Tag: USPTO

The USPTO’s New Guidance Simplifies Prosecution by Clarifying Subject-Matter Eligibility of Patents

Armstrong Teasdale Law firm

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued new guidance on Dec. 8, 2015 that provides improved clarity to those prosecuting patent applications in the computer-implemented and biochemical arts. Although many questions remain on the issue of subject matter eligibility, this guidance will be a useful tool to move prosecution of such applications past rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101. It is available here.

The Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility (the “Guidance”) will be available to examiners for prosecution immediately. This long-awaited document aims to provide better clarity on the subject matter eligibility of computer-implemented patents and patents in the biological, chemical and biochemical arts. For the past several months, navigating the eligibility of such patent applications has been difficult, in part due to unclear PTO rules and procedures following the Supreme Court decisions of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) and Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).

The Guidance primarily focuses on adding details to the two-step subject matter eligibility test of Alice Corp. and Mayo. The first step of this test is to “determine whether the claim is directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.” Here, the Guidance affirms the PTO’s broad power to find claims pending before the office as being directed to such judicially created exceptions.

Although the Guidance provides several examples of abstract ideas and natural phenomenon, it is clear that these examples are non-limiting. As such, the Guidance confirms the substantial discretion that has been used by examiners, courts and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to find that claims are directed to abstract ideas or laws of nature. In light of this broad discretion, applicants should avoid only arguing that their claims are not directed to such exceptions. Such arguments will likely fail, therefore applicants should not rely solely on this approach.

The second step is to “determine whether any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception.” The Guidance provides applicants with new methods of showing “significantly more” than previously provided.

First, the Guidance re-affirms the validity of the “machine or transformation” test. Specifically, “applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine” and “effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing” both can constitute “significantly more” than the abstract idea, law of nature or natural phenomenon. Second, the Guidance states that “adding a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field, or adding unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular useful application” may also constitute “significantly more”.  This language appears to give PTO examiners significant latitude to overcome rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The Guidance also clarifies that “extrasolution activity” and “linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use” will not constitute “significantly more”, resolving an open question since Alice Corp. It also specifies that when a claim recites “a plurality of exceptions,” failing to find “significantly more” for any one of those exceptions will cause the claim to fail subject matter eligibility.

Additionally, the Guidance provides a new option for applicants with claims that “clearly do not seek to tie up any judicial exception such that others cannot practice it.” Though the meaning of this statement is unclear, the PTO has offered an option of “streamlined eligibility analysis” for such claims.

There are some notable limitations to the Guidance. First, the Guidance does not constitute substantive rulemaking and lacks the force of law. As a result, examiners are not formally required to follow it. (Practically, however, we anticipate it will be used by most examiners.) Second, the Guidance is not binding on or applicable to litigation proceedings or proceedings at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Third, these are truly “interim” guidelines.

We anticipate that final rules and laws are still in development and this area of law will continue to change over the coming months. More information on the Interim Guidance can be found here.

© Copyright 2014 Armstrong Teasdale LLP. All rights reserved

Post Holiday Trademark Sale!!!!!!!

Giordano Halleran Ciesla Logo

The USPTO announced that they are having a sale.  You can save $50 per class on all new trademark registration applications and $100 on all renewals.  The Final Rule issued on December 16, 2014 announced that trademark filing fees will be reduced.

Small Print:  Unfortunately, the discounts will not be effective in time for the holidays.  The new discounted fees don’t kick in until January 17, 2015.  In the good news department, the discounts will continue thereafter!

ARTICLE BY

Kurt E. Anderson
OF
Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, P.C.

USPTO Issues New Subject Matter Eligibility Examination Interim Guidelines – Abstract Idea Guidance

Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox

On December 15, 2014, the USPTO issued Interim Guidance for examination of subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. These new guidelines largely follow the previous interim guidelines issued on June 25, 2014, in view of CLS v. Alice (2014), with some additional details. The new guidelines have also combined that earlier guidance for claims reciting abstract ideas with the March 4, 2014, guidance for claims reciting natural phenomena/laws of nature.

Under the new guidelines, the examiner will first determine whether the claim is directed to one of the four accepted statutory categories. If it does, examiners are instructed to apply the 2-part patent-eligibility analysis, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Alice. Examiners are instructed to apply the 2-part analysis to the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims when analyzed as a whole. Importantly, the Guidance also confirms that “[e]very claim must be examined individually, based on the particular elements recited therein, and should not be judged to automatically stand or fall with similar claims in an application.”

Analysis for Software/Business Method Claims – Abstract Idea Guidance

To evaluate software and business method claims, the “abstract idea” analysis laid out in the Guidance will be the most relevant. To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea, the 2-part Alice test is as follows: 1) determine whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea, and if they are, then 2) determine whether the claims recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.

Part 1

In accordance with Alice, the Interim Guidance notes that fundamental economic practices, certain methods of organizing human activities, an idea ‘of itself,’ and mathematical relationships/ formulas are recognized as abstract ideas. Citing previous cases, the Interim Guidance provides examiners with specific examples of abstract ideas:

  • mitigating settlement risk (Alice);

  • hedging (Bilski);

  • creating a contractual relationship (buySAFE);

  • using advertising as an exchange of currency (Ultramercial);

  • processing information through a clearinghouse (Dealertrack);

  • comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options (SmartGene);

  • using categories to organize, store and transmit information (Cyberfone);

  • organizing information through mathematical correlations (Digitech);

  • managing a game of bingo (Planet Bingo);

  • the Arrhenius equation for calculating the cure time of rubber (Diehr);

  • a formula for updating alarm limits (Flook);

  • a mathematical formula relating to standing wave phenomena (Mackay Radio); and

  • a mathematical procedure for converting one form of numerical representation to another

    (Benson).

Part 2

If no abstract idea is found in Part 1, then Part 2 need not be addressed. But if Part 1 identifies an abstract idea in the claims, Part 2 is considered. The Guidance stresses the importance of considering the claim as a whole, rather than addressing individual elements on their own.

The Guidance provides examples of limitations that may be enough to qualify as “significantly more” when recited in a claim. These examples include:

  • improvements to another technology or technical field;

  • improvements to the functioning of the computer itself;

  • applying the abstract idea with, or by use of, a particular machine;

  • effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing;

    • adding a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field, or adding unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular useful application; and

    • other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment.

      These examples are consistent with the recent Federal Circuit Decision in DDR Holdings, LLC. v. Hotels.com (DDR).

      Limitations that do not qualify as “significantly more” include:

    • adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the abstract idea, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer;

    • simply appending well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea, e.g., a claim to an abstract idea requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry;

    • adding insignificant extrasolution activity to the abstract idea, e.g., mere data gathering in conjunction with the abstract idea; and

    • generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment or field of use.

      2-Part Analysis Not Always Necessary

      According to the Interim Guidance, examiners do not need to perform the complete 2-part analysis when eligibility is self-evident. A full analysis may not be needed where the claims clearly do not preempt the abstract idea in such a manner that others cannot practice it. For instance, the interim guidelines note that a claim directed to a complex manufactured industrial product or process that recites meaningful limitations along with an abstract idea may sufficiently limit its practical application so that a full eligibility analysis is not needed. As an example, a robotic arm assembly having a control system that operates using certain mathematical relationships is not an attempt to tie up use of the mathematical relationships and would not require the examiner to perform the full 2-part analysis to determine eligibility.

    The Interim Guidance is effective on December 16, 2014 and is not legally binding. The USPTO is seeking public comments on this Interim Guidance along with additional suggestions on claim examples by March 15, 2015.

Federal Circuit’s Sandoz Decision Increases Importance of Post-Grant Proceedings to Biosimilar Developers

Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox

On Friday, December 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rendered its decision in Sandoz v. Amgen, No. 2014-1693, a case with major implications for the emerging U.S. biosimilars industry. The decision addresses when and how a party seeking to launch a biosimilar product in the U.S. can initiate litigation to challenge the brand company’s potential blocking patents. This is the first instance in which the Federal Circuit has had the opportunity to address the scope and applicability of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), which established a formal pathway for biosimilar approval in the US.

Background

At issue in Sandoz is a litigation Sandoz, Inc. initiated against Amgen, Inc. and Hoffman-La Roche Inc. on June 24, 2013. Sandoz’s complaint seeks a declaratory judgment (DJ) that two patents owned by Roche and exclusively licensed to Amgen are invalid, unenforceable, and would not be infringed by the commercial marketing of Sandoz’s biosimilar version of Amgen’s blockbuster biologic product Enbrel® (etanercept). The patents at issue extend Amgen’s protection around etanercept an additional 15 years past the original patents. Sandoz filed its complaint against Amgen prior to filing any application with the FDA for approval to market its biosimilar etanercept product, which is currently in Phase III clinical trials. Sandoz will not file with the FDA until the Phase III trial is complete, and of course will not be able to market its version of etanercept in the US without FDA approval. At the time of suit, Amgen had not alleged Sandoz was currently doing anything that exposes it to liability for infringing Amgen’s patents rights around Enbrel®.

The District Court Decision

Amgen moved to dismiss Sandoz’s complaint, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because no immediate and real controversy between the parties exists. In a brief order, the court granted Amgen’s motion to dismiss on two separate grounds. First, the court ruled that its discretion to enter a DJ in the case is subject to the provisions of the BPCIA, which sets specific limitations on the timing and conduct of any litigation arising from the filing of an application for approval to market a biosimilar. The court concluded that “neither a reference product sponsor, such as Amgen, nor [a biosimilar applicant] such as Sandoz, may file a lawsuit unless and until they have engaged in a series of statutorily–mandated exchanges of information” related to patents potentially in dispute. In this case, Sandoz had not complied with the exchanges as it had not even started the process by filing its application with the FDA.

Second, the court found that Sandoz had not established jurisdiction under traditional grounds because it had not established a real and immediate injury or threat of future injury caused by Amgen. The court noted that Amgen had never advised Sandoz that it intended to sue Sandoz, and that the mere allegation by Sandoz that it intended to file an application for FDA approval in the future was not sufficient to create a case on controversy. Sandoz appealed the district court order dismissing the action.

The Federal Circuit Decision

On appeal, Sandoz argued that the litigation provisions of the BPCIA only govern the statutory patent infringement litigation authorized by the Act after a biosimilar application is filed with the FDA, and do not apply to DJ actions in general. Sandoz further argued that nothing in the BPCIA can be construed to bar or limit in any way the ability to bring DJ actions to resolve patent disputes prior to filing a biosimilar application. Finally, Sandoz argued that the district court erred in concluding that Sandoz had not adequately demonstrated a sufficient actual case or controversy sufficient to allow the DJ action to proceed.

The Federal Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Sandoz’s complaint, concluding that Sandoz had not alleged an injury of sufficient immediacy and reality to create subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit noted that “a case of actual controversy” is a prerequisite to exercising declaratory judgment jurisdiction. The test for determining whether a case or controversy exists is whether “ there is a substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” The Federal Circuit, however, declined to address the lower court’s interpretation of the BPCIA as barring a lawsuit by either the reference product sponsor or the biosimilar applicant unless and until the parties have engaged in the statutorily-mandated patent information exchanges.

In concluding that Sandoz’s complaint does not present a case or controversy, the Federal Circuit panel noted that there was no prior decision in which the Federal Circuit had found a case or controversy to exist when the only activity that would create exposure to potential infringement liability was a future activity requiring FDA approval that had not yet been sought. The court found the immediacy requirement lacking where the conclusion of Sandoz’s Phase III trial, which was a prerequisite for filing for FDA approval, was still several years away when Sandoz filed suit. The court refused to assume that the Phase III trial would be successful, and noted that the trial could in fact uncover issues with Sandoz’s product that could push the application filing date back even further. Alternatively, the clinical trial could fail resulting in Sandoz never seeking FDA approval, or Sandoz could modify its proposed product and file for approval on the modified product. The court also noted that Sandoz’s complaint lacked specificity as to how Amgen’s patents read or don’t read on Sandoz’s product; and instead relies on prior general assertions by Amgen that the patents at issue cover Enbrel, that Amgen will assert the patents against products that compete with Enbrel, and that Sandoz intends to market a competing product at some point in the future. Ultimately, the court concluded that the events allegedly exposing Sandoz to infringement liability may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all. The court found that Sandoz also had not shown that it would suffer any “immediate and substantial adverse impact” from not being able to seek or secure a patent adjudication before filing its application for FDA approval.

Unanswered Questions

The Federal Circuit specifically stated that its decision was limited to the particular facts before it, and does not address whether Sandoz would be able to seek declaratory judgment jurisdiction once it files its FDA application, or whether the BPCIA forecloses declaratory judgment actions outside of the statutorily-mandated patent information exchange once the application is accepted by the FDA. The decision also did not clarify the additional issue disputed by the parties concerning what constitutes sufficient “notice of commercial marketing,” which the BPCIA states must be provided by the biosimilar applicant prior to launch.

Increased Important of Post-Grant Proceedings before the USPTO

Although the Sandoz court made a point to limit the scope of its decision to the facts before it, the decision casts substantial doubt on the ability of any biosimilar developer to bring a district court action challenging the reference product sponsor’s patents prior to filing a biosimilar application with the FDA and triggering the patent information exchange provisions of the BPCIA. At the same time, the decision elevates the importance to biosimilar developers of post-grant challenges before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, such as inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR), as means for obtaining some degree of early patent certainty before initiating the FDA approval process. IPRs in particular have proven to be a potent weapon for generic drug manufacturers in the context of ANDA litigation. The lower standard of proof required to show invalidity, the expedited pace of the proceedings, and the decreased cost in comparison to district court litigation coupled with the extremely high rate in which patent claims are being invalidated provide generic manufacturers with tremendous leverage to obtain favorable settlements with brand companies. We expect that the Sandoz decision should only increase the speed with which post-grant proceedings are adopted in the biosimilar arena.

ARTICLE BY

Timothy J. Shea, Jr., PhD.
Paul A. Calvo
OF
Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.

They Know It When They See It: Patentable Subject Matter After Alice

VedderPriceLogo

To those with even a casual interest in the preparation and prosecution of patents in the United States, the holding in the Supreme Court’s June 2014 decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International is well known: claims directed to intermediated settlement encompass an abstract idea, and generic recitation of a computer implementation in such claims fails to transform the abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. Predictably, numerous articles have since been published extolling the virtues (or lack thereof, as the case may be) of theAlice decision. While the patent eligibility debate is good and necessary, it leaves open the question of many would-be patentees: may I get a patent on my software-based innovation?

While the Court provided virtually no “bright line” rules in answer to this question, the decision nevertheless suggests various approaches that may be employed going forward to best ensure your patent application embraces patent-eligible subject matter.

Background

Alice Corporation obtained various patents directed to, as the Court put it, “a computerized scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’—i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation.” In a highly fractured opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that all of Alice’s claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

On further appeal, the Court cited its recent decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., in which the Court laid out its two-step process for separating patents directed to patent ineligible concepts from “those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” First, one must “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to . . . patent ineligible concepts.” If so, in the second step, one must then ask what else is in the claims that may be sufficient to “transform” the ineligible concept into a patent-eligible application thereof.

Unfortunately, the Court provides no guidance how one goes about determining whether claims are directed to ineligible concepts in the first step. In fact, the Court expressly takes a pass on the issue, stating that it “need not labor to delimit the precise contours” of what constitutes a patent-ineligible concept. Instead, the Court noted that it’s Bilski decision concerned claims directed to “hedging,” which “all members of the Court agreed” constituted an abstract idea. Without further reference to the actual language of the claims, the Court stated that Alice’s “claims . . . are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement.” With this setup, the Court quickly concluded that “[l]ike the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is a ‘fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.'”

Turning to the second step, the Court had little trouble in determining that various other recitations in the claim beyond the abstract idea failed to “do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer.” Looking at “the claim elements separately,” the Court stated that “each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions.” Further, considering the claimed computer elements “as an ordered combination” did not add anything “that is not already present when the steps are considered separately.”

Going Forward

So, you are now considering patent protection for your new, software-implemented invention, but the Court’s “guidance” in Alice has left you unsure whether it makes sense to proceed. Despite the outcome in Alice, patents based on software-implemented innovations have not been knocked out entirely, though they did take a pretty good punch to the gut. Going forward, would-be patentees must take greater care to ensure that they claim and present their inventions in a manner that minimizes the likelihood of being interpreted as an “abstract idea.” The following observations should help you avoid that pitfall.

1. Stay As Far Away From Bilski and Alice As You Can

As noted, the closest the Court came to providing concrete guidance for identifying patent-ineligible abstract ideas was to measure how close the underlying “inventive concept” of an invention comes to the abstract ideas found in Bilski and, in the future, Alice. That is, if the subject matter of your claims is reasonably analogous to the risk hedging claimed in Bilski or the intermediated settlement in Alice, it’s almost certainly going to be viewed as embracing an abstract idea. Instead, try to find a way to describe the subject matter of your invention as something other than a concept that is related to these concepts.

Even more so than before, for software-implemented ideas, application drafting will require a careful balancing of what you say in the specification and in the claims. That is, the difference between whatever abstract idea is arguably discussed in the specification versus the limitations in your claims (∆abst) should be as large as possible.

For example, assume an invention concerns a new technique for completing payments for goods and services via mobile, wireless devices, which method facilitates a more rapid exchange of certain types of data. Having a method claim that begins “A method for completing payments via mobile, wireless devices” strongly suggests that the “inventive concept” is directed to the mere idea of completing financial transactions, which starts to sound awfully similar to the intermediated settlement of Alice. Rather than focusing the claim on the novelty of the financial transaction itself, attempt to focus the claim on the effect the method has on the underlying mobile device, e.g., “A method for communicating transactional data by a mobile, wireless device.”

2. Get “Technical”

Perhaps more importantly, even if you can strongly contrast your claims to the underlying abstract idea, you may still be on shaky grounds if your application doesn’t somehow discuss how it leads to a technological improvement. In Alice, when rejecting the sufficiency of a generic computer implementation to rescue claims otherwise directed to an abstract idea, the Court specifically noted that the claim did not “purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself . . . [or] effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.” Stated another way, rather than directing your specification and claims as teaching improvements to a traditionally human-implemented field of endeavor (e.g., hedging risk, mediating settlement risk), they should clearly establish how the innovation improves the operation of a machine (i.e., the computer implementing the software-driven method) or an overarching “technology or technical field” in which the computer-implemented method is employed.

The graph below illustrates the apparent “sliding scale” nature of the abstract idea and technology aspects of the Alice decision. As shown, the connection of the claimed subject matter to improvement to a particular technology is shown along one axis, and the distinction of the claims over an encompassed abstract idea (∆abst) is shown along the other. For claimed subject matter that demonstrates little distinction from the alleged abstract idea and that demonstrates a weak connection to a technological improvement, there is little likelihood (“No Chance”) of demonstrating subject-matter eligibility. Oppositely, for claimed subject matter that is strongly distinguished from the alleged abstract idea and that clearly concerns a technological improvement, there is a much greater likelihood (“No Problem”) of demonstrating subject-matter eligibility. It is to be expected, however, that the relative areas of the illustrated outcomes will be different according to the particular realm of abstract ideas at hand, i.e., the “No Chance” area is likely to be much larger when dealing with finance-related inventions versus inventions concerning, say, telecommunications.

 

For example, assume an invention concerns a new process applicable to trading platforms for various financial instruments, e.g., stocks, commodities, etc. Where possible, one should not stress how the claimed process makes trading markets more efficient or enables different types of financial instruments to be traded. Instead, it may be better to acknowledge in the specification that electronic trading is well-known and that the invention leads to better operation of the underlying machines (e.g., where the claimed process enables the machine to complete more trades per unit of time, complete the trades more accurately, in a manner less consuming of resources, etc.) or broadens the capabilities of such machines (e.g., where the process provides a function that was previously unavailable). In drafting the specification, carefully ascribe certain steps to humans versus machines where possible and then make sure the claims don’t include any of the human-performed steps.

3. Get to Know a European Patent Attorney

It has been observed by many commentators that the Alice decision is yet another nudge of U.S. practice in the direction of European practice, i.e., focused on a “technical problem” for which your invention must provide a “technical solution.” European patent attorneys have been dealing with such issues for many years and may be able to offer valuable insights how to best position your invention in an application.

4. Be Prepared to Make Decision Makers Prove “Abstractness”

A concern with the Court’s lack of guidance when assessing whether a claim embraces excluded subject matter is that, not unlike those seeking to obtain patents, the examiners at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) and federal district court judges will be equally in the dark. Unfettered from concrete guidance, it may be anticipated that examiners and judges will be more apt to make unsubstantiated assertions that claims encompass abstract ideas. Having drafted your claims and specification as noted above, i.e., emphasizing less how the invention helps achieve a business goal or perform human tasks better and instead illustrating how it improves/extends operation of an underlying machine or overarching technology, you will at least have a stronger foundation for arguing against the alleged abstract idea.

ARTICLE BY

Christopher P. Moreno
OF
Vedder Price

PTO Litigation Center Report – April 11, 2014

Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox

Listed below are all new filings before PTAB of requests for inter partes review (IPR) and covered business methods review (CBM).  Also listed are any newly-posted requests for ex parte reexamination at the USPTO.  This listing is current as of 9:45 AM on Friday, April 11, 2014.

New IPR Requests

Trial Number – IPR2014-00604
Filing Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 6,896,775
Title – HIGH-POWER PULSED MAGNETICALLY ENHANCED PLASMA PROCESSING
Assignee –  ZOND, INC.
Petitioner – THE GILLETTE COMPANY
Status – Pending
Tech Center – 1700

Trial Number – IPR2014-00605
Filing Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 7,348,723
Title – EMISSION DEVICE, SURFACE LIGHT SOURCE DEVICE, DISPLAY AND LIGHT FLUX CONTROL MEMBER
Assignee –  ENPLAS CORPORATION
Petitioner – Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd.
Status – Pending
Tech Center – 2800

Trial Number – IPR2014-00606
Filing Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 6,833,404
Title – HOT MELTS UTILIZING A HIGH GLASS TRANSITION TEMPERATURE SUBSTANTIALLY ALIPHATIC TACKIFYING RESIN
Assignee –  H.B. FULLER COMPANY
Petitioner – HENKEL CORPORATION
Status – Pending
Tech Center – 1700

Trial Number – IPR2014-00607
Filing Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 7,870,249
Title – NETWORKED SYSTEM FOR INTERACTIVE COMMUNICATION AND REMOTE MONITORING OF INDIVIDUALS
Assignee –  ROBERT BOSCH HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC.
Petitioner – Medtronic, Inc.
Status – Pending
Tech Center – 2400

Trial Number – IPR2014-00610
Filing Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 7,490,151
Title – ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE COMMUNICATION LINK BASED ON A DOMAIN NAME SERVICE (DNS) REQUEST
Assignee –  VIRNETX INC.
Petitioner – Microsoft Corporation
Status – Pending
Tech Center – 2100

New CBM Review Requests

Trial Number – CBM2014-00115
Filing Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 7,970,674
Title – AUTOMATICALLY DETERMINING A CURRENT VALUE FOR A REAL ESTATE PROPERTY, SUCH AS A HOME, THAT IS TAILORED TO INPUT FROM A HUMAN USER, SUCH AS ITS OWNER
Assignee –  ZILLOW, INC.
Petitioner – TRULIA, INC.
Status – Pending
Tech Center – 3600

Newly-Posted Reexam Requests

Control # – 90/013,207
Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 7,489,423
Inventor –  Nachman, Marvin J. et al.
Assignee –  INFINITY COMPUTER PRODUCTS, INC.
Title – INTERFACE CIRCUIT FOR UTILIZING A FACSIMILE MACHINE COUPLED TO A PC AS A SCANNER OR PRINTER
Co-pending Litigation – Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. Toshiba America Business Solutions, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-06796-LDD (E.D. Pa.) and 11 other litigations.

Control # – 90/013,208
Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 6,894,811
Inventor –  Nachman, Bruce G. et al.
Assignee –  INFINITY COMPUTER PRODUCTS, INC.
Title – INTERFACE CIRCUIT FOR UTILIZING A FACSIMILE COUPLED TO A PC AS A SCANNER OR PRINTER
Co-pending Litigation – Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. Toshiba America Business Solutions, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-06796-LDD (E.D. Pa.) and 11 other litigations.

Control # – 90/013,209
Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 8,040,574
Inventor –  Nachman, Bruce G. et al.
Assignee –  INFINITY COMPUTER PRODUCTS, INC.
Title – INTERFACE CIRCUIT FOR UTILIZING A FACSIMILE MACHINE TO A PC AS A SCANNER OR PRINTER
Co-pending Litigation – Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. Toshiba America Business Solutions, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-06796-LDD (E.D. Pa.) and 11 other litigations.

Control # – 90/013,210
Date – 4/10/2014
Patent # – 8,294,915
Inventor –  Nachman, Bruce G. et al.
Assignee –  INFINITY COMPUTER PRODUCTS, INC.
Title – INTERFACE CIRCUIT FOR UTILIZING A FACSIMILE MACHINE COUPLED TO A PC AS A SCANNER OR PRINTER
Co-pending Litigation – Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. Toshiba America Business Solutions, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-06796-LDD (E.D. Pa.) and 11 other litigations.

Article By:

PTO Litigation Center
Of:
Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C.