Tag: Whistleblower

Are Culpable Whistleblowers Eligible to Receive SEC Whistleblower Awards?

Yes. In many circumstances, culpable whistleblowers are eligible to receive SEC whistleblowers awards (see limitations below). The final rules of the SEC Whistleblower Program recognize that culpable whistleblowers enhance the SEC’s ability to detect violations of the federal securities laws, increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the SEC’s investigations, and provide critical evidence for the SEC’s enforcement actions. In fact, a speech by the former Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement highlighted the importance of culpable whistleblowers to the agency’s enforcement efforts:

Finally, I want to say a word about participants in wrongdoing and their ability to be whistleblowers. It is important for participants in misconduct to understand that, in many circumstances, they are eligible for awards and we would like to hear from them. Obviously, culpable insiders with first-hand knowledge of misconduct can provide valuable information and assistance in identifying participants in, transactions relating to, and proceeds of, fraudulent schemes. And, while there are safeguards built into the program to ensure that whistleblowers do not profit from their own misconduct…culpable whistleblowers can still get paid for eligible information they report that falls outside of these limitations.

SEC Whistleblower Awards to Culpable Whistleblowers

The SEC Whistleblower Program’s decision to work with, and award, culpable whistleblowers has proven to be effective in enabling the SEC to discover fraud and protect investors. To date, the SEC has issued several awards to whistleblowers who had some culpability in the violations, including:

  • On August 30, 2016, the SEC announced a $22 million award to a whistleblower who helped the agency “halt a well-hidden fraud” at the company where the whistleblower worked. The accompanying order states that the Commission considered several factors mitigating the whistleblower’s culpability in determining the appropriate percentage, but the whistleblower did not financially benefit from the misconduct.
  • On July 27, 2017, the SEC announced a $1.7 million award to a whistleblower who helped the Commission stop a “serious, multi-year fraud that would have otherwise been difficult to detect.” There were a few mitigating factors in the Commission’s determination of the whistleblower’s final award, including the fact that the whistleblower did not comply with one of the SEC’s rules, an omission which normally requires an award denial. The order stated that “certain unusual circumstances” governed this case, thus the Commission decided to waive that requirement. In determining the award amount, the Commission considered, too, the fact that the whistleblower unreasonably delayed in reporting and ultimately bore “some, albeit limited, culpability” in the fraud.
  • On September 14, 2018, the SEC announced it had reduced a whistleblower’s award to $1.5 million because the Commission found that the whistleblower unreasonably delayed in reporting the fraud, the whistleblower “received a significant and direct financial benefit,” and was culpable in the scheme. The order further details these determining factors, and explains that the whistleblower waited more than a year after learning of the facts to report the fraud and reported to the Commission only after learning of the ongoing investigation.

See additional SEC whistleblower cases that have resulted in multi-million dollar awards.

Limitations on SEC Whistleblower Awards to Culpable Whistleblowers

While the SEC has been clear that it welcomes information from culpable whistleblowers, the SEC Whistleblower Program has specific rules that could disqualify certain whistleblowers from receiving SEC whistleblower awards. In addition, the program has rules that could limit the size of a culpable whistleblower’s future SEC whistleblower award. Importantly, whistleblowers who are concerned about potential liability should consult with experienced SEC whistleblower attorneys before reporting information to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower. Once information is submitted to the SEC, it cannot be withdrawn.

Whistleblowers Cannot Be Convicted of a Criminal Violation

The SEC Office of the Whistleblower will not issue awards to whistleblowers who are convicted of a criminal violation in relation to an action for which they would otherwise be eligible for an award. Moreover, the SEC Whistleblower Program does not provide amnesty to whistleblowers who provide information to the SEC. The fact that a whistleblower reports information to the SEC and assists in an SEC investigation and enforcement action does not preclude the SEC from bringing an action against the whistleblower based upon their own conduct in connection with violations of the federal securities laws. If such an action is determined to be appropriate, however, the SEC will take the whistleblower’s cooperation into consideration. As noted in the speech of the former Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement: “There are also other potential benefits for culpable whistleblowers — in appropriate circumstances, we will take their cooperation under the whistleblower program and in our investigation into consideration in deciding what remedies, if any, are appropriate in any action we determine should be brought against the whistleblowers for their role in the scheme.”

Culpable Whistleblowers Cannot Benefit from Their Own Misconduct

Under the SEC Whistleblower Program, the SEC will issue awards to whistleblowers who provide original information that leads to enforcement actions with total monetary sanctions in excess of $1 million. A whistleblower may receive an award of between 10-30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected. Since 2011, the SEC Whistleblower Office has issued nearly $400 million in awards to whistleblowers. The largest SEC whistleblower awards to date are a $50 million award, a $39 million award, and a $37 million award.

While the SEC is permitted to issue awards to culpable whistleblowers, the rules of the SEC Whistleblower Program do not allow whistleblowers to benefit from their own misconduct. Specifically, for purposes of determining whether the $1 million threshold has been satisfied or calculating the amount of an award, the SEC will not count any monetary sanctions that the whistleblower is ordered to pay or that are ordered to be paid against any entity whose liability is based substantially on conduct that the whistleblower directed, planned, or initiated.

Culpability May Decrease the Size of an Award

In determining the percentage of monetary sanctions to award a whistleblower, the SEC considers various factors that may increase or decrease the size of a whistleblower’s award. One of the factors that may decrease the size of an award is the whistleblower’s culpability in the securities law violation. When making this determination, the SEC may consider the following factors:

  • the whistleblower’s position or responsibility at the time the violations occurred;
  • if the whistleblower acted with scienter, both generally and in relation to others who participated in the violations;
  • if the whistleblower is a recidivist;
  • the egregiousness of the fraud committed by the whistleblower;
  • whether the whistleblower financially benefitted from the scheme; and
  • whether the whistleblower knowingly interfered with the SEC’s investigation.

Notably, while culpability may reduce a whistleblower’s award percentage, any whistleblower who qualifies for an award under the SEC Whistleblower Program – including culpable whistleblowers – will receive at least 10% of the monetary sanctions collected in the enforcement action.

© 2020 Zuckerman Law

For more on whistleblower rules, see the National Law Review Securities & SEC laws section.

Who Must Protect the Ukraine-Trump Whistleblower?

Op-Ed From Stephen M. Kohn of the National Whistleblower Center

As the impeachment proceedings heat-up, and calls for the Ukraine whistleblower to be identified increase, there remains a fundamental question:  Who has the legal responsibility to protect this whistleblower?  The answer will surprise you!

There are very few laws mandating what the President, as part of his required and mandatory job duties, must perform.   Guaranteeing that employees who make protected disclosures under the  Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (“ICWPA”) are fully protected is one of them.  The Ukraine whistleblower is a a federal employee covered under the ICWPA.  He or she made a protected disclosure under the ICWPA.  Thus, it is up to President Trump to fully and completely protect this individual.  Here’s why:  The ICWPA directs that “[t]he President shall provide for the enforcement of the [Act].” It is as clear and simple as that.  The President “shall” “enforce” the whistleblower law that makes it illegal to retaliate against intelligence community whistleblowers.

Every intelligence community whistleblower, whether they be a Democrat, Republican or Independent, is entitled to the same protection from the President.  In the case of the Ukraine whistleblower, the law does not permit the political implications of the whistleblower’s disclosure to have any impact on the mandatory duty of President Trump to fully “enforce” that whistleblower’s right to be free from any retaliation.  The President is required to put his biases or self-interest aside and defend the right of intelligence community whistleblowers to report abuses of authority.  This includes wherever those abuses are committed, including the Oval Office. Under the ICWPA the buck stops with President Trump, impeached or not.

Unlike other whistleblower laws which give the federal courts or independent agencies, like the Merit Systems Protection Board or the Department of Labor, the authority to protect whistleblowers, the ICWPA places that solemn duty directly on the shoulders of the President.  It is the unique legal responsibility of the President.  The President must ensure that the identity of the intelligence community whistleblowers who file  complaints with the Inspector General pursuant to the Inspector General Act, are fully protected.  It is the President who must ensure that every person within the executive branch of government protect the job security of ICWPA whistleblowers.  It is the obligation of the President to punish those who fail to do so.

The ICWPA anti-retaliation law is not limited simply to preventing whistleblowers from being fired.  The law defines the types of “adverse action” the President must shield whistleblowers from, including  “any change in working conditions.”   In the case of the Ukrainian “quid pro quo” whistleblower, the catastrophic impact on the whistleblower’s ability to perform his or her job duties that would be triggered by violating his right to confidentiality is obvious.  This would include undermining his or her ability to work oversees, be promoted to a covert agent (if not one already), or effectively interact with employees in the White House.

Furthermore, breaching the confidentiality of whistleblowers is well established as an “adverse action” under whistleblower law.  Federal courts and administrative agencies as divergent as the SEC and Department of Labor have ruled that revealing the name of a whistleblower is an adverse action.  Anyone with experience working with whistleblowers knows that once their identity is revealed, their working conditions will never be the same, and they will have a target on their back for the rest of their careers.

The procedures applicable to the Ukraine whistleblower actually informed the whistleblower, in writing, that he or she could file a confidential complaint to the Inspector General.   The actual form submitted guaranteed this right.  Once the complaint was filed and accepted by the Inspector General, the whistleblower protections afforded under the ICWPA kicked in.  As a matter of law, it became President Trump’s obligation to “enforce” the ICWPA and ensure that the Ukraine whistleblower suffer no retaliation. It became the President’s non-discretionary duty to ensure the whistleblower suffered no harm.   This may be hard to believe, but the law is the law.

Given the highly public attacks on the whistleblower emanating from the White House it is now incumbent upon President Trump to instruct all employees within the federal government to comply with the ICWPA.  He must take steps to have his Congressional supporters, “stand down” and stop their continued drum beat to “out” the whistleblower.  Regardless of where you stand on impeachment, the President must enforce the requirements of the ICWPA and protect the whistleblower.

When Donald Trump signed onto the job of President, protecting intelligence community whistleblowers became one of his few mandatory job duties.  Like other employees who work for the taxpayers, he many not like all of his required jobs.  Like other employees he may find some parts of his job difficult or distasteful.  But he has no discretion in this matter.  It is a requirement.  He must ensure that the whistleblower is not retaliated against, that the whistleblower’s identity remains confidential, and that the whistleblower can continue in his or her career, free from stigma.    He must hold those who retaliate accountable.  That is part of the job he wanted.  That is the job he must perform.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2019. All Rights Reserved.

Qui Tam Defendants’ Presentations to Government During Investigation Unprotected from Discovery in Other Lawsuits, Federal District Court Ruled

In a recent decision, a federal district court judge ruled that a defendant’s presentations to the Department of Justice, made during the course of the Department’s investigation of a pending False Claims Act qui tam lawsuit, are not protected from discovery by the whistleblower who brought that lawsuit. The case is the United States and State of California ex rel. Higgins v. Boston Scientific Corp., 11-cv-2453 (D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2019), and was decided by Judge Joan Ericksen.

The relator (the term for the whistleblower in a False Claims Act lawsuit), Higgins, alleged that Boston Scientific made certain false certifications relating to the company’s defibrillators, thereby causing physicians to submit false claims for payment relating to the use of those devices. As is usual in qui tam cases, after filing the lawsuit, the Department of Justice opened an investigation and requested documents (known as a “civil investigative demand” under the False Claims Act) to Boston Scientific. The company turned over documents to the Department, but then also created and made “presentations” to the government. While the court’s decision does not describe those “presentations,” presumably they were slideshows or other materials, put together by Boston Scientific’s lawyers, to try to convince the Department of Justice to shut down the investigation or to decline intervention in the lawsuit.

Unscrupulous companies have found many different ways to take advantage of vital government programs. The False Claims Act is an essential weapon in the fight against government programs fraud since it was first enacted during the Civil War to combat war profiteering. The system often depends on whistleblowers telling their story with the help of an experienced False Claims Act attorney.

These private citizens bring qui tam (whistleblower) lawsuits under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), which allows them to act on behalf of the U.S. government in exposing government programs fraud committed by companies serving the federal government. Under the FCA, relators (fraud whistleblowers) receive a portion of the money that has been recovered by the government, known as the relator’s share.

After the government declined intervention in the case, Higgins decided to pursue the case on his own (which a relator is permitted to do), and he served a document request on Boston Scientific demanding production of any such presentations. Boston Scientific did not want to turn over the materials and therefore raised four separate legal objections. It was those objections that Judge Ericksen addressed in her opinion.

First, Boston Scientific objected to turning over the presentations because they were akin to “settlement negotiations” with the government, and thus not “relevant” to relator’s lawsuit. The court, however, ruled that although settlement negotiations might not be admissible at trial, they were still subject to discovery by Higgins because “they were related to his claims about the medical devices at issue.”

Second, Boston Scientific objected because “public policy” required protection of the presentations, arguing that “the government will not be able to settle False Claims Act cases if a defendant’s presentations to the government could later be revealed to relators.” Judge Erickson, however, found nothing in the False Claims Act that supported this position. While the government might not be able to turn over such presentations under certain circumstances, nothing in the statute prevented Boston Scientific from turning them over to relator.

Third, Boston Scientific claimed an “expectation of confidentiality” in the presentations, citing a 1977 decision by the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Erickson rejected that contention, finding that the earlier Circuit Court decision related to attorney-client privilege, but not to the work product doctrine. Because the materials that Boston Scientific had provided to the Department of Justice were not covered by attorney-client privilege, the company’s only argument was “work product,” and that argument was not sufficient to support its claimed “expectation of confidentiality.”

Finally, Boston Scientific argued that the work product doctrine itself protected the presentations from disclosure. Judge Erickson easily disposed of that argument, noting that work product protection “is waived by intentional disclosure to an adversary,” and that the government was indeed Boston Scientific’s “adversary,” even though the Department of Justice later declined to intervene in the case.

The court’s decision was correct. Although Boston Scientific’s attorneys came up with several creative arguments in an attempt to protect the “presentations” from discovery, none of them had any merit. Although a defendant in a False Claims Act case is free to communicate with the Department of Justice, the defendant cannot assume that those communications will remain secret, particularly from the relator who has brought the very lawsuit under investigation by the Department. The relator is entitled to know about those communications, especially if they are relevant to the merits of the relator’s case (which they almost always will be). Accordingly, Judge Erickson reached the correct result and established useful precedent on this recurring issue.

© 2019 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP

For more on qui tam cases, see the National Law Review Litigation / Trial Practice page.

Japanese Toyobo Pays $66 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Over Selling Defective Fiber to Government for Use in Bullet Proof Vests

The Department of Justice recently announced the settlement of a qui tam lawsuit against Toyobo, the sole manufacturer of Zylon fiber used in bulletproof vests, in relation to their violation of the False Claims Act (FCA). According to the allegations of the case, between 2001 and 2005, Toyobo actively marketed and sold defective Zylon fiber for bullet proof vests, knowing that Zylon degraded quickly in normal heat and humidity, which makes the material unfit for use in bullet proof vests. It is further alleged in the whistleblower lawsuit, that Toyobo published misleading degradation data, that underestimated the degradation issue and started a public campaign to influence body armor manufacturers to keep selling bullet proof vests made with Zylon fiber.

Within the Complaint that the United States filed following their decision to intervene in the case, the U.S. alleged that Toyobo’s actions delayed the government’s efforts to determine the defect in Zylon fiber by several years. After a study of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in August 2005 found out, that more than 50 percent of Zylon-containing vests could not stop bullets that they had been certified to stop, NIJ decertified all Zylon-containing vests.

The qui tam lawsuit is brought to Government’s attention by relator Aaron Westrick, Ph.D., who is a law enforcement officer, formerly employed as the Director of Research and Marketing at Second Chance Body Armor (SCBA), which used to be the largest bullet proof vest company in the United States. In the lawsuit, whistleblower Westrick alleged, that Toyobo knew the strength of Zylon fibers sold to the bullet resistant vest makers would degrade quickly under certain environment, and nevertheless Toyobo did not disclose such fact or made misleading disclosures, resulting in the United States’ payment for the defective bullet resistant vests.

The relator Westrick brought the qui tam lawsuit under the FCA, which allowed him to act on behalf of the U.S. government in exposing the government programs fraud. Under the FCA, relators receive a portion of the money that has been recovered by the government, which is known as the relator’s share. For his participation as a relator, or whistleblower, within the case Dr. Westrick will receive $5,775,000, as a reward for exposing the government fraud scheme. Such high rewards are not uncommon for individuals who file qui tam lawsuits on behalf of the federal government. If and when a case settles, whistleblowers can receive between 15% and 30% of the amount recovered by the government.

 

© 2018 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP.

Supreme Court Limits Scope of Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Protections

On February 21, the US Supreme Court decided Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers (583 U.S. ____ (2018)), which resolved a circuit split related to whether the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. 1376 (Dodd-Frank) extend to individuals who have not reported a securities law violation to the Securities and Exchange Commission and, therefore, falls outside of Dodd-Frank’s definition of a “whistleblower.”

Paul Somers alleged that Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (Digital Realty) terminated his employment shortly after reporting suspected securities-law violations to the company’s senior management. Somers filed a case in the US District Court for the Northern District of California (District Court) alleging that his termination amounted to whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that Somers did not qualify as a “whistleblower” for purposes of Dodd-Frank because (1) the statute defines a “whistleblower” as someone “who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the [SEC];” and (2) Somers failed to report the allegations to the SEC prior to his termination. The District Court denied Digital Realty’s motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections should be read to protect employees regardless of whether they provide information to the SEC.

Reversing the District Court and the Ninth Circuit, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Court, explained that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower retaliation provisions do not extend to an individual who has not reported alleged securities law violations to the SEC. Citing Dodd-Frank’s definition of a “whistleblower,” the Court determined that the statute explicitly required an individual to report such violations to the SEC in order to receive whistleblower protections. The Court found this interpretation of the whistleblower definition to be corroborated by Dodd-Frank’s intended purpose of motivating individuals to report securities law violations directly to the SEC.

The text of the decision is available here.

©2018 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
Read more Litigation news on the National Law Review Litigation page.

Whistleblower Fired for Disclosing Improper Asbestos Removal Wins at Trial

A jury awarded approximately $174,00 to a whistleblower who was fired for reporting improper asbestos removal practices at asbestos abatement and demolition company Champagne Demolition, LLC.  OSHA brought suit on his behalf under Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the jury awarded $103,000 in back wages, $20,000 in compensatory, and $50,000 in punitive damages.  The jury instructions are available here.

According to the complaint, the company fired the whistleblower one day after he raised concerns about improper asbestos removal at a high school in Alexandria Bay, NY, and entered the worksite when it was closed to take pictures of the asbestos. The whistleblower also removed a bag containing the improperly removed asbestos.  A few weeks after Champagne Demolition terminated the whistleblowers’ employment, they sued him for defamation.  Champagne Demolition subsequently stipulated to the dismissal of the defamation claim.  OSHA alleged that both the termination of the whistleblower’s employment and the filing of a defamation action were retaliatory acts prohibited by Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

Although for procedural reasons the court did not rule on whether the filing of the defamation action against the whistleblower was retaliatory, the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment   stakes out an important position on retaliatory lawsuits against whistleblowers:

Lawsuits filed with the intent to punish or dissuade employees from exercising their statutory rights are a well- established form of adverse action. See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (Finding that a lawsuit that was both objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by an unlawful purpose could violate the National Labor Relations Act’s prohibition on retaliation); Torres v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 447, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Courts have held that baseless claims or lawsuits designed to deter claimants from seeking legal redress constitute impermissibly adverse retaliatory actions.”); Spencer v. Int’l Shoppes, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 2d 287, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (Under Title VII, the filing of a lawsuit with a retaliatory motive constitutes adverse action).

OSHA should be commended for taking the case to trial and obtaining punitive damages.  As approximately 4,379 workers in the U.S. are killed annually due to unsafe workplaces, it is critical for OSHA to vigorously enforce Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and counter retaliatory lawsuits against whistleblowers, an especially pernicious form of retaliation.

 

© 2017 Zuckerman Law
Written by Jason Zuckerman of Zuckerman Law.
Read more on court decisions on the National Law Review’s Litigation page.

U.S. State Department Contractor to Resolve Allegations of Improper Vetting with $5 Million Settlement

On September 14, 2017, Pacific Architects & Engineers Incorporated (PAE) settled a whistleblower lawsuit alleging the company did not follow proper vetting procedures for its personnel that performed and billed work to the U.S. State Department. The $5 million settlement resolves allegations without any determination of liability of contract violations.

PAE is a company originally incorporated in California in 1955. The company first served the rebuilding of Japan after WWII and has since grown to participate in projects and government contracts globally. In 2007, already a contractor with the U.S. State Department, PAE was assigned the task of training U.S. personnel in Afghanistan and conducting extensive background checks and documentation for those in high-risk positions. Reporting the names, nationalities and background information on contract employees in these positions was a requirement of the contract for work between PAE and the U.S. government.

After its investigation, the U.S. Justice Department alleged that “PAE was aware of these contractual requirements but did not comply with them for extended periods.”

Robert Palombo, the former PAE manager, filed this whistleblower lawsuit against his employer alleging that this was the case and that PAE continued billing for work done under the contract.

PAE, however, contends that “The invoices specifically identified the names of employees for whom the lawsuit alleges that requisite notice was not made. The employees whose background investigations were allegedly inadequate were not involved in any security incidents or injuries. The services called for under the contract were provided in full.”

Without admitting fault or liability, PAE has decided to settle these allegations of improper vetting by paying the U.S. government $5 million, $875,000 of which whistleblower Robert Palumbo is entitled to receive.

This post was written by Tycko & Zavareei Whistleblower Practice Group of Tycko & Zavareei LLP © 2017

For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Potential Obstacle To Effective Internal Compliance Reporting System? The False Claims Act

Yes, you read the title of this post correctly.  Under the False Claims Act, a whistleblower is not required to report compliance concerns internally through a company’s internal reporting system before filing a “qui tam” court action.  Indeed, the False Claims Act — with its potential “bounty” of 15 to 30 percent of the government’s recovery — may actually encourage employees to file suit in the first instance, to qualify as an “original source,” and bypass the organization’s reporting system altogether, thereby frustrating a key component of an effective compliance program.  Whistleblower organizations have recently gone so far as to discourage individuals employed by health care providers from bringing compliance concerns directly to their employer so that they can get a share of the government’s recovery.

A provider or other entity participating in the Medicare or Medicaid programs, however, can mitigate that risk through, among other things, employee training and disciplinary policies encouraging good-faith reporting and the promotion of a culture of compliance, including setting the right “tone from the top.”

Internal Reporting System.  The cornerstone of any effective compliance program is developing and implementing a robust internal reporting system that employees can use to raise any compliance concerns on an anonymous basis.  Among other things, when compliance concerns are brought to the attention of the organization’s compliance personnel, the organization can investigate the issue and take appropriate steps to prevent or remediate any continued potential misconduct.  Likewise, having such a system in place may serve as a defense to liability under the False Claims Act.  Even if improper billing is found to have taken place, evidence that the organization has an effective, anonymous internal compliance reporting system may show that the improprieties were not the result of deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for such practices.

False Claims Act.  Plainly, the risk of treble damages and per claim penalties under the False Claims Act is a powerful incentive for a health care organization to implement an effective compliance program.  What is more, the provision for whistleblower awards under the False Claims Act can be an effective tool to aid the government in detecting and preventing overpayments by Medicare and Medicaid to fraudulent operators and other bad actors.  By allowing whistleblowers to file relator actions under seal and potentially share in any of the government’s recovery — as well as to seek damages for any retaliatory employment action — the False Claims incentivizes employees in the health care industry to come forward with information about fraudulent billing, without the fear of reprisal.

The Tension Between The Two.  At the same time, a whistleblower’s potential recovery can operate as a countervailing disincentive for an employee to report compliance concerns internally.  That is because under the False Claims Act, a qui tam relator is entitled to a “bounty” only if the individual is the “original source” of information to the government about the improper billing practices that are the subject of the relator’s action.  On the other hand, if an employee does dutifully report a compliance concern internally through the organization’s reporting system, and the organization itself reports any overpayments to the government or remediates the misconduct itself, the whistleblower may be unable to sue and recover any “bounty.”  As noted earlier, this point is not lost on the relator bar.

Overcoming The Tension.  How does a provider overcome the entreaties of the relator bar, along with the incentives under the False Claims Act whistleblower provisions, to convince employees with compliance concerns to avail themselves of the company’s internal reporting system?  At the outset, the reporting system may be both effective and credible to instill  confidence in the system so that employees will take full advantage of it – that is, the organization must deliver on its promise of anonymity and protection of good-faith reporting and must follow through on a timely basis with a thorough investigation and meaningful corrective action, if indicated.  Further, a robust reporting system, standing alone, will not be effective unless all other elements of an organization’s compliance program are working effectively as well, starting with a “culture of compliance,” reinforced by the executive team and management, and continuing with inservice compliance training, underscoring the importance of timely reporting and the anonymity and other protections afforded to reporting employees.

Likewise, the organization must have personnel and disciplinary policies that reward good-faith reporting and punish compliance lapses, both for engaging in unlawful conduct as well as for failing to report it.  That said, taking any disciplinary action against an employee who files suit as a relator, without ever having reported the compliance concerns in breach of the employee’s duties, is fraught with the risk that the termination or other action will be challenged as retaliation for filing the False Claims Act action, and that the cited ground — failing to report   — is allegedly merely pretextual.

However, with the proper messaging and training, coupled with a robust anonymous reporting system, the company can give its employees good reason to “do the right thing” and report compliance concerns to the company in the first instance, despite the lure of a False Claims Act bounty.

This post was written byBrian T. McGovern of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.
For more legal analysis check out the National Law Review.

Comey’s Testimony Underscores Need for Strong Whistleblower Protections

For me, the most telling moment of former FBI Director Jim Comey’s June 8th testimony occurred early in the hearing, when Mr. Comey choked up as he recalled the White House’s publicly stating that the President had fired him because the “FBI was in disarray.”

This emotional display seemed out of character for Mr. Comey. While U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, he successfully prosecuted organized crime. As Deputy Attorney General during the George W. Bush Administration, Mr. Comey refused to sign an extension of the warrantless domestic spying program and defied the White House Counsel and Chief of Staff. Mr. Comey can fairly be described as a “tough guy.” So how did he go from leading the most powerful law-enforcement agency worldwide to being labeled a “leaking liar”?

To an experienced whistleblower advocate, Mr. Comey’s predicament is not surprising. Mr. Comey’s experience, unfortunately, is like those of many whistleblowers I have represented over more than a decade. President Trump promised to bring a business approach to government—and his retaliation against Mr. Comey is straight out of the corporate defense playbook. Corporations typically take the following steps of escalating retaliation to silence whistleblowers:

Intimidate and Silence the Whistleblower

In his June 8th testimony, Mr. Comey described in detail how the President had asked him to drop the investigation of Michael Flynn and had conditioned Mr. Comey’s job on “loyalty” to him. Senator Rubio expressed skepticism about Mr. Comey’s feeling intimidated by the President and blamed Mr. Comey for not pushing back. But that type of Monday-morning quarterbacking ignored the power dynamics of the conversation. Mr. Comey wanted to keep his job and was understandably reluctant to accuse the President of obstructing an investigation.

Whistleblowers often confront this intimidation tactic in the workplace. A supervisor or senior company official tells the whistleblower to “let it go,” “mind your own business,” or learn to be a “team player.” And in some cases, the whistleblower is told to shut up if he or she wants to remain employed. Threats of retaliation, whether express or implicit, are powerful tools to silence a whistleblower. When a company officer or senior manager orders a subordinate to do something unlawful or to cover up unlawful conduct, holding firm to one’s ethical values is not an easy avenue to follow. As Mr. Comey learned, refusing to carry out an unlawful order may be career suicide, at least in the short term.

Retaliate Swiftly and Severely Against the Whistleblower

Initially, the bizarre method of firing Mr. Comey seemed surprising for a President who perfected the art of firing on his reality show, The Apprentice. Mr. Comey was not given an opportunity to resign; he was not even notified that he had been fired. But now that we know about the President’s real motive for firing Mr. Comey, it’s clear that his tack was deliberate.

Mr. Comey learned of his firing while addressing FBI agents at a Los Angeles field office when the announcement flashed across a television screen. The White House had announced Mr. Comey’s firing without notifying Mr. Comey himself. President Trump sent a loud and clear message to Mr. Comey and to every senior government official about the consequence of disloyalty.

In the corporate workplace, whistleblower-employees are similarly humiliated as a warning to their colleagues. A whistleblower may be escorted out of the office with security guards while other employees are present, pulled out of a meeting and fired on the spot in front of colleagues, or simply fired via text message. When a corporation fires a whistleblower in this humiliating fashion, it ensures that all other employees know the consequence of whistleblowing.

Badmouth the Whistleblower and Their Work History

Firing Mr. Comey in a humiliating and offensive manner served only as phase one. President Trump then defamed Mr. Comey and asserted that he fired him because of chaos within the FBI, as well as the alleged loss of confidence in Mr. Comey among FBI agents.

These statements stand in stark contrast to the President’s repeated, public praise of Mr. Comey before Mr. Comey refused to comply with the President’s “hope” that Mr. Comey drop the investigation of Flynn. Indeed, if President Trump believed that Mr. Comey’s leadership caused chaos within the FBI, then why did the President invite Mr. Comey to continue to serve as FBI Director?

This patent distortion of Mr. Comey’s performance record is an all-too-common experience of whistleblowers. Prior to blowing the whistle, they receive strong performance evaluations and bonuses; they are valued members of the team. But once they blow the whistle and refuse to drop their concerns, they are suddenly deemed incompetent and unqualified for their position. And when a company realizes that it lacks any existing basis to fire the whistleblower, it creates one by subjecting the whistleblower to heightened scrutiny and setting the whistleblower up to fail. For example, a company might place the whistleblower on a performance-improvement plan that contains impossible objectives, and then fire the whistleblower for not meeting those unattainable goals.

This tactic may backfire and enable a whistleblower to ultimately prevail at trial, but the damage to the whistleblower’s reputation is permanent. Prospective employers are reluctant to hire someone who previously fired for poor performance and are especially reluctant to hire a whistleblower. Many whistleblowers never find comparable employment and must accept lower-level positions, earning a fraction of what they did before their wrongful termination.

Attack the Whistleblower’s Credibility

Apparently, President Trump has no evidence to rebut Mr. Comey’s vivid account of the President’s alleged attempts to obstruct justice. So President Trump called him a “liar.”

Desperate to defend themselves at all costs, corporations frequently employ this tactic—labeling the whistleblower a disgruntled former employee who will say anything to win his or her case. So far, this is not working well for President Trump, whose accusation merely serves to shine a spotlight on his own questionable credibility.

Attacking a whistleblower’s credibility is an effective and pernicious tactic in many whistleblower cases. Once expelled from a company, a whistleblower is marginalized and alienated from former coworkers. The key witnesses continue to work at the company and, fearing retaliation, are reluctant to corroborate the whistleblower’s testimony. Though whistleblowers may still prevail (for example, by using documentary evidence), the attack on a whistleblower’s credibility is odious because the company fired the whistleblower precisely for having integrity.

Create a Post-Hoc Justification for Firing the Whistleblower

Prior to firing Mr. Comey, President Trump papered the file with a post-hoc justification for the firing. After the President decided to fire Mr. Comey, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein was tasked with drafting a memorandum to the Attorney General outlining concerns about Mr. Comey’s performance. Most of those concerns focus on Mr. Comey’s statements about the investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server. Surely President Trump knew of those public statements when he repeatedly asked Mr. Comey to remain as FBI Director (as long as he could pledge “loyalty” and drop the Flynn investigation).

In this case, the White House’s initial reliance on the Rosenstein memo as the basis for the decision to fire Mr. Comey backfired because President Trump told NBC anchor Lester Holt that he had decided to fire Mr. Comey regardless of the memo. In many whistleblower-retaliation cases, however, these types of pretextual memos may be persuasive. Some judges even rely on such memos, which mask the real reason for a firing or other adverse action, to grant the company summary judgment and deny the whistleblower a jury trial.

On the other hand, creating a post-hoc justification for a retaliatory adverse action sometimes misfires by providing strong evidence of pretext and spurring a jury to award punitive damages. For instance, a former in-house counsel at Bio-Rad Laboratories recently secured more than $11 million in damages at trial in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower-retaliation case. The jury awarded $5 million in punitive damages because Bio-Rad had backdated a negative performance evaluation of the whistleblower that the company drafted after it fired him.

Focus on the Whistleblower’s Alleged Misconduct

To distract attention from what may be obstruction of justice, President Trump and his attorney have focused on Mr. Comey’s leak to the press and have alleged that the leak was unlawful. This accusation seems frivolous because Mr. Comey did not leak classified information, grand jury material, or other sensitive information. Instead, he revealed that President Trump had conditioned his continued service as FBI Director on his agreeing to drop the investigation of Flynn. As a private citizen, Mr. Comey has a constitutional right to blow the whistle to the media about this matter of public concern. Mr. Comey did not reveal to the media information from FBI investigative files or classified information. Yet President Trump and his allies compare Mr. Comey to leakers who illegally disclosed classified information. This is an appalling accusation against the former head of a law-enforcement agency.

But this is another standard corporate defense tactic in whistleblower cases. To divert attention from the wrongdoing that the whistleblower exposed, the company uses its substantial resources to dig up dirt on the whistleblower. The company or its outside counsel examines the whistleblower’s timesheets and expense reports with a fine-tooth comb to find any discrepancy, reviews every email to find some inappropriate communication, and places all of the whistleblower’s work under a microscope to find any shortcoming.

Sue the Whistleblower and Initiate a Retaliatory Investigation

Firing Comey, concocting a pretextual basis for the firing, and branding him a leaking liar apparently was not sufficient retaliation.  So shortly after his testimony, President Trump’s personal attorney announced his intention to sue Mr. Comey and/or file a complaint with the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG).  I am skeptical that a civil action against Mr. Comey or an OIG complaint poses any real legal threat to Mr. Comey.  To the contrary, such a complaint would likely pose a greater risk for President Trump, including potential counterclaims and the risk of being deposed or questioned under oath by the OIG.

The misuse of legal process against corporate whistleblowers, however, is an especially powerful form of retaliation in that it can dissuade a whistleblower from pursuing their claims.  When I defend against this form of abuse of process, I am always struck at the seemingly endless resources that the company will spend to prosecute claims lacking any merit or value.  Fortunately, these claims can go awry by spawning additional retaliation claims under the whistleblower protection laws.  And a jury can punish the employer for subjecting the whistleblower to abuse of process.

Why Whistleblowers Deserve Strong Legal Protection

In light of Mr. Comey’s distinguished record, he will likely bounce back and rebuild his career. But most corporate whistleblowers never fully recover. Too often they find their careers and reputations destroyed. Even when whistleblowers obtain monetary relief at trial, they are usually blacklisted from comparable positions, especially if they work in a small industry.

Mr. Comey’s experience as a whistleblower is a stark reminder of what can happen to any employee who is pressured by a powerful superior to engage in unlawful conduct or to cover up wrongdoing. When intimidation tactics succeed, the public suffers. The company could be covering up threats to public health or safety, environmental contamination, financial fraud, defective products, or any other conceivable harmful wrongdoing.

Courageous whistleblowers who put their jobs on the line deserve strong protection. As Congress embarks on a mission to gut “job killing” agencies, let us hope it will spare the very limited resources that are spent enforcing whistleblower-protection laws. Without such a large backlog of whistleblower cases, OSHA could have, for example, addressed the complaints of Wells Fargo whistleblowers years ago, potentially curbing or halting the bank’s defrauding of its customers. And Congress should consider filling the gaps in existing whistleblower laws. If Mr. Comey “lacked the presence of mind” to explicitly reject the President’s improper demand for him to drop the Flynn investigation, then surely most employees would also be reluctant to refuse an order to commit an unethical or unlawful act.

After Mr. Comey’s testimony, Speaker Ryan pointed out that “[t]he President’s new at this. He’s new to government.” Mr. Comey’s testimony should be a lesson for the President about how to treat whistleblowers. To make America great again, the President should abandon the Rambo litigation tactics that apparently served him well in New York real-estate disputes, and instead view whistleblowers as allies, not as enemies. As Tom Devine of the Government Accountability Project and I argue in an article in the Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review, Draining the Swamp Requires Robust Whistleblower Protections and Incentives.

This post was written by Jason Zuckerman of Zuckerman Law.

How the Trump Administration May Impact the Oversight and Enforcement of Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Protections

Dodd-frank, WhistleblowerOn the campaign trail, President Trump vowed to “dismantle” Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank was enacted in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis to curtail risky investment activities and stop financial fraud through increased oversight and regulation of the banking and securities industries. Among other things, it amended the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Securities Exchange Act, and Commodity Exchange Act to include monetary incentives for individuals to blow the whistle on suspected financial fraud and stronger protections for whistleblowers against retaliation by their employers. President Trump has criticized Dodd-Frank, arguing that it is overbroad and inhibits economic growth. Now that he is in office, President Trump has the statute squarely in his crosshairs, and he is poised to impact its whistleblower protections on the legislative, administrative, and judicial fronts.

From a legislative standpoint, President Trump has wasted no time in seeking to roll back Dodd-Frank’s statutory framework. Only two weeks after his inauguration, he issued an EO titled “Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System,” which directs the Treasury Secretary to consult with the heads of financial agencies, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), to find ways to conform U.S. financial regulations, including Dodd-Frank, to the Trump administration’s “Core Principles.” These “Core Principles” (detailed in the second article of this Take 5) are broad-sweeping and include, among other things, requiring “more rigorous regulatory impact analysis” for new laws and “mak[ing] regulation efficient, effective, and appropriately tailored.” While the precise scope of these principles is undefined (perhaps intentionally so), they appear to demonstrate a clear first step toward deregulation in the financial sector and may be a shot across the bow signaling the President’s intent to scale back—or at least halt any expansion of—Dodd-Frank, including its whistleblower protections.

Additionally, President Trump is well positioned to substantially affect the SEC’s administrative enforcement of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower laws. Dodd-Frank created the SEC Office of the Whistleblower (“OWB”) to enforce its comprehensive whistleblower program. As reported in the 2016 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, since the OWB was established, the SEC has (i) awarded more than $100 million in bounty awards to whistleblowers who provided information leading to successful enforcement actions, (ii) independently sued employers for retaliating against employees for reporting alleged securities violations, and (iii) made it a top priority to find and prosecute employers that use confidentiality, severance, and other agreements that impede their employees from communicating with the SEC.

The SEC’s enforcement agenda could change significantly, however, under the Trump administration. Specifically, in 2017, President Trump will have the opportunity to appoint four out of the five SEC Commissioners (three seats are now vacant, and another will become vacant in June). He has nominated Jay Clayton—a corporate attorney who has spent his career representing financial services firms in business transactions and regulatory disputes—to fill one of those vacancies and serve as SEC Chair. New SEC leadership may result in the potential replacement of the sitting OWB Chief and alter the OWB’s current enforcement strategies. Thus, through his administrative appointments, President Trump may attempt to temper the SEC’s aggressiveness and focus when it comes to enforcement of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections to more closely reflect his vision for less onerous regulation of the financial sector.

The President is also uniquely situated to influence the application of Dodd-Frank in the courtroom. Indeed, President Trump has inherited more than 100 federal court vacancies that he must fill, including one on the U.S. Supreme Court, giving him the opportunity to shape how Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower laws will be interpreted and applied by federal judges across the country. One of the most critical issues that hangs in the balance is whether an employee who reports an alleged securities violation only to his or her employer, and not to the SEC, is protected by Dodd-Frank’s anti-whistleblower retaliation provision. At present, there is a circuit court split on this issue. In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, LLC, that an employee who only reports a suspected violation internally is not a protected whistleblower for the purposes of Dodd-Frank’s anti-relation provision. In 2015, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC. The question has since come before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (which declined to rule on it) and is currently pending before the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Third Circuits, and it will almost certainly end up before the U.S. Supreme Court for resolution. Accordingly, President Trump’s federal judicial appointments—particularly his nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. Supreme Court—may play a pivotal role in establishing exactly who is protected under Dodd-Frank’s proscription against whistleblower retaliation.

Ultimately, it is unlikely that President Trump will actually be in a position to completely “dismantle” Dodd-Frank. Yet, there is no question that he has at his disposal the power to greatly impact the statute at the legislative, administrative, and judicial levels, and there is little doubt that change is on the horizon.

ARTICLE BY Jason Kaufman of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

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