As of January 6, 2023, Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans and their immediate family members may be eligible for safe passage into the United States for up to two years as parolees if they have a financial supporter. This program is like the Uniting for Ukraine program. Organizations, including companies, can provide the financial support and, upon admission, the parolees may apply for Employment Authorization Documents (EADs).

Proposed beneficiaries cannot apply directly. Supporters must start the process.

The first step is for the supporter to submit a Form I-134A, Online Request to be Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support, including documentation proving they are able to financially support the beneficiaries they are agreeing to support. Only after that application is reviewed and adjudicated will USCIS notify the proposed beneficiary and provide instructions about how to proceed. The beneficiary will be told how to submit biographic information online and, if approved, will eventually receive travel instructions. They will be told to arrange to fly directly to their destination in the United States. Upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry, the beneficiary will be vetted again before being paroled into the country. Beneficiaries should not attempt to enter through a land port of entry as that will likely lead to a denial.

Financial supporters must be U.S. citizens or nationals, legal permanent residents (“green card holders”), conditional permanent residents, non-immigrants in lawful status, asylees, refugees, parolees, and beneficiaries of TPS, DACA or Deferred Enforced Departure (DED). While an individual must submit the Form I-134A, they can do so in association with or on behalf of an organization, business, or other entity that will provide some or all the support. Individuals who file the form on behalf of an organization must submit a letter of commitment or other documentation from an officer or other credible representative of the organization or business describing the monetary or other types of support they will provide. Beyond monetary support, other forms of support can include housing, basic necessities, and transportation. When an individual is submitting the form on behalf of an organization that will be providing the necessary level of support, the individual need not submit their own financial information.

Applications will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The grant of parole is discretionary, based on urgent humanitarian reasons or if the applicants would provide a significant public benefit to the United States.

To be eligible, proposed beneficiaries must:

• Have a financial supporter in the United States;
• Undergo robust security screening;
• Have a passport valid for international travel;
• Meet vaccination requirements;
• Provide their own transportation to the United States, if approved for travel;
• Meet other general requirements; and
• Warrant an exercise of discretion.

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Hackers caused a massive traffic jam in Moscow by exploiting the ride-sharing app Yandex Taxi and using it to summon dozens of taxis to a single location. While Yandex has not confirmed the attacker’s identity, the hacktivist group Anonymous claimed responsibility on Twitter. The group has been actively taking aim at Russian targets in response to the Russian Federation’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Yandex claims that it has implemented new algorithms to detect this type of attack in the future and will compensate the affected drivers.

This traffic jam is a new application of an old hacktivist tactic: flood the system to make it unusable. Other techniques in this vein include blackouts (which target fax machines) and distributed denial of service (which targets websites and networks). No word yet on whether this new rideshare jam exploit will merit a snappy title.

Blair Robinson contributed to this article. 

For more Global Law news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

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Yes, we shall live, Uncle Vanya. Could Anton Chekhov ever have imagined that his literary work would be used to sell hamburgers? In March, a controversial application for an “Uncle Vanya” mark in connection with “snack bars, cafes, cafeterias, restaurants, bar services, canteens, cooking and home delivery services,” incorporated the red-and-yellow golden arches logo of McDonald’s. It was just one in a series of recent applications in Russia that have caused serious pearl-clutching among intellectual property lawyers.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the country has faced numerous financial, trade and travel sanctions. It’s also been snubbed by major intellectual property partners. In a February 28 letter, a group of whistleblowers and staff representatives at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) called for the entity’s public condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the rapid closure of its Russia Office. The European Patent Office severed ties with Russia on March 1, and shortly thereafter the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) confirmed that it had “terminated engagement” with officials from Russia’s agency in charge of intellectual property, the Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent), and with the Eurasian Patent Organization.

In response, Russia has adopted an aggressive posture in the intellectual property realm where it once sought to peacefully engage with the world, an effort that began well before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When the USSR joined the Paris Convention in 1965, it eagerly sought to develop Soviet intellectual property. Yet in March, Russia issued Decree No. 299, which effectively nullifies the enforcement value of Russian patents owned by entities and individuals in “unfriendly” countries including the United States, European Union member states, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin also greenlighted the importation of branded products without the brands’ permission, creating gray market headaches. As Boris Edidin, deputy chairman of the Commission for Legal Support of the Digital Economy of the Moscow Branch of the Russian Bar Association, clarified in a recent legal commentary published by Moscow-based RBC Group: “entrepreneurs have the opportunity to import goods of well-known brands, regardless of the presence or absence of an official representative on the Russian market.”

Russia, like the EU, had traditionally adopted a tougher stance than the United States on parallel imports. Now, however, “both by ‘anti-crisis’ measures and by cloak-and-dagger methods” Russia is sure to do all it can to keep its planes flying and its factories running, said Peter B. Maggs, research professor of law at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and noted expert on Russian and Soviet law and intellectual property.’

The increase in parallel imports makes trademark prosecution and maintenance more important than ever in Russia, but it’s not the only cause for concern. In March, as political tensions reached a crescendo, a Russian court declined to enforce the trademark rights for Peppa Pig, the famous British cartoon character, due to “unfriendly actions of the United States of America and affiliated foreign countries.” (See case No. A28- 11930/2021 in the Arbitration Court of the Kirov Region; an appeals court later overturned this holding, in a win for the porcine star.) RBC Group reported in March that it had tracked more than 50 trademark applications by Russian entrepreneurs and businesses for the marks of famous foreign brands, many in the fashion and tech sector. While most trademark applications were explicit copies of existing brands, in other cases applicants were content to imitate well-known trademarks and trade dress.

For example, a Russian entrepreneur from a design studio called Luxorta applied to register an IDEA brand that mimics the style and yellow-and-blue color schemes of famous Swedish brand IKEA. He told RBC that his business had suffered after IKEA suspended its Russian operations, and that he aspired to develop his own line of furniture and work with IKEA’s former suppliers. Other applicants RBC interviewed indicated they hoped to sell the marks back to foreign companies once those companies return.

On April 1, Rospatent published a press statement clarifying that “in case an identical or similar trademark has already been registered in the Russian Federation, it would be the ground for refusal in such registration.” More recently, the head of Rospatent, Yury Zubov, has responded with frustration to news coverage of trademark woes in Russia, noting that intellectual property legislation is unchanged and the “Uncle Vanya” hamburger mark had been withdrawn.

Prof. Maggs agreed that those trying to register or use close copies of foreign marks in Russia will likely fail. He cited a June 2 decision by the Court of Intellectual Property Rights to uphold lower court findings that the mark “FANT” for a carbonated orange soft drink violated unfair competition laws, because it was confusingly similar to the “FANTA” brand owned and licensed to third parties by Coca-Cola HBC Limited Liability Company. Russia’s consumer protection agency had originally brought the case.

The Court reasoned that “confusion in relation to two products can lead not only to a reduction in sales of the FANTA drink and a redistribution of consumer demand, but can also harm the business reputation of a third party, since the consumer, having been misled by the confusion between the two products, in the end receives a different product with different quality, taste and other characteristics.”

In addition, Prof. Maggs said, “the Putin Regime is and will be promoting Russian products as ‘just as good’ as foreign products. An example, obviously approved at high levels is the adoption of a totally different trademark for the sold McDonald’s chain,” he said, referring to the June 12 reopening of former McDonald’s restaurants in Moscow under the name “Vkusno & tochka” (“Tasty and that’s it”).

Brands should be wary of inadvertently jeopardizing their Russian marks by suspending local operations; a trademark may be cancelled in Russia after three years of uninterrupted non-use. While Article 1486 of the Russian Civil Code states that “evidence presented by the rightholder of the fact that the trademark was not used due to circumstances beyond his control [emphasis added] may be taken into account,” brands claiming infringement still risk being ineligible for damages or injunctive relief, because technically they are not losing sales while pausing business in Russia.

Moreover, if a company has suspended sales in Russia to show solidarity with Ukraine but seeks to stop sales in Russia by others, it may be accused of violating the good faith requirement of Article 10 of the Russian Civil Code, which states that exercising “rights for the purpose of limiting competition and also abuse of a dominant position in a market are not allowed.”

Russia remains a party to numerous intellectual property treaties, including the Paris Convention, the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the Hague Agreement. But as the Peppa Pig case illustrates, court decisions on intellectual property are not immune to political heat.

The question looming on the horizon is whether, if the current crisis escalates, the Russian government would outright cancel trademarks from hostile countries. It would not be the first time a state denied intellectual property rights during political conflicts. In the aftermath of the First World War, for example, the US government advocated for the “expropriation” of property, including intellectual property, of German nationals, perceived as responsible for the militarism of their government1. And in the 1930s, the German patent office removed Jewish patent-holders from its roster as part of its notorious “Aryanization” process. However, because Russia is not officially at war with the countries it has deemed “unfriendly,” these precedents are not directly on point.

Brands that have suspended business operations in Russia should monitor their trademark portfolios closely for infringement and consider how they can prove use of each mark during a prolonged absence from the Russian market. In other words: keep your eyes on Uncle Vanya.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Caglioti DL. Property Rights in Time of War: Sequestration and Liquidation of Enemy Aliens’ Assets in Western Europe during the First World War. Journal of Modern European History. 2014;12(4):523-545. doi:10.17104/1611-8944_2014_4_523.

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While multi-national sanctions recently imposed on Russia were intended to punish Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, the effects of the sanctions have led to a need for tough decisions for U.S. entities with patent interests in Russia.  The prohibitions on financial exchanges with certain Russian banks will essentially prevent any payment of fees to Rospatent (the Russian patent office), and although a general license from the Department of the Treasury provides a short window for winding down certain administrative transactions, U.S. entities engaged in patent transactions with Rospatent only have a short time to make decisions about current and future patent activities in Russia.

Prohibited Activities

On February 28, 2022, the Department of the Treasury initiated prohibitions related to transactions involving certain financial institutions in Russia, including the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.¹ The directive specifically prohibits a United States person (unless otherwise excepted or licensed) from engaging in any transaction involving the listed financial institutions, including any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction for or on behalf of such entities.  Under the directive, the prohibitions are specifically worded to include: (1) any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions of the directive; and (2) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions of the directive.

Notably, the prohibited activities do not expressly prevent any transactions of a U.S. person with Rospatent.  And although the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has cut off direct engagement with Rospatent for carrying out activities such as use of the Global Patent Prosecution Highway (GPPH) program², Rospatent is not currently a sanctioned entity under the directive.  This, however, is essentially a distinction without a difference.  Moreover, since the USPTO (and also the European Patent Office) has already cut ties with Rospatent, there still remains the possibility that Rospatent itself will be added to the sanctions at a future date and thus completely eliminate any pursuits by U.S. persons with Rospatent.

The current sanctions directly affect entities seeking patent protection in Russia since payments of required fees related to patent applications and granted patents in Russia are processed through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.  This includes a number of financial transactions, such as payment of government filings fees for directly filing a patent application in Russia or filing a national phase of an international PCT application in Russia, as well as incidental fees incurred during prosecution of pending Russian patent applications and payment of yearly maintenance fees for issued Russian patents.  This would also include payment of yearly maintenance fees for patents obtained through the Eurasian Patent Organization (EAPO) and maintained in Russia since such fees paid to the EAPO must be forwarded to Rospatent.  Because of the intertwining of Rospatent with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, any fees paid to Rospatent must be considered equivalent to making a transaction through said bank.

Patent prosecution in Rospatent requires engagement with a Russian patent practitioner.  While U.S. entities pursuing patent interests in Russia are unlikely to directly engage Rospatent and pay fees that are ultimately processed through the prohibited bank, it is clear from the directive that strategies, such as routing payments through countries that are neutral in relation to sanctions, are prohibited.  As noted above, the directive prohibits any transaction that actually “evades or avoids” the other prohibitions of the directive, as wells as any transaction that “has the purpose of evading or avoiding” the other prohibitions.  This language appears to have the potential to ensnare purposeful non-adherence as well as actions that unwittingly end in non-adherence (e.g., forgetting to discontinue an automated payment of a patent maintenance fee to Rospatent).

Deadline for Administrative Transactions

U.S. entities still have time to complete administrative transactions with Rospatent despite the February implementation of the directive.  On March 2, 2022, the Department of the Treasury issued a general license authorizing certain transactions that are otherwise prohibited by the directive.³  The license authorizes U.S. persons to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations or certifications to the extent such transactions are prohibited under the directive, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons’ day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation.  For at least U.S. entities whose day-to-day operations include securing and maintaining intellectual property, including in Russia, this license provides a window to complete activities and avoid violation of the directive.  Currently, the transaction window provided under the license runs through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on June 24, 2022.

Forming a Russian Patent Strategy

The incursion of Russia into Ukraine has been underway for shortly more than one month, but there is no way to know when hostilities may cease.  Moreover, even when peace is achieved, it is impossible to know how long the current sanctions against Russia may continue.  Those familiar with patent law know that the business of obtaining patents is a deadline-driven venture, and uncertainty of time quickly breaks apart the paradigm.  A “wait and see” approach thus has the potential to result in a loss of patent rights as well as possible liability for knowingly or unknowingly engaging in activities that are prohibited under the directive.  Anyone engaged in patent activities in Russia thus would be advised to undertake a portfolio review and utilize the time remaining under the General License to form a plan that ensures compliance with the current sanctions.  This can include at least the following items.

Anyone engaged in patent activities in Russia thus would be advised to undertake a portfolio review and utilize the time remaining under the General License to form a plan that ensures compliance with the current sanctions.

• Proceeding with Grant of Presently Allowed Applications – For Applicants that have received a Notice of Allowance with a due date after expiration of the General License, one may consider early payment of the fees.  This should only be done, however, to the extent that it is possible to confirm that payment will be processed through Rospatent and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation prior to the expiration of the General License on June 24, 2022.
• Annuities on Granted Patents – Any patent annuity paid to Rospatent after the General License expires should be assumed to be in violation of the current sanctions.  Patent holders that engage a patent annuity service should contact their provider to confirm that they have a plan in place for compliance with the sanctions.  Some annuity services have, in fact, already announced that they will no longer make payments to the Rospatent until further notice.  Presumably, for Russian patents with annuities due in 2022, early payment could be made in the hope that normalcy will ensure prior to the deadline in 2023, but such action should only be taken to the extent one can ensure that payment is processed through Rospatent and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation before the deadline.  Even then, it may be advisable to consider whether “early” payment of patent annuities would be considered to be “ordinarily incident” to day-to-day operations of a person’s patent pursuits.  In the alternative, a patent owner should confirm that any Russian patents are under a “do not pay” order with their annuity provider to avoid an unintentional, automated payment in violation of the sanctions.
• Filing a Direct or National Phase Patent Application – If a new patent application in Russia is planned, or if the deadline for national phase entry of a PCT application is approaching, one may consider early filing prior to the expiration of the General License.  This could be done in the hope that a deadline for payment of future fees to Rospatent do not arise before the time that sanctions are lifted.  This is seen to be a risky proposition since it is unknown how quickly Rospatent processes paid fees through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, and it is likewise unknown to what extent a fee paid to Rospatent before expiration of the General License but only processed through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation after expiration would be viewed as being in violation of the sanctions.  Moreover, if Rospatent itself is later added to the sanctions, any early filings would be at significant risk for abandonment due to an inability to continue transactions with Rospatent.
• Filing Through EAPO as an Alternative to Russia – Russia is one of several countries where patent protection can be secured based on a granted patent from the EAPO.  As of this writing, the banks utilized for processing financial transactions for the EAPO (AO UniCredit Bank and AO Raiffeisenbank) are not included in the U.S. sanctions.  As such, direct filing or national stage entry with the EAPO can provide an alternate pathway for patent protection in Russia.  The cessation of interaction between the USPTO and the EAPO would not have a bearing on this option, but care would need to be taken to ensure that all documents otherwise transferrable directly between the offices are handled by other routes.  Once a patent is granted by the EAPO and Russia is elected as a country for maintenance of the patent, annuities paid to the EAPO are forwarded to Rospatent.  As such, this alternative pathway is only effective for patents where annuities in Russia would not become due until after lifting of sanctions.  As the average length of time for completion of patent prosecution with the EAPO is generally two or more years, one would hope that the current situation in Russia would be resolved within that timeframe.  Again, however, uncertainty remains.
• Using Russia as an International Search Authority – Rospatent is one of the limited number of patent offices available for use as the ISA in a PCT application, and Rospatent may be preferred because of the relatively low cost relative to other ISA options.  Search fees paid to the World Intellectual Proper Organization (WIPO) are forwarded to Rospatent when chosen as the ISA, and it is not possible to ensure that such fees paid to WIPO will be forwarded to Rospatent, and then to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation before the expiration of the General License deadline.  As such, it is recommended to not use Rospatent as the ISA in any PCT application from now until sanctions are lifted.
• Enforcement of Granted Russian Patents – A comprehensive patent strategy in Russia must now also consider the relative value of any Russian patents in light of the recent decree on patent enforceability in Russia.⁴   Therein, any holder of a Russian Patent from a so-called “unfriendly” foreign state is required to give a mandatory license with no compensation to anyone in Russia wishing to exercise the right of use without consent of the patent owner.  As with the entire situation, uncertainty reigns with this decree, and it is impossible to know when (if ever) rights of Russian patent holders from “unfriendly” states will be returned.  Accordingly, a Russian patent strategy must consider not only options for proceeding in the near term to secure rights to the extent possible but must also consider the reality that any “rights” that are secured with a Russian patent are of no effect and will be for the foreseeable future.

Next Steps

For anyone with significant patent interests in Russia, time is of the essence for cementing a strategy for moving forward.  For some, the most expeditious approach could be to simply close your file on any Russian patents and patent applications.  If such approach is taken, careful attention must be made, as noted above, to ensure that any possibility of a fee being paid to Rospatent after June 24, 2022, is eliminated.  For others, investments in Russia may not allow for a complete abandonment of possible future patent enforcement rights in Russia.  If actions as noted above are taken to “batten down the hatches” of the Russian patent portfolio prior to the deadline in order to weather this storm, timing is again crucial in order to avoid unintentional engagement in sanctioned activities.  Also, moving to patent filings through the EAPO as a starting point for Russia can be an effective workaround so long as Russian sanctions get lifted before any patent annuities through an EAPO patent would become due in Russia.  Finally, in forming a strategy, one also must consider that even before its recent decree on patent enforceability, Russia was already one of nine countries on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) “Special 301 Report”  of trading partners presenting the most significant concerns regarding insufficient IP protection or enforcement or actions that otherwise limited market access for persons relying on intellectual property protection.

¹  Directive 4 Under Executive Order 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” February 28, 2022, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury.  See, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/eo14024_directive_4_02282022….
²  USPTO Statement on Engagement with Russia, the Eurasian Patent Organization, and Belarus, March 22, 2022.  See, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-statement-engagement-r….
³  General License No. 13, “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 Under Executive Order 14024, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, March 2, 2022.  See, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl13.pdf. 
⁴  Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 06.03.2022 No. 299 “On Amendments to Clause 2 of the Methodology for Determining the Amount of Compensation Paid to a Patent Owner When Deciding to Use an Invention, Utility Model or Industrial Design without His Consent, and the Procedure for its Payment.” See, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070005?index=0&r…

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The United States has joined many European countries that are opening their doors and offering humanitarian assistance to fleeing Ukrainians.

Ireland, Great Britain and Canada have all started private sponsorship programs for Ukrainians. That assistance is not necessarily a one-way street. Easing the way for incoming Ukrainians may help those nations deal with their own labor shortages.

Ukraine is known for its skilled workforce, including tech engineers, and some companies in Europe are specifically targeting jobs for Ukrainians, offering everything from language training to child care to attract the refugees. Even temporary employment agencies are involved and new companies are being founded for the purpose of matching Ukrainians to jobs across Europe – jobs that run the gamut from highly skilled tech work, to healthcare aids, to retail and hospitality positions.

U.S. employers are generously offering humanitarian aid and donations to help Ukrainian refugees, but now those employers may be able to offer jobs to displaced Ukrainians seeking refuge. The Biden Administration will open various legal pathways that could include the refugee admissions program (which can lead to permanent residence through asylum, but is a long process), visas, and humanitarian parole (a temporary solution). The focus will be on Ukrainians with family in the United States or others considered to be particularly vulnerable. Approximately 1,000,000 people of Ukrainian descent currently live in the United States.

The administration originally believed that most Ukrainians did not want to flee to the United States because it was too far away from other family members who have remained in Ukraine. Secretary of State Antony Blinken had stated that the priority was to help European countries who are the dealing with huge waves for migration instead. But advocates have been arguing that the administration could create special status for Ukrainians to allow them to enter the U.S. or stay with family members.

In early March, the Biden Administration established Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Ukrainians who have been in the United States continuously since March 1, 2022, but that did not help those who are still abroad. Visitor visas are hard to come by because applicants for visitor visas need to be able to show that their stay will be temporary and that they have a home to return to in Ukraine, and such temporary nonimmigrant visas may not meet that criterion or be practical in most of these situations. Moreover, consulates abroad are already overwhelmed and understaffed due to COVID-19.

While small numbers of Ukrainians have made it to the United States by finding private or family sponsors, this new policy should at least open the doors to some Ukrainians and likely make it possible for U.S. companies to hire some of the incoming refugees. They will need and want employment, but they will also need support.

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On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered ground troops into the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Invading under the guise of establishing independence for the region on February 24, Russia started bombing key points of interest around the country, including the capital city of Kyiv. At the time of writing, the skirmishes remain ongoing, with Russia expanding its invasion force as the days go on.

The ramifications of Russia’s war are widespread. In Ukraine, infrastructural damage is considerable, an estimated 2 million civilians are evacuating or have been driven from their homes. The death toll remains uncertain at this time, but the Ukrainian health ministry estimates that hundreds of citizens have been killed as a result of the violence. Globally, financial markets are in a state of rapid flux, seeing huge rises in inflation, a strained supply chain and plummeting stock prices.

Law firms in the United States and abroad have responded to the conflict by offering pro bono services in anticipation of resultant legal complications and organized means by which money can be donated to Ukrainian humanitarian efforts.

How Have Law Firms Responded to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?

In some instances, firms have also closed offices in Ukraine to protect workers, and severed ties with Russian businesses. Law firms that have closed offices in Ukraine include Dentons, CMS and Baker McKenzie, which have closed offices in Kyiv.

“Dentons has established a taskforce to monitor and manage the crisis situation, with a primary focus on protecting our people,”  Tomasz Dąbrowski, CEO of Dentons Europe, told the National Law Review. “We are in regular contact with our team in Kyiv and are providing our colleagues and their families with any possible assistance, including transport, relocation and accommodation assistance in the neighboring countries. Furthermore, we have seen a wave of kindness and generosity from our people across Europe, who have volunteered to provide accommodation in their homes for Ukrainian colleagues.  Furthermore, in addition to the financial support our Firm is providing to our Ukrainian colleagues, we have also received financial donations from around the world to help them resettle.”

Many law firms have announced they are closing offices in Russia, including Squire Patton Boggs, Latham & Watkins Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld and Morgan Lewis & Bockius, among others. Norton Rose Fulbright announced March 7 that they are winding down their operations in Russia and will be closing their Moscow office as soon as they can, calling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “increasingly brutal.”

“The wellbeing of our staff in the region is a priority. We thank our 50 colleagues in Moscow for their loyal service and will support them through this transition.”

Norton Rose Fulbright said they “stand unequivocally with the people of Ukraine,” and are taking steps to respond to the invasion.

“Some immediate actions are possible and we are taking them. We are not accepting any further instructions from businesses, entities or individuals connected with the current Russian regime, irrespective of whether they are sanctioned or not. In addition, we continue to review exiting from existing work for them where our professional obligations as lawyers allow. Where we cannot exit from current matters, we will donate the profits from that work to appropriate humanitarian and charitable causes,” the statement read. “We are working with our charitable partners in every region to raise funds to help the people of Ukraine, as well as providing pro bono support to those Ukrainians and others who are being forced to relocate.”

Law firms have also stepped forward to offer pro bono assistance to those affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Law Firms Offering Pro Bono Assistance to Ukraine

Akin Gump Partner and Pro Bono Practice leader Steven Schulman explained how the legal industry is collaborating and working to provide assistance:

“So what we often do in these crises, we will self organize, [and] say who’s a point person who knows what’s going on, and then we will share information so that again, we’re lightening the load on the legal aid organizations.”

Another law firm offering assistance to Ukraine is  Covington & Burling, which the country hired to help pursue its claim against  Russia at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Specifically, Ukraine asked the court to order Russia to halt its invasion. Covington filed a claim on behalf of Ukraine to the ICJ.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are providing emergency aid in Ukraine, as well as in neighboring countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania to help people displaced by the war as they come across the border, Mr.Dąbrowski said. These organizations are providing food, water, hygiene supplies and other necessities, and urgent psychological counseling. Specific NGOs on the ground in Ukraine include Mercy Corps, Fight for Right, Project HOPE, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, and  Fundacja Ocalenie, among others.

However, NGOs need cash donations in order to keep providing aid. Mr.Dąbrowski detailed what pro bono work Dentons is doing, and how the firm is supporting NGOs:

“Our Positive Impact team is in touch with numerous NGOs and lawyers from our firm to identify opportunities for pro bono legal advice, mainly in the countries which share a border with Ukraine.  We are already working with NGOs in Poland and Hungary which are helping Ukrainian refugees displaced by the war. We are assisting with issues related to employment law, contracts, establishment of charitable foundations, etc… We are also in discussions with an international relief agency which is looking to set up operations within Ukraine.

While men between the ages of 18 and 60 are currently prohibited from leaving Ukraine, as of March 10, 2022, the conflict has created one of the largest refugee crises within the last few decades.

“We have activated our registered charitable foundation to collect donations from our people around the world to support Ukrainian families – and particularly children –  displaced by the war, including some of our own people from Kyiv.  So far, our colleagues from around the world have donated or pledged close to €300,000,” Mr.Dąbrowski said. “We have already distributed €60,000 of that to eight NGOs in Poland, Hungary and Romania, which are providing emergency aid, food and water, hygiene supplies, transportation, medical and psychological care, shelter and schooling to Ukrainian civilians fleeing from the war”

Concerns with immigration and refugee asylum is the next expected complication. In the short-term, the Department of Homeland Security is prioritizing Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for those already in the U.S.

For the public, there are a number of actions to take to support Ukrainians. However, those wishing to help should make sure to do their research before making any donations in order to ensure the funds end up in the right hands.

How Can Members of the Public Help Ukraine?

Possible scam organizations and outreach programs are common during international crises, so it’s important to know the signs of fraudulent charities. Some best practices for providing support include:

• Giving directly to an organization rather than through shared donation links on social media

• Being wary of crowdfunding efforts

• Doing a background check on an organization and its donation claims using Charity Watch, Give.org, and Charity Navigator.

Some examples of charitable organizations focused on Ukraine relief include:

• Doctors Without Borders

• UNICEF USA

• Global Empowerment Mission (GEM)

• AmeriCares

• Hope for Ukraine

• Additional Information

Informational resources for those affected are provided below:

• UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)

• U.S. Embassy in Ukraine

• U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

Conclusion

Law firms and the public alike have stepped up to offer assistance and financial help to those most affected by the Russian invasion. Law firms cutting ties with Russian businesses and closing offices in Russia shows that the legal industry is standing behind Ukraine as the conflict continues to escalate.

In upcoming coverage, the National Law Review will be writing about how law firms are helping clients handle Russian sanctions, as well as the immigration implications of refugees displaced by the war in Ukraine.

*The quotes and input of interviewees reflect the latest information on the Russian invasion of Ukraine as of March 7, 2022. Readers can find the latest legal news from around the world on The National Law Review’s Global Law page.*

The post Law Firms Respond to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: How the Legal Industry & the Public Can Help appeared first on The National Law Forum.

Last Friday, Commissioner Clothilde V. Hewlett issued guidance concerning the “situation in Ukraine and Russia”.   The guidance reminds licensees of their obligations under federal, and to a lesser extent, California law.  The guidance mentions three areas of concern: sanctions, virtual currency and cybersecurity.  I was somewhat taken aback by the guidance reference to the “situation”, but in several places, the guidance refers to the “Russian invasion”.

With respect to virtual currency, Commissioner Hewlett notes that the Russian invasion “significantly increases the risk that listed individuals and entities may use virtual currency transfers to evade sanctions”.   She advises that all licensees engaging in financial services using virtual currencies should have policies, procedures, and processes to protect against the unique risks that virtual currencies present.

When Russia Came To California

In may come as a surprise that Russia once had plans to expand into California and even occupied a fort here for nearly three decades.  Fort Ross, now a California state park, is situated on the California coast about 60 miles north of San Francisco.  It was established in 1812 and represents Tsarist Russia’s southernmost settlement on the North American continent.  The name of the fort is derived from the word “Russia”, which is derived from the name of a medieval people known as the Rus.

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As the impeachment proceedings heat-up, and calls for the Ukraine whistleblower to be identified increase, there remains a fundamental question:  Who has the legal responsibility to protect this whistleblower?  The answer will surprise you!

There are very few laws mandating what the President, as part of his required and mandatory job duties, must perform.   Guaranteeing that employees who make protected disclosures under the  Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (“ICWPA”) are fully protected is one of them.  The Ukraine whistleblower is a a federal employee covered under the ICWPA.  He or she made a protected disclosure under the ICWPA.  Thus, it is up to President Trump to fully and completely protect this individual.  Here’s why:  The ICWPA directs that “[t]he President shall provide for the enforcement of the [Act].” It is as clear and simple as that.  The President “shall” “enforce” the whistleblower law that makes it illegal to retaliate against intelligence community whistleblowers.

Every intelligence community whistleblower, whether they be a Democrat, Republican or Independent, is entitled to the same protection from the President.  In the case of the Ukraine whistleblower, the law does not permit the political implications of the whistleblower’s disclosure to have any impact on the mandatory duty of President Trump to fully “enforce” that whistleblower’s right to be free from any retaliation.  The President is required to put his biases or self-interest aside and defend the right of intelligence community whistleblowers to report abuses of authority.  This includes wherever those abuses are committed, including the Oval Office. Under the ICWPA the buck stops with President Trump, impeached or not.

Unlike other whistleblower laws which give the federal courts or independent agencies, like the Merit Systems Protection Board or the Department of Labor, the authority to protect whistleblowers, the ICWPA places that solemn duty directly on the shoulders of the President.  It is the unique legal responsibility of the President.  The President must ensure that the identity of the intelligence community whistleblowers who file  complaints with the Inspector General pursuant to the Inspector General Act, are fully protected.  It is the President who must ensure that every person within the executive branch of government protect the job security of ICWPA whistleblowers.  It is the obligation of the President to punish those who fail to do so.

The ICWPA anti-retaliation law is not limited simply to preventing whistleblowers from being fired.  The law defines the types of “adverse action” the President must shield whistleblowers from, including  “any change in working conditions.”   In the case of the Ukrainian “quid pro quo” whistleblower, the catastrophic impact on the whistleblower’s ability to perform his or her job duties that would be triggered by violating his right to confidentiality is obvious.  This would include undermining his or her ability to work oversees, be promoted to a covert agent (if not one already), or effectively interact with employees in the White House.

Furthermore, breaching the confidentiality of whistleblowers is well established as an “adverse action” under whistleblower law.  Federal courts and administrative agencies as divergent as the SEC and Department of Labor have ruled that revealing the name of a whistleblower is an adverse action.  Anyone with experience working with whistleblowers knows that once their identity is revealed, their working conditions will never be the same, and they will have a target on their back for the rest of their careers.

The procedures applicable to the Ukraine whistleblower actually informed the whistleblower, in writing, that he or she could file a confidential complaint to the Inspector General.   The actual form submitted guaranteed this right.  Once the complaint was filed and accepted by the Inspector General, the whistleblower protections afforded under the ICWPA kicked in.  As a matter of law, it became President Trump’s obligation to “enforce” the ICWPA and ensure that the Ukraine whistleblower suffer no retaliation. It became the President’s non-discretionary duty to ensure the whistleblower suffered no harm.   This may be hard to believe, but the law is the law.

Given the highly public attacks on the whistleblower emanating from the White House it is now incumbent upon President Trump to instruct all employees within the federal government to comply with the ICWPA.  He must take steps to have his Congressional supporters, “stand down” and stop their continued drum beat to “out” the whistleblower.  Regardless of where you stand on impeachment, the President must enforce the requirements of the ICWPA and protect the whistleblower.

When Donald Trump signed onto the job of President, protecting intelligence community whistleblowers became one of his few mandatory job duties.  Like other employees who work for the taxpayers, he many not like all of his required jobs.  Like other employees he may find some parts of his job difficult or distasteful.  But he has no discretion in this matter.  It is a requirement.  He must ensure that the whistleblower is not retaliated against, that the whistleblower’s identity remains confidential, and that the whistleblower can continue in his or her career, free from stigma.    He must hold those who retaliate accountable.  That is part of the job he wanted.  That is the job he must perform.

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An initiative to spur investment in this underdeveloped region.

Amid the ongoing loud noise surrounding the situation in Ukraine (and in Syria) and the related sanctions and counter-sanctions, a new Russian development initiative seems to have slipped under the radar. But it is worthy of note—particularly for potential investors in Russia’s Far East. This has all the more potential importance in the context of Russia’s recent pronounced political and economic pivot toward Asia. The Law on Advanced Development Territories (the ADT Law, or the Law), enacted in December 2014 and entered into force in spring 2015 (and the related simultaneously adopted acts that make corresponding amendments to the Tax Code and some 20 other laws) set out the “rules of the road” for these ADTs.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and other top officials at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September spotlighted this ADT program prominently. A number of new projects were announced at that forum or earlier, and most recently at an international forum in Harbin, China.

In a separate related development, in July, a so-called “Free Port of Vladivostok” was established within Vladivostok city and a few neighboring municipalities – which provides benefits and incentives to investors similar to the ADT Law, and with an enhanced exemption regime for customs clearance and immigration. The fiscal benefits of the Vladivostok free port come into force in January 2016, but a major Korean conglomerate is reported to be eyeing this opportunity.

Background

The ADT regime is somewhat similar to Russia’s existing Special Economic Zones (SEZ), which came into being under the 2005 Law on SEZs and some earlier regulations. These programs have had only mixed success. But the central focus of the new ADT regime is different: while SEZs have been aimed primarily at spearheading various industries (such as innovative technologies, ports, or recreational complexes), the ADTs are to address the general unevenness in development across Russia’s vast territory by incentivizing investment in more depressed areas—starting with the underpopulated and relatively neglected Far East.

As initially drafted, the ADT Law was to be confined to the Far Eastern Federal District alone. This geographical limit no longer applies so generally under the Law as enacted. But for the first three years, under special transitional provisions, it will apply only in the Far East and in certain sole-core-employer cities “where the social and economic situation is particularly drastic.”

The Law further directs the government to appoint a special authorized body (AB) charged with various ADT supervisory and planning functions. So far only the new Ministry of Eastern Development (established in 2012) has been appointed as such an AB—for the Far Eastern Federal District. For all practical purposes the Law will apply essentially in the Far East, at least initially. The Ministry has already adopted various implementing regulations envisaged under the Law. Further, Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev, who is also the president’s plenipotentiary in the Far Eastern Federal District, has pledged strong support for the ADT program alongside other measures for development of Russia’s Far East.

As of September, the government has already approved the establishment of nine ADTs, including Komsomolsk (in the Khabarovsky Krai), Khabarovsk (covering several districts within Khabarovsk City and elsewhere), Nadezhdinskaya (in the Primorsky Krai), and some others in Kamchatka, Yakutia, and Amurskaya Oblast. The first specific ADT projects announced at the Vladivostok Forum and on other occasions (taking into account the most recent Harbin EXPO) include the following:

• Construction of a bitumen plant by a Chinese-owned Singapore company together with Russia’s Independent Petroleum Co. (NNK) in the Khabarovsk ADT
• An Australian coal company’s proposed investment into the transport infrastructure of the Beringovsky ADT in Chukotka
• Recreational infrastructure facilities (including a golf club) to be financed and constructed by a Japanese company in Vladivostok
• A proposed major agricultural enterprise investment by Russian interests at Mikhailovsky ADT in Primorsky Krai (the precise location is not yet identified)
• German investors’ readiness to provide some 20 billion rubles to the Kamchatka ADT
• A planned 50 billion rubles investment for infrastructure development in the Primorsky ADT
• A coal-loading terminal to be constructed by Sakhatrans in Khabarovsky Krai (estimated investment of 30 billion rubles)
• A truck-building plant (and dealership and service centers) project to be undertaken together by Chinese Sinotruk and the Far-Eastern Road and Construction Company in the Komsomolsk ADT

Government Decree

Under the Law, an ADT is created by a government decree for a term of 70 years. Such decrees are based on a proposal by the Authorized Body. This proposal, in turn, is supposed to be based on preliminary agreements with one or more prospective investors into the planned ADT. A special federal government commission will also play a role in ADT selection and formation.

The relevant government decree will set out the main ADT parameters, including its territorial limits (no overlap with an SEZ is allowed), types of commercial activities eligible for benefits to ADT residents (in contrast to SEZs, there are no economic sector limits for such activities are established in the Law), minimum investment and technology requirements, and a few other aspects. These decrees presumably will take into account the preliminary agreements with prospective investors mentioned above.

Tripartite Agreement

After the base government decree is adopted, the AB (again, for practical purposes, this is the Ministry of Eastern Development for now) and the relevant regional and municipal authorities are to enter into a tri-partite agreement to regulate various obligations and procedures for the ADT in question. This includes the regional and municipal authorities’ obligations on transferring of land plots and facilities into ownership by or lease to the management company (see immediately below on this point) or granting the management company the authority to manage such land plots and facilities, financing and operation of the infrastructure facilities, the conditions for granting property and land tax holidays to ADT residents (see more on tax and other exemptions below), and other aspects.

Management Company

An important player in an ADT’s actual functioning is its management company (MC). Under the Law, an MC is a 100% federally owned joint stock company that is designated as such by the government. An MC will have a broad range of powers, authority, and functions for its ADT(s). For example, an MC will (itself or by delegation to a subsidiary) do the following:

• Act as an infrastructure construction customer (in Russian, zastroischik)
• Ensure or organize the functioning of the ADT infrastructure
• Take ownership or lease of federally or municipally owned land plots, buildings, and various infrastructure facilities (on certain conditions)
• Facilitate connection into the utilities networks for ADT residents and service providers
• Draft proposals for relevant amendments to municipal and other zoning plans
• Organize the construction of roads and installation of infrastructure facilities
• Provide various services to ADT residents

The government has already appointed a joint stock company Korporatiya Razvitiya Dalnego Vostoka (in English, Far East Development Corp.) as such an MC—again, with respect to the whole Far East District.

ADT “Residents”

To become an ADT resident, a commercial company (or individual entrepreneur) needs to file an application with the MC that includes a business plan and proposal for the types of activities to be performed and the level of investments and then enter into an activities performance agreement with the MC reflecting the investment obligations as well as the MC’s obligations. The Ministry of Eastern Development in its capacity as AB has already approved a template of such agreement following the ADT Law guidelines. Per the Law, once an ADT is established and running, there are limits to the grounds for an MC to reject an application and refuse to enter into a contract with a potential resident. The main (and quite general) recognized ground is inconsistency between the applicant’s proposal and the ADT’s particular parameters. It remains to be seen how the activity agreements will be negotiated in practice, as more experience is gathered for substantial new proposed investments.

ADT residents will be incentivized by an array of fiscal and administrative measures, including the following:

• Exemption from or reduction of taxes on corporate profit, mineral extraction, and property and land
• Customs free zone (if approved by the decree enacting the ADT)
• Reduction of Social Security payments
• A system of special protections and guarantees regarding state supervision (only “joint inspections” by various authorities, to be conducted per a schedule approved by the AB, etc.)
• Exemption from foreign employee quota (if approved by the ADT’s supervisory council)
• Reduction of educational and medical care administrative burdens (including admission of foreign-trained doctors and use of best foreign educational methods)

Some of these incentives are fairly similar to those applied to SEZs, including tax and customs holidays and state-inspection limitations.

Conclusion

The new ADT Law appears to open real new investment opportunities, primarily in the Far East. Yet one should be mindful of various restrictions in using this Law’s benefits—including that the potential resident has to be registered within the ADT territory and, if it is a commercial company, it may not have branches or other subdivisions outside of the ADT  (sister companies are permitted). More preconditions apply to the associated tax benefits under the revised Tax Code. Time will tell how effective the ADT Law will be in attracting much-needed new investment to Russia’s Far East.

The post Russia’s New Advanced Development Territories Law: Far East Focus appeared first on The National Law Forum.

Syrian and Iraqi Crises

Secretary of State John Kerry delivered remarks on U.S. Middle East policy last Wednesday at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  The Secretary called on the Russian Government to contribute to the end of the Syrian conflict, including through a political settlement.  He also highlighted areas where the United States, Russia, and others agree, which include the fact that Daesh cannot be victorious and that a secular and united Syria must be preserved.  That same day, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that Russia cannot win in Syria, adding it can perhaps prevent Assad from losing.  Earlier in the week, the press reported that Russia has sent a few dozen special operations troops to Syria, redeploying the elite units from Ukraine as the Kremlin shifts its focus to supporting the Syrian regime.

Secretary Kerry then headed to Vienna, Austria, for another round of multilateral talks regarding the Syrian conflict, talks that will for the first time include Iran. At his Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing to be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, State Department Counselor Tom Shannon testified that Secretary Kerry was convening the meeting in Austria to ascertain Russia’s commitment to fighting ISIL and to finding a political solution to the crisis that does not include Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  This comes after Secretary of Defense Ash Carter signaled last Tuesday that the Administration is considering deploying a small number of special operations forces to Syria and attack helicopters to Iraq to build momentum in the fight against ISIL.

• On Wednesday, 4 November, the House Foreign Affairs Committee is expected to hold a hearing titled, “U.S. Policy after Russia’s Escalation in Syria.”

• On Wednesday, 4 November, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe is expected to hold a hearing titled, “Challenge to Europe: The Growing Refugee Crisis.”

Ukraine Crisis

Last Monday, the White House and State Department issued statements commending Sunday’s elections in Ukraine and calling for votes on 15 November in Mariupol and in other parts of eastern Ukraine where the elections could not take place.

Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker travelled to Ukraine early last week to meet with Government officials and to discuss ongoing economic reforms.  She reiterated U.S. support for Ukraine and announced that President Obama, working with Congress, intends to move forward with a third $1 billion loan guarantee for Ukraine in the coming months.  This, she said, fulfills a U.S. commitment to consider providing a third $1 billion loan guarantee in late 2015, if the conditions warrant.

The press reported last week that NATO is considering proposals to deploy 4,000 troops to Eastern European countries bordering Russia.  The proposals are apparently part of an ongoing debate within the Alliance about the long-term response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its support for the separatist uprising in eastern Ukraine.

• On Tuesday, 3 November, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to hold a hearing titled, “Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Propaganda that Threatens Europe.”

NDAA – Avenues Sought

After the presidential veto, Congressional leaders are looking for options to advance the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; H.R. 1735).   Some sources report that Senate Armed Services Chairman John McCain (R-Arizona) may be considering drafting a revised NDAA that could be attached to an Omnibus appropriations measure that will likely move later next month or early December.  However, some Members are reportedly advocating for a revised NDAA – one that reflects the $5 billion in cuts mandated by the Budget deal – to be passed quickly and not delayed until Congress takes up the expected Omnibus bill.

TPP Update

Last Thursday, Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack sought to explain the delay around publicly releasing the final text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), attributing it to the Canadian election.  Reports around Washington indicate the release of the text is weeks away.  At a Thursday press conference, Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-Connecticut) called on the White House to “stop selling something [TPP deal] that nobody but them knows about.”  Meanwhile, Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) praised the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) last Thursday for issuing new guidelines that allow the Committee Members’ personal staff to access the text of the deal.

Ex-Im Bank Re-Authorization Advances

Early last week, the House of Representatives passed a measure to reauthorize the U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank by a vote of 313-118 over the objections of the chamber’s most conservative Republican members.  Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) blocked the measure from being brought to the floor as a standalone bill last week and instead reiterated the bill will have to be attached to another legislative vehicle expected to advance in the Senate.

Washington Prioritizes TTIP

U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman confirmed last Tuesday at an Atlantic Council event that last month’s conclusion of the TPP deal allows USTR to shift its focus to advancing and accelerating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment (TTIP) negotiations with the European Union.  That same day, SPB released a client alert on Washington’s shift to TTIP.

U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum

Last week, the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum convened in Washington to discuss agriculture, trade in services and goods, promoting investments in manufacturing, and intellectual property.

Other Congressional Hearings This Week

• On Tuesday, 3 November, the Senate Armed Services Committee is expected to hold a hearing titled, “Future of Warfare.”

• On Tuesday, 3 November, the House Energy and Commerce Committee is expected to hold a hearing titled, “Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows.”

• On Tuesday, 3 November, the House Judiciary Committee is expected to hold a hearing titled, “International Data Flows: Promoting Digital Trade in the 21st Century.”

• On Tuesday, 3 November, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces is expected to hold a hearing titled, “Aircraft Carrier – Presence and Surge Limitations. Expanding Power Projection Options.”

• On Wednesday, 4 November, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Global Human Rights is expected to hold a hearing titled, “Demanding Accountability: Evaluating the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report.”

• On Wednesday, 4 November, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to hold a hearing titled, “U.S. Policy in North Africa.”

• On Wednesday, 4 November, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight is expected to hold a hearing titled, “Iran Terror Financing and the Tax Code.”

• On Friday, 6 November, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere is expected to hold a hearing titled, “Deplorable Human Rights Violations in Cuba and Venezuela.”

Looking Ahead

Washington will likely focus on the following upcoming matters:

• 1-7 November: First Lady Michelle Obama travels to Doha, Qatar, and Amman, Jordan

• 9 November: President Obama hosts Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

• 14-22 November: President Obama travels to Turkey, the Philippines, and Malaysia

• 30 November-11 December:  U.N. Global Climate Conference in Paris

• 15-18 December: 10^th WTO Ministerial Conference to be held in Nairobi, Kenya

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