Taking Control of Cybersecurity: A Practical Guide for Officers and Directors

Foley and Lardner LLP

Major cybersecurity attacks of increased sophistication — and calculated to maximize the reputational and financial damage caused to the corporate targets — are now commonplace. These attacks have catapulted cybersecurity to a top priority for senior executives and board members.

To help these decision makers get their arms around cybersecurity issues, Foley Partners Chanley T. Howell, Michael R. Overly, and James R. Kalyvas have published a comprehensive white paper entitled: Taking Control of Cybersecurity — A Practical Guide for Officers and Directors.

The white paper describes very practical steps that officers and directors should ensure are in place or will be in place in their organizations to prevent or respond to data security attacks, and to mitigate the resulting legal and reputational risks from a cyber-attack. The authors provide a blueprint for managing information security and complying with the evolving standard of care. Checklists for each key element of cybersecurity compliance and a successful risk management program are included.

Excerpt From Taking Control of Cybersecurity: A Practical Guide for Officers and Directors

Sony, Target, Westinghouse, Home Depot, U.S. Steel, Neiman Marcus, and the National Security Agency (NSA). The security breaches suffered by these and many other organizations, including most recently the consolidated attacks on banks around the world, combined with an 80 percent increase in attacks in just the last 12 months, have catapulted cybersecurity to the top of the list of priorities and responsibilities for senior executives and board members.

The devastating effects that a security breach can have on an enterprise, coupled with the bright global spotlight on the issue, have forever removed responsibility for data security from the sole province of the IT department and CIO. While most in leadership positions today recognize the elevated importance of data security risks in their organization, few understand what action should be taken to address these risks. This white paper explains and demystifies cybersecurity for senior management and directors by identifying the steps enterprises must take to address, mitigate, and respond to the risks associated with data security.

Officers and Directors are Under a Legal Obligation to Involve Themselves in Information Security

The corporate laws of every state impose fiduciary obligations on all officers and directors. Courts will not second-guess decisions by officers and directors made in good faith with reasonable care and inquiry. To fulfill that obligation, officers and directors must assume an active role in establishing correct governance, management, and culture for addressing security in their organizations.

Download This White Paper

ARTICLE BY

Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Litigation Heating Up

Barnes Thornburg

The past few months have been busy for courts and the SEC dealing with securities whistleblowers. The Supreme Court’s potentially landmark decision in Lawson v. FMR LLC back in March already seems like almost ancient history.  In that decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection provision (18 U.S.C. §1514A) protected not simply employees of public companies but also employees of private contractors and subcontractors, like law firms, accounting firms, and the like, who worked for public companies. (And according to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, it might even extend to housekeepers and gardeners of employees of public companies).

Since then, a lot has happened in the world of whistleblowers. Much of the activity has focused on Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions, rather than Sarbanes-Oxley. This may be because Dodd-Frank has greater financial incentives for plaintiffs, or because some courts have concluded that it does not require an employee to report first to an enforcement agency. The following are some interesting developments:

What is a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank?

This seemingly straightforward question has generated a number of opinions from courts and the SEC. The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower-protection provision, enacted in 2010, focuses on a potentially different “whistleblower” population than Sarbanes-Oxley does. Sarbanes-Oxley’s provision focuses particularly on whistleblower disclosures regarding certain enumerated activities (securities fraud, bank fraud, mail or wire fraud, or any violation of an SEC rule or regulation), and it protects those who disclose to a person with supervisory authority over the employee, or to the SEC, or to Congress.

On the other hand, Dodd-Frank’s provision (15 U.S.C. §78u-6 or Section 21F) defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6).  It then prohibits, and provides a private cause of action for, adverse employment actions against a whistleblower for acts done by him or her in “provid[ing] information to the Commission,” “initiat[ing], testif[ing] in, or assist[ing] in” any investigation or action of the Commission, or in making disclosures required or protected under Sarbanes-Oxley, the Exchange Act or the Commission’s rules.  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(h)(1). A textual reading of these provisions suggests that a “whistleblower” has to provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.  If the whistleblower does so, an employer cannot discriminate against the whistleblower for engaging in those protected actions.

However, after the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC promulgated rules explicating its interpretation of Section 21F. Some of these rules might require providing information to the SEC, but others could be construed more broadly to encompass those who simply report internally or report to some other entity.  Compare Rule 21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3), 17 C.F.R. §240.21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3). The SEC’s comments to these rules also said that they apply to “individuals who report to persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission.”

Therefore, one issue beginning to percolate up to the appellate courts is whether Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions consider someone who reports alleged misconduct to their employers or other entities, but not the SEC, to be a “whistleblower.” The only circuit court to have squarely addressed the issue (the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC) concluded that Dodd-Frank’s provision only applies to those who actually provide information to the SEC.

In doing so, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the “plain language and structure” of the statutory text, concluding that it unambiguously required the employee to provide information to the SEC.  Several district courts, including in Colorado, Florida and the Northern District of California, have concurred with this analysis.

More, however, have concluded that Dodd-Frank is ambiguous on this point and therefore have given Chevrondeference to the SEC’s interpretation as set forth in its own regulations. District courts, including in the Southern District of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Tennessee and Connecticut, have adopted this view. The SEC has also weighed in, arguing (in an amicus brief to the Second Circuit) that whistleblowers should be entitled to protection regardless of whether they disclose to their employers or the SEC.  The agency said that Asadi was wrongly decided and, under its view, employees that report internally should get the same protections that those who report to the SEC receive. The Second Circuit’s decision in that case (Liu v. Siemens AG) did not address this issue at all.

Finally, last week, the Eighth Circuit also decided not to take on this question. It opted not to hear an interlocutory appeal, in Bussing v. COR Securities Holdings Inc., in which an employee at a securities clearing firm provided information about possible FINRA violations to her employer and to FINRA, rather than the SEC, and was allegedly fired for it. The district court concluded that the fact that she failed to report to the SEC did not exclude her from the whistleblower protections under Dodd-Frank. It reasoned that Congress did not intend, in enacting Dodd-Frank, to encourage employees to circumvent internal reporting channels in order to obtain the protections of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection.  In doing so, however, the district court did not conclude that the statute was ambiguous and rely on the SEC’s interpretation.

A related question is what must an employee report to be a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank. Thus far, if a whistleblower reports something other than a violation of the securities laws, that is not protected. So, for example, an alleged TILA violation or an alleged violation of certain banking laws have been found to be not protected.

These issues will take time to shake out. While more courts thus far have adopted, or ruled consistently with, the SEC’s interpretation, as the Florida district court stated, “[t]he fact that numerous courts have interpreted the same statutory language differently does not render the statute ambiguous.”

Does Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection apply extraterritorially?

In August, the Second Circuit decided Liu. Rather than focus on who can be a whistleblower, the Court concluded that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions do not apply to conduct occurring exclusively extraterritorially. In Liu, a former Siemens employee alleged that he was terminated for reporting alleged violations of the FCPA at a Siemens subsidiary in China.  The Second Circuit relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank case in reaching its decision. In Morrison, the Court reaffirmed the presumption that federal statutes do not apply extraterritorially absent clear direction from Congress.

The Second Circuit in Liu, despite Liu’s argument that other Dodd-Frank provisions applied extraterritorially and SEC regulations interpreting the whistleblower provisions at least suggested that the bounty provisions applied extraterritorially, disag
reed. The court concluded that it need not defer to the SEC’s interpretation of who can be a whistleblower because it believed that Section 21F was not ambiguous.  It also concluded that the anti-retaliation provisions would be more burdensome if applied outside the country than the bounty provisions, so it did not feel the need to construe the two different aspects of the whistleblower provisions identically.  And finally, the SEC , in its amicus brief, did not address either the extraterritorial reach of the provisions or Morrison, so the Second Circuit apparently felt no need to defer to the agency’s view on extraterritoriality.

Liu involved facts that occurred entirely extraterritorially. He was a foreign worker employed abroad by a foreign corporation, where the alleged wrongdoing, the alleged disclosures, and the alleged discrimination all occurred abroad. Whether adding some domestic connection changes this result remains for future courts to consider.

The SEC’s Use Of The Anti-Retaliation Provision In An Enforcement Action

In June, the SEC filed, and settled, its first Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation enforcement action. The Commission filed an action against Paradigm Capital Management, Inc., and its principal Candace Weir, asserting that they retaliated against a Paradigm employee who reported certain principal transactions, prohibited under the Investment Advisers Act, to the SEC. Notably, that alleged retaliation did not include terminating the whistleblower’s employment or diminishing his compensation; it did, however, include removing him as the firm’s head trader, reconfiguring his job responsibilities and stripping him of supervisory responsibility. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, both respondents agreed to cease and desist from committing any future Exchange Act violations, retain an independent compliance consultant, and pay $2.2 million in fines and penalties.  This matter marks the first time the Commission has asserted Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions in an enforcement action, rather than a private party doing so in civil litigation.

The SEC Announces Several Interesting Dodd-Frank Bounties

Under Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers who provide the SEC with “high-quality,” “original” information that leads to an enforcement action netting over $1 million in sanctions can receive an award of 10-30 percent of the amount collected. The SEC recently awarded bounties to whistleblowers in circumstances suggesting the agency wants to encourage a broad range of whistleblowers with credible, inside information.

In July, the agency awarded more than $400,000 to a whistleblower who appears not to have provided his information to the SEC voluntarily.  Instead, the whistleblower had attempted to encourage his employer to correct various compliance issues internally. Those efforts apparently resulted in a third-party apprising an SRO of the employer’s issues and the whistleblower’s efforts to correct them. The SEC’s subsequent follow-up on the SRO’s inquiry resulted in the enforcement action. Even though the “whistleblower” did not initiate communication with the SEC about these compliance issues, for his efforts, the agency nonetheless awarded him a bounty.

Then, just recently, the SEC announced its first whistleblower award to a company employee who performed audit and compliance functions. The agency awarded the compliance staffer more than $300,000 after the employee first reported wrongdoing internally, and then, when the company failed to take remedial action after 120 days, reported the activity to the SEC. Compliance personnel, unlike most employees, generally have a waiting period before they can report out, unless they have a reasonable basis to believe investors or the company have a substantial risk of harm.

With a statute as sprawling as Dodd-Frank, and potentially significant bounty awards at stake, opinions interpreting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions are bound to proliferate. Check back soon for further developments.

 
ARTICLE BY

 
OF 

Accepting on-site registration for 14th Annual SuperConference from InsideCounsel

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming 14th Annual Super Conference hosted by Inside Counsel. You can still register on-site!

Now offering an exclusive National Law Review discount until May 12. Register HERE.
IC Superconference 2014

When

Monday, May 12 – Wednesday, May 14, 2014

Where

Chicago, IL

The annual InsideCounsel SuperConference, for the past 13 years, has offered the highest value for educational investment within a constructive learning and networking environment. Legal professionals will gain the opportunity to elevate the quality of their performance and learn ways to become a strategic partner within his/her organization. In two-and-half days attendees earn CLE credits, network with hundreds of peers and legal service providers and hear strategies to tackle corporate legal issues that are top of mind throughout this comprehensive program. SuperConference is presented by InsideCounsel magazine, published by Summit Professional Networks.

Now celebrating its 14th year, InsideCounsel’s SuperConference is an exclusive corporate legal conference attracting more than 500 senior level in-house counsels from Fortune-1000 and multi-national companies. The three-day event offers opportunities to showcase your firm’s industry knowledge and thought leadership while interacting with GC’s and other senior corporate counsel during exclusive networking and educational opportunities. The conference agenda offers the perfect blend of experts and national figure heads from some of the nation’s largest corporations, top law firms, government and regulatory leaders, and industry trailblazers. The conference agenda and educational program receives consistent high marks.

Risky Business: Target Discloses Data Breach and New Risk Factors in 8-K Filing… Kind Of

MintzLogo2010_Black

After Target Corporation’s (NYSE: TGT) net earnings dropped 46% in its fourth quarter compared to the same period last year, Target finally answered the 441 million dollar question – To 8-K, or not to 8-K?  Target filed its much anticipated Current Report on Form 8-K on February 26th, just over two months after it discovered its massive data breach.

In its 9-page filing, Target included two introductory sentences relating to disclosure of the breach under Item 8.01 – Other Events:

During the fourth quarter of 2013, we experienced a data breach in which certain payment card and other guest information was stolen through unauthorized access to our network. Throughout the Risk Factors in this report, this incident is referred to as the ‘2013 data breach’.

Target then buried three new risk factors that directly discussed the breach apparently at random within a total of 18 new risk factors that covered a variety of topics ranging from natural disasters to income taxes.  Appearing in multiple risk factors throughout the 8-K were the following:

  • The data breach we experienced in 2013 has resulted in government inquiries and private litigation, and if our efforts to protect the security of personal information about our guests and team members are unsuccessful, future issues may result in additional costly government enforcement actions and private litigation and our sales and reputation could suffer.
  • A significant disruption in our computer systems and our inability to adequately maintain and update those systems could adversely affect our operations and our ability to maintain guest confidence.
  • We experienced a significant data security breach in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2013 and are not yet able to determine the full extent of its impact and the impact of government investigations and private litigation on our results of operations, which could be material.

An interesting and atypically relevant part of Target’s 8-K is the “Date of earliest event reported” on its 8-K cover page.  Although Target disclosed its fourth quarter 2013 breach under Item 8.01, Target still listed February 26, 2014 as the date of the earliest event reported, which is the date of the 8-K filing and corresponding press release disclosing Target’s financial results.  One can only imagine that this usually benign date on Target’s 8-K was deliberated over for hours by expensive securities lawyers, and that using the February earnings release date instead of the December breach date was nothing short of deliberate.  Likely one more subtle way to shift the market’s focus away from the two-month old data breach and instead bury the disclosure within a standard results of operations 8-K filing and 15 non-breach related risk factors.

To Target’s credit, its fourth quarter and fiscal year ended on February 1, 2014, and Target’s fourth quarter included the entirety of the period during and after the breach through February 1.  Keeping that in mind, Target may not have had a full picture of how the breach affected its earnings in the fourth quarter until it prepared its fourth quarter and year-end financial statements this month.  Maybe the relevant “Date of earliest event” was the date on which Target was able to fully appreciate the effects of the breach, which occurred on the day that it finalized and released its earnings on February 26.  But maybe not.

Whatever the case may be, Target’s long awaited 8-K filing is likely only a short teaser of the disclosure that should be included in Target’s upcoming Form 10-K filing.

Article by:

Adam M. Veness

Of:

Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

Consent Isn’t the Only Consideration: NY Comic Con Attendees Disagree that Hijacking Twitter Accounts Makes the Event “100x cooler! For realz.”

MintzLogo2010_Black

The comic book industry is no stranger to displays of heroic anger and berserker rage, but over the weekend New York Comic Con (NYCC) was on the receiving end of considerable fan fury after it began ghostwriting effusive tweets about NYCC and posting on the Twitter pages of NYCC attendees in a way that made it appear as though the attendee was the author of the tweet.

During the event registration process, NYCC attendees were given the option of linking RFID badges to their Twitter account through the event’s mobile application interface.  During the application registration process, attendees were asked to authorize NYCC to access their Twitter accounts.  At this point, attendees arguably consented to having NYCC impersonate the attendee when posting about NYCC on the attendee’s Twitter feed.

The NYCC website page explaining the ID badge technology and the site’s registration page did not mention that NYCC would be posting to attendee Twitter pages on the attendee’s behalf.  Rather, the registration process is explained as a method for giving the attendee access to enhanced social media content, while helping NYCC protect against fraudulent credentials.  The activation terms provided that NYCC could use the information collected through the badge “for internal purposes” and to contact the user about future events.  After a user registered his or her badge and elected to link a Twitter account, the user was presented with an opt-in notice (a screenshot of which can be seenhere), specifying that following authorization, the application would be able to, among other things, “post Tweets for you”.  This type of warning is not uncommon.  For example, any website that allows users to click to share news articles or stories on their Twitter pages requires this type of access.

In spite of the opt-in warning, the wide-spread surprise among attendees suggests that the opt-in language did not draw a clear distinction between posting tweets for a user and posting tweets as a user.  Moreover, the failure to mention this practice when explaining the registration process could have led attendees to conclude that even if they were agreeing to provide this type of access, NYCC would not be taking the unusual step of pretending to be the attendee when it published tweets on the user’s page.

NYCC’s initial response was a brief tweet telling attendees not to “fret” over the ghostwritten posts and informing attendees that the “opt-in feature” had been disabled.  However, after anger continued to spread, NYCC issued a longer statement apologizing for any “perceived overstep.”

This type of disconnect between online service providers and users is becoming increasingly common as advances in technology permit mobile device and social media data to be accessed and used in new ways.  Earlier this year, for example, Jay-Z and Samsung stepped into a public relations debacle when the “JAY Z Magna Carta” mobile application required that the user, in exchange for receiving a free music download, authorize the application to have extensive access to phone data and social media accounts. The response from NYCC attendees also underscores the lesson learned by Googleearlier this month, that consent provided by users who do not fully understand what they are consenting to may not be consent at all.

As your online business finds new and innovative ways to deliver products and services to your users, it is important to take a step back and consider whether additional communications in different formats, such as just-in-time notifications, are necessary to ensure that the only surprise your customers have is how great your products and services are.   Or, to put it another way, “with great power comes great responsibility.”

Article By:

 of

Cyber Security Summit – October 22-23, 2013

The National Law Review is pleased to bring you information about the upcoming Cyber Security Summit.

cyber security

When:

Where:

Survey Says: Fortune 500 Disclosing Cyber Risks

Mintz Logo

Ever since our 2013 prediction, an ever increasing number of public companies are adding disclosure related to cybersecurity and data breach risks to their public filings.  We previously analyzed how the nation’s largest banks have begun disclosing their cybersecurity risks.   Now, it appears that the rest of the Fortune 500 companies are catching on and including some level of disclosure of their cyber risks in response to the 2011 SEC Guidance.

The recently published Willis Fortune 500 Cyber Disclosure Report, 2013 (the “Report”), analyzes cybersecurity disclosure by Fortune 500 public companies.  The Report found that as of April 2013, 85% of Fortune 500 companies are following the SEC guidance and are providing some level of disclosure regarding cyber exposures.  Interestingly though, only 36% of Fortune 500 companies disclosed that such risk was “material”, “serious” or used a similar term, and only 2% of the companies used a stronger term, such as “critical”.

Following the SEC’s recommendation in its guidance, 95% of the disclosing companies mentionedspecific cyber risks that they face.  The top three cyber risks identified by those companies that disclosed cyber risks were:

1)      Loss or theft of confidential information (65%).

2)      Loss of reputation (50%).

3)      Direct loss from malicious acts (hackers, viruses, etc.) (48%).

Surprisingly, 15% of Fortune 500 companies indicated that they did not have the resources to protect themselves against critical attacks and only 52% refer to technical solutions that they have in place to defend against cyber risks.

The Report notes that despite the large number of Fortune 500 companies that acknowledge cyber risks in their disclosure, only 6% mentioned that they purchase insurance to cover cyber risks.  This number runs contrary to a survey published by the Chubb Group of Insurance Companies in which Chubb indicates that about 36% of public companies purchase cyber risk insurance.  For whatever reason, it appears that many of the Fortune 500 companies are simply not disclosing that they purchase cyber risk insurance as a means of protecting against cyber risk.

Almost two years after its issuance, the Report findings indicate that the 2011 SEC Guidance is in full swing and making its way into reality.  As more large companies disclose cyber risks in their public filings, this will continue to trickle down to the smaller companies that rely on those filings for precedent and guidance.  The Report provides a clear snapshot of where things stand in cyber risk disclosure by Fortune 500 public companies.  The scope of the Report is expected to expand to include Fortune 1000 companies, and it will be interesting to see how this data changes, if at all, when comprised of a larger pool of public companies.

Stay tuned!

Article By:

 of

Basic Guidelines for Protecting Company Trade Secrets

Lewis & Roca

Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), “trade secrets” are generally defined as confidential proprietary information that provides a competitive advantage or economic benefit. Trade secrets are protected under the Economic Espionage Act of 1994 (EEA) at the federal level, and the vast majority of states have enacted statutes modeled after the UTSA (note that some jurisdictions, such as California, Texas and Illinois, have adopted trade secret laws that differ substantially from the UTSA; thus, businesses should research laws in the relevant jurisdiction(s).). Under the UTSA, to be protectable as a trade secret, information must meet three requirements:

i. the information must fall within the statutory definition of “information” eligible for protection;

ii. the information must derive independent economic value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable by others using appropriate means; and

iii. the information must be the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.

Trade secret theft continues to accelerate among U.S. companies, and can have drastic consequences. To combat this threat, Congress and certain state legislatures have recently enacted legislation to broaden trade secret protection. As a result, it is paramount that companies safeguard all proprietary information that may qualify as protectable trade secrets. This blog post explains some key trade secrets concepts, and offers pointers on how to identify and protect trade secrets.

(1) Determine Which Data Constitutes “Information”

The UTSA-type statutes generally define “information” to include:

Financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, and engineering information;

Computer code, plans, compilations, formulas, designs, prototypes, techniques, processes, or procedures; and

Information that has commercial value, such as customer lists or the results of expensive research.

Courts have similarly interpreted “information” to cover virtually any commercially valuable information. Examples of information that has been found to constitute trade secrets includes pricing and marketing techniques, customer and financial information, sources of supplies, manufacturing processes, and product designs.

(2) “Valuable” and “Not Readily Ascertainable” Information

To be protectable, information must also have “economic value” and not be “readily ascertainable” by others. Courts generally determine whether information satisfies this standard by considering the following factors:

Reasonable measures have been put in place to protect the information from disclosure;

The information has actual or potential commercial value to a company;

The information is known by a limited number of people on a need-to-know basis;

The information would be useful to competitors and would require a significant investment to duplicate or acquire the information; and

The information is not generally known to the public.

(3) Take Reasonable Measures to Maintain Secrecy

Businesses should implement technical, administrative, contractual and physical safeguards to keep secret the information sought to be protected. Companies should identify foreseeable threats to the security of confidential information; assess the likelihood of potential harm flowing from such threats; and implement security protocols to address potential threats. Examples of security measures might include restricting access to confidential information on a need-to-know basis, employing computer access restrictions, circulating an employee handbook that outlines company policies governing confidential information, conducting entrance interviews for new hires to determine whether they are subject to restrictive covenants with former employers, conducting exit interviews with departing personnel to ensure that the employee has returned all company materials and agrees to abide by post-employment obligations, encrypting confidential information, limiting access to confidential information through passwords and network firewalls, track all access to network resources and confidential information, restrict the ability to email, print or otherwise transfer confidential information, employ security personnel, limit visitor access, establish surveillance procedures, and limit physical access to areas that may have confidential information.

Conclusion

This blog post is intended to provide some broad guidelines to identifying and protecting company trade secrets. Most if not all companies have confidential information that may be protectable as a trade secret. But certain precautions need to be in place to ensure that the information is protectable. Because each company and situation is different, you should seek advice about your specific circumstances.

Article By:

 of

China’s First-Ever National Standard on Data Privacy – Best Practices for Companies in China on Managing Data Privacy

Sheppard Mullin 2012

Companies doing business in China should take careful notice that China is now paying more attention to personal data privacy collection. This would be an opportune time for private companies to internally review existing data collection and management practices, as well as determine whether these fall within the new guidelines, and where necessary, develop and incorporate new internal data privacy practices.

The Information Security Technology-Guide for Personal Information Protection within Public and Commercial Systems (“Guidelines”), China’s first-ever national standard for personal data privacy protection, came into effect on February 1, 2013. The Guidelines, while not legally binding, are just what they purport to be – guidelines – some commentators view these as technical guidelines. However, the Guidelines should not be taken lightly as this may be a pre-cursor of new legislation ahead. China is not quite ready to issue new binding legislation, but there are indications it seeks to develop consistency with other internationally accepted practices, especially following recent data legislation enacted in the region by neighboring Hong Kong and other Asian countries.

What should companies look for when examining existing data privacy and collection policy and practices? As the Guidelines provide for rules on collecting, handling, transferring and deleting personal information, these areas of a company’s current policies should be reviewed.

“Personal Information”

What personal information is subject to the Guidelines? The Guidelines define “personal information” as “computer data that may be processed by an information system, relevant to a certain natural person, and that may be used solely or along with other information to identify such natural person.”

“General” and “Sensitive” Personal Information

The Guidelines makes a distinction on handling “general” as opposed to “sensitive” personal information. Sensitive personal information is defined as “information the leakage of which will cause adverse consequences to the subject individual” e.g. information such as an individual’s identity card, religious views or fingerprints.

Consent Required

If an individual’s personal information is being collected, that individual should be informed as to the purpose and the scope of the data being collected; tacit consent must be obtained- the individual does not object after being well informed. With “sensitive” personal information being collected, a higher level of consent must be obtained prior to collection and use; the individual must provide express consent and such evidence be retained.

Notice

Best practices dictate a well-informed notice be given the individual prior to collection of any personal information. The notice should clearly spell out, among other items, what information is being collected, the purpose for which the information will be used, the method of collection, party to whom the personal information will be disclosed and retention period.

Cross Border Transfer

The Guidelines further limit the transfer of personal information to any organization outside of P.R. China except where the individual provides consent, the government authorizes the transfer or the transfer is required by law. It is unclear as to which law applies where transfer is “required by law”- PRC law or law of any other country.

Notification of Breach

There is a notification requirement. The individual must be notified if personal information is lost, altered or divulged. If the breach incident is material, then the “personal information protection administration authority.” The Guidelines, however, do not define or make clear this administration authority is here.

Retention and Deletion

Best practices for a company is to minimize the amount of personal information collected. Personal information once used to achieve their intended purpose should not be stored and maintained, but immediately deleted.

The Guidelines may not be binding authority, but at a minimum sets certain standards for the collection, transfer and management of personal information. Especially for companies operating in China, the Guidelines is a call to action, and for implementation of best practices relating to data privacy. Companies should take this opportunity to assess their data privacy and security policies, review and revise customer information intake procedures and documentation, and develop and implement clear, company-wide internal data privacy policies and methods.

Article By:

 of

New Cybersecurity Guidance Released by the National Institute of Standards and Technology: What You Need to Know for Your Business

Mintz Logo

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”)1 has released the fourth revision of its standard-setting computer security guide, Special Publication 800-53 titled Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations2 (“SP 800-53 Revision 4”), and this marks a very important release in the world of data privacy controls and standards. First published in 2005, SP 800-53 is the catalog of security controls used by federal agencies and federal contractors in their cybersecurity and information risk management programs. Developed by NIST, the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, the Committee on National Security Systems as part of the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency Working Group3over a period of several years with input collected from industry, Revision 4 “is the most comprehensive update to the security controls catalog since the document’s inception in 2005.”4

Taking “a more holistic approach to information security and risk management,5” the new revision of SP 800-53 also includes, for the first time, a catalog of privacy controls (the “Privacy Controls”) and offers guidance in the selection, implementation, assessment, and ongoing monitoring of the privacy controls for federal information systems, programs, and organizations (the “Privacy Appendix”).6 The Privacy Controls are a structured set of standardized administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, based on best practices, for the protection of the privacy of personally identifiable information (“PII”)7 in both paper and electronic form during the entire life cycle8of the PII, in accordance with federal privacy legislation, policies, directives, regulations, guidelines, and best practices.9 The Privacy Controls can also be used by organizations that do not collect and use PII, but otherwise engage in activities that raise privacy risk, to analyze and, if necessary, mitigate such risk.

Description of the Eight Families of Privacy Controls

The Privacy Appendix catalogs eight privacy control families, based on the widely accepted Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)10 embodied in the Privacy Act of 1974, Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002, and policies of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Each of the following eight privacy control families aligns with one of the eight FIPPs:

  1. Authority and Purpose. This family of controls ensures that an organization (i) identifies the legal authority for its collection of PII or for engaging in other activities that impact privacy, and (ii) describes the purpose of PII collection in its privacy notice(s).
  2. Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management. This family of controls ensures that an organization (i) develops and implements a comprehensive governance and privacy program; (ii) documents and implements a privacy risk management process that assesses privacy risk to individuals resulting from collection of PII and/or other activities that involve such PII; (iii) conducts Privacy Impact Assessments (“PIAs”) for information systems, programs, or other activities that pose a privacy risk; (iv) establishes privacy requirements for contractors and service providers and includes such requirements in the agreements with such third parties; (v) monitors and audits privacy controls and internal privacy policy to ensure effective implementation; (vi) develops, implements, and updates a comprehensive awareness and training program for personnel; (vii) engages in internal and external privacy reporting; (viii) designs information systems to support privacy by automating privacy controls, and (ix) maintains an accurate accounting of disclosures of records in accordance with the applicable requirements and, upon request, provides such accounting of disclosures to the persons named in the record.
  3. Data Quality and Integrity. This family of controls ensures that an organization takes reasonable steps to validate that the PII collected and maintained by the organization is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete.
  4. Data Minimization and Retention. This family of controls addresses (i) the implementation of data minimization requirements to collect, use, and retain only PII that is relevant and necessary for the original, legally authorized purpose of collection, and (ii) the implementation of data retention and disposal requirements.
  5. Individual Participation and Redress. This family of controls addresses implementation of processes (i) to obtain consent from individuals for the collection of their PII, (ii) to provide such individuals with access to the PII, (iii) to correct or amend collected PII, as appropriate, and (iv) to manage complaints from individuals.
  6. Security. This family of controls supplements the security controls in Appendix F and are implemented in coordinating with information security personnel to ensure that the appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards are in place to (i) protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII, and (ii) to ensure compliance with applicable federal policies and guidance.
  7. Transparency. This family of controls ensures that organizations (i) provide clear and comprehensive notices to the public and to individuals regarding their information practices and activities that impact privacy, and (ii) generally keep the public informed of their privacy practices.
  8. Use Limitation. This family of controls addresses the implementation of mechanisms that ensure that an organization’s scope of use of PII is limited to the scope specified in their privacy notice or as otherwise permitted by law.

Some of the Privacy Controls, such as Data Quality and Integrity, Data Minimization and Retention, Individual Participation and Redress, and Transparency also contain control enhancements, and while these enhancements reflect best practices which organizations should strive to achieve, they are not mandatory.11 The Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), tasked with enforcement of the Privacy Controls, expects all federal agencies and third-party contractors to implement the mandatory Privacy Controls by April 30, 2014.

The privacy families must be analyzed and selected based on the specific operational needs and privacy requirements of each organization and can be implemented at various operational levels (e.g., organization level, mission/business process level, and/or information system level12). The Privacy Controls and the roadmap provided in the Privacy Appendix will be primarily used by Chief Privacy Officers (“CPO”) or Senior Agency Officials for Privacy (“SAOP”) to develop enterprise-wide privacy programs or to improve an existing privacy programs in order to meet an organization’s privacy requirements and demonstrate compliance with such requirements. The Privacy Controls supplement and complement the security control families set forth in Appendix F (Security Control Catalog) and Appendix G (Information Security Programs) and together these controls can be used by an organization’s privacy, information security, and other risk management offices to develop and maintain a robust and effective enterprise-wide program for management of information security and privacy risk.

What You Need to Know

The Privacy Appendix is based upon best practices developed under current law, regulations, policies, and guidance applicable to federal information systems, programs, and organizations, and by implication, to their third-party contractors. If you provide services to the federal government, work on government contracts, or are the recipient of certain grants that may require compliance with federal information system security practices, you should already be sitting up and paying attention. This revision puts privacy up front with security.

Like other NIST publications, this revision will be looked at as an industry standard for best practices, even for commercial entities that are not doing business with the federal government. In fact, over the last few years, we have seen increasing references to compliance with NIST 800-53 as setting a contractual baseline for security. We expect that this will continue, and now will include both the Security Controls and the Privacy Controls. As such, general counsel, business executives and IT professionals should become familiar with and conversant in the Privacy Controls set forth in the new revision to SP 800-53. At a minimum, businesses should undertake a gap analysis of the privacy controls at their organization against these Privacy Controls to determine if they are up to par or if they have to enhance their current privacy programs. And, if NIST 800-53 appears in contract language as the “minimum standard” to which your company’s policies and procedures must comply, the gap analysis will at least inform you of what needs to be done to bring both your privacy and security programs up to speed.


1 The National Institute of Standards and Technology is a non-regulatory agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce, which, among other things, develops information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems to assist federal agencies in implementing the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.

2 See Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publ. (SP) 800-53,
Rev. 4 (April 30, 2013), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf.

3 The Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency Working Group is an interagency partnership formed in 2009 to produce a unified security framework for the federal government. It includes representatives from the Civil, Defense, and Intelligence Communities of the federal government.

4 See NIST Press Release for SP 800-53 Revision 4 at http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/201304_sp80053.cfm. Revision 4 of
SP 800-53 adds a substantial number of security controls to the catalog, including controls that address new technology such as digital and mobile technologies and cloud computing. With the exception of the controls that address evolving technologies, the majority of the cataloged security controls are policy and technology neutral, focusing on the fundamental safeguards and countermeasures required to protect information during processing, while in storage, and during transmission.

5 See NIST Press Release for SP 800-53 Revision 4 at http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/201304_sp80053.cfm.

6 See Appendix J, Privacy Control Catalog to Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publ. (SP) 800-53, Rev. 4 (April 30, 2013),http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf. Appendix J was developed by NIST and the Privacy Committee of the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council.

7 Personally Identifiable Information is defined broadly in the Glossary to SP 800-53 Revision 4 as “Information which can be used to distinguish or trace the identity of an individual (e.g., name, social security number, biometric records, etc.) alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or likable to a specific individual (e.g., date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.). See page B-16 of Appendix B, Privacy Control Catalog to Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publ. (SP) 800-53, Rev. 4 (April 30, 2013),http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf. However, as stated in footnote 119 in Appendix J, “the privacy controls in this appendix apply regardless of the definition of PII by organizations.”

8 Collection, use, retention, disclosure, and disposal of PII.

9 See page J-4 of Appendix J, Privacy Control Catalog to Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publ. (SP) 800-53, Rev. 4 (April 30, 2013),http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf.

10 See NIST description and overview of Fair Information Practice Principles at http://www.nist.gov/nstic/NSTIC-FIPPs.pdf.

11 See pages J-4 of Appendix J, Privacy Control Catalog to Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publ. (SP) 800-53, Rev. 4 (April 30, 2013),http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf.

12 See page J-2 of Appendix J, Privacy Control Catalog to Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publ. (SP) 800-53, Rev. 4 (April 30, 2013),http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf.