Tag: employment

Five States Put Abortion Questions on the Ballot; Health Care and Other Employers Should Stay Tuned

In the wake of the landmark decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, we have been closely monitoring legal developments across the country. In addition to well publicized “trigger laws” that were effectuated as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s order, states have taken up a variety of legislative actions in response to the ruling, which placed authority for the regulation of abortion with the states.

On Election Day, five states will have voters consider various proposals in light of Dobbs and its directive that abortion law belongs with the people. Here is a run-down of abortion-related ballot initiatives that will be put to a popular vote on November 8, 2022.

A Constitutional Amendment for California

On the ballot in California is Proposition 1: Constitutional Right to Reproductive Freedom, which would amend the state Constitution at Article I, Section 1.1, to provide that the state cannot “deny or interfere with an individual’s reproductive freedom in their most intimate decisions, which includes their fundamental right to choose to have an abortion and their fundamental right to choose or refuse contraceptives.” Any amendment to the California Constitution requires a simple majority of voters. If the amendment is passed, changes take effect the fifth day after the Secretary of State files the statement of the vote for the election.

Should Proposition 1 pass, it would add express protection for reproductive freedom, including decisions about abortion and contraception, to the state constitution, under its existing guaranteed right to privacy. If the proposition does not pass, it will not affect the status quo of reproductive rights in California: while current protections for abortion and other reproductive medical care would not be constitutionally guaranteed, they would remain in place under state law.

California currently has strong protections for the right to abortion, generally only prohibiting abortion at viability. Since the Dobbs decision earlier this year, California has promoted access to abortion, including launching abortion.ca.gov, a website dedicated towards providing information on reproductive health care services to people both inside and outside of California. Recently, in late September, Governor Gavin Newsom signed a package of 12 bills of abortion protections, aimed towards improving access to abortion and protecting patients and clinicians who undergo or provide them.

With the backdrop of an already-strong California legal reproductive health network, consistent polling indicates the ballot measure is expected to pass by a wide margin. Passage of the proposition will likely signal and establish the state as a refuge for individuals from more restrictive states seeking abortions.

Michigan May Modify its Constitution, Too

Michigan will also turn to its voters to decide whether its state constitution should be amended to include protections for abortion. The Michigan proposal, referred to as “Proposal 3 of 2022 – ‘Reproductive Freedom for All’ Petition,” seeks to protect the right to an abortion with a constitutional amendment that declares a right to reproductive freedom. The petition sets forth proposed language for a new section of the Michigan Constitution, stating, in part, that “[e]very individual has a fundamental right to reproductive freedom, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to pregnancy, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, contraception, sterilization, abortion care, miscarriage management, and infertility care.”

Proposal 3 would take effect 45 days following the ballot initiative if approved by the majority of voters. It would (1) establish new individual rights to reproductive freedom, to broadly include the right to make and carry out all decisions relating to pregnancy; (2) permit state regulation of abortion in limited circumstances; (3) forbid discrimination in enforcement of reproductive rights; (4) prohibit adverse action by the state with respect to “potential, perceived, or alleged pregnancy outcomes;” and (5) invalidate state laws that conflict with the Constitution as amended by Proposal 3.

If Proposal 3 is not passed and the state constitution remains as is, the future of the right to an abortion in Michigan will be unclear. Michigan has a pre-Roe ban that, if enforced, would prohibit abortion in nearly all situations and make abortions in non-life saving circumstances potentially prosecuted as manslaughter. However, a Michigan Court of Claims judge granted a permanent injunction in Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s suit to block local prosecutors from enforcing the ban. The ban is subject to an ongoing lawsuit.

Given the uncertainty of the ballot initiative’s outcome, Michigan employers should closely monitor the results of the November 8, 2022 vote.

Vermont’s Vote

In Vermont, abortion remains legal after Dobbs under state law. However, on November 8, 2022, voters will have the opportunity to further protect abortion rights through a ballot initiative. This initiative, referred to as Proposal 5, asks registered Vermont voters whether they are in favor of amending the state’s constitution to add the following language: “That an individual’s right to personal reproductive autonomy is central to the liberty and dignity to determine one’s own life course and shall not be denied or infringed unless justified by a compelling State interest achieved by the least restrictive means.” Passage would guarantee the right to access and obtain an abortion as well as other reproductive care, and prohibit government infringement of reproductive rights absent a compelling state interest, which would need to be achieved through the least restrictive means.

Should Proposal 5 pass, the resulting constitutional amendment is not expected to significantly alter the legal landscape of abortion in Vermont, which currently has strong protection for the right to abortion. If approved, the amendment will become part of Vermont’s constitution on November 22, 2022.

In Contrast, Kentucky Seeks to Constitutionally Exclude Abortion Rights

Kentuckians will cast their votes deciding whether to amend the state’s constitution to explicitly provide that the state constitution offers no protection for a right to abortion. The proposal further clarifies that there is no constitutional right to use public funds for abortion. “Constitutional Amendment 2” poses the following question to voters: “Are you in favor of amending the Constitution of Kentucky by creating a new Section of the Constitution to be numbered Section 26A to state as follows: ‘To protect human life, nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to secure or protect a right to abortion or require the funding of abortion?’”

If the majority of votes are affirmative, a new section will be added to Kentucky’s constitution. This does not constitute an outright abortion ban, but rather prohibits courts from finding an implicit right to an abortion within the state’s constitution. Kentucky laws restricting abortion, including those triggered by Dobbs, are among the most restrictive in the nation. Approval of Constitutional Amendment 2 would not alter these laws or their existing narrow exceptions, which permit the procedure only when necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother.

An advisory from the Kentucky Attorney General provides further color on the ramifications of the amendment, noting that Amendment 2 does not ban abortion, but rather ensures that elected officials of Kentucky’s General Assembly, and not courts, would regulate abortion. The Advisory also explains that implementation of Amendment 2 would not amend other provisions in the state’s constitution.

Montana’s Ballot – NOT a Proposed Constitutional Amendment

Abortion is currently legal in Montana, as a 1999 Supreme Court ruling held that the state constitution protects abortion under its right-of-privacy provision. However, in 2021, a number of restrictive abortion laws were enacted, including a law that prohibits abortions after 20 weeks. These laws are under legal challenge by abortion providers and are temporarily enjoined pending litigation.

Meanwhile, on the ballot for November 8 is a referendum on LR-131, also known as the Born Alive Infant Protection Act. The Act proposes a new statute that would classify any infant born alive as “a legal person” and require the provision of “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to such person. This would include all infants born alive from an induced labor, C-section, or attempted abortion. The Act also includes a provision mandating providers, employees, and volunteers to report a failure to comply to law enforcement, and sets forth criminal penalties. Violation of this law would be a felony with a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison or a fine of up to $50,000. The proposed law is aimed at health care workers, and does not impose liability on parents or other parties.

Health care providers have raised concerns that the broad language of the bill could lead to unintended consequences, particularly for OB/GYN practitioners. Health care providers would be required to take “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to keep any infant alive, but these terms are not defined in the bill. Health care workers that could be held liable include doctors, nurses, and “any individual who may be asked to participate in any way in a health care service of procedure.”

If approved by the Montana electorate, the law would take effect on January 1, 2023. Hospitals and other health care providers would need to reexamine their operating procedures to comply with the bill, should it pass, including compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement.

Keeping Up With The Changes

We continue to track litigation, legislative developments, and the entirety of the post-Dobbs legal landscape as it continues to shift. Our 50-state survey and other resources provide employers, health care providers, life sciences stakeholders, and others impacted by these rapidly changing circumstances with in-depth analysis and monthly updates. Election Day results will be another element of this evolving story.

Article By Susan Gross Sholinsky, Amy K. Dow, and Catherine Kang of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

An Updated Federal Overtime Rule: When’s It Coming?

Twice a year (in the spring and the fall), each federal agency publishes a “Regulatory Agenda” that discloses the proposal and final rules it has recently issued, together with those that it plans to issue.  Back in the fall of 2021, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division noted in the agenda that it was reviewing the regulations for exemption of executive, administrative, and professional (“EAP”) employees from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage and overtime requirements codified in 29 C.F.R. Part 541.

One of the “primary goals” of the planned rulemaking is to update the minimum salary level requirement for employees who, by virtue of their duties, would qualify for an EAP exemption under section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA.  You may recall that in May 2016, the Obama DOL issued a new overtime rule, to take effect on December 1 of that year, that would have—among other things—required the DOL to update (i.e., increase) the salary threshold for EAP exemptions every three years.  In November 2019, before it could take effect, a federal judge in Texas enjoined the new overtime rule on a nationwide basis, declaring it “unlawful.”

In September 2019, the Trump DOL issued a new overtime rule, which took effect on January 1, 2020, raising the weekly minimum salary for EAP exemptions from $455 per week ($23,660 per year) to $684 per week ($35,568 per year).  The increase was the first in 15 years, but nowhere near the boost the Obama administration tried to roll out in 2016 (to $913 per week, or $47,476 per year).

Cut to the Biden administration.  The DOL noted in the fall 2021 Regulatory Agenda that “[r]egular updates [to the minimum salary for EAP exemption] promote greater stability, avoid disruptive salary level increases that can result from lengthy gaps between updates and provide appropriate wage protection.”  The agency listed a timetable for issuance of a proposed overtime rule update (a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, or NPRM) as April 4, 2022.  Seven months later, we’ve seen no proposed rule.

If and when issued, the public will have the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.  (Back in 2016, the Obama DOL received more than 293,000 comments to its proposed overtime rule.)  Stay tuned.

Article By Allan S Bloom of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

OSHA Expands Criteria for Severe Violator Enforcement Program

In an announcement that expands the criteria for entry into the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Severe Violator Enforcement Program, OSHA has signaled that it is making enforcement a priority and that employers with willful, repeat, and failure-to-abate violations will be subject to significant consequences.

Key Takeaways

  • On September 15, 2022, OSHA announced that it was expanding its criteria for entering employers into its Severe Violator Enforcement Program (“SVEP”). The updated SVEP directive is available here.
  • Previously, entry into the program was limited to cases involving fatalities, three or more hospitalizations, high-emphasis hazards, the potential release of a highly hazardous chemical, and enforcement actions classified as egregious.
  • Now, an employer can be entered into the program in cases involving two or more willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations, regardless of the hazard involved. They will continue to be subject to entry in the program in certain cases involving fatalities, three or more hospitalizations, and enforcement actions classified as egregious.
  • In light of this expansion, employers should review their compliance records and current health and safety practices and consider whether further actions are needed to mitigate enforcement risks.

Background

In 2010, OSHA created the Severe Violator Enforcement Program to “concentrate[] resources on inspecting employers who have demonstrated indifference to their OSH Act obligations by willful, repeated, or failure-to-abate violations.” Under the original SVEP, OSHA would designate employers as “severe violators” if they were involved in an enforcement action:

  • Involving a fatality in which OSHA found one or more willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations;
  • Involving a catastrophe (three or more hospitalizations) in which OSHA found one or more willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations;
  • Involving a high-emphasis hazard in which OSHA found two or more high-gravity willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations;
  • Involving the potential release of a highly hazardous chemical in which OSHA found three or more high-gravity willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations; or
  • Classified by OSHA as “egregious.”

Employers entered into the SVEP were subject to consequences that included mandatory enhanced follow-up inspections, a nationwide inspection of related workplaces, negative publicity, enhanced settlement provisions, and the potential for federal court enforcement under Section 11(b) of the OSH Act.

Updated Criteria

Under the new criteria, employers will continue to be entered into the SVEP in enforcement actions involving a fatality or catastrophe in which OSHA found one or more willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate-violations and in enforcement actions classified as egregious.

In a departure from the original criteria, cases involving two or more high-gravity willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations will also be entered into the SVEP, regardless of whether they are linked to a certain hazard or standard. As a result of this change, OSHA expects that more employers will be entered into the SVEP.

Other Key Changes

In addition to expanding the criteria for entry into the SVEP, OSHA made key changes regarding follow-up inspections and removal from the SVEP.

  • Follow-up OSHA inspections must occur within one year, but not longer than two years after the final order. Previously, there was no required timeframe for conducting follow-up inspections.
  • Eligibility for removal will begin three years after the date an employer completes abatement. Previously, that period began running on the final order date.
  • If an employer implements an enhanced settlement agreement that includes the use of a safety and health management system that follows OSHA’s Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs, the employer can be eligible for removal after two years.

Implications

These changes signify that OSHA is prioritizing enforcement and intends to impose significant consequences on employers that repeatedly and/or willfully violate OSHA requirements. Employers should review their compliance records and current health and safety practices and evaluate whether additional action is needed to mitigate the risk for willful, repeat, or failure-to-abate violations and entry into the SVEP.

Article By Jayni A. Lanham and Mark N. Duvall of Beveridge & Diamond PC

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Beveridge & Diamond PC

The COVID-19 Change Order

During the pandemic it has become common for contractors to submit change orders to owners seeking reimbursement for COVID-19 related expenses and costs.  This is especially true for large construction projects.  These “COVID-19 Change Orders” seek reimbursement for everything from masks, dividers, hand sanitizer and other items required to follow and implement CDC guidelines (or to comply with state and local orders) for maintaining a safe work environment.  COVID-19 Change Orders also seek reimbursement for extended general conditions caused by having less workers on site because of social distancing requirements, lost time caused by shorter working hours, and lost time associated with CDC mandated hygiene breaks and temperature checks. On larger projects, COVID-19 Change Orders can escalate into millions of dollars and are often submitted without warning towards the end of a project when final completion and the payment of retainage are approaching.

For owners and contractors that are trying to complete their projects, many of which have been delayed or suffered from cost overruns, these unexpected COVID-19 Change Orders can be very problematic and hard to navigate.  Owners will argue that increased costs associated with the pandemic have affected all businesses, not just contractors.  Contractors will respond that these are real costs that they must pay to operate.  Often, the justification for reimbursement is not black and white because it is hard to find a specific contractual provision that addresses such an unprecedented situation, which causes uncertainty and strained relations between owners and contractors at the end of a project.

The justifications asserted for COVID-19 Change Orders vary from project to project and are sometimes asserted as an event of force majeure or more commonly as a general change in site conditions.  While many force majeure clauses expressly apply to acts of God, pandemics and government shutdowns, that is not the end of analyzing whether the clause applies.  While the application of a force majeure clause to these situations is highly dependent on the wording of such a clause, most require that performance be completely prevented and do not recognize commercial impracticability as a justification for delay.  There were a small number of projects that were shut down at the beginning of the pandemic by state and local orders in stricter jurisdictions, but for the most part complete shutdowns were uncommon because of various exceptions to such orders for businesses broadly defined as “essential.”  As the pandemic extended through late 2020, and into 2021, shutdowns became non-existent.  Finally, many force majeure clauses don’t allow for the reimbursement of costs for implementing required protective measures, they simply allow for an extension of the contract time.

As a result, many contractors have turned to other contractual provisions, such as language related to changes in site conditions or clauses related to change orders in general.  But prior to the pandemic these provisions were not drafted with this circumstance (a virus) in mind.  Instead, they usually apply to changes in “physical” conditions at the site that are specifically described, like subsurface conditions, otherwise concealed physical conditions or hazardous materials found at the site.   Making the argument that a virus is an unknown “physical” condition at the site can be a challenge since the virus is airborne, not necessarily part of the site itself and not unique to the site.  In addition, because many of these clauses require the approval of the owner or are only triggered by specific conditions, they may not support a unilateral change order.

Because of the ambiguity surrounding COVID-19 Change Orders, many owners will initially be reluctant to cover such reimbursements for their contractors.  Aside from the specific language in their construction contracts, Owners should consider other factors when deciding whether to reject, accept or partially accept COVID-19 Change Orders, including the risk of strained relations with its contractor, distractions at the project and the costs of a potential dispute with its contractor.  If there are remaining construction contingency funds available, and the project has otherwise run smoothly, the owner should consider offering all or part of it at the end of the project to avoid a dispute.  Likewise, contractors should be thoughtful and thorough when deciding whether to seek reimbursement for project costs associated with COVID-19, and make sure the costs at issue were necessary and can be verified.  Finally, if the contractor received government loans or payments because of the pandemic, including funds from the Paycheck Protection Program, it should strongly consider not seeking reimbursement from the owner.

Article By Richard F. Whiteley, Phillip L. Sampson Jr., and Stacianne M. Wilson of Bracewell LLP

For more coronavirus legal news updates, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Bracewell LLP

Abortion-Related Travel Benefits Post-Dobbs

Immediately following the Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson returning the power to regulate abortion to the states, a number of large employers announced that they would offer out-of-state travel benefits for employees living in states where abortion-related medical care is unavailable. Employers considering offering abortion-related travel benefits have several key considerations to keep in mind. The law currently allows health plans to provide reimbursement for travel primarily for and essential to medical care. Although this area of the law is evolving, employers with self-funded medical plans may amend their existing medical plans to provide abortion-related travel benefits while those with fully insured medical plans may face more obstacles in providing such benefits.

In Dobbs v. Jackson, an abortion clinic challenged a Mississippi law that would ban abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions. In establishing the constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court restricted states in their ability to limit or ban abortions before viability of the fetus, or 24 weeks from the time of conception. In upholding the Mississippi law, the Supreme Court overturned Roe and held that the protection or regulation of abortion is a decision for each state.

Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Dakota have already banned or made abortion illegal pursuant to trigger laws which went into effect as of the Supreme Court decision on June 24, 2022.  Also, a number of additional states are expected to soon have similar legislation in effect, either by virtue of expected legislative action or trigger laws with slightly delayed effective dates.  In response, a number of employers have announced that they will reimburse all or a portion of abortion-related travel expenses for employees in states where abortions are banned or otherwise not available.

Under Section 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, the definition of “medical care” includes transportation that is both “primarily for and essential to” the medical care sought by an individual. These types of travel benefits have historically been utilized in connection with certain specialized medical treatments, such as organ transplants.  However, Section 213(d) is not limited to particular types of procedures, and thus forms the framework for providing abortion-related travel benefits through existing medical plans.

Although Code Section 213(d) applies to both self-insured and insured medical plans, the substantive coverage provisions of insured medical plans will generally be governed by the state insurance code of the state in which the insurance policy is issued.  Coverage for abortion services or any related travel benefits may not be permitted under the insurance code of the state in which the policy is issued, or an insurer may not offer a travel benefit for such services even if permitted to do so.  Self-insured plans, by contrast, provide employers more flexibility in plan design, including control, consistent with existing federal requirements, over the types and levels of benefits covered under the plan. As noted above, existing plans may already cover travel-related benefits for certain types of medical procedures.

Employers with high-deductible health plans tied to health savings accounts (HSAs) will need to consider the impact of adding abortion-related travel benefits to such plans.  Travel-related benefits of any type would not appear to be eligible for first dollar coverage, and thus may be of minimal benefit to participants enrolled in high-deductible health plans.

Employers with fully insured medical plans that do not cover abortion-related travel benefits may be able to offer a medical travel reimbursement program through an integrated health reimbursement arrangement (HRA).  An integrated HRA is an employer-funded group health plan from which employees enrolled in the employer’s traditional group medical insurance plan are reimbursed for qualifying expenses not paid by the traditional plan.

Another potential option for employers with fully insured medical plans may be to offer a stipend entirely outside of any established group health plan. Such reimbursement programs may result in taxable compensation for employees who receive such reimbursements. Also, employers would need to be sensitive to privacy and confidentiality considerations of such a policy, which should generally be minimized if offered in accordance with the existing protections of HIPAA through a medical plan and under which claims are processed by an insurer or third-party administrator rather than by the employer itself.

Additionally, some state laws may attempt to criminalize or otherwise sanction so-called aiding and abetting actions related to the procurement of abortion services in another state.  This is an untested area of the law, and it is unclear whether any actions brought under such statutes would be legally viable.  In this regard, Justice Kavanaugh stated as follows in his concurring opinion in Dobbs:  “For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel.” (Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion, page 10.)  This is an area that will require continual monitoring by employers who offer abortion-related travel benefits.

Article By Thomas G. Hancuch, Philip L. Mowery, and Amal Rafiq of Vedder Price

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Vedder Price

U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Roe and Casey: What This Decision Means for Employers

As many expected based on the draft opinion that was leaked months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court has held the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to obtain an abortion. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (June 24, 2022).

Dobbs overturns nearly 50 years of precedent from the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood Pennsylvania v. Casey on the issue.

The impact of Dobbs will vary, as states are now at liberty to enforce and create abortion legislation without restrictions arising out of constitutional protections.

What does this mean for employers?

As pressure mounts on this issue, some employers may be considering what, if anything, they can or should do. Many states have enacted legislation that restricts individual abortion rights and potentially third parties who assist individuals who seek abortions. To the extent any state laws were not enforced because of the Court’s holding in Roe or Casey, states can move forward now to implement and enforce those laws.

Laws often referred to as “trigger laws,” those that are in place but unenforceable due to overriding federal restrictions, become enforceable once those federal restrictions are lifted. As a result of Dobbs, abortion-related “trigger laws” previously unenforceable can take effect, creating new standards for individuals and others that will redefine the national abortion law landscape.

Some existing state laws and trigger laws may affect employers and put employers at risk of violating state law if they implement policies to assist employees seeking an abortion or even continue to cover abortions under group health plans. For example, a state law may create liability for anyone who “aids or abets” a person who obtains an abortion. Employers also must be cognizant of how they apply their leave policies, who may seek accommodations based on a sincerely held religious belief, and whether certain provisions of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act apply to women who are seeking or who have had an abortion.

In addition, the Court’s ruling may affect employee benefit plans. Many employers are considering additional benefits for their employees, and their covered dependents, such as travel reimbursement for seeking an abortion outside of the local jurisdiction due to state law restrictions. There are many legal issues to consider in connection with the coverage of abortion-related services under employee benefit plans. (For additional guidance on the issue, see our article, Group Health Plan Considerations in the Face of (Potentially) Changing Abortion Laws.) Depending on how the state laws are enacted, there also may be issues with relying on ERISA preemption provisions to avoid these obligations.

Corporate management and directors should plan for changes and be aware of policies and fiduciary responsibilities. This can include preparing for public and employee reactions (for and against), legislative and law enforcement threats, social media posts, and other employee demonstrations. Pressure from a variety of groups to take a corporate public opinion also may occur.

Whether changes to leave policies, employee benefits, travel reimbursement, or handling accommodation requests, employers considering policies or benefit offerings in response to Dobbs must carefully review and consider federal and state laws, including state abortion-related legislation to evaluate the risk of potential liability.

Article By Patricia Anderson Pryor, Joy Napier-Joyce, Melissa Ostrower, and Tasos C. Paindiris of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

You Have Mail (Better Read It): District Court Finds EEOC 90-Day Deadline Starts When Email Received

If a letter from the EEOC is in your virtual mailbox but you never open it, have you received it? Most of us are familiar with the requirement that a claimant who files an EEOC charge has 90 days to file a lawsuit after receiving what is usually required a “right-to-sue” letter from the agency. This is one of the deadlines that both plaintiff and defense counsel track on their calendars. But when is that notice officially “received” by the claimant — especially in these days of electronic correspondence? In Paniconi v. Abington Hospital-Jefferson Health, one Pennsylvania federal court decided to draw a hard line on when that date actually occurs.

A Cautionary Tale

Denise Paniconi worked for a hospital in Pennsylvania and filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging race and religious discrimination. The EEOC investigated and issued a right-to-sue letter dated September 8, 2021, which gave her 90 days to file her complaint. She filed her complaint 91 days after the EEOC issued the letter. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to comply with the 90-day deadline.

What ordinarily would just be a day counting exercise took a twist because of how the EEOC issued the notice. The EEOC sent both the plaintiff and her lawyer an email stating that there was an “important document” now available on the EEOC portal. Neither the plaintiff nor her lawyer opened the email or accessed the portal until sometime later. They argued that the 90-day filing deadline should run from the date that the claimant actually accesses the document, not from the date the EEOC notified them it was available.

The court dismissed the complaint for failing to meet the deadline. The opinion noted that although the 90-day period is not a “jurisdictional predicate,” it cannot be extended, even by one day, without some sort of recognized equitable consideration. Paniconi’s lawyer argued that the court should apply the old rule for snail mail  ̶  without proof otherwise, it should be assumed that the notice is received within three days after the issuance date. The court disagreed and pointed out that no one disputed the date that the email was sent  ̶   it was simply not opened and read by either Paniconi or her lawyer. The court said that there was no reason that those individuals did not open the email and meet the 90-day deadline.

Deadlines Are Important

This is another example of how electronic communication can complicate the legal world. The EEOC has leaned into its use of the portal, and the rest of the world needs to get used to it. The minute you receive an email or notice from the portal, you need to calendar that deadline. Some courts (at least this one) believe that electronic communication is immediate, and you may not get grace for not logging on and finding out what is happening with your charge. Yet another reason to stay on top of your emails.

Article By J. William Manuel and Anne R. Yuengert of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

Supreme Court Declines to Resolve Circuit Split on Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in FLSA Collective Actions

On June 6, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear petitions seeking review of whether federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. The petitions sought review of rulings on the issue by the First and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc. and Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc., respectively. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision declining to hear the petitions, there remains a circuit split as to whether the Court’s 2017 ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court applies to FLSA collective actions, and employers with nationwide footprints remain subject to uncertainty depending on jurisdiction.

To date, only the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have ruled on the issue. On August 17, 2021, the Sixth Circuit was the first to address the issue in Canaday. There, the Court held that federal courts may not exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join FLSA collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. Just one day later, on August 18, 2021, the Eighth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Vallone v. CJS Solutions Group, LLC.

On January 13, 2022, in Waters, the First Circuit held to the contrary, concluding that federal courts do have personal jurisdiction over claims asserted by nonresident opt-in plaintiffs.

The Significance of Bristol-Myers

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers provides the basis for the current circuit split. Bristol-Myers involved a mass tort action under state law for alleged defects in a blood-thinning drug, Plavix, which the company manufactured. Residents and nonresidents of California sued Bristol-Myers in California state court, alleging injuries related to the drug. The nonresident plaintiffs claimed no relationship with the forum state, nor did they purchase Plavix in California or suffer any harm from it in California. The Supreme Court reasoned that any similarity between the resident and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims was an “insufficient basis” to exercise specific jurisdiction. Unless nonresident plaintiffs could demonstrate that their claims arose out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, personal jurisdiction over the company did not exist, no matter “the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”

In ruling that the California state court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its holding might ultimately generate more litigation in the form of separate actions by nonresident plaintiffs in their respective states. But the Supreme Court also noted that all plaintiffs to the action could have brought a mass tort action against Bristol-Myers in New York (the company’s headquarters) or Delaware (its place of incorporation) because courts in those states would have had general personal jurisdiction over the company. Instead, the California state court could exercise only specific personal jurisdiction over the company based on its activities in the state. Notably, Bristol-Myers was limited to Rule 23 class actions, leaving lower courts to determine whether its holding applied to FLSA collective actions, which differ procedurally.

The Circuit Split

In Canaday, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the basic tenet that, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the defendant’s contacts with the state in which the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. Because Anthem is both incorporated and headquartered in Indiana and not otherwise “at home” in the state of Tennessee, the district court in Tennessee lacked general jurisdiction over Anthem as a defendant. At issue was whether the district court in Tennessee had specific personal jurisdiction over Anthem, and thus, whether there was a claim-specific and Anthem-specific relationship between the nonresidents’ FLSA claims and the state of Tennessee.

Applying Bristol-Myers, the Sixth Circuit held that there was not. The court found that the nonresident plaintiffs did not bring claims arising out of or relating to Anthem’s conduct in Tennessee, because Anthem neither employed nor paid the nonresident plaintiffs within the state. The Sixth Circuit went on the explain that adherence to this approach should not change the way FLSA collective actions are filed, because plaintiffs traditionally file their actions where courts have general jurisdiction, or where the conduct occurred. Of note, Sixth Circuit Judge Bernice Donald dissented in Canaday, contending that Bristol-Myers does not apply to FLSA collective actions because the Supreme Court in that case addressed only the limitations of state courts, not federal courts, in their exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.

In Waters, the First Circuit largely followed the reasoning in Judge Donald’s dissent, concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb “rest[ed] on Fourteenth Amendment constitutional limits on state courts exercising jurisdiction over state-law claims” and thus did not control whether a federal court could exercise jurisdiction over federal claims asserted by nonresident plaintiffs. The First Circuit also observed that the plain language of Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely concerns the service of summonses and does not “constrain[] a federal court’s power to act once a summons has been properly served, and personal jurisdiction has been established.”

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s decision to deny the petitions means that employers with nationwide footprints continue to live with potentially inconsistent rulings on the question of whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to hear claims of out-of-state workers when the defendant is neither headquartered nor incorporated in the state. Canaday and Vallone stand to significantly limit the size and geographic scope of FLSA collective actions in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, absent a district court’s exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant, while Waters permits nationwide jurisdiction in the First Circuit. For now, at least, multistate employers face continued uncertainty on the issue until courts of appeals in the remaining circuits weigh in.

Article By Maggie (Hanrahan) Santen, Monica Lacks, and Samuel H. Ottinger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

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© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

EEOC and the DOJ Issue Guidance for Employers Using AI Tools to Assess Job Applicants and Employees

Employers are more frequently relying on the use of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) tools to automate employment decision-making, such as software that can review resumes and “chatbots” that interview and screen job applicants. We have previously blogged about the legal risks attendant to the use of such technologies, including here and here.

On May 12, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued long-awaited guidance on the use of such AI tools (the “Guidance”), examining how employers can seek to prevent AI-related disability discrimination. More specifically, the Guidance identifies a number of ways in which employment-related use of AI can, even unintentionally, violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), including if:

  • (i) “[t]he employer does not provide a ‘reasonable accommodation’ that is necessary for a job applicant or employee to be rated fairly and accurately by” the AI;
  • (ii) “[t]he employer relies on an algorithmic decision-making tool that intentionally or unintentionally ‘screens out’ an individual with a disability, even though that individual is able to do the job with a reasonable accommodation”; or
  • (iii) “[t]he employer adopts an [AI] tool for use with its job applicants or employees that violates the ADA’s restrictions on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations.”

The Guidance further states that “[i]n many cases” employers are liable under the ADA for use of AI even if the tools are designed and administered by a separate vendor, noting that “employers may be held responsible for the actions of their agents . . . if the employer has given them authority to act on [its] behalf.”

The Guidance also identifies various best practices for employers, including:

  • Announcing generally that employees and applicants subject to an AI tool may request reasonable accommodations and providing instructions as to how to ask for accommodations.
  • Providing information about the AI tool, how it works, and what it is used for to the employees and applicants subjected to it. For example, an employer that uses keystroke-monitoring software may choose to disclose this software as part of new employees’ onboarding and explain that it is intended to measure employee productivity.
  • If the software was developed by a third party, asking the vendor whether: (i) the AI software was developed to accommodate people with disabilities, and if so, how; (ii) there are alternative formats available for disabled individuals; and (iii) the AI software asks questions likely to elicit medical or disability-related information.
  • If an employer is developing its own software, engaging experts to analyze the algorithm for potential biases at different steps of the development process, such as a psychologist if the tool is intended to test cognitive traits.
  • Only using AI tools that measure, directly, traits that are actually necessary for performing the job’s duties.
  • Additionally, it is always a best practice to train staff, especially supervisors and managers, how to recognize requests for reasonable accommodations and to respond promptly and effectively to those requests. If the AI tool is used by a third party on the employer’s behalf, that third party’s staff should also be trained to recognize requests for reasonable accommodation and forward them promptly to the employer.

Finally, also on May 12th, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released its own guidance on AI tools’ potential for inadvertent disability discrimination in the employment context. The DOJ guidance is largely in accord with the EEOC Guidance.

Employers utilizing AI tools should carefully audit them to ensure that this technology is not creating discriminatory outcomes.  Likewise, employers must remain closely apprised of any new developments from the EEOC and local, state, and federal legislatures and agencies as the trend toward regulation continues.

Article By Joseph C O’Keefe and Edward C. Young of Proskauer Rose LLP

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© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Illinois Department of Labor Publishes Guidance for Employers Seeking Equal Pay Registration Certificate

Effective March 24, 2022, the Illinois Equal Pay Act (IEPA) was amended to require private businesses with more than 100 employees in Illinois to obtain an Equal Pay Registration Certificate (EPRC) by March 23, 2024, and every two years thereafter.

To apply for the EPRC, businesses must submit the following to the Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL): (1) a filing fee; (2) an equal pay compliance statement; (3) a copy of the employer’s most recently filed EEO-1 report; and (4) a list of employees separated by gender and the race and ethnicity categories as reported in the employer’s most recently filed EEO-1 report, and the total wages paid to each employee during the past calendar year.

The IDOL recently updated its Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for the EPRC, addressing, among other things, the application and submission processes, fee requirements, recertification, publicly available data, and penalties for employer noncompliance.  Here are key takeaways:

  • All employees based in Illinois, including those working remotely, should be included in the total employee count for reporting purposes. An employer’s total employee count includes the total number of people employed who worked in or were based out of Illinois on December 31 of the 12-month calendar year immediately prior the year the employer is required to submit an EPRC application.
  • For reporting purposes, “wages” means any compensation paid to an employee by an employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the two parties, including wages, salaries, earned commissions, earned bonuses, stocks and ownership shares. This does not include retirement health insurance benefits, or other fringe benefits.
  • If an employer’s submitted wage data in its EPRC application shows that the employer is paying unequal wages to male and female employees or to African-American and non-African American employees, the IDOL may initiate its own investigation pursuant to Sections 10(a) and 15(c) of the IEPA and Section 320.200 of the IEPA regulations.
  • Before any fines may be imposed for a violation of the IEPA, the IDOL will provide notice to an employer that violates the IEPA and inadvertently fails to file an initial EPRC application or recertification that they have 30 calendar days to submit the application or recertification. If the employer fails to do so, it shall be fined up to $10,000.
  • An employer that falsifies or misrepresents data on an EPRC application faces suspension or revocation of the EPRC and civil penalties up to $10,000.
  • Current employees subject to the IEPA may request anonymized data from the IDOL regarding their job classification or title and the pay for that classification.

Illinois employers should audit their pay practices to ensure that any differences in wages amongst employees of similar job classifications are justified by legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.
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