Tag: Unions

Union Launches National Organizing Effort in Gaming and Tech Industries

The Communications Workers of America (CWA) has begun a nationwide union-organizing campaign targeting game and tech industry employees, in partnership with Game Workers Unite! (GWU), a so-called “grass-roots” worker group founded in Southern California in 2018 to spur unionization in the gaming industry. As here, such groups typically are founded and funded by established labor organizations.

The idea for the organizing effort is the result of discussions between the CWA and GWU over the past months. In addition, CWA Canada is partnering with the GWU chapter in Toronto. The CWA has used similar partnerships with other activist groups, most recently teaming up with the Committee for Better Banks to attempt to organize banking sector employees.

Organizing is being spearheaded by Emma Kinema, a co-founder of GWU, and Wes McEnany, a former organizer with the Service Employees International Union and leader of the “Fight for 15” effort. Kinema will lead the organizing on the West Coast, McEnany will focus on the East Coast. Organizers from CWA locals across the country will populate the teams. According to Kinema, the issues on which the union will focus are: “crunch,” or long hours for weeks or months to meet launch deadlines; cyclical layoffs; harassment; misogyny; gender-based pay discrimination; values and ethical issues, such as working with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); climate change; AI ethics; and pay, severance, and benefits. According to Tom Smith, CWA’s lead organizer, “For a lot of folks, that’s what led them to do this work in the first place, and people are feeling a disconnect between their personal values and what they’re seeing every day in the working lives.”

With the moniker CODE – Campaign to Organize Digital Employees – the ambitious initiative seeks to organize employees across the industry, typically at individual shops or employers. According to Kinema, “We believe workers are strongest when they’re together in one shop in one union, so the disciplines can’t be pitted against each other – none of that’s good for the workers. I think in games and tech, the wall-to-wall industrial model is the best fit.” Smith said the CWA would be open to craft-based organizing – where the focus is industry-wide bargaining units composed of employees performing similar work at different employers – if that is what employees want. In an industry where workers frequently move from employer to employer, portable benefits can be attractive.

An annual survey by the International Game Developers Association, an industry group, found that gaming worker interest in unions had increased to 47 percent by 2019. Indeed, a representation petition is pending at the Brooklyn office of the National Labor Relations Board on behalf of the employees at a gaming company. About 220,000 employees work in the two-billion-dollar gaming industry.

The union has established a website — www.code-cwa.org – as well as a presence on other social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.

As most union organizing is based on the presence in the workplace of unresolved employee issues, a comprehensive analysis of such matters may be valuable to employer. Also, supervisors and managers often interact frequently with employees when organizing is afoot or underway. Training regarding their rights and responsibilities under the labor laws often is essential.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2020

For more on unionizing news, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

AB 1291 Forces California Cannabis Companies To Sign “Labor Peace Agreements” With Unions, But Statute May be Unconstitutional

 

On October 12, 2019, Governor Newsom signed Assembly Bill 1291 (“AB 1291”) into law, which requires companies to sign a so-called “labor peace” agreement with a union or risk losing their cannabis license; thereby, strengthening already union-friendly statewide cannabis law. AB 1291 was supported and endorsed by various unions, including the United Food and Commercial Workers Western States Council, a 170,000-member branch representing thousands of cannabis workers. This bill, as well as other California statutes and local laws, signals a growing insistence by state and local regulators that employers doing business in California accept pro-union requirements. However, many of these new pro-union laws, including AB 1291, may be unconstitutional.

The main takeaways of AB 1291 are as follows:

  1. Effective January 1, 2020, California cannabis license applicants must sign so-called labor peace agreements with a union within 60 days of their 20th hire or risk losing their cannabis license.
  2. Employers and business associations seeking to challenge AB 1291, and other similar state or local union-related ordinances, are encouraged to speak with experienced labor counsel to discuss their options.
  3. Employers seeking to comply with AB 1291 and sign labor peace agreements should conduct due diligence on the labor unions they are considering entering into negotiations with. Not all unions are the same. Additionally, businesses should be thoughtful about what they agree to put into a labor peace agreement to satisfy the requirements under California’s cannabis laws. For example, these agreements are frequently mistakenly referred to as “neutrality agreement.” Neutrality agreements typically contain a commitment from the employer to remain “neutral” through a union organizing campaign. In contrast, AB 1291 does not use the term “neutral(ity)” and, thus, arguments can be made that strict “neutrality” is not required under the statute and may not need to be included in the labor peace agreement. Thus, employers should speak with experienced labor counsel before negotiating labor peace agreements with unions.

Background

Since its adoption into law in 2018, the Medicinal and Adult Use of Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (“MAUCRSA”) has required applicants for state cannabis licenses with 20 or more employees to “provide a statement that the applicant will enter into, or demonstrate that it has already entered into, and abide by the terms of a labor peace agreement.”1 (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 26015.5(a)(5)(A).) A labor peace agreement, as defined under California’s cannabis laws, must contain the following commitments, at a minimum:

  1. Employer shall not “disrupt” efforts by the union to “communicate with, and attempt to organize and represent” the employer’s employees;
  2. Employer shall give the union “access at reasonable times to areas in which the employees work, for the purpose of meeting with employees to discuss their right to representation, employment rights under state law, and terms and conditions of employment;” and
  3. Union and its members shall not engage in picketing, work stoppages, boycotts, and any other economic interference with the employer’s business.

(Cal. Lab. & Prof Code § 26001(x).)

Effective January 1, 2020, AB 1291 requires an applicant for a state license under MAUCRSA with 20 or more employees to provide a notarized statement that the applicant will enter into, or demonstrate that it has already entered into, and abide by the terms of a labor peace agreement. If the applicant has less than 20 employees and has not yet entered into a labor peace agreement, AB 1291 requires the applicant to provide a notarized statement as a part of its application indicating that the applicant will enter into and abide by the terms of a labor peace agreement within 60 days of employing its 20th employee. By expanding the scope of the crime of perjury, AB 1291 imposes a state-mandated local program and authorizes the Bureau of Cannabis Control, the Department of Food and Agriculture, and the State Department of Public Health to revoke or suspend a license for a violation of these requirements.

AB 1291 May Be Unconstitutional

AB 1291 poses substantial questions as to whether it is unconstitutional due to preemption by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) under two complementary preemptions doctrines: Garmon and Machinists. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the states are constitutionally barred by the U.S. Constitution’s supremacy clause from regulating conduct that NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits. Garmon preemption exists to protect the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) primary jurisdiction and to preclude a state’s interference with its interpretation and enforcement of the integrated regulatory scheme that is the NLRA. Indeed, Congress delegated exclusive authority to the NLRB because it sought to establish a single, uniform national labor policy that would be unaffected by the vagaries of state law or shaped by local attitudes or prejudices. (Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).) In Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court similarly declared that the NLRA forbids states to regulate conduct that Congress intended “to be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’” Together, Garmon and Machinists preempt state and local policies that would otherwise interfere with the “integrated scheme of regulation” and disrupt the balance of power between labor and management embodied in the NLRA.

It appears AB 1291’s purpose is to afford unions greater rights than provided under the NLRA and make it easier for unions to organize cannabis employers. AB 1291 arguably presents the type of state interference in labor-management relations that Garmon and Machinists preemption forbids. For example, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (“Golden State I”), 475 U.S. 608, 616 (1986), the Supreme Court held that while the NLRA “requires an employer and a union to bargain in good faith, … it does not require them to reach agreement,” nor does it demand a particular outcome from labor negotiations.” The substance of labor negotiations, and the results therefrom, are among those areas Congress intentionally left to the free play of economic forces when it legislated in the field of labor law. (Id.) In that case, the Supreme Court found that Machinists preempted the City of Los Angeles’ (“City”) refusal to renew a taxi cab company’s license when it failed to reach an agreement with striking union members. By conditioning the renewal of the taxi cab franchise on the acceptance of the union’s demands, the City effectively imposed a timeline on the parties’ negotiations and undermined the taxi cab company’s ability to rely on its own economic power to resist the strike. (Id. at 615.) The Supreme Court held that the City could not pressure the taxi cab company into reaching a settlement and thereby “destroy[] the balance of power designed by Congress, and frustrate[] Congress’ decision to leave open the use of economic weapons.” (Id. at 619.)

The facts of Golden State I are instructive here. Like the taxi cab company in Golden State I, California cannabis businesses now face a Hobson’s “all or nothing” choice under AB 1291. If a cannabis business refuses to negotiate a labor peace agreement with a labor organization, it effectively loses the right to do business in California. But if the cannabis business negotiates a labor peace agreement, the union knows full well that it can hold out for significant concessions in exchange for its members giving up one of their most valuable economic weapons – the power to strike.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) is also instructive. At issue in Brown was California’s Assembly Bill 1889 (“AB 1889”), prohibiting certain private employers from using state funds to “assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” (Id. at 63 [quoting Cal. Govt. Code §§ 16645.1–16645.7].) The Court held that AB 1889 was unconstitutional. As explained by the Court, the current text of Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA are amendments made to the NLRA in 1947 as part of the Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft Harley Act, for the purpose of overturning earlier NLRB precedent. The NLRA was amended in in several key respects. First, it emphasized that employees “have the right to refrain from any or all” union activities. (29 U.S.C. § 157.) Second, it added Section 8(b), which prohibits unfair labor practices by unions. (29 U.S.C. § 158(b).) Third, it added Section 8(c), which protects speech by both unions and employers from regulation by the NLRB. (29 U.S.C. § 158(c).) Specifically, Section 8(c) provides:

The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.

With the amendments, Section 8(c) “manifested a “congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.” (Id. at 6-7.) That Congress amended the NLRA, rather than leaving to the courts the task of correcting the NLRB’s decisions on a case-by-case basis, is “indicative of how important Congress deemed such ‘free debate.’” (Id. at 7.) In addition, Sections 8(a) and 8(b) “demonstrate that when Congress has sought to put limits on advocacy for or against union organization, it has expressly set forth the mechanisms for doing so.” (Brown, 554 U.S. at 67.) Moreover, “the amendment to §7 calls attention to the right of employees to refuse to join unions, which implies an underlying right to receive information opposing unionization.” (Id.) “[T]he addition of §8(c) expressly precludes regulation of speech about unionization so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” (Id. [internal quotation omitted].) Thus, based on these overriding principles, the Court concluded that “California’s policy judgment that partisan employer speech necessarily interfere[s] with an employee’s choice about whether to join or to be represented by a labor union” and struck down AB 1889. (Id. at 68 [internal quotation omitted].)

AB 1291 is arguably no different. By forcing unwilling cannabis businesses to negotiate and accept labor peace agreements, AB 1291 compels a result Congress deliberately left to the free play of economic forces. The NLRA does not allow state and local governments to interfere with employer rights to communicate with employees regarding unionization under Section 8(c). Nor does it allow state and local governments to “introduce some standard of properly balanced bargaining power . . . or to define what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an ideal or balanced state of collective bargaining.” (Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-50.) Yet, this is exactly what AB 1291 appears to do. Accordingly, AB 1291 may be unconstitutional.

1 A labor peace (aka a labor harmony agreement) is essentially a contract between an employer and an organized labor union in which the employer agrees to help the union organize the employer’s workforce (i.e., unionize) by providing, for example, certain information or agreeing not to interfere with the union organizing efforts, in exchange for the union’s agreement not to strike or cause other disruption in the employer’s workforce during a union organizing campaign. Because these agreements open the door to union activity within the workplace, they should not be entered into casually. Rather, unionization may result in increased labor costs, contractual contributions to union pension plans, loss of flexibility, and adherence to union rules set forth in a legally binding contract. In addition, once a union is recognized or certified as the collective bargaining representative of employees, it is practically impossible to terminate that relationship. Indeed, only after a costly and divisive decertification election can a workforce return to the merit-based and flexible non-union environment.

Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

For more on union regulation, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Legal Alert: Not So Fast: National Labor Relations Board Rejects Boeing S.C. Micro Unit

On September 9, 2019, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) clarified its test for unionizing “micro units” of employees within larger workforces, and prevented the International Association of Machinists from representing a small group of Boeing Co. technicians at a plant in South Carolina. The Boeing Company, 368 NLRB No. 67 (2019). In a three-to-one vote, the Board said a proposed bargaining unit consisting of about 175 flight-readiness technicians at Boeing’s Charleston Final Assembly operation does not meet federal standards for appropriate units, because the workers are not distinct from the site’s larger workforce of approximately 2,700 maintenance and production workers.

The International Association of Machinists won an election in May of 2018 to become the bargaining representative of this smaller unit of employees. This election followed an earlier election where a large unit of production and maintenance workers rejected the Union in a 2,087 – 731 vote. After the May 2018 election, the Company appealed the certification of the smaller unit of Boeing employees, arguing that the NLRB Regional Director had improperly approved the small unit of flight-readiness technicians.

In Boeing, the Board indicated that the standard it set forth for unionizing smaller bargaining units of employees in the PCC Structurals decision from December of 2017 was being misapplied. The standard for unionizing micro units of employees, as set forth in Boeing, requires a three-step legal analysis to determine the appropriateness of the proposed bargaining unit. First, the proposed unit must share an internal community of interest. Second, the interests of those within the proposed unit and the shared and distinct interests of those excluded from that unit must be comparatively analyzed and weighed. Third, consideration must be given to the Board’s decisions on appropriate units in the particular industry involved.

Moving forward, unions will have to demonstrate a sufficiently distinct community of interest among the proposed bargaining unit as compared to excluded employees. And, excluded employees’ distinct interests will have to outweigh the similarity of interests that excluded employees share with members of the proposed bargaining unit. This decision strikes a strong blow against unions’ efforts to organize and represent smaller bargaining units.

Copyright © 2019 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite. A Professional Association. All Rights Reserved.

For more NLRB decision-making, see the Labor & Employment law page on the National Law Review.

Changing Course: “Contract Coverage” is the New Standard for Unilateral Action

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) departed from precedent last week when it addressed whether an employer’s unilateral action under a collective bargaining agreement was lawful.

The case in question – M.V. Transportation, Inc. and Amalgamated Transit Union Local #1637, AFL–CIO, CLC., Case 28– CA–173726 – concerned what standard the Board should apply to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement grants an employer the right to take certain unilateral actions, without further bargaining with the union. Under prior case law, the Board had applied the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard, under which the employer would be found to have violated the Act unless a provision of the collective bargaining agreement specifically refers to the type of employer decision at issue, or mentions the kind of factual situation that the case presents.

In M.V. Transportation, the Board noted that several appeals courts have rejected the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard in favor of a “contract coverage” standard, including, importantly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which, by statute, has full jurisdiction to review NLRB decisions.  Under the “contract coverage” standard, the decision-maker must examine the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the action taken by an employer was within the “compass or scope of contractual language granting the employer the right to act unilaterally. The Board cited the example of a collective bargaining agreement that broadly grants the employer the right to implement new rules and policies and to revise existing ones, noting that under such circumstances, an employer would not violate the law by unilaterally implementing new attendance or safety rules or by revising existing disciplinary or off-duty-access policies.

While the Board did choose to adopt the “contract coverage” standard, it did not totally abandon the “waiver” concept. It warned that if an agreement does not clearly cover the employer’s disputed act, and that act has materially, substantially and significantly changed a term or condition of employment constituting a mandatory subject of bargaining, the employer will have violated the law unless it demonstrates that the union clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the change, or that its unilateral action was privileged for some other reason.

In a move that is becoming more common in NLRB cases, the Board also decided to apply the new standard retroactively in all pending unilateral change cases where the determination of whether the employer violated the law turned on whether contractual language granted the employer the right to make the change in question.

Under the new standard, employers should take care in collective bargaining to make sure that the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement supports any unilateral action that the employer wants to reserve the right to take. The language should be clearly written and explicit in its grant of authority, and its meaning should be clear when applying ordinary principles of contract interpretation. By doing that, the employer can assure that its unilateral action does not violate the law or the agreement.

Copyright © 2019 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Running Backs NLRB Petition Seeks To “Stiff Arm” NFL Players Association With New Bargaining Unit

An upstart labor organization, the International Brotherhood of Professional Running Backs (IBPRB), has filed a petition with Region 13, the Chicago office of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), seeking to form a separate union for the National Football League’s running backs. The unit clarification petition, NLRB Case No. 13-UC-246227, seeks to sever and create a separate running back bargaining unit from the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA), which has historically represented all NFL players regardless of position.

A unit clarification or “UC” petition generally is used to resolve disputes regarding the unit placement of disputed positions, typically newly created positions, in a process referred to as an accretion. However, a UC petition also can be used as a method to affect the subdivision of an existing bargaining unit, as the IBPRB seeks to do here. A severance effort is most often undertaken when some changed circumstances have occurred that have negated any “community of interest” (similarity of terms and conditions of employment) that may have previously existed among the bargaining unit and raise uncertainty regarding the continued appropriateness of the existing bargaining unit.

The petition filed by the IBPRB cited “the unique career structures” of running backs as its basis for the loss of the necessary community of interest between the running backs and the other NFL player members of the NFLPA.

For a successful UC petition, the petitioner must show “recent, substantial changes in their operations, or that other compelling circumstances exist which would warrant disregarding the long-existing bargaining history” of the parties. In Batesville Casket Company, Inc., 283 NLRB 795 (1987), the NLRB relied upon the standard established in Rock-Tenn Co., 274 NLRB 772 (1985), and dismissed a UC petition because the employer-petitioners did not show any “recent, substantial changes in their operations, or that other compelling circumstances which would warrant disregarding the long-existing bargaining history” of the parties.

It may be difficult for the IBPRB to meet the “recent, substantial changes” test.

While the role of a running back has evolved over recent years as the passing game has become the dominant force in offensive schemes, the basic mission of the position– to carry the ball, catch passes, and block – is unchanged. Whatever may be the unique career structures to which the IBPRB referred in the petition (the average career of an NFL running back is 2.5 years compared to 3.3 years for all positions), it may be difficult for the union to show that there have been “recent, substantial changes” in the running back position to satisfy the Batesville Casket threshold for unit clarification.

In representation cases such as this, the regional office of the NLRB conducts an initial investigation and holds a hearing if appropriate. A notice of hearing has not yet been issued. The NLRB may still be in a huddle.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019

More sports law on the National Law Review Entertainment, Sports & Art law page.

NLRB Will No Longer Require Employers to Permit Union Organizers in “Public Space” on Employers’ Property

Overruling 38 years of precedent, the NLRB has determined employers have no duty to permit union organizers to use “public space” to solicit union support on their property.  UPMC and SEIU, 368 NLRB No. 2 (June 14, 2019).

UPMC is a hospital system based in western Pennsylvania.  SEIU organizers visited the hospital cafeteria and distributed organizing materials to employees over lunch discussing union organizing activity. The hospital maintained a no-solicitation practice that prohibited nonemployees from using the cafeteria for purposes of solicitation.  When the hospital learned of the union organizers’ presence and purpose, they were asked to leave the cafeteria by security guards, and when they refused, local police were summoned and escorted the organizers off the property.  The Union filed unfair labor practice charges, alleging that this act was illegal.

The NLRB disagreed. Since 1981, the NLRB has created an entitlement to union agents to obtain access to “public space” – or, space in an employer’s property open to the public – for the purpose of soliciting union support among employees.  Typically, the “public space” involved a cafeteria or a restaurant, and union agents were permitted to use the space in a manner consistent with its intended use as long as they were not disruptive.  Montgomery Ward & Co., 256 NLRB 800, 801 (1981).

“The Board’s approach has been soundly rejected by multiple circuit courts (of appeal).”  In support of this finding, the Board recited decisions from the circuit courts of appeal of the 6th, 4th and 8th circuits, concluding the “public space” exception was insupportable in light of the United States Supreme Court decisions that permit employers to prohibit union agents from entering an employer’s property for organizing activity if the union could appeal to employees through other means and if the employer does not discriminate against unions by permitting other persons or organizations from soliciting on its property.  NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).  Even when those conditions exist, the United States Supreme Court has held both of these exceptions are “narrow” and unions have a “heavy” burden of proof to establish the exception.  Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978).

The NLRB agreed with the judicial criticism of its previous precedent and held:

… to the extent that Board law created a “public space” exception that requires employers to permit nonemployees to engage in promotional or organizational activity in public cafeterias or restaurants absent evidence of inaccessibility or activity-based discrimination, we overrule those decisions.

While the NLRB decision stops short of rejecting the policy of “nonacquiescence” where the Board ignores circuit court precedent which refuses to enforce its orders, it is illustrative of a growing sensitivity to the maintenance of Board law that is inconsistent with the precedent of the United States’ courts which refuse to enforce flawed NLRB precedent.

© 2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.
This article was written by Mark A. Carter and Brian J. Moore from Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
For more on Union matters, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment page.

Handbook Wars – Common Sense Returns NLRB Overhauls Standard for Legality of Work Rules

We have noted many times over the years how the NLRB’s zeal to review employer policies, or more correctly, fragments of employer policies, for lawfulness has led to nettlesome issues that rarely, if ever, involve actual employees.  The results have been absurd and have raised an entire cottage industry of attacks on language by unions and vetting of employer policies for lawfulness.

This may be ending.  As we noted yesterday, the NLRB issued a significant decision that will have far-reaching implications for both unionized and non-unionized workplaces.  In Boeing Company, 365 NLRB No. 154 (2017), the Board established a new standard for evaluating whether facially lawful workplace rules, policies or employee handbook provisions unlawfully interfere with employees’ exercise of Section 7 rights.  In so doing, the Board placed in doubt the applicability of scores of decisions issued in the 13-years since Lutheran Heritage, 343 NLRB 646 (2004), was decided.  We previously identified this issue as a case that the NLRB would revisit once a new majority was installed.

“Reasonably Construe” Standard

For the last 14 years the Board evaluated whether an employee would “reasonably construe” the language of a work rule to prohibit the exercise of NLRA rights.  If it did, then the rule—regardless of whether it actually restricted Section 7 activity—was found unlawful.  Applying this standard, an inconsistent line of cases developed.  Take, for instance, a sampling or recent decisions concerning “civility in the workplace.”  A rule prohibiting “abusive or threatening language to anyone on Company premises” was lawful, while a rule restricting “loud, abusive or foul language” was not.  And, as noted, a policy or fragment of a policy could be found unlawful even if there was no evidence that employees read the policy or were even aware of its existence.  It was, in terms of the NLRA, a victimless crime.

Policy Considerations Behind Abandoning The Lutheran Village Standard

The new three member Board majority (Miscimarra, Kaplan and Emmanuel) decided to change this standard because employers were often held to an impossible standard of precision in drafting language in which they would need to foresee any potential impact on any Section 7 right, regardless of how remote.  An employer would have to foresee the future, which the majority characterized as requiring “perfection that literally is the enemy of the good.”  The Lutheran Heritage standard has been criticized as unworkable by many in the employer community, and by various Board members over the years.  So it is not surprising that that a new standard was on the agenda.

New Balancing Test

The Board abandoned the singularly-focused and vague “reasonably construe” standard, in favor of a new balancing test, which would consider the impact of the rule on NLRA rights and an employer’s business justification for the rule.  Going forward,  in order to provide greater clarity and certainty to all parties, the Board indicated it would categorize the results of future decisions in three ways:

  • Category 1: Lawful rules because (i) when “reasonably interpreted,” the rule does not prohibit or interfere with the exercise of NLRA rights or (ii) the potential adverse impact on protected rights is outweighed by justifications associated with the rule.  Examples of these types of rules include the no-camera requirement in the Boeing case, where the employer supported its rule with multiple business and security justifications.  The Board also found that a rule requiring employees to have “harmonious interactions and relationships” in the workplace, and other rules requiring employees to abide by basic standards of civility would be categorically lawful.
  • Category 2: Rules warranting individual scrutiny on a case-by-case basis.
  • Category 3: Unlawful rules because they would prohibit or limit NLRA-protected conduct, and the adverse impact is not outweighed by legitimate business justifications (e.g., a rule prohibiting discussion of wages or benefits with another).

The Board proceeded to use this new framework to find that Boeing’s policy restricting the use of camera-enable devices was justified in light of the employer’s security concerns.  As it does in every case in which it overrules precedent and/or sets a new standard, the Board weighed whether to apply this new test retroactively, and decided to apply the standard to all pending cases in whatever stage.

Impact of this Decision

It will be some time before the full impact of the decision will be felt as rules are evaluated under the new standard.  However, the fact Lutheran Heritage was overruled likely will inhibit unions from attacking employer policies as the forum for these sorts of claims is less receptive.

Because the Board will evaluate the purpose for the rule, employers should consider clearly articulating the reasons for a rule in the policy.

Also, employers may feel less constrained by the thicket created by the previous standard; however, the true impact of Boeing likely will be felt once the host of pending cases work their way through ALJs and the Board under this new paradigm.  Only then will employers understand how the Board’s new categories will work.  We will keep you posted…there is sure to be more to follow.

© 2017 Proskauer Rose LLP.
This post was contributed by Mark Theodore and Joshua S Fox of Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more on the NLRB go to the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment Practice group page.

Right-to-Work Battle in Illinois Enters Cease Fire – For Now

Illinois is completely surrounded by right-to-work states that have laws making it unlawful for companies to require union dues as a condition of employment. Notwithstanding the recent trend of states enacting such laws, the Illinois legislature tried its best this year to block right-to-work legislation within its borders.

Earlier this year, the Illinois legislature passed a law that would prohibit local governments from enacting their own right-to-work laws after one Illinois municipality attempted to enact a right-to-work ordinance in 2015. Illinois Gov. Bruce Rauner vetoed the legislation – based on his belief that right-to-work laws promote business growth – and this week the legislature fell one vote short of overriding his veto. There are signals legislators may attempt to revive the legislation next year. Thus, this remains an issue for Illinois employers to watch.

This issue is not unique to Illinois; local governments in Kentucky enjoyed some success with their own right-to-work ordinances several years ago before the state enacted its own right-to-work law.

Right-to-work laws are permitted under Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act and make it unlawful for companies to require union dues as a condition of employment. In states where right-to-work laws are not enacted, most unionized employers have clauses in their labor agreements that require dues payments as a condition of employment – the clauses generally are known as “union seniority clauses.” At present, 28 states have right-to-work laws on the books. The National Right to Work Foundation maintains a current list.

This post was written by David J. Pryzbylski of BARNES & THORNBURG LLP., © 2017
For more Labor & Employment legal analysis, go to The National Law Review

2015 Union Membership Rate Relatively Stable Despite New NLRB Election Rules

national labor relations boardDespite the National Labor Relations Board’s “quickie election rules,” the percentage of unionized workers in the private sector remained stable during 2015, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor: 6.7% of private-sector workers were in unions in 2015, up from 6.6% in 2014. Not surprisingly, public-sector workers had a much higher union membership rate: 35.2%.

According to the report, men had a higher union membership rate than women: 11.5% versus 10.6%. In addition, the percentage of African-American workers who were union members was greater than Caucasian workers.

New York (24.6%), Alaska (22.8%), and Hawaii (21.8%) had the highest unionization rates, whereas South Carolina (2.2%), Mississippi (3.7%), and Utah (3.7%) had the lowest.

The report found the median weekly earnings of nonunion workers were lower than the median weekly earnings for unionized workers ($776 per week versus $980 per week). The report, however, recognizes that this comparison may not be valid because the “comparisons of earnings in [the] release are on a broad level and do not control for many factors that can be important in explaining earnings differences.” Indeed, this is likely the case.

Article By Howard M. Bloom & Philip B. Rosen of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

Be Careful What You Say During a Union Organizing Campaign

national labor relations boardAt the same time that the current National Labor Relations Board is giving employees what seems like the unfettered ability to engage in disparagement, profane outbursts, and racist comments that accompany protected union or other concerted activity, employers are having to become ever more careful about what they say. Even truthful and seemingly innocuous statements made during an organizing campaign can be viewed, in hindsight, as having an unlawful “chilling effect” that discourages employees from exercising their rights to support a union. A recent decision from a federal appeals court in Chicago provides a cautionary tale for employers who find out about organizing activity and want to keep their workplace union-free.

On September 4, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (covering Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin) upheld the Board’s determination that an Illinois auto dealership illegally discouraged workers from supporting a union and illegally terminated a worker after learning he failed to disclose the suspensions of driver’s license following a DUI charge. The court noted that the employer learned union activity was “afoot” after receiving an anonymous voicemail from a woman who called “on behalf of the spouse of one of your employees.” The anonymous caller said that a particular employee was trying to “stir up” the unionization effort and stated that he did not have a valid license, which the dealership required, because of his DUI. After receiving this voicemail, the employer interviewed the employee, who admitted his license was invalid, and then suspended and later terminated him.

Meanwhile, the dealership’s general manager and other top managers met with workers to discuss the union organizing effort. One of the employees present secretly recorded the meeting. During the meeting, the managers said that any bargaining with the union would “start from scratch,” warned (truthfully) that its Orlando dealership had not had any bargaining negotiations even though its workers elected a union nearly three years ago, advised that pay raises were “absolutely possible” in the event employees rejected the union as it considered pay adjustments every year, responded that they “don’t know” if some employees would be demoted under union rules, and suggested that support for the union could “follow” them when they seek other employment because other employers might be hesitant to hire them.

The Board determined that the managers’ statements all had a “tendency” to discourage employees from organizing, and were therefore illegal under federal labor law. The managers’ statements were unlawful in four respects: (1) they “threatened” that it would be “futile” for workers to organize by suggesting that bargaining would start from scratch and bringing up the Orlando dealership as an example of potential negative consequences; (2) they implied “promises” of wage increases by suggesting that employees might receive pay raises if they reject the union; (3) they “threatened” workers with demotions by saying they didn’t know what would happen under the union’s rules; and (4) they “threatened” blacklisting by suggesting that employees’ support for the union would follow them.

The Seventh Circuit upheld all of the Board’s findings, although it did not review the Board’s decision from scratch but rather decided only whether there was “substantial evidence” to support the decision. The most obvious violation to the appellate court was the threat of blacklisting. The court found the other statements could reasonably be interpreted as unlawfully discouraging employees from unionizing. For example, the managers told the truth about the failure of negotiations at the Orlando dealership, but bringing this up in the context of the other statements could have been viewed by the workers as a threat that it would be futile for them to elect the union. And the managers were not off the hook when they spoke in hypotheticals or said that they were unaware of what would happen – answering “maybe” when asked about future pay increases was still an illegal promise of benefit and saying “I don’t know” if workers will be demoted under union rules was still a threat.

As to the employee who was suspended (and later terminated) after the employer found out his license was suspended, the Board found that his termination was illegal because it was motivated, at least in part, by his support for the union. The court again upheld this finding, stressing that the employee’s support for the union did not need to be the sole or even primary reason for his termination – it only needed to be a “motivating factor.” Here, there was enough evidence to show an unlawful motivation because the caller who left a voicemail singled out the employee for his union activity and the employer had shown “hostility” toward the union during its meeting with employees.

The lesson from this case is that employers need to be very careful about what they tell employees during a union organizing campaign. Even one statement that crosses the line can put everything else that was said in a worse light and ultimately get the employer in trouble. The case shows that employers should not make the following statements:

  • Bargaining will start from scratch (viewed as a threat that workers will lose their current pay and/or benefits).

  • You will receive a pay increase and/or other benefits even without a union (viewed as a promise that workers will receive benefits if they reject the union).

  • We are going to bargain hard if you elect a union, so do not expect things to change (viewed as a threat that supporting a union would be futile).

Perhaps you are wondering, what can employers say? Here are some examples of permissible statements:

  • We oppose the union and urge you to do the same.

  • You enjoy good pay, benefits, and job security without a union.

  • You have a right to refuse to sign an authorization card or speak to union representatives, and may vote against the union in an election even if you previously signed a card.

  • If there is an economic strike, we may permanently replace all striking workers.

  • The union cannot guarantee better wages, benefits, and working conditions (as long as there is no threat that workers risk losing what they currently have by supporting the union).

In short, employers can express their opposition to the union and discuss the pros and cons of union membership, such as having to pay union dues (in non-right to work states). Employers can also provide factual information about the law, the union (dues, fees, rules, officials’ salaries, etc.), and how unionized companies compare against non-unionized companies in terms of wages and benefits, competitiveness, etc. in the industry.

It is often hard to tell when an employer’s statement opposing a union might cross the line and be viewed as unlawfully discouraging workers from exercising their rights. Even true statements can be viewed as illegally tending to discourage union activity. To stay in the clear, employers should obtain legal advice before speaking in opposition to a union organizing campaign.

Article By Scott T. Allen of Foley & Lardner LLP
© 2015 Foley & Lardner LLP