Category: Civil Rights

Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Final Regulations Released

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released the text of the final regulations and interpretative guidance implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) on April 15, 2024. The final regulations are expected to be formally published in the April 19, 2024, Federal Register and will be effective 60 days later.

The EEOC received more than 100,000 public comments, including comments from Jackson Lewis, in response to the Commission’s notice of the proposed regulations issued on Aug. 11, 2023. Although largely unchanged from the proposed regulations, the final regulations provide important clarifications and insights into how the EEOC will enforce the law. Discussed below are some key points employers need to know about the final regulations.

Key PWFA Requirements

The PWFA, which went into effect on June 27, 2023, requires employers with at least 15 employees and other covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations to a qualified employee’s or applicant’s known limitations related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, unless the accommodation will cause undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.

Qualified Employee

Under the PWFA, an employee has two ways to establish they are a “qualified employee”:

  1. Like under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), “an employee or applicant who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position” is qualified.
  2. If an employee (or applicant) cannot perform all essential job functions even with reasonable accommodation, the employee can be qualified for accommodations under the PWFA if: (a) the inability to perform an essential job function is for a temporary period; (b) the essential job function(s) could be performed in the near future; and (c) the inability to perform the essential function(s) can be reasonably accommodated. The Act, however, does not define “temporary” or “in the near future.” Several commentors raised concerns about the EEOC’s definition of these terms in the proposed regulations.

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations state that “temporary” means “lasting for a limited time, not permanent, and may extend beyond ‘in the near future.’” Unlike the proposed regulations, however, the final regulations state that assessing whether all essential job functions can be performed in the near future depends on the circumstances:

  • For a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is generally defined as 40 weeks from the start of the temporary suspension of an essential function.
  • For conditions other than a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is not defined as any particular length of time. However, the preamble to the final regulations explains that an employee who needs indefinite leave cannot perform essential job functions “in the near future.”

The final regulations explain that employers should consider whether an employee will be able to perform the essential functions “in the near future” each time an employee asks for an accommodation that requires suspension of an essential job function.

Ultimately, whether an employee is “qualified” involves a fact-sensitive evaluation whether the temporary suspension of essential job functions can be reasonably accommodated by the employer. This is significantly different from the ADA reasonable accommodation obligation and may involve, as the final regulations state, removing essential job functions and other arrangements including, but not limited to, requiring the employee perform the remaining job functions and other functions assigned by the employer, temporarily transferring the employee to another job or assigning the employee to light or modified duty, or allowing the employee to participate in an employer’s light or modified duty program.

Accommodations Only Required for Individual With Limitation

The EEOC explains that the regulations do not require employers to provide accommodations to an employee when an employee’s partner, spouse, or family member — not the employee themselves — has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. For clarity, the EEOC revised the final regulations’ definition of “limited” to state the limitation must be the specific employee.

Known Limitations

Employers are only obligated under the PWFA to accommodate an individual’s “known limitation.”

A “limitation” is defined as a “physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, of the specific employee in question.” The condition may be “modest, minor, and/or episodic, and does not need to meet the definition of “disability” under the ADA.

It becomes “known” to the employer when the employee or the employee’s representative has communicated the limitation to the employer. An employee’s representative may include a family member, friend, healthcare provider, union representative, or other representative.

The limitation may be communicated to a supervisor, a manager, someone who has supervisory authority for the employee or who regularly directs the employee’s tasks (or the equivalent in the case of an applicant), human resources personnel, or other appropriate official or by following the steps in the employer’s policy to request an accommodation.

This communication need not be in any specific format and may also be oral.

Pregnancy, Childbirth, Related Medical Conditions

Although the EEOC acknowledged receiving many comments on the scope of the proposed definition of “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions,” it made no substantive changes to the definition in the final regulations.

“Pregnancy” and “childbirth” are still defined as including current pregnancy, past pregnancy, potential or intended pregnancy (which can include infertility, fertility treatments and the use of contraception), labor, and childbirth (including vaginal and cesarean delivery).

The term “related medical conditions” continues to be defined as conditions that are “related to, are affected by, or arise out of pregnancy or childbirth.” The regulations provide the following non-exhaustive list of examples: termination of pregnancy, including by miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion; lactation and conditions related to lactation; menstruation; postpartum depression, anxiety or psychosis; vaginal bleeding; preeclampsia; pelvic prolapse; preterm labor; ectopic pregnancy; gestational diabetes; cesarean or perineal wound infection; maternal cardiometabolic disease; endometriosis; changes in hormone levels; and many other conditions.

The final regulations also reference related medical conditions that are not unique to pregnancy or childbirth, such as chronic migraine headaches, nausea or vomiting, high blood pressure, incontinence, carpal tunnel syndrome, and many other medical conditions. These conditions are covered by the PWFA only if the condition relates to pregnancy or childbirth or are exacerbated by pregnancy or childbirth, although the ADA or other civil rights statutes may apply.

Documentation

The final PWFA regulations continue to provide for a “reasonableness” standard in evaluating the circumstances under which an employer may request documentation from an employee. The final regulations, however, modify the definition of “reasonable documentation.” An employer may only request the “minimum documentation” necessary to confirm the employee has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions (a limitation) and describe the adjustment or change at work due to the limitation.

In addition to stating when an employer can ask for documentation, the PWFA regulations add a paragraph regarding an employee’s self-confirmation of their pregnancy status. It provides that an employer must accept as sufficient an employee’s self-confirmation when: (1) the pregnancy is obvious; or (2) an employee seeks one of the “predictable assessment” accommodation requests set forth in the regulations (discussed below).

The final PWFA regulations make clear the circumstances where it is not reasonable to seek supporting documentation. These circumstances include when: (1) the limitation and adjustment or change needed is obvious and the employee provides self-confirmation; (2) the employer has sufficient information to determine whether the employee has a qualifying limitation and needs an adjustment or change due to the limitation; (3) when the employee is pregnant a “predictable assessment”; (4) the reasonable accommodation relates to a time and/or place to pump or to nurse during work hours, and the employee provides self-confirmation; or (5) the requested accommodation is available to employees without known limitations under the PWFA pursuant to a policy or practice without submitting supporting documentation.

Importantly, the same prohibitions on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations as well as the protection of medical information enforced under the ADA apply with equal force to documentation collected under the PWFA. Employers should ensure they continue to limit inquiries to only those that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. Employers should also treat all documentation relating to a PWFA accommodation request like they treat ADA documentation — maintain it confidentially and separate from an employee’s personnel file.

Reasonable Accommodations

The PFWA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations, which the final regulations define to be generally consistently with the ADA except for temporarily excusing or eliminating the performance of an essential job function. Otherwise, the rule provides that a reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment that is “reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases” if it appears to be “feasible” or “plausible.” An accommodation also must be effective in meeting the qualified employee’s needs to remove a work-related barrier and provide an employee with equal employment opportunity to benefit from all privileges of employment.

The final regulations include examples of requests that may be reasonable. These include schedule changes due to morning sickness or to treat medical issues following delivery, adjustments to accommodate restrictions for lifting or requests for light duty, time and/or space to pump or nurse during work hours, or time off to recover from childbirth.

Lactation Accommodations

The EEOC’s final regulations require reasonable accommodation for lactation beyond what may be required under the Providing Urgent Maternal Protection for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP Act). The PUMP Act generally requires reasonable break time and space shielded from view and free from intrusion for a nursing mother to express breast milk. The final PWFA regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of accommodations relating to lactation, including space for pumping that is in reasonable proximity to a sink, running water, and refrigeration for storing milk.

The final regulations add nursing during working hours (as distinct from pumping) to the list of potentially reasonable accommodations. In the comments explaining this addition, the EEOC cautioned that accommodations for nursing mothers during work hours address situations where the employee and child are in close proximity in the normal course of business, such as where the employee works from home or where the employer offers on-site daycare. The EEOC stated this is not intended to create a right to proximity to nurse because of an employee’s preference.

Predictable Assessments

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations recognize four “predictable assessments” that will not impose an undue hardship in “virtually all cases”:

  1. Allowing an employee to carry or keep water near to enable them to drink;
  2. Permitting an employee to take additional restroom breaks as needed;
  3. Allowing an employee whose work requires standing to sit and whose work requires sitting to stand as needed; and
  4. Allowing an employee to take breaks to eat and drink as needed.

Despite stating the predictable assessments above will not “in virtually all cases” impose an undue hardship, the EEOC clarified this does not mean such requests are reasonable per se. The EEOC recognized that in certain industries, these predictable assessments may cause an undue hardship. Accordingly, employers may still conduct an individualized assessment of a predictable assessment accommodation request. However, the final regulations make clear that any such individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.

Many individuals and organizations that submitted comments on the proposed regulations suggested the addition of other types of predictable assessment accommodations, including dress code modifications, minor workstation modifications, proximity to a restroom, permitting eating and drinking at a workstation, rest breaks, and personal protective equipment. Although noting agreement with the commenters and stating that employers should be able to provide such requests with “little difficulty,” the EEOC declined to expand the list of predictable assessments beyond the four originally listed that in “virtually all cases” will be considered reasonable and will not pose an undue hardship. In response to comments objecting to predictable assessments based on different challenges by industry, the EEOC guidance recognizes that an employer in certain industries may assert an accommodation request otherwise deemed to be a predictable assessment causes the employer an undue hardship and may deny the request.

Undue Hardship

The EEOC adopted the same standard for undue hardship in the final regulations as was in the proposed regulations. When an employee can perform all their essential job functions, the EEOC stated that undue hardship has the same meaning as under the ADA and generally means significant difficulty or expense for the employer’s operation. If an employee cannot perform all essential functions and the accommodation is temporary suspension of an essential job function, the employer needs to consider the ADA definition of undue hardship and the following relevant factors: (1) the length of time the employee or applicant will be unable to perform the essential function(s); (2) whether there is work for the employee to accomplish by allowing the employee to perform all the other functions of the job, transferring the employee to a different position, or otherwise; (3) the nature of the essential function, including its frequency; (4) whether the covered entity has temporarily suspended the performance of essential job functions for other employees in similar positions; (5) whether there are other employees, temporary employees, or third parties who can perform or be temporarily hired to perform the essential function(s); and (6) whether the essential function(s) can be postponed or remain unperformed for any length of time and for how long.

EEOC Interpretative Guidance

The EEOC’s final regulations include an appendix entitled “Appendix A to Part 1636—Interpretative Guidance on the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act” (Interpretative Guidance). The Interpretative Guidance, which becomes part of the final regulations, has the same force and effect as the final regulations.

The Interpretative Guidance addresses the major provisions of the PWFA and its regulations and explains the main concepts pertaining to an employer’s legal requirements under the PWFA to make reasonable accommodations for known limitations (physical or mental conditions related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions). It represents the EEOC’s interpretation of the PWFA and, as stated in comments to the final regulations, the EEOC will be guided by the Interpretive Guidance when enforcing the PWFA. The Interpretative Guidance includes many examples and other practical guidance illustrating common workplace scenarios and how the PWFA applies.

Remedies, Enforcement

The final regulations’ remedies and enforcement are the same as proposed. Remedies under the PWFA mirror those under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and include injunctive and other equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Employers that demonstrate good faith efforts to work with employees to identify and make reasonable accommodations have an affirmative defense to money damages.

PWFA’s Relationship to Other Federal, State, Local Laws

The final regulations provide that the PWFA does not invalidate or limit the powers, remedies, or procedures available under any federal, state, or local law that provides greater or equal protection for individuals affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. About 40 states and cities have laws protecting employees and applicants from discrimination due to pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. Accordingly, employers should evaluate whether state and/or local law may provide greater rights and obligations than the PWFA. To the extent such laws provide greater obligations, the PWFA final regulations require employers to comply with both the PWFA and analogous state and local law.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024
For more news on the PWFA, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

White House Publishes Revisions to Federal Agency Race and Ethnicity Reporting Categories

On March 28, 2024, the White House unveiled revisions to the federal statistical standards for race and ethnicity data collection for federal agencies, adding a new category and requiring a combined race and ethnicity question that allows respondents to select multiple categories with which they identify.

Quick Hits

  • The White House published an updated SPD 15 with revisions to the race and ethnicity data collection standards for federal agencies.
  • The revisions change the race and ethnicity inquiry by making it one question and encouraging respondents to identify under multiple categories.
  • Federal agencies have eighteen months to submit an agency action plan for compliance and must bring all of their data collections and programs into compliance within five years.
  • The race and ethnicity categories are widely used across federal agencies and serve as a model for employers for their own data collection and required diversity reporting.

The White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published updates to its Statistical Policy Directive No. 15: Standards for Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity (SPD 15) with major revisions, the first since 1997. The revisions took immediate effect and were formally published in the Federal Register on March 29, 2024.

OMB stated that the revisions—which come after a two-year review process that included input from more than 20,000 comments, ninety-four listening sessions, three virtual town halls, and a Tribal consultation—are “intended to result in more accurate and useful race and ethnicity data across the federal government.”

Background

In 2022, OMB convened the Federal Interagency Technical Working Group on Race and Ethnicity Standard (Working Group) to review the race and ethnicity standards in the 1997 SPD 15 with the goal of “improving the quality and usefulness of Federal race and ethnicity data.” The race and ethnicity standards are used by federal contractors and subcontractors for affirmative action programs (AAPs) and by employers for federal EEO-1 reporting and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) surveys. Many employers further use the race and ethnicity categories for their own recordkeeping purposes, and federal agencies use the categories for various surveys and federal forms.

In January 2023, OMB published the Working Group’s proposals, observing that the 1997 SPD 15 standards might no longer accurately reflect the growing diversity across the United States and evolving understandings of racial and ethnic identities. During the pendency of the review process, several justices of the Supreme Court of the United States criticized the imprecision of the 1997 race and ethnicity categories throughout the Court’s 237-page opinion in the June 2023 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard College (SFFA decision) case, in which the Court struck down certain race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.

Revisions to SPD 15

The updated standards closely follow the Working Group’s final recommendations and revise SPD 15 to require that data collection:

  • combine the race and ethnicity inquiry into one question that allows respondents to select multiple categories with which they identify,
  • add “Middle Eastern or North African” (MENA) as a “minimum reporting category” that is “separate and distinct from the White’ category,” and
  • “require the collection of more detailed data as a default.”

Under the 1997 standards, respondents were required to first select an ethnicity (i.e., “Hispanic or Latino” or “Not Hispanic or Latino”), and second, select a race category (i.e., “American Indian or Alaskan Native,” “Asian,” “Black or African American,” “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander,” or “White”).

The revised race and ethnicity categories for minimum reporting are:

  • “American Indian or Alaska Native”
  • “Asian”
  • “Black or African American”
  • “Hispanic or Latino”
  • “Middle Eastern or North African”
  • “Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander”
  • “White”

The updated SPD 15 further revises some terminology and definitions used and provides agencies with guidance on the collection and presentation of race and ethnicity data pursuant to SPD 15. Additionally, the update instructs federal agencies to begin updating their surveys and forms immediately and to complete and submit an AAP, which will be made publicly available, to comply with the updated SPD 15 within eighteen months. Federal agencies will have five years to bring all data collections and programs into compliance.

OMB noted that “the revised SPD 15 maintains the long-standing position that the race and/or ethnicity categories are not to be used as determinants of eligibility for participation in any Federal program.”

Looking Ahead

The new race and ethnicity categories have implications for employers as they use these categories for federal reporting compliance and their own recordkeeping purposes, including potentially influencing their own diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. Covered federal contractors and subcontractors must also use the categories in meeting their affirmative action obligations.

Still, the updated SPD 15 adds only one new minimum category. OMB recognized the tension with attempting to “facilitate individual identity to the greatest extent possible while still enabling the creation of consistent and comparable data.” One of the issues OMB identified as needing further research is “[h]ow to encourage respondents to select multiple race and/or ethnicity categories when appropriate by enhancing question design and inclusive language.” The agency is also establishing an Interagency Committee on Race and Ethnicity Statistical Standards that will conduct further research and regular reviews of the categories every ten years, though OMB may decide to review SPD 15 again at any time.

Employers may want to take note of the revisions to SPD 15 as these changes will directly impact many employers’ compliance and recordkeeping obligations. They may also want to be on the lookout for additional guidance from federal agencies, such as the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) and the EEOC, on when and how to implement the standards. Relevant agencies will have to take action before employers will be required to implement the new standards. In the meantime, employers may want to consider whether to use the government’s new or existing categories when shaping their DEI initiatives, as racial and ethnic identities and terminology continue to evolve.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on Race and Ethnicity Reporting, visit the NLR Civil Rights section.

It’s Protected: NLRB Finds “Black Lives Matter” Insignia on Employee Uniform Constitutes Protected Activity Under Circumstances

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), in a 3-1 decision, held that an employee’s display on their work uniform of “BLM,” an acronym for Black Lives Matter, constituted protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“Act”). Accordingly, the NLRB reversed an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) decision, and found that the employer (Home Depot) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by directing the employee to remove the BLM insignia because it violated the company’s uniform policy. The employee resigned instead of removing the insignia from their uniform.

Procedural History

In June 2022, an ALJ found that the employer did not violate the Act by requiring the employee to remove the BLM messaging, because the insignia lacked “an objective, and sufficiently direct, relationship to terms and conditions of employment.” The ALJ concluded that the BLM messaging was “primarily used, and generally understood, to address the unjustified killings of Black individuals by law enforcement and vigilantes … [and] while a matter of profound societal importance, is not directly relevant to the terms, conditions, or lot of Home Depot’s employees as employees.” (emphasis in original).

Further, the ALJ determined that the employee’s motivation for displaying the BLM message (i.e., their dissatisfaction with their treatment as employees) was not relevant. The petitioner sought review before the NLRB.

NLRB Finds Wearing BLM Insignia at Work Constitutes Protected Activity

On review, the NLRB concluded that the employee’s refusal to remove the BLM insignia was protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act because the activity was for “mutual aid or protection,” as it was a “logical outgrowth” of the employee’s and other employees’ complaints about race discrimination in the workplace that allegedly occurred over the preceding months.

According to the NLRB, an individual employee’s actions are a “logical outgrowth” of the concerns expressed by the group where “the record shows the existence of a group complaint,” even though “the employees acted individually and without coordination.” In this case, the fact that the group complaints post-dated the employee’s initial display of the BLM insignia was not dispositive. Instead, and contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, the NLRB focused on whether the employee’s subsequent refusal to remove the BLM insignia was a “logical outgrowth” of the prior protected concerted activity.

Additionally, the NLRB found that no special circumstances existed, such that there was a sufficient justification for the company to preclude their employees from wearing such insignia. For instance, this was not a situation where display of the insignia might jeopardize employee safety, exacerbate employee dissention, or unreasonably interfere with the company’s public image. In this regard, the NLRB concluded that the company’s public image was not at issue because it encourages employees to customize their uniforms. Likewise, the NLRB held that the company failed to put forth evidence of any non-speculative imminent risks to employee safety from the public and/or any violent or disruptive acts or threats thereof by other employees connected to the BLM insignia.

The NLRB ordered the employer to, among other things, (1) cease and desist from prohibiting employees from taking part in “protected concerted activities,” such as displaying “Black Lives Matter” insignia on their uniform aprons; (2) reinstate the employee without prejudice and compensate him for lost back pay and any adverse tax consequences; and (3) post notice of the decision for 60 days at the store where the dispute arose. The company may still appeal the Board’s decision to a federal appeals court.

Significantly, the NLRB declined to adopt a broader objective advanced by the NLRB General Counsel that protesting civil rights issues on the job is “inherently concerted” activity that is protected by Section 7 of the Act. The fact-intensive reasoning behind the NLRB’s decision here reflects that the underlying circumstances in each situation will play a significant role in the legal outcome as to whether the conduct at issue is protected, and it is not advisable to adopt a broad, one-size fits all rule from this decision.

© 2024 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more news on Protected Concerted Activity under the NLRA, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Form I-9 Software: Avoiding Unlawful Discrimination When Selecting and Using I-9 and E-Verify Software Systems

A recent employer fact sheet from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides guidance for avoiding unlawful discrimination and other violations when using private software products to complete Forms I-9 and E-Verify cases.

Quick Hits

  • Employers are responsible for selecting and using software products that avoid unlawful discrimination and comply with Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements.
  • Employers must not use software products that violate Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements or involve system limitations that unlawfully discriminate among workers.
  • DOJ and DHS advise employers to train staff on Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements, and to provide access to published government guidance on Form I-9 and E-Verify requirements.

Employer Compliance With Form I-9 Software Products

The fact sheet reminds employers to use the current Form I-9 and properly complete the Form I-9 for each new hire after November 6, 1986, with any acceptable employee documents. Form I-9 systems must comply with requirements for electronic signatures and document storage including the ability to provide Form I-9 summary files containing all information fields on electronically stored Forms I-9. The fact sheet confirms required software capabilities and employer practices to properly complete the Form I-9 and avoid unlawful discrimination.

Employers must ensure that any software:

  • allows employees to leave form fields blank, if they’re not required fields (such as Social Security numbers, if not required on E-Verify cases);
  • allows workers with only one name to record “Unknown” in the first name field and to enter their names in the last name field on the Form I-9;
  • uniquely identifies “each person accessing, correcting, or changing a Form I-9”;
  • permits Form I-9 corrections in Section 1 and does not complete Section 1 corrections for workers, unless completing preparer/translator certifications in Supplement A;
  • retains all employee information and documents presented for form completion; and
  • permits Form I-9 corrections in Section 2 and allows completion of Supplement B reverifications with any acceptable employee documents.

Employer Compliance With E-Verify Software Products

The fact sheet reminds employers to comply with E-Verify program requirements when using software interfaces for E-Verify case completion. The fact sheet confirms required software capabilities and employer practices for completing E-Verify cases. Employers must still:

  • provide employees with current versions of Further Action Notices and Referral Date Confirmation letters in resolving Tentative Nonconfirmations (mismatches) in the E-Verify system;
  • provide English and non-English Further Action Notices and Referral Date Confirmation letters to employees with limited English proficiency;
  • display E-Verify notices confirming employer use of E-Verify;
  • “promptly notify employees in private” of E-Verify mismatches and provide Further Action Notices. If an employee who has been notified of a mismatch takes action to resolve the mismatch, provide the Referral Date Confirmation letter with case-specific information;
  • delay E-Verify case creation, when required. For example, when workers are awaiting Social Security numbers or have presented acceptable receipts for Form I-9 completion, employers must be able to delay E-Verify case creation; and
  • allow employees to resolve E-Verify mismatches prior to taking any adverse action, including suspensions or withholding pay.

Prohibited Employer Activity When Using Form I-9 Software

The fact sheet notes that an employer that uses private software products for Form I-9 or E-Verify compliance is prohibited from:

  • completing the Form I-9 on an employee’s behalf unless the employer is helping an employee complete Section 1 as a preparer or translator;
  • prepopulating employee information from other sources, providing auto-correct on employee inputs, or using predictive language for form completion;
  • requiring more or less information from employees for Form I-9 completion or preventing workers from using preparers/translators for form completion;
  • improperly correcting the Form I-9, improperly creating E-Verify cases, or failing to report corrections in the Form I-9 audit trail;
  • requesting more or different documentation than needed for Form I-9 completion, or failing to complete reverification in Supplement B of the Form I-9; and
  • imposing “unnecessary obstacles” in starting work or receiving pay, “such as by requiring a Social Security number to onboard or by not paying an employee who can complete the Form I-9 and is waiting for a Social Security number.” (Emphasis in the original.)

Staff Training and Technical Support

The fact sheet warns employers against using software products that do not provide technical support to workers, and it notes that employers are required to provide training to staff on Form I-9 and E-Verify compliance. Resources for staff members using software products for Form I-9 and E-Verify case completion include I-9 Central, the Handbook for Employers M-274, the M-775, E-Verify User Manual, and DOJ publications.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on Form I-9, visit the NLR Immigration section.

International Trade, Enforcement & Compliance Recent Developments Update (January 17, 2024)

One of the most consistent messages coming from the U.S. government is that multinational companies need to take control of their supply chains. Forced labor, human trafficking, supply chain transparency, OFAC sanctions, even conflict minerals — all are areas in which the best defense against potential violations is strong compliance and due diligence to ensure that companies properly manage their supply chains, rights down to the last supplier. Today’s mix of enforcement actions and guidance from the U.S. government underscores the importance of doing so.

EXPORT CONTROLS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The Department of Commerce has stated that it has the authority to put companies on the Entity List (requiring special licensing and restrictions) solely for human rights violations. Does your company conduct full due diligence on its suppliers and sub-suppliers to ensure that they are operating in accordance with U.S. forced labor and human trafficking laws?

FORCED LABOR/UFLPA

The Department of Homeland Security continues to add Chinese and other companies to the Uyghur Forced Labor and Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List. Does your organization specifically screen against the UFLPA Entity List, as well as have in place UFLPA compliance and due diligence measures?

FORCED LABOR/UFLPA

The U.S. government has issued a pointed six-agency set of compliance guidelines regarding “the Risks and Considerations for Businesses and Individuals with Exposure to Entities Engaged in Forced Labor and other Human Rights Abuses linked to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” Does your organization maintain a compliance policy, vendor code of conduct, supply chain transparency and due diligence procedures, and other measures designed to ensure your supply chain is free of forced labor, human trafficking, or goods sourced from forced labor in the Xingjian Autonomous Region?

CUSTOMS PENALTY FOR ERRONEOUS USE OF FIRST SALE RULE

Due to the imposition of special Section 301 tariffs on most goods from Customs, many companies have begun to use the first sale rule, which allows the reporting of a lower value where there is a bona fide sale to a middleman. Improper application of the rule, however, can be the basis for substantial penalties, as an apparel company that paid a $1.3 million settlement with the DOJ found out. If your company uses the first sale rule, do you regularly review pricing and relevant circumstances to ensure you are meeting all the requirements for all entries?

EXPORT CONTROLS

Pledging “a new era of trilateral partnership,” the U.S., Japan, and South Korea governments have announced expanded collaboration to fight illegal exports of dual-use products, including high-tech products that might be shipped to China in violation of U.S. export controls. Has your organization performed a recent classification review to confirm it is aware of any restrictions that might adhere to the export of any of its products to sensitive countries, governments, or users?

© 2024 Foley & Lardner LLP
For more on Trade and Enforcement, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.

EEOC Takes Action to Address Mental Health Discrimination in the Workplace

Employers must take notice that the United State Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is cracking down on companies that discriminate against workers because they have a mental health condition. Mental health conditions, such as major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia, substantially limit brain function. The EEOC determined these disorders constitute disabilities under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The EEOC has significantly increased charges against employers for alleged ADA violations premised upon mental health issues.

In September, the EEOC released its Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP). A review of the SEP reveals that the EEOC will focus on harassment, retaliation, job segregation, labor trafficking, discriminatory pay, disparate working conditions, and other policies and practices that impact particularly vulnerable workers and persons from underserved communities, including workers with mental health related disabilities.

Hence, employers must be extremely careful when dealing with employees or prospective employees who suffer from mental health conditions.

Under the ADA and other nondiscrimination laws, employers must provide “reasonable accommodations” to qualified employees with disabilities. These accommodations are adjustments to the workplace that allow these employees to perform their job duties. These accommodations are usually not costly and can be beneficial in allowing employees to return to work, avoiding productivity losses, and promoting the recruitment and retention of qualified employees.

However, not all employees with mental health conditions require accommodations to perform their job duties. For those who do, accommodations should be individualized and developed with the input of the employee. Below is a list of examples of accommodations that have helped employees with mental health conditions to better perform their job duties. These are not all possible accommodations but provide a starting point to help employers promote an inclusive and supportive work environment. These include:

  • Flexible workplace arrangements
  • Scheduling adjustments
  • Sick leave or flexible use of vacation time
  • Individualized breaks
  • Modification of non-essential job duties
  • Additional training or support
  • Positive reinforcement and flexible supervision
  • Accommodations to the work environment, equipment, and technology
  • Regular meetings between employees and supervisors to discuss workplace issues.

It is important for all employees to be aware of their rights and provide relevant training to co-workers and supervisors. Effective implementation of these accommodations will help create a more inclusive work environment and benefit both employees and employers.

COPYRIGHT © 2023, STARK & STARK
For more news on Mental Health Discrimination in the Workplace, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Supreme Court Says Case Over ADA ‘Tester’ Standing Is Moot, But Issue is Still Alive

On December 5, 2023, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated a case over whether a self-proclaimed “tester” had standing to bring Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims against a hotel that she did not plan to visit, finding the case was moot without addressing the highly-anticipated standing issue.

Quick Hits

The Supreme Court vacated an ADA case against a hotel by a plaintiff who did not intend to stay at the hotel as moot despite the hopes of the business community that it would reduce the overwhelming number of ADA lawsuits.
The decision did not address whether such a ‘tester’ plaintiff has standing under the ADA except to say the issue is still alive and without providing any indication for how the Supreme Court or any other court will resolve the tester standing issue going forward.
A concurring opinion by Justice Thomas suggested that the plaintiff lacked standing because the only injury she suffered was so-called “informational injury” that is not protected by the ADA.
The Supreme Court vacated Acheson Hotels v. Laufer as moot but said the circuit split over whether “testers” have standing “is very much alive.” The high court further vacated the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that the plaintiff, Deborah Laufer, who uses a wheelchair, did have standing to bring ADA claims.

Still, the ruling failed to answer key questions about whether testers, individuals who seek out potential claims for discrimination violations against businesses, have standing to bring such claims amid a legal strategy to barrage businesses with tester lawsuits that often allege mere technical rights violations with a goal of extracting settlement payouts.

Despite once providing hope that the Supreme Court saw the Laufer case as a vehicle for reducing the overwhelming number of ADA lawsuits, including website accessibility lawsuits, when it accepted the case in March 2023, the dismissal of the case as moot does not offer relief for the business community and provides virtually no indication for how this Court (or any other court) will resolve the tester standing issue going forward.

Laufer, a self-proclaimed tester plaintiff who combed through various hotel websites searching for potential ADA violations, alleged that the website for The Coast Village Inn and Cottages in Maine, which was formerly owned by Acheson Hotels, LLC, did not provide sufficient information about its accessible accommodations in violation of Title III of the ADA and relevant U.S. Department of Justice regulations.

After the case was accepted by the Supreme Court, Laufer voluntarily dismissed her suit and asked the court to dismiss the case as moot. During oral arguments in October 2023, the justices questioned whether Laufer dropping her suit in addition to the facts that Acheson Hotels had already sold the hotel in question and the hotel’s current website is currently compliant with Title III, did not render the case moot.

But Acheson Hotels argued that the high court should decide the important standing questions while the issue was briefed and before the court as another appropriate case might not reach the high court anytime soon.

In the high court’s decision, Justice Amy Coney Barrett, stated that while the Court was “sensitive to Acheson’s concern about litigants manipulating the jurisdiction of” the Supreme Court, they were “not convinced … that Laufer abandoned her case in an effort to evade” the Court’s review. Still, Justice Barrett noted that the Court “may exercise [its] discretion differently in a future case.”

Justice Clarence Thomas stated in a separate concurring opinion that he would not dismiss the case as moot and would find that Laufer lacks standing to bring ADA claims. Justice Thomas argued that Laufer did not allege a violation of her rights under the ADA because “the ADA prohibits only discrimination based on disability—it does not create a right to information.

Justice Thomas distinguished Laufer’s claim from that in the 1968 Supreme Court case in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, in which the high court held, in addressing the Fair Housing Act, that a “dignitary harm” a tester may experience from witnessing discrimination is an adequate harm to establish standing.

Justice Thomas argued that in Havens Realty, “a black tester” who was told there were no apartments available when a “white tester” was told there were “vacancies,” had standing because he had been “personally denied that truthful information.” The situation in that case “thus has no bearing on Laufer’s standing as a tester of compliance with the ADA, which provides no such statutory right to information,” Justice Thomas stated.

Next Steps

With the Supreme Court declining to address tester standing, the issue and broad circuit split remains open. At this time, it is unclear when the high court will have another opportunity to address it, and, if it does, if the plaintiff will effectively moot the case again by abandoning the claim that made its way to the Court. Additionally, while Justice Thomas’s concurrence suggested that Laufer did not have standing based on the facts of her case, the opinion did not reject “dignitary harm” as a basis for standing under Havens Realty.

© 2023, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more news on Supreme Court ADA decisions, visit the NLR Civil Rights section.

European Citizens Sue States for Breach of Human Rights Resulting from Failure to Take Stronger Climate Action

On September 27, 2023, six “Portuguese young people” were heard by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in a lawsuit against 32 European governments, including all EU member states, alleging that their failure to act fast enough against climate change has violated the applicants’ human rights to life, physical and mental wellbeing. The applicants claim that the respondents are failing to fulfil their obligations under the Paris Agreement to limit global warming.

The original application cites a number of contributions to climate change made by the respondent states: (i) permitting the release of emissions within national territory and offshore areas over which they have jurisdiction; (ii) permitting the export of fossil fuels extracted on their territory; (iii) permitting the import of goods, the production of which involves the release of emissions into the atmosphere; and (iv) permitting organizations within their jurisdiction to contribute to the release of emissions overseas. Taken together, the applicants say, the respondents have contributed to climate change and, while mitigation measures have been adopted, contributions to adverse climate change continues. The applicants are seeking an order from ECtHR requiring the respondent governments to take more ambitious action.

Describing the impact on them, the applicants say that climate change has contributed to harm to human health. In an expert report commissioned to supplement their application, the applicants say that Portugal is already experiencing the impact of climate change, including an increase in mean and extreme high temperatures, with heatwaves becoming more frequent. As a result, the region is also prone to wildfires – 120 people died and 500,000 hectares of land were burned during wildfires preceded by heatwaves. Responding to the application, a lawyer on behalf of Greece claimed that climate change cannot be directly linked to an adverse impact on human health, stating “[the] effects of climate change, as recorded so far, do not seem to directly affect human life or human health.” Lawyers on behalf of Portugal stated that the applicants failed to provide evidence of the specific damages caused by climate change on their lives.

The case was originally filed in September 2020. The September 27 hearing was one of the largest before the ECtHR, with 22 judges and 86 government lawyers, and took place following one of the hottest summers on record in Europe. A decision is expected in 2024.

Taking the Temperature: The claims made in this case echo certain conclusions reached in the United Nations’ first global stocktake on parties’ achievements under the Paris Agreement. The UN acknowledged that although significant progress has been made, there is a crucial need for nations to significantly enhance their clean energy ambitions if they are to achieve their Paris-aligned objectives.

In July 2023, we discussed the Grantham Institute’s report on trends in climate litigation and the types of strategies being employed by claimants. One of these included so-called government framework actions in which plaintiffs focus on a government’s response to climate change and potentially, its failure to implement policies or legislation. The case brought by the six Portuguese young people falls squarely within this category.

In June 2023, we discussed the lawsuit filed by, among others, Greenpeace and 12 Italian citizens against ENI S.p.A. alleging that ENI knew of the detrimental effect of fossil fuel burning since around 1970 but through “lobbying and greenwashing” continued to encourage extraction, thereby contributing to climate change, and violating the citizens’ rights to life, health and private and family life. In March of this year, a group of Swiss citizens accused the Swiss government of infringing on the right to life and health of elderly women via its climate-related policies. The case is pending in the European Court of Human Rights.

Comparable cases have also been filed in the U.S. In Montana, 16 residents—ranging from ages 2 to 18—commenced litigation claiming that they “have been and will continue to be harmed by the dangerous impacts of fossil fuels and the climate crisis,” and that the defendants have violated the Montana Constitution by fostering and supporting fossil fuel-based energy policies in the state that led to these conditions. In September this year, the court struck down on state constitutional grounds certain provisions of the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), which restricted Montana from incorporating the impact of greenhouse gas emissions or other forms of climate change in environmental reviews. Similar constitution-based climate-related suits against state governments are pending in other U.S. states.

© Copyright 2023 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP
By Jason M. Halper , Sharon Takhar of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP
For more news on Climate Change Human Rights Violations, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

Do Federal Civil Rights Laws Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sex and Age?

Harvard Business Review’s recent survey, “Women in Leadership Face Ageism at Every Age,” shines a bright light on the bleak reality of age discrimination against women in the workplace.  The survey of 913 women leaders from across the United States in the higher education, faith-based nonprofit, legal, and health care industries found that supervisors and colleagues find women of every age unfit for leadership roles based on their age.  Young women leaders are subjected to head pats and pet names and are often mistaken for students, interns, or support staff.  Middle aged women leaders are discounted as having too many family responsibilities or being on the runway to menopause.  Older women are largely erased from the work environment, facing assumptions that they are on their way out.  This stands in stark contrast to older men, whom employers tend to regard as “wells of wisdom.”  In short, when it comes to the workplace, age-related bias perpetually stands between women and recognition as leaders.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which prohibits discrimination in employment, identifies certain “protected classes” upon which bases employers may not discriminate: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.  A separate statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“the ADEA”), outlaws age discrimination in the workplace.  Plaintiffs filing a lawsuit challenging employment discrimination typically must articulate a specific statute their employer has violated.  In the case of sex-plus-age discrimination—that is, mistreatment based on the intersection of sex and age—neither statute standing alone captures the plaintiff’s experience.[1]  This raises the question of how women facing uniquely gendered age bias in the workplace—like that outlined in the Harvard Business Review survey—can state legal claims a court will consider viable.

For the most part, federal courts have been skeptical of such claims.

A recent case, however, brought a new perspective to the question of sex-plus-age discrimination under federal law.  On July 21, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court that covers Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming, addressed the question “whether sex-plus-age claims are cognizable under Title VII.”[2]  In Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk LLC, nine female plaintiffs brought (among other claims) sex-plus-age claims for disparate impact and disparate treatment under Title VII, alleging they were terminated because Affinity discriminated against women over forty.[3]  The older women, who had worked at the Golden Mardi Gras Casino, were laid off after the defendant purchased the casino in 2012.  The terminations were largely unexplained.  After the lower court dismissed their claims, the plaintiffs appealed.

The Tenth Circuit ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, affirming the validity of sex-plus-age claims under Title VII alone.  The court noted that it had allowed claims based on a combination of race and sex discrimination in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.[4]In Hicks, the court considered the combined effect of racial slurs and sexual harassment in a hostile work environment case.  In Frappied, however, the court had to decide a novel question—whether an intersectional discrimination claim could be based on a second characteristic that is not protected by Title VII: age.  Most courts that have considered such claims have refused to decide whether a plaintiff can challenge discrimination under an intersectional theory that the combination of the two protected characteristics led to the adverse action, or they have decided the plaintiff can prevail under one statute so the court does not have to decide whether the intersectional claim is viable. For instance, both the Second and Sixth Circuits have sidestepped the issue, making dispositive rulings based on other claims in plaintiffs’ complaints.[5]

In Frappied, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had long held that Title VII prohibits “sex-plus” discrimination where the “plus” factor is not protected under the statute.[6]  In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.[7]the Supreme Court held that a policy against hiring women with preschool-age children violated Title VII, because men with preschool-age children were not subject to that policy.  Even though “people with preschool-age children” is not a protected class, the Supreme Court recognized this to be a form of sex discrimination.  The Tenth Circuit used the same reasoning to hold that if sex—which is protected under Title VII—“play[ed] a role in the employment action,” then the termination was impermissible even though the “plus” factor, age, is in another statute.[8]  Borrowing from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bostock,[9] which held that Title VII’s sex discrimination provision prohibits sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in employment, the Tenth Circuit held that “if a female plaintiff shows that she would not have been terminated if she had been a man—in other words, if she would not have been terminated but for her sex—this showing is sufficient to establish liability under Title VII.[10]

While the outcome in Frappied is a positive development for civil rights in employment, in most jurisdictions there is no clear protection under federal law against sex-plus-age discrimination.  The EEOC has long acknowledged the availability of such intersectional claims, but as mentioned, other sex-plus-age claims have made their way through the courts on occasion without success.  The Tenth Circuit is the first and only federal appellate court to formally recognize these claims as viable under federal law.

However, there are state laws that prohibit sex and age discrimination in the same provision,[11] so the federal courts’ unwillingness to combine the effects of discrimination prohibited by two separate statutes is not always a concern.  Given the Harvard Business Review’s exposure of the dire state of workplace age bias against women, and the Tenth Circuit’s groundbreaking decision in Frappied, more women experiencing workplace age discrimination may want to consider challenging their employers’ decisions.  Because of the variations in protections in different jurisdictions, employees should consider seeking legal advice.  If you or someone you know has experienced sex-plus-age bias, contact the experienced lawyers at Katz Banks Kumin today.

[1] The legal standards, particularly the causation standards, also differ under the two statutes.  Under Title VII, it is sufficient to prove that sex was a “motivating factor” in an employment decision.  Under the ADEA, however, age must be the but-for cause, Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).  Many courts have interpreted this but-for causation standard to mean that if any other reason—even sex, which is a protected class under Title VII—played a role in the employment decision, then the age claims fail.  The Supreme Court recently clarified that “but-for cause” does not mean “sole cause,” Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), but the idea has yet to trickle down through the federal courts—and into ADEA claims.

[2] Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1045 (10th Cir. 2020).

[3] Id.

[4] 833 F.2d 1406, 1416-17 (10th Cir. 1987)

[5] Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Having determined that Gorzynski has provided sufficient evidence of age discrimination to reach a jury, there is no need for us to create an age-plus-sex claim independent from Gorzynski’s viable ADEA claim.”); Schatzman v. Cty. Of Clermont, Ohio, No. 99-4066, 2000 WL 1562819, at *9 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e decline the invitation to decide the ‘sex plus [age]’ charge partly because it is unnecessary for us to do so.”).

[6] 966 F.3d at 1046.

[7] 400 U.S. 542 (1971).

[8] Id. at 1046.

[9] 140 S. Ct. 1731.

[10] Id. at 1047.

[11] See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.1.

Katz Banks Kumin LLP Copyright ©
For more articles on workplace discrimination, visit the NLR Civil Rights section.

How The U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling On College Affirmative Action Programs May Impact Private Employers

The U.S. Supreme Court in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College decided that the race-based admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina (the “Schools”) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court answered the question for publicly funded schools, it is an open question whether, and how, the Court’s decision will impact affirmative action and diversity programs for private employers, as discussed in more detail below.

Overview

The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, that no State shall “deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” Among other things, the clause protects people regardless of their race. A limited exception that permits race-based action by the government is permissible if such action can survive a rigorous standard known as “strict scrutiny.” Under that standard, race-based conduct is permissible only if the government can establish a “compelling government interest” and the race-based action is “narrowly tailored” to achieve that established interest.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Schools’ race-based admissions programs failed strict scrutiny. In support of their race-based admissions programs, the Schools asserted the following educational goals as their compelling interests:

  • Training future leaders in the public and private sectors/preparing engaged and productive citizens and leaders.
  • Preparing graduates to adapt to an increasingly pluralistic society/broadening and refining understanding.
  • Better educating students through diversity/enhancing appreciation, respect, and empathy, cross-racial understanding, and breaking down stereotypes/promoting the robust exchange of ideas.
  • Producing new knowledge stemming from diverse outlooks/fostering innovating and problem solving.
  • Preparing engaged and productive citizens and leaders.

The Court noted that although these goals were laudable, they were too amorphous to pass muster under the strict scrutiny standard. The Court recognized that a court would have no way to know whether leaders have been adequately trained; whether the exchange of ideas is sufficiently robust, or whether, and in what quantity, racial diversity leads to the development of new knowledge. In other words, the Court took issue with the fact that the asserted interests could not be measured in any meaningful, quantifiable way.

In addition, the Court found there was no meaningful connection between the Schools’ use of race in the admissions process and the claimed benefits. For example, the Court noted that while diversity may further the asserted interests, the Schools failed to establish that racial diversity would. The Court took particular issue with what it viewed as the overbroad and arbitrary nature of the Schools’ race considerations as they were underinclusive (for example, failing to distinguish between South Asians or East Asians, or define what Hispanic means, or account at all for Middle Eastern applicants). The Court reasoned that the overbroad, arbitrary, and underinclusive racial distinctions employed by the Schools undermine the Schools’ asserted interests—essentially noting that the Schools’ race-based admissions programs sought to “check the diversity box” rather than obtain a truly diverse (racially or otherwise) student body.

In addition to the School’s programs’ failure to survive strict scrutiny, the Court also recognized that the Schools’ race-based admissions processes promoted stereotyping, negatively impacted nonminority applicants, and, contrary to Court precedent, did not have a durational limit or any cognizable way in which to adopt a durational limit.

Supreme Court Precedent

The Court’s decision rested largely on two prior cases addressing race-based admission programs in higher education: Regents Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). As a guiding principle, the Court noted that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars admissions programs that use race as a stereotype or a negative.

In Bakke, while rejecting other asserted interests, the Court explained that obtaining the educational benefits associated with having a racially diverse student body was “a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education,” provided that certain guardrails were in place. This is despite the Court’s recognition that racial preferences cause serious problems of justice. The Court said that race only could operate as “a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file” and the weight afforded to race must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant.”

In Grutter, the Court decided “student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions,” provided that sufficient limitations were in place—notably, that under no circumstances would race-based admissions decisions continue indefinitely. The Court cautioned that, because the use of race was a deviation from the norm of equal treatment, race-based admissions programs must not result in “illegitimate . . . stereotyping,” must not “unduly harm nonminority applicants,” and must be “limited in time.”

The Court’s Additional Considerations

Of critical importance to the Court’s ruling was the fact that neither School’s race-based admissions program had an articulable end point. The Court noted that the Schools’ arguments to overcome the lack of a definite end point were, essentially, “trust us, we’ll know when we’re there.” Yet such arguments, the Court held, were insufficiently persuasive to offset the pernicious nature of racial classifications. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, who joined the majority opinion, took additional issue with the Schools’ “trust us” arguments in separate concurrences, noting (1) their view of the Schools’ histories of harmful racial discrimination, and (2) that courts are not to defer to the morality of alleged discriminators.

Additionally, the Court took issue with the logical necessity that, in any instance when a limited number of positions are available, a race-based “plus factor” for applicants of a certain race is a negative for applicants who do not belong to the favored race. “How else but ‘negative’ can race be described if, in its absence, members of some racial groups would be admitted in greater numbers than they otherwise would have been?” In this, the Court recognized that equal protection is not achieved through the imposition of inequalities.

Impact on Private Employers

The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have no direct legal impact on private employers. The Court based its decision on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the Schools under Title VI, which does not intrinsically apply to private companies; it is Title VII and analogous state and local laws that apply to private employers (not Title VI) and prohibit private employers from discriminating against employees and applicants on the basis of race (and other protected characteristics). In employment, the law has always prohibited any consideration of race in decision-making, such as who to hire or who to promote, except in extremely narrow and limited situations but, even then, quotas and set-asides are strictly prohibited.

While not directly applicable, it is highly likely that the Court’s decision will spawn new challenges to private employer diversity and inclusion programs, and the Court’s rationale will be referenced as an indicator of how the Court will view such programs under Title VII. Even before the Court’s decision, the legal landscape around an employer’s use of affirmative action plans to aid in making employment decisions was murky. Generally a private employer’s affirmative action plan is permissible under Title VII in two scenarios: (1) if the plan is needed to remedy an employer’s past discrimination, and (2) if the plan is needed to prevent an employer from being found liable under Title VII’s disparate impact prohibitions (which operate to prohibit facially neutral policies that nevertheless disproportionately disadvantage certain groups).

Regarding the latter scenario, it is unlikely the Court’s ruling will have much if any impact. For an affirmative action plan to survive scrutiny on this basis, an employer must first prove a disparate impact case against itself: it must identify a specific policy, prove that such policy has a disparate impact on a certain group, and either show that the policy is not justified by business necessity or show that there is a viable alternative that both (a) accounts for the employer’s business necessity, and (b) has less of a disparate impact on the affected group. Then, the employer must prove how its affirmative action steps offset the disparate impact. There is nothing in the Court’s opinion that suggests an employer’s effort to remedy an ongoing Title VII violation would itself be a violation of Title VII.

However, there is language in the Court’s opinion that suggests an affirmative action plan implemented in the former scenario could be problematic, especially if it is not designed carefully. Indeed, a number of lower court decisions even before the Supreme Court’s recent ruling have struck down employer affirmative action programs. Permissible affirmative action programs are typically implemented to remedy past racial imbalances in an employer’s workforce overall, and are not tied to past discrimination against an identifiable employee or applicant. At the close of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion, it admonished Justice Sotomayor’s dissent wherein she proposed a world where schools consider race indirectly, through, for example, essays submitted alongside applications. The Court noted that such would nevertheless violate the Constitution, and clarified that admission decisions can rely on the content of application essays, but that such decisions must be based on an individual applicant’s character or experiences, and not based on the applicant’s race. Similarly, Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, recognized that “[w]hatever their skin color, today’s youth simply are not responsible for instituting the segregation of the 20th century, and they do not shoulder the moral debts of their ancestors.” Accordingly, challenges to affirmative action plans that attempt to remedy past discrimination generally, by using race in its decision-making may find purchase in the Court’s closing sentiments and Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Although a standard less exacting then “strict scrutiny” is used to evaluate discrimination claims under Title VII, the sentiment expressed by Members of the Court could make the judiciary increasingly skeptical of affirmative action programs that resemble those used by the Schools. In any event, the possibility of being able to continue to use affirmative action plans in the strict sense to increase diversity in an employer’s workforce is likely little comfort to private employers, as few will want to prove a discrimination case against themselves to justify a diversity program.

Additionally, employers’ diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs may be the subject of challenges based on the Supreme Court’s skepticism of the benefits of “racial” diversity, as opposed to diversity on less-pernicious characteristics. For example, DEI programs that seek to increase racial diversity based on broad racial definitions may be subject to challenges because of their overbreadth or purportedly arbitrary nature. And DEI programs that highlight racial diversity, rather than, for example, diversity based on socio-economic, ideological, or experiential characteristics may suffer challenges to their legitimacy in reliance on the Supreme Court’s implication that there may be no identifiable tether between “racial” diversity and the purported benefits of diversity as a concept.

Of course, to the extent private employers with affirmative action plans have contracts with government entities and/or receive government funding, affirmative action plans under the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”), require targeted diversity recruiting efforts, aimed at increasing the diversity of applicant pools, although this also does not permit race (or other protected traits) to be used in decision-making.

Practical Tips For Employers

The Court’s decision applies to affirmative action programs in the college setting and applies an analysis under the Equal Protection Clause that does not directly apply to private employers. The decision also deals with very different scenarios where colleges and universities directly used race as a criteria for admissions. As noted, this has generally never been permitted in the employment context and, as a result, the rules of the road for implementing DEI programs have not changed, although they may evolve through future legal challenges in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions. There are still countless ways that private employers can design and implement lawful DEI programs. Below are just a few examples employers may consider:

  • Reiterate D&I as a priority in meetings, conferences, and other communications.
  • Implement recruiting programs to diversify your talent pool.
  • Incentivize employees to refer diverse candidates for openings.
  • Support employee resource groups, mentoring programs, and leadership training.
  • Educate your managers and supervisors on unconscious bias.
  • Encourage diversity in suppliers and business partners.
  • Tie D&I efforts (not results) to managerial performance evaluations.
  • Under the privilege of working with counsel, monitor changes in workforce demographics and conduct pay audits.
  • Consider modifying the goal of DEI programs to seek diversity based on broader characteristics that do not involved protected classes, such as experiences, economic background, or worldview.

Conclusion

The Court’s decision is a landmark ruling that will alter the landscape of college and university admissions. And it will almost certainly spawn new challenges beyond the classroom and into the workplace.

However, the decision does not legally require private employers to make changes to their existing DEI programs if such practices comply with already-existing employment laws. Employers can still implement diversity and inclusion programs and promote diversity within their workplaces but, as has always been the case, employers should tread carefully in designing and implementing these programs. Employers would do well to engage counsel to review such programs and initiatives for possible concerns in light of the Court’s decision, as well as existing precedent in the employment context.

Copyright © 2023, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

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