Posted this week at the National Law Review by Daniel J. Struck and Neil B. Posner of Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein P.C. a good overview of R.C. Wegman Construction Company v. Admiral Insurance Company which help address the issues involved with insurance claims in excess of policy limits in Illinois: 
In general, if a lawsuit is covered or potentially covered by a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy, the insurer has a duty to defend that claim. If the insurer provides that defense without reserving its rights to deny coverage, the insurer is entitled to select defense counsel and control the defense. But when the insurer defends under a reservation of rights, that reservation may create a conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured.
The leading Illinois Supreme Court case on this subject is Maryland Casualty v. Peppers, decided in 1976. According to Peppers, when an insurer defends an insured, but reserves the right to deny coverage based on an exclusion in the insurance policy (the applicability of which could be established during the course of defending the insured), there is a conflict of interest that gives the insured the right to select independent counsel to defend it at the insurer’s expense. But the Illinois Supreme Court did not say that this is the only conflict of interest that could give rise to the insured’s right to select independent defense counsel.
In R.C. Wegman Construction Company v. Admiral Insurance Company, decided in 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit answered a question that has vexed Illinois insureds for a long time. Although the case involves a relatively uncommon set of facts, the court’s ruling in Wegman recognizes the conflicting interests that can arise between insureds and insurers when an insured faces a claim in which there is a “non-trivial probability” that there could be a judgment in excess of policy limits.
The Nuts and Bolts of Wegman
R.C. Wegman Construction Company was the manager of a construction site at which another contractor’s employee was seriously injured. Wegman was an additional insured under a policy issued by Admiral Insurance to the other contractor. When the worker sued Wegman, Admiral acknowledged its duty to defend, apparently without reserving any rights, and undertook the control of Wegman’s defense. The Admiral policy provided $1 million in per-occurrence limits of liability. Although it soon became clear that there was a “realistic possibility” that the underlying lawsuit would result in a settlement or judgment in excess of the policy limits, Admiral never provided this information to Wegman.
Shortly before trial, a Wegman executive was chatting about the case with a relative who happened to be an attorney. That relative pointed out the risk of liability in excess of policy limits, and mentioned that it was important for Wegman to notify its excess insurers. But by then it was too late, and the excess insurer denied coverage because notice was untimely. A judgment was entered against Wegman for more than $2 million. Wegman sued Admiral for failing to give sufficient warning of the possibility of an excess judgment so that Wegman could give timely notice to its excess insurer. According to the Seventh Circuit, the key issue was whether this situation—in which there was a risk of judgment in excess of the limit of liability, and where the insurer was paying for and controlling the defense—gave rise to a conflict of interest.
Admiral’s explanation for failing to inform Wegman was ultimately part of its downfall. Because there were other defendants in the underlying lawsuit, there was a good chance that Wegman would not be held jointly liable and that if a jury determined that Wegman was no more than 25% responsible for the worker’s injury, Wegman’s liability would have been capped at 25% of the judgment. Admiral’s trial strategy was not to deny liability, but to downplay Wegman’s responsibility. Admiral, however, never mentioned this litigation gambit to Wegman!
In the Seventh Circuit’s view, this was a textbook example of “gambling with an insured’s money.” And that is a breach of an insurer’s fiduciary duty to its insured.
When a potential conflict of interest arises, the insurer has a duty to notify the insured, regardless of whether the potential conflict relates to a basis for denying coverage, a reservation of rights, or a disconnect between the available limits of coverage and the insured’s potential liability. Once the insured has been informed of the conflict of interest, the insured has the option of hiring a new lawyer whose loyalty will be exclusively to the insured. In reaching its Wegman conclusion, the Seventh Circuit cited the conflict-of-interest rule established by the Illinois Supreme Court’s Peppersdecision. Thus, a potential conflict of interest between an insured and an insurer concerning the conduct of defense is not limited to situations in which the insurer has reserved its rights.
In rejecting Admiral’s arguments, the Seventh Circuit explained that a conflict of interest (1) can arise in any number of situations and (2) does not necessarily mean that the conflicted party—the insurer—has engaged in actual harmful conduct. A conflict of interest that permits an insured to select independent counsel occurs whenever the interests of the insured and the insurer are divergent, which creates a potential for harmful conduct.
The conflict between Admiral and Wegman arose when Admiral learned that a judgment in excess of policy limits was a “non-trivial probability.” When confronted with a conflict of this type, the insurer must inform the insured as soon as possible in order to allow the insured to give timely notice to excess insurers, and to allow the insured to make an informed decision as to whether to select its own counsel or to continue with the defense provided by the insurer.
Looking Beyond Wegman
The fact pattern discussed in Wegman, however, is not the only situation in which there may be a conflict of interest between an insurer and an insured concerning the control of the defense. Under the supplemental duty to defend in a CGL policy, an insured is entitled to be defended until settlements or judgments have been paid out in an amount that equals or exceeds the limits of liability. The cost of defense does not erode the limits of liability, which means that the supplemental duty to defend is of significant economic value to an insured.
The following hypothetical situations (involving an insured covered by a CGL policy with $1 million in per-occurrence and aggregate limits of liability and a supplemental duty to defend) illustrate the economic value of the duty to defend:
- The insured is sued 25 times in one policy year. In each instance, the insurer acknowledges coverage and undertakes to defend the lawsuits. Each lawsuit is dismissed without the insured becoming liable for any settlements or judgments. The total cost of defending these 25 lawsuits is $1.5 million. The limits of liability are completely unimpaired with $1 million in limits of coverage remaining available.
- The insured is a defendant in dozens of lawsuits alleging that one of the products it sells has a defect that has caused bodily injury. The insurer agrees to defend. The lawsuits are consolidated, and the costs of defense accumulate to more than $2.5 million. Eventually, there is a global settlement of the lawsuits for $1 million. Thus, a total of $3.5 million has been paid out on an insurance policy with a $1 million limit of liability.
- The insured is involved in a catastrophic accident for which he was solely responsible and in which four other people were permanently disabled. Each of the victims files a lawsuit and the realistic projected liability exposure to each victim is $1.5 million—or $6 million collectively. Shortly after the complaints are filed (and before there has been any significant discovery or investigation), three of the plaintiffs make a joint offer to settle their claims for a collective $1 million. The insurer and the insured both believe that this is an outstanding settlement opportunity, but the fourth plaintiff wants her day in court. If the insured agrees to this promising settlement opportunity, the limits of liability will be exhausted, the duty to defend will be extinguished, and the insured will be forced to pay for his own defense or rely on his excess insurance to reimburse him for defense costs.
Any insured who has been in the position of defending against either a serious claim or a multitude of smaller claims will understand that the supplemental duty to defend under a CGL policy may have much greater economic value than the limit of liability alone.
In these kinds of situations—when either the potential liability exceeds policy limits or there are multiple claims against the insured such that the economic value of the defense is worth more than the limit of liability—who should be allowed to control the defense of claims against the insured? In prior cases (Conway v. County Casualty Insurance Company [1992] and American Service Insurance Company v. China Ocean Shipping Co. [2010]), Illinois courts concluded that an insurer cannot be excused of any further duty to defend by paying out its remaining limits to the plaintiffs or by depositing its policy limits into court. But this rule does not address the conflict of interest when (1) it is in the insurer’s financial interest to avoid the potentially unlimited expense of defending its insured but (2) it is in the insured’s interest to continue receiving a defense that may have greater financial value than the limits of liability of a primary CGL policy.
Thanks to the Wegman decision, there is now some authority acknowledging that the insured’s right to select independent counsel may exist even if the insurer defends without a reservation of rights. The court recognized that the insurer-insured relationship and the right to control the defense is fraught with potential conflicts. Therefore, it is more important than ever for insureds to protect their interests.
Editor’s note: For more on the insured’s right to a defense, see “Policyholders and the Right to a Defense: Don’t Be Left Holding the Bag.”
© 2011 Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C.
