Tag: Wisconsin

Chicken Restaurant Case Serves Up A Bucket of Sound Contract Principles for Commercial Leases

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In Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality LLC, 2013 WI 62, the Wisconsin Supreme Courthighlighted the importance of including precise language in commercial leases, especially if the lease includes an integration clause. The court confirmed that when dealing with a fully integrated lease, it is guided by the terms of the lease as written rather than by extrinsic evidence or unwritten understandings between the parties. While this may seem obvious, this case serves as a good reminder for those who negotiate commercial leases to always include all specific business and legal terms.

Tufail (“Landlord”) and Midwest Hospitality LLC (“Tenant”) entered into a lease for commercial property that was then being used by Landlord as a “New York Chicken” restaurant. Tenant leased this property with the intent of operating a “Church’s Chicken” restaurant. However, during build-out, Tenant discovered that a special use permit would be required to operate its fast food restaurant with a drive-through. While Tenant was able to obtain the permit it needed, the permit was conditioned upon the restaurant being closed by 9 p.m. (as opposed to the 4 a.m. close time allowed for the prior restaurant).

Tenant terminated the Lease and notified Landlord that it would stop paying rent due to the adverse effect the earlier closing time would have on its profitability. Tenant argued that the permit requirement was contrary to Landlord’s representation that Tenant would not be prevented from using the premises for the permitted uses set forth in the lease. The lease contained the following use clause: “[t]enant may use and occupy the Premises for any lawful purposes, including, but not limited to, the retail sales, consumption, and delivery of food and beverages which shall include, but not be limited to, Chicken products, Fish products, bread products, salads, sandwiches, dessert items, promotional items, and any other items sold by any Church’s Chicken store.”

After reviewing the lease’s integration clause and finding it to be complete, the court rejected Tenant’s argument that the general reference to “Church’s Chicken” in the use clause required that a fast food restaurant with a drive-through be allowed because the understanding between the parties was that Church’s Chicken restaurants were in fact drive-through fast food restaurants. The court concluded that the lease did not include a false representation and also limited its review to the specific language used in the use and representation clauses of the lease due to its conclusion that the lease was fully integrated.

The court also concluded that the terms of the representation clause as written required simply that Tenant not be prevented from using the property for the purposes set forth in the use clause. The court stated that there was nothing that prevented Tenant from specifically addressing hours of operation, the requirement that a drive-through be allowed, or other specific requirements it considered to be vital to the successful operation of its restaurant in the lease. However, the court was bound to interpret only the contract to which the parties actually agreed, and these requirements were not included therein.

While this is a misrepresentation case on its face, the case ultimately turned on basic contract principles and is an important reminder of the effects of integration clauses. Not only can these “boilerplate” clauses intensify the scrutiny of the specific language chosen by the parties, but, as shown in this case, they can be used to support the theory that even the smallest of deal points should have been included in the agreement if they were important to the parties. This case demonstrates that it is extremely important to include precise, unambiguous language in leases and to double check that even the seemingly minor deal points are included in the lease if they are necessary to make the deal viable.

Article By:

Chris A. Jenny
William R. West
Megan L.W. Jerabek
Of:
von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

Wisconsin’s Password Protection Law Mandates Review of Policies and Practices

Godfrey Kahn

Wisconsin has joined the ranks of other states who have limited the circumstances under which employees or applicants can be required to provide access to his or her personal Internet account. The Social Media Protection Act (2013 Wisconsin Act 208) became effective April 16, 2014. The new law makes it illegal for an employer to request or require an employee or applicant to disclose personal Internet account access information. A parallel prohibition within the Act applies to educational institutions and landlords.

A “personal Internet account” is defined as an Internet-based account that is created and used by an individual exclusively for purposes of personal communications. With the passage of the Act, employers are now prohibited from:

  • Requesting or requiring an employee or applicant, as a condition of employment, to disclose access information to the individual’s personal Internet account or to ask the individual to grant access to or allow observation of that account.
  • Discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee for exercising his/her right to refuse to disclose personal Internet account access information.
  • Refusing to hire an applicant because the individual did not disclose personal Internet account access information.

While the law primarily protects the privacy of employees and applicants, it also offers employers a limited degree of protection. Specifically, employers can:

  • Request or require an employee to disclose access information to the employer in order for the employer to gain access to or operate an employer-provided (or employer-paid) electronic communications device provided by virtue of the employee’s employment relationship or used for the employer’s business purposes.
  • Discharge or discipline employees for transferring proprietary or confidential information or financial data to the employee’s personal Internet account without the employer’s authorization.
  • If the employer has reasonable cause, conduct an investigation or require an employee to cooperate in an investigation of any alleged unauthorized transfer of the employer’s proprietary or confidential information or financial data to the employee’s personal Internet account or to conduct an investigation of any other alleged employment-related misconduct, violation of the law or violation of the employer’s work rules. During the investigation, the employer can require the employee to grant access to or allow observation of the employee’s personal Internet account, but may not require the employee to disclose access information for that account.
  • Restrict or prohibit an employee’s access to certain Internet sites, while using an employer-provided (or paid for) electronic communications device, or while the employee is using the employer’s network or other resources.
  • View, access or use information about an employee or applicant that can be obtained without access information or that is available in the public domain.
  • Request or require an employee to disclose his or her personal electronic mail address.

A person who has been discharged, expelled, disciplined, or otherwise discriminated against for reasons provided under this law may file a complaint with Wisconsin’s Department of Workforce Development (the “DWD”).

Employers should make sure that their employment policies and practices conform to the requirements of 2013 Wisconsin Act 208. In particular, employers should make sure that employees using employer-provided or paid for electronic communication devices for business purposes do not have any expectation of privacy in such devices or the communications that flow from them.

In addition, employees should be informed that they are prohibited from disclosing proprietary or confidential information or financial data to anyone using personal Internet accounts and only for legitimate business reasons if using an employer-provided account. Lastly, employers should make sure that their employment policies are clear in reserving the right to conduct, and in expecting employees to cooperate in, investigations concerning the unauthorized transfer of proprietary, confidential or financial information.

Article By:

Jon E. Anderson
Of:
Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Wisconsin Federal Court Recognizes Same-Sex Marriage: How Does This Affect the Administration of an Employer’s Employee Benefits?

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On Friday, June 6, 2014, Judge Crabb of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin issued a decision finding that Wisconsin’s constitutional amendment recognizing marriages only between men and women violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Unlike several other federal judges who have considered the issue, Judge Crabb did not make her ruling immediately effective. Instead the Court asked the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the case to help her fashion an injunction to implement her ruling. The plaintiffs have until June 16, 2014, to submit this proposal. The State asked for clarification on the June 6, 2014 ruling and requested that the court stay its decision until it made a final decision on the scope of the injunctive relief. On June 9, 2014, the court denied the State’s motion. In response, the State appealed Judge Crabb’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago and requested an immediate stay of Judge Crabb’s order. The Seventh Circuit has solicited arguments from the parties to determine whether it has jurisdiction of the matter.

In response to Judge Crabb’s decision, many of the State’s counties have begun issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in the state. Others have declined to do so and have, instead, sought guidance from counsel or the Attorney General.

Addressing the Change

Judge Crabb’s decision, and issuance of Wisconsin same-sex marriage licenses, has injected some uncertainty into benefit plan administration in Wisconsin. Based upon the state of the prior law, it is likely that a Wisconsin employer will have more employees with domestic partners than employees with same-sex spouses through legal marriages formed elsewhere. Nevertheless, same-sex benefits are certainly an evolving issue for employers.

Family and Medical Leave

Registered and unregistered domestic partners were already covered under the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act. Because an unregistered domestic partnership does not require a formal filing with a county clerk, it appears that the state law in this context is relatively unaffected.

On the other hand, the federal FMLA is substantially affected. The definition of spouse under the federal regulations requires that the marriage must be recognized by the state of residence. Most FMLA policies do not distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex partners. Consequently, if Judge Crabb’s decision stands, requests for FMLA leave relating to same-sex spouses must be recognized under both federal and Wisconsin law if the leave is otherwise appropriate under the law.

Until the ramifications of the injunctive language are known, employers should pay particular attention to the language of their FMLA policies before making any determination about FMLA requests. Depending on how the courts ultimately rule, an employer’s FMLA policy may or may not require amendment. Regardless, if an employee asks about leave for a same-sex spouse, legal counsel should be consulted.

Benefits

The status of the law will remain uncertain until Judge Crabb makes a decision regarding whether to issue an injunction and the form such an order would take. If an injunction is issued and then stands following the anticipated appeal, employers who employ employees who have a same-sex spouse would no longer impute Wisconsin income tax for health coverage, and would otherwise recognize such spouse for all legal purposes. Because of the uncertainty in the current climate, employers should consider whether to continue imputing income for benefits provided to same-sex spouses until such time as transitional guidance is issued by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue on this issue.

Nothing has changed as it relates to unmarried domestic partners—these individuals are still subject to imputed income where the individual obtains coverage on behalf of his or her domestic partner.

Because employee benefits rules are largely governed by federal law, many same-sex marriage changes in employee benefits have been observed already since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Windsor decision of last year. If the Judge Crabb ruling stands, the most significant change for Wisconsin employers will likely pertain to Wisconsin tax treatment of family health coverage.

What should employers do in response?

  • Account for those same-sex couples who may have been married in a state that permitted same-sex marriage or who are newly married in Wisconsin following Judge Crabb’s decision;
  • Examine if modification of FMLA policy/forms is warranted based upon the changes; and
  • Examine if modification to benefit plan materials may be necessary.
Article By:

Charles P. Stevens
Kirk A. Pelikan
Of:
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

Phosphorus in Wisconsin: The Clean Waters, Healthy Economy Act

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On April 23, 2014, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker signed the Clean Waters, Healthy Economy Act (Act) into law. This legislation establishes the basis for creating a multi-discharger variance for point sources struggling to meet Wisconsin’s stringent numeric phosphorus water quality criteria. Although several conditions must be met before it is available to permit holders, this legislation could have significant impacts on Wisconsin agribusinesses that hold Wisconsin Pollution Discharge Elimination System (WPDES) permits, as well as agricultural produces that may be targeted for non-point source reductions of phosphorus. In addition, since the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has noted that it generally favors these multi-discharger permit approaches, Wisconsin’s approach may be replicated in other areas of the country that are considering stricter water quality standards for nutrients like phosphorus and nitrogen.

What does the Act do?

Very simply, the Act sets in motion the collection of economic information to justify a multi-discharger variance based on a finding of adverse widespread social and economic impact. The Act requires the Department of Administration (DOA) to look at costs of compliance for categories of point source dischargers statewide. If the DOA finds that the “cost of compliance with water quality based effluent limitations for phosphorus by point sources that cannot achieve compliance without major facility upgrades” would cause substantial adverse social and economic impacts on a statewide basis, then the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) will seek approval from the EPA for a variance under 40 CFR Part 131. The Act also defines the criteria for qualifying for the variance and what a point source must do if it opts into the variance.

How would this multi-discharger variance work for permit holders?

Agribusinesses that hold WPDES permits may be eligible for the variance. To qualify, permit holders will need to:

1)    Demonstrate the economic determination made by the DOA applies to the source;

2)    Certify the permittee cannot achieve compliance without a major facility upgrade (defined to mean the addition of both new treatment equipment and a new treatment process); and

3)    Agree to comply with the requirements of the variance.

Once DNR has confirmed these requirements have been met, the permittee may participate in the variance for up to four permit cycles as long as it meets the discharge limits established by the multi-permit variance and takes steps to reduce phosphorus contributions from other sources.

First, the permit must comply with decreasing phosphorus discharges. These concentrations begin at 0.8 mg/L in the first permit term and then drop to 0.6 mg/L and 0.5 mg/L in the third and fourth permit term, respectively. In the fourth permit for which the variance is available, the DNR will require the permittee to achieve – by the end of the term of that permit – the water quality based effluent limit for phosphorus that would apply without the variance.

Second, while complying with these reduced discharge limits, the permittee must also undertake some activity to reduce phosphorus contributions from other sources in its watershed. This concept borrows from Wisconsin’s EPA-approved adaptive management program, and requires the permittee to:

1)    Enter into a binding, written agreement with the DNR under which it implements a project or plan designed to reduce phosphorus contributions from other sources; or

2)    Enter into a binding, written agreement that is approved by DNR with another person under which the other person implements a project or plan designed to phosphorus contributions from other sources; or

3)    Make a payment to the counties of the watershed in which the permittee is located. These payments are calculated by multiplying $50/lb times the difference between what the permittee is currently discharging, and what the permittee would discharge if its effluent met a target limit. The target limit is either the limit set by a TMDL (total maximum daily load), if applicable, or 0.2mg/L if no TMDL is approved.

How might the Act affect producers as nonpoint sources?

Counties that receive money through this program must use at least 65% of the amounts received to fund cost-sharing for projects governed by 281.16(3)(e) or (4) (the state’s nonpoint source program). These must be applied to projects that have been prioritized by their potential to “reduce the amount of phosphorus per acre entering the waters of the state, based on an assessment of land and land use practices in the county.” Up to 35% can be used for staffing, or toward modeling or monitoring to evaluate the amount of phosphorus in waters for planning purposes. In Wisconsin, producers that are not currently meeting state performance standards may be asked to install certain practices when cost share dollars are available. The Act has the potential to increase the amount of cost share dollars available to county work in this area.

What’s Next for the Act?

Before this program is available to permittees, a number of things must happen. First, the DOA must complete an economic study that demonstrates compliance with the phosphorus standard will have adverse and widespread social and economic impact. This study must also identify the categories of dischargers that will be eligible for the multi-discharger variance. Second, EPA must approve the variance before it may be implemented in Wisconsin. Finally, permittees would need to apply for the variance to alter any existing permit conditions that have been imposed to implement the phosphorus standard. Look for further updates in 2015!

Article By:

Angela A. James
Of:
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

Wisconsin Right to Life v. Barland (7th Cir. May 14, 2014)

Godfrey Kahn

On May 14, 2014 the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals released its long-awaited decision in Wisconsin Right to Life v. Barland. Click here to read a copy of the court’s decision.

The opinion is authored by Judge Diane Sykes who was a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court before being nominated by President Bush and then appointed to the federal Court of Appeals in 2004. The matter had been fully briefed, argued and pending since January 2013.

In 2010, the Government Accountability Board (the G.A.B.) adopted an administrative rule, GAB 1.28. In short, this rule greatly expanded the scope of communications subject to regulation as independent expenditures. As a result, issue advocacy communications in the 30/60 days before an election that identified a candidate would be presumed to be independent expenditures and subject to full PAC regulation under state campaign finance law, including donor disclosure.

In response to the G.A.B.’s adoption of this highly controversial rule, three lawsuits were filed almost immediately after the rule took effect. One of those lawsuits was filed in federal court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin by attorney James Bopp on behalf of Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL). However, WRTL not only sued the G.A.B. about administrative rule GAB 1.28, it also challenged a multitude of other Wisconsin campaign finance laws. Today’s decision is essentially a resolution of WRTL’s lawsuit and all of those legal challenges.

WRTL prevailed in virtually all of its arguments, including:

  • Wisconsin’s ban on corporate political spending is unconstitutional under Citizens United;
  • GAB 1.28 which treats issue advocacy during the 30/60 day preelection period as fully regulable express advocacy/independent expenditures is unconstitutional; and,
  • GAB 1.91 which imposes PAC-like registration and reporting requirements on all organizations that sponsor independent expenditures is unconstitutional as applied to sponsors who are not superPACs (such as 501(c)(4) organizations and other non-committee sponsors).

The Court of Appeals reached its conclusions using very strong and clear language on government’s limited ability to regulate political speech:

  • “The effect of [Buckley] was to place issue advocacy—political ads and other communications that do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate—beyond the reach of the regulatory scheme.” (p. 20)
  • “As applied to political speakers other than candidates, their committees, and political parties, the statutory definition of ‘political purposes’ in section 11.01(16) and the regulatory definition of ‘political committee’ in GAB 1.28(1)(a) are limited to express advocacy and its functional equivalent as those terms were explained in Buckley and Wisconsin Right to Life II.” (p. 62)
  • The G.A.B.’s administrative rule “sweeps a far wider universe of political speech into [state campaign finance laws], introducing confusion for ordinary political speakers who lack the background or assistance of a campaign finance lawyer.” (p. 64)
  • “Regulations on speech, however, must meet a higher standard of clarity and precision. In the First Amendment context, ‘rigorous adherence to [these] requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.’ Vague or overbroad speech regulations carry an unacceptable risk that speakers will self-censor, so the First Amendment requires more vigorous judicial scrutiny.” (p. 65)

The WRTL decision also highlights the confusing nature of Wisconsin’s campaign finance statutes and the burdens these laws place on those organizations desiring to participate in the process:

Like other campaign-finance systems, Wisconsin’s is labyrinthian and difficult to decipher without a background in this area of the law; in certain critical respects, it violates the constitutional limits on the government’s power to regulate independent political speech. Part of the problem is that the state’s basic campaign-finance law—Chapter 11 of the Wisconsin Statutes—has not been updated to keep pace with the evolution in Supreme Court doctrine marking the boundaries on the government’s authority to regulate election-related speech. In addition, key administrative rules do not cohere well with the statutes, introducing a patchwork of new and different terms, definitions, and burdens on independent political speakers, the intent and cumulative effect of which is to enlarge the reach of the statutory scheme. Finally, the state elections agency has given conflicting signals about its intent to enforce some aspects of the regulatory mélange. (pp. 3-4)

The WRTL decision also is an excellent summary of the history of campaign finance regulation and litigation in Wisconsin during the last 20 years. It covers in detail successful legal challenges brought against the Elections Board / Government Accountability Board (the G.A.B) by our law firm on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce (Wis. Supreme Court 1999); Wisconsin Realtors Association (W.D. Wis. 2002); and, Wisconsin Club for Growth / One Wisconsin Now (W.D. Wis. 2010). And, it discusses how despite losing in each of these instances, the G.A.B. continued to push for greater regulation—not less—of political speech.

Bottom line, the WRTL decision makes clear that the government’s authority to regulate political speech extends only to money raised and spent for speech that is express advocacy and that “ordinary political speech about issues, policy, and public officials must remain unencumbered.” (p. 9) Hopefully, with the strong language in this opinion, the G.A.B. will now understand the statutory and First Amendment limitations on its ability to regulate political speech. And, hopefully, the State Legislature will now understand that “Wisconsin’s foundational campaign finance law is in serious need of legislative attention to account for developments in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence protecting political speech.” (p. 80)

Article By:

Mike B. Wittenwyler
Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Privacy, Behavioral Health and Hospital Regulations: Recent Developments in Wisconsin Law [VIDEO]

vonBriesen

In recent months, the Wisconsin legislature has passed several bills relating to health information privacy, treatment of behavioral health patients, and regulation of hospitals. Please view this webcast that will provide a summary of the legislative action and tips for complying with the new law.

http://player.vimeo.com/video/90057974

Health Law Check-Up Webcast: Recent Developments in Wisconsin Law

Article By:

Meghan C. O’Connor
Ralph V. Topinka
Of:
von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

It’s That Time of the Year Again Re: Wisconsin Property Taxes

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It’s time to open up the unwelcome envelope with your property tax bill inside. Property taxes are necessary, of course, for roads and schools and all of the other services your property receives, but you should take some time to make sure that you are not paying more than your fair share of these taxes.

Wisconsin’s State Constitution has a provision requiring that all real estate be taxed “uniformly.” Regular real estate and personal property is taxed by the local municipality. Property which is used for manufacturing purposes, is taxed by the State of Wisconsin, in an effort to make sure that manufacturing property throughout the State is taxed in the same manner. Land which is in agricultural use enjoys a separate “use value assessment” system, which not only allows a lower assessment for land in that use, but also requires a per-acre penalty if that land is removed from the ag use, as defined by those statutes.

Of course, each of those taxing categories is controlled by pages of regulations containing definitions and limitations which are too complicated to insert into this article. Be aware that if you bought a parcel during calendar year 2013, your tax assessment may rise next year to the sale price named on the Transfer Tax Return filed with that deed, and you will receive a notice next spring of that increased assessment. The notice will tell you the procedure for contesting that new higher assessment and the time period, usually very short, during which you must file an appeal or lose the opportunity for another year. However, if your tax assessment should have been reduced and was not, you might not receive a notice at all, which means you must affirmatively seek out the date for filing the tax challenge and the forms needed to preserve the right to challenge. You must affirmatively notify the assessor if you demolished a building, lost a tenant, suffered a casualty loss, signed new leases for lower rents or had to offer rent concessions to renew a lease, or moved a parcel of land into or out of ag use, if you want to be sure the tax assessment is properly calculated for the actual use of the land and actual income from it. We can help you evaluate behind the scenes if the property is accurately assessed, and if it is not, file and defend a claim for you. We often charge a nominal amount for the investigation and then take the tax challenge on a contingency basis so you are only billed if we secure a tax savings for you.

Article by:

Nancy Leary Haggerty

Of:

Michael Best & Friedrich LLP

Wisconsin Supreme Court Upholds Broad Asbestos Exclusion

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In Phillips v. Parmelee, 2013 WI 105 (Dec. 27, 2013), the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the validity of a broad asbestos exclusion.

In 2006, Daniel Parmelee and Aquila Group (“Sellers”) sold an apartment building to Michael Phillips, Perry Petta and Walkers Point Marble Arcade, Inc. (“Buyers”) covered by an American Family business owners policy. Prior to selling the building to Buyers, Sellers received a property inspection report noting the probable presence of asbestos. However, Buyers claimed Sellers never put them on notice that the property probably contained asbestos and eventually filed suit.

The trial court granted American Family’s motion for declaratory judgment due to the policy’s broadly worded asbestos exclusion. The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision.

The asbestos exclusion at issue stated as follows:

This language does not apply to … “property damage” … with respect to:

a. Any loss arising out of, resulting from, caused by, or contributed to in whole or in part by asbestos, exposure to asbestos, or the use of asbestos. “Property damage” also includes any claim for reduction in value of real estate or personal property due to its contamination with asbestos in any form at any time.

b. Any loss, cost, or expense arising out of or in any way related to any request, demand, order, or statutory or regulatory requirement that any insured or others identify, sample, test for, detect, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify, neutralize, abate, dispose of, mitigate, destroy, or any way respond to or assess the presence of, or the effects of, asbestos.

….

f. Any supervision, instructions, recommendations, warnings or advice given or which should have been given in connection with any of the paragraphs above.

The only issue presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court was whether the asbestos exclusion in the American Family policy precluded coverage for the losses claimed by Buyers.

First, Buyers argued the term “asbestos” is ambiguous because it is undefined in the American Family policy and there are various forms and meanings of “asbestos.” The court was unpersuaded and found a reasonable person reading the policy would understand the word “asbestos” to mean any form of asbestos.

Buyers then argued the broad language of the asbestos exclusion invites multiple reasonable interpretations and it should be narrowly construed against American Family. The court found the case law cited by Buyers in support of their position to be factually distinguishable because the exclusion language in that policy was materially different from the broad, comprehensive language in the American Family policy, which included a wider range of asbestos-related losses than the case law cited by Buyers.

Finally, Buyers asserted that the Sellers negligently failed to disclose defective conditions or any other toxic or hazardous substances contained on the property. However, the court found nothing in the record to demonstrate the Buyers sustained any loss related to electrical or plumbing issues. Rather, the loss arose from asbestos.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals’ decision giving force to American Family’s broadly worded asbestos exclusion.

Article by:

Of:

von Briesen & Roper, S.C.