Category: Civil Rights

EEOC Outlines Enforcement Priorities in Approved Plan

The National Law Review recently published an article, EEOC Outlines Enforcement Priorities in Approved Plan, written by Kelly H. Kolb of Fowler White Boggs P.A.:

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The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently approved a Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP) aimed at establishing national enforcement priorities and more effectively integrating enforcement responsibilities across the Commission’s 54 offices.

As part of the plan, the EEOC has identified six national priorities:

  • Eliminating barriers in recruiting and hiring;
  • Protecting vulnerable workers (such as immigrant workers);
  • Addressing emerging and developing employment discrimination issues;
  • Enforcing equal pay laws;
  • Preserving access to the legal system; and
  • Preventing harassment through systemic enforcement and targeted outreach.

The SEP notes that the EEOC will continue its focus on systemic discrimination, using individual discrimination charges as a vehicle to investigate all of the employment practices of employers. The EEOC will also pay particular attention to use of criminal background checks during the hiring process, an issue we have discussed in other newsletters and on radio, to LGBT discrimination, disability discrimination and to pregnancy discrimination claims.

The SEP lays out an aggressive agenda for the EEOC. Employers are well advised to take precautionary steps now to insulate against a possible EEOC “pandemic”.

©2002-2013 Fowler White Boggs P.A.

Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of “Reverse” Racial Discrimination Claim Against Cracker Barrel

The National Law Review recently published an article, Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of “Reverse” Racial Discrimination Claim Against Cracker Barrel, written by Kyle P. Konwinski of Varnum LLP:

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In Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc., Case No. 11-2189 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2013), in a published decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a “reverse” racial discrimination claim arising out of Cracker Barrel’s termination of the plaintiff’s position as a retail manager at a Flint, Michigan Cracker Barrel.

The plaintiff was a general manager of a Cracker Barrel store for ten years.  Cracker Barrel terminated the plaintiff because she violated company policy when she made remarks during conversations regarding the Haiti earthquake, the plight of those in Haiti, and the use of a “bridge card” as a “ghetto card.”  The plaintiff, a Caucasian, contended that similarly situated African Americans were treated more favorably than her—i.e., not fired for making similar remarks.

Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit noted that a claim of “reverse” racial discrimination under federal law requires a showing of “background circumstances supporting the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”  Because the plaintiff also brought a claim alleging race discrimination under Michigan’s law, however, she did not need to satisfy this heightened standard of proof to establish a claim because Michigan does not require a heightened standard of proof for reverse discrimination claims.

The Sixth Circuit dismissed the claims because, first, the plaintiff did not come forward with direct evidence of reverse discrimination because her evidence required an inference that Cracker Barrel terminated her based on race.  Second, the plaintiff did not come forward with sufficient evidence that another similarly situated employee was treated more favorably—the plaintiff was differently situated in the management structure of the store and also engaged in more pervasive and severe conduct.  Therefore, the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

© 2013 Varnum LLP

Privacy of Mobile Applications

The National Law Review recently featured an article, Privacy of Mobile Applications, written by Cynthia J. Larose with Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.:

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As we continue our “new year, new look” series into important privacy issues for 2013, we boldly predict:

Regulatory Scrutiny of Data Collection and Use Practices of Mobile Apps Will Increase in 2013

Mobile apps are becoming a ubiquitous part of the everyday technology experience.  But, consumer apprehension over data collection and their personal privacy with respect to mobile applications has been growing.   And as consumer apprehension grows, so does regulatory scrutiny.  In 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) offered guidance to mobile app developers to “get privacy right from the start.”    At the end of 2012, the California Attorney General’s office brought its first privacy complaint against Delta Airlines, Inc., alleging that Delta’s mobile app “Fly Delta” failed to have a conspicuously posted privacy policy in violation of California’s Online Privacy Protection Act.  And also in December, SpongeBob Square Pants found himself in the middle of a complaint filed at the FTC by a privacy advocacy group alleging that the mobile game SpongeBob Diner Dash collected personal information about children without obtaining parental consent.

In 2013, we expect to see new regulatory investigations into privacy practices of mobile applications.   Delta was just one of 100 recipients of notices of non-compliance from the California AG’s office and the first to be the subject of a complaint.  Expect to see more of these filed early in this year as the AG’s office plows through responses from the lucky notice recipients.   Also, we can expect to hear more from the FTC on mobile app disclosure of data collection and use practices and perhaps some enforcement actions against the most blatant offenders.

Recommendation for action in 2013:  Take a good look at your mobile app and its privacy policy.   If you have simply ported your website privacy policy over to your mobile app – take another look.  How is the policy displayed to the end user?  How does the user “accept” its terms?  Is this consistent with existing law, such as California, and does it follow the FTC guidelines?  

©1994-2013 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

Internet Defamation—What Can You Do When You Are the Target?

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We’ve all seen them.  Anonymous spewing hate-filled, defamatory statements on Facebook and Twitter, as well as in the comment pages of news stories on both local and national news.  The commenters have a certain entertainment value, until you or your business are in their sights.  So what do you do?  The answer is not always so simple, especially when you don’t even know who is speaking.

Internet freedom has allowed for an unprecedented expansion in opportunities for the Average Joe to speak, but that expansion has come with a price for those defamed on the internet.  In order to foster a free and expansive internet, in 1996 Congress enacted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.  Section 230 grants interactive internet service providers (such as Facebook, Yelp, YouTube, and Twitter) immunity from civil defamation claims for user-created content.

There are very few exceptions to Section 230 immunity, with the only one recognized in case law being a case in which provider Roommates.com directed the posts to a certain extent using drop-down menus.  See Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9thCir. 2008).  Providers have learned from Roommates.com’s example and are careful to maintain their Section 230 immunity.

What this means in simple terms is that if you or your business is defamed on Facebook or Twitter, you can’t sue Facebook or Twitter, and you can’t force Facebook or Twitter to remove the defamatory postings.  Section 230 forces you to attempt to track down the user who originally posted the speech—often a virtual impossibility in this day and age when the vast majority of defamatory postings on the internet are done anonymously.

So what can you do?  First, don’t give up on social media and its ability to deal with at least some of the problems.  Interactive internet service providers are aware of the damage defamatory statements can do, and know that they risk losing their Section 230 immunity if they don’t self-police to a certain extent.  All interactive internet service providers have terms of service, and the majority ban defamatory and harassing speech.  Most will delete the offending material upon a showing that the material is indeed defamatory (i.e., not protected opinion), and most providers include a function allowing you to report the post directly from the webpage, without the need to send a demand letter from an attorney.

Furthermore, interactive internet service providers realize that though anonymity enjoys protections under the First Amendment, it also feeds a great deal of the ugliness seen on the internet today.  Facebook, for instance, requires posters to use their real names, and if Facebook is informed that a person is using a pseudonym, Facebook will disable the account.  Likewise, news sites are increasingly requiring commenters to link their comments to their Facebook accounts in order to provide a measure of accountability that anonymous posts lacked.  YouTube also recently began asking posters to use real names, though that is not currently a requirement.  Not all interactive internet service providers eschew anonymity – Twitter and Tumblr still tout the user’s ability to post anonymously – but increasing numbers of providers are requiring that speakers stand behind their comments.

If you can’t get posts removed through the interactive internet service provider, you still have legal options available.  Of course, quite often the best action at this point is no action.  Often defamation lawsuits are counterproductive in that they simply bring more attention to the posts than if the posts are simply ignored.  While difficult to do, sometimes ignoring a simply nasty post is the best policy.

If the post can’t be ignored but is not worth litigation, you can engage with the poster on the interactive site. If someone posts a negative review on Yelp, address the review and contest any factual misrepresentations.  If someone posts on your Facebook wall or sends an angry or defamatory Tweet, address the poster’s concerns.  You have the right to speak too, and quite often thoughtful, careful engagement is the best remedy.

Some posts are simply so egregious and damaging that they must be addressed in a court of law.  If action is warranted, and you are lucky enough to have the name of the poster, you can pursue traditional legal avenues available to victims of defamatory speech.

If you do not have the name, however, if you want to take action you will need to file a civil defamation lawsuit naming as defendant a John Doe.  Unfortunately, even though many interactive internet service providers will remove defamatory posts upon request, none will give up the names, email addresses, or IP addresses of posters without a subpoena.  Once litigation is filed, you and your legal counsel will have subpoena power to require the interactive internet service provider to give up the names, emails and IP addresses associated with the poster.  Normally the providers will still put up a fight even in light of a subpoena, but this is the only way available to obtain the identity of an anonymous poster so that you can hold them responsible for their defamatory speech.

While we have the right to free speech in the United States, our laws require us to take responsibility for what we say when we are wrong and our speech causes damage.  In the case of internet-based speech, it may be difficult to vindicate your rights and hold speakers responsible, but with persistence and a clear understanding of how interactive internet service providers work you can protect your good name on the internet.

© 2012 by McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC

Advocacy Groups Ask White House to Postpone Decisions Affecting Same-Sex Spouses’ Immigration Status

The National Law Review recently published an article by Nataliya Binshteyn of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Advocacy Groups Ask White House to Postpone Decisions Affecting Same-Sex Spouses’ Immigration Status:

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According to The New York Times, over 50 gay rights and immigrant advocacy groups have written a letter to the White House asking President Obama to delay the adjudication of derivative lawful permanent residency petitions that would benefit the foreign same-sex spouses of U.S. citizens.

In their December 10th request, the groups are seeking a postponement of USCIS decisions until the Supreme Court issues a ruling on same-sex marriage in one of the two such cases it has recently agreed to hear next year. According to the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), same-sex marriages do not bestow federal benefits, including those related to immigration. As a result, the USCIS has, to date, denied petitions that would grant legal permanent resident status to the same-sex immigrant spouses of U.S. citizens despite a January 2011 declaration that the U.S. Department of Justice would no longer enforce DOMA in the courts.

©2012 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

“Employee” Status Not Necessarily Dependent on Compensation

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While Title VII discrimination claims apply only to “employees” and “employers,” the statute’s definitions of those terms are spectacularly unhelpful. An employee is someone who is employed by an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) & (f). Thanks, Congress! In light of this thoroughly circular definition, courts use agency principles to determine employment status when such is not clear.

An illustrative opinion was recently issued by the Northern District of Illinois in Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad. In Volling, one of the main questions was whether the members of ARS’s volunteer ambulance squad should be considered employees for purposes of Title VII. The opinion can be found here.

Several factors are considered in making this employment determination, including: the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. No single factor is dispositive, but courts will often give great weight to the amount of control the putative employer has over the putative employee.

Defendant ARS argued that the volunteer ambulance squad could not be employees because they received no payment. This view seems to be supported by the Second and Fourth Circuits, which require significant economic remuneration for a worker to be considered an employee for Title VII purposes. The Seventh Circuit has yet to rule on the issue, but the district court noted that the Seventh Circuit has rejected labels such as “volunteer” and endorsed the consideration of the common law factors listed above.  Accordingly, the district court agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s view that compensation is just one factor to be considered in the employment analysis. Perhaps significantly, the Volling court stated that compensation may well be less important with regard to not-for-profit organizations such as ARS than to commercial employers.

Thus, the court took into consideration the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, which included, among other things, that plaintiffs: are assigned to work specific shifts and defendants control who works those shifts with them; performed their work in the station and ambulances operated and used by ARS; are required to wear uniforms; received training; had to go through probationary periods; and had supervisory subordinate relationships with team leaders and board members of ARS.

Based on the degree of control exercised by ARS and the mandate to construe Title VII broadly to prevent discrimination, the court refused to dismiss the case for a lack of an employment relationship. “A workplace is not necessarily any different for a non-compensated volunteer than it is for a compensated ‘employee,’ and while both are generally free to quit if they don’t like the conditions (at-will employment being the norm), neither should have to quit to avoid sexual, racial, or other unlawful discrimination and harassment.”

This case serves as a good reminder that – similar to problems that can arise from using independent contractors – just because a worker is considered to be and labeled an unpaid volunteer, trainee, or intern doesn’t mean the employer is necessarily shielded from Title VII (or other federal statutory) liability. What counts is how those workers are treated, not how they are labeled.

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Holiday Warning: Cut Sexual Harassment From Your Holiday Party Invitation List

The National Law Review recently published an article by Matthew J. Kreutzer of Armstrong Teasdale, Holiday Warning: Cut Sexual Harassment From Your Holiday Party Invitation List:

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A recent federal judge’s decision allowing a sexual harassment case to proceed against an employer is a sobering reminder that the lighthearted, and sometimes drunken, atmosphere at office holiday parties does not equate to a free pass for your employees to engage in unwanted touching, lewd comments and other types of inappropriate behavior that otherwise would not be tolerated. Indeed, employers who fail to protect themselves can be held liable for workers’ conduct that might easily get out of hand at festive events particularly when there is drinking.

Just in time for the 2012 holiday party season, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York refused to dismiss a sexual harassment lawsuit filed against the State University of New York growing out of just such a party. (Shiner v. State University of New York, University at Buffalo, No. 11-CV-01024.)

The plaintiff, a clerk working at the University at Buffalo Dental School, alleged she had not wanted to attend the school’s annual holiday party because the conduct at previous events made her uncomfortable. However, a supervisor encouraged her to attend the party, which was held at a local bar. During the party, an associate dean, with supervisory authority over the plaintiff, allegedly made sexual advances toward her that included fondling her, putting his tongue in her ear and pulling her onto his lap. Another department official with supervisory authority allegedly cheered him on.

The plaintiff filed claims of sexual harassment under state and federal anti-discrimination laws, as well common law claims of assault and battery. The judge is allowing the case to proceed to trial, exposing (no pun intended) the employer to a potentially large monetary liability.

Employers can reduce the threat of misbehavior that gives rise to these kinds of allegations by, for example:

  • Reminding employees prior to the event that the company’s code of conduct remains in effect during the event
  • Establishing procedures in advance to handle any inappropriate behavior that might occur
  • Limiting the amount of drinking

If an employee does come to you with a sexual harassment complaint, please consider it seriously and take prompt action as necessary to investigate and stop the harassment.

© Copyright 2012 Armstrong Teasdale LLP

Federal Courts Clarify Reasonable-Accommodation Standards

The National Law Review recently published an article, Federal Courts Clarify Reasonable-Accommodation Standards, written by Alan M. Koral and Andrea Lewis with Vedder Price:

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The extent of an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is not always clear. Indeed, when the requested accommodation involves a leave of absence or the transfer to a different position, employers are often unsure what the law requires of them. A series of recent decisions from the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, however, have addressed the limitations and obligations facing employers presented with such requests for accommodation.

Leaves of Absence as a Reasonable Accommodation

Few questions vex employers more than what length of time is reasonable when a disabled employee requests a leave of absence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma), in Robert v. Board of County Commissioners of Brown County, 691 F. 3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2012), has shed some light on this issue that should help employers in deciding how to respond to employee leave requests under the ADA. The plaintiff, Ms. Robert, worked for Brown County supervising felony offenders. The essential functions of her job required that she perform many duties outside of her office such as performing drug screenings, ensuring compliance with court orders, testifying in court, and other “considerable fieldwork” including site visits under potentially dangerous circumstances. Robert was diagnosed with sacroiliac joint dysfunction, and because of severe pain in her back and hips eventually she could work only from home. Thus, she was unable to visit offenders, supervise drug and alcohol screenings or testify in court.

Following a surgery to treat her joint dysfunction, Robert exhausted her FMLA and sick and vacation leaves, but she still could not return to work. Neither she nor her doctor informed her employer as to when she could resume her job duties. Since she could not perform her job duties, the County terminated Robert’s employment. Among other claims, Robert alleged that her termination constituted discrimination under the ADA. The court disagreed. The court accepted that site visits and other out-of-office work were essential functions of Robert’s employment, but it stated that she would still be qualified to perform her job if she could have performed those duties with reasonable accommodation. The only possible reasonable accommodation in this case, however, would have been a leave of absence.

The court noted that there are two limits on the bounds of reasonableness for a leave of absence: (1) the employee must provide the employer an estimated date for when she can resume her essential duties, and (2) the leave request must assure the employer that the employee can perform the essential functions of her position in the “near future.” Though the court did not define “near future,” it cited to a case stating that a six-month leave request was too long to constitute reasonable accommodation. Here, Robert never provided any estimate as to when she could resume her fieldwork. Therefore, the only accommodation that would have allowed Robert to perform the essential functions of her position was an improper indefinite reprieve from her fieldwork functions. Thus, since Robert was not qualified to perform her duties, her discrimination claim failed.

Transfers to a Different Position as a Reasonable Accommodation

On September 7, 2012, the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. United Airlines overruled two of its prior decisions (EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling (2000) and Mays v. Principi (2002) that together stood for the principle that employers could hire the most qualified applicant for a position, even if that meant passing over a disabled employee seeking the position because his disability precluded him from performing the essential functions of his current position. Going forward, employers in the Seventh Circuit will now be required to offer that vacant position to the disabled employee, unless it can show that doing so creates an undue hardship that renders mandatory reassignment unreasonable.

The dispute in United Airlines centered around a set of “reasonable accommodation” guidelines that the company used when evaluating transfer requests involving disabled employees. United’s guidelines provided that the transfer process was a competitive one, and that employees requesting a transfer as an accommodation would not automatically be placed into qualifying vacant positions. Instead, the disabled employee would receive preferential treatment, which included a “guaranteed” interview for the position and priority over similarly qualified applicants. Under these guidelines, however, a non-disabled applicant would receive the job if he or she was more qualified than a disabled employee seeking the accommodation.

In abandoning the standard it had followed since 2000, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the “ADA does indeed mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer.” While the existence of a seniority rule mandated by a collective bargaining agreement will likely satisfy the undue-hardship requirement, not all such provisions are created equal, and their language should be parsed before rejecting a transfer request out of hand in such a setting. In the future, employers in the Seventh (and Tenth or Washington, DC) Circuits may no longer rely on a “best applicant” policy when making decisions about transferring disabled employees to vacant positions.

The Employee’s Role in Requesting a Reasonable Accommodation

In yet another noteworthy decision, the Seventh Circuit held that a university was not liable for failing to accommodate a professor’s mental disorder, where the university reasonably tried to fulfill a request for office reassignment but the employee did not cooperate. In Hoppe v. Lewis University, 692 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2012), Elizabeth Hoppe requested that her office be relocated to accommodate her adjustment disorder. Both the initial letter that Hoppe presented from her doctor and a follow-up letter failed to specify a suitable campus location for Hoppe or the particular stressors that necessitated Hoppe’s relocation. Nevertheless, the university offered Hoppe four different office options, one of which she accepted but never used; she refused the remaining offices because they were in the same building as individuals whom she alleged heightened her anxiety, but her physician never specified a change of buildings or any location information at all. The court emphasized:

An employer can take no solace in its failure to engage in this process in good faith if what results is an unreasonable or inappropriate accommodation offer. And an employee who fails to uphold her end of the bargain – for example, by not “clarifying the extent of her medical restrictions” – cannot impose liability on the employer for its failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.[1]

In finding in favor of the university, the Seventh Circuit noted that the university offered Hoppe several options to change offices, despite having no specific details from her doctor about what steps were necessary to reasonably accommodate her disability. Further, the university had asked Hoppe’s doctor for specific information several times, to no avail. Therefore, the university did its part to participate in good faith in the ADA-required interactive process, and there was no evidence it did not offer Hoppe a reasonable accommodation.

Lessons for Employers

First, these cases emphasize that an employer need not shoulder the entire burden when trying to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability; the employee has responsibilities as well. As noted in Hoppe, an employer need not offer an employee the precise accommodation he or she requests, if the employee does not clarify the extent of his or her medical restrictions. The employer must participate in good faith in an interactive process under the ADA to find a reasonable accommodation, but the employer’s obligation runs only so far. If an employee’s physician does not specify the employee’s restrictions or what type of accommodation is necessary, following up with the physician and working with the employee to find alternative options should protect an employer from liability if the employee later argues that the offered accommodations were unreasonable.

Second, an employer is not required to provide an open-ended leave of absence if an employee requests such an absence as an accommodation. Under Robert’sanalysis, an indefinite absence, especially when there is no assurance that the employee will be able to perform the essential functions of his or her position, is unreasonable as a matter of law. Under these circumstances, once an employee has exhausted other types of leave, if she cannot provide an estimate of when she can resume the essential duties of her position, a court is likely to uphold an employer’s decision to terminate her. The employee does not need to return to work at full capacity, but the employee must be able to perform the duties of her position with reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

Third, employers in the Seventh Circuit must now reassign qualified disabled employees who can no longer perform their original jobs to vacant positions, unless the employer can establish the existence of special circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship. While the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement should satisfy this requirement, it remains to be seen what other special circumstances will suffice going forward. Employers should vigorously explore the possibility of reassignment with disabled employees and be sure that any positions discussed with and/or offered to the employee are documented.

Finally, these cases further emphasize the importance of detailed job descriptions. With or without accommodation, an employee must be able to perform the essential functions of his or her job. If the employer can pinpoint the essential functions of a job, both the employer and the employee will have an easier time engaging in the required interactive process for establishing reasonable accommodations. Further, in the event an employee cannot perform the essential functions of a job, an employer is further protected in a lawsuit if it has articulated the essential functions of a position ahead of time.If you have any questions about this article or the ADA in general, please contact Alan Koral at +1 (212) 407 7750, Andrea Lewis at +1 (312) 609 7739, or any other Vedder Price attorney with whom you have worked.

[1]   Id. at 840 (citations omitted)

© 2012 Vedder Price

After Nearly 25 Years, New Jersey Appellate Court Provides ‘Sobering’ Guidance to Employers Respecting Workplace Alcoholism

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It has been almost 25 years since a New Jersey appellate court published a decision providing any meaningful analysis of the treatment of alcoholism in the workplace under the State’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), the last time being the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Clowes v. Terminix International, Inc.

That has now changed.

On October 26, 2012, the Appellate Division held in A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Research & Engineering Co. that a private-sector, non-union employer’s blanket policy requiring any employee returning from an alcohol rehabilitation program to submit to random alcohol testing, applicable only to those identified as being “alcoholic” and divorced from any individualized assessment of the employee’s performance, was facially discriminatory under the LAD — a conclusion that would likely be the same under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as well. Although the Court reversed summary judgment initially entered in favor of the employer, A.D.P. provides valuable guidance to employers as they develop their policies concerning how best to deal with alcohol (and substance) abuse in the workplace. Equally important,  A.D.P. illustrates the utility of so-called “last chance agreements” to address these issues when they arise.

Plaintiff in  A.D.P. had been employed as a research technician, and later Senior Research Associate, for approximately 30 years.  Unlike the plaintiff in the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., hers was not a “safety-sensitive” position. In 2007, plaintiff voluntarily disclosed to her employer that she suffered from alcoholism, and entered a rehabilitation program. At the time, she was not subject to any pending or threatened disciplinary action, and she had built a good performance record over the years. The company’s policy nonetheless required that, upon her return from rehabilitation, plaintiff sign a contract agreeing to participate in a company-approved “aftercare program” obligating her to “maintain total abstinence from alcohol” and submit to “clinical substance testing for a minimum of two (2) years.” A positive test result or refusal to submit to a test would be deemed grounds for discipline, “which is most likely to be termination of employment.” Although plaintiff passed nine breathalyzer tests over a period of just 10 months, she subsequently failed a pair of tests on August 22, 2008, and accordingly was terminated under the company’s policy.

Reversing summary judgment, the Appellate Division held that the employer’s blanket policy was facially discriminatory because it was unrelated to any performance concerns and was based solely on the  fact that an employee was identified (in plaintiff’s case, self-identified) as an alcoholic (i.e., the employer, according to the court, exhibited “hostility toward members of the employee’s class”). Unlike the Supreme Court in  Hennessey, which considered  whether an employer’s termination of an employee who failed a mandatory random drug test violated a clear mandate of “public policy” thereby creating a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge, the A.D.P. Court grounded its analysis of the defendant’s alcohol policy on LAD.

Notably, the A.D.P. Court looked to the EEOC’s 2000 policy guidance under the ADA, even though the EEOC had not yet considered the potential impact of the 2008 ADA Amendments Act upon that guidance. The EEOC explains that, absent a “last chance” agreement, an employer can subject employees returning from alcohol rehabilitation to random alcohol testing, a breathalyzer for example, only if the employer has a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that the employee will pose a “direct threat” (for example, to safety or job performance) absent such testing. Any such “reasonable belief” must be based on an individualized assessment of the employee and his/her position, including “safety risks associated with the position,” and not on generalized assumptions. The A.D.P. Court looked to this guidance statement for “assistance in interpreting the LAD” because the ADA’s prohibition against disability discrimination is “similar” to its LAD counterpart, and alcoholism may qualify as a disability under either statute.

In A.D.P., plaintiff did not have a last chance agreement, a fact the court “emphasize[d]” at the outset. The court also stressed that the employer had made no individualized assessment, but rather “defend[ed] its actions as requirements it uniformly imposed as a matter of policy upon any identified alcoholic.” Interestingly, the A.D.P. Court did not mention the Third Circuit’s unpublished 2009 decision inByrd v. Federal Express Corp. Byrd upheld an employer’s termination of a self-reported alcoholic employee for failing a random alcohol test mandated under a “Statement of Understanding” (SOU) — a contract the Third Circuit described as “in effect, a ‘last chance’ agreement” — that the employer required all employees identified as alcoholics to sign.  Byrd did not, however, consider plaintiff’s claim that requiring the SOU was itself a violation of LAD “because it treats employees with alcohol or substance abuse problems differently,” as plaintiff had failed to challenge the SOU within LAD’s statutory limitations period.

Although  A.D.P. invalidated the particular policy before it, in its opinion, the Court nonetheless provides employers with valuable guidance in developing their own policies concerning alcohol and substance abuse in the workplace. It seems clear under A.D.P. that private, non-union employers can require employees returning from rehabilitation programs for alcoholism to submit to random alcohol or drug testing (subject to the limits imposed by the Supreme Court in Hennessey) provided that either (i) they articulate a reasonable belief, based on careful assessment of objective evidence concerning both the employee and the position, that the employee will pose a direct threat absent such testing, or (ii) the employee has entered into a last chance agreement providing for random testing.

Key Takeaways

  • Employers should strongly consider entering into last chance agreements with any employee who points to alcohol or substance dependency as a cause for workplace problems (for example, poor performance or persistent tardiness), and include in the agreement requirements that, as a condition of continued employment, the employee will enter a rehabilitation program and submit to periodic testing.
  • Absent a last chance agreement, employers should not compel an employee to submit to periodic alcohol testing unless the employer can articulate a reasonable belief, based on a careful assessment of objective evidence concerning both the employee and the nature of his/her position, that the subject employee will pose a direct threat without testing.
  • Employers are cautioned against instituting blanket workplace alcohol (or substance) policies that specifically target employees returning from rehabilitation without regard to safety or performance issues.

©2012 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Sixth Circuit Strikes Down Michigan Affirmative Ban As Unconstitutional

The National Law Review recently published an article by Bryan R. Walters of Varnum LLP regarding Michigan’s Affirmative Action Ban:

Varnum LLP

 

In Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v Regents of the University of Michigan (6th. Cir. Nov. 16, 2012), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in an en banc decision decided on an 8-7 basis, held that the provision in Michigan’s Constitution prohibiting public colleges and universities from discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin (commonly known as “Proposal 2”) was unconstitutional.

The majority was careful to note that the Court was “neither required nor inclined to weigh in on the constitutional status or relative merits of a race-conscious admissions policy as such.  This case does not present us with a second bite at Gratz and Grutter – despite the best efforts of the dissenters to take one anyway.”  Id. at 9.  Rather, the Court framed the issue as follows:  “The sole issue before us is whether Proposal 2 runs afoul of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection by removing the power of university officials to even consider using race as a factor in admissions decisions – something they are specifically allowed to do under Grutter.” Id.

The Court concluded that when an enactment (1) has a racial focus and “inures primarily to the benefit of the minority” and (2) reallocates political power in a way that places special burdens on a minority group’s ability to achieve its goals, that enactment violates the Equal Protection Clause of the constitution absent a compelling state interest to the contrary.  Id. at 15.  The Court held that Proposal 2 inured primarily to the benefit of racial minorities and that its enactment placed special burdens on racial minorities’ access to public education.  Id. at 18, 27.

Several of the dissenting judges wrote separate opinions voicing the reasons for their dissent.  In general, the dissents echo a similar theme – that Proposal 2’s mandate of non-discrimination in public education cannot be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  One dissent noted that the majority’s opinion was out of step with the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Wilson (which is generally regarded as the most “liberal” circuit court of appeals) that “impediments to preferential treatment do not deny equal protection.”  Id. at 47.  Another dissent described thwae majority opinion as “the antithesis of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 70.  Given the obvious circuit split created between this decision and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilson, it seems very likely that the issue will ultimately be decided by the United States Supreme Court.  Stay tuned.

© 2012 Varnum LLP