Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Takes Effect: What Importers Need to Know

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) is in effect as of June 21, 2022. Congress passed the Act in December 2021 to increase enforcement of longstanding U.S. policy prohibiting the importation of goods, or components thereof, made with forced labor and to create a “rebuttable presumption” that merchandise from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) or by an entity on the UFLPA Entity List is made with forced labor and thereby prohibited from entry into the United States. The rebuttable presumption applies to downstream products that incorporate inputs from XUAR, regardless of where the finished products are manufactured, including goods from outside XUAR in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), or in third countries. There is no de minimis provision in the law – any prohibited content, no matter how small, will make a product subject to the rebuttable presumption made by the law. If an importer can demonstrate by “clear and convincing” evidence that the goods were not produced wholly or in part by forced labor, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will grant an “exception” to the presumption. The UFLPA provides for increased detentions and seizures of merchandise and potential civil and criminal penalties. See prior GT Alerts on the UFLPA.

Pursuant to the UFLPA, a multi-agency task force chaired by the Department of Homeland Security was mandated to develop a strategy for the Act’s implementation. On June 17, in anticipation of the June 21 effective date, DHS released the “Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China” (Enforcement Strategy), which includes:

  • An assessment of risk of importing goods mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in part, in the PRC; according to the strategy, complex supply chains that touch XUAR are “highly susceptible to contamination by goods made using forced labor.”
  • list of entities affiliated with forced labor; therefore, their products are subject to the presumption that their goods are prohibited from entry. The Entity list will be updated multiple times per year and will be publicly available.
  • A list of high priority sectors and products including apparel and textiles, cotton and cotton products, polysilicon, and tomato products. Other products listed include footwear, nails, electronics, and toys.
  • Guidance to importers advising that companies need heightened due diligence to ensure compliance with UFLPA and to identify potential supply chain exposure to Xinjiang. Supply chain tracing is the general method to demonstrate that goods are free of inputs from Xinjiang, but CBP expects that barriers to supply chain tracing may make it difficult for importers to be compliant and has stated that third-party audits alone are insufficient to demonstrate due diligence.

Should CBP detain goods on suspicion of being made wholly or in part with forced labor, the importer has options. It can re-export the goods (up until CBP seizes them); it can abandon the goods; it can seek an “exception” for the goods, to get them released from CBP custody; it can also provide information to CBP demonstrating that the goods are not subject in any way to the Act. The evidence and documentation needed for the latter two must be “clear and convincing.”

It should be noted that in order to obtain an “exception” for goods that have been detained, an importer must meet all three of the following requirements:

  • Provide clear and convincing evidence that the detained goods were not made in whole or in part with forced labor, or were sourced from entities on the Entity List.
  • Fully and substantively respond to any questions from CBP.
  • Show that it has complied with all of the requirements set out in the Enforcement Strategy and CBP’s Operational Guidance (i.e., due diligence, supply chain tracing and management, etc.).

The Enforcement Strategy document provides importers with guidance in the following three areas:

  • Due diligence, effective supply chain tracing, and supply chain management measures to ensure that no goods violating the Act enter the importer’s supply chain.
  • The type, nature, and extent of evidence that demonstrates that goods originating in China were not mined (or grown), produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in Xinjiang.
  • The type, nature, and extent of evidence that demonstrates goods originating in China, including goods detained under Section 307 of the Tariff Act, were not mined (or grown), produced, or manufactured wholly or in part with forced labor.

CBP has made it clear that should there be a detention, participants in the Customs and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program (C-TPAT) will be prioritized for review of submissions to rebut the presumption that the merchandise was made with forced labor.

Importers may wish to plan for contingencies should CBP detain imported merchandise, map complex supply chains and review purchase agreements and supplier codes of conduct.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Heated Debate Surrounds Proposed Federal Privacy Legislation

As we previously reported on the CPW blog, the leadership of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Ranking Member of the Senate Commerce Committee released a discussion draft of proposed federal privacy legislation, the American Data Privacy and Protection Act (“ADPPA”), on June 3, 2022. Signaling potential differences amongst key members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Chair Maria Cantwell (D-WA) withheld her support. Staking out her own position, Cantwell is reportedly floating an updated version of the Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act (“COPRA”), originally proposed in 2019.

Early Stakeholder Disagreement

As soon as a discussion draft of the ADPPA was published, privacy rights organizations, civil liberty groups, and businesses entered the fray, drawing up sides for and against the bill. The ACLU came out as an early critic of the legislation. In an open letter to Congress sent June 10, the group urged caution, arguing that both the ADPPA and COPRA contain “very problematic provisions.” According to the group, more time is required to develop truly meaningful privacy legislation, as evidenced by “ACLU state affiliates who have been unable to stop harmful or effectively useless state privacy bills from being pushed quickly to enactment with enormous lobbying and advertising support of sectors of the technology industry that resist changing a business model that depends on consumers not having protections against privacy invasions and discrimination.” To avoid this fate, the ACLU urges Congress to “bolster enforcement provisions, including providing a strong private right of action, and allow the states to continue to respond to new technologies and new privacy challenges with state privacy laws.”

On June 13, a trio of trade groups representing some of the largest tech companies sent their open letter to Congress, supporting passage of a federal privacy law, but ultimately opposing the ADPPA. Contrary to the position taken by the ACLU, the industry groups worry that the bill’s inclusion of a private right of action with the potential to recover attorneys’ fees will lead to litigation abuse. The groups took issue with other provisions as well, such as the legislation’s restrictions on the use of data derived from publicly-available sources and the “duty of loyalty” to individuals whose covered data is processed.

Industry groups and consumer protection organizations had the opportunity to voice their opinions regarding the ADPPA in a public hearing on June 14. Video of the proceedings and prepared testimony of the witnesses are available here. Two common themes arose in the witnesses’ testimony: (1) general support for federal privacy legislation; and (2) opposition to discrete aspects of the bill. As has been the case for the better part of a decade in which Congress has sought to draft a federal privacy bill, two fundamental issues continue to drive the debate and must be resolved in order for the legislation to become law: the private right of action to enforce the law and preemption of state laws or portions of them. . While civil rights and privacy advocacy groups maintain that the private right of action does not go far enough and that federal privacy legislation should not preempt state law, industry groups argue that a private right of action should not be permitted and that state privacy laws should be broadly preempted.

The Path Forward

The Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce of the House Energy and Commerce Committee is expected to mark up the draft bill the week of June 20. We expect the subcommittee to approve the draft bill with little or no changes. The full Energy and Commerce Committee should complete work on the bill before the August recess. Given the broad bipartisan support for the legislation in the House, we anticipate that the legislation, with minor tweaks, is likely to be approved by the House, setting up a showdown with the Senate after a decade of debate.

With the legislative session rapidly drawing to a close, the prospects for the ADPPA’s passage remain unclear. Intense disagreement remains amongst key constituency groups regarding important aspects of the proposed legislation. Yet, in spite of the differences, a review of the public comments to date regarding the ADPPA reveal one nearly unanimous opinion: the United States needs federal privacy legislation. In light of the fact that most interested parties agree that the U.S. would benefit from federal privacy legislation, Congress has more incentive than ever to reach compromise regarding one of the proposed privacy bills.

© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

DOJ Limits Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Providing Clarity for Ethical Hackers and Employees Paying Bills at Work Alike

On May 19, 2022, the Department of Justice announced it would not charge good-faith hackers who expose weaknesses in computer systems with violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA or Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Congress enacted the CFAA in 1986 to promote computer privacy and cybersecurity and amended the Act several times, most recently in 2008. However, the evolving cybersecurity landscape has left courts and commentators troubled by potential applications of the CFAA to circumstances unrelated to the CFAA’s original purpose, including prosecution of so-called “white hat” hackers. The new charging policy, which became effective immediately, seeks to advance the CFAA’s original purpose by clarifying when and how federal prosecutors are authorized to bring charges under the Act.

DOJ to Decline Prosecution of Good-Faith Security Research

The new policy exempts activity of white-hat hackers and states that “the government should decline prosecution if available evidence shows the defendant’s conduct consisted of, and the defendant intended, good-faith security research.” The policy defines “good-faith security research” as “accessing a computer solely for purposes of good-faith testing, investigation, and/or correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where such activity is carried out in a manner designed to avoid any harm to individuals or the public, and where the information derived from the activity is used primarily to promote the security or safety of the class of devices, machines, or online services to which the accessed computer belongs, or those who use such devices, machines, or online services.”

In practice, this policy appears to provide, for example, protection from federal charges for the type of ethical hacking a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter performed in 2021. The reporter uncovered security flaws in a Missouri state website that exposed the Social Security numbers of over 100,000 teachers and other school employees. The Missouri governor’s office initiated an investigation into the reporter’s conduct for unauthorized computer access. While the DOJ’s policy would not affect prosecutions under state law, it would preclude federal prosecution for the conduct if determined to be good-faith security research.

The new policy also promises protection from prosecution for certain arguably common but contractually prohibited online conduct, including “[e]mbellishing an online dating profile contrary to the terms of service of the dating website; creating fictional accounts on hiring, housing, or rental websites; using a pseudonym on a social networking site that prohibits them; checking sports scores at work; paying bills at work; or violating an access restriction contained in a term of service.” Such activities resemble the facts of Van Buren v. United States, No. 19-783, which the Supreme Court decided in June 2021. In Van Buren, the 6-3 majority rejected the government’s broad interpretation of the CFAA’s prohibition on “unauthorized access” and held that a police officer who looked up license plate information on a law-enforcement database for personal use—in violation of his employer’s policy but without circumventing any access controls—did not violate the CFAA. The DOJ did not cite Van Buren as the basis for the new policy. Nor did the DOJ identify any another impetus for the change.

To Achieve More Consistent Application of Policy, All Federal Prosecutors Must Consult with Main Justice Before Bringing CFAA Charges

In addition to exempting good-faith security research from prosecution, the new policy specifies the steps for charging violations of the CFAA. To help distinguish between actual good-faith security research and pretextual claims of such research that mask a hacker’s malintent, federal prosecutors must consult with the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) before bringing any charges. If CCIPS recommends declining charges, prosecutors must inform the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) and may need to obtain approval from the DAG before initiating charges.

©2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

ARPA-E: Biden’s Proposed FY 2023 Budget Boosts Investment in Clean Energy Technologies

On March 28, 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration sent the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 to the United States Congress (“Congress”). The President’s proposed $5.8 trillion budget for FY 2023 allocates billions of dollars toward combating climate change and boosting clean energy development. Biden’s budget requests $48.2 billion for the Department of Energy (“DOE”), with $700 million of those funds allocated to the DOE’s Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy program (“ARPA-E”).[1] With these increased funds, the Biden administration plans for ARPA-E to expand its scope beyond energy technology–focused projects to include climate adaptation and resilience innovations.[2]

What Is ARPA-E?

ARPA-E is a United States federal government agency under the purview of the Department of Energy that funds and promotes the research and development of advanced energy technologies. ARPA-E was recommended to Congress in the 2005 National Academies report Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Bright Economic Future, which published recommendations for federal government actions to maintain and expand U.S. competitiveness.[3] In 2007, ARPA-E was officially created after Congress implemented a number of the report’s recommendations by enacting the America COMPETES Act.[4] The 2007 Act was superseded by the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, which incorporated much of the original language of the 2007 Act but made some modifications to ARPA-E structure.[5] In 2009, ARPA-E officially commenced operations after receiving its first appropriated funds through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 —$400 million to fund the establishment of ARPA-E.[6]

ARPA-E’s mission is statutorily defined as overcoming “the long-term and high-risk technology barriers in the development of energy technologies.”[7] This involves the development of energy technologies that will achieve various goals, including the reduction of fossil fuel imports, the reduction of energy-related emissions, improvements in energy efficiency, and increased resilience and security of energy infrastructure.[8] The statute directs ARPA-E to pursue these objectives through particular means:

  1. Identifying and promoting revolutionary advances in fundamental and applied sciences;
  2. Translating scientific discoveries and cutting-edge inventions into technological innovations; and
  3. Accelerating transformational technological advances in areas industry is unlikely to undertake because of technical and financial uncertainty.[9]

The Impact of ARPA-E

Since 2009, ARPA-E has provided approximately $3 billion in R&D funding for over 1,294 potentially transformational energy technology projects.[10] Publishing annual reports to analyze and catalog its influence, the agency tracks commercial impact with key early indicators, including private-sector follow-on funding, new company formation, partnership with other government agencies, publications, inventions, and patents.[11]

Many ARPA-E project teams have continued to advance their technologies: 129 new companies have been formed, 285 licenses have been issued, 268 teams have partnered with another government agency, and 185 teams have together raised over $9.87 billion in private-sector follow-on funding.[12] In addition, ARPA-E projects fostered technological innovation and advanced scientific knowledge, as evidenced by the 5,497 peer-reviewed journal articles and 829 patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that sprung from the ARPA-E program.[13] ARPA-E recently announced that it is starting to count exits through public listings, mergers, and acquisitions. As of January 2022, ARPA-E has 20 exits with a total reported value of $21.6 billion.[14]

How Does Biden’s FY 2023 Budget Affect ARPA-E?

Biden has requested a 56% increase for ARPA-E, to $700 million.[15] The budget also proposes expansions of ARPA-E’s purview to more fully address innovation gaps around adaptation, mitigation, and resilience to the impacts of climate change.[16] This investment in research and development of high-potential and high-impact technologies aims to help remove technological barriers to advance energy and environmental missions.[17]

The request provides that ARPA-E shall also expand its scope “to invest in climate-related innovations necessary to achieve net zero climate-inducing emissions by 2050.”[18] Given the increasing bipartisan support for alternative energy funding and ARPA-E’s continuing and rising commercial impact, it is likely that ARPA-E’s funding and support of the research and development of early-stage energy technologies will continue to pave the way for the commercialization of advanced energy technologies.


Endnotes

  1. https://www.law360.com/articles/1478133/biden-budget-provides-billions-for-clean-energy
  2. https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-energy-secretary-granholm-president-bidens-doe-fiscal-year-2023-budget
  3. https://doi.org/10.17226/24778
  4. Id. at 22
  5. Id.
  6. Id.
  7. 42 U.S.C. § 16538(b)
  8. 42 U.S.C. § 16538(c)(1)(A)
  9. 42 U.S.C. § 16538(c)(2)
  10. https://arpa-e.energy.gov/about/our-impact
  11. Id.
  12. Id.
  13. Id.
  14. Id.
  15. https://www.science.org/content/article/biden-s-2023-budget-request-science-aims-high-again
  16. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/budget_fy2023.pdf
  17. Id.
  18. https://www.science.org/content/article/biden-s-2023-budget-request-science-aims-high-again
©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Confirmed to U.S. Supreme Court

Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson will become the first Black woman and the third Black Justice to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court.

With support of only a handful of Republican senators, a Senate majority voted to confirm Judge Jackson’s nomination to the Supreme Court, 53-47, on April 7, 2022. Judge Jackson will fill the vacancy left by Justice Stephen Breyer, who will retire at the end of the Court’s current term.

During Judge Jackson’s distinguished legal career, she served as a federal district judge from 2013 to 2021, a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from 2021 to 2022, assistant special counsel and then vice chair on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a federal public defender, and a private practice attorney.

Despite bringing a new perspective to the bench, Judge Jackson is unlikely to affect the current composition of the Court. Her decisions as a district and appellate judge suggest that, like Justice Breyer, she takes a pragmatic approach to the law.

Judge Jackson’s legal methodology will become apparent shortly after she takes her seat for the 2022-2023 term, which begins on October 3, 2022. The Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments on three cases touching on contentious issues during Judge Jackson’s first term. Judge Jackson, who serves on Harvard University’s board of overseers, has stated she will recuse herself from hearing Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard, a case involving the use of race in college admissions. However, she will participate in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, which asks the Court to decide on the constitutionality of a Colorado state law that prohibits business owners from refusing to provide service to people on the basis of sex, including sexual orientation and gender identity. Judge Jackson also will participate in the Court’s hearing of Merrill v. Millgan, which asks the Court to weigh in on whether Alabama’s proposed congressional district plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Judge Jackson is expected to be sworn in before the start of the 2022-2023 term.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

PFAS Air Regulations Proposed By House

In the latest federal legislative move to try to force the EPA to take quicker action than contemplated by the agency’s PFAS Roadmap of 2021, a bill was recently introduced in the House that would require the EPA to set air emission limits for all PFAS under the Clean Air Act. PFAS air regulations are something that advocates concerned about PFAS pollution issues beyond just drinking water have advocated for in the past few years. There are barriers, though, to achieving the desired results even if the legislation passes. Nevertheless, the federal legislative activity underscores the need for all companies that are currently using PFAS in their manufacturing or industrial processes to understand the full scope of compliance needs when and if PFAS air regulations become a reality.

House Bill For PFAS Air Regulations

On March 17, 2022, a bipartisan group in the House introduced the “Prevent Release Of Toxics Emissions, Contamination, and Transfer Act of 2022” (also known as the PROTECT Act of 2022 or HR 7142). The aim of the bill is to require the EPA to list all PFAS as hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) under the Clean Air Act. If passed, the designation as HAPs would require the EPA to develop regulatory limits for the emission of PFAS into the air.

The proposed steps, however, go well beyond the EPA’s own plan for potential PFAS air regulations as detailed in the EPA’s PFAS Strategic Roadmap 2021. In the PFAS Roadmap, the EPA indicates that it commits to performing ongoing investigation to:

  • Identify sources of PFAS air emissions;
  • Develop and finalize monitoring approaches for measuring stack emissions and ambient concentrations of PFAS;
  • Develop information on cost-effective mitigation technologies; and
  • Increase understanding of the fate and transport of PFAS air emissions to assess their potential for impacting human health via contaminated groundwater and other media pathways.

The EPA committed to using this information and data in order to, by the Fall of 2022, “evaluate mitigation options”, which could include listing “certain PFAS” as HAPs. However, the EPA also indicated that it might use other regulatory or non-regulatory tools to achieve results similar to formal PFAS air regulations under the Clean Air Act.

The bill, therefore, would considerably accelerate the EPA’s process for potential HAPs, which in turn could result in legal challenges to any rushed HAPs, as the EPA would not have had the opportunity to collect all necessary data and evaluate the soundness of the science behind any HAP designation.

Impact On Business

Any designation of PFAS as HAPs under the Clean Air Act will of course immediately impact companies that are utilizing PFAS and emitting PFAS into the air. While it remains to be seen whether the PROTECT Act will pass, if it were to pass and the EPA’s HAP designations were to survive any legal challenges, the impacts on businesses would be significant. Companies would need to undertake extensive testing of air emissions to determine their risk of Clean Air Act violations, which will be complicated due to limitations on current technology to do this type of testing. Companies may also need to pivot their production practices to reduce or limit PFAS air emissions, which would add unplanned costs to balance sheets. Finally, companies may wish to explore substitutes for PFAS rather than navigate Clean Air Act regulatory compliance, which is a significant undertaking that takes time and money.

It is also worth noting that a designation as a HAP for any PFAS would also trigger significant regulatory challenges to businesses that might have nothing to do with air emissions. Any substance listed as a HAP under the Clean Air Act is automatically designated as a “hazardous substance” under CERCLA (the Superfund law). Once a substance is classified as a “hazardous substance” under CERCLA, the EPA can force parties that it deems to be polluters to either cleanup the polluted site or reimburse the EPA for the full remediation of the contaminated site. Without a PFAS Superfund designation, the EPA can merely attribute blame to parties that it feels contributed to the pollution, but it has no authority to force the parties to remediate or pay costs. The designation also triggers considerable reporting requirements for companies. Currently, those reporting requirements with respect to PFAS do not exist, but they would apply to industries well beyond just PFAS manufacturers. Superfund site cleanup costs can be extensive, even as high as hundreds of millions of dollars, depending on the scope of pollution at issue and the amount of territory involved in the site.

©2022 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.

Congress Grants Five Month Extension for Telehealth Flexibilities

On Tuesday, March 16, 2022, President Biden signed into law H.R. 2471, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (“2022 CAA”). This new law includes several provisions that extend the Medicare telehealth waivers and flexibilities, implemented as a result of COVID-19 to facilitate access to care, for an additional 151 days after the end of the Public Health Emergency (“PHE”). This equates to about a five-month period.

The 2022 CAA extension captures most of the core PHE telehealth flexibilities authorized as part of Medicare’s pandemic response, including the following:

  • Geographic Restrictions and Originating Sites: During the extension, Medicare beneficiaries can continue to receive telehealth services from anywhere in the country, including their home. Medicare is permitting telehealth services to be provided to patients at any site within the United States, not just qualifying zip codes or locations (e.g. physician offices/facilities).
  • Eligible Practitioners: Occupational therapists, physical therapists, speech-language pathologists, and qualified audiologists will continue to be able to furnish and receive payment for telehealth services as eligible distant site practitioners during the extension period.
  • Mental Health:  In-person requirements for certain mental health services will continue to be waived through the 151-day extension period.
  • Audio-Only Telehealth Services: Medicare will continue to provide coverage and payment for most telehealth services furnished using audio-only technology. This includes professional consultations, office visits, and office psychiatry services (identified as of July 1, 2000 by HCPCS Codes 99241-99275, 99201-99215, 90804-90809 and 90862) and any other services added to the telehealth list by the CMS Secretary for which CMS has not expressly required the use of real-time, interactive audio-visual equipment during the PHE.

Additionally, the 2022 CAA allocates $62,500,000 from the federal budget to be used for grants for telemedicine and distance learning services in rural areas. Such funds may be used to finance construction of facilities and systems providing telemedicine services and distance learning services in qualified “rural areas.”

Passage of the 2022 CAA is a substantial step in the right direction for stakeholders hoping to see permanent legislative change surrounding Medicare telehealth reimbursement.

A View From Washington, DC — Budgets, Bills, and Elections

February in Washington, DC, usually ushers in the start of a new federal budget approval process, but that will not be the case this year. President Joe Biden is not expected to release his fiscal year 2023 budget until later this spring, which will be followed by congressional hearings and oversight on our nation’s federal spending. While the president’s budget is not binding, in a Congress controlled by his own party, his suggestions on how Congress should appropriate our federal dollars are certainly taken seriously.

Furthering delays, Congress is still mired in passing the fiscal year 2022 appropriations bills — which appear to now be on target for passage in mid-March. Part of the slowdown on passing these bills revolves around an agreement on the overall topline spending number. The House approved $1.506 trillion in spending in its versions of the 12 annual appropriations bills. The Senate never released a topline number. President Biden’s budget request was for $1.523 trillion, $770 billion for nondefense spending and $753 billion for defense spending. Also of note, assuming these bills are enacted, it will be the first time in a decade that Congress has provided funds for earmarks (now referred to as “community projects”) through appropriations legislation.

Another weighty item on Congress’ agenda is the reauthorization of the nation’s flood insurance program. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was last reauthorized in 2012, when Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012. The NFIP’s five-year reauthorization ended on September 30, 2017, and since then, the program has been funded by a series of short-term measures. The program is currently operating under an extension that expired on February 18, 2022. The purpose of the Biggert-Waters Act was to make the NFIP solvent, as the program faced a $24 billion deficit. But anyone who has kept apprised of the program knows it’s not solvent and is broken in many respects. Current policyholders are facing an 18% policy rate increase in the coming year.

Finally, once summer arrives, many in Congress will turn their attention in earnest to the mid-term elections in November. Several states have new congressional maps due to redistricting. The released census data gave Texas, Florida, North Carolina, Montana, and Oregon additional seats, while California, New York, and Pennsylvania (among others) lost seats. In an almost evenly divided House, the Republicans only need to pick up three to five seats in order to take control, and most observers expect that to happen. The current US Senate is evenly divided and most incumbent Senate seats are safe, but a few states, such as Georgia, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, are statistically tied in current polling and are truly toss-up elections at this point, leaving control of the US Senate up for grabs.

© 2022 Jones Walker LLP
For more articles about election and legislative updates, visit the NLR Election & Legislative section.

Federal Cannabis Reform – Is 2022 the Year?

Hope soared with the possibility of federal cannabis reform in 2021.  And for good reason –  the induction of a new, more liberal administration, rapid state-level legalization, broad support by Americans,[1] and growing bipartisan backing led many to believe that 2021 was going to be the year where federal decriminalization of cannabis would become a reality.  But, as 2021 continued on, optimism dwindled as any advancement in federal cannabis reform was hobbled by the inability of Congress to agree on the appropriate level of reform  and the proper mechanics for passage.  Specifically, tension rose amongst the elected Democrats on whether to support incremental reform (like access to banks or removal of cannabis from the list of Schedule 1 drugs) or comprehensive legalization with provisions to address social inequities stemming from the legacy of the War on Drugs.  And so 2021 came to an end, and the cannabis industry saw yet another year of failed meaningful change on the federal level.

Still, momentum for reform has not been lost.  If anything, last year saw more bills introduced into Congress (including two new federal legalization proposals) than ever before – clearly indicating its import to our nation’s leaders.  Justice Clarence Thomas from the Supreme Court even subtly advised Congress to address legalization, noting that the Federal Government’s current “half in, half out regime” on cannabis strained the principles of federalism.

And so, as we move forward in 2022 with hope, we review the bills before Congress and their progresses to assess which of these may have some traction for passage during this upcoming year.

Secure and Fair Enforcement (“SAFE”) Banking Act of 2021[2]

Considered modest reform, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 mainly focused on granting cannabis-related businesses access to federally-backed financial institutions.  The bill was introduced early in 2021,[3] and passed in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 20, 2021 by a vote of 321 to 101.  At the time of the House’s passage, many believed the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 would easily move its way through the Senate, due – in part – to its demonstrated bipartisan appeal with 106 Republican votes in the House.  Congressman Ed Pearlman, one of its drafters, even remarked:

After years of bringing up this issue, I’m thrilled to see overwhelming support for this bipartisan, commonsense legislation in the U.S. House once again. I feel optimistic about the path forward for the SAFE Banking Act and, more broadly, reforms to our federal cannabis laws.[4]

However, after its passage in the House, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 languished in the Senate’s Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.  Momentum for the bill slowed, with those opposing it campaigning for more comprehensive legalization.  In late September 2021, fervor for the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 arose again when the House passed, by voice vote, an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (“NDAA”) to add the SAFE Banking Act of 2021.  Many hoped that by couching the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 in the NDAA, it would make it easier to pass through the Senate.  On November 23, 2021, 4 Senators[5] penned a letter to the Senate’s Armed Services Committee urging them to retain the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 in the NDAA.  Despite these efforts, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 was stripped from the NDAA on December 10, 2021 – stalling its progress once more.

The Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment & Expungement (“MORE”) Act

The MORE Act is the oldest comprehensive legislative proposal.  It was passed in the House in December 2020, during a lame-duck session, but never made any headway in the Senate.[6]  On May 28, 2021, Representative Jerrold Nadler reintroduced the MORE Act into the House and much of its substance provided the legislative stepping stones for the Cannabis Administrative and Opportunity Act (“CAO”).

The MORE Act aimed to end criminalization of cannabis by removing it from the list of controlled  substances, eliminate related past criminal penalties and convictions, and provide essential criminal justice reform, social justice and economic development for those affected by the War on Drugs.  The MORE Act also would tax cannabis products starting at 5% to 8% (increasing by 1% over 5 years) to help fund social reform projects, make Small Business Administration loans and services available to cannabis-related businesses, and prohibit denial of federal public benefits (like housing) and protections under immigration law on the basis of cannabis-related conduct or conviction.

After sitting in the House Judiciary Committee, the bill was finally approved in the Committee on September 30, 2021, with 2 Republican Representatives voting yes.  This act sent the measure to the House floor for another vote before it could make its way to the Senate.

The Cannabis Administrative and Opportunity Act

Embracing the MORE Act’s goals for comprehensive reform, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (along with Senators Cory Booker  and Ron Wyden) introduced the long awaited draft of the CAO into the Senate on July 14, 2021.  Considered a historic and ambitious bill, the CAO aimed to implement a full-scale federal scheme for cannabis reform that reaches beyond just decriminalization.  It hopes to provide restorative measures “to lift up people and communities who were unfairly targeted in the War on Drugs.”[7] Specifically, the CAO seeks to do the following:

  • Decriminalize cannabis by removing it from the Controlled Substances Act and automatically expunge any arrests and convictions for non-violent federal cannabis offenses;
  • Transfer primary agency jurisdiction over cannabis to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (“TTB”), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) so that cannabis can be federally regulated similar to alcohol and tobacco;
  • Establish a Center for Cannabis Products responsible for regulating the “cannabis aspect of all products containing cannabis,” and implementing requirements related to cannabis products (g., good manufacturing practice, product standards, product labeling, product distribution and recall, etc.) within the FDA;
  • Mandate federal research and studies regarding the impact of cannabis (including any benefits and/or impairments) on the human brain and health conditions and its impact on drivers under its influence;
  • Permit movement of cannabis products through channels of interstate commerce;
  • Establish Opportunity Trust Fund Programs funded by federal cannabis tax revenue to restore and reinvest in communities greatly impacted by the War on Drugs (including funds for job training, reentry services, legal aid, and youth recreation/mentoring programs) and to help level the playing field by granting entrepreneurs of color access to the cannabis industry through small business loans;
  • Prohibit denial of federal benefits or immigration protection due to a past cannabis-related offense; and
  • Impose federal excise tax on sale of cannabis products, starting at 10% and increasing up to 25% in a span of 5 years, with certain favorable tax credit for cannabis producers with less than $20 million sales.

Though the CAO has lofty goals, it does not force states to legalize cannabis, emphasizing the integrity of state-specific cannabis law.

As a draft bill, the CAO was subject to a review period in which its authors requested public comments by September 1, 2021.  At the expiration of this review period, the drafters of the bill received numerous comments from both supporters and those criticizing the CAO as overly ambitious and a big-government approach.  In particular, many critics take issue with the bill’s tax structure, calling the imposition of an ultimate 25% federal excise tax burdensome.  Indeed, the CAO – as it stands – implements the highest tax structure for cannabis products of all the bills proposed in 2021.  Many allege that the high federal tax in addition to any state-imposed tax could promote the illicit cannabis market rather than encourage business owners to engage legally.  Additionally, the high federal tax could force states to reduce their own tax requirements, negatively affecting their own ability to fund state-run social equity and education initiatives.

For now, the public comments have been taken under advisement as the cannabis industry waits to see what the drafters decide to incorporate.  Once formally filed, the CAO will be sent to a committee for continued discussions and revisions before it can be advanced to the Senate floor for a vote.

The States Reform Act

The States Reform Act (“SRA”) is the latest comprehensive reform bill led by Republican Representative Nancy Mace and introduced in the House in November 15, 2021.  Like the MORE Act and the CAO, the SRA also seeks to decriminalize cannabis and provides retroactive expungement for non-violent federal cannabis offense, except for any person involved in a drug cartel.  However, the SRA differentiates itself by limiting federal social equity reform programs.  Instead, the SRA vests the authority  to determine what level of cannabis reform, including outright prohibition, in the individual states.  States will also retain authority to regulate the use, distribution, sale and manufacturing of cannabis, with some general federal oversight by the FDA, TTB, ATF and the Department of Agriculture.  Specifically, the SRA aims to regulate cannabis like alcohol (and alcohol alone) – another substantial difference from the CAO.  The SRA permits each state to determine the appropriate age limit for purchase of cannabis products, but incentivizes states to implement a 21+ limit by eliminating funding for highways for any state with an age limit of under 21 years of age and prohibiting advertisements directed at any person under the age of 21.  The bill also seeks to provide veterans with access to medical cannabis without fear of discrimination or denial of Veteran Affairs benefits.  The SRA also generally requires that medical cannabis be permitted for treatment of arthritis, cancer and chronic pain.  Similar to the CAO, the SRA will also allow the interstate cannabis transportation.

Notably, the SRA provides the lowest tax structure for cannabis products in comparison to other reform proposals, with the proposed imposition of a single tax rate of 3% that cannot be increased for at least 10 years.  Revenues from the tax would be used to support SBA programs for cannabis businesses, law enforcement initiatives including reentry programs, and veteran mental health programs.

Given its recency, little is known about the bill’s reception in the House and any progress that has been made.  However, the SRA does carry potential bipartisan appeal, particularly because it is sponsored by 4 Republican Representatives.  Additionally, it is anticipated that the Congressional Republicans will appreciate the SRA’s straight forward tax structure capped at a low rate for at least 10 years and its stance on states’ sovereignty regarding cannabis reform.  The real issue for the SRA is its lack of restorative justice and social equity efforts, which may be its death knell in the current Democrat-controlled House.

Implications for 2022

There are now 4 bills (3 with comprehensive legislation) circulating Capitol Hill that could provide much needed cannabis reform in 2022.  Congress will likely continue debating, revising and attempting to compromise on the terms in the MORE Act, the CAO and the SRA.  Potentially, if the 3 comprehensive bills remain on the discussion table, they will compete with one another, potentially dividing the Legislators’ support.  Congress should thus focus on forging a compromise or middle ground on these reforms to increase bipartisan support and avoid competing and inconsistent bills floating around, resulting in another year of unwanted (and unnecessary) deadlock.  Indeed, the CAO could be an example of such needed compromise – especially if the drafters seriously heed the criticisms and comments provided during the bill’s review period and consider incorporating certain bipartisan elements of the SRA, like a more stream-lined and lower rate tax structure.  With that said, the status of these cannabis reform bills, particularly the CAO and the MORE Act, face potential change should this year’s mid-term elections change the makeup of who controls the Senate, House or both.

Regardless, until Congress can iron out the kinks on comprehensive cannabis reform, the SAFE Banking Act of 2021 remains a practical law to pass in the interim.  The SAFE Banking Act of 2021 is currently the least controversial of all the cannabis-reform bills, has substantial bipartisan appeal, and will provide immediate financial resources and relief to the largely cash-based cannabis industry.  Though a small reform, it is still a necessary one that is long overdue.  The SAFE Banking Act of 2021 (and its predecessors) has already made its way through the House 6 times, proving that federal lawmakers believe it will help cannabis businessmen.  It may not resolve the issue of prohibition on cannabis, but its passage will likely be a great victory for the cannabis industry, signal federal de-stigmatization of cannabis, promote public safety by discouraging participation in the illicit cannabis market, and help cannabis-related businesses comply with tax laws.

Footnotes

[1] https://news.gallup.com/poll/356939/support-legal-marijuana-holds-record…

[2] On February 4, 2022, the SAFE Banking Act passed again in the House – this time, as an included amendment to the America COMPLETES Act.

[3] The bill is the successor to the previously introduced SAFE Banking Act of 2019.  See https://www.cannabislawblog.com/2021/09/safe-banking-act-2021/

[4] https://perlmutter.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=5486

[5] Gary Peters, Angus King, Kevin Cramer, and Mark Kelly

[6] https://www.cannabislawblog.com/2020/12/house-representatives-passes-bil…

[7] https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CAOA%20Detailed%20Summary

 

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

Senator Manchin Announces That He Will Not Support the Build Back Better Act – Where Things Stand Now

Today, December 19, 2021, Senator Joe Manchin (D., W.Va.) said that he opposes the Build Back Better Act, which effectively prevents its passage.  While there are no immediate prospects for the Build Back Better Act to become law, future tax acts tend to draw upon earlier proposals.  With a view to future tax proposals, this blog summarizes the final draft that was released by the Senate Finance Committee on December 11, 2021 (the “Build Back Better Bill”), and compares it to the bill passed by the House of Representatives (the “House Bill”) and the prior bill that was released by the House Ways and Means Committee in September 2021 (the “Prior House Bill”), which the House Bill was based on.  In light of Senator Manchin’s announcement, this blog refers to the bills in the past tense.

Summary of Significant Changes to Current Law in the Build Back Better Bill

Individual taxation

  •  A 5% surtax would have been imposed on income in excess of $10 million ($5 million for a married individual filing a separate return) and a 3% additional surtax would have been imposed on income in excess of $25 million ($12.5 million for a married individual filing a separate return). The surtax would have also applied to non-grantor trusts but at significantly lower thresholds – the 5% surtax would apply to income in excess of $200,000 and the 3% surtax would apply to income in excess of $500,000.  The individual income tax rates would have otherwise remained the same as under current law.
  • The 3.8% net investment income tax would have been expanded to apply to the active trade or business income of taxpayers earning more than $400,000. As a result, active trade or business income allocated to a limited partner of a limited partnership or a shareholder of a subchapter S corporation would have been subject to the net investment income tax. Under current law, the tax applies only to certain portfolio and passive income.  Under current law, a limited partner of a limited partnership and a shareholder of a subchapter S corporation is otherwise not subject to self-employment taxes.  The Build Back Better Act would not have had otherwise imposed self-employment taxes on S corporation shareholders or limited partners.
  • The exemption of gains on the disposition of “qualified small business stock” would have been reduced from 100% to 50% for taxpayers earning more than $400,000/year, and all trusts and estates.
  • “Excess business losses” in excess of $250,000 ($500,000 in the case of a joint return) would have been carried forward as business losses (thus remaining still subject to the limitation) and would not have been converted to net operating losses, and the excess business loss provision would have been made permanent. It currently is scheduled to expire in 2026.
  • Losses recognized with respect to worthless partnership interests would have been treated as capital losses (rather than ordinary losses as is often the case under current law), and would have been taken when the event establishing worthlessness occurs (rather than at the end of the year under current law).
  • The wash sale rules would have been expanded to cover commodities, foreign currencies, and digital assets, like cryptocurrency, as well as dispositions by parties related to the taxpayer.
  • The constructive ownership rules would have been expanded to cover digital assets, like cryptocurrency.

Business taxation

  • A corporate minimum tax of 15% would have been imposed on “book income” of certain large corporations. But the corporate income tax rates would have remained unchanged at 21%.
  • 1% excise tax would have been imposed on the value of stock repurchased by a corporation.
  • The interest expense deduction of a domestic corporation that is part of an “international financial reporting group” and whose average annual net interest expense exceeds $12 million over a three-year period would have been disallowed to the extent its net interest expenses for financial reporting purposes exceeds 110% of its proportionate share (determined based on its share of either the group’s EBITDA or adjusted basis of assets) of the net interest expense for financial reporting purposes of the group. The disallowed interest deduction could be carried forward for subsequent years.
  • Losses recognized by a corporate shareholder in liquidation of its majority-owned corporate subsidiary would have been deferred until substantially all of property received in the liquidation is disposed of by the shareholder.
  • Corporations spinning off subsidiaries would have been limited in their ability to use debt of the subsidiary to receive tax-free cash.

International taxation

  • A foreign person who owns 10% or more of the total vote or value of the stock of a corporate issuer (as opposed to 10% or more of total vote under current law) would have been ineligible for the portfolio interest exemption.
  • The Build Back Better Bill would have substantially revise the various international tax rules enacted as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”), including “GILTI”, “FDII” and “BEAT” regimes.
  • Foreign tax credit limitation rules would have been applied on a country-by-country basis.
  • Section 871(m), which imposes U.S. withholding tax on U.S.-dividend equivalent payments on swaps and forward contracts, would have been expanded to require withholding on swaps and forwards with respect to, or by reference to, interests in publicly traded partnerships.[1]

Proposals Not Included in the Build Back Better Bill

The Build Back Better Bill would not have:

  • Increased individual and corporate income tax rates (other than the surtaxes);
  • Changed the tax treatment of carried interests;
  • Affected the “pass-through deduction” under section 199A;
  • Affected “like-kind” exchanges under section 1031;
  • Increased the cap on social security tax withholding;
  • Changed the $10,000 annual cap on state and local tax deductions;[2] or
  • Treated death as a realization event.

Discussion

Individual Tax Changes

Surtax on individuals

The Build Back Better Bill would have added new section 1A, which would have imposed a tax equal to 5% of a taxpayer’s “modified adjusted gross income” in excess of $10 million (or in excess of $5 million for a married individual filing a separate return).  Modified adjusted gross income would have been adjusted gross income reduced by any reduction allowed for investment interest expenses.  Modified adjusted gross income would not have been reduced by charitable deductions and credits would not have been allowed to offset this surtax.  An additional 3% tax would have been imposed on a taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income over $25 million (or in excess of $12.5 mm for taxpayers filing as married filing separately).  The surtaxes would also have applied to non-grantor trusts at significantly lower thresholds – the 5% surtax would apply to modified adjusted gross income in excess of $200,000 and the 3% additional surtax would have applied to modified adjusted gross income in excess of $500,000.

As a result, the top marginal federal income tax rate on modified adjusted gross income in excess of $25 million would have been 45% for ordinary income and 31.8% for capital gains (including the net investment income tax).  Nevertheless, the Build Back Better Bill rate on capital gains would have remained meaningfully less than the 39.6% rate proposed by the Biden Administration.

The Build Back Better Bill did not include a change to the individual income tax rates, which was a major departure from the Prior House Bill.  The Prior House Bill included a similar surtax on individual taxpayers, but the threshold was lower at $5 million for taxpayers that file joint returns and the surtax rate was 3%.

The surtax would have been effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2021.

Application of net investment income tax to active business income; increased threshold

The Build Back Better Bill would have expanded the 3.8% net investment income tax to apply to net income derived in an active trade or business of the taxpayer, rather than only to certain portfolio income and passive income of the taxpayer under current law.

As a result, the 3.8% net investment income tax would have been imposed on limited partners who traditionally have not been subject to self-employment tax on their distributive share of income, and S corporation shareholders who have not been subject to self-employment tax on more than a reasonable salary. This proposed change was generally consistent with the Biden administration’s proposal to impose 3.8% Medicare tax (although the additional net investment income tax proposed in the Build Back Better Bill would not be used to fund Medicare).

The Build Back Better Bill also would have limited the 3.8% net investment income tax so that it applies only to taxpayers with taxable income greater than $400,000 (and $500,000 in the case of married individuals filing a joint return), rather than $250,000 under current law.

These changes were consistent with the proposals in the Prior House Bill and would have applied in taxable years beginning after 2021.

Limitation on “qualified small business stock” benefits

The Build Back Better Bill would have limited the exemption of eligible gain for disposition of “qualified small business stock” (“QSBS”) to 50% for taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $400,000 or more, as well as all trusts and estates, and would have subjected the gain to the alternative minimum tax.

Very generally, under current law, non-corporate taxpayers are entitled to exclude from tax up to 100% of gain from the disposition of QSBS that has been held for more than 5 years.[3]  In addition, gain from the sale of QSBS can potentially be deferred if proceeds are reinvested in other QSBS.

The same proposal was included in the House Bill and the Prior House Bill.  The Prior House Bill contained a proposal to increase corporate tax rates, which together with the proposed changes to the QSBS rules, would have further limited desirability of investing in QSBS. The Build Back Better Bill, the House Bill and the Prior House Bill only addressed the rules applicable to exclusion of gain from the sale of QSBS, and did not alter the rules allowing for deferral of gains for proceeds invested in other QSBS.   Although the benefits associated with ownership of QSBS would have remained significant, had the Build Back Better Bill passed, in light of the reduction in potential gain that would have been excluded, the Build Back Better Bill would have required a reevaluation of choice-of-entity decisions based on QSBS benefits.

The proposal would have been effective retroactively and apply to sales or exchanges of stock on or after September 13, 2021, which is the date that the Prior House Bill was released.

Excess business losses

Under current law, for taxable years that begin before January 1, 2027, non-corporate taxpayers may not deduct excess business loss (generally, net business deductions over business income) if the loss is in excess of $250,000 ($500,000 in the case of a joint return), indexed for inflation.  The excess loss becomes a net operating loss in subsequent years and is available to offset 80% of taxable income each year.  The Build Back Better Bill would have made this limitation permanent and would treat the losses carried forward to the next taxable year as deduction attributable to trades or businesses, which would have been subject to the excess business losses limitation under section 461(l).  As a result, no more than $250,000/$500,000 in losses could be used in any year, and excess business losses would never have become net operating losses.  Unlike deductions that are suspended under the passive activity rules and at-risk rules that become deductible upon a disposition of the interest in the relevant trade or business, the excess business losses continue to be limited after the sale of the relevant trade or business.

This proposal is consistent with the Prior House Bill and would have been retroactive and apply for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2020.

Worthless partnership interest and limitation on loss recognition in corporate liquidations

Under current law, if a partner’s interest in a partnership becomes worthless, in the taxable year of worthlessness the partner may take an ordinary loss if the partner receives no consideration and a capital loss in all other cases.  As a practical matter, this rule allows for an ordinary loss if the partner has no share of any liabilities of the partnership immediately prior to the claim of worthlessness, or a capital loss if the partner has a share of any partnership liability immediately prior to the claim of worthlessness (because relief of partnership liabilities is treated as consideration received in a sale).  Under current law, if a security (not including an obligation issued by a partnership) that is held as a capital asset becomes worthless, the loss is treated as occurring on the last day of the taxable year in which the security became worthless.

Under the Build Back Better Bill, if a partnership interest becomes worthless, the resulting loss would have been treated as a capital loss (and not an ordinary loss).  Also, in the case of a partnership interest or a security that becomes worthless, the loss would have been recognized at the time of the identifiable event establishing worthlessness (and not at the end of the taxable year).  The proposal would also have expanded the scope of securities subject to worthless securities rules to included obligations (bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness, with interest coupons or in registered form) issued by partnerships.  These proposals were also included in the Prior House Bill and would apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2021.

The Build Back Better Bill would also have deferred the loss that is recognized by one corporate member of a controlled group[4] when a subsidiary merges into it in a taxable transaction under section 331 until substantially all of the property received in the liquidation is disposed to a third-party.  This proposal would effectively have eliminated taxpayers’ ability to enter into Granite Trust transactions to recognize capital losses by liquidating an insolvent subsidiary.[5]  A similar loss deferral rule would also have applied to dissolution of a corporation with worthless stock or issuance of debt in connection with which corporate stock becomes worthless.  This proposal would have applied to liquidations occurring on or after the date of enactment.

Expansion of wash sale and constructive sale rules

The Build Back Better Bill would have expanded the application of wash sale rules and constructive sale rules to cryptocurrencies and other digital assets.

The Build Back Better Bill would also have expanded the wash sale rules to include transactions made by related parties.  The wash sale rules disallow a loss from a sale or disposition of stock or securities if the taxpayer acquires or enters into a contract to acquire substantially similar stock or securities thirty days before or after the sale giving rise to the claimed loss.  The basis of the acquired assets in the wash sale is increased to include the disallowed loss.  Under the Build Back Better Bill, a wash sale would also have occurred when a “related party” to the taxpayer (other than a spouse) acquires the substantial similar stock or securities within the thirty-day period.[6]  More significantly, the disallowed loss in a wash sale triggered by a related party (other than a spouse) would have been permanently disallowed under the Build Back Better Bill. If the Build Back Better Bill had passed, it would have been challenging for certain taxpayers to comply with the related party provisions—and very difficult for the IRS to enforce it.  Under the provision, if a parent were to sell stock at a loss and, within 30 days, her child were to purchase the same stock, the parent’s loss would have been denied, even if neither parent nor child knew about each other’s trades.

The Build Back Better Bill would have exempted from the wash sale rules foreign currency and commodity trades that were directly related to the taxpayer’s business needs (other than the business of trading currency or commodities).  This exception would not have applied to digital assets.

Finally, the Build Back Better Bill would have provided that an appreciated short sale, short swap, short forward, or futures contract is constructively sold under section 1259 when the taxpayer enters into a contract to acquire the reference property (and not when the taxpayer actually acquires the reference property, as current law provides).

The changes were the same as those proposed in the Prior House Bill.  The proposal would have applied after 2021.

SALT deductions

The Build Back Better Bill has a “placeholder for compromise on deduction for state and local taxes”.  This is a key departure from the House Bill, which included an increase to the current annual $10,000 cap on SALT deductions to $80,000 until 2030, at which time the $10,000 annual limitation would apply again.

Business Tax Changes

Corporate alternative minimum tax

The Build Back Better Bill would impose a 15% minimum tax on “book income” of corporations with a 3-year average book income in excess of $1 billion.  A corporation’s book income would have been calculated based on the corporation’s audited financial statement (or if publicly traded, the financial statement shown on SEC Form 10-K), but adjusted to take into account certain U.S. income tax principles.[7]  Because this is a minimum tax, a corporation would have paid any excess amount of this minimum tax over its regular tax for the applicable tax year.  This minimum tax would also have applied to a foreign-parented U.S. corporation if the U.S. corporation has an average annual book income of $100 million or above.

The Prior House Bill did not include this corporate minimum tax based on book income, but the Biden administration’s tax reform proposals included a similar corporate minimum tax for large corporations.  The Build Back Better Bill does not otherwise provide for an increase in corporate income tax rates.

The corporate minimum tax would have been effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2022.   

Limitation on business interest expense deductions

The Build Back Better Bill would have introduced an additional interest deduction limitation for a U.S. corporate member of an international group that has disproportionate interest expense as compared to the other members of the group.  New section 163(n) would generally have limited the interest deduction of a U.S. corporation that is part of an “international financial reporting group” and has net interest expense that exceeds $12 million (over a three-year period) if the ratio of its net interest expense to its EBITDA (or if an election is made, the aggregated bases of its assets)[8] exceeds by 110% of the similar ratio for the group.

Proposed section 163(n) was similar to what was included in the Prior House Bill, as well as a proposal that was included in the Senate and House bill for TCJA that was ultimately dropped in the conference agreement between the Senate and the House.  This limitation appears to target base erosion interest payments that may not be captured under the BEAT regime (which is further discussed in detail below).

The Build Back Better Bill would also have revised section 163(j) to treat partnerships as aggregates for purposes of applying the business interest expense limitation.  As a result, the section 163(j) limitation would have been applied at the partner level.  Under current law, the limitation, which very generally limits business interest expense deduction to 30% of EBITDA, is applied at the partnership level.   The interest deductions limited under section 163(j) or (n) (whichever imposes a lower limitation) would have continued to be allowed to be carried forward indefinitely (as opposed to 5 years under the Prior House Bill).

The proposals would have been effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2022.

Limitation on using controlled corporation’s debt in a spin-off transaction

The Build Back Better Bill would have limited the ability of a U.S. “distributing corporation” to effectively receive cash tax-free from a spun-off “controlled corporation” subsidiary.  Under current law, a controlled corporation can issue debt securities to its parent distributing corporation that the distributing corporation can then use to redeem its own outstanding debt on a tax-free basis in connection with the spin-off of the controlled corporation.  The Build Back Better Bill would have required the parent distributing corporation to recognize gain in this transaction to the extent that the amount of controlled corporation debt it transfers to its creditors exceeds (x) the aggregate basis of any assets it transfers to its controlled corporation in connection with the spin-off less (y) the total amount of liabilities the controlled corporation assumes from it and (z) any payments that the controlled corporation makes to it. This effectively would have treated the debt securities issued by a controlled corporation as same as any other property distributed by the controlled corporation (which is commonly called as “boot”).

The proposal would have applied to reorganizations occurring on or after the date of enactment.

Excise tax on corporate stock buybacks

The Build Back Better Bill would have imposed a nondeductible 1% excise tax on publicly traded U.S. corporations engaging in stock buybacks. The tax was to be imposed on the value of the stock “repurchased” by the corporation during the tax year, reduced by value of stock issued by the corporation during the tax year (including those issued to the employees).  The term “repurchase” is defined as a redemption within the meaning of section 317(b), which is a transaction in which a corporation acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property.  Repurchases that are (i) dividends for U.S. federal income tax purposes, (ii) part of tax-free reorganizations, (iii) made to contribute stock to an employee pension plan or ESOP, (iv) made by a dealer in securities in the ordinary course of business, or (v) made by a RIC or a REIT are not subject to the excise tax.  Also, repurchases that are less than $1 million in a year are excluded.

It was unclear how the value of repurchased stock was to be determined in calculating the excise tax amount.  The types of transactions that would have been covered under the proposed rule is also unclear.  The term “repurchase” was very broad and it could have had applied to different types of transactions, such as redemption of redeemable preferred stocks or redemption of stock in a company’s acquisition transaction.  The rule would also have had significant impact on de-SPAC transactions, which involve redemption rights for shareholders of the SPAC.  The Treasury would also have been provided with a broad authority to issue regulations to cover economically similar transactions.

The proposal would have applied to repurchases of stock after December 31, 2021.

International Tax Changes

Portfolio interest exemption

Under current law, a foreign person that owns 10% or more of the total voting power of a corporate issuer of debt is not eligible for the “portfolio interest” exemption, which provides for exemption from withholding on interest paid on certain debt.  Current law does not prohibit “de-control structures” under which the sponsor of a fund will typically invest a small percentage of the capital of a U.S. blocker in exchange for large percentage of its voting stock, thereby ensuring that no foreign investor will own 10% of the voting power of the U.S. blocker and permitting those foreign investors who own more than 10% of the value of the U.S. blocker to take the position that they may avoid U.S. withholding tax on interest received from the U.S. blocker.  The Build Back Better Bill would have revised this exception so that any person who owns 10% or more of the total vote or value of the stock of a corporate issuer would have been ineligible for the portfolio interest exemption.  This change would have prevented the de-control structures.

This proposal, which was also included in the Prior House Bill, would have applied to obligations issued after the date of enactment (i.e., all existing obligations would have been grandfathered).  However, if a grandfathered obligation was “significantly modified” for U.S. federal income tax purposes, it might have lost its grandfathered status.  Also, any subsequent draws on existing facilities that are made after the date of enactment would not have been grandfathered.

GILTI

The “global intangible low-taxed income” (“GILTI”) regime generally imposes a 10.5% minimum tax on 10-percent U.S. corporate shareholders of “controlled foreign corporations” (“CFCs”) based on the CFC’s “active” income in excess of a threshold equal to 10% of the CFC’s tax basis in certain depreciable tangible property (such basis, “qualified business asset investment”, or “QBAI”).  GILTI is not determined on a country-by-country basis, and, therefore, under current law a U.S. multinational corporation may be able to avoid the GILTI tax with respect to its subsidiaries operating in low-tax rate countries by “blending” income earned in the low tax-rate countries with income from high-tax rate countries.  Taxpayers are allowed 80% of the deemed paid foreign tax credit with respect to GILTI.

The Build Back Better Bill would have imposed GILTI on a country-by-country basis to prevent blending of income from a low tax-rate country with income from a high-tax rate country. This general approach would have been largely consistent with the prior proposals made by the Biden administration and the Senate Finance Committee.[9]

The Build Back Better Bill would have determined net CFC tested income and losses and QBAI on a country-by-country basis.  The Build Back Better Bill would have achieved this by using a “CFC taxable unit” – net CFC tested income and loss would have been determined separately for each country in which CFC taxable unit is a tax resident.  The Build Back Better Bill would have allowed a taxpayer to carryover country-specific net CFC tested loss to succeeding tax year to offset net CFC tested income of the same country.  In addition, taxpayers would no longer have been able to offset net CFC tested income from one jurisdiction with net CFC tested losses from another jurisdiction.  These proposed changes on determining net CFC tested income on a country-by-country basis were consistent with the Prior House Bill’s proposals.

The Build Back Better Bill would also have (i) reduced the exclusion amount from 10% to 5% of QBAI, (ii) increased the effective tax rate on GILTI for corporate taxpayers from 10.5% to 15%,[10] and (iii) helpfully reduced the “haircut” for deemed paid foreign tax credit for GILTI from 20% to 5% (i.e., 95% of GILTI amount would have been creditable as deemed paid credit).

The GILTI proposals would generally have been effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2022.

FDII

The “foreign-derived intangible income” (“FDII”) regime encourages U.S. multinational groups to keep intellectual property in the U.S. by providing a lower 13.125% effective tax rate for certain foreign sales and provision of certain services provided to unrelated foreign parties in excess of 10% of the taxpayer’s QBAI.  The lower effective tax rate is achieved by 37.5% deduction allowed for FDII under section 250.

The Build Back Better Bill would have reduced the section 250 deduction for FDII from 37.5% to 24.8%, which would have had the effect of increasing the effective rate for FDII from 13.125% to 15.8%.[11]  The Build Back Better Bill further provided that if a section 250 deduction actually exceeded the taxable income of the taxpayer, the deduction would have increased the net operating loss amount for the taxable year and could be used in subsequent years to offset up to 80% of taxable income.

This proposal generally would have been effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2021.

BEAT/SHIELD

The “base erosion and anti-abuse tax” (“BEAT”) generally provides for an add-on minimum tax, currently at 10%, on certain deductible payments that are made by very large U.S. corporations (generally, with at least $500 mm of average annual gross receipts) whose “base erosion percentage” (generally, the ratio of deductions for certain payments made to related foreign parties overall allowable deductions) is 3% or higher (or 2% for groups that include banks and securities dealers).

The Build Back Better Bill would have expanded the BEAT regime.  The proposal would have increased the BEAT tax rate gradually from 10% up to 18% by the taxable year starting after December 31, 2024.  The proposal would also have substantially revised the formula for calculating “modified taxable income”, which generally appeared to have increased the income amount that would have been subject to the BEAT regime.  Finally, the Build Back Better Bill would have eliminated the 3%/2% de minimis exception.  These proposals were generally consistent with the BEAT proposals in the Prior House Bill, but with different tax rates.

The Build Back Better Bill did not include the Biden administration’s “Stopping Harmful Inversions and Ending Low-Tax Developments” (“SHIELD”), which had been proposed to replace the BEAT regime.

Changes to Subpart F regime

The Build Back Better Bill would have significantly changed the subpart F regime.  The Build Back Better Bill would have helpfully reinstated section 958(b)(4) retroactively.  Section 958(b)(4) had prevented “downward” attribution of ownership of foreign person to a related U.S. person for purposes of applying subpart F regime.  Section 958(b)(4) was repealed in the TCJA, which allowed stock owned by a foreign person to be attributed downward to a U.S. person for purposes of determining a foreign corporation’s CFC status.

To address the situation that had prompted the repeal of downward attribution, the Build Back Better Bill would have introduced a new section to apply the GILTI and subpart F regimes to a foreign corporation that would have been a CFC if the downward attribution rule had applied, but only if the U.S. shareholder held at least 50% of vote or value of the foreign corporation’s stock.  This regime would have been effective for taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment.

The Build Back Better Bill would also have allowed a U.S. shareholder of a foreign corporation to elect to treat the foreign corporation as a CFC, which may have permitted a taxpayer to exclude foreign-source dividends received from the foreign corporation under the Build Back Better Bill’s amended section 245A (which is discussed below).  The Build Back Better Bill also would have limited the scope of foreign base company sales and services income, which is includible as subpart F income, to sales and services provided to U.S. residents and pass-through entities and branches in the United States, which effectively would have subjected foreign base company sales and services income for non-U.S. sales and services to the GILTI regime.  The Build Back Better Bill also would have amended section 951(a) so that a United States shareholder that receives a dividend from a CFC would have been subject to tax on its pro-rata share of the CFC’s subpart F income (generally negating any deduction under section 245A with respect to the dividend), regardless of whether the shareholder held shares in the CFC on the last day of the taxable year.  Current law requires a United States shareholder to include Subpart F income only if it owned shares of the CFC on the last day of the taxable year.

Foreign tax credits

The Build Back Better Bill would have imposed the foreign tax credit limitation on a country-by-country basis.  Currently, foreign tax credits are calculated on an aggregate global basis and divided into baskets for active income, passive income, GILTI income, and foreign branch income.  The revised rules would have calculated foreign tax credit limitations based on a country-by-country “taxable unit”, which is consistent with the “CFC taxable unit” used under the Build Back Better Bill’s GILTI rules.  Together with the proposed amendments to the GILTI regime, this revision to the foreign tax credit limitation rules would have sought to prohibit taxpayers from using foreign tax credits from taxes paid in a high-tax jurisdiction against taxable income from a low-tax jurisdiction.

The Build Back Better Bill would have made a number of other changes to the foreign tax credit rules, including and repealing the carryback period (which, under current law, is 1 year, but retaining the current 10-year carryforward period for excess foreign tax credit limitation).

This proposal would have been generally effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2022.

Dividends from foreign corporations

The Build Back Better Bill would have amended section 245A so that the foreign portions of dividends received only from a CFC (rather than any specified 10-percent owned foreign corporation) would have qualified for the participation exemption (and not have been subject to U.S. federal income tax) under section 245A.[12]  Currently, section 245A allows foreign-source dividends from any specified 10-percent owned foreign corporation (a broader concept than CFC) to be exempt from U.S. tax under section 245A.  Although the provision appeared to narrow the scope of section 245A, as noted above, the Build Back Better Bill would have permitted a taxpayer and a foreign corporation to make an election to treat the foreign corporation as a CFC, in which case the benefits of section 245A would have been available to all dividends paid by the electing foreign corporation (even if U.S. shareholders own less than 10%).  This provision was consistent with the proposal in the Prior House Bill and would have been effective for distributions made after the date of the enactment.

Anti-inversion rules

The Senate Finance Committee’s Build Back Better Bill would have significantly expanded the anti-inversion rules.  Generally, under current law, a foreign acquirer of an inverted U.S. corporation – typically, an existing U.S. corporation that is acquired by a foreign acquirer and whose shareholders continue own the U.S. corporation indirectly through their ownership in the foreign acquirer – is treated as a U.S. corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes, if the continuing ownership stake of the shareholders of the inverted U.S. corporation is 80% or more.   If the continuing ownership stake of the shareholders of the inverted U.S. corporation is between 60% and 80%, certain rules designed to prevent “earnings stripping” – or deductible payments by the U.S. corporation to its foreign parent – apply.

The Build Back Better Bill would have lowered the 80% threshold in treating a foreign acquirer of an inverted U.S. corporation as a U.S. corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes to 65%.  The Build Back Better Bill would also have lowered the 60% threshold in applying the earnings stripping rules to 50%.  Finally, the Build Back Better Bill would have expanded the scope of the anti-inversion rules to cover acquisitions of substantially all of the assets constituting (i) a trade or business of a U.S. corporation or partnership, or (ii) a U.S. trade or business of a non-U.S. partnership.

This provision was not included in the House Bill, but it did reflect some elements of an anti-inversion rule proposal by the Biden administration, such as the lowering of the 80% threshold to treat a foreign acquirer as a U.S. corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes and the expansion of the scope of the rules to cover certain asset acquisitions.  This proposal would have applied for taxable years ending after December 31, 2021.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

[2] The House Bill contained a provision that would raise the $10,000 cap to $80,000 for 2021 through 2030.

[3] The amount of gain eligible to be taken into account for these purposes by any taxpayer and any corporation is subject to a cap generally equal to the greater of (i) $10 million cumulative exclusions of gain with respect to that corporation and (ii) 10 times the taxpayer’s aggregate adjusted tax bases of QSBS of the corporation disposed of in that year.

[4] Generally, corporations connected through stock ownership of more than 50%.  Section 267(f).

[5] In a Granite Trust transaction, a corporate parent that owns a depreciated subsidiary reduces its ownership in the subsidiary to below 80% before liquidating the subsidiary so that the liquidation is taxable and any built-in loss of the parent in the subsidiary’s stock would have been recognized.

[6] A related party for this purpose includes (i) the taxpayer’s spouse, dependent, (ii) any corporation, partnership, trust or estate that is controlled by the taxpayer, and (iii) the taxpayer’s retirement account and certain other tax-advantaged investment accounts for which the taxpayer is the beneficiary or the fiduciary.

[7] For example, if a corporation owned foreign corporations that are “controlled foreign corporations” for U.S. federal income tax purposes, the corporation would have had to take into account its pro-rata share of such foreign corporation’s book income.  Also, prior year’s net operating losses (calculated for book purposes) could have been used to reduce the book income, but could have only offset 80% of the book income for the subsequent year.

[8] The election to use the aggregated bases of assets in lieu of EBITDA was added in the Senate Finance draft of the Bill.

[9] The Senate Finance Committee’s prior proposal (which included a draft legislation and a section-by-section explanation) provided for mandatory exclusion of high-taxed income.  This approach was different than the Build Back Better Bill, but the general approach of disallowing “blending” of income between high-tax jurisdiction and low-tax jurisdiction was the same.

[10] This would have been achieved by reducing the deduction provided to corporate taxpayers under section 250 from the current 50% level to 28.5%.  The Build Back Better Bill would have not changed the tax rate to be applied to a non-corporate taxpayer’s GILTI amount.  This was a lower rate than what was proposed in the Prior House Bill (37.5%), but the effective tax rate under the Prior House Bill was higher due to the increased income tax rates.

[11] The FDII deduction was higher under the Prior House Bill (at 21.875%), with an effective tax rate of 20.7% (taking into account the increased corporate rate).  The Senate Finance Committee’s prior proposal also stated that the FDII deduction would have been reduced, but did not commit to a specific percentage.

[12] The Build Back Better Bill would have also amended section 1059 so that if a corporation received a dividend from a CFC that was attributable to earnings and profits of the foreign corporation before it was a CFC or before it was owned by the corporation, the non-taxed portion of that dividend would have reduced the basis of the CFC’s stock, regardless of whether the corporation had held the CFC’s stock for 2 years or less.  Therefore, CFC’s dividends that are exempt from tax under section 245A could have been subject to the proposed expanded section 1059.

© 2021 Proskauer Rose LLP.