstream licensing of designs tied to NFTs, and third parties can confirm that the designs are legitimate by reviewing the relevant blockchain ledger. Accordingly, although encouraging customers to use the brand’s designs may not be a model for every brand, there are some steps brands can take to protect the IP rights associated with them and reap financial benefits.

As virtual fashion items become more popular, companies are faced with uncertainties and novel questions regarding how to protect and enforce their IP rights. In 2022, some questions were answered, but many more remain open. Therefore, it is important to discuss strategies for protecting innovative virtual fashion with IP counsel.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Notably, on December 30, 2022, the Hermès court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, with an opinion to follow by January 20. A jury trial is scheduled to begin on January 30, 2023. Hermès International, et al. v. Mason Rothschild, 1:22-cv-00384-JSR (S.D.N.Y.).

[2] See, e.g., AM Gen. LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 467, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[3] If a defendant’s unauthorized use of a mark is protected by the First Amendment, many courts use the Rogers test to balance the plaintiff’s trademark rights with the defendant’s First Amendment right of expression. This test looks at whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark was artistically relevant and, if so, whether it was explicitly misleading. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).

[4] 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1412 (2022).

[5] Case No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C.).

[6] 140 F. Supp. 3d 795, 802 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

[7] Thaler v. Vidal, 43 F.4th 1207, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

[8] We will save for another day a discussion of the recent lawsuit against BAYC and many celebrities for failing to disclose financial incentives when promoting the BAYC NFT collection, and instead focus here on IP protection. Adonis Real, et al., v. Yuga Labs, Inc., et al., 2:22-cv-08909 (C.D. Cal.). But companies should also ensure that influencers properly disclose any incentives and other material connections.

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New Climate Guidance Issued to Federal Agencies Conducting Environmental Impact Analyses

Overview

On January 9, 2023, the Council for Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) published interim National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change (hereafter, “guidance” or “GHG Guidance”).1 CEQ intends for agencies to apply the guidance now even as CEQ seeks public comment on it.2 The guidance aims to establish best practices to ensure that Federal agencies conduct detailed analyses of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change when evaluating proposed major Federal actions in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and CEQ’s Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA.3 The guidance states that these analyses should (1) quantify a proposed action’s GHG emissions; (2) place GHG emissions in appropriate context and disclose relevant GHG emissions and relevant climate impacts; and (3) identify alternatives and mitigation measures to avoid or reduce GHG emissions.

The long-awaited GHG Guidance does not set a numerical threshold for significant impact under NEPA, but it emphasizes achievement of national and other climate objectives. The guidance also stresses monetization of climate-related impacts (social cost of carbon) and consideration of alternatives to fossil energy production and transport, mitigation of climate-related impacts, and resilience and adaptation to climate-related vulnerability. Also prominent in the guidance is consideration of disparate impacts to environmental justice communities.

GHG Guidance

Quantifying a Proposed Action’s GHG Emissions

The guidance explains that agencies should quantify the reasonably foreseeable direct and indirect GHG emissions of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives (including the no-action alternative) to ensure that each agency adequately considers the incremental contribution of its action to climate change. CEQ recommends that agencies quantify gross emissions increases or reductions (including direct and indirect emissions) individually by each GHG, as well as aggregated in terms of total CO2 by factoring in each pollutant’s global warming potential (“GWP”). CEQ further recommends that agencies quantify the proposed action’s total net GHG emissions or reductions (both by pollutant and by total CO2 emissions) relative to baseline conditions. Finally, CEQ recommends that “[w]here feasible . . . [agencies] should present annual GHG emissions increases or reductions, as well as net GHG emissions over the projected lifetime of the action, consistent with existing best practices.”4 CEQ emphasizes that agencies should be guided by the rule of reason when quantifying emissions. The guidance does not set a “significance” threshold that would trigger the requirement to prepare an EIS.

Disclosing and Providing Context for a Proposed Action’s GHG Emissions and Climate Effects

In the eyes of CEQ, quantifying emissions and summarizing this information in a NEPA document is not sufficient. Agencies should also disclose and provide context for GHG emissions and climate effects to help decision makers and the public understand a proposed action’s potential GHG emissions and climate change effects. CEQ provides a list of best practices for disclosing and contextualizing quantified GHG emissions:5

  • Use the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (“SC-GHG”) to estimate the dollar value of impacts associated with each type of GHG emission;
  • Explain how the proposed action and alternatives would help meet or detract from achieving climate action goals and commitments, and discuss whether and to what extent the proposal’s reasonably foreseeable GHG emissions are consistent with GHG reduction goals;
  • Summarize and cite to available scientific literature to help explain the real-world effects associated with an increase in GHG emissions that contribute to climate change; and
  • Provide accessible comparisons or equivalents to help the public and decision makers understand GHG emissions in more familiar terms (i.e., household emissions per year, annual average emissions from a certain number of cars on the road, etc.).

CEQ explicitly states that monetizing the “social cost” of GHG emissions as recommended does not require the agency also to monetize the social benefits of the proposed action, nor does it have to compare estimated costs and benefits.6 The guidance also emphasizes the use of “substitution analysis” to discern the GHG-related changes associated with shifting energy sources if the proposed or alternative actions occurred.7

Identifying Reasonable Alternatives and Potential Mitigation Measures

The GHG Guidance directs agencies to use the NEPA process to identify and assess the reasonable alternatives to proposed actions that will avoid or minimize GHG emissions or climate change effects. CEQ recognizes that reasonable alternatives must be consistent with the purpose and need of the proposed action, and that agencies are not required to select the alternative with the lowest net GHG emissions or climate costs or the greatest net climate benefits.8 However, “in line with the urgency of the climate crisis,” agencies should identify the alternative with the lowest net GHG emissions or the greatest net climate benefits among the alternatives they assess and should “use the NEPA process to make informed decisions grounded in science that are transparent with respect to how Federal actions will help meet climate change goals and commitments, or alternately, detract from them.”9 When quantifying reasonably foreseeable emissions associated with the proposed action or alternatives, CEQ directs agencies to include reasonably foreseeable direct and indirect GHG emissions of their proposed actions. CEQ provides that processing, refining, transporting, and end-use of the fossil fuel being extracted, including combustion of the resource to produce energy, would constitute indirect emissions of fossil fuel extraction.10

CEQ encourages agencies to mitigate GHG emissions “to the greatest extent possible.”11 It instructs agencies to consider potential mitigation measures by determining whether impacts from a proposed action or alternatives can be avoided, considering whether adverse impacts can be minimized, and rectifying or requiring compensation for residual impacts where unavoidable. CEQ considers available mitigation that avoids, minimizes, or compensates for GHG emissions and climate change effects to include measures like renewable energy generation and energy storage, carbon capture and sequestration, and capturing GHG emissions such as methane.12

Examples

The guidance provides a number of examples as to how it would work in specific scenarios. For example, the guidance notes that “absent exceptional circumstances,” construction of renewable energy projects “should not warrant a detailed analysis of lifetime GHG emissions.”13 CEQ uses natural gas pipelines as an example of consideration of indirect effects, stating that they create the “economic conditions for additional natural gas production and consumption, including both domestically and internationally, which produce indirect (both upstream and downstream) GHG emissions that contribute to climate change.”14 When discussing the need to analyze the effects of climate change on a proposed action (and not just the impacts of the proposed action on climate change), CEQ gives as an example a project that may require water from a source with diminishing quantities available and advises the agency consider such issues to “inform decisions on siting, whether to proceed with and how to design potential actions and reasonable alternatives, and to eliminate or mitigate effects exacerbated by climate change.”15

Conclusion

Robust comments are likely to be filed to further inform CEQ’s effort on the GHG Guidance. Nevertheless, CEQ has directed agencies to apply the guidance to all new proposed actions and to consider applying it to proposed actions that are currently under NEPA review. Comments on the interim guidance are due March 10, 2023.

FOOTNOTES

1. CEQ, National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,196 (Jan. 9, 2023), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-01-09/pdf/2023-00158.pdf (“GHG Guidance”).

2. Id.

3. Note that CEQ has announced its intention to further revise its existing NEPA regulations in 2023, after having issued an earlier round of regulatory amendments in 2022. See CEQ Fall 2022 Regulatory Agenda, National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations Revisions Phase 2, RIN No. 0331-AA07, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202210&RIN=0331-AA07; CEQ, National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations Revisions, 87 Fed. Reg. 23,453 (Apr. 20, 2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-04-20/pdf/2022-08288.pdf.

4. GHG Guidance at 1,201.

5. Id. at 1,202-03.

6. Id. at 1,203, 1,211.

7. Id. at 1,205.

8. Id. at 1,204.

9. Id.

10. Id.

11. Id. at 1,206.

12. Id.

13. Id. at 1,202.

14. Id. at 1,204 n.86.

15. Id. at 1,208.

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