Five States Put Abortion Questions on the Ballot; Health Care and Other Employers Should Stay Tuned

In the wake of the landmark decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, we have been closely monitoring legal developments across the country. In addition to well publicized “trigger laws” that were effectuated as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s order, states have taken up a variety of legislative actions in response to the ruling, which placed authority for the regulation of abortion with the states.

On Election Day, five states will have voters consider various proposals in light of Dobbs and its directive that abortion law belongs with the people. Here is a run-down of abortion-related ballot initiatives that will be put to a popular vote on November 8, 2022.

A Constitutional Amendment for California

On the ballot in California is Proposition 1: Constitutional Right to Reproductive Freedom, which would amend the state Constitution at Article I, Section 1.1, to provide that the state cannot “deny or interfere with an individual’s reproductive freedom in their most intimate decisions, which includes their fundamental right to choose to have an abortion and their fundamental right to choose or refuse contraceptives.” Any amendment to the California Constitution requires a simple majority of voters. If the amendment is passed, changes take effect the fifth day after the Secretary of State files the statement of the vote for the election.

Should Proposition 1 pass, it would add express protection for reproductive freedom, including decisions about abortion and contraception, to the state constitution, under its existing guaranteed right to privacy. If the proposition does not pass, it will not affect the status quo of reproductive rights in California: while current protections for abortion and other reproductive medical care would not be constitutionally guaranteed, they would remain in place under state law.

California currently has strong protections for the right to abortion, generally only prohibiting abortion at viability. Since the Dobbs decision earlier this year, California has promoted access to abortion, including launching abortion.ca.gov, a website dedicated towards providing information on reproductive health care services to people both inside and outside of California. Recently, in late September, Governor Gavin Newsom signed a package of 12 bills of abortion protections, aimed towards improving access to abortion and protecting patients and clinicians who undergo or provide them.

With the backdrop of an already-strong California legal reproductive health network, consistent polling indicates the ballot measure is expected to pass by a wide margin. Passage of the proposition will likely signal and establish the state as a refuge for individuals from more restrictive states seeking abortions.

Michigan May Modify its Constitution, Too

Michigan will also turn to its voters to decide whether its state constitution should be amended to include protections for abortion. The Michigan proposal, referred to as “Proposal 3 of 2022 – ‘Reproductive Freedom for All’ Petition,” seeks to protect the right to an abortion with a constitutional amendment that declares a right to reproductive freedom. The petition sets forth proposed language for a new section of the Michigan Constitution, stating, in part, that “[e]very individual has a fundamental right to reproductive freedom, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to pregnancy, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, contraception, sterilization, abortion care, miscarriage management, and infertility care.”

Proposal 3 would take effect 45 days following the ballot initiative if approved by the majority of voters. It would (1) establish new individual rights to reproductive freedom, to broadly include the right to make and carry out all decisions relating to pregnancy; (2) permit state regulation of abortion in limited circumstances; (3) forbid discrimination in enforcement of reproductive rights; (4) prohibit adverse action by the state with respect to “potential, perceived, or alleged pregnancy outcomes;” and (5) invalidate state laws that conflict with the Constitution as amended by Proposal 3.

If Proposal 3 is not passed and the state constitution remains as is, the future of the right to an abortion in Michigan will be unclear. Michigan has a pre-Roe ban that, if enforced, would prohibit abortion in nearly all situations and make abortions in non-life saving circumstances potentially prosecuted as manslaughter. However, a Michigan Court of Claims judge granted a permanent injunction in Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s suit to block local prosecutors from enforcing the ban. The ban is subject to an ongoing lawsuit.

Given the uncertainty of the ballot initiative’s outcome, Michigan employers should closely monitor the results of the November 8, 2022 vote.

Vermont’s Vote

In Vermont, abortion remains legal after Dobbs under state law. However, on November 8, 2022, voters will have the opportunity to further protect abortion rights through a ballot initiative. This initiative, referred to as Proposal 5, asks registered Vermont voters whether they are in favor of amending the state’s constitution to add the following language: “That an individual’s right to personal reproductive autonomy is central to the liberty and dignity to determine one’s own life course and shall not be denied or infringed unless justified by a compelling State interest achieved by the least restrictive means.” Passage would guarantee the right to access and obtain an abortion as well as other reproductive care, and prohibit government infringement of reproductive rights absent a compelling state interest, which would need to be achieved through the least restrictive means.

Should Proposal 5 pass, the resulting constitutional amendment is not expected to significantly alter the legal landscape of abortion in Vermont, which currently has strong protection for the right to abortion. If approved, the amendment will become part of Vermont’s constitution on November 22, 2022.

In Contrast, Kentucky Seeks to Constitutionally Exclude Abortion Rights

Kentuckians will cast their votes deciding whether to amend the state’s constitution to explicitly provide that the state constitution offers no protection for a right to abortion. The proposal further clarifies that there is no constitutional right to use public funds for abortion. “Constitutional Amendment 2” poses the following question to voters: “Are you in favor of amending the Constitution of Kentucky by creating a new Section of the Constitution to be numbered Section 26A to state as follows: ‘To protect human life, nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to secure or protect a right to abortion or require the funding of abortion?’”

If the majority of votes are affirmative, a new section will be added to Kentucky’s constitution. This does not constitute an outright abortion ban, but rather prohibits courts from finding an implicit right to an abortion within the state’s constitution. Kentucky laws restricting abortion, including those triggered by Dobbs, are among the most restrictive in the nation. Approval of Constitutional Amendment 2 would not alter these laws or their existing narrow exceptions, which permit the procedure only when necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother.

An advisory from the Kentucky Attorney General provides further color on the ramifications of the amendment, noting that Amendment 2 does not ban abortion, but rather ensures that elected officials of Kentucky’s General Assembly, and not courts, would regulate abortion. The Advisory also explains that implementation of Amendment 2 would not amend other provisions in the state’s constitution.

Montana’s Ballot – NOT a Proposed Constitutional Amendment

Abortion is currently legal in Montana, as a 1999 Supreme Court ruling held that the state constitution protects abortion under its right-of-privacy provision. However, in 2021, a number of restrictive abortion laws were enacted, including a law that prohibits abortions after 20 weeks. These laws are under legal challenge by abortion providers and are temporarily enjoined pending litigation.

Meanwhile, on the ballot for November 8 is a referendum on LR-131, also known as the Born Alive Infant Protection Act. The Act proposes a new statute that would classify any infant born alive as “a legal person” and require the provision of “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to such person. This would include all infants born alive from an induced labor, C-section, or attempted abortion. The Act also includes a provision mandating providers, employees, and volunteers to report a failure to comply to law enforcement, and sets forth criminal penalties. Violation of this law would be a felony with a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison or a fine of up to $50,000. The proposed law is aimed at health care workers, and does not impose liability on parents or other parties.

Health care providers have raised concerns that the broad language of the bill could lead to unintended consequences, particularly for OB/GYN practitioners. Health care providers would be required to take “medically appropriate and reasonable care” to keep any infant alive, but these terms are not defined in the bill. Health care workers that could be held liable include doctors, nurses, and “any individual who may be asked to participate in any way in a health care service of procedure.”

If approved by the Montana electorate, the law would take effect on January 1, 2023. Hospitals and other health care providers would need to reexamine their operating procedures to comply with the bill, should it pass, including compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement.

Keeping Up With The Changes

We continue to track litigation, legislative developments, and the entirety of the post-Dobbs legal landscape as it continues to shift. Our 50-state survey and other resources provide employers, health care providers, life sciences stakeholders, and others impacted by these rapidly changing circumstances with in-depth analysis and monthly updates. Election Day results will be another element of this evolving story.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

An Emoji is Worth 1,000 Words

In modern communication emojis have become ubiquitous. So much so that last year Vermont introduced legislation to allow emojis to be used on vanity license plates. In fact, emoji license plates have been available in Queensland, Australia since 2019.

Emojis, first introduced in 1999, are a way to communicate tone in written communication. The “smile” emoji can take what might be interpreted as harsh criticism and change it to sarcasm or a joke. Often single emoji in a message or email can communicate an idea more effectively than a paragraph of text. Because they are an integral part of today’s communications, they are also an important part of the discovery process.

There is more and more caselaw, civil and criminal, that involves emojis—from 2018 to 2019 the number of cases nearly doubled and there are no signs of that trend slowing. Despite the increase in litigation related to emojis the technology to interpret them in discovery is lagging. Anyone who’s ever collected text messages is familiar with the dreaded “�” indicating an emoji was used but, was not rendered in the discovery production process.

There are certainly situations where that missing emoji is essentially meaningless, but then there is the nightmare scenario.  In this situation you have Anne sending an email to her co-worker Frank; they both work in the HR department.

The presence of the eggplant emoji dramatically changes the tone of the email from one that is fairly innocuous to one that is not. If the emoji doesn’t render, crucial evidence is lost. Further, if one side has a version with the emoji and the other doesn’t it can lead to an unfortunate “gotcha” moment.

Emojis have taken on secondary and even tertiary meanings and the meanings can change in the time it takes a Tweet to go viral. It’s crucial to understand these meanings and understand the timing of their evolution. For example, in September of 2019 the Anti-Defamation league added the “okay” symbol to its hate list as it’s become a symbol for white supremacy groups.

There is no definitive lexicon for emoji use and there are many challenges to beginning to create one. Context matters. The same emoji can be texted by the same person to different people and mean something completely different. Legal professionals need to be mindful of this. Often context will only be found in further discovery—interrogatories, depositions, etc., but only if you know what questions to ask.

Complicating things even more is the reality that e-discovery technology has not fully caught up to emoji use. In 2019 Relativity, a leader in e-discovery technology, introduced the Relativity Short Message Format (RSMF) as a unified message format that processes and renders short message data like, Slack, SMS, iMessage, Bloomberg, and Skype with their attachments. In this format you can search for specific emojis, but there are still issues. The RSMF format renders ~1,000 different emojis.  At last count Slack alone has 26-million different emoji.

So, what should we do? As legal professionals we must be diligent and ensure that all the data we collect is processed properly so we can take full advantage of the tools available. We also must recognize the constantly evolving world around us so we can fully understand the necessary context and recognize when we need to dig deeper.

©2021 Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

For more articles on emojis, visit the NLRCommunications, Media & Internet section.

EPA Sued to Issue Pending Methylene Chloride Prohibition Rule in Final

On January 14, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, the Vermont Public Interest Group; Safer Chemicals, Health Families; and two individuals (plaintiffs) followed up on their earlier notice of intent to sue and filed a complaint against Andrew Wheeler and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to compel EPA to perform its “mandatory duty” to “address the serious and imminent threat to human health presented by paint removal products containing methylene chloride.”  Plaintiffs bring the action under Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Section 20(a) which states that “any person may commence a civil action … against the Administrator to compel the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary.”  Plaintiffs allege that EPA has not performed its mandatory duty under TSCA Sections 6(a) and 7.  TSCA Section 6(a) gives EPA the authority to regulate substances that present “an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment” and TSCA Section 7 gives EPA the authority to commence civil actions for seizure and/or relief of “imminent hazards.”  Plaintiffs’ argument to direct EPA to ban methylene chloride is centered on the issue of risk to human health only, however, stating that it presents “an unreasonable risk to human health” as confirmed by EPA.  Under TSCA Section 20(b)(2), plaintiffs are required to submit a notice of intent to sue 60 days prior to filing a complaint which they did on October 31, 2018.

Background

On January 19, 2017, EPA issued a proposed rule under TSCA Section 6 to prohibit the manufacture (including import), processing, and distribution in commerce of methylene chloride for consumer and most types of commercial paint and coating removal (82 Fed. Reg. 7464).  EPA also proposed to prohibit the use of methylene chloride in these commercial uses; to require manufacturers (including importers), processors, and distributors, except for retailers, of methylene chloride for any use to provide downstream notification of these prohibitions throughout the supply chain; and to require recordkeeping.  EPA relied on a risk assessment of methylene chloride published in 2014, the scope of which EPA stated included “consumer and commercial paint and coating removal.”  The proposed rule stated that in the risk assessment, EPA identified risks from inhalation exposure including “neurological effects such as cognitive impairment, sensory impairment, dizziness, incapacitation, and loss of consciousness (leading to risks of falls, concussion, and other injuries)” and, based on EPA’s analysis of worker and consumer populations’ exposures to methylene chloride in paint and coating removal, EPA proposed “a determination that methylene chloride and NMP in paint and coating removal present an unreasonable risk to human health.”  The comment period on the proposed rule was extended several times, ending in May 2017, and in September 2017 EPA held a workshop to help inform EPA’s understanding of methylene chloride use in furniture refinishing.

No further action was taken to issue the rule in final, however, until December 21, 2018, when EPA sent the final rule to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review.  On the same day, EPA also sent another rule to OMB for review titled “Methylene Chloride; Commercial Paint and Coating Removal Training, Certification and Limited Access Program,” which has not previously been included in EPA’s Regulatory Agenda; very little is known about this rule.  Plaintiffs do not refer to it in the complaint but there is speculation, based on its title, that this second rule may allow for some commercial uses of methylene chloride.

Commentary

We recall the lawsuit filed by the Natural Resources Defense Counsel (NRDC) in 2018 challenging EPA’s draft New Chemicals Decision-Making Framework document as a final rule.  The current action further reflects the commitment of detractors of EPA to use the courts and every other means available to oppose the Administration’s TSCA implementation efforts.  Whether and when this court will respond is unclear.  What is clear is that the case will be closely watched, as the outcome will be an important signal to the TSCA stakeholder community regarding the utility of TSCA Section 20(a)(2) to force non-discretionary EPA actions that the Administration may be disinclined to take.

 

©2019 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA) and Vermont Agree to Drop GMO Lawsuit

GMO LawsuitThe food industry, led by the Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA), and Vermont have agreed to dismiss a federal lawsuit that challenged a state law requiring the labeling of certain foods made with genetically modified organisms.

Vermont’s labeling requirements for genetically modified (GM) foods have been preempted by the recent enactment of federal GM labeling legislation which establishes a “National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard” and calls for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to “establish a national mandatory bioengineered food disclosure standard”.  On August 11, 2016, Vermont’s Attorney General (AG) issued a formal memo stating that the AG’s office will no longer enforce the state’s requirements.  Still pending on appeal to the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York, however, was a federal court case filed by food industry groups against the state of Vermont challenging the state GMO labeling law.

Earlier this week, the parties to the lawsuit agreed the suit was no longer warranted because a new federal law preempted the Vermont law that took effect July 1, 2016.

The dismissal of the legal challenge to Vermont’s GMO labeling law represents the formal conclusion of a particularly controversial chapter in the GM labeling debate that involved sparring over the potential development of a patchwork of conflicting labeling requirements across the 50 states.  With the conclusion of the Vermont GMO labeling law saga, industry can now work with USDA to develop uniform federal regulation for labeling GMO foods.

Vermont GMO Battle Continues in Second Circuit

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals is currently in the midst of an interlocutory appeal by the Grocery Manufacturer’s Association (“GMA”) and others of the District Court of Vermont’s denial of a request for a preliminary injunction against Vermont’s “Right to Know” Act.

The Act, passed by the Vermont legislature on May 8, 2014, and effective July 1, 2016, has the stated goal of establishing a system to allow for informed decisions by consumers with respect to the potential health effects of “genetically engineered foods,” commonly referred to as “GMOs.”  The Act applies to products entirely or partially produced with genetic engineering, with a focus on raw agricultural commodities and covered processed foods.  Labels on covered food products must either state that they are “produced with genetic engineering” or “may be produced with genetic engineering.”  Limited exceptions are made for foods derived entirely from animals, restaurant foods, alcoholic beverages and foods that have been independently verified to have “minimal” GMO content.  Penalties under the Act include $1,000.00 per day, per product, fines for food manufacturers.

The GMA filed its initial Complaint with the District Court in June 2014, and sought a preliminary injunction in September 2014.  U.S. District Judge Christina Reiss refused to enjoin the law in a ruling issued on April 27, 2015, which was promptly appealed to the Second Circuit.  Oral argument in the appeal took place on October 8, 2015.

The crux of the issue before the Second Circuit is the proper standard for evaluating GMA’s position that the Act violates the First Amendment by imposing a burden on speech by, inter alia, food manufacturers, based upon the content of that speech.  In reaching her decision to deny the preliminary injunction, Judge Reiss applied the less-stringent First Amendment analysis set forth in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,  471 U.S. 626 (1985).  Given what the appellants term the “controversial” information/disclosures mandated by the Act, they argue the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) and its stricter level of scrutiny applies.  Appellants further rely on Second Circuit precedent, arguing that the case of Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996), bars the state legislature from enacting a law that “trammel[s] manufacturer’s free speech rights to appease “consumer curiosity” and was ignored by the District Court.  The State of Vermont continues to argue that the District Court’s reliance on Zauderer and its less-stringent “rational basis” test was proper, in that the Act merely serves to provide consumers with “factual information.”

The Second Circuit panel reviewing the case addressed the issue of ripeness during oral argument, and remains, given the impact of the Act as the first of its kind to have a set effective date, at the forefront of debate over the regulation of GMO food and food products.  The Second Circuit’s decision bears watching, as the costs to industry resulting from enactment of the Act and the potential domino effect of similar acts being passed by other state legislatures could be significant and will require extensive advanced planning to ensure compliance.

The Second Circuit case is Grocery Manufacturers Association, et al. v. Sorrell, Case No. 15-1504.  The District Court case is Case No. 5:14-cv-117 and the Court’s order denying the preliminary injunction is Document #95.  A link to a .pdf copy of the Order is provided immediately here.

© Copyright 2015 Armstrong Teasdale LLP. All rights reserved