Tag: union

Old Standard, New Challenges: The NLRB Restores ‘Clear and Unmistakable Waiver’ Standard

The National Labor Relations Board issued its decision in Endurance Environmental Solutions, LLC, 373 NLRB No. 141 (2024), in which it announced a major precedential shift: a return to the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard. This shift may make it more difficult for employers to make changes to employee working conditions without union approval.

This decision overturns the NLRB’s 2019 decision in MV Transportation, Inc., 368 NLRB No. 66 (2019), in which the NLRB jettisoned the long-standing “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard in favor of the more employer-friendly “contract-coverage” standard. Under the latter rule, an employer could make changes to workplace conditions–without engaging in collective bargaining–as long as those changes generally aligned with the management-rights clause of a collective bargaining agreement, even if the disputed employer action was not mentioned specifically in the contract’s text.

While the clear and unmistakable waiver rule might be familiar territory, an old standard can raise new challenges for employers.

Under this more stringent and labor-friendly standard, an employer may only make a unilateral change to workplace conditions if there is clear and unmistakable language in the collective bargaining agreement permitting the proposed action. In other words, an employer is now required to demonstrate that a union has given a “clear and unmistakable waiver” of its right to bargain over specific changes being implemented for its unilateral change to survive NLRB review.

The NLRB champions its return to this standard as one that better accomplishes the goals of the National Labor Relations Act: to promote industrial peace by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.” The NLRB touts this decision as more consistent with U.S. Supreme Court and NLRB precedent.

Employers negotiating collective bargaining agreements should carefully evaluate their management-rights provisions and consider whether those provisions are now insufficient to enable them to implement unilateral changes without bargaining.

Notably, with the upcoming change in presidential administrations, the effect of Environmental Solutions, LLC may be ephemeral. If (or when) the NLRB comprises a Republican majority, we may be in store for another seismic shift as the NLRB looks for more employer-friendly opportunities, like a potential return to the contract-coverage standard.

Today, the Board issued its decision in Endurance Environmental Solutions, LLC. and restored the “clear and unmistakable” waiver standard for evaluating employers’ contractual defenses to allegations that they have unlawfully changed the working conditions of union-represented employees without first giving the union notice and an opportunity to bargain.
© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more on the NLRB, visit the NLR Labor Employment section

Office Politics: The Basics for Private Employers

In case you haven’t noticed the yard signs popping up like mushrooms, the constant barrage of television and radio advertisements, or the unsolicited text messages from unknown numbers, we are in the homestretch of election season. For those employers with questions on how to handle political speech in the workplace, especially during the last few days before (and hopefully not much beyond) Election Day, here is a refresher on the basics for private employers.

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prevents the government from enacting laws to prohibit the free exercise of speech and assembly, among other liberties. It does not apply to private employers. Where there is no state action involved, there is no unfettered right to free speech in a private place of employment. Quite simply, a private employer can enact rules to keep political expression from its workplace. Some employers prohibit political speech in the workplace to avoid potential disruptions to business operations, customer relations, or employee morale.

If an employer adopts a policy concerning political expression and messaging, it must do so fairly and consistently, and it should be inclusive and consistent to avoid the perception of favoritism or discrimination. In other words, if an employer requires Meghan to remove her Kamala button, it should also direct Dennis not to wear his Trump t-shirt. Remote workers are still “in the workplace” when they participate in virtual meetings, so there are no separate rules for them.

When enacting rules about political expression and messaging in the workplace, private employers should of course remain aware of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which applies to both union and non-union settings, and among other things protects employees’ ability to engage in concerted activity or to discuss the terms and conditions of their employment. Therefore, private employers must be mindful of a potential nexus or overlap between employees’ political speech and discussion of working conditions. Under the NLRA, for instance, employees may distribute information during non-working time about a candidate’s stance on a particular issue that may also constitute a complaint about the employees’ working conditions.

© Copyright Babst, Calland, Clements and Zomnir, P.C.
For more on Political Speech, visit the NLR Constitutional Law section.

Big Labor Got Bigger in 2023

While union numbers on the whole generally declined in 2023, some of the biggest American unions were able to augment their numbers in spite of the downward trend.

According to a recent report from Bloomberg, “Many of the nation’s largest unions including the Teamsters and West Coast dock workers saw membership gains last year, signaling potential for new organizing even as the labor movement struggles to tighten its grip on the workforce, according to new federal data.

“The numbers paint a more optimistic portrait of unions’ ability to recruit new members, particularly in the service and manufacturing sectors, even in the face of declining density nationwide. Two dozen groups added members in 2023, a year marked by high-profile strikes and labor stoppage threats across industries. The additions overcome losses from seven other peer unions, according to a Bloomberg Law analysis of disclosures filed with the US Department of Labor last week.”

For context, union membership rates across private and public sector workers overall dropped to 10 percent in 2023, down from 10.1 percent in 2022. For comparison, when this data first became available in 1983, that number was at 20.1 percent – or double where unions are now. In the private sector, only 6 percent of those workers now belong to unions as of 2023.

Nevertheless, this report showing gains by some of the nation’s largest labor organizations, combined with historic union organizing numbers and the seemingly growing number of union election successes, may move those union membership percentages upward by the close of 2024. In addition, recent changes by the National Labor Relations Board to the union election process may further help unions bolster their ranks. We’ll see how this all shakes out by year’s end. Stay tuned.

© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more on Unions, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Minimizing National Labor Relations Act Liability for Employers with Non-Unionized Workforces

This post continues our consideration of comments submitted in response to proposed regulations under the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA).

Under current law, if a plan provides any mental health or substance use disorder (MH/SUD) benefits in any classification of benefits, benefits for that condition or use disorder must be provided in every classification in which medical/surgical (M/S) benefits are provided. Classifications for this purpose include inpatient, in-network; inpatient, out-of-network; outpatient, in-network; outpatient, out-of-network; emergency care; and prescription drugs. The proposed regulations modify this standard by providing that a plan does not provide benefits for MH/SUD benefits in every classification in which M/S benefits are provided unless the plan provides meaningful benefits for treatment for the condition or disorder in each such classification “as determined in comparison to the benefits provided for medical/surgical conditions in the classification.”

The term “meaningful benefits” is nowhere defined. The regulators nevertheless “recognize that the proposal to require meaningful benefits [ ] is related to scope of services.” “Scope of services” for this purpose generally refers to the types of treatments and treatment settings that are covered by a group health plan or health insurance issuer. The preamble to the proposed regulation invites comments on how the meaningful benefits requirement “would interact with the approach related to scope of services adopted under the 2013 final regulations.” The preamble of the 2013 final regulations addressed an issue characterized as ‘‘scope of services’’ or ‘‘continuum of care’’ but otherwise failed to provide any substance. Two examples from the proposed regulations do, however, give us a sense of what the regulators have in mind.

  • A plan that generally covers treatment for autism spectrum disorder (ASD), a mental health condition, and covers outpatient, out-of-network developmental evaluations for ASD but excludes all other benefits for outpatient treatment for ASD, including applied behavior analysis (ABA) therapy, when provided on an out-of-network basis. (ABA therapy is one of the primary treatments for ASD in children.) The plan generally covers the full range of outpatient treatments and treatment settings for M/S conditions and procedures when provided on an out-of-network basis. The plan in this example violates the applicable parity standards.
  • In another example, a plan generally covers diagnosis and treatment for eating disorders, a mental health condition, but specifically excludes coverage for nutrition counseling to treat eating disorders, including in the outpatient, in-network classification. Nutrition counseling is one of the primary treatments for eating disorders. The plan generally provides benefits for the primary treatments for medical conditions and surgical procedures in the outpatient, in-network classification. The exclusion of coverage for nutrition counseling for eating disorders results in the plan failing to provide meaningful benefits for the treatment of eating disorders in the outpatient, in-network classification, as determined in comparison to the benefits provided for M/S conditions in the classification. Therefore, the plan violates the proposed rules.

Notably, the newly proposed meaningful benefits requirement is separate from, and in addition to, the newly prescribed nonquantitative treatment limitation (NQTL) testing standards. These latter standards include a “no more restrictive” requirement, a “design and application” requirement and an “outcomes data and network composition” requirement. A handful of comments nevertheless urge the regulators to add scope of services to its non-exhaustive list of NQTLs. As a result, a plan’s scope of services would be subject to comprehensive NQTL testing. Or, put another way, they would be fed back into the NQTL testing loop. Using the first of the examples above, this would require that ABA therapy to be first compared to the treatment limitations imposed on some M/S benefits in each classification. But what benefits, exactly? The problem is that a plan’s scope of services – what types of treatments a plan will pay for and in what settings – is a high-level plan design feature and not an NQTL.

While reasonable minds can and do differ on much of the substance of the proposed regulations, we doubt that anyone would claim that they streamline or simplify compliance. Compliance with these rules is already complicated and expensive; if the final rule looks anything like the proposed regulations, compliance will only get more complicated and more expensive. The proposed meaningful benefits requirement is intended to prevent plans, as a matter of plan design, from satisfying the parity rules by offering nominal or insubstantial MH/SUD benefits when compared to similar M/S benefits in each classification. Treating a plan’s scope of services as itself a separate NQTL does not advance this goal.

© 2024 McDermott Will & Emery
by: Alden J. Bianchi of McDermott Will & Emery 

For more news on Health Care Law, visit the NLR Health Law and Managed Care section.

Automating Entertainment: Writers Demand that Studios Not Use AI

When the Writers Guild of America (WGA) came with their list of demands in the strike that has already grinded production on many shows to a halt, chief among them was that the studios agree not to use artificial intelligence to write scripts. Specifically, the Guild had two asks: First, they said that “literary material,” including screenplays and outlines, must be generated by a person and not an AI; Second, they insisted that “source material” not be AI-generated.

The Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP), which represents the studios, rejected this proposal. They countered that they would be open to holding annual meetings to discuss advancements in technology. Alarm bells sounded as the WGA saw an existential threat to their survival and that Hollywood was already planning for it.

Writers are often paid at a far lower rate to adapt “source material” such as a comic book or a novel into a screenplay than they are paid to generate original literary material. By using AI tools to generate an outline or first draft of an original story and then enlisting a human to “adapt” it into screenplay, production studios potentially stand to save significantly.

Many industries have embraced the workflow of an AI-generated “first draft” that the human then punches up. And the WGA has said that its writers’ using AI as a tool is acceptable: There would essentially be a robot in the writers’ room with writers supplementing their craft with AI-generated copy, but without AI wholly usurping their jobs.

Everyone appears in agreement that AI could never write the next season of White Lotus or Succession, but lower brow shows could easily be AI aped. Law and Order, for instance, is an often cited example. Not just because it’s formulaic but because AIs are trained on massive data sets of copyrighted content and there are 20 seasons of Law and Order for the AI to ingest. And as AI technology gets more advanced who knows what it could do? Chat GPT was initially released last November and as of writing we’re on GPT-4, a far more powerful version of a platform that is advancing exponentially.

The studios’ push for the expanded use of AI is not without its own risks. The Copyright Office has equivocated somewhat in its determination that AI-generated art is not protectable. In a recent Statement of Policy, the Office said that copyright will only protect aspects of the work that were judged to have been made by the authoring human, resulting in partial protections of AI-generated works. So, the better the AI gets—the more it contributes to cutting out the human writer—the weaker the copyright protection for the studios/networks.

Whether or not AI works infringe the copyrights on the original works is an issue that is currently being litigated in a pair of lawsuits against Stability AI, the startup that created Stable Diffusion (an AI tool with the impressive ability to turn text into images in what some have dubbed the most massive art heist in history). Some have questioned whether the humans who wrote the original episodes would get compensated, and the answer is maybe not. In most cases the scripts were likely works for hire, owned by the studios.

If the studios own the underlying scripts, what happens to the original content if the studios take copyrighted content and put it through a machine that turns out uncopyrightable content? Can you DMCA or sue someone who copies that? As of this writing, there are no clear answers to these questions.

There are legal questions and deeper philosophical questions about making art. As the AI improves and humans become more cyborgian, does the art become indistinguishable? Prolific users of Twitter say they think their thoughts in 280 characters. Perhaps our readers can relate to thinking of their time in 6 minute increments, or .1’s of an hour. Further, perhaps our readers can relate to their industry being threatened by automation. According to a recent report from Goldman Sachs, generative artificial intelligence is putting 44% of legal jobs at risk.

© Copyright 2023 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more Employment Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

You’ve Got Mail: NLRB Requests Briefing on Standard for Employee Use of Employer Owned Electronic Communication Systems

In what could signify the beginning of the end for Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NLRB 1050 (2014) and guaranteed employee access to Employer computer systems for union organizing purposes, the NLRB issued a notice on August 1 inviting the filing of briefs on whether the Board should uphold, modify or overrule the decision.  Under Purple Communications (which we previously covered here), employees have a presumptive right to use their employer’s e-mail system to engage in protected activity under Section 7 of the NLRA on nonworking time, unless the employer can demonstrate circumstances allowing it to restrict such use.  Overturning Purple Communications could return the Board to the standard under Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), which permitted employers to impose Section 7-neutral restrictions on an employee’s non-work use of their e-mail systems, even if those restrictions ultimately limited the employee’s use of the employer’s e-mail for communications involving protected activity.

The NLRB issued the notice in response to a 2016 ALJ decision finding that an employer’s computer usage policy did not comply with Purple Communications standard, because it prohibited employees from using their work e-mail for any nonbusiness purpose.  Board Members Pearce (who was in the Purple Communicationsmajority) and McFerran dissented from the decision to solicit briefs.  Both dissenting Members contended that issuing the notice was inappropriate in light of the pending appeal of Purple Communications before the Ninth Circuit and their view that there has been no change in workplace trends or evidence showing that Purple Communications has created significant challenges for employers, employees, unions or the Board.

Perhaps in recognition that workplace communication technology has clearly expanded beyond e-mail, the notice welcomes briefing on what standard the Board should apply to other methods of employee communication on employer-owned equipment (e.g., instant messages, text messages, and social media postings). While the Board has limited its holdings in the area of computer usage to employer e-mail systems, this notice may indicate a move by the Board to apply a consistent standard to all forms of workplace communication platforms.

 

© 2018 Proskauer Rose LLP.
This post was written by Michael J Lebowich and Jordan Simon of Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more labor and employment news, check out the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment Page.

United Auto Workers Announces ‘Buy Union American-Made’ Ad Campaign

american-made carsLooking to piggyback off the “keep jobs in America” theme touted by President Trump, the United Auto Workers (UAW) Union announced an ad campaign that urges people to buy union- and American-made cars.  UAW President Dennis Williams said the campaign could be similar to the “Look for the Union Label” jingle in in the 1970s in support of the now-defunct International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union. “If it’s not built in the United States, then don’t buy it,” Williams said in news reports.

Williams clarified that the union is urging consumers to buy union-made vehicles first, then those made at non-union factories in the U.S. The union-made then American-made caveat could put the UAW in a tricky spot with Detroit automakers, however, as five of the top eight cars on the 2016 American-Made Index by Cars.com are made by either Toyota or Honda. The Toyota Camry, built in Georgetown, Kentucky, and Lafayette, Indiana, tops the list. By contrast, the popular Ford F-150 pickup did not make the list because it fell below the 75-percent eligibility threshold for domestic-parts content.

The UAW did not specify when the ads might start running or how much they might cost. Presumably, the ads would be funded with UAW members’ dues, which average about two hours’ pay per month.

ARTICLE BY John T.L. Koenig of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

© 2017 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

NLRB Excludes Theology Teachers from Bargaining Unit at Catholic Universities

theology NLRBWhile the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) decision this week in the teaching assistants’ case caught most of the headlines, the very same day the Board also issued two important rulings defining appropriate bargaining units at Catholic universities.

In cases arising at Seattle University (a Catholic university operated by the Jesuit order) and Saint Xavier University (a Chicago-area Catholic university founded by the Sisters of Mercy), the Board determined that faculty teaching theology and religion were exempt from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and therefore must be excluded from the petitioned-for bargaining units.

At Seattle University, the Service Employees International Union, Local 925, sought to represent a bargaining unit comprised of all non-tenure eligible faculty at the university other than those teaching nursing and law. At Saint Xavier, the Illinois Education Association (IEA-NEA)  petitioned to represent all part-time faculty at the university other than those teaching at the School of Nursing.

In reaching its decision, the Board retraced its torturous reasoning in Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB 157 (2014), in which it sought to avoid the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). In that case, the Supreme Court instructed that the NLRA must be construed to exclude teachers in church-operated schools because to do otherwise “will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school’s religious mission.” The court concluded that the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools would give “rise to entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid.”  For the Board to engage in such inquiry would violate the First Amendment.

In Pacific Lutheran, the Board purports to follow the teaching of Catholic Bishop but instead formulates the following seemingly non-compliant test: “[T]he Act permits jurisdiction over a unit of faculty members at an institution of higher learning unless the university or college demonstrates, as a threshold matter, that it holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment, and that it holds out the petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific role in creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.”

In both the Seattle and Saint Xavier cases, the Board agreed that both universities identify themselves as “providing a religious educational environment,” thus meeting the first part of the two-part test. However, in both cases, the Board concluded that only the faculty in Seattle’s Department of Theology and Religious Studies and School of Theology and Ministry and Saint Xavier’s Department of Theology met the second part of the test. Therefore, those individuals could not be part of the bargaining unit.

In his dissents in each case, NLRB Board Member Phillip A. Miscimarra lays bare the clear conflict between the Pacific Lutheran decision and the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Bishop. “My colleagues and I are not permitted to write from a clean slate regarding this issue. It is governed by NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, where the Supreme Court rejected the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over ‘lay teachers’ at church-operated schools, which the Board had attempted to justify on the basis that the schools were ‘religiously associated’ rather than ‘completely religious.’” The Supreme Court held that the Board could not exercise jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools based on “abundant evidence” that doing so “would implicate the guarantees of the Religion Clauses.”

And as Miscimarra points out in dissent, the decision reached by the Board in these two current cases actually proves his point. “In other words, my colleagues draw the precise distinction—between faculty members who teach  ‘religious’ subjects, on the one hand, and those who teach ‘secular’ subjects, on the other—that the Supreme Court rejected as entailing the type of ‘inquiry’ that, by itself, may impermissibly impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses.” That impingement necessarily results, Miscimarra writes because “[l]engthy reflection is not needed to recognize that it will often be impossible to determine whether faculty members at religiously affiliated schools who ostensibly teach ‘secular’ subjects nonetheless perform a ‘specific role in creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.’”

One would expect that both of these cases will be appealed, particularly because, as Miscimarra points out, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reads Catholic Bishop in an entirely different fashion than does the Board.  In University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 1335 (D.C. Cir 2002), that court articulated a three-part test under Catholic Bishop. Under its test, the Board has “no jurisdiction over faculty members at a school that (1) holds itself out to students, faculty and community as providing a religious educational environment; (2) is organized as a nonprofit; and (3) is affiliated with or owned, operated, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a recognized religious organization, or with an entity, membership of which is determined, at least in part, with reference to religion.”

Copies of the Seattle Board Decision and Saint Xavier Board Decision decisions are available here.

ARTICLE BY Gerald F. Lutkus of Barnes & Thornburg LLP
© 2016 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Students May Now Organize… For the Time Being – Flip Flops in the Summer

union, organize, National Labor Relations ActThe issue of whether students may be considered employees for purposes of organizing under the National Labor Relations Act has been a hotly contested issue over the past decade.  On August 23, 2016, the Board reversed itself again and held that certain students at Columbia University are able to organize under the NLRA.

For many years, students who provided teaching and other services to their college or university in the course of their studies were not considered employees for the purposes of organizing under the NLRA. Adelphi University, 195 NLRB 639 (1972);  The Leland Stamford Junior University, 214 NLRB 621 (1974).  The Board long held that the relationship between graduate students and their university was primarily that of a student and not a statutory employee.

In 2000, the Board reversed its position and held that students may in fact qualify as employees under the Act.  New York University, 332 NLRB 1205 (2000).  Four years later, holding that students have a “primarily educational, not economic, relationship with their university,” the Board reversed itself again and returned to holding that students were not employees under the Act.  Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004).

Yesterday, three members of the Board voted to reverse Brown University and held that students at Columbia University may organize under the Act.  In doing so, the Board observed that there were several public universities where students were represented by labor unions and that there was no empirical evidence that collective bargaining by student assistants would harm the educational process.

Who knows how long the Columbia University decision will remain the law.  Much will likely depend on who wins in November.  Stay tuned!

ARTICLE BY Michael Colgan Harrington of Murtha Cullina

© Copyright 2016 Murtha Cullina

Supreme Court Rules Public Sector Union Agency Fees Still Alive

The U.S. Supreme Court was equally divided 4-to-4 on a case that asked the Justices whether to overturn long-established law that allows a public sector union to charge an agency or service fee to those employees who choose not to join the union. With the Court equally split, the lower court’s decision is automatically affirmed, and public sector unions can continue to charge agency fees to employees who do not join the union.

Overturning Abood Appeared A Real Possibility

In the 1977 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education decision, the Supreme Court ruled that unions could charge an agency fee to public employees who chose not to join the union to cover the union’s costs to negotiate a contract that covers all the public employees. For over thirty years, that has been settled law. In 2014, however, the Court suggested it might be willing to overturn Abood, questioning its analysis on several grounds, including whether a mandatory agency fee violates a non-union member’s First Amendment right to free speech.

That apparent willingness to overturn Abood set up the First Amendment challenge to public union agency fees in this term’s case of Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. At the oral argument in Friedrichs in January, the Court’s more conservative Justices appeared ready to overrule Abood. Even the four more liberal Justices appeared to concede that the First Amendment argument may be tough to uphold but instead focused on the importance of not overturning prior rulings unless there is a compelling reason to do so. The long-standing Abood precedent appeared in jeopardy.

Justice Scalia’s Death Creates Stalemate 

Justice Antonin Scalia’s unexpected death in February left the Court at a 4-to-4 stalemate in Friedrichs. With the even split, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling applying Abood stands.

Opponents of unions and the Abood decision will have to wait for another case to work its way through the judicial system to raise the issue for consideration by a future Court. Of course, depending on who fills Justice Scalia’s vacancy, the majority of Justices may no longer have an appetite to reconsider Abood. We’ll all have to wait and see. In the meantime, public sector unions may continue to charge agency fees to those employees not paying union dues.

Article By Jason S. Ritchie of  Holland & Hart LLP

Copyright Holland & Hart LLP 1995-2016.