No Going Back – Rejection of Promotion Offer Not a Failure to Mitigate

soccer players.jpgGibbs -v- Leeds United Football Club concerned the former Assistant Manager of the Club who took his £330,000 constructive dismissal claim to the High Court so as to sidestep the compensation ceiling in the Employment Tribunal.

Having fairly easily established the fundamental breach of contract necessary to win his claim against Leeds, Mr Gibbs then faced two more difficult questions about his compensation. First, how do you provide for mitigation where you know the dismissed employee is going to get a bonus from his new employer, and when, but don’t know how much it will be?  Second, is it a failure to mitigate that the employee declines to accept an offer of improved employment terms from the old employer?

On the first point, the Judge reviewed the options of (i) estimating the bonus figure (but thereby certainly being wrong in one party’s favour of the other) or (ii) delaying the compensation award until the bonus amount were known, but thereby racking up interest charges for Leeds and denying Mr Gibbs receipt of his money. Note that part of the relevant bonus was due to be paid by Mr Gibbs’ new employer, Tottenham Hotspur FC, little more than four months after the High Court’s decision, at a time of low prevailing interest rates and when Mr Gibbs was safely in receipt of a salary from Spurs and so had no immediate need for the money. Nonetheless, this was still felt to be hardship enough all round to leave that option on the bench.

The Judge chose instead to order that:

  • the full amount of the £330,000 award should be paid to Mr Gibbs’ solicitors to be held in an interest-bearing account;

  • the parties should then agree how much of that could be released to Mr Gibbs (i.e. leaving at least enough in the account to cover any likely bonus award from Spurs); and

  • the rest would be offset against that bonus, with the bonus amount going back to Leeds and the balance to Mr Gibbs, plus interest in each case.

All very sensible and the fact that this was a High Court case in no way prevents a similar Order (or agreement between the parties) being made by the Employment Tribunal where there is a need to reflect an uncertain future receipt in the amount of a settlement or compensation award.

On the second point, was it a failure by Mr Gibbs to take reasonable steps to mitigate his losses when he rejected Leeds’ post-resignation offer to stay at Elland Road as Head Coach/Manager? The Judge gave this allegation a fairly short shrift – having found the Club guilty of a repudiatory breach of Mr Gibbs’ contract, it could not fix things so easily.  Though the new role would have been more senior and presumably better paid, the damage caused to Mr Gibbs’ credibility among players and staff by the Club’s earlier treatment of him made it reasonable for him to refuse.  He could have taken the chance that Leeds would change its behaviour towards him, but he was not obliged to do so.  Bear in mind also the recent Employment Appeal Tribunal decision in Cooper Contracting -v- Lindsey which stressed just how high is the hurdle of showing a failure to mitigate, and also Buckland –v- Bournemouth University in 2010. There the Court of Appeal decided much against its own better judgment that once the employer was guilty of a repudiatory breach of contract, it could not “mend” that breach by profuse apologies and other appropriate steps afterwards, even if those measures would have undone all or most of the harm caused in the first place.

© Copyright 2016 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
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Financial Services Sector Implications of ‘Brexit

Should Britain decide to leave both the EU and EEA as a result of a “Brexit” vote on 23 June 2016, the impact on UK and EU financial services firms could be significant.

The City of London is Europe’s key financial centre and one of the world’s leading financial centres. As such, asset managers, investment banks, retail banks, broker-dealers, corporate finance firms, and insurers choose the United Kingdom to headquarter their businesses, anchoring themselves in a convenient time zone and location from which to access the European and global markets.

A central plank of the European Union’s vision for a single market in financial services is that financial services firms authorised by their local member state regulators may carry on business in any other member state by establishing a local branch or by providing services on a cross-border basis without the need for separate authorisation in every host state. UK-based regulated asset managers (e.g., long-only, hedge fund, and private equity), banks, broker-dealers, insurers, Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS) funds, UCITS management companies, and investment managers of non-UCITS (known as alternative investment funds or AIFs) have a passporting right to carry on business in any other state in the European Economic Area (EEA) in which they establish a branch or into which they provide cross-border services, without the need for further local registration. Passporting also facilitates the marketing of UCITS and AIFs established in the EEA (EEA AIFs) into other member states.

Members of the EEA (which comprises the 28 EU member states and Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland) are subject to the benefits and burdens of the financial services single market directives and regulations, including passporting rights. One outcome of a vote to leave the European Union in the UK referendum to be held on 23 June 2016, would be that the UK leaves the EU but decides to remain in the EEA (with a similar status to, say, Norway)—in which case the impact of a “Brexit” on the financial sector would likely be minimal. Another outcome would be that the UK finds it unpalatable politically to leave the EU whilst remaining in the EEA and therefore decides to leave both the EU and the EEA; it is this scenario that would have significant impact on both UK and EU financial services firms.

Effect on Passporting for UK Financial Services Firms

According to figures released by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in December 2015, more than 2,000 UK investment firms carrying on Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) business (e.g., portfolio managers, investment advisers, and broker dealers) benefit from an outbound MiFID passport, and nearly 75% of all MiFID outbound passporting by firms across the EEA is undertaken by UK firms into the EEA. Notably, according to the EBA, 2,079 UK firms use the MiFID passport to access markets in other EEA countries, and the next two highest totals in the EBA list are Cyprus (148 firms) followed by Luxembourg (79 firms). EEA-wide, there are around 6,500 investment firms authorised under MiFID. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France are the main jurisdictions for more than 70% of the MiFID investment firm population of the EU; more than 50% are based in the UK.

We consider that these figures suggest that Continental consumers potentially stand to lose more than UK consumers in terms of the cross-border provision of financial services in the event of a Brexit, which could be a driver for the UK being given a special deal to permit access to continue, although this needs to be weighed against the political imperative that the remaining EU countries would likely feel against being seen as being too accommodating to a country leaving the EU.

In the event of a Brexit where the United Kingdom leaves the EEA, unless special arrangements for the UK were to be agreed between the UK and the EU, and subject to the more detailed comments below, UK firms would cease to be eligible for a passport to provide services cross-border into, or establish branches in, the remaining EEA countries (rEEA) and to market UCITS and AIFs across the rEEA. Instead, local licences would be required, and the use of relatively low-cost branches in multiple member states may have to be reassessed. UK-authorised firms no longer able to passport into the rEEA but wishing to do so would need to consider moving sufficient of their main operations to an rEEA jurisdiction in order to qualify for a passport.

Effect on UK Financial Services Regulatory Law

The EU is a major source of UK financial services regulatory law. Recent UK parliamentary research estimates that EU-related law constitutes one-sixth of the UK statute book. That figure does not include the deposit of more than 12,000 EU “regulations” which take direct effect in each member country (including the UK) in contrast to EU “directives” which must be implemented or “transposed” in local law by each country; EU regulations would cease to apply in the UK post-Brexit. In addition, it would be necessary for the UK to renegotiate or reconfirm a series of EU negotiated free-trade deals that would not automatically be inherited by the UK upon Brexit. Post-Brexit, the UK would need to legislate to “renationalise” voluminous laws rooted in the EU and fill any regulatory gaps in UK legislation once the EU treaties ceased to apply.

It would be open to the UK merely to incorporate directly applicable EU regulations into UK law. This might be the easiest course of action, given the volume and breadth of issues which would need to be addressed by the UK government in the event of a vote to leave the EU.

Accordingly, in contrast to the impact that the UK leaving the EEA would have on passporting, the UK regulatory environment for financial services firms may not change dramatically in the event of a Brexit, at least in the short-term. Furthermore, any subsequent changes to the UK regime are more likely than not to be deregulatory in nature and therefore favourable to UK firms. In relation to the AIFMD, to take one example, the UK government would have the option to introduce a more tailored and proportionate regime for fund managers managing AIFs with lower risk profiles.

Pre-Referendum Planning

Planning for a Brexit is difficult without knowing what a post-Brexit landscape would look like (as yet, this is a “known unknown”). However, in the run up to the UK referendum, it seems prudent for UK financial institutions to consider the impact of a Brexit on the terms of any new contracts being entered into and, if relevant, seek to make provision for a Brexit (e.g., by including Brexit in a force majeure provision; providing for termination rights in the event of a Brexit and adapting references to the EEA to continue to cover the UK, if appropriate).

Passporting aside, UK firms will also need to assess the practical issues that would arise in the event of a Brexit. For instance, investment strategies that permit investments in the EEA may need to be amended in order for investments in the UK to continue to be permitted. Similarly, a Brexit may impact the terms of product distribution agreements and other service agreements.

Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)

If the UK were to leave the EEA, then, potentially: UK AIFMs would be treated as non-rEEA AIFMs, marketing by UK AIFMs of AIFs to rEEA investors would have to be undertaken on the basis of member state private placement regimes, and UK AIFMs would no longer be able to manage (from the UK) an AIF established in an rEEA member state without being locally authorised in that member state to do so. Further, UK AIFMs that utilise AIFMD passports for MiFID investment services to provide segregated client portfolio management and/or advisory services on a cross-border basis would cease to be able to use those passports. Conversely, rEEA AIFMs that seek to manage or market AIFs in the UK or provide MiFID investment services to clients in the UK in reliance on AIFMD passports would no longer be able to do so.

However, unlike other single-market directives, the AIFMD provides for its regime to be extended to non-EEA managers, and this offers a potential “third way” should the UK not remain in the EEA. If the UK were to leave its current AIFMD compliant regime in place, it ought to be technically straightforward, following a Brexit, for the AIFMD to be extended to the UK. In this scenario, UK AIFMs could continue to be authorised under the regime and be entitled to use the AIF marketing and management passports (a non-rEEA manager passport). This possibility may influence the UK government to leave the current UK regime unchanged in the event of a vote to leave the EU. However, any such extension of the AIFMD would require a positive opinion from the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and a decision by the EU Commission, so there would be a political dimension to it that would likely introduce uncertainty.

It is important to note, though, that the use by a UK AIFM of a non-rEEA manager passport would be subject to a number of conditions prescribed by the AIFMD that would have material practical implications. In particular,

  • a UK AIFM would need to be authorised by the regulator in its rEEA “member state of reference” (this would be determined in accordance with the AIFMD by reference to where in the rEEA the manager is proposing to manage and/or market funds). This regulator could not be the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), so the use of a non-rEEA manager passport would involve dual regulation and supervision—by the FCA in the UK and by a regulator in an rEEA country in relation to compliance with the directive for funds managed or marketed in rEEA countries (the guidance and approach to application and interpretation of the directive by the regulator and local rules in the member state of reference may well differ from that of the FCA);

  • it would be necessary to establish a legal representative in the member state of reference in order to be the contact point between the manager and rEEA regulators, and the manager and rEEA investors. The legal representative would be required to perform the compliance function relating to funds managed or marketed in rEEA countries; and

  • disputes with rEEA investors in a fund managed/marketed by a manager using a non-rEEA manager passport would need to be “settled in accordance with the law of and subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State”—this would preclude the use of UK courts as a forum for disputes with investors.

UK AIFMs should also note that the AIFMD does not provide for a non-rEEA manager passport to cover the provision of MiFID investment services on a cross-border basis. Accordingly, even if the AIFMD were to be extended to the UK so that UK AIFMs could use a non-rEEA manager passport to manage and/or market AIFs in the rEEA, in the event of the UK not remaining in the EEA, UK AIFMs providing cross-border MiFID investment services within the rEEA (e.g. discretionary management/advisory services for separate account clients) may need to think about where the services are in fact being provided and whether local authorisation would be required to continue the provision of those services. For the provision of MiFID investment services, this would re-establish the position prior to the implementation of the Investment Services Directive (the precursor of MiFID) in the mid-1990s.

Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS)

A UCITS fund must by definition be EEA domiciled, as must its management company. Currently, both UCITS funds and their EEA managers benefit from the passport. UCITS funds are passportable into any other member state for the purposes of being marketed locally to the public and management companies can set up branches and/or provide services cross-border into other member states (e.g., a UK-based management company can provide management services to a UCITS fund based in any other EEA country such as, for example, Ireland or Luxembourg). UK UCITS funds and management companies established pre-Brexit would no longer qualify as UCITS post-Brexit. UK-based UCITS funds would no longer be automatically marketable to the public in the rEEA and would therefore become subject to local private placement regimes. Conversely, a UCITS fund established, say, in Ireland or Luxembourg, would no longer be marketable in the UK to the general public, and a management company based in Ireland or Dublin would no longer be entitled to provide management services to a UK-based UCITS fund.

Accordingly, consideration would need to be given to migrating UK UCITS funds to an rEEA country. Otherwise, UK UCITS funds would become subject to the AIFMD regime instead of the UCITS regime and would be subject to additional restrictions and unavailable to most types of retail investor. UK UCITS management companies would have to migrate to rEEA in order to continue to benefit from the passport.

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)

MiFID gives EEA investment firms authorised in their home EEA country a passport to conduct cross-border business and to establish branches in other EEA countries, free from additional local authorisation requirements. MiFID prohibits member states from imposing any additional requirements in respect of MiFID-scope business on incoming firms that provide cross-border services within their territory, but does allow host territory regulators to regulate passported branches in areas such as conduct of business.

UK-regulated firms that undertake MiFID business would no longer be able to rely on the passport to undertake MiFID business in rEEA and might have to restructure accordingly. Conversely, rEEA firms that seek to undertake MiFID business in the UK would no longer be able to do so and might also have to restructure. However, in contrast to UCITS, that outcome is potentially leavened by the new third-country regime indicated by the recast Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II).

The impact on the provision of cross-border MiFID investment services might be diluted by the regime under MiFID II permitting non-EEA firms to provide investment services to professional clients on a pan-EEA basis upon registration with ESMA, but this would not be an immediate solution, as it would be subject to ESMA making an equivalence determination under MiFID II in relation to the UK, and the timing would be highly uncertain (in particular, MiFID II seems unlikely to come into effect until January 2018, which will be 18 months after the UK referendum). The UK could implement an equivalent regime (in practice, largely by not repealing or amending its EU-generated legislative inheritance and “renationalising” it) to secure its status as an “equivalent” third country with which EEA firms can do business. However, it seems unlikely, given the technical difficulties and delays being experienced generally by ESMA in relation to MiFID II implementation, that an equivalence determination for any non-EEA firms will be high on the agenda until sometime following January 2018.
UK financial institutions would need to consider the regulatory perimeter in each rEEA country in which a financial institution wishes to undertake business. Conversely, rEEA financial institutions would need to consider the UK perimeter to identify what activities by them in the UK would engage a registration requirement locally in the UK.

On the other hand, equivalency considerations aside, the proposals under MiFID II for the unbundling of research and trading fees would fall away in the UK and remain in the rEEA. The unpopular cap on bonuses for systemically important banks and investment firms brought in by the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) would also fall away in the UK but remain in the rEEA. Notably, the EBA has recently indicated that the bonus cap should be imposed on all firms subject to the CRD, which would implicate a huge increase in the number of banks and investment firms subject to the cap. On 29 February, it was announced that FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority had decided to reject that advice on the basis of proportionality. Accordingly, even without a Brexit, the UK is already implementing a policy which should put it at a competitive advantage to other EEA countries that decide to follow the EBA’s guidelines.

Under MiFID, EEA countries must permit investment firms from other EEA countries to access regulated markets, clearing and settlement systems established in their country. Post-Brexit, UK investment firms would no longer be able to rely on those provisions, but nor would rEEA firms looking to access the UK. It is precisely this possibility of “mutually assured destruction”—combined with the UK’s status as Europe’s leading financial centre—that could drive some hard bargaining post-Brexit by both sides towards a constructive outcome in favour of continuing integrated financial markets and services.

The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)

EMIR applies to undertakings established in the EEA (except in the case of AIFs, wherever established, where it is the regulatory status of the manager under AIFMD which is key) that qualify as “financial counterparties” or “non-financial counterparties.” Since, post-Brexit, a UK undertaking would no longer be established in the EEA, under EMIR, UK undertakings that are currently financial counterparties or non-financial counterparties would become third-country entities (TCEs) for EMIR purposes.

Post-Brexit, UK undertakings—along with other TCEs—would not be able to avoid EMIR altogether, as a number of its provisions have extraterritorial effect, including in relation to key requirements such as margin for uncleared trades and mandatory clearing. The trade reporting obligation, however, does not apply to TCEs. The UK government would need to consider whether to introduce similar reporting requirements domestically, particularly given the size and importance of the UK derivatives market. If UK undertakings became TCEs, they would be required to determine whether they would be financial counterparties or non-financial counterparties if they were established in the rEEA, an exercise which would be straightforward.

In any event, UK undertakings subject to the clearing and margin requirements of EMIR pre-Brexit would remain subject to such requirements when entering into derivatives transactions with rEEA firms post-Brexit. Importantly, the exemption from the forthcoming mandatory clearing requirement for UK pension scheme trustees would cease to apply post-Brexit. Accordingly, a UK pension scheme would no longer be able to rely on the EMIR exemption when entering an OTC derivative contract with an rEEA counterparty.

The City of London boasts some of the world’s largest clearing houses, and at least three of them are currently permitted under EMIR to provide clearing services to clearing members and trading venues throughout the EEA in their capacity as ESMA-authorised central counterparties (CCPs). Post-Brexit, however, a UK CCP would become a third-country CCP. Under EMIR, a third-country CCP can only provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in the EEA where that CCP is specifically recognised by ESMA. This would require, among other things, clearing houses operating out of London to apply to ESMA for recognition, the European Commission to pass an implementing act on the equivalence of the UK’s regime to EMIR, and relevant cooperation arrangements to be put in place between the rEEA and the UK—a lengthy process overall. Financial institutions based in rEEA will certainly want to continue to access UK regulated markets and CCPs.

Copyright © 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

The UK Psychoactive Substances Act 2016: An Example of Poor Drafting and Unintended Consequences for Food?

The UK has enacted new legislation to address the issue of so-called ‘legal highs’ following a number of cases of paranoia, seizures, hospitalisation and even death after consumption of certain psychoactive substances.  The Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (the “Act”) was granted Royal Assent on 28 January 2016.  It is expected to come into force on 6 April 2016.  The Act makes it an offence to produce, supply, offer to supply, possess with intent to supply, possess in a custodial institution, import or export psychoactive substances.

A psychoactive substance is defined very broadly to cover “any substance which is capable of producing a psychoactive effect in a person who consumes it”.  A substance produces a psychoactive effect in a person if it affects the person’s mental functioning or emotional state  by stimulating or depressing the person’s central nervous system.  There are a number of specific exemptions, including controlled drugs, medicinal products, alcohol, nicotine and tobacco products, caffeine and food.  However, the definition of food has left a number of questions since it does not align with the legal definition of food set out in EU Regulation 178/2002.  Rather, the Act defines food as:

Any substance which—

            (a) is ordinarily consumed as food, and

            (b) does not contain a prohibited ingredient (emphasis added).

In this paragraph—

  • “food” includes drink;

  • “prohibited ingredient”, in relation to a substance, means any

psychoactive substance—

            (a) which is not naturally occurring in the substance, and

            (b) the use of which in or on food is not authorised by an EU instrument.

The authorities have stated that the Act is not intended to capture foods with a “negligible” psychoactive effect, such as chocolate and nutmeg, but concerns were raised during the legislative debates that the Act could capture inadvertently a much broader range of food substances, including energy drinks and certain botanical ingredients used in foods and dietary supplements.  It is hoped that guidance from the enforcement authorities will make clear exactly which foods and drinks are exempted.

Lucie Klabackova, paralegal, also contributed to this article.

© 2016 Covington & Burling LLP

January 2016 UK Immigration Update

United Kingdom ButtonNew developments include the Migration Advisory Committee announcing its findings regarding Tier 2 of the Points-Based System, a requirement for private landlords to conduct right-to-rent checks, and changes to UK immigration application fees.

MAC Announces Its Findings Regarding Tier 2

The UK Government’s Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) has published its findings on Tier 2 of the Points-Based System. In reviewing Tier 2, the MAC sought to balance the Government’s objective to reduce volumes with its desire to ensure that Tier 2 remains open to the “brightest and best workers who will help Britain succeed”.

The MAC has made the following recommendations to the Government:

  • The best way for the Government to achieve its aim to restrict volumes under Tier 2 and focus on more highly skilled migrants is through salary thresholds, and the minimum salary threshold for Tier 2 should be increased from £20,800 to £30,000

  • The minimum qualifying period for Tier 2 long-term and short-term Intra-Company Transfers should be increased from 12 months to 24 months

  • The cost of Tier 2 recruitment should be raised by introducing an annual Immigration Skills Charge that would be payable by Tier 2 Sponsor Licence holders

  • The use of the Tier 2 (Intra-Company Transfer) route for third-party contracting should be moved into a separate immigration category with a higher salary threshold of £41,500

  • Tier 2 (General) is not restricted only to occupations on an expanded shortage occupation list

  • The Government should not restrict automatic work rights for dependants or an automatic sun-setting of occupations on the shortage occupation list

We are waiting to hear whether the Government will adopt these recommendations in full and how they will apply to Tier 2 migrants in practice. We will release an additional LawFlash once the Government announces the changes to the immigration rules.

Right-to-Rent Checks

Starting 1 February 2016, all private landlords will be required to conduct right-to-rent checks and to request documents that confirm prospective tenants’ right to reside in the UK. Individuals must provide evidence of their right to rent in the UK up to 28 days before their tenancy’s start date.

Where employees move or transfer from overseas and have not yet travelled to the UK, a landlord can elect to enter into a “conditional agreement” in which an individual provides evidence of his or her right to rent after arrival and before occupying a property. Individuals who provide a Biometric Residence Permit as evidence of their right to rent in the UK will need to present the permit to their landlord before they can occupy a property.

The following agreements will be exempt from the right-to-rent checks:

  • Long leases that grant a right of occupation for a term of seven or more years

  • Existing tenants and occupiers who moved in before the requirements were introduced

  • Tenancies renewed between the same parties at the same property without a break, where the start of a tenancy predates the requirements

Changes to UK Immigration Application Fees

The UK Government recently set out proposed changes that will take effect beginning 6 April 2016 to the fees for visas, immigration and nationality applications, and associated premium services, with the aim to make the services self-funded by those who use them over the next four years. The changes include the following:

  • Entry clearance fees for Tier 2 will rise from £564 to £575 for a three-year visa and from £1,128 to £1,151 for a five-year visa

  • In-country further leave to remain will rise from £651 to £664 for a three-year visa and from £1,302 to £1,328 for a five-year visa; the same fees will be charged for each dependant

  • Same-day processing for in-country applications will increase from £400 to £500

  • Fees for indefinite leave to remain (settlement) will rise from £1,500 to £1,875 per applicant—if same-day processing is required, each applicant will now need to pay £2,375

  • Fees for all sponsor licensing applications will stay at the current rates

Fees for all sponsor licensing applications will remain at the current rates.

View a comprehensive table that details of the indicative fees.

Copyright © 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

UK Holiday Pay Inactivity – Inertia or Strategy?

We were in the hallowed legal portals of Farringdon’s Bleeding Heart Restaurant last week for a client dinner on the still vexed issue of holiday pay. “Hallowed legal portals”, because so far as I know, no other restaurant has been cited so frequently in the employment law reports as just the only place to go for a decent spot of covenant-busting and a little post-prandial breach of fiduciary duties.  They also do a very good coffee.

We had to open with an acknowledgement – that despite the absolute nature of my recollection, Peter O’Toole had not said in the film Lawrence of Arabia that “doing nothing was generally best”. Apparently it was Anthony Quayle.  Pressing on despite this setback, our dinner guests considered with the kind contribution of a senior member of the Engineering Employers Federation’s Employment Policy Team whether doing nothing could really remain a sensible holiday pay position at this stage, a full year after the EAT’s decision in Bear Scotland.

Despite the breadth of sectors represented, including retail, financial services, recruitment and advertising, there was a remarkable commonality of view. While it was of course sensible to be providing behind the scenes for some possible accrued holiday pay liability, none of our guest organisations had yet sought any negotiation or reached any agreement with staff representatives (unionised or not) about the inclusion of overtime or commissions in holiday pay calculations.   Despite this inaction, only one of our attendees had had a Tribunal claim on the point.  This is a function perhaps of the relatively limited quantum of most holiday pay claims per individual, a sum which will often be less than the Tribunal fees incurred in making the claim in the first place.

We floated the proposition that an employee’s entitlement to an allowance for commission or overtime in his holiday pay should depend upon his being able to show (at least on a balance of probabilities) that he would have earned that extra money had he not been on leave, i.e. that he had suffered some actual loss. Most of our attendees seemed willing to take that loss as a given based on recent average overtime or commissions rates. Where such extra earnings are pretty regular and pretty consistent, that might well be a sensible approach.  However, the financial services attendee, being from a sector which pays fewer but larger supplementary sums above salary, could see some mileage in this argument.  If such a lumpy payment fell within the reference period for the holiday pay calculation, it could seriously distort the figure and turn it into a number wholly unconnected with what the employee would actually have earned had he not been on leave.  None of the cases or commentaries have yet mentioned this possibility (apart from the most throw-away line in the Acas Guidance http://www.acas.org.uk/holidaypay). Nonetheless, it will surely gain new legs as an idea if and when the Government confronts the reality of drafting legislation to define a “normal pay” formula which works equally well over the myriad different shapes and sizes of supplementary payment arrangements in the UK market.

Might some clarity on this be derived from Mr Cameron’s impending begging session in Europe? His original podium-thumping was about procuring material changes to the Working Time Directive as applicable to the UK, but his formal overture was watered down to a gripe about lessening employer red tape.  The collective view around our table was that the EU will listen politely to Mr C and give him nothing.  The more cynical among our guests (that is to say, all of them) considered that he would then introduce some “clarificatory” amendments to the Working Time Regulations which would make little or no actual impact on employers but could be presented to a puzzled electorate as an indication of the merits of his tough stance in Europe.

I asked our guests at the outset of the dinner what they wanted from it. Almost exclusively it was reassurance that they were not alone or acting foolishly in doing nothing about holiday pay at this stage.  In cases where there are no unions, no pressing reputational issues and no easy means of determining what supplement to holiday pay would be appropriate anyway, it was reassurance which we were happy to give.

© Copyright 2015 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Customs and Border Protection Announces Expansion of Global Entry to UK Citizens

On November 3, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) commissioner announced the expansion of Global Entry to UK citizens. Global Entry, a CBP Trusted Traveler program, allows for expedited clearance of preapproved, low-risk travelers. As an added benefit, Global Entry members are also eligible to participate in the TSA Pre✓ expedited screening program.

The registration process is quite straightforward. UK citizens will apply through the UK Home Office’s website and pay a £42 processing fee. Successful applicants will receive an access code to enter when applying for Global Entry through CBP’s Global Online Enrollment System. The nonrefundable application fee for a five-year Global Entry membership is $100, and applications must be made online. Once an application is approved, a CBP officer will conduct a scheduled interview with the applicant and make a final eligibility determination. Although no traveler is guaranteed expedited screening, this expansion should facilitate travel for low-risk travelers from the UK significantly.

Similarly, US citizens are eligible to apply for the UK’s trusted traveler program, Registered Traveller. Members enrolled in Registered Traveller may use e-gates at airports in the UK. The service costs £70 to apply and an additional £50 a year thereafter. If an application is unsuccessful, the applicant will receive £50 back. To qualify for Registered Traveller, a US citizen must make four trips to the UK per year.

Copyright © 2015 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Lawrence of Arabia Makes Surprise Contribution to UK Holiday Pay Debate

There is a line in, I think, Lawrence of Arabia where a terrified young soldier trapped under fire with a small group of his colleagues asks Peter O’Toole as Lawrence what they  are going to do.  “Nothing”, drawls O’Toole languidly, “After all, it’s generally best”.

And so by a tenuous little link to the question of amending your holiday pay calculations to reflect the new jurisprudence around including an allowance for overtime and/or commission.  Have you been sitting in your office wondering why no one seems able to tell you exactly what you need to do?  Have you been approached for a deal by your union on the basis that everyone else has sorted it out and only your company still has its head over the parapet?

You are not as alone as you may feel.  A survey of over 1,000 companies of a wide variety of sizes, sectors and employee representation structures provides the answers and a number of interesting statistics:-

  • Of all respondents, a full 73% have yet to take any steps to amend their holiday pay calculations. Those union claims may perhaps be taken with a pinch of salt.

  • Of the 27% who have changed their holiday pay arrangements, only a small majority (less than 60%) have unionised workforces.

  • Where changes to holiday pay include use of a reference period, the period invariably picked has been twelve weeks. That is even though that period has yet to be enshrined in law and even though those responses came from sectors as diverse as construction, aviation, retail and banking.  Employee numbers in those businesses ranged from less than 100 to over 45,000.  It therefore appears that for all the uncertainties and injustices both ways which such a reference period can generate (and despite the enormous spread of overtime and commission schemes in use over that population) twelve weeks will likely be the default position for voluntary holiday pay agreements.

  • Where respondents have reached agreements with their workforces about alterations to holiday pay calculations, these have all been forward-looking. None of respondents refer to any accommodation being reached in relation to any notional arrears.

  • The principal factors leading to changes in those 27% of employers were (i) awareness of the case law (i.e. the perceived inevitability of having to do something at some stage) followed by (ii) union/employee pressure (though of the 73% who had made no change, only one admitted to receipt of a Tribunal claim), and (iii) brand/reputational factors.

  • Where changes have been made, half had applied them to the full UK 5.6 week holiday entitlement. About a quarter of respondents had limited the changes to the Working Time Directive four week minimum and a further quarter did not specify which.

  • Of those cases where changes had not been made, nearly 85% of employers had also taken no steps to amend their commission/overtime structures to minimise the scope for employee claims.

So in other words, whether or not it is generally best, doing nothing does seem thus far to be the principal employer response to the holiday pay question.  There are good objective reasons to support such a stance at this point, including in particular the absence of Government guidance, the uncertain direction (in matters of detail, at any rate) of the case law, and the relatively limited number of unions willing to undertake the colossal logistical exercise of collective Tribunal claims.  There is no reason to expect much change in the first two factors in the near future, but whether that last point will remain valid if employer indifference persists at such a high rate is an open question.

© Copyright 2015 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

U.S., U.K. Governments Seek Cyber Innovations from Private Sector

The private sector is likely to produce critical cyber innovations—at least, that is what the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) and the U.K. Centre for Defence Enterprise (“CDE”) would like to see.

In the United States, although the internet may have been invented at DARPA, DARPA is turning to a private sector competition to protect it.  In March 2014, DARPA solicited a “Cyber Security Grand Challenge”: an open competition to devise automated security systems that can defend against cyberattacks as fast as they are launched.  DARPA pitched the Grand Challenge as a “first of its kind,” “capture the flag”-style competition for computer security experts in academia, industry, and the broader security community.  Over 100 teams registered to compete.  Some likely saw the cash prizes—$2 million for first place, $1 million for second, and $750,000 for third—as nominal incentives compared to the value of shaping future cybersecurity efforts.  On July 8, 2015, DARPA announced its selection of seven finalists for the final round of the competition.  The finalists include computer security experts from industry, start-up incubators, and academia.

Not one of DARPA’s Grand Challenge finalists?  Take heart: DARPA is said to be developing technology that would allow spectators to watch the final contest in real time.  Or better yet, look to the United Kingdom, where the CDE has an open competition seeking “novel approaches to human interaction with cyberspace to increase military situational awareness.”  CDE is asking for “revolutionary approaches” to “rapidly convey” cyberspace information, events, and courses of action to military commanders, analysts, and decision-makers.  Just as DARPA officials acknowledged the limitations of existing cybersecurity strategy and technology, CDE officials have recognized that “the traditional human-computer interface” is inadequate for “current military information processing and sense-making in the cyber domain.”  Up to £500,000 in research funding will be awarded.  A July 9, 2015 presentation given by CDE is available online; slides from a July 16, 2015 webinar soon could be available, as well.  The competition closes on September 3, 2015.  Proposals must be submitted through CDE’s online portal.

© 2015 Covington & Burling LLP

Part Three: An Overview of the Legal Mechanisms for Challenge and Redress by Those Potentially Affected by the Early Closure of the Renewables Obligation

In the first two parts of this series, we considered how the RO operates, possible plans to close the RO in 2016, and the potential impact of those plans upon the onshore wind industry. In this final post, we outline two possible legal avenues for challenge and redress by those who may be affected by the early closure of the RO: through the national courts and under international investment treaties.

windmill vertical

The first possibility is to challenge the Government’s actions through the national courts. This route recently has been used by the solar industry, with mixed results. In 2012, the Supreme Court refused the Government’s appeal to cut solar feed-in-tariffs before the completion of a consultation on the matter. However, in November 2014, the High Court refused an application for judicial review against the Government’s decision to close the RO to ground and building mounted solar photovoltaic capacity above 5 megawatts in 2015 rather than 2017.

Affected investors could also consider commencing international arbitration proceedings under an investment treaty. If successful, an investor could obtain compensation for the loss of their investment as a result of measures introduced by the Government. However, this option would only be available to foreign investors from member States that have an investment treaty in place with the UK, and who have made a qualifying investment in the UK, as defined by the applicable treaty.

A number of European states, including Spain, are currently being sued by foreign investors under the Energy Charter Treaty as a result of changes to national solar subsidies. Marcus Trinick QC, representing Renewables UK, has warned Energy Minister Amber Rudd to “be aware of the dangers of state aid discrimination and look at what is happening in international energy arbitration across Europe. In such a position we could not afford not to fight, especially if action is taken to interfere retrospectively.

Media reports suggest that, given the extent of industry opposition, DECC is delaying an announcement to allow for further refinement of the proposed measures and their impact, in order to reduce the scope for legal challenges. Marcus Trinick QC has emphasised the need for dialogue between the industry and the Government before action is taken, which could reduce the risk of legal challenges arising.

The message from industry representatives is clear: the early closure of the RO would be a major blow to the future of onshore wind in the UK, which could spark a legal battle with the UK Government. As Maf Smith, deputy chief executive of RenewableUK, has stated, “[t]he industry will fight against any attempts to bring in drastic and unfair changes utilising the full range of options open, including legal means if appropriate.

Part One: An Overview of the Renewables Obligation and Plans for Its Early Closure

Part Two: How Would the Renewables Obligation’s Early Closure Affect the UK Onshore Wind Industry?

© 2015 Covington & Burling LLP

Part Two: How Would the Renewables Obligation’s Early Closure Affect the UK Onshore Wind Industry?

Part One of this series outlined the RO scheme and the expected announcement to close the RO earlier than anticipated. In this second post, we consider the potential impact of such measures upon the onshore wind industry.

Until the consultation with devolved authorities (Scotland and Northern Ireland) is completed, and detailed proposals are published, the timing and nature of the impact on the industry will be uncertain.

There are currently around 3,000 new turbines with a combined capacity of more than 7 gigawatts seeking planning permission, many of which would have been expecting to secure accreditation under the RO. Bloomberg Energy Finance has estimated that, if the RO closes to new generating capacity in 2016 and onshore wind was not eligible for public subsidy under the Contracts for Difference scheme, less than half the capacity of projects in advanced stages of planning would benefit from subsidies.

The majority of the planned projects are due to be located in Scotland. Given the apparent tension between the Scottish First Minister and Prime Minister over the future of onshore wind (referred to in our first post in this series), there is currently uncertainty as to whether or not the applicable RO in Scotland would close in 2016. This is an important consideration regarding the possible impact of any proposed measures.

It is unclear whether there would be a ‘grace period’ in relation to the changes, which could enable projects that already have planning permission to be included under the RO scheme, and closing the RO for those that do not. Ian Marchant, chairman of wind developer Infinis Energy, said: “The Government’s alleged plans to close down the Renewable Obligation-regime early for onshore wind beggar belief. . . . If the RO is terminated early without reasonable grace periods in place, not a single energy or large scale infrastructure project in the UK will be safe going forward.

The potential impact of such measures is giving rise to considerable uncertainty and concern over the future of the onshore wind industry. In our final post in this series, we will consider what action could be taken by industry participants who may be affected by the early closure of the RO.

Part One: An Overview of the Renewables Obligation and Plans for Its Early Closure

Part Three: An Overview of the Legal Mechanisms for Challenge and Redress by Those Potentially Affected by the Early Closure of the Renewables Obligation

© 2015 Covington & Burling LLP