Tag: USPTO

Patent Trial and Appeal Board Provides Guidance on Timing of Requests for Certificates of Correction During PTAB Proceedings

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) recently issued a decision in Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLC (IPR2016-00984) (Jan. 24, 2020) that illustrates some important points for patent practitioners to consider when requesting a certificate of correction for a patent subject to a Petition for Inter Partes Review before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).

The Board’s recent decision was the result of numerous proceedings before both the Board and the Federal Circuit, which began with Emerson Electric Co. filing a Petition for Inter Partes Review against Sipco, LLC (Patent Owner) on April 29, 2016.  The Board issued a final written decision that found all challenged claims unpatentable under at least one ground on October 25, 2017.  This decision was appealed by the Patent Owner to the Federal Circuit, and on appeal the Patent Owner requested that the Federal Circuit remand the case back to the Board based on a certificate of correction that had issued for the patent in question (8,754,780; “’780 patent”) after the date of the Board’s final written decision.  (Id.)  The Federal Circuit granted this request, and remanded the matter with an Order requesting the Board to address the issue of “what, if any, impact the certificate of correction had” on the Board’s final written decision.

On remand, the Board found that the earliest priority date to which the challenged claims of the ’780 patent were entitled was April 2, 2013, and refused to recognize the belatedly issued certificate of correction that would have changed the earliest priority to an earlier date in favor of the Patent Owner.  This was because the certificate of correction did not issue until March 27, 2018, which was five months after the Board’s final written decision and three months after the Patent Owner appealed to the Federal Circuit.  (Id. at 5.)

A patent owner is permitted to request a certificate of correction in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.323, which allows patent owners to ask the Director to make corrections to “mistakes” in a patent.  See 35 U.S.C. § 255.  In this case, the Board noted a series of mistakes and oversights by the Patent Owner in seeking a proper certificate of correction.  Although the Patent Owner filed a certificate of correction with the USPTO Petitions Branch about one month after the filing date of the Petition for Inter Partes Review, the Patent Owner failed to seek permission from the Board to do so, either before or after this filing.  The USPTO dismissed the Patent Owner’s first request for correction, and although the Patent Owner’s second request was thereafter granted, the second request had no chain of priority to the first, and so the USPTO Petitions Branch treated it as a new request for correction.  (Id. at 7-8.)

The Patent Owner then made a third request for a certificate of correction, and this time made its request to the Board, but this request was ultimately denied.  (Id. at 8.)  The Board later permitted the Patent Owner to submit a request for a certificate of correction to the USPTO Petitions Branch, and the Patent Owner did so.  However, the USPTO Petitions Branch found there was no chain of priority to the first certificate of correction request, because the Patent Owner had again failed to “make a reference to the first (earliest) application and every intermediate application.”  (Id. at 9.)  Finally, and without any motion to the Board, the Patent Owner submitted a final request for a certificate of correction to the USPTO Petitions Branch, and this request was granted – leading to a certificate of correction issuing on March 27, 2018 that set forth a priority claim material to the final written decision of October 25, 2017.

The Board determined that the belatedly issued certificate of correction was well after its initial final written decision and should not be given retroactive effect so as to alter its initial decision.  In considering both sides’ arguments, the Board turned to analyzing the language of 35 U.S.C. § 255, and whether or not it permits retroactive effect of a certificate of correction in an Inter Partes Review proceeding.  The Board ultimately found that section 255 does not authorize such a retroactive effect.  In other words, under the facts presented, the Patent Owner’s corrections of its mistakes in priority claims through a certificate of correction issued after the date of the Board’s final written decision did not apply back to the time when the Petition for Inter Partes Review was filed.  Further, the Board made clear that “once a petition for inter partes review of a patent has been filed, the Board may exercise jurisdiction over a request for a certificate of correction, and may stay the request,” citing to 35 U.S.C. § 315(d), 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.3 and 42.122.  (Id. 22.)  The Board noted that its decision that the finally issued certificate of correction had no impact on its earlier final written decision was consistent with the Board’s exercise of exclusive USPTO jurisdiction over a patent once Inter Partes Review is instituted.  (Id. at 22-23.)

Key Takeaway

Although non-precedential, the Board’s decision illustrates that it is best to file a request for a certificate of correction of a patent before Inter Partes Review is instituted.  After institution, the Board has discretion to stay, and effectively deny, a patent owner’s ability to request a certificate of correction that can determine the outcome of the Inter Partes Review proceeding before the USPTO.

© 2020 Brinks Gilson Lione. All Rights Reserved.

For more PTAB decisions, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law section.

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Takes on Artificial Intelligence

If the hallmark of intelligence is problem solving, then it should be no surprise that artificial intelligence is being called on to solve complex problems that human intelligence alone cannot. Intellectual property laws exist to reward intelligence, creativity and problem solving; yet, as society adapts to a world immersed in artificial intelligence, the nation’s intellectual property laws have yet to do the same. The Constitution seems to only contemplate human inventors when it says, in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8,

“The Congress shall have Power … To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”

The Patent Act similarly seems to limit patents to humans when it says, at 35 U.S.C. § 100(f),

“The term ‘inventor’ means the individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.”

In fact, as far back as 1956, the U.S. Copyright Office refused registration for a musical composition created by a computer on the basis that copyright laws only applied to human authors.

Recognizing the need to adapt, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) recently issued notices seeking public comments on intellectual property protection related to artificial intelligence. In August 2019, the PTO issued a Federal Register Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. 166 (Aug. 27, 2019) entitled, “Request for Comments on Patenting Artificial Intelligence Inventions.” On October 30, the PTO broadened its inquiry by issuing another Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. 210 (Oct. 30, 2019) entitled, “Request for Comments on Intellectual Property Protection for Artificial Intelligence Innovation.” Finally, on December 3, 2019, the PTO issued a third notice, extending the comment period on the earlier notices to January 10, 2020. All of the notices can be downloaded from the PTO’s web site.

The January 10, 2020 deadline for public comments on the issues raised in the notices is fast approaching. This is an important topic for the future of technology and intellectual property, and the government is plainly looking at these important issues with a clean slate.

© 2020 Vedder Price

For more on patentable inventions, see the Intellectual Property law section of the National Law Review.

How to Get a PTAB Decision Designated Precedential

This past year, we have seen the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) designate a number of decisions as precedential and informative more so than in past years. This is directly a result of the USPTO’s revised Standard Operating Procedure 2 (SOP2). On September 20, 2018, the USPTO announced that Board decisions can now be designated as precedential or informative through either one of two tracks: (1) POP Review or (2) a “ratification” process.

Under both tracks, a newly formed Precedential Opinion Panel (POP) comprising of at least three members will decide whether the decision should be designated as precedential or informative. Members of the POP will be selected by the Director and, by default, will comprise the Director, the Commissioner of Patents and the Chief Judge. The three members of the POP may each decide to delegate their authority in certain circumstances.

POP Review

POP Review under the first track is a rehearing of an issue in a pending trial. A party to a proceeding or any other member of the Board may recommend POP review—or a rehearing—of a particular Board decision. The request for POP review should be limited to situations where the Board decides issues of exceptional importance involving policy or procedure. A screening committee will review the recommendations and forward its recommendations to the Director. The Director will then convene with the POP to decide whether to grant rehearing, and if rehearing is granted, to render a decision on rehearing of the case.

If POP review is ordered, the Order will identify the issues the POP intends to resolve, may request additional briefing from the parties and, in some cases, may authorize amicus briefs. The POP may also order, at its discretion, an oral hearing. The decision resulting from POP Review will then be designated precedential, informative, or “routine.”

At this time, only two decisions have been issued by the newly formed POP:

  • Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren Techs., LLC, Case IPR2018-00914, Paper 38 (Mar. 13, 2019) (designated: Mar. 13, 2019)

  • GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., Case IPR2018-01754, Paper 38 (Aug. 23, 2019) (designated: Aug. 23, 2019)

Please see my latest blog post on the GoPro decision regarding the one-year time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).

To request POP review, a party to the proceeding must submit a request by email to Precedential_Opinion_Panel_Request@uspto.gov. The email must identify with particularity the reasons for recommending POP review along with a request for rehearing filed with the Board under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a) or 42.71(d). In addition, counsel must also include a statement that the Board’s decision for which rehearing is requested was contrary to law or is a question of exceptional importance.

“Ratification” process

Under the second track, the public may nominate already issued decisions to be designated precedential or informative. Under this track, the Board is relying on the public to recognize which decisions are valuable to post-grant practice. This is the more traditional path for which a decision may be designated as precedential or informative. In this past year, there have been more than a dozen decisions that have been designated as precedential or informative through this ratification process. As above, a screening committee will review the recommendations and the Director will then convene with the POP to decide whether to designate the decision as precedential or informative.

Nominations should be submitted by email to PTAB_Decision_Nomination@uspto.gov and must set forth with particularity the reasons for the requested designation.

To learn more about the process under either track described above, I recommend reviewing the revised Standard Operating Procedure 2 (SOP2) online which provides the detailed procedural requirements for nominating a decision as precedential or informative.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California
ARTICLE BY Margaux A. Savee of Polsinelli PC.

Protecting Your Brand and Trademarks in the Cannabis Space Following the 2018 Farm Bill

The 2018 Farm Bill [1] relaxed restrictions covering hemp-based cannabis products, and it is causing a shift in business strategies in the industry. Instead of a full prohibition of trademark registrations covering cannabis goods or services, a narrow range of filings is now permitted, so long as they conform to the requirements of the Farm Bill and the latest USPTO guidelines. While the regulatory framework is still being developed, cannabis-related business owners who could not previously receive federal trademark protection are now reconsidering their trademark strategies.

The principal change from the 2018 Farm Bill is that while all cannabis products derived from marijuana are still prohibited by federal law under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), those derived from hemp are now permitted, albeit still tightly regulated. Hemp-based cannabis products are defined as those that contain no more than 0.3 percent THC, the primary active ingredient in marijuana. Accordingly, certain products and services derived from hemp are now legal under federal law, and the USPTO has published guidelines that allow narrow federal trademark registrations covering them.

The USPTO had previously refused any trademark application that covered cannabis products or services. In response, many businesses have filed state-law trademark applications in jurisdictions in which marijuana has been legalized, although this provides only limited protection. Businesses have also tried to circumvent the federal prohibition by filing for goods and services tangentially related to marijuana or cannabis, such as apothecary or pharmacy services for medical marijuana, or services for the provision of information and/or advocacy for cannabis and its uses. The policy at the federal level is still to refuse these applications that cover goods and services that are legal on their face but are in fact related to marijuana. But that policy is now moot for certain hemp-related applications that conform to the new guidelines.

Even for applicants that have succeeded in registering trademarks for cannabis-based products under facially legal goods and services descriptions, attempts to enforce these marks can be hollow. During the course of litigation, it may become clear that the activities of the trademark owner are not permitted under federal law. These registrations are still valuable to block other filers as well as to signal that a business is adopting and is willing to enforce a particular mark, but the new USPTO regulations can provide substantially more protection to businesses that sell qualifying hemp-related products or services.

Under the new USPTO guidelines, marks covering hemp-based cannabis products and services are permitted to be registered as long as they contain no more than 0.3 percent THC and are otherwise legal under federal law. Accordingly, there are certain exceptions and requirements, which include the following:

  • The 2018 Farm Bill left jurisdictional responsibility for regulating certain products to the FDA. As of now, the FDA does not permit cannabidiol (CBD) to be sold in food or drug products. Accordingly, registrations for marks that cover “foods, beverages, dietary supplements, or pet treats containing CBD” are still prohibited. This restriction applies only to CBD at this point. Other non-CBD hemp-based food or drug products would be permitted registration so long as they conform to the applicable FDA guidelines. Also, CBD products that are not a food or drug may still be permitted registration as long as they do not fall under the FDA’s jurisdiction or are not otherwise prohibited by other federal laws.  See USPTO Examination Guide 1-19.
  • For marks covering cultivation and other services related to hemp-based products, applications will be examined not only for compliance with applicable USPTO requirements but also for compliance with the 2018 Farm Bill and applicable state laws. Applicants must show that they have an applicable state license to provide their services, as not all states follow the 2018 Farm Bill’s guidance for hemp products, and in many states, these products are still illegal for commercial purposes or highly restricted.[2]

The new guidelines also allow for applicants to amend pending applications covering cannabis products to conform to the new requirements. To do so, the applicant must limit the list of goods and services to products that contain no more than 0.3 percent THC and submit any required documents showing that the goods and services covered are legal. The application’s filing date would also be amended to coincide with the legalization of hemp-based products, and the USPTO would conduct a new search of the register for prior marks to account for the later filing date.

Under the new regulations, cannabis businesses should consult a trademark attorney to consider their options to protect their trademarks on a federal level. Although the law is in flux and uncertainty abounds, there are several points from a trademark-filing strategy perspective to keep in mind when considering filings under the new guidelines:

  • The new, narrow USPTO guidelines will not be helpful to every business operating in the cannabis space. Businesses that will be helped either already offer or are considering offering hemp-derived goods and services that contain less than 0.3 percent THC, goods that do not constitute food or drug products that contain CBD, and goods that are not otherwise in conflict with FDA or other federal laws or guidelines.
  • A large number of trademark applications will likely be filed for hemp-based products soon, regardless of their applicants’ qualifications. Businesses should explore their options and file quickly, and keep in mind that it will be difficult to show prior use to oppose a third-party filer, as any such use was likely illegal under federal law.
  • Because the USPTO can suspend applications for good cause, it is logical to expect the USPTO to grant suspensions of applications while applicants are in the process of obtaining a license to cultivate hemp-based products.
  • Creating even more uncertainty, the 2018 Farm Bill has directed the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to derive regulations for hemp-related activities that fall outside of the FDA’s jurisdiction. The USPTO is expected to quickly adopt new guidelines to conform to the USDA.
  • Narrowing an existing application to conform to the new requirements will significantly narrow the filing. After such an amendment, the application cannot be amended back to cover the previous broader range of goods and/or services. If an applicant anticipates a change in law and can draw out the application process to wait for such a change, it may be advisable to file a new application that conforms to the new guidelines rather than amending the old one. The applicant can then keep the broader application alive to preserve their options.
  • In some cases, existing registrations may have made it through the examination process, even if they cover goods and services that were prohibited under federal law at the time of filing. If this is a possibility, businesses should consider their options for re-filing based on the new guidelines which on their face do not apply to amending existing registrations.

The new marijuana legalization framework being put in place state by state, most recently in Illinois, has raised more questions than answers in the state-regulatory sphere. However, until now, the federal guidelines were clear, as all cannabis-related products were prohibited under federal law. After the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill, this is no longer the case. As the law in the cannabis sphere unfolds, businesses should work closely with a trademark attorney to explore options for protecting their valuable brands.

© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.
More on Cannabis & Marijuana law developments on the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

USPTO Issues Examination Guide on Trademark Applications for Cannabis and Cannabis-Related Goods and Services

On May 2, 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) issued Examination Guide 1-19 (“Examination Guide”), which outlines the path to registration for trademark applications covering hemp-based goods and services.  The issuance of the Examination Guide serves as a departure from the USPTO’s longstanding bar to the registration of cannabis-related marks, and signals the potential for further relaxation of the USPTO’s prohibition on federal registration of trademarks and service marks for cannabis and cannabis-related goods and services as state legalization of cannabis continues to crop up across the country.

To obtain federal registration for a mark, a mark’s use in commerce must be lawful under federal law.  See generally Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure §907.  The USPTO will not issue registrations for marks covering goods or services that violate federal law – even if such goods or services are legal at the state level.  Despite the legalization of cannabis for medical use in 33 states and the legalization of cannabis for recreational use in 10 states, cannabis has been deemed illegal by the federal government under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”)1.  Cannabis-related marks have therefore been ineligible for federal trademark registration.

On December 20, 2018, the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, better known as the 2018 Farm Bill, was signed into law.  In relevant part, the 2018 Farm Bill removed “hemp”2from the CSA’s definition of marijuana, thus removing “hemp” from the list of controlled substances under the CSA and creating an avenue for federal registration of marks covering some goods and services derived from hemp.  Now, marks covering certain hemp-derived goods and services with less than 0.3% tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”)3 may be eligible for federal registration.  However, the USPTO will continue to refuse registration when the identified goods or services in an application involve cannabis that meets the definition of marijuana and encompass activities still prohibited under the CSA.

To assist in the prosecution of trademark applications for these newly registerable goods and services, the USPTO outlined the requirements an application must meet before it may be eligible for registration for hemp-derived goods and related services.  First, the USPTO advises that only applications covering hemp-derived goods and services with less than 0.3% THC are registerable.  Second, an application’s identification of goods for all goods derived from hemp must explicitly state that the hemp-derived goods contain less than 0.3% THC.  Third, only applications for marks covering hemp-based products and related services filed after December 20, 2018, are eligible for federal registration.  Any applications filed prior to December 20, 2018, must be amended or refiled.4.  Specifically, applicants must request the USPTO amend their filing date to December 20, 2018, or withdraw their application and submit a new one.   Notably, the USPTO will also examine applications to register service marks for compliance with the CSA and the 2018 Farm Bill; and, as such, an application’s identification of services must also specify that the involved cannabis contains less than 0.3% THC on a dry weight basis.  Moreover, there are additional requirements for applications that include services involving the cultivation or production of hemp.

Restrictions still remain on the registrability of marks for hemp and hemp-derived goods.  For example, applications to register marks covering hemp-derived foods, beverages, dietary supplements, or pet treats will still be refused as unlawful because the use of hemp in items for human or animal consumption has not yet been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)5.

While Examination Guide 1-19 signals the budding federal registrability of marks for certain hemp-derived goods and services, applicants should consider the stringent requirements placed on the same.  Mark owners should think critically about whether their trademarks for cannabis and cannabis-related products and services are potentially eligible for federal protection, as we expect to see a significant influx of applications covering these types of offerings in the near future.  Filing applications for eligible products and services now may help mark owners gain a foothold in what will likely be a competitive business field going forward.

1 Under the Controlled Substances Act the drug class “Marihuana” (also referred to as “cannabis” or “marijuana”) is defined as “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin.”  21 U.S.C. §802(16).  Cannabidiol (“CBD”), a chemical constituent of the marijuana plant is included in the Controlled Substances Act’s definition of “Marihuana.”  See id.

2 Hemp is defined as “the plant Cannabis sativa L., and any other part of that plant, including the seeds thereof an all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) concentration of not more than 0.3% on a dry weight basis.”  Agricultural Improvement Act §297A

3 THC is the main psychoactive ingredient of cannabis.

4 The USPTO takes the position that any applications filed before December 20, 2018 lacked a valid basis to support registration at the time of filing because the applied-for goods violated federal law.  See Examination Guide 1-19: Examination of Marks for Cannabis and Cannabis Related Goods and Services after Enactment of the 2018 Farm Bill.

5 The 2018 Farm Bill specifies that the FDA retains its authority to regulate goods containing cannabis and cannabis-derived compounds, and the FDA has taken the position that cannabis-infused items for human or animal consumption require the FDA’s approval before they may be sold to consumers. The FDA is conducting clinical investigations into the safety and efficacy of such products for human and animal consumption.

© 2019 Brinks Gilson Lione. All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Virginia Wolk Marino and Emily Kappers of  Brinks Gilson & Lione
Read more USPTO & Trademark news on the National Law Review Intellectual Property page

PTO Releases Revised Guidance on Compliance with Mayo/Alice Rule

On April 19, the USPTO released a Memorandum from Robert Bahr, The Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, that summarized the support required for a finding if a claim directed to a judicial exception to s. 101 eligibility under Step 2A of the Mayo/Alice analysis chart of MPEP 2106 – a natural phenomenon, an abstract idea or a product of nature [ ed. note “PAIN’]– contains an additional inventive concept that, taken alone or in combination, would not represent well-understood, routine, or conventional [“WRC”] activity. The Memorandum was prompted by the recent decision in Berkheimer v. HP, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

At virtually the same time, Director Iancu released a Request for Comments on Determining Whether a claim element is [WRC] for the Purposes of Subject Matter Eligibility, and it pretty much repeats the factors listed in the Bahr Memorandum. For a detailed summary of the factual underpinnings that an examiner must make in order to support a rejection on the basis that a claim directed to a PAIN does not meet the inventive concept requirement because it is WRC, please refer to my post of April 20th.

I criticized the four factors outlined in the Memorandum/Request for using the s. 112 standard that that which is known to the art need not be set forth fully in the specification, as a blaze mark to guide examiners in determining whether the additional elements(s) in the claim are WRC. In other words, if the specification does not give the details of how to measure a biomarker, the examiner can use such facts to support a WRC finding. This relying on material not present in the specification is repeated in Factors 1, 3 and 4. I also criticized Factor 2 as permitting examiners to simply cite to “one or more court decisions discussed in MPEP 2106(5)(d)(2)” as noting the WRC nature of the additional element(s) in the claim, primarily due to the breadth of the summaries of the cases in this section of the MPEP.

The Revised Guidance in the May 8th Presentation (which is available as a slideshow from the PTO) takes these two criticisms to heart. It drops the reference to the value of a s. 112 analysis in Factors relating to the evidence of WRC provided by the specification, the disclosures in the prior art and the ability of the examiner to take official notice of the WRC, which usually will be based upon disclosures in the prior art.

The Revised Guidelines start out by stating that the examiner should conclude that a claim element(s) represents only WRC activity only if he/she can conclude that the element(s) is “widely prevalent or in common use in the relevant industry,” a conclusion that must be supported by factual determinations. Here is a quick run-down of the four “Options” that the examiner can use to demonstrate that a claim directed to PAIN does not contain more than elements that are WRC (These are mostly my words):

  1. Applicant makes a “statement against interest” in the specification or during prosecution that a claim element(s) is conventional, widely prevalent or in common use, or is a commercially available product.

  2. The examiner can cite to one or more court decisions as noting the WRC nature of the additional elements, as reported in MPEP 2106(d)(II). I criticized this as overly broad, especially in view of the fact that there is almost no case law involving diagnostic testing or methods of medical treatment. Interestingly, in Vanda v. West-Ward, the Fed. Cir. stated that the Mayo claims were diagnostic claims. This is a stretch – What condition did they diagnose? The recited patient had been treated with the drug before any sample testing was carried out. However, the revised guidelines make it clear that the additional element in the claim must be the same as the element addressed in the court case, as well as the fact that the case must be on the MPEP list. Vanda v. West-Ward should be added to this list.

  3. The examiner finds prior art publication(s) that demonstrate that the element(s) in questions are WRC, not just in existence at some point in the past. This should come from the prior art located in the search done by the Examiner or disclosed by Applicant.

  4. The examiner is permitted to take official notice of the WRC of the additional element(s) but only to be used when the examiner is certain thereof based upon his/her personal knowledge. For all but the most indisputable WRC, the examiner may be required to provide a declaration under 37 CFR 1.104(d)(2).

If more than one element is present, the examiner must show that the combination of the elements is WRC in the pertinent art. If the examiner cited to a publication not previously of record in response to an argument by applicant, the office action should not be made final.

Comments must be received by Aug. 20, 2018 by submitting them to Eligibilty2018@USPTO.gov.

 

© 2018 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.
Read more updates on Mayo/Alice on the National Law Review’s Intellectual Property Page.

USPTO Freedom Of Information Act Inquiry

Whats Next, Question Marks, Freedom of Information Act, FOIAThe Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) can be a very powerful tool. It provides unqualified right to access certain public records. Patent attorney Gary Shuster used it to file a FOIA request (Request No. F-17-00099) with the USPTO on January 26, 2017, seeking the following:

1. Any document written by or on behalf of Michelle Lee constituting a resignation from office, a request to withdraw a resignation from office, or a request to refrain from her position.

2. The most current document identifying the Director of the USPTO or, if there is no director, the acting director of the USPTO.

3. Any written instructions received between January 20, 2017 and the date of this request regarding deletion of any data from web sites operated by or on behalf of the USPTO, including USPTO.com.

To spare the USPTO having to compile and produce all documents responsive to this request, Shuster offered: “In the alternative, you may satisfy this request by simply answering the following question: Who is the current director or acting director of the USPTO?”

On February 24, 2017, USPTO FOIA specialist Karon Seldon sent Shuster a letter stating that the agency was extending the time limit, citing FOIA provisions allowing extensions in “unusual circumstances.” This is a FOIA provision which provides an extension may be claimed in usual circumstances where there is a “need for consultation … with another Federal Agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request.” This is likely to give a bit of breathing room to determine how the Trump administration will affect the decision.

The new deadline for response is March 10, 2017. Although it’s currently a bit of a mystery, we’ll see tomorrow who will be named to the Director role.

ARTICLE BY Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices

© Copyright 2002-2017 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

Ariosa v. Sequenom: In Search of Yes After a Decade of No

The Federal Circuit this Wednesday declined to reconsider its June decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom, a closely watched medical diagnostics case involving patents on cell-free fetal DNA testing. Biotech companies, investors, and patent lawyers alike should expect a prompt petition for certiorari, and should hope that the Supreme Court grants it.  (Disclosure: I was one of twenty-three law professors who submitted an amicus brief urging the Federal Circuit to grant en banc rehearing.)

In the last decade, the Supreme Court has suggested in case after case that the inventions they were considering were not merely unworthy of patent protection because they were, say, not inventive enough or useful enough or disclosed in enough detail. Rather, the Court in these cases gave us information about the very boundaries of the patent system—by placing the disputed inventions outside those boundaries altogether. But they have not yet told us what is just inside those boundaries.

This legal uncertainty has a significant chilling effect on investment in innovation, one that we are increasingly able to quantify.  As USPTO Chief Economist Alan Marco and I explained in a 2013 paper in the Yale Journal of Law and Technology, when a court issues a decision resolving the legal uncertainty over whether a patent was valid, that newfound certainty actually moves the market as much as the initial patent grant does.  In other words, the unpredictability of courts forces the market to discount—by as much as half—how much trust to put in the legal rights that the Patent Office issues.

Patent holder Sequenom certainly experienced the downside of that uncertainty, as Wednesday’s rehearing denial sent its stock price tumbling over 14% in just two days.  Others have taken a hit as well, such as the large-cap DNA analysis firm Illumina, which has pursued Ariosa in a separate patent litigation and whose stock price fell 7% across the same two-day period.

The reason for this uncertainty is that we are effectively back in the late 1970s, when the Court was prominently rejecting inventions as patent-ineligible subject matter—Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972 and Parker v. Flook in 1978—without saying anything concrete about what was eligible.  Relief would come only after Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 1980 and Diamond v. Diehr in 1981, when the Court finally produced binding precedents going the other way.

The result is that today’s patentees can only try to run away from the settlement risk mitigation patent in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank (2014), the breast cancer genetic diagnostic patent in AMP v. Myriad (2013), the thiopurine dosage monitoring patent in Mayo v. Prometheus (2012), the energy futures risk hedging patent application in Bilski v. Kappos (2010), and, although they were never definitively adjudicated, the vitamin deficiency diagnostic patents in LabCorp v. Metabolite (2006).  There is no case yet to run toward.

Ariosa v. Sequenom could have been that case and still can be, if the Court grants certiorari.  Certainly the Federal Circuit order has framed the issue well.  The per curiam order denying en banc rehearing was accompanied by three opinions that addressed in different combinations both the reach and the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s recent precedents.

Judge Dyk’s concurrence concluded that the precedents, particularly Mayo and Alice, do apply to the present facts and that those precedents are generally sound.  He invited “further illumination” from the Supreme Court only on whether the all-important inventive concept must come at the second step of the two-step Mayo test (application of the natural law or abstract idea) or may also come at the first step (discovery of the natural law).  Meanwhile, Judge Newman’s dissent concluded that the precedents, particularly Mayo and Myriad, do not apply here, for the facts “diverge significantly.”  She found the Sequenom patent’s subject matter to be eligible and would have proceeded to more specific patentability analysis under §§ 102, 103, 112, etc.

Their midpoint and the best argument for certiorari was Judge Lourie’s concurrence, which agreed that Mayo controls, with “no principled basis to distinguish this case from Mayo”—but which also urged that Mayo and the Supreme Court’s other precedents from Bilski onward are an increasingly unsound basis for differentiating between natural laws and abstract ideas on the one hand, and applications of those laws and ideas on the other hand.  Echoing a previously expressed position of the Patent Office, he favored the “finer filter of § 112” for issues of indefiniteness or undue breadth (rather than what the agency’s post-Bilski Subject Matter Eligibility Guidelines called the “coarse filter” of § 101).

He also pushed back directly against a argument that the Supreme Court frequently invokes to express its preference for flexible standards that foster over predictable rules that can be manipulated: the draftsman’s art.  Decisions from Flook and Diehr to Mayo and Alice have rested in part on the suspicion that patent lawyers may at any time evade substantive doctrinal limitations through clever claim drafting.  To this Judge Lourie’s opinion aptly responded that “a process, composition of matter, article of manufacture, and machine are different implementations of ideas, and differentiating among them in claim drafting is a laudable professional skill, not necessarily a devious device for avoiding prohibitions.”

In these regards, Judge Lourie’s approach may well represent the “center” of the Federal Circuit on subject-matter eligibility.  He was in the en banc majority in Bilski and authored the panel opinion in Mayo.  He authored both panel majority opinions in Myriad (before and after the Supreme Court’s GVR order).  And he authored the five-judge en banc plurality opinion in Alice, whose analysis was ultimately consolidated and endorsed in the Supreme Court’s opinion in that case.

With the issues so well framed and the recent subject-matter eligibility precedents so well synthesized, then, there is reason to be optimistic that a decade of hearing “no” from the Supreme Court may finally give way to a “yes” and better orient us on the true boundaries of our patent system.

Article By Saurabh Vishnubhakat of Texas A&M University School of Law

© Copyright 2015 Texas A&M University School of Law

New Amendments to USPTO Post-Grant Regulations

OUS-PatentTrademarkOffice-Sealn May 19, 2015, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a final rule amending its regulations that apply to post-grant proceedings. These new rules deal with ministerial changes such as increasing page limits and making the regulations reflect the current practices used by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).

A second set of rule changes—to be issued later this year—will be more substantive and issued in proposed form first with an opportunity for public comment. We will issue an On the Subject when the second set of rules is issued, and we will be happy to assist with the submission of any comments. Below is a brief overview of the major provisions of this first amendment to the regulations.

  • Motions to Amend. The page limit for motions to amend, and oppositions to motions to amend, is increased from 15 pages to 25 pages. The required claim listing may now be made in an appendix accompanying the motion to amend, and the appendix is not counted toward the 25-page limit.

  • Petitioner’s Reply Brief. The page limit for the petitioner’s reply to patent owner’s response after institution is increased from 15 pages to 25 pages.

  • Font Style. All filings must be in 14-point, Times New Roman proportional font.

  • Back-Up Counsel. The rules are modified to make it clear that there can be more than one back-up counsel. There may be only one lead counsel.

  • Fees. The rules clarify that you must include in the number of claims in the petition when calculating the required fees each challenged claim as well as any claim from which a challenged claim depends, unless that claim is separately challenged. The USPTO explains that the claims from which the dependent claim depends must be construed along with the dependent claim.

  • Right to Depose. The rules make clear that routine or automatic discovery only includes affidavit testimony prepared for the post-grant proceeding. Consequently, if an affidavit is submitted from a district court proceeding, a motion must be filed to depose that affiant.

  • Objections to Evidence. The rule makes it clear that objections to evidence must be filed with the PTAB and served on opposing counsel.

  • Covered Business Method Proceedings. The rule explicitly provides that a covered business method proceeding may not be instituted where the petitioner filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent before filing the petition. The change was made to track the statute.

ARTICLE BY Bernard Knight & Carey C. Jordan of McDermott Will & Emery
© 2015 McDermott Will & Emery

Understanding Post-AIA Power of Attorney Procedures –America Invents Act

Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

Applicants identified upon a U.S. patent application’s filing can impact the ownership rights to the patent application throughout prosecution.  Prior to implementation of relevant aspects of the America Invents Act (AIA) on September 16, 2012, patent application Applicants could only be Inventors.  Conversely, applications filed on or after September 16, 2012 can have Inventors or Assignees as Applicants.  The choice of Applicant – Inventors or Assignees – upon filing in post-AIA applications affects how Power of Attorney can be properly established before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).

Pre-AIA patent applications filed before September 16, 2012 can have Power of Attorney granted by Inventors or Assignees under Rule 32, provided that the requirements of Rule 3.73 are satisfied.  In contrast, post-AIA applications filed on or after September 16, 2012 can be filed with Inventors or Assignees as the Applicant, with Rule 32 requiring a Power of Attorney to be signed by either the “Applicant” or “Patent Owner.”  However, an Assignee only becomes the patent owner after the application issues as a patent.  Thus, in order to take over prosecution in a post-AIA application, the Assignee must either initially be listed as or later formally established to be the Applicant for Power of Attorney to be granted on behalf of the Assignee.

In circumstances where a post-AIA application’s Applicant is identified upon filing as the Assignee, the Assignee may execute a Power of Attorney, and it can be filed without the need to file any separate papers to satisfy Rule 3.71 or Rule 3.73.

When a post-AIA patent application is filed without listing the Assignee as the Applicant (i.e., because the Inventors are listed as the Applicant) or when the Assignee changes during the course of prosecution, Rule 3.71 or Rule 3.73 must be satisfied for the Assignee to establish a Power of Attorney before the USPTO.  Namely, a statement under Rule 3.73(c) and a Power of Attorney must be filed.  However, the Assignee must first be identified as an Applicant.  Currently there are two ways for an Assignee to become an Applicant when not so listed upon initial application filing.  First, an Applicant can be added to the existing list of Applicants.  Alternately, all Inventors can be removed as the Applicant and be replaced with the Assignee as the Applicant.

A change in an Applicant can be accomplished by filing a supplemental Application Data Sheet (ADS), fulfilling the Rule 3.73(c) requirements including a showing of ownership.  A chain of title can be demonstrated through executed assignment(s) and a statement specifying where documents verifying the chain of title from the original owner to the assignee are recorded in the assignment records of the USPTO by reel and frame number.  After adding the Applicant, Rule 3.71 or Rule 3.73 can be satisfied by filing a statement under Rule 3.73(c) and filing a properly executed Power of Attorney, thereby appointing the designated patent practitioner.

Accordingly, administrative burdens on the USPTO, on Assignees, and on Assignee representatives can generally be reduced by filing post-AIA applications listing the Assignee as the Applicant, should the Assignee be known at the time of filing.

Colleen Witherell also contributed content for this article.

ARTICLE BY

Christina Sperry
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.