Category: Securities Law

5 Keys to SEC Compliance Success

The best way to avoid the scrutiny from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that can lead to significant legal liability is to strictly comply with all of the agency’s rules and regulations. Unfortunately, given the complexity of these regulations and the constantly changing legal landscape of securities laws, such as the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, this is much easier said than done.

Here are five keys to SEC compliance.

1. Identify Your Particular Needs

It should be an obvious first step, but many compliance attorneys treat all clients the same and offer a one-size-fits-all approach to complying with the regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). While this might not be a terrible approach – so long as it is all-encompassing, it will keep your company in line with the SEC across the board – it can saddle your firm with concerns and extraneous internal rules that have no bearing on how you conduct business.

A great example is a cryptocurrency. The SEC is, belatedly, beginning to issue rules and regulations for financial firms that focus on and trade in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. If your brokerage firm is not buying or selling securities in crypto-assets and has no plans to do so soon, then implementing compliance measures for cryptocurrency regulations has no benefit to your company. Those measures will, however, make the regulated securities professionals who work for your firm jump through pointless hoops in the ordinary course of their business.

Adopting a compliance strategy that more precisely meets your company’s needs will let your workers perform to their full capacity while still insulating your firm from legal liability or SEC scrutiny. It will just have to be updated if you choose to expand into new forms of securities trading.

2. Craft an All-Encompassing Compliance Strategy

Based on your firm’s precise regulatory needs, the next key to success is to come up with a compliance strategy that takes into account all of the SEC’s rules that could impact your company. Given the breadth of the SEC’s jurisdiction and the sheer number of regulations that it has put forth, this can take a while.

Once your firm’s legal requirements have been ascertained, the next step is to come up with ways that you can satisfy them during the day-to-day business activities at your firm. This is another reason why every compliance strategy should be tailored to your business – a compliance technique that works well and is easy for one firm may be onerous and inconvenient for another one.

As Dr. Nick Oberheiden, founding partner of the SEC compliance law firm Oberheiden P.C., often tells clients, “All SEC compliance measures should protect the securities firm from SEC liability. However, those measures should also be judged by how burdensome they are on the firm that is employing them. The least inconvenient method to adequately insulate your firm from liability is the best. Learning about a brokerage firm and understanding its strengths and weaknesses and its capabilities help compliance lawyers craft the best solutions for their clients. Unfortunately, one of the most common complaints that securities professionals have about attorneys is that they do not listen to their particular concerns. We strive to do better.”

3. Train, Train, and Retrain Your Workers

No compliance strategy is effective if it is not implemented. Training your employees and workers in the intricacies of the compliance strategy, explaining why it is important for them to follow it strictly, and describing the penalties for noncompliance is the next key to success.

Even here, though, it is not a matter of simply giving your employees a handbook of rules, policies, and procedures to memorize. Just like how the compliance strategy should be tailored to your firm, so too should the instruction materials be tailored to each type of worker at your company. While it can help to train non-regulated administrative staff how to detect the signs of financial misconduct or fraud, there is no reason to bog them down in the details of SEC regulations that only pertain to traders – doing so can overload them with irrelevant information and make them lose sight of what they need to know.

It is also important to remember that training is not a one-time ordeal. New hires must be onboarded and taught the rules of internal compliance. Existing workers should be retrained to keep them apprised of any updates and to ensure that they remember their roles in the compliance protocol.

4. Keep Your Compliance Strategy Updated

Keeping your compliance strategy updated is also essential when it comes to compliance inspections. An out-of-date compliance protocol may still cover many of the bases for SEC compliance. However, there will be gaps in the compliance requirements that you will be unaware of, giving you a false sense of security.

The compliance strategy should not just be updated to account for new SEC regulations, though: It should also get updated whenever your brokerage firm branches out into new types of trading or adds a new kind of financial service to its portfolio. With that new line of business will likely come new SEC regulations to abide by.

5. Audit Yourself Regularly

Even if you have a good compliance program or plan, have trained workers to follow it, and keep the protocols updated, you are still moving forward blindly if you do not regularly conduct internal audits of your company to make sure that those compliance rules are working. Many compliance programs and strategies check off all of the boxes, only to lead to an SEC investigation that finds problems because a single worker did not actually understand how to correctly perform a job task.

These situations of compliance issues are incredibly frustrating. They can also be detected, identified, and corrected through a compliance strategy that includes internal auditing by outside counsel or an SEC compliance attorney with prior experience investigating securities fraud.

Article By Dr. Nick Oberheiden of Oberheiden P.C.

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Oberheiden P.C. © 2022

Why More Than One Commodity May Not Be Commodities

A plural form of a noun usually implies a set having more than one member of the same type.  For example, a reference to “dogs” is understood to refer to more than one dog.  No one understands a reference to “dogs” to mean a dog, a cat and a mouse.  That is not necessarily the case, however, under the California Corporations Code.

Section 29005 of the Corporations Code defines “commodities” to mean “anything movable that is bought or sold”.  Section 29504 assigns a much broader definition to the singular term “commodity”:

“Commodity” means, except as otherwise specified by the commissioner by rule or order, any agricultural, grain, or livestock product or byproduct, any metal or mineral (including a precious metal set forth in Section 29515), any gem or gemstone (whether characterized as precious, semiprecious, or otherwise), any fuel (whether liquid, gaseous, or otherwise), any foreign currency, and all other goods, articles, products, or items of any kind.  However, the term “commodity” shall not include (a) a numismatic coin whose fair market value is at least 15 percent higher than the value of the metal it contains, or (b) any work of art offered or sold by art dealers, at public auction, or through a private sale by the owner of the work of art.

Putting these two definitions together, it is possible for a multiple items to be “commodities” even though a single item is not a “commodity”.  For example, a numismatic coin of the requisite value would not be a “commodity” even more than one such coin would meet the definition of “commodities”.   The explanation for these seemingly inconsistent definitions is that they are found in two different laws.  “Commodities” is defined in California’s Bucket Shop Law while “commodity” is defined in the California Commodity Law of 1990.

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more corporate law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2010-2022 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Government Brings First Cryptocurrency Insider Trading Charges

In a series of parallel actions announced on July 21, 2022, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated criminal and civil charges against three defendants in the first cryptocurrency insider trading case.

According to the criminal indictment, DOJ alleges that a former employee of a prominent cryptocurrency exchange used his position at the exchange to obtain confidential information about at least 25 future cryptocurrency listings, then tipped his brother and a friend who traded the digital assets in advance of the listing announcements, realizing gains of approximately $1.5 million. The indictment further alleges that the trio used various means to conceal their trading, and that one defendant attempted to flee the United States when their trading was discovered. The Government charged the three with wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy. Notably, and like the Government’s recently announced case involving insider trading in nonfungible tokens, criminal prosecutors did not charge the defendants with securities or commodities fraud.

In its press release announcing the charges, US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Damian Williams said: “Today’s charges are a further reminder that Web3 is not a law-free zone. Just last month, I announced the first ever insider trading case involving NFTs, and today I announce the first ever insider trading case involving cryptocurrency markets. Our message with these charges is clear: fraud is fraud is fraud, whether it occurs on the blockchain or on Wall Street. And the Southern District of New York will continue to be relentless in bringing fraudsters to justice, wherever we may find them.”

Based on these facts, the SEC also announced charges against the three men in a civil complaint alleging securities fraud. In order to assert jurisdiction over the matter, the SEC alleges that at least nine of the cryptocurrencies involved in the alleged insider trading were securities, and the compliant traces through the Howey analysis for each. The SEC has not announced charges against the exchange itself, though in the past it has charged at least one cryptocurrency exchange that listed securities tokens for failure to register as a securities exchange. Perhaps coincidentally, on July 21 the exchange involved in the latest DOJ and SEC cases filed a rulemaking petition with the SEC urging it to “propose and adopt rules to govern the regulation of securities that are offered and traded via digitally native methods, including potential rules to identify which digital assets are securities.”

In an unusual move, Commissioner Caroline Pham of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) released a public statement criticizing the charges. Citing the Federalist Papers, Commissioner Pham described the cases as “a striking example of ‘regulation by enforcement.’” She noted that “the SEC’s allegations could have broad implications beyond this single case, underscoring how critical and urgent it is that regulators work together.” Commissioner Pham continued, “Major questions are best addressed through a transparent process that engages the public to develop appropriate policy with expert input—through notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.” She concluded by stating that, “Regulatory clarity comes from being out in the open, not in the dark.” The CFTC is not directly involved in either case, and it is atypical for a regulator to chide a sister agency on an enforcement matter in this fashion. On the same day, another CFTC Commissioner, Kristin Johnson, issued her own carefully-worded statement that seemed to support the Government’s actions.

Article By Scott H. Kimpel of Hunton Andrews Kurth

For more criminal law and business crimes legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

What Public Comments on the SEC’s Proposed Climate-Related Rules Reveal—and the Impact They May Have on the Proposed Rules

On March 21, 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) published for comment its much-anticipated proposed rules on climate disclosures, entitled “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors.”[1]  The SEC invited public comments on these rules, and the response was overwhelming—nearly 15,000 comments were published on the SEC’s website over the course of three months, from individuals and organizations representing all aspects of modern American society.  Few, if any, of the SEC’s rule proposals have ever received such voluminous, significant, and diverse comments.  And the comments themselves range from brief statements to complex legal arguments either in support or in opposition, as well as detailed proposals for further changes to the proposed climate disclosures.  The comment period closed on June 17, 2022, and further action by the SEC to finalize the proposed rule is anticipated this fall.

This article provides a brief summary of the comments, and analyzes and summaries the key points the comments conveyed.

Statistical Analysis of Form and Individualized Submissions

Since the beginning of the public comment period, the SEC has received 14,645 comments on the proposed climate disclosure rules.[2]  To provide some context for how massive that figure is, the SEC has only received 144 comments on its proposed cybersecurity risk management rules, which were announced two weeks before the proposed climate disclosures and have also been the subject of extensive commentary in the press.  Yet despite the prominence of the SEC’s cybersecurity proposal, it has received fewer than 1% of the comments offered on the climate disclosure rule.

Of the 14,645 comments, approximately 12,304, or 84% of the total, are form letters.  This includes 10,589 comments that the SEC itself identified as form letters, and another 1,715 apparently individualized comments that were actually form letters.  However, even when removing these form letters from consideration, fully 2,341 individualized comment letters remain—a substantial number, and a significant percentage (16%) of the volume.[3]

The form letters are worth exploring in more detail.  Of the 12,304 comments, fully 10,861 (88%) broadly express support for the proposed climate disclosure rule, and only 1,443 (12%) are in opposition.  This disparity in the level of support for the two positions is best conveyed by the chart below.

Positions for and against the new SEC Disclosures

Notably, it has been possible to identify some, although not all, of the organizations that sponsored the form letter writing campaign.  In particular, form letters proposed by the Union of Concerned Scientists in support of the proposed climate disclosures were submitted 6886 times—more than 55% of the total volume of form letters.  Additionally, the form letters proposed by the Climate Action Campaign and the National Wildlife Federation in support of the SEC’s proposed disclosures were also quite voluminous among the submissions—1208 and 956 comment letters, respectively.  The most frequent form letters submitted in opposition to the proposed climate disclosure rules—e.g., those proposed by FreedomWorks (348 letters) and the Club for Growth (172 letters)—did not achieve nearly the same volume of submissions.

But the apparent overwhelming majority in favor of the proposed SEC climate disclosure rules, as conveyed by the form letters, is belied by the individualized submissions, which were far more closely divided.  Of the 2341 individualized comment letters submitted, approximately 53% (1238 comment letters) expressed support, about 43% (1015 comment letters) were opposed, and a handful—around 4% (88 comment letters)[4]—did not express a position.  The below chart demonstrates the levels of support expressed by the individualized submissions:

Individual submissions supporting, opposing, and neutral to the new SEC Disclosures

Besides the mere volume of submissions, however, the most noteworthy aspect of the individualized submissions are the substantive arguments—both factual and legal—that these comment letters articulate, whether in support or opposition to the proposed rules, as well as the identity of those making these submissions.

Arguments in Support of the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rules

The organizations and individuals that chose to offer support for the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures represent a wide swathe of society.  Broadly speaking, these proposed climate disclosures attracted support from, among others: Democratic politicians, civil society organizations (such as environmental NGOs), individual corporations, professional services organizations, and academics. While the rationales offered by these different groups varied considerably, in part due to their varying perspectives (e.g., environmental NGOs were more concerned with the impact on the transition to a clean-energy environment, while corporations often focused on the consequences of particular aspects of the rules), the individualized comments in support of the proposed disclosures nonetheless shared some common features.

Specifically, there are a number of common arguments that are frequently featured among the 1239 individualized submissions in support of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures.  Six arguments appear in over 10% of the submissions.  In order of prevalence, these are:

  1. Environmental Protection (347 submissions, 28%): that the proposed rules will help protect the environment
  2. Investor Choice (280 submissions, 23%): that the proposed rules will enable investors to make more informed choices
  3. Investor Protection (263 submissions, 21%): that the proposed rules will enable investors to protect themselves and their investments from climate-related risk
  4. Standardization of Climate Disclosures (259 submissions, 21%): that the proposed rules will enable the standardization of climate disclosures, making data comparable
  5. Increased Transparency (171 submissions, 14%): that the proposed rules will increase transparency and hold companies accountable for their emissions
  6. Alignment with International and Foreign Regulatory Frameworks (169 submissions, 14%): that the proposed rules will bring the United States into alignment with both international frameworks and other countries (e.g., the EU)

No other argument appeared in more than 6% of the individualized submissions in support of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures.

Notably, the most common arguments in favor of the proposed climate disclosures share a common feature: these are all policy arguments, focusing on the benefits to investors and the broader economy from the adoption of the SEC’s proposed disclosures.  Only a single argument among the top ten most frequent arguments in support was a legal argument—namely that the proposed rules fall within the SEC’s statutory authority—and that argument appeared in only around 3% of the submissions (41 submissions).[5]  This focus on policy benefits among supporters of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures is unsurprising, as these public policy rationales were a key factor in encouraging the Biden Administration to pursue this regulatory agenda.  However, the reluctance to engage with critics of the proposed climate disclosures on a legal basis may signal the difficulties that the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures may encounter in future court challenges.

Arguments in Opposition to the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rules

Those entities and individuals that submitted individualized comment letters opposing the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures also represent a broad range of American society, albeit with a somewhat different focus.  Generally, individualized letters in opposition to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures tended to be submitted by, among others: Republican politicians, individual corporations, trade industry groups, and NGOs. (Unsurprisingly, the fossil fuel industry and extractive industries were particularly well-represented among the commenters.)  These individualized submissions—frequently lengthy and extensively analyzing the SEC’s regulatory practices and authority—shared a number of common themes.

In particular, there are a number of common arguments that featured frequently among the 1014 individualized submissions to the SEC in opposition to these proposed climate disclosures.  Three (3) arguments appeared in more than ten (10) percent of these submissions:

  1. Ultra vires (322 submissions, 32% ): that the SEC lacks the ability to issue these disclosures as the proposed rule is beyond the scope of the SEC’s legal authority
  2. Compliance Costs (218 submissions, 21% ): that compliance with the proposed rule will impose unreasonable and extensive costs on businesses
  3. Climate Science Skepticism (123 submissions, 12%): that the science concerning climate change is unsettled and therefore the proposed rule is inappropriate

Although no other common argument appeared in more than 7% of the individualized letters in opposition, it should still be noted that there were a large number of letters that objected to the increased burdens placed on particular types of businesses, whether farmers (53 submissions, 5%), fossil fuel companies (49 submissions, 5%), or small businesses (36 submissions, 4%).

Overall, it is striking that around a third of the comments submitted in opposition stated that the SEC had acted beyond its authority (ultra vires) in proposing this new rule.  While this critique is hardly novel—it has been a frequent refrain of the Republican SEC Commissioners ever since this topic was first broached—the prevalence of this argument among the individualized comments suggests that both the public and sophisticated market actors perceive this issue as a key vulnerability in the SEC’s proposal, and that this legal argument will likely be emphasized in the inevitable legal challenge to this SEC rule.  And, based on recent decisions by the Supreme Court, it is altogether likely that this line of attack may find a sympathetic audience in the courts.

Potential Changes to the SEC Climate Disclosure Rules Resulting from Public Comments

Despite the differences between the advocates and opponents of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures, both sides submitted proposals to the SEC to change or adjust the proposed rules.  Although there was often substantial disagreement about the content of these proposed changes, there were also significant areas of convergence.

Some of the changes to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures frequently submitted by supporters of the rule included:

  1. ISSB: that the SEC should further align its proposal with the ISSB and help create a global standard (76 comments);
  2. Extended Phase-In Period: to extend the phase-in period for these new disclosure requirements (72 comments);
  3. Alignment with International and Foreign Standards: that the SEC should further align its proposal with international and foreign standards, such as the EU or TCFD (66 comments);
  4. Enhance Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to eliminate exemptions so that all companies must disclose Scope 3 GHG emissions (55 comments);
  5. Principles-Based Approach to Materiality: to adopt a principles-based approach to materiality rather than bright-line rules (53) comments;
  6. Remove Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to remove the requirement that Scope 3 GHG emissions be disclosed (36 comments);
  7. Furnish, Not File: that the disclosures be provided in a document that is “furnished” to the SEC, rather than filed (which impacts potential liability) (26 comments).

Although certain proposed changes by proponents of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule are undeniably expected (e.g., removing exemptions for disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions), there are others that seem somewhat surprising on initial review (e.g., extending the phase-in period or removing Scope 3 GHG emissions entirely).  This can most easily be explained by the fact that supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule include corporations and other business interests, which will resist certain burdensome regulations even if generally offering support for the overall thrust of the proposal.  There are also academics and others who continue to express skepticism concerning the utility of disclosing Scope 3 emissions, or even whether it can be adequately measured.

It should be emphasized that these changes proffered by supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule, many of which are designed to render the proposed rule less onerous, may indicate that the support for the proposed rule—or at least the most stringent aspects of it—is relatively weak (or at least among the corporate interests nominally aligned with the SEC).

The most frequent changes suggested by opponents of the rule included:

  1. Remove Scope 3 GHG Emissions: to remove the requirement that Scope 3 GHG emissions be disclosed (69 comments);
  2. Principles-Based Approach to Materiality: to adopt a principles-based approach to materiality rather than bright-line rules (35 comments);
  3. Extended Phase-In Period: to extend the phase-in period for these new disclosure requirements (25 comments);
  4. Furnish, Not File: that the disclosures be provided in a document that is “furnished” to the SEC, rather than filed (which impacts potential liability) (18 comments).

These proposed changes (and others) advanced by opponents of the SEC’s proposed rule are generally designed to make the rules less stringent and also to reduce costs and potential legal liability.

As can be seen by comparing the above lists, there are certain areas where suggested changes to the proposed rule converged.  In particular, there are issues where both opponents of the SEC’s proposed rule and some of its supporters would try to render it less intrusive or impactful, particularly with respect to the elimination of the requirement to report Scope 3 GHG emissions and to extend the phase-in period further.  (Although, as noted, this apparent convergence between opponents and supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule may be due to divergent interests among the supporters of the SEC’s proposed rule with respect to its implementation.)

But, regardless of the specific content of the particular proposed changes, what is undoubtedly significant is that these proposed changes have highlighted the aspects of the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule that are likely most sensitive to regulated corporations.  Such an insight reveals not only the areas where active lobbying is most likely to take place, but also previews probable priorities for corporate compliance departments.  In effect, focusing on the aspects of the proposed rule where changes were proposed is a means to identify the key issues from the perspective of the regulated entities and the public at large.

Conclusion

The level of engagement with the SEC’s proposed climate disclosures, as demonstrated by the number and detail of the public comments offered, is extraordinary. This degree of attention indicates the significant impact that is expect to result from the ultimate promulgation of these rules (or a revised version thereof).

Of course, the key question here is what changes, if any, are likely to be made to the SEC’s proposed rule based upon the public comments submitted to the SEC.  In this context, it is noteworthy that a handful of key issues have been identified by both proponents and opponents of the proposed disclosures as especially ripe for potential revision.  As noted above, these include, among others, the length of the phase-in period and the disclosure of Scope 3 GHG emissions.  If any changes are to be made to the SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule, it is likely that such changes will be related to these issues.

However, given the relative lack of forward momentum with respect to other aspects of the Biden Administration’s climate agenda, there may well be political pressure not to weaken or otherwise rollback the SEC’s proposed rule, as this is one of the few areas where significant—and publicly-recognized—progress has been made with regulations designed to address the issue of climate change.  Further, the Biden Administration’s SEC has certainly recognized the inevitability of a legal challenge to these proposed climate disclosures, and, since no degree of alteration would suffice to preempt such a lawsuit, the SEC may conclude that it is better to seek to implement all aspects of the proposed regulation for the political benefit that can be achieved in the short term, since the substantive aspects of the proposed disclosure may not ultimately survive judicial scrutiny.  The SEC may also prefer to send a strong signal to the market by maintaining its original proposed rule.  Recognizing these pressures, it seems unlikely that the public comments submitted to the SEC will have a significant impact on the final rule promulgated in the coming months—and improbable that the SEC will make the proposed disclosures less robust.

FOO​TNOTES

[1] These proposed rules are discussed more fully in our prior publication:  https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2451/2022-03-30-brief-summary-secs-proposed-climate-related-rules

[2] Although the total number of comments, when including both form letters and individualized letters, is 14,739, there are 94 comment letters on the SEC website that are duplicates, and have thus been removed from the calculation.

[3] For comparison, the proposed SEC rule on disclosing compensation ratios drew about 300,000 form letters and around 1500 individualized comment letters.  In this case, the individualized comment letters represented only about 0.5% of the total volume.  https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713.shtml

[4] The eighty-eight comment letters that did not adopt an express position on the proposed climate disclosure rules instead conveyed a number of different points, including proposing narrow changes to the proposed rule without taking a stance on the rule as a whole, or offering further context for the SEC’s actions (e.g., comparing the SEC to other regulators, whether domestic or international).  This category also includes a number of early comments that simply requested that the SEC extend the deadline for submitting comments.

[5] There are public comments in support of the proposed rule that focus on the legal issues.  In particular, the submission of Prof. John Coates of Harvard Law School, a former SEC official, is devoted exclusively to defending the legal authority of the SEC to issue the proposed climate disclosure rule. https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20130026-296547.pdf

Article By Jacob H. Hupart, Megan N. Gates, William F. Weld, Douglas P. Baumstein, Jennifer B. Rubin, and Courtney O. Taylor of Mintz. Luke Haubenstock also contributed to this article.

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

By Law, Everything Is Possible In California

The California Civil Code includes a number of decidedly gnomic provisions.  Section 1597 is one of these.  It purports to answer the question of what is possible:

Everything is deemed possible except that which is impossible in the nature of things.

The problem with the statute is that it doesn’t fully answer the question because to know what is possible, one must know what is impossible and the statute doesn’t provide a definition of impossibility.  In this regard, I am reminded of the following lines from James Joyce’s Ulysses: 

But can those have been possible seeing that they never were?  Or was that only possible which came to pass?

But why define what is possible?  The reason is that Civil Code requires that the object of a contract must, among other things, be possible by the time that it is to be performed.  Cal. Civ. Code § 1596.  When a contract that has a single object that is impossible of performance, the entire contract is void.  Cal. Civ. Code § 1598.

Happy Bloomsday!

Today is Bloomsday.  Joyce chose June 16, 1904 as the day on which most (but not all) of the action in Ulysses takes place.  It is called Bloomsday because the hero of the novel is Leopold Bloom.  It was on June 16, 1904 that Joyce and his future wife, Nora Barnacle, had their first date (and intimate contact).

1C8E1253-FA65-4ED3-B026-ABF4D9098AAC

Finn’s Hotel in Dublin, where Nora worked in 1904

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more legislative legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2010-2022 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

A Fool in Idaho; SEC Sues Idahoans for Insider Trading Scheme

In July 1993 two brothers, David and Tom Gardner, and a friend, Erik Rydholm, founded a private investment advisory firm in Alexandria, Virginia. They named that firm Motley Fool after the court jester in “As You Like It,” a play written by William Shakespeare (it is believed in 1599). The Motley Fool, or Touchstone as he is known in the play, was the only character who could speak the truth to Duke Frederick without having his head cut off. Similarly, Motley Fool, the advisory firm, sought to give investors accurate advice, even if it flew in the face of received wisdom. For example, in advance of April Fool’s Day 1994, Motley Fool issued a series of online messages promoting a non-existent sewage-disposal company. The April Fool’s Day prank was intended to teach investors a lesson about penny stock companies. The messages gained widespread attention including an article in The Wall Street Journal.

Over time Motley Fool grew into a worldwide subscription stock recommendation service. It now releases new recommendations every Thursday, and subscribers receive them through computer interfaces provided by Motley Fool. The terms of service in a Motley Fool subscription agreement (in the words of the May 3, 2022 Complaint brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [“SEC”] in the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York) “expressly prohibit unauthorized access to its systems.”  David Lee Stone of Nampa, Idaho (southwest of Boise), is a 36-year-old computer design and repair person with a degree in computer science.  Since June 2021, he and his wife have lived periodically in Romania, a fact cited in the Complaint, suggesting, perhaps, some involvement with Romania-based computer hackers. In any event, Stone is alleged in the Complaint to have used deceptive means beginning in November 2020 to obtain pre-release access to upcoming Motley Fool stock picks. Using that information, Stone and a co-defendant made aggressive investments, typically in options, which generated more than $12 million in gains. Stone, his codefendant, and his family and friends all benefited financially from knowing in advance the Motley Fool picks.

The SEC seeks injunctions against Stone and his co-defendant, as well as disgorgement with interest and civil penalties, for violating the antifraud provisions of federal law. The Commission also seeks disgorgement with interest from the family and friends. In addition, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York has filed criminal charges against Stone.

This case is in many ways reminiscent of the 1985 federal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (who happened to be Rudolph Giuliani at the time) of R. Foster Winans. Winans was, from 1982 to 1984, the co-author of “Heard on the Street,” a column in The Wall Street Journal. Winans leaked advance word of what would be in his column to a stockbroker who then invested with the benefit of that information, sharing some of the profits with Winans. Winans argued that his actions were unethical, but not criminal. He was found guilty of insider trading and wire fraud and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. He appealed his conviction all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court rulings.

Attempting to profit on market sensitive information can be both a civil and a criminal offense. The SEC Enforcement Division and the relevant U.S. Attorney are prepared to introduce a perpetrator to those consequences.

Article By Peter D. Hutcheon of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

CFTC Wades Into Climate Regulation

On June 2, 2022, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued a Request for Information (“RFI”) for “public comment on climate-related financial risk to better inform its understanding and oversight of climate-related financial risk as pertinent to the derivatives markets and underlying commodities markets.”  According to the RFI, the CFTC is contemplating “potential future actions including, but not limited to, issuing new or amended guidance, interpretations, policy statements, regulations, or other potential Commission action within its authority under the Commodity Exchange Act as well as its participation in any domestic or international fora.”

Specifically, the RFI issued by the CFTC is quite wide-ranging, and engages with numerous aspects of the CFTC’s authority, focusing on both systemic and narrow issues.  For example, the CFTC has, among other things, issued a broad request for comment on how “its existing regulatory framework and market oversight . . . may be affected by climate-related financial risk” and “how climate-related financial risk may affect any of its registered entities, registrants, or other market participants, and the soundness of the derivatives markets.”  It is hard to imagine a broader request by the CFTC–it is effectively asking for input on how “climate-related financial risk” may impact any portion of its regulatory purview.  Conversely, the CFTC has also posed very specific questions, including as to how the CFTC “could enhance the integrity of voluntary carbon markets and foster transparency, fairness, and liquidity in those markets,” and how it could “adapt its oversight of the derivatives markets, including any new or amended derivative products created to hedge-climate-related financial risk.”  In short, based upon the RFI, the CFTC could conceivably adopt a narrow or broad view of how it should adjust its regulations to account for climate-related financial risk.  Notably, however, the CFTC also asked if there were “ways in which updated disclosure requirements could aid market participants in better assessing climate-related risks,” which suggests that the CFTC may echo the SEC’s recent proposed rule for mandatory climate disclosures.

Most significantly, the fact that yet another financial regulatory agency is focused on “climate-related financial risk” suggests that the Biden Administration is willing to expend significant resources and energy in engaging in this type of regulation to advance its climate agenda.  When considered in tandem with the SEC’s recent proposed rules for mandatory climate disclosures and to combat greenwashing, it is apparent that there is a significant regulatory focus on climate issues and the financial markets.  This move by the CFTC also suggests that the Biden Administration will fully support the SEC’s proposed rules against the inevitable legal challenge.  (And, based upon the concurrences of the Republican CFTC commissioners to this RFI, it is likely that any climate-related regulation proposed by the CFTC will also be subject to legal challenge, likely on the grounds that such a regulation exceeded the CFTC’s authority.)  Most importantly, this move by the CFTC–that seeks to “understand how market participants use the derivative markets to hedge and speculate on various aspects of physical and transition [climate] risk”–demonstrates that the regulatory focus on climate and the financial markets will remain a top priority for the foreseeable future.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission today unanimously voted to release a Request for Information (RFI) to seek public comment on climate-related financial risk to better inform its understanding and oversight of climate-related financial risk as pertinent to the derivatives markets and underlying commodities markets.

Article By Jacob H. Hupart of Mintz

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SEC Commissioner Signals Need to Fulfill Mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Develop “Minimum Standards” for Lawyers Practicing Before the Commission

In remarks on March 5, 2022, on PLI’s Corporate Governance webcast, Commissioner Allison Herren Lee of the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that 20 years after its enactment, it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and establish minimum standards for lawyers practicing before the Commission.1  Commissioner Lee, who announced that she will not seek a second term when her current one ends this month, took issue with what she called the “goal-directed reasoning” of some securities lawyers—that is, focusing primarily on the outcome sought by executives, rather than the impact on investors and the market as a whole.  Such lawyering, Commissioner Lee observed, has a host of negative consequences, including encouraging non-disclosure of material information, harming investors and market integrity, and stymying deterrence.  The solution, Commissioner Lee opined, is to fulfill the mandate of Section 307, which empowered the Commission to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers.”2

Over the last 20 years, the Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before the Commission.  There are good reasons for the Commission’s inaction, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, the fact-specific nature of materiality determinations, and the traditionally state-law basis for the regulation of attorney conduct.  Commissioner Lee, moreover, did not propose specific new rules and recognized that the task was difficult and should be informed by the views of the securities bar and other stakeholders.  Nor did she say that action by the Commission was imminent; it is unclear whether the Commission has authority to promulgate new rules under Section 307 given a 180-day sunset under the statute that occurred in 2003.  Indeed, neither Commissioner Lee nor any of the other SEC commissioners have issued statements on this topic since the PLI webcast.  SEC Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal has, however, indicated an increased emphasis on gatekeeper accountability in order to restore public trust in the market.3  Nonetheless, given the Commission’s existing authority to impose discipline under its Rules of Practice, practitioners should be mindful of the potential for increased scrutiny moving forward.

Background

In the wake of corporate accounting scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, and other companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets.”4  The Act was aimed at “combating fraud, improving the reliability of financial reporting, and restoring investor confidence,”5 including by empowering the SEC with increased regulatory authority and enforcement power.6  To that end, the Act includes provisions to fortify auditor independence, promote corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures, and enhance corporate fraud accountability.7

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed just six months after the collapse of Enron in December 2001, and neither the House nor Senate bills originally contained professional responsibility language.8  Hours before the Senate passed its version of the Act, however, the Senate amended the bill to include language that would eventually become Section 307.9  Around the same time, 40 law professors sent a letter to the SEC requesting the inclusion of a professional conduct rule governing corporate lawyers practicing before the Commission.10  The letter picked up on a 1996 article by Professor Richard Painter, then of the University of Illinois College of Law, which recommended corporate fraud disclosure obligations for attorneys similar to those imposed on accountants by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.11  Senator John Edwards, one of the sponsors of the Senate floor amendment of the bill, emphasized the importance of including professional conduct rules for attorneys in such a significant piece of legislation, stating that “[o]ne of the problems we have seen occurring with this sort of crisis in corporate misconduct is that some lawyers have forgotten their responsibility” is to the companies and shareholders they represent, not corporate executives.12

In its final form, Section 307 imposed a professional responsibility requirement for attorneys that represent issuers appearing before the Commission.  Specifically, Section 307 directed the Commission, within 180 days of enactment of the law, to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,”13 and, at minimum, promulgate “a rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the issuer or any agent thereof to appropriate officers within the issuer and, thereafter, to the highest authority within the issuer, if the initial report does not result in an appropriate response.”14

Since the enactment of Section 307, however, the Commission has promulgated only one rule pursuant to its authority, commonly known as the “up-the-ladder” rule.15  The up-the-ladder rule imposes a duty on attorneys representing an issuer before the Commission to report evidence of material violations of the securities laws.  When an attorney learns of evidence of a material violation, the attorney has a duty to report it to the issuer’s chief legal officer (“CLO”) and/or the CEO.16  If the attorney believes the CLO or CEO did not take appropriate action within a reasonable time to address the violation, the attorney has a duty to report the evidence to the audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or the full board of directors until the attorney receives “an appropriate response.”17  Alternatively, attorneys can satisfy their duty by reporting the violation to a qualified legal compliance committee.18  To date, the SEC has never brought a case alleging a violation of the up-the-ladder rule.

Commissioner Lee’s Remarks

In her remarks, Commissioner Lee stated that it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 and consider whether the Commission should adopt and enforce minimum standards for lawyers who practice before the Commission.  Commissioner Lee criticized “goal-directed reasoning” employed by sophisticated counsel in securities matters, and cited as an example Bandera Master Fund v. Boardwalk Pipeline,19 a recent decision in which the Delaware Court of Chancery rebuked the attorneys involved for their efforts to satisfy the aims of a general partner instead of their duty to the partnership-client as a whole.  The Court, specifically, stated that counsel “knowingly made unrealistic and counterfactual assumptions, knowingly relied on an artificial factual predicate, and consistently engaged in goal-directed reasoning to get to the result that [the general partner] wanted.”20  Bandera and cases like it, according to Commissioner Lee, are emblematic of a “race to the bottom” caused by pressure on securities lawyers to compete with each other for clients, while failing to give due consideration to the potential impact on investors, market integrity, and the public interest.

In Commissioner Lee’s view, “goal-directed” lawyering not only falls short of ethical standards but causes harm to the market and reduces deterrence.  Commissioner Lee expressed concern that, in an effort to give management the answer it wants, lawyers may downplay or obscure material information.21  Although recognizing that materiality determinations are fact-intensive, Commissioner Lee said that should not provide blanket cover for legal advice aimed at concealing material information from the public.  Non-disclosure has a host of negative consequences, including distorting market-moving information, interfering with price discovery, misallocating capital, impairing investor decision-making, and eroding confidence in the financial markets and regulatory system.  Further, such lawyering diminishes deterrence by creating a legal cover for inadequate disclosure, making it more difficult for regulators to hold responsible individuals accountable.  This type of legal counsel, in Commissioner Lee’s view, “is merely rent-seeking masquerading as legal advice, while providing a shield against liability.”

Commissioner Lee stated that the existing framework governing professional conduct is not adequate to hold lawyers accountable for such “reckless” advice.  According to Commissioner Lee, state bars—the principal source for lawyer discipline nationwide—are not up to the task because they lack resources, expertise in securities matters, and the ability to impose adequate monetary sanctions.  Additionally, Commissioner Lee noted that state law standards focused mostly on the behavior of individual lawyers, assigning few responsibilities to the firm for quality assurance.  Indeed, state law standards are mostly drafted in a “one-size-fits-all fashion” according to Commissioner Lee, and do not take into account the different issues faced at large firms that represent public companies, which are quite different from a solo practitioner handling personal injury or estate law matters.  Likewise, although the SEC has the power under Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice to suspend or bar attorneys whose conduct falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,” there has been little effort to define or enforce that standard.22  Nor has the SEC rigorously enforced standards of attorney conduct under the one rule it has issued under Section 307, the “up-the-ladder” rule.

Commissioner Lee stated that it was time for the Commission to fulfill its mandate under Section 307.  Although not proposing any specific rules, Commissioner Lee offered the following concepts as a starting point:

  • Greater detail on lawyers’ obligations to a corporate client, including how advice must reflect “the interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather than the executives who hire them”;
  • Requirements of “competence and expertise” (as an example, disclosure lawyers should not opine on materiality “without sufficient focus or understanding of the views of ‘reasonable’ investors”);
  • Continuing education for securities lawyers advising public companies (similar to requirements set by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board for minimum hours of qualifying continuing professional education for audit firm personnel);
  • Oversight at the firm level (similar to quality-control measures implemented at audit firms);
  • Emphasis on the need for independence in rendering advice (similar to substantive and disclosure requirements implemented in Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X for auditors);
  • Obligations to investigate red flags and ensure accurate predicates for legal opinions (similar to the obligations that an auditor must perform to certify to the accuracy of their client’s financial statements); and
  • Retention of contemporaneous records to support the reasonableness of legal advice.

Commissioner Lee noted that the content of any specific rules or standards will require “careful thought,” as well as assistance from the securities bar, experts on professional responsibility, and other interested parties and market participants.  She invited input from the legal community and other stakeholders and noted that she appreciated the complexity of the task and concerns of the American Bar Association and others regarding protection of the attorney-client privilege.  Indeed, outside auditors are generally regarded as “public watchdogs” and such communications between the corporation and an auditor are not entitled to the affirmative attorney-client privilege afforded to legal counsel.  Accordingly, regulating the legal profession using a similar framework to that applied to the accounting profession has sparked more controversy.  Nonetheless, in Commissioner Lee’s view, those concerns should be weighed against “the costs of there being few, if any, consequences for contrived or tortured advice.”

Implications

The Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it in the 20 years since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Commissioner Lee’s call for minimum standards, however, potentially signals increased scrutiny by the SEC with respect to lawyers who “practice before the Commission.”  As Commissioner Lee noted, that means “counsel involved in the formulation and review of issuers’ public disclosure, including those who address the many legal questions that often arise in that context.”23  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee cautioned that she did “not intend with these comments to address the conduct of attorneys serving as litigators or otherwise representing their client(s) in an advocacy role in an adversarial proceeding or other similar context, such as in an enforcement investigation.”24

Although framing her call for standards in terms of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is not clear that the Commission will—or even can—promulgate any further rules under that authority.  Commissioner Lee did not state that she was speaking on behalf of the Commission or indicate that the Commission would be taking concrete, imminent steps to adopt such standards.  The Commission has not put its imprimatur on the remarks by incorporating them into a formal release or statement of policy.  Moreover, the text of Section 307 appears to foreclose the possibility of further rulemaking, as it provides that the Commission shall issue any such rules “[n]ot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this act,” i.e., January 27, 2003.  Consistent with that constraint, the SEC proposed the up-the-ladder requirements on November 21, 2002, in Release No. 33-8150, and the rule became final on January 29, 2003.25  But the SEC has not issued any other rule under Section 307 to date.

Even if official action under Section 307 may not be forthcoming, Commissioner Lee’s call for action should not be discounted.  Setting aside the up-the-ladder requirements, the SEC has authority under Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice to censure or bar a lawyer from appearing or practicing before the Commission if found, among other things, “[t]o be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged and unethical or improper professional conduct.”26  Commissioner Lee cited prior SEC guidance to indicate that Rule 102(e) may apply to attorney conduct that falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,”27 a standard that has been left undefined to date.28  In practice, the SEC “will hold attorneys who practice before it to the standards to which they are already subject, including state bar rules.”29  At a minimum, then, Commissioner Lee’s objective of greater accountability may be achieved through a more aggressive application of Rule 102(e), which, as she noted, has generally only been applied as a follow-on penalty for primary violations of the securities laws by lawyers.

Commissioner Lee’s term expires on June 5, and she has announced that she intends to step down from the Commission once a successor has been confirmed.30  Should the Commission nonetheless take up her call to action in the future, it will be no easy task to adopt clear standards that can be implemented in a predictable manner.  In particular, Commissioner Lee’s focus on the role of lawyers in advising issuers on determinations of materiality and disclosure does not lend itself well to oversight or enforcement.  The well-established standard for materiality—whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”—is far from clear-cut.31  The Supreme Court, moreover, long has recognized that materiality “depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”32  As such, and as evidenced by the sundry cases concerning disclosure issues reversed on appeal, disagreement between litigants—as well as jurists—on matters of materiality and disclosure are par for the course.  If that is so, how can a lawyer’s advice on such matters (which will inevitably turn on the facts and the lawyer’s judgment and experience) be subject to oversight in any objective sense?

Even if lawyers’ materiality advice could be evaluated under objective standards, there are other difficulties.  First and foremost is that oversight of legal advice implicates the attorney-client privilege and the underlying benefit of candid advice from securities disclosure and corporate counsel.  As the Supreme Court has observed, the attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”33  Aside from situations in which the client has voluntarily waived privilege (as sometimes occurs in SEC investigations) or where another exception to the privilege applies, it is unclear how the SEC could evaluate legal advice without invading privilege.  Such attempts could have led to an increase in corporate wrongdoing as corporate executives could be more reluctant to seek expert legal advice.  In addition, it is unclear how regulators assessing materiality advice would—or could—balance an assessment of whether a lawyer has given the “correct” advice with a lawyer’s ethical obligations of zealous representation of the client.34  The divide between overreaching “goal-directed” reasoning and permissible zealous advocacy for the client is often murky, and reasonable minds can differ depending on the circumstances.  Moreover, it is already well-accepted that a corporate lawyer’s obligation is to the corporation as its client, not to any individual officer or director.35  That obligation carries with it ethical duties to “proceed as is reasonably necessary for the best interest” of the corporation, including when the lawyer is aware of violations of the law or other misconduct by senior management.36  In that sense, Commissioner Lee’s proposal could be viewed as a call for the SEC to take on enforcement of existing ethical rules, rather than for the development of novel “minimum standards.”

Ultimately, there are good reasons for the Commission’s reluctance to date to formally adopt minimum standards of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, and the fact-specific nature of materiality inquiries.  The manipulation of facts and bad reasoning targeted by Commissioner Lee are not only the exception, and difficult if not impossible to eliminate completely, but are largely covered by existing rules and practices.  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee’s call for lawyers to strive for higher legal and ethical standards in their counsel should be welcomed.  Sound legal advice is not only important for issuer clients, but also for the financial well-being of investors, the integrity of the markets, and public confidence in the regulatory system and capital markets.  Enhancements in ethical standards for the legal profession could also lead to reputational benefits and greater integrity in the profession.  It remains to be seen whether Commissioner Lee’s remarks will serve as an aspirational goal for securities lawyers, or translate into concrete action by the Commission.

1 Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, Send Lawyers, Guns and Money: (Over-) Zealous Representation by Corporate Lawyers Remarks at PLI’s Corporate Governance – A Master Class 2022 (Mar. 4, 2022), [hereinafter “Commissioner Lee Remarks”].

2 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

3 Gurbir Grewal, Director, Division of Enforcement, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2021 (Oct. 13, 2021).

4 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 432 (2014).

5 Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2006).

6 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2002).

7 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).

8 Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 461, 464 (2003).

9 Id.

10 Id. at 468-69.

11 See generally Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996).

12 Wheeler, supra note 8, at 465 (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)).

13 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

14 Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003).

15 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.

16 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).

17 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(3), (b)(4).

18 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).

19 Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, No. CV 2018-0372-JTL, 2021 WL 5267734, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2021).  In Bandera, plaintiffs brought suit against a general partner for breach of a partnership agreement stemming from the general partner’s exercise of a call right without satisfying two requisite preconditions.  The court held for the plaintiffs and found the general partner had engaged in willful misconduct.  Id. at *51.  Contributing to the misconduct was the general partner’s outside counsel, who drafted an opinion letter justifying the general partner’s exercise of the call right.  Id.  Throughout the drafting process, the court found, that the outside counsel manipulated the facts in order to achieve the general partner’s desired conclusion.  Id. at *18-*47.

20 Id. at *51.

21 Commissioner Lee specifically cited, among other matters, environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) disclosures.  The Commission is currently considering additional climate change-related disclosures to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X.  See Jason Halper et al., SEC Proposes Climate-Related Changes to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Mar. 23, 2022); see also Paul Kiernan, SEC Proposes More Disclosure Requirements for ESG Funds, The Wall Street Journal (May 25, 2022, 6:26 pm ET).

22 Rule 102(e) states, in relevant part:

(1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter:

(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or

(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or

(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.

17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1).

23 Commissioner Lee Remarks, supra note 1.

24 Id.

25 Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8150 (Nov. 21, 2002); Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003); see also 2 Legal Malpractice § 14:114 (2022 ed.).

26 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).  The Rules of Practice generally “govern proceedings before the Commission under the statutes that it administers.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.100.  The SEC has the authority to administer and enforce such rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. See Comment to Rule 100, SEC Rules of Practice (July 2003).

27 In the Matter of William R. Carter Charles J. Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 28, 1981) (“elemental notions of fairness dictate that the Commission should not establish new rules of conduct and impose them retroactively upon professionals who acted at the time without reason to believe that their conduct was unethical or improper.  At the same time, however, we perceive no unfairness whatsoever in holding those professionals who practice before us to generally recognized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms had previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed by the Commission.  To do so upsets no justifiable expectations, since the professional is already subject to those norms.”).

28 In the past, the Commission has sought to discipline lawyers for violating securities laws with scienter, rendering misleading opinions used in disclosures and engaged in otherwise liable conduct, but not for giving negligent legal advice to issuers. See In the Matter of Scott G. Monson, Release No. 28323 (June 30, 2008) (collecting cases).

29 In the Matter of Steven Altman, Esq., Release No. 63306 (Nov. 10, 2010).

30 Statement of Planned Departure from the Commission (Mar. 15, 2022).

31 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).

32 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).

33 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).

34 Rule 1.3: Diligence, American Bar Association, (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); Rule 1.3 Diligence – Comment 1, American Bar Association,  (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).

35 See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.

36 Rule 1.13: Organization As Client, American Bar Association, cmt. 2  (last visited April 19, 2022).

Article By Jason M. Halper, William P. Mills, Erica Hogan, Adam Magid, James Orth, and Jayshree Balakrishnan of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

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Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Act Enters into Force

On June 1, 2022, Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Act (“PDPA”) entered into force after three years of delays. The PDPA, originally enacted in May 2019, provides for a one-year grace period, with the main operative provisions of the law originally set to come into force in 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the Thai government issued royal decrees to extend the compliance deadline to June 1, 2022. 

The PDPA mirrors the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) in many respects. Specifically, it requires data controllers and processors to have a valid legal basis for processing personal data (i.e., data that can identify living natural persons directly or indirectly). If such personal data is sensitive personal data (such as health data, biometric data, race, religion, sexual preference and criminal record), data controllers and processors must ensure that data subjects give explicit consent for any collection, use or disclosure of such data. Exemptions are granted for public interest, contractual obligations, vital interest or compliance with the law.

The PDPA applies both to entities in Thailand and abroad that process personal data for the provision of products or services in Thailand. Like the GDPR, data subjects are guaranteed rights, including the right to be informed, access, rectify and update data; restrict and object to processing; and the right to data erasure and portability. Breaches may result in fines between THB500,000 (U.S.$14,432) and THB5 million, plus punitive compensation. Certain breaches involving sensitive personal data and unlawful disclosure also carry criminal penalties including imprisonment of up to one year.

Article By Hunton Andrews Kurth’s Privacy and Cybersecurity of Hunton Andrews Kurth

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How Changing Beneficial Ownership Reporting May Impact Activism

The SEC in February proposed amendments to Regulation 13D-G to modernize beneficial ownership reporting requirements. Adoption of the amendments as proposed will accelerate the timing – and expand the scope – of knowledge of certain activist activities. The deadline for comments on the proposed rules was April 11 and final rules are expected to be released later this year.

The current reporting timeline creates an asymmetry of information between beneficial owners on the one hand and other stockholders and issuers on the other. The SEC proposal is seeking to eliminate this asymmetry and address other concerns surrounding current beneficial ownership reporting. The accelerated beneficial ownership reporting deadlines will result in greater transparency in stock ownership, allowing market participants to receive material information in a timely manner and potentially alleviating the market manipulation and abusive tactics used by some investors.

The shortened filing deadlines should benefit a company’s overall shareholder engagement activities. The investor relations team at a company will have a more accurate and up-to-date picture of its institutional investor base throughout the year, which should result in more timely outreach to such shareholders.

INVESTOR ACCUMULATION OF SHARES BEFORE DISCLOSURE

Although issuers will likely view the proposed rules as beneficial, many commentators have predicted a negative impact on shareholder activism. Under the current reporting requirements, certain activist investors may benefit by having both additional time to accumulate shares before disclosing such activities and potentially more flexibility in strategizing with other investors.

Many commentators have argued that the proposed shorter timeline for beneficial ownership reporting will negatively impact an activist shareholder’s ability to accumulate shares of an issuer at a potentially lower price than if market participants had more timely knowledge of such activity and intent. In many cases a company’s stock price is impacted once an investor files a Schedule 13D with clear activist intent. This can even occur in some cases once a Schedule 13G is filed by a known activist investor without current activist intent.

If the shorter reporting deadlines reduce such investors’ profit, it is expected that an investor’s incentive to accumulate stock in order to initiate change at a company will also be reduced. Activists instead may be encouraged to engage more with management. In other words, the shorter reporting period may deter short-term activists and encourage more long-term focused activism.

TIMING OF ISSUER RESPONSE

The shorter reporting deadlines are also expected to result in management having earlier notice of any takeover attempt and to give a company the opportunity to react more quickly to any such attempt. There is potential for this to lead to increased use of low-threshold poison pills. But the SEC stated in the proposed rules release that it believes the risk of abundant reactionary low-threshold poison pills is overstated due to scrutiny of such poison pills from courts and academia, limitations imposed by state law and the unlikelihood that the beneficial ownership would trigger the low-threshold poison pills.

Companies that have low-threshold poison pills – such as one designed to protect a company’s net operating losses – may want to review them to confirm that the proposed rules would not be expected to have any impact. For example, such poison pills may link the definition of beneficial ownership to the SEC rules, including Schedule 13D and 13G filings.

‘GROUP’ REPORTING

Another proposed change expected to affect shareholder activism is the expanded definition of ‘group’ for the purposes of reporting under Schedule 13D. The current rules require an explicit agreement between two or more persons to establish a group for purposes of the beneficial ownership reporting thresholds.

Commentators believe that under the current rules, certain investors seeking change at a company may share the fact that they are accumulating shares of a company with other shareholders or activists, which can then act on this information before the general public is aware; in other words, before public disclosure in and market reaction to the Schedule 13D filing. This activity may result in near-term gains for the select few involved before uninformed shareholders can react.

Under the SEC’s proposed amended Rule 13d-5, persons who share information with another regarding an upcoming Schedule 13D filing are deemed to have formed a group within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) regardless of whether an explicit agreement is in place, and such concerted action will trigger reporting requirements. This proposed change is expected to benefit companies and shareholders overall by preventing certain investors from acting in concert on information not known to a company and its other shareholders.

The full impact of the proposed rule changes on shareholder activism cannot be accurately predicted, but we believe that at a minimum, issuers will find it beneficial to have more regularly updated information on their institutional investor base for, among other things, their shareholder engagement efforts.

Article By Alexandra Clark Layfield and Rachel Solino of  Jones Walker LLP

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