trademarks Archives - The National Law Forum

AI-Generated Content and Trademarks

The rapid evolution of artificial intelligence has undeniably transformed the digital landscape, with AI-generated content becoming increasingly common. This shift has profound implications for brand owners introducing both challenges and opportunities.

One of the most pressing concerns is trademark infringement. In a recent example, the Walt Disney Company, a company fiercely protective of its intellectual property, raised concerns about AI-generated content potentially infringing on its trademarks. Social media users were having fun using Microsoft’s Bing AI imaging tool, powered by DALL-E 3 technology, to create images of pets in a “Pixar” style. However, Disney’s concern wasn’t the artwork itself, but the possibility of the AI inadvertently generating the iconic Disney-Pixar logo within the images, constituting a trademark infringement. This incident highlights the potential for AI-generated content to unintentionally infringe upon established trademarks, requiring brand owners to stay vigilant in protecting their intellectual property in the digital age.

Dilution of trademarks is another critical issue. A recent lawsuit filed by Getty Images against Stability AI sheds light on this concern. Getty Images, a leading provider of stock photos, accused Stability AI of using millions of its copyrighted images to train its AI image generation software. This alleged use, according to Getty Images, involved Stability AI’s incorporation of Getty Images’ marks into low-quality, unappealing, or offensive images which dilutes those marks in further violation of federal and state trademark laws. The lawsuit highlights the potential for AI, through the sheer volume of content it generates, to blur the lines between inspiration and infringement, weakening the association between a trademark and its source.

In addition, the ownership of copyrights in AI-generated marketing can cause problems. While AI tools can create impressive content, questions about who owns the intellectual property rights persist. Recent disputes over AI-generated artwork and music have highlighted the challenges of determining ownership and copyright in this new digital frontier.

However, AI also presents opportunities for trademark owners. For example, AI can be employed to monitor online platforms for trademark infringements, providing an early warning system. Luxury brands have used AI to authenticate products and combat counterfeiting. For instance, Entrupy has developed a mobile device-based authentication system that uses AI and microscopy to analyze materials and detect subtle irregularities indicative of counterfeit products. Brands can integrate Entrupy’s technology into their retail stores or customer-facing apps.

Additionally, AI can be a powerful tool for brand building. By analyzing consumer data and preferences, AI can help create highly targeted marketing campaigns. For example, cosmetic brands have successfully leveraged AI to personalize product recommendations, enhancing customer engagement and loyalty.

The intersection of AI and trademarks is a dynamic and evolving landscape. As technology continues to advance, so too will the challenges and opportunities for trademark owners. Proactive measures, such as robust trademark portfolios, AI-powered monitoring tools, and clear internal guidelines, are essential for safeguarding brand integrity in this new era.

Bad Faith Games – Hasbro Rolls and Loses

For EU and UK trademarks, there is a five-year grace period following the issuance of a registration, during which the trademark owner must use the mark in connection with the goods and/or services covered by the registration before it can be challenged (and potentially ultimately revoked) for non-use with such goods and/or services. Some trademark owners have tried to take advantage of this by re-filing their previously registered trademarks for exactly the same goods and/or services just before the five-year grace period ends as a means of extending this grace period. This is commonly referred to as “evergreening.”

In Hasbro v EUIPO¹, the General Court has upheld the EUIPO Board of Appeal’s decision that repeat filing of trademarks can result in bad faith applications. While it is true that evergreening doesn’t always mean bad faith, where it can be demonstrated that an applicant’s intention for filing a trademark application is to dodge showing genuine use of a mark more than five years old, then bad faith may be established.

Bad faith?

In legal terms, “bad faith” goes back in time and considers a trademark owner’s intention at the time it applied for the trademark. If the intention was to weaken the interests of third parties or obtain a trademark registration for reasons that are unrelated to the trademark itself, then this might result in bad faith. In Hasbro, the question of whether the board game conglomerate acted in bad faith hinged on whether Hasbro’s repeat filings of the MONOPOLY trademark, to avoid showing genuine use of the mark, amounted to bad faith.

Hasbro v EUIPO

When Hasbro filed its MONOPOLY trademark yet again, specifying goods and services near-identical to its earlier filing, the General Court said the application was made in bad faith, as Hasbro’s intention was to prolong the five-year grace period allowed for establishing use.

Although the case was initially rejected by the Cancellation Division of the EUIPO, the EUIPO Board of Appeal partially invalidated Hasbro’s EU Registration for the MONOPOLY mark. A key factor of the General Court’s decision supporting the EUIPO Board of Appeal’s verdict was Hasbro’s admission that its motivation for re-filing was to avoid potential costs that would be incurred to show genuine use of the MONOPOLY trademark.

Impact

The Hasbro case is setting precedent in both the European and UK courts. Although the Hasbro case came along post-Brexit, it is still considered “good law” in the English courts.

In a recent dispute between the two supermarket chains Tesco and Lidl², Tesco argued that Lidl’s wordless version of its logo should be invalidated, as the mark had never been used and Lidl was periodically re-filing it to avoid having to prove genuine use. Tesco’s counterclaim was struck out in the High Court as Tesco had not made a clear-cut case for bad faith. However, the Court of Appeal allowed Tesco’s appeal and maintained that it was possible bad faith had occurred. This forced Lidl to explain its intentions when filing the mark, which is consistent with the Hasbro case. Tesco’s bad faith allegation will now be assessed at the substantive trial later this year. This will be watched closely by brand-owners and practitioners hoping for further guidance on evergreening and specifically where re-filings amount to bad faith.

In Sky v SkyKick³, the Court of Appeal said that a trademark applicant can have both good and bad reasons for applying to register trademarks. However, trademark filings that are submitted underhandedly, particularly where dishonesty is the main objective of filing the application in the first place, should be invalidated.

Bad faith beware!

The Hasbro v EUIPO decision has resulted in brand owners and trademark lawyers taking greater care when re-filing trademarks. It is important to highlight though, that re-filing a trademark is allowed. It is only when it can be established that an applicant’s intention at the point of re-filing the mark was to skirt use requirements, that bad faith can be found.

Brands looking to file new, or re-file existing, trademarks, should ensure they have a clear trademark strategy. Also consider retaining and recording: (1) evidence of genuine use of your marks; and (2) your reasons for re-filing any existing trademarks.

1 21/04/2021, Case T‑663/19, ECLI:EU:T:2021:211 (Hasbro, Inc. v European Union Intellectual Property Office)

2 Lidl Great Britain Limited v Tesco Stores Limited [2022] EWHC 1434 (Ch)

3 Sky Limited (formerly Sky Plc), Sky International AG, Sky UK Limited v SkyKick, UK Ltd, SkyKick, Inc [2021] EWCA Civ 1121, 2021 WL 03131604

Article By Sarah Simpson and Tegan Miller-McCormack of Katten. To read Kattison Avenue/Katten Kattwalk | Issue 2, please click here.

For more entertainment, art, and sports legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Legal Standing in Trademark Non-Use Cancellation Actions

In recent years the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office (IMPI) allowed the possibility that complainants credit their legal standing on trademark non-use cancellation proceedings through the existence of a trademark application without the need of initially demonstrating that such application was blocked to registration in view of the prior existence of third parties’ confusingly similar registered marks, as long as the official action citing the conflicting registration as pertinent barrier was submitted as subsequent evidence in the proceeding.

Accordingly, it started to be a common practice to file non-use cancellation actions submitting as evidence a certified copy of the trademark application serving as a basis to attack the registration not being used accompanied with the results of an availability search showing the existence of the registration subject to the proceeding.

Nonetheless, such criteria adopted by IMPI was revoked by the Federal Court of Administrative Affairs and by Federal Circuit Courts sustaining that legal standing must be credited initially along with the complaint without being possible to do it at a later stage by submitting the evidence attesting that IMPI objected the registration of complainant’s trademark application on grounds of likelihood of confusion because of the existence of defendant’s registration.

The Court’s reasonings behind the revocation of such criteria were mainly based on legal certainty arguments stating that legal standing can only born when a formal objection is raised by IMPI communicating to the applicant the existence of a citation based on likelihood of confusion.

Therefore, IMPI is now starting to analyze and solve non-use cancellation actions following the Court’s legal reasonings stating that legal standing must be credited initially along with the complaint, without enabling complainants to credit such standing subsequently.

Consequently, it is advisable that titleholders file non-use cancellation actions only after being served with the official actions communicating the existence of pertinent barriers blocking the registration.

Article By Jaime Rodríguez of OLIVARES

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Names and Brand Names

A key aspect of trademarks has been at the forefront of both fiction and real-life sports news over the past few weeks: what makes a name a name and who can use a name as a trademark? While trademarks are commercial rights, trademark law also protects a person’s right to control their own identity, including well-known pseudonyms and nicknames.

Marvel’s She-Hulk: Attorney-at-Law is, like most TV shows about lawyers, often cavalier with how it represents the law, but when the question of the protagonist’s rights in her nom de guerre came up, it was more accurate than most courtroom dramas. Jen Walters (the civilian identity of the titular She-Hulk) discovers a “super-influencer” has launched a line of cosmetics under the SHE-HULK brand and based on that use, is claiming trademark rights in SHE-HULK, going so far as to sue Jen Walters for her use of the name She-Hulk. While much of the terminology is mangled, the show’s hearing on the issue reaches points that are relevant in the real world. First, does “She-Hulk” identify a living person? And second, would another’s use of SHE-HULK be “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association” (as set forth in 15 U.S. Code § 1125) of that user and the person known to the public as SHE-HULK? It being a superhero show, Jen Walters ultimately vindicates her rights to the She-Hulk name and SHE-HULK Mark.

Circumstances in the real world are rarely as cut-and-dried. In a proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, NBA player Luka Doncic is attempting to reclaim the trademark rights in his own name from his ex-manager, his mother. Doncic, born in 1999, was a basketball star from his early teens. During his meteoric rise in European basketball, his mother, with his consent at the time, registered a design trademark (consisting mainly of his name) for goods and services including soaps, recorded basketball games, apparel, sports equipment, and promotional and educational services, starting with an application in the European Union in 2015 (when Doncic was 16) and filing in the U.S. in 2018 (when he was 19).

Doncic, as stated in his petition to cancel that U.S. Registration, has since withdrawn his consent to his mother’s use and registration of his name as a trademark. Instead, he has, through his own company, Luka99, Inc., applied to register a few marks including his own name, which have been refused registration because of the existing registration owned by his mother. To clear the way for his own registrations, he is seeking to cancel hers on the basis that (as in the fictional example above) her use or registration is likely to make consumers believe the goods and services offered with her authorization are associated with or endorsed by him, and because he has withdrawn his consent, her registrations are no longer permitted to remain on the register.

As Doncic was a minor when he gave consent, he has a good chance of regaining control of his name. Not everyone is so lucky, so you should be especially careful when entering any agreement that allows someone to use your name as a trademark.

Article By David H. Siegel of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

War and Peace at Rospatent: Protecting Trademarks in Russia

Yes, we shall live, Uncle Vanya. Could Anton Chekhov ever have imagined that his literary work would be used to sell hamburgers? In March, a controversial application for an “Uncle Vanya” mark in connection with “snack bars, cafes, cafeterias, restaurants, bar services, canteens, cooking and home delivery services,” incorporated the red-and-yellow golden arches logo of McDonald’s. It was just one in a series of recent applications in Russia that have caused serious pearl-clutching among intellectual property lawyers.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the country has faced numerous financial, trade and travel sanctions. It’s also been snubbed by major intellectual property partners. In a February 28 letter, a group of whistleblowers and staff representatives at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) called for the entity’s public condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the rapid closure of its Russia Office. The European Patent Office severed ties with Russia on March 1, and shortly thereafter the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) confirmed that it had “terminated engagement” with officials from Russia’s agency in charge of intellectual property, the Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent), and with the Eurasian Patent Organization.

In response, Russia has adopted an aggressive posture in the intellectual property realm where it once sought to peacefully engage with the world, an effort that began well before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When the USSR joined the Paris Convention in 1965, it eagerly sought to develop Soviet intellectual property. Yet in March, Russia issued Decree No. 299, which effectively nullifies the enforcement value of Russian patents owned by entities and individuals in “unfriendly” countries including the United States, European Union member states, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin also greenlighted the importation of branded products without the brands’ permission, creating gray market headaches. As Boris Edidin, deputy chairman of the Commission for Legal Support of the Digital Economy of the Moscow Branch of the Russian Bar Association, clarified in a recent legal commentary published by Moscow-based RBC Group: “entrepreneurs have the opportunity to import goods of well-known brands, regardless of the presence or absence of an official representative on the Russian market.”

Russia, like the EU, had traditionally adopted a tougher stance than the United States on parallel imports. Now, however, “both by ‘anti-crisis’ measures and by cloak-and-dagger methods” Russia is sure to do all it can to keep its planes flying and its factories running, said Peter B. Maggs, research professor of law at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and noted expert on Russian and Soviet law and intellectual property.’

The increase in parallel imports makes trademark prosecution and maintenance more important than ever in Russia, but it’s not the only cause for concern. In March, as political tensions reached a crescendo, a Russian court declined to enforce the trademark rights for Peppa Pig, the famous British cartoon character, due to “unfriendly actions of the United States of America and affiliated foreign countries.” (See case No. A28- 11930/2021 in the Arbitration Court of the Kirov Region; an appeals court later overturned this holding, in a win for the porcine star.) RBC Group reported in March that it had tracked more than 50 trademark applications by Russian entrepreneurs and businesses for the marks of famous foreign brands, many in the fashion and tech sector. While most trademark applications were explicit copies of existing brands, in other cases applicants were content to imitate well-known trademarks and trade dress.

For example, a Russian entrepreneur from a design studio called Luxorta applied to register an IDEA brand that mimics the style and yellow-and-blue color schemes of famous Swedish brand IKEA. He told RBC that his business had suffered after IKEA suspended its Russian operations, and that he aspired to develop his own line of furniture and work with IKEA’s former suppliers. Other applicants RBC interviewed indicated they hoped to sell the marks back to foreign companies once those companies return.

On April 1, Rospatent published a press statement clarifying that “in case an identical or similar trademark has already been registered in the Russian Federation, it would be the ground for refusal in such registration.” More recently, the head of Rospatent, Yury Zubov, has responded with frustration to news coverage of trademark woes in Russia, noting that intellectual property legislation is unchanged and the “Uncle Vanya” hamburger mark had been withdrawn.

Prof. Maggs agreed that those trying to register or use close copies of foreign marks in Russia will likely fail. He cited a June 2 decision by the Court of Intellectual Property Rights to uphold lower court findings that the mark “FANT” for a carbonated orange soft drink violated unfair competition laws, because it was confusingly similar to the “FANTA” brand owned and licensed to third parties by Coca-Cola HBC Limited Liability Company. Russia’s consumer protection agency had originally brought the case.

The Court reasoned that “confusion in relation to two products can lead not only to a reduction in sales of the FANTA drink and a redistribution of consumer demand, but can also harm the business reputation of a third party, since the consumer, having been misled by the confusion between the two products, in the end receives a different product with different quality, taste and other characteristics.”

In addition, Prof. Maggs said, “the Putin Regime is and will be promoting Russian products as ‘just as good’ as foreign products. An example, obviously approved at high levels is the adoption of a totally different trademark for the sold McDonald’s chain,” he said, referring to the June 12 reopening of former McDonald’s restaurants in Moscow under the name “Vkusno & tochka” (“Tasty and that’s it”).

Brands should be wary of inadvertently jeopardizing their Russian marks by suspending local operations; a trademark may be cancelled in Russia after three years of uninterrupted non-use. While Article 1486 of the Russian Civil Code states that “evidence presented by the rightholder of the fact that the trademark was not used due to circumstances beyond his control [emphasis added] may be taken into account,” brands claiming infringement still risk being ineligible for damages or injunctive relief, because technically they are not losing sales while pausing business in Russia.

Moreover, if a company has suspended sales in Russia to show solidarity with Ukraine but seeks to stop sales in Russia by others, it may be accused of violating the good faith requirement of Article 10 of the Russian Civil Code, which states that exercising “rights for the purpose of limiting competition and also abuse of a dominant position in a market are not allowed.”

Russia remains a party to numerous intellectual property treaties, including the Paris Convention, the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the Hague Agreement. But as the Peppa Pig case illustrates, court decisions on intellectual property are not immune to political heat.

The question looming on the horizon is whether, if the current crisis escalates, the Russian government would outright cancel trademarks from hostile countries. It would not be the first time a state denied intellectual property rights during political conflicts. In the aftermath of the First World War, for example, the US government advocated for the “expropriation” of property, including intellectual property, of German nationals, perceived as responsible for the militarism of their government1. And in the 1930s, the German patent office removed Jewish patent-holders from its roster as part of its notorious “Aryanization” process. However, because Russia is not officially at war with the countries it has deemed “unfriendly,” these precedents are not directly on point.

Brands that have suspended business operations in Russia should monitor their trademark portfolios closely for infringement and consider how they can prove use of each mark during a prolonged absence from the Russian market. In other words: keep your eyes on Uncle Vanya.

FOOTNOTES

¹Caglioti DL. Property Rights in Time of War: Sequestration and Liquidation of Enemy Aliens’ Assets in Western Europe during the First World War. Journal of Modern European History. 2014;12(4):523-545. doi:10.17104/1611-8944_2014_4_523.

Article By Cynthia Martens of Katten

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

A Primer on Practice at the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board

In a precedential decision rendered in an opposition proceeding, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) took the lawyers for each side to task for ignoring Board rules in presentation of their case, but ultimately decided the case on a likelihood of confusion analysis. The Board found that the parties’ marks and goods were “highly similar” and sustained the opposition. Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, Opposition Nos. 91223352; 91223683; 91227387 (June 15, 2022, TTAB) (Wellington, Heasley and Hudis, ALJs) (precedential).

Pharmavite sought registration of the standard character mark NATURE MADE for various foods and beverages based on allegations of bone fide intent to use in commerce. Made in Nature (MIN) opposed on the ground that Pharmavite’s mark so resembled MIN’s registered and common law “Made In Nature” marks as to cause a likelihood of confusion when used on the goods for which registration was sought.

In its brief to the Board, Pharmavite raised, for the first time, the Morehouse (or prior registration) defense. MIN objected to the Morehouse defense as untimely. The Board agreed, noting that defense is “an equitable defense, to the effect that if the opposer cannot be further injured because there already exists an injurious registration, the opposer cannot object to an additional registration that does not add to the injury.” The party asserting a Morehouse defense must show that it “has an existing registration [or registrations] of the same mark[s] for the same goods” (emphasis in original).

Here, the Board found that this defense was not tried by the parties’ express consent and that implied consent “can be found only where the non-offering party (1) raised no objection to the introduction of evidence on the issue, and (2) was fairly apprised that the evidence was being offered in support of the issue.” In this case, Pharmavite did introduce into the record its prior NATURE MADE registrations but only for the purpose of supporting Pharmavite’s “[r]ight to exclude; use and strength of Applicant’s mark.” The Board found that this inclusion did not provide notice of reliance on the Morehouse or prior registration defense at trial.

In sustaining the opposition, the Board commented extensively on the record and how it was used, “[s]o that the parties, their counsel and perhaps other parties in future proceedings can benefit and possibly reduce their litigation costs.”

Over-Designation of the Record as Confidential

The Board criticized the parties for over-designating as confidential large portions of the record, warning that only the specific “exhibits, declaration passages or deposition transcript pages that truly disclosed confidential information should have been filed under seal under a protective order.” If a party over-designates material as confidential, “the Board will not be bound by the party’s designation.”

Duplicative Evidence

The Board criticized the parties for filing “duplicative evidence by different methods of introduction; for example, once by Notice of Reliance and again by way of an exhibit to a testimony declaration or testimony deposition.” The Board noted that such practice is viewed “with disfavor.”

Overuse of Deposition Designations

The Board criticized both parties for over-designating extensive excerpts of discovery deposition testimony of their own witnesses under Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4), which provides:

If only part of a discovery deposition is submitted and made part of the record by a party, an adverse party may introduce under a notice of reliance any other part of the deposition which should in fairness be considered so as to make not misleading what was offered by the submitting party. A notice of reliance filed by an adverse party must be supported by a written statement explaining why the adverse party needs to rely upon each additional part listed in the adverse party’s notice, failing which the Board, in its discretion, may refuse to consider the additional parts.

As the Board explained, “[i]t is not an appropriate use of Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4) to introduce unrelated testimony, rather than just the additional necessary portions of discovery deposition excerpts that clarify the passages originally submitted.” In this case, the Board stated that both parties “are equally guilty of abusing Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(4), and [we] trust that the parties and their counsel will not repeat this practice in future matters before the Board.”

Limiting the Record to Pertinent Evidence

The Board noted that “sizeable portions of each party’s evidentiary materials were not pertinent to the issues involved in this rather straightforward priority and likelihood of confusion opposition proceeding, such that the Board was forced to spend needless time sifting through an inappropriately large record in search of germane proofs.” The Board pointedly noted that “[t]his is not productive. ‘Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in [the record].’”

Record Citations

The Board advised the parties to adhere to its Manual of Procedure at § 801.03. As to how evidence should be cited:

For each significant fact recited, the recitation of facts should include a citation to the portion of the evidentiary record where supporting evidence may be found. When referring to the record in an inter partes proceeding before the Board, parties should include a citation to the TTABVUE entry and page number (e.g., 1 TTABVUE 2) to allow the reader to easily locate the cited materials.

In this case, the Board criticized the parties for using their own exhibit numbering system rather than the TTABVUE docket number and, for testimony submitted by deposition transcripts, using the page and line numbers provided by the court reporters rather than the TTABVUE citations. As the Board noted, this encumbered the Board in its efforts “to provide evidentiary references for use in this opinion; lengthening the time for review of the record, drafting of the decision and ultimately for issuance of this opinion.”

Likelihood of Confusion

After its chapter and verse critique of the presentation by the parties, the Board embarked on an exhaustive Trademark Act § 2(d) analysis, considering and balancing each of the DuPont factors, and ultimately concluded that MIN had sustained its opposition.

Article By Paul Devinsky of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Trade Mark Infringement – Muslim Dating App Meets its Match [.com]

A recent Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Decision (IPEC) on 20 April 2022 has decided that ‘Muzmatch’, an online matchmaking service to the Muslim Community has infringed Match.com’s registered trade marks.

The decision by Nicholas Caddick Q.C was that Muzmatch’s use of signs and its name amounted to trade mark infringement and/or passing off of Match.com’s trade marks. This case follows successful oppositions by Match.com to Muzmatch’s registration of its marks in 2018, and unsuccessful attempts by Match.com to purchase Muzmatch between 2017 and 2019.

Match.com is one of the largest and most recognisable dating platforms in the UK. It first registered a word mark ‘MATCH.COM’ in 1996 and also owns other dating-related brands including Tinder and Hinge with other marks including the word mark ‘TINDER’. Match.com used a 2012 TNS report to illustrate its goodwill and reputation and 70% of people surveyed would be able to recall Match.com if prompted, 44% unprompted and 31% of people would name Match.com as the first dating brand off the ‘top of their head.’

Muzmatch is a comparatively niche but growing dating platform, which aims to provide a halal (i.e. in compliance with Islamic law) way for single Muslim men and women to meet a partner. Muzmatch is comparatively much smaller and was founded in 2011 by Mr Shahzad Younas and now has had around 666,069 sign-ups in the UK alone.

The Court considered that the marks ‘Muzmatch’ and ‘MATCH.COM’ and each company’s graphical marks, had a high degree of similarity in the services provided. The marks were also similar in nature orally and conceptually and the addition of the prefix ‘Muz’ did not distinguish the two marks, nor could the lack of the suffix ‘.com’ or stylistic fonts/devices.

The key issue of the case relates to the idea of the term ‘Match’ which is used by both marks to describe the nature of the business: match[ing]. Muzmatch argued that as both marks share this descriptive common element, so it is difficult to conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion between the two marks as the term just describes what each business does.

The Court found that finding that there is a likelihood of confusion for a common descriptive element is not impossible, as the descriptive element can be used distinctively. The average consumer would conclude that the portion ‘Match’ is the badge of origin for Match.com due to its reputation as a brand and the very substantial degree of distinctiveness in the dating industry. An average consumer would have seen the word ‘Match’ as the dominant element in the Match.com trade marks and Match.com is often referred to as just ‘Match’ in advertisements.

Aside from its marks, Muzmatch utilised a Search Engine Optimisation strategy from January 2012 whereby it utilised a list of around 5000 keywords which would take a user to a landing page on the its website. In the list of the keywords used, Muzmatch used the words ‘muslim-tinder’, ‘tinder’ and ‘halal-tinder’ which were accepted by Muzmatch during the litigation to have infringed Match’s trade marks of the Tinder brand including the word mark ‘TINDER’. Muzmatch’s SEO use was also found to cause confusion based on some of its keywords including ‘UK Muslim Match’, which again uses the term Match distinctively, therefore a consumer may confuse a link to ‘UK Muslim Match’ with ‘Match.com’.

Therefore, the Court found that there was likely to be confusion between Muzmatch and Match.com because of the distinctive nature of the term ‘Match’ in the world of dating platforms. An average consumer would conclude that Muzmatch was connected in a material way with the Match.com marks, as if it was targeted at Muslim users as a sub-brand, so this confusion would be trade mark infringement under S10(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994.

The Court also considered that Muzmatch had taken unfair advantage of Match.com’s trade marks and had therefore infringed those marks under S10(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994. This was due to the reputation of Match.com’s trade marks and because a consumer would believe that Muzmatch was a sub-brand of Match.com.

The Court rejected Muzmatch’s defence of honest concurrent use and found that Match.com would also have an alternative claim in the tort of passing off.

Key Points:

The Court found that a common descriptive element can acquire distinctiveness in an area, solely because of a company’s reputation and influence in that market.

The use of Search Engine Optimisation strategies can also constitute a trade mark infringement.

The lack of the suffix ‘.com’ in a mark is not sufficient to distinguish use from a household brand such as Match.com, so care should be taken with brands such as ‘Match.com’, ‘Booking.com’[1]

Source:

[1] Match Group, LLC, Meetic SAS, Match.Com International Limited v Muzmatch Limited, Shahzad Younas [2022] EWHC 941 (IPEC)

[1] Note- Blog Post of July 6 2020 Relating to Booking.com- https://www.iptechblog.com/2020/07/us-supreme-court-opens-doors-to-generic-com-trademarks/

Article By Connor Sargeant and the Intellectual Property and Technology Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP .

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

To Search or To Sink: The Importance of Clearing Your Brand

So many times in my three decades of practice I’ve shaken my head at the perils a trademark owner can so easily avoid by searching and clearing a mark. The litigations! The unnecessary attorneys’ fees! The time and resources lost! All because my client (or adversary) didn’t conduct a proper trademark search.

Adopting a Trademark

So what’s all the fuss about? Well, before adopting a trademark (that is, a brand name for goods or services) you should have an attorney commission a proper clearance search, review it, and provide you with a well-reasoned opinion as to the availability of the brand for “use” and “registration.” (Yes, they are different things, as explained below.) I’m not talking about an Internet search or an online search of U.S. Trademark Office records, though both can be useful to make sure there aren’t any easily found barriers to use or registration of a mark before a full search is commissioned.

I’m talking about a full clearance search done by a reputable vendor the attorney commissions to uncover all uses (registered and not) of the same or similar marks for the same or similar goods/services as you want to use your brand for. The resulting vendor’s report sent to the attorney is typically anywhere from 300 pages up to 1000 pages. Then the (experienced trademark) attorney reviews it and lets you know in a detailed opinion if the mark is free for you to use and register without entangling you in the risk of a dispute/lawsuit. If it’s not available, you pick another brand, and search again.

Using a Brand and Registering It

So what’s the difference between freedom to use a brand and freedom to register it? In the U.S., “common law” trademark rights can exist based solely upon use (that is use of a trademark without registration). That’s because consumers can associate a brand with a single source (the trademark owner/producer of goods/services) even if it’s not registered. (It’s different in other countries, and searches should be done in every country for which you want to use your brand.)

So it’s possible that there’s a barrier to use but not to registration, because a common law (unregistered) trademark is too similar to the brand you want to use, and is being used in connection with identical or related goods/services as your proposed brand. That’s why you want clearance to both use and register a mark. (Registration is important because it provides you with nationwide rights in your brand; common law trademarks cover only the geographic territory where sales under the brand occur.)

So please clear your mark. It’s pennies on the dollar compared to what you will spend in a dispute or (heaven forbid) litigation. Here’s to happy searching!

Article By Jeanne Hamburg of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

The Time Has Come for Trademark Modernization Act Regulations

On Dec. 18, 2021, regulations implementing the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA) went into effect. Trademark owners and practitioners should be aware of the new procedures and ensure they are ready for the changes.

Trademark Modernization Act Regulations

Our posts “Three Things to Know About the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020” and “The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020: New Rules and Procedures” from March and May 2021, respectively, gave an overview of the changes that will be implemented with the act. Most notably, the TMA provides for new procedures to challenge trademark registrations based on nonuse – expungement, and reexamination. It is intended that the new ex parte expungement and reexamination proceedings will be faster and more efficient alternatives to cancellation procedures before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. You can read the final rule here.

Another significant change is the requirement for filers to verify their identity with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). This is part of the USPTO’s efforts to protect the integrity of the register and combat fraudulent filings, which have been on the uptick. Beginning in early 2022, the following must verify their identity with the USPTO using one of the verification options that includes an electronic process by ID.me

Trademark owners and corporate officers not represented by an attorney, US-licensed attorneys (including in-house counsel), and Canadian attorneys or agents are required to verify their identity. Paralegals and other support staff working for an attorney must be sponsored by a verified attorney. Trademark owners who are represented by an attorney do not currently need to verify their identities to sign electronic forms sent by their attorney; however, if the representation by that attorney ends, the owners will need to submit to the verification process.

It is important that trademark holders and practitioners prepare for these new policies and procedures to ensure they can complete filings on a timely basis.

Article By Danielle M. DeFilippis of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Immoral and Scandalous Trademarks Are Now Allowed According to Today’s U.S. Supreme Court Decision

On June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Iancu v. Brunetti, addressing whether, in light of its previous holding in Matal v. Tam, the Lanham (Trademark) Act’s prohibition on registration of “immoral” and “scandalous” trademarks represents a violation of the First Amendment. Six justices joined the majority opinion, which held that both the immoral and the scandalous provisions of the Lanham Act do not square with the First Amendment and, thus, must be invalidated.

Respondent Erik Brunetti founded a clothing line that uses the trademark and brand name ‘FUCT’. When Brunetti attempted to register his trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the registration was denied on the grounds that the mark was “a total vulgar” and therefore could not be registered. Brunetti appealed, arguing that, particularly in light of Tam (which held that the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act represented a First Amendment Violation), the Lanham Act’s exclusion of immoral and scandalous marks as eligible for federal registration by the USPTO also represented unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.

The government argued that the ban on such marks was viewpoint-neutral, and, in any case, could be constructed in a limiting way such that the only prohibition would be to marks that are offensive or shocking due to their mode of expression, regardless of the views presented by the marks. Doing this, according to the government, would result in only vulgar—lewd, sexually explicit, and profane—marks being refused registration, which would make the prohibition constitutional.

The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that “the statute says something markedly different”. The Lanham Act, as written “does not draw the line at lewd, sexually explicit, or profane marks…[or] refer only to marks whose “mode of expression,” independent of viewpoint, is particularly offensive.” Moreover, the Supreme Court explained, while the Lanham Act clearly has a legitimate purpose, it is still not permitted to engage in viewpoint-based discrimination. As an illustration, the Supreme Court pointed to several contradictions by the USPTO when it came to attempts to register a trademark (‘KO KANE’ rejected as a trademark for beverages while ‘SAY NO TO DRUGS—REALITY IS THE BEST TRIP IN LIFE’ registered; ‘BONG HITS 4 JESUS’ refused registration due to the belief that “Christians would be morally outraged” but ‘JESUS DIED FOR YOU’ allowed registration on clothing).

Between Tam and Brunetti, the Lanham Act has now lost its ability to exclude a wide swath of potential trademarks. Previously, Examining Attorneys with the USPTO were permitted to refuse registration of a trademark, even if it was not phonetically equivalent to a curse word (as in the present case), if the Examining Attorney felt that the trademark was, or could potentially be, offensive or outside the “accepted” viewpoint. This is why ‘BONG HITS 4 JESUS’ was refused registration but ‘JESUS DIED FOR YOU’ was allowed; as the Supreme Court opinion notes, one mark suggests irreverence while the other suggests religious faith and, while some may find the first mark offensive, it is not the place of the USPTO to police what is and is not objectionable. Marks that are disparaging, explicit, immoral, and/or scandalous are now eligible for registration with the USPTO. Brunetti should now be granted federal registration for his clothing brand and enjoy the additional protections that come from having the USPTO backing a trademark.

This article was written by Erin E. Kaprelian of Davis Kuelthau.

Learn more about SCOTUS IP decisions on the National Law Review Intellectual Property page.

Tag: trademarks

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