Tag: Constitutional Law

Court Finds Corporate Transparency Act Unconstitutional and Unenforceable as to NSBA Members

On March 1, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ruled that the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”) is unconstitutional.[1] The CTA requires many U.S. entities to disclose their individual beneficial owners in a report filed with the U.S. Treasury. The CTA statute was enacted in 2021.[2] Its implementing regulations require many entities formed in 2024 to report beneficial ownership information within 90 days of formation.[3] The CTA requires many entities formed prior to 2024 to report beneficial ownership information by January 1, 2025.[4]

The federal court’s ruling arose in the context of a constitutional challenge by plaintiffs the National Small Business Association (“NSBA”) and one of its individual members, Isaac Winkles. In granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the court held that:

  • the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper clause, the taxing power, and the U.S. government’s authority over foreign affairs and national security do not provide sufficient authority for the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”), and the CTA is unconstitutional as a result; and
  • the U.S. government is enjoined from enforcing the CTA as to the NSBA and Isaac Winkles.

The court did not issue a nationwide injunction barring the U.S. government from enforcing the law against other entities within the scope of the CTA’s reporting requirements.

On March 11, 2024, the U.S. Government filed a notice of appeal of the court’s ruling.[5]  The same day, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), which is the U.S. Treasury bureau that administers the CTA, stated that it will continue to implement the CTA while complying with the court’s order.[6]

FinCEN clarified that it is not currently enforcing the CTA against two categories of persons:

  • individual plaintiff Isaac Winkles and reporting companies for which he is a beneficial owner; and
  • the NSBA and its members as of March 1, 2024.

FinCEN stated, “[o]ther than the particular individuals and entities subject to the court’s injunction [. . .] reporting companies are still required to comply with the law and file beneficial ownership reports as provided in FinCEN’s regulations.”[7]

[1] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-alnd-5_22-cv-01448/pdf/USCOURTS-alnd-5_22-cv-01448-0.pdf.

[2] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. 116-283, div. F, title LXIV, § 6403 (adding 31 § U.S.C. 5336), available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-116publ283/pdf/PLAW-116publ283.pdf.

[3] 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380.

[4] Id.

[5] https://fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/54_Notice_of_Appeal.pdf

[6] https://fincen.gov/news/news-releases/updated-notice-regarding-national-small-business-united-v-yellen-no-522-cv-01448

[7] Id.

© Copyright 2024 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP
For more news on the Constitutionality of the CTA, visit the NLR Corporate & Business Organizations section.

Employment Tip of the Month – February 2024

Q: Can my company treat employees adversely because of their personal political beliefs? If they wear a shirt of their favorite candidate? Or proselytize about their candidate?

A: The short answer: There exists no “First Amendment Right to freedom of expression” in a private workplace, and that extends to political expression. See Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S.Ct. 1921 (2019) (Only “State actors subject to First Amendment constraints.”)

So, yes, legally a private employer can refuse to hire Democrats or Republicans, and can fire an employee for wearing a shirt of their candidate or vocalizing a particular political position.

On the other hand, other laws can apply, such as the right to “concerted action” under the National Labor Relations Act. Overt adverse action also could be ripe for allegations of selective enforcement, such as “you only selectively enforce this rule against me because I am ___________”, where Title VII covers race, sex, religion, color and national origin; ADA covers disability; ADEA age, etc. Some political positions could easily bleed over into religious beliefs.

Even if legally permissible for a private employer to discriminate against holders of one particular political belief, from a practical management perspective, it cannot be recommended, and would be loaded with risk. Also, it could simply make for bad optics and make it harder to attract and retain the best talent.

Finally, this answer changes entirely for public employers and government employers, where employees do possess First Amendment rights, so long as, in general, they are speaking (1) as a private citizen, (2) about a matter of public concern, and (3) their speech does not interfere with the job. There are exceptions for high-ranking individuals, political appointees or someone trying to release classified information, though in many instances they would still be protected from retaliation.

© 2024 Wilson Elser
For more news on Political Expression in the Workplace, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

As Foretold, California’s New Forced Speech Laws Are Being Challenged

Last year, I commented on the likely unconstitutionality of two California laws compelling forced speech:

The California legislature has of late adopted the tactic of driving behavior by compelling speech. SB 253 (Wiener), for example, compels disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions and SB 261 (Stern) requires disclosure of climate-related financial risks. Both of these requirements clearly compel speech arguably in contravention of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006) (“Some of this Court’s leading First Amendment precedents have established the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.”).

I had previously noted that SB 253 was very similar to an earlier bill that did not make it into law.

Yesterday, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and several others filed suit in the Central District Court challenging these laws. In its complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the “State’s plan for compelling speech to combat climate change is unconstitutional – twice over.” The plaintiffs urge the court to apply “strict scrutiny” to both laws because they compel speech about a controversial subject – climate change. If the court applies strict scrutiny, the bills would be presumptively unconstitutional and may be upheld only by proof that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. That is an exceedingly high hill to climb.

Because both bills quite obviously violate basic free speech rights, the question arises whether the authors knew or were grossly negligent in not knowing of the constitutional infirmities of the legislation. In 2020, I wrote Senator Wiener, the author of SB 253, that SB 260, “abridges free speech rights guaranteed by the U.S. and California Constitutions”. At the time, I was distressed that the legislative analyses for SB 260 failed to mention the constitutional infirmities of the bill. See Legislators Again Kept In Dark About Constitutional Infirmities Of Climate Corporate Accountability Act and Legislators Again Kept In Dark About Constitutional Infirmities of Climate Corporate Accountability Act.

© 2010-2024 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
by: Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP 
For more news on California Free Speech Laws regarding Climate Change, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

Federal Court Directed to Rule on Challenge to WV Pooling Statute

A federal appeals court has instructed a lower court to resolve a pending suit challenging the constitutionality of West Virginia’s oil and gas pooling and unitization law. The federal district court previously declined to resolve certain constitutional issues presented in the suit on the grounds that those issues should be decided by a state court instead of a federal court.

In 2022, the West Virginia Legislature enacted Senate Bill 694 to revise West Virginia law governing the pooling and unitization of oil and gas formations associated with horizontal well development. Pooling and unitization essentially involves combining separately owned properties into a single “unit” through which one or more horizontal wells are drilled. The oil and gas produced from the horizontal well is then allocated among all the properties in the unit for purposes of calculating production royalties payable to the mineral owners.

Prior to Senate Bill 694 becoming effective on June 7, 2022, formation of a pooled unit for a horizontal well drilled through “shallow” oil and gas formations, which includes the Marcellus Shale, required consent of 100% of the mineral owners for all the properties to be included in the unit. This 100% consent requirement did not apply to horizontal wells drilled through “deep formations” such as the Utica Shale. One of the more significant changes made by SB 694 was to allow the West Virginia Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to approve units for shallow formations where at least 75% of the mineral owners consent, provided other requirements are also satisfied. This means that up to 25% of a unit could potentially include properties for which the mineral owner did not consent to being part of a unit.

Before Senate Bill 694 became effective, a pair of mineral owners (Scott Sonda and Brian Corwin) filed a lawsuit in the federal District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia seeking to preclude the law from taking effect. Governor Jim Justice was the only defendant named in the case. In their suit, Sonda and Corwin alleged that the law was illegal for several reasons, including the claim that the law authorizes the unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation and deprives landowners of due process of law.

Federal Judge John Preston Bailey initially dismissed all of their claims for two reasons. First, Judge Bailey concluded that Sonda and Corwin lacked standing to bring the challenge because (a) their property had not been pooled into a unit without their consent and no operator had sought approval of a unit to include their property without their consent; and (b) the Commission, not the Governor, has the power to directly enforce Senate Bill 694.

Second, Judge Bailey ruled that, even if Sonda and Corwin established standing, Governor Justice had constitutional immunity from the suit because he had no direct authority to implement Senate Bill 694. Rather, the Commission has the authority to implement the law.

Instead of dismissing their suit entirely, Judge Bailey granted leave for Sonda and Corwin to amend their complaint to name the Commission as a defendant instead. Sonda and Corwin did so, and also named as defendants each person who serves on the Commission. The amended complaint still does not allege that mineral properties owned by Sonda or Corwin were pooled into a unit without their consent. Instead, the amended complaint attempts to address the standing issue by alleging that Senate Bill 694 effectively eliminates their ability to challenge whether they are being fairly compensated for oil and gas produced from their property that was pooled into a unit with their consent.

The Commission moved to dismiss the amended complaint for various reasons, including Sonda’s and Corwin’s lack of standing to bring the case. Judge Bailey did not address the standing issue, but agreed with the Commission with respect to three of the five claims asserted by Sonda and Corwin. Judge Bailey then abstained from addressing the Commission’s arguments for dismissal of the other two claims, which asserted constitutional violations, because he believed that those issues were more appropriate for resolution by a state court instead of a federal court.

The Commission appealed Judge Bailey’s decision to abstain from addressing the arguments for dismissal of the constitutional claims. By opinion issued on January 31, 2024, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Bailey should not have abstained. The appellate court also directed Judge Bailey to first address the standing issue before addressing any other pending issue. The opinion does not specify a deadline for Judge Bailey to rule on those issues. If Judge Bailey finds that Sonda and Corwin continue to lack standing to assert their claims, the case will presumably be dismissed on that ground alone. If Judge Bailey concludes that Sonda and Corwin have established standing, Judge Bailey will likely address the merits of the Commission’s other arguments for dismissal.

© Copyright Babst, Calland, Clements and Zomnir, P.C.
For more news on the Constitutionality of West Virginia’s Oil and Gas Laws, visit the NLR Election Law / Legislative News section.

Supreme Court Upholds State Courts’ Power of Judicial Review Over Election Matters

On June 27, 2023, the United States Supreme Court upheld a decision by North Carolina’s highest court holding that the North Carolina legislature went too far in gerrymandering voting district maps. The Court affirmed the authority of state courts to review the decisions of state legislatures on election matters, rejecting the “independent state legislature theory.” The theory, taken to its extreme, is that no branch of state government can question a state legislature’s decision regarding any federal election.  The ruling is an encouraging sign for states like Arizona, Illinois, and Michigan, where independent redistricting commissions have created, or are creating, new maps intended to represent non-partisan, or less partisan, boundary drawing and citizen-driven ballot initiatives to protect voters’ rights.

The plaintiffs in Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. ___ (2023), were groups and individuals challenging North Carolina’s 2021 congressional districting map, which they viewed as unacceptable gerrymandering, created to favor Republican candidates. The legislative defendants asserted that in creating the new map, they had exercised the authority established by the “Elections Clause” in Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution that provides that state legislatures shall prescribe, “the Times, Places and Manner of” federal elections. Although North Carolina judges had found the new map to be “a partisan outlier intentionally and carefully designed to maximize Republican advantage in North Carolina’s Congressional delegation,” the legislative defendants argued the map was beyond the reach of judicial review. The Supreme Court had to decide whether “the Elections Clause insulates state legislatures from review by state courts for compliance with state law.” Moore, slip opinion at p 11.

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts began the analysis by citing our country’s long-standing legal tradition of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative acts. The majority opinion noted the 1787 decision in Bayard v Singleton, where the North Carolina Supreme Court found a law banning British loyalists from challenging property seizures was unconstitutional. The opinion goes on to review many decades of decisions where courts have considered the “interplay between state constitutional provisions and a state legislature’s exercise of authority under the Elections Clause.” Moore, slip opinion at p 15.

Looking at the other side of the case, the Court examined the legislative defendants’ arguments about the impact of the Election Clause. Rejecting Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent, Roberts addressed the concept known as “independent state legislature theory” which contends that, “because the Federal Constitution gives state legislatures the power to regulate congressional elections, only [the Federal] Constitution can restrain the exercise of that power.” Id at 18. The historical references supporting this theory are debunked in the Moore decision, and many commentators have stated the decision in Moore slams the door on the extreme view that state legislative acts around federal elections are not subject to review by state courts.

The Moore decision, however, refers to a need to balance competing interests: “Although we conclude that the Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures from the ordinary constraints imposed by state law, state courts do not have free rein.” Moore, slip opinion at p 26.  The opinion goes on to note:

We do not adopt these or any other test by which we can measure state court interpretations of state law in cases implicating the Elections Clause… We hold only that state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections.

Id. p 28-29. It therefore remains to be seen how difficult it will be to challenge state legislatures in their future attempts at partisan district drawing in state courts.  Paying homage to the Supreme Court decision in Bush v Gore, it also leaves open the question of when federal courts may find that a state court has transgressed the “ordinary bounds of judicial review.” And, Moore leaves the Court’s holding in Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484 (2019) that partisan gerrymandering claims brought in federal court are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond their reach.

Nevertheless, taken in the context of other decisions reached this term, such as the Alabama districting case implicating the Voting Rights Act (Allen v Milligan), the recent decision in Moore gives comfort to many traditionalists who have been increasingly fearful of sudden and/or extreme changes to norms in American jurisprudence.

Click Here for More Election Law News at the National Law Review.

© 2023 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

Is The End Of FINRA Drawing Nigh?

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, aka FINRA, is a non-profit Delaware corporation.  It was formed in 2007 by the combination of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the regulatory arm of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.  FINRA is a self-regulatory organization that primarily regulates securities broker-dealers.

Professor Benjamin P. Edwards recently reported that a complaint has been filed in Florida challenging the constitutionality of FINRA.  The lawsuit filed by two broker-dealers alleges:

However, FINRA’s current structure and operations, particularly in light of the transformation of the organization over the course of the last two decades, contravene the separation of powers, violate the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution (the “Constitution”) and constitute an impermissible delegation of powers. Because it purports to be a private entity, FINRA is unaccountable to the President of the United States (the “President,” or “POTUS”), lacks transparency, and operates in contravention of the authority under which it was formed.  It utilizes its  own in-house tribunals in a manner contrary to Article III and the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution and deprives entities and individuals of property
without due process of law.

The plaintiffs are seeking, among other things, declaratory and injunctive relief.

For more Finance Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review

© 2010-2022 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Supreme Court Expands State Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country

In a 5-4 opinion issued Wednesday in Oklahoma v. Castro Huerta, No. 21-429, the Supreme Court expanded the authority of States to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives in Indian country without tribal consent or congressional authorization, upending a long-standing basic principle of Federal Indian Law and striking a blow to tribal sovereignty. Under federal law, “Indian country” has been interpreted as including Indian reservations, dependent Indian communities, Indian allotments, In Lieu sites (land outside reservation boundaries meant to replace lost Indian lands), and tribal trust lands. The majority opinion in Castro-Huerta, written by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, held that States presumptively have “inherent” jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country and “do not need a permission slip from Congress to exercise their sovereign authority,” dismissing the Court’s prior statements to the contrary as non-binding dicta. After concluding States presumptively have criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, the majority found that the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1152, did not preempt that jurisdiction for crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives in Indian country. As a result, States now have concurrent criminal jurisdiction with the federal government to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives in Indian country.

Castro-Huerta involved the prosecution of Defendant Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta, who was convicted in an Oklahoma State court of a crime against a Native child. Following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), in which the Court concluded much of Oklahoma is Indian country, Castro-Huerta successfully argued that the State lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because he committed his crime in Indian country. The State appellate court’s decision in Castro-Huerta’s favor followed the interpretation of the General Crimes Act that has prevailed since the statute’s 1948 reenactment. Under that interpretation, only the federal government has authority to prosecute non-Native individuals who commit crimes against Native individuals in Indian country.

Arguing before the Supreme Court, Oklahoma claimed that the prevailing interpretation is incorrect, and the majority agreed. The Court began its analysis by describing the details of Castro-Huerta’s crime and noting that of the 2 million people who live in Oklahoma, “the vast majority are not Indians.” Op. at 2. The Court also noted that Castro-Huerta had accepted a plea agreement with the federal government for a 7-year sentence followed by removal from the United States (he was in the United States unlawfully), receiving, in effect, a 28-year reduction in his sentence. Op. at 3. The majority stated that his case “exemplifies a now-familiar pattern in Oklahoma in the wake of McGirt” in which non-Indian criminals have received “lighter sentences in plea deals negotiated with the Federal Government” or have “simply gone free.” Op. at 3-4.

Citing the United States Constitution and prior Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that Indian reservations are “part of the surrounding State” and subject to State jurisdiction except as forbidden by federal law, the majority concluded that an “overarching jurisdictional principle dating back to the 1800s” is that “States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian country unless preempted.” Op. at 5-6.

The majority then considered whether the State’s authority to prosecute non-Native v. Native crimes in Indian country had been preempted under the “ordinary principles of federal preemption” or because “the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government.” Op. at 7. The majority found that the plain text of the General Crimes Act did not expressly provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction. Op. at 7-14. It then rejected Castro-Huerta’s argument that Public-Law 83-280 and similar statutes through which Congress authorized certain States to exercise jurisdiction in Indian country demonstrated Congress’s understanding that States presumptively lack such authority. The majority reasoned that, despite what Congress might have assumed, the question had not yet been decided and the statutes in question lacked language preempting State jurisdiction. Op. at 16-18. The statutes also provided for civil jurisdiction and State jurisdiction over Natives, in addition to criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives, so they were not entirely redundant.

Turning next to whether the exercise of State jurisdiction under the General Crimes Act would unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government, the majority applied the “Bracker balancing test,” which weighs tribal, federal, and state interests, and is generally used to determine whether a state tax is preempted when assessed against a non-Native on tribal land. The majority concluded that the Bracker factors supported State jurisdiction, dismissing any tribal preference for federal jurisdiction as irrelevant to the Court’s analysis, Op. 19 n.6, Op. 20 n. 7. Concluding the State’s inherent jurisdiction had not been preempted, the majority noted in its holding that, “Unless preempted, States may exercise jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country,” and this “applies throughout the United States,” including on Indian allotments. Op. 24 n.9.

In a scathing dissent, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, pushed back against the majority’s opinion, suggesting any future analysis would need to consider the specific context of each tribe, its treaties, and relevant laws. Dissent at 40-41 n.10. The dissent, appealing for a legislative fix, accused the majority of ignoring history, congressional action, precedent, and tribal sovereignty, and usurping “congressional decisions about the appropriate balance between federal, tribal, and state interests.” Dissent at 38.

Article By Charlene Koski of Van Ness Feldman LLP

For more tribal law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Van Ness Feldman LLP

Lawsuits for Illegal Strip Searches

DETROIT — Strip searches are routinely performed by law enforcement officers of all types. This ranges from police to prison guards, as well as to TSA agents at airports in the United States.

Private security guards also perform strip searches, including in malls and retail stores.

While some strip searches are legal, others violate the person’s constitutional rights. In general, people have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

A public officer or private guard cannot simply conduct a strip search without a proper legal basis. When an illegal strip search occurs, the victim can file a lawsuit seeking compensation for the violation of protected rights.

The basis for most illegal strip search lawsuits is a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The text of the Fourth Amendment states:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

The key words in the Fourth Amendment as it relates to an unlawful search are “unreasonable” and “probable cause.” Probable cause is a higher standard than reasonable suspicion. An officer does not have the right to search a person simply because there was a basis for stopping that person. In fact, most illegal strip searches are performed on people who are legitimately stopped or apprehended, but there is no legal basis to perform a subsequent search.

The main requirement is if the person being searched had a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy. Probable cause is required only when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. When a search is disputed, what is “reasonable” is often determined by a judge or jury.

There are often even disputes as to what constitutes a strip search in the first place.

Different parties often have varying definitions of what constitutes a strip search. And, the context of each type of search may vary from one person to another.

For example, a prison guard performing a strip search may have one definition in mind that involves a physical search of the inmate’s body.  Others may have broader definitions as to what they define as a strip search.  Case law, both state and federal, have examined a variety of situations and fact patterns and their decisions form the basis of what is legal and what is not.

Some case law holds that complete nudity is required to be constituted as a strip search. Other cases hold that it is a lesser degree, and that a strip search can be illegal without the person being totally naked. There are many cases that also address the degree of the search itself and how invasive it is on the person being searched. This can vary on the type of crime suspected and the urgency to perform the search to preserve potential evidence against the person.

There have been many illegal strip search lawsuits filed throughout the United States. Most are based upon violations of the Fourth Amendment when asserted against a governmental agency, or person acting on behalf of the government. Other claims are brought under an invasion of privacy theory, and this theory is frequently used in cases against private individuals and entities.

In addition, there have been several class action lawsuits filed by prisoners and inmates at correctional facilities.   These cases allege that a large number of inmates were illegal searched by prison staff and correction officers. Several of these lawsuits have resulted in substantial class action settlements, including a $ 53 million settlement against Los Angeles County for illegal strip searches of thousands of women by law enforcement personnel.

Individual lawsuits seek compensatory damages for the harm suffered by the victim.  This includes both physical pain and suffering as well as mental anguish. The damages inflicted upon the victim often cause serious and permanent psychological harm.

Lawsuits hold the wrongdoers accountable for violating a person’s constitutional rights.  They also serve as a deterrence to future unlawful actions.  This helps to protect every person’s right to be free from an unlawful search and curbs systematic illegal actions of law enforcement.

Sources:

https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Documents/Publications/Jail_Strip-Search_Cases.pdf

https://buckfirelaw.com/case-types/sexual-abuse/illegal-strip-search/

https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/supreme-court-says-jails-can-strip-search-you-even-traffic

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2013_vol_39/may_2013_n2_privacy/upending_human_dignity_fourth_amendment/

Buckfire & Buckfire, P.C. 2020
For more articles on the Fourth Amendment, visit the National Law Review Constitutional Law section.

Youtube May Be an Enormous Town Square, But It’s Still Not Subject to the First Amendment

In Prager University v. Google LLC, et al., Case No. 18-15712 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2020), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed a First Amendment lawsuit against YouTube late last week, holding that the video hosting giant is a private forum that is free to foster particular viewpoints – and need not be content-neutral.  The victory is a significant message to other online content hosts, aggregators and service providers that they need not feel threatened by censorship claims for selecting and curating content on their systems.

The lawsuit began in 2017, when conservative media company PragerU sued YouTube for imposing restrictions on some of PragerU’s short animated educational videos.  YouTube tagged several dozen videos for age-restrictions and disabled third party advertisements on others.  PragerU claimed the restrictions constituted censorship because they muted conservative political viewpoints.

Traditionally, the First Amendment regulates only U.S. and state government actors when it comes to censoring speech; it does not touch the actions of private parties.  The Ninth Circuit noted that these principles have not “lost their vitality in the digital age.”  While this threshold question is not new, PragerU’s approach to this legal hurdle has drawn fresh interest in how courts’ conception of state action might one day shift in order to accommodate the digital re-imagining of a marketplace of ideas.

PragerU argued that YouTube should be treated as something akin to a government where it operates a “public forum for speech.”  The theory follows that because YouTube has an overwhelming share of the video sharing and streaming space, it essentially performs a “public function.”  The Ninth Circuit affirmed that public use of private resources, even on a large scale, is simply not governmental.  Just because YouTube generally invites the public to use its private property (in this case, its platform) for a specific or designated purpose, does not mean that property should lose its private character.  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit ruled almost twenty years ago that internet service provider America Online was not a government actor even though it broadly opened its networks to the public to send and receive speech.

PragerU’s theory does enjoy some support.  As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, a private actor is a state or government entity for First Amendment purposes when it performs a public function that is “traditionally and exclusively governmental.”  In other words, the First Amendment may well still apply to private companies tasked with operating public elections or even local governmental administrative duties (for example, the proverbial “company town”).  But the Ninth Circuit simply did not accept the argument that YouTube’s function of “hosting speech on a private platform” bore any resemblance to “an activity that only governmental entities” traditionally and exclusively perform.  After all, noted the Court, even “grocery stores and comedy clubs have opened their property for speech.”  Neither was the Court persuaded that the sheer scale of YouTube’s operation – equal to perhaps many millions of grocery stores and comedy clubs – should alter the analysis.

Had the Ninth Circuit adopted PragerU’s approach, it would have been the first major judicial endorsement of the view that a private entity can convert into a public one solely where its property is opened up to significant public discourse.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit imposed and upheld a more traditional delineation between public and private actors in First Amendment jurisprudence.

© 2020 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP

See the National Law Review for more on constitutional law questions.

The Future of the CFPB: the Executive Branch and Separation of Powers

On October 18, 2019 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). SCOTUS  will answer the question of “whether the substantial executive authority yielded by the CFPB, an independent agency led by a single director, violates the separation of powers,” and the Justices requested that the parties brief and argue an additional issue: “If the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is found unconstitutional on the basis of the separation of powers, can 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) [the for-cause removal provision] be severed from the Dodd-Frank Act?”

Origins of the Consumer Financial Bureau and Previous Constitutional Challenges

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) established the CFPB as an independent bureau within the Federal Reserve System designed to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices.  The structure and constitutionality of the CFPB has been addressed before. In 2018, the D.C. Circuit held in PHH Corp. v. CFPB, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (PHH) that the current structure of the CFPB, which features a single director that cannot be removed by the president except for cause, “is consistent with Article II” of the Constitution.

The PHH opinion stated that Congress’ response to the consumer finance abuse that led up to the 2008 financial crisis purposely created the CFPB to be “a regulator attentive to individuals and families”  because the existing regulatory agencies were too concerned about the financial industry they were supposed to supervise. It was determined that the CFPB needed independence to do its job, and the CPFB structure was designed to confer that independence.   Neither PHH Corporation nor the CFPB filed a petition for certiorari to ask the Supreme Court to review the D.C. Circuit’s decision.

Background of the Seila Law Case

In Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) the Petitioner is a law firm that provides a variety of legal services to consumers, and as part of a CFPB investigation into whether Seila Law violated certain federal laws, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand seeking information and documents. Seila Law objected to the demand on the ground that the CFPB was unconstitutionally structured and filed a petition to a federal district court for enforcement. The district court held that the structure of the CFPB did not violate the separation of powers and was constitutional, after which that district court decision was appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that the issues had been “thoroughly canvassed” in the DC Circuit it in PHH, and adopting the position of the PHH majority that the CFPB’s structure is constitutional. Seila Law filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, and here we are.

An Experienced Federal Agency Litigator’s Perspective

Mr. Anthony E. DiResta, is co-chair of Holland & Knight’s Consumer Protection Defense and Compliance Team, and a former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Southeast Regional office.  Mr. DiResta was kind enough to take some time with the National Law Review to discuss the upcoming Seila Law decision and its impact on the future of the CFPB.

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NLR: Can you sum up the CFPB and separation of powers story to this point from your own viewpoint?

DiResta: The Supreme Court has decided to review this case because of the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure, based on separation of powers. Any single leader in government who doesn’t serve at the pleasure of the President may simply have too much power, and people with certain jurisprudential philosophies about how government should be run find that an offensive situation. That’s the theory behind the certiorari decision and why SCOTUS is addressing the case – it’s really a question of constitutionality and the power of administrative agencies. Additionally, the Court will look at the severability of the CFPB in Dodd-Frank, whether it’s possible to just restructure the single leader structure, and then leave the Bureau intact to continue business as usual.

NLR: It seems many of these issues could’ve been avoided had the CFPB been structured more as a multi-member commission initially or if Congress had simply expanded FTC powers.  Why do you think it was structured differently?

DiResta: That’s a matter of speculation – but I think it might have gone something like this: After the Recession in the early 2000s, many people felt that government was asleep at the wheel, letting  devastating things in banking and finance and servicing to consumers run out of control, which led to serious blunders and mishaps. So it was decided that a new office was needed – and this was led by representatives in Congress like Elizabeth Warren.

Why they didn’t simply expand the power and resources of the FTC is also pure speculation – they could have merely expanded FTC’s jurisdiction and reach to achieve similar outcomes and intentions.

The Constitutionality of the CFPB

NLR: Do you think SCOTUS will rule in favor of the petitioner in Seila Law, and find the structure of the CFPB unconstitutional?

DiResta: I do. I suspect that SCOTUS will, in fact, find the structure unconstitutional on the basis of the separation of powers. But I also believe that an even more interesting part of that will be the discussion of the severability of the organization’s leadership, leaving the CFPB itself intact. If the structure is unconstitutional, how the Court recommends a remedy to correct that unconstitutionality could have far-reaching effects. This is so important – and we should all be excited that we get to watch this corrective process in action.

NLR: Is there a chance this would result in a complete restructure of CFPB, or even its possible dissolution?

DiResta: I really don’t think so – and the Court couldn’t do that anyway. The Court could recommend to Congress that a certain path for correction be followed, but it will be up to Congress to rearrange the CFPB (if that’s the result) in the best way. The legislative branch will just have to make sure it’s done, in a way that the Court recommends.

Some More Background on CFPB Constitutionality Litigation

Then-Judge, now Justice Kavanaugh was on the U.S Court of Appeals Court for the D.C. Circuit for the 2018 en banc ruling in the PHH Corp. v. CFPB case and on the 2016 three-judge decision. Judge Kavanaugh authored two opinions regarding PHH:  declaring a certain aspect of the CFPB to be unconstitutional and in 2018, the dissenting opinion from the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit’s decision overruling the 2016 panel opinion.

The 2016 panel opinion determined that the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional stating:  “The concentration of massive, unchecked power in a single Director marks a dramatic departure from settled historical practice and makes the CFPB unique among independent agencies.” And the 2016 panel also presented a view of the Constitution that vests with the president an extensive degree of unilateral authority over the executive branch’s enforcement of federal laws.

NLR:  Since Justice Kavanaugh was a judge involved in a similar case – PHH Corp. v. CFPB – why is he allowed to rule on this matter again?

DiResta: I’m not an expert on judicial ethics but there does not appear to be improper bias in Kavanaugh reviewing this decision. Rather, his views in PHH reflect a philosophical perspective on separation of powers and the role of administrative agencies.  In fact, I expect they’ll use his past ruling on PHH as part of their internal discussion.

Seila Law v CFPB and Election Politics

NLR: It’s difficult to ignore the political undertones of this case:  a watchdog organization created, in part, with input from some high-profile democrats (most notably Elizabeth Warren, who is currently running as a candidate for president) is being challenged and that challenge is being echoed in support by largely conservative elements.  In your view, is this case a litmus test for the Supreme Court delving into political issues, something it has largely tried not to do?

DiResta: No – I really don’t see this as political. Again, this is a purely constitutional question, a legal question, and it’s exactly the kind of case the SCOTUS should be deciding. If we’re honest, this is a perfect example of why we have SCOTUS in the first place: To examine how effective our public servants are behaving and performing their responsibilities under the constitutional structure revealed in the separation of powers doctrine.

Besides that, politically speaking, this could boomerang. Consider: if the Democrats win the White House in 2020, and the Court were to change the structure, that would offer any Democratic President the opportunity to appoint a new Director in 2021, and Kathleen Kraninger’s term isn’t up until 2023.

Informed Democracy at Work

While the situation with CFPB and its constitutionality is demonstrably important, DiResta touched on a few more salient – though no less important – points.

DiResta: Democracy isn’t supposed to be easy. Democracy is hard – it’s messy and complicated. It’s in its nature, and in the nature of different ideas.

In a free marketplace of ideas, people will clash when citizens are free to express themselves, and there will always be conflict – but it’s out of resolving those conflicts that democracy claims – and grows – its power and attraction. It’s so important that we – the people – see this and get to comment on it – to watch this happening.

NLR: Absolutely. In a world where the news cycle has compressed from days, to hours, to minutes – while attention spans have diminished in similar fashion – it’s increasingly important that these monumental workings in government are transparent, and that people see them.

DiResta: I couldn’t agree more. And – as a young lawyer, I  had the privilege to work with some very dedicated and highly professional journalists who understood journalism as a public service, not as entertainment.  These journalists saw themselves as educators, bringing light to the processes and prospects of government to citizens. And that’s how the media serves effectively as the Fourth Branch of government. A branch that presents a constant check to the power of government and its branches, and that gives the people the knowledge to make better decisions, and to vote for the best people and the best situations.

We sincerely appreciate Mr. DiResta for his thoughtful insights and for taking time out of his busy schedule to share them with the National Law Review.

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