Tag: Trade

Starving the Bear: The United States Restricts Exports to Russia

Sheppard Mullin 2012

The pressure on Russia continues to build.  As we previously reported here and here, throughout March, the United States and other Western powers implemented a series of sanctions against individuals and entities deemed to be involved in the political destabilization of Ukraine.  Those sanctions were restricted to specific parties, including high ranking Russian and Ukrainian officials and – notably – one Russian bank.

The United States has now gone further, implementing restrictions that restrict trade with the entire country of Russia.  These sanctions are bound to have more bite.

Specifically, on March 26, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that, since March 1, 2014 and until further notice, it had not and will not issue licenses for exports or re-exports to Russia.  Commerce governs exports and re-exports of U.S.-origin commercial and “dual use” items.  While not all such items require a license for Russia, many sensitive items do.

On March 27, the State Department followed suit: it announced that, until further notice, it will not issue any authorizations for exports of defense articles or services to Russia.  This is essentially an absolute embargo on defense exports to Russia and Russian nationals: an export authorization is required for virtually any export of a defense article, technical data, or defense service to Russia (or any other country).

These two actions constitute a significant expansion of U.S. trade restrictions on Russia, particularly because the license restrictions apply to exports of both goods and technology.  Moreover, the restrictions apply to all Russian individuals and entities, as opposed to the very targeted economic sanctions previously imposed by the Treasury Department.

While the United States has acted quickly, it is not alone, as the European Union has also taken action, introducing targeted sanctions, including an asset freeze and visa ban, against designated parties responsible for human rights violations, violence, and use of excessive force with respect to Ukraine.  In addition, EU Member States have agreed to (i) suspend export licenses on equipment that might be used for internal repression and (ii) reconsider export licenses to Ukraine and Russia related to military technology and equipment.

Collectively, the sanctions imposed to date bring with them a host of practical challenges for companies conducting business in or with Russia.  Western banks may scrutinize transactions with Russian banks and other parties especially carefully in light of the new restrictions.  In some cases, a Western bank might hold up a legitimate transaction for further review if a Russian counterparty is involved.

Companies with current business ties in Russia must, therefore, consider the commercial and related risks of continuing that business.  The United States in particular is implementing sanctions rapidly, piecemeal, and often without much warning.  As the landscape of trade restrictions continues to change, companies must perform ongoing diligence with respect to their Russian business.  For example, companies should perform periodic rescreening of Russian business partners to ensure they do not appear on any U.S. prohibited parties lists.

Article By:

Thaddeus Rogers McBride
Cheryl Palmeri
Of:
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

Bittersweet Ending for Plaintiffs in Chocolate Price-Fixing Litigation

In a February 26, 2014 Memorandum, Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment for three defendants Mars, Inc., Nestlé USA, Inc., and The Hershey Company in a detailed opinion. The plaintiffs filed suit against chocolate manufacturers nearly six years ago, claiming that they conspired to fix the prices of various chocolate products. The decision is helpful for defendants as precedent that even lock-step price increases are not enough to survive summary judgment in a price-fixing case, at least in a market with few competitors. Judge Conner’s decision also demonstrates for defendants the value of developing and shepherding a comprehensive record to support the argument that their decisions were independent and economically and rationally defensible.

The plaintiffs relied on circumstantial evidence and an inference that parallel price increases were the result of a tacit agreement to engage in collusive behavior, “actuated” by a conspiracy in Canada that resulted in at least one guilty plea by a Canadian chocolate manufacturer. Judge Conner relied in part on a finding that the Canadian conspiracy made a similar conspiracy in the United States more plausible in denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 538 (M.D. Pa. 2009).

Judge Conner found at the summary judgment stage, however, that there was no evidence that executives responsible for pricing in the United States were aware of any anticompetitive activity in Canada, and concluded that the rest of the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to preclude summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs had no direct evidence of conspiracy, so they were required to show both that the defendants consciously raised prices in parallel as well as sufficient evidence of “plus factors.” In this case, the court considered three plus factors: (1) the defendants’ motive and market factors; (2) whether the defendants’ behavior was against their self-interest; and (3) traditional conspiracy evidence. The plaintiffs’ evidence of parallel pricing was the strongest part of their case. The court concluded that Mars, Nestle, and Hershey raised prices in parallel because¾three times over the course of five years¾Mars initiated a price increase, and both Hershey and Nestle followed in quick succession (within one to two weeks) with nearly identical price increases (varying only once, and even then only by two-tenths of a penny).

The court recognized, however, that parallel price increases were not sufficient, especially in a market controlled by a few competitors (or an oligopoly) to support an inference of antitrust liability. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants acted against their own self-interest as required by the second plus factor. In reaching this conclusion, the court first pointed to evidence that the defendants increased prices in anticipation of cost increases, stating “it is rational, competitive, and self-interest motivated behavior to increase prices for the purpose of mitigating the effect of anticipated cost increases.” Judge Conner also cited to what he described as “extensive” internal communications before each increase in which each defendant unilaterally discussed whether they could raise prices as evidence of “independent and fiercely competitive business conduct,” not collusion. Finally, the court agreed with Nestle’s argument that widely supported economic principles supported its decision as the defendant with the smallest market share to follow the price increases of its competitors. In doing so, the court likely rejected an argument¾often made by plaintiffs¾that it was in Nestle’s best interest to cut prices and gain market share.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ traditional evidence of conspiracy was insufficient to satisfy the third plus factor. The plaintiffs relied on three pieces of evidence to satisfy this factor: (1) the Canadian conspiracy; (2) the defendants’ possession of competitors’ pricing information; and (3) the defendants’ opportunity to conspire at trade association meetings. While the court accepted that the Canadian conspiracy could, in theory, facilitate a conspiracy in the United States, it found the facts did not support the application of the theory in this case because there was no evidence that U.S. decision-makers had knowledge of the Canadian conspiracy and there was no tie between the pricing activities in the two countries. From the court’s opinion, it appears the plaintiffs had little traditional conspiracy evidence beyond the supposed connection to Canada. The court rejected an argument that a “handful” of documents suggesting that the defendants were aware of competitors’ price increases before they were made public supported an inference of conspiracy. There was no evidence that the pricing information came from competitors, and the court concluded that this exchange of advance price information was as consistent with independent competitive behavior as it was with collusion. Finally, the court ruled that the presence of company officers at trade meetings¾without any evidence that they discussed prices there¾was insufficient to permit an inference that the price increases were the result of collusive behavior. Reviewing the record as a whole, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had produced no evidence tending to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted independently.

Judge Conner’s opinion is a relatively straightforward application of the standard for ruling on summary judgment in antitrust cases set forth in the Supreme Court’s Matsushita decision and for parallel pricing cases as set forth in the Third Circuit’s Baby Food and Flat Glass opinions. If appealed, Chocolate Confectionary is unlikely to result in a decision changing these standards significantly.

On the bright side for the plaintiffs, they reached a settlement with at least one defendant, Cadbury, before the summary judgment motion was ruled upon, so they will not be left empty handed.

Article by:

of:

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Just the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership): A Review of the Transatlantic Partnership Agreement One Year After It Is Introduced to America

Sheppard Mullin 2012

 

Next week will mark one year since President Obama introduced the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to the nation in his State of the Union Address.  Although the TTIP received only a brief nod in the President’s speech, the TTIP initiative has moved forward at a stunning pace . . . well, a stunning pace for an international trade negotiation, a process that normally crawls along.  As discussed in this blog, the U.S. and European parties to this proposed partnership set an ambitious goal of finalizing an agreement by the end of 2014.  A year into the process, we take a look at the progress to date and the challenges to come.

TTIP Background

We often hear news of trade agreements and other arrangements designed to increase business between the United States and one or more partner countries.

TTIP is different. It’s bigger.

The European Union and the United States comprise the largest and wealthiest market in the world, accounting for over 54% of the world’s GDP and 40% of the world’s purchasing power.  It follows that even the slightest reduction in marketplace barriers on a scale that large could result in sizeable trade increases and economic benefits.  The European Centre for Economic Policy Research estimates that TTIP could boost U.S. exports to the EU by $300 billion annually and add $125 billion to U.S. GDP each year.

Tariffs between the trading partners are already some of the lowest in the global market.  Accordingly, TTIP focuses on reducing non-tariff-barriers (NTBs) to trade between the United States and Europe.  The proposed NTB reductions include aligning domestic standards, cutting costs imposed by bureaucracy and regulations, and liberalizing trade in services and public procurement.

TTIP Negotiations Thus Far

Over the past year, U.S. and EU representatives have met for three rounds of negotiations – the first round was primarily introductory and the other two were more substantive.  The most recent of these negotiation rounds, completed in December, left the U.S. Trade Representative sanguine.  The USTR stated on its website that, “it is a measure of progress that we are firmly in the phase of discussing proposals on core elements of each of the main negotiating areas, as well as beginning to confront and reconcile our differences on many important issues. We have a lot of work to do in 2014, but I am optimistic about what we’ll be able to accomplish in the coming year.”

TTIP in the Coming Year

The next round of TTIP negotiations will be held in Washington, D.C. from March 16 – 20, 2014.  In this fourth round, negotiators expect to work on the wording of provisions designed to ease compliance with existing rules.  Negotiators also expect to draft agreement language to enable U.S. and EU regulators to work together as they draft their respective domestic regulations in the future.  Specific provisions to be addressed in this fourth round will include rules on food safety and animal and plant health, as well as technical regulations, product standards, and testing and certification procedures.  Taken together, these items are often referred to as “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBTs).

The Chief Negotiator for the EU made clear that, although this set of negotiations will focus on the reduction of TBTs, “TTIP is not and will not be a deregulation agenda.”

This statement exemplifies the numerous conflicts that the negotiators will face in the coming year.  They will have a mandate to harmonize two regulatory systems, reducing the NTBs and TBTs without overly compromising or placing inordinate burdens on either system.  In other words, the negotiators must aim to reduce regulatory barriers without having a deregulation agenda – a tough target to hit.

From that conundrum, potential snares for the negotiating team only multiply.  Interest groups and protectionist factions from both sides of the Atlantic will continue to actively oppose the partnership.  Some Europeans will raise an objection that the deal gives away too much to American business interests.  Further, the voices of labor unions, consumer advocates, environmental groups and other skeptics in opposition to TTIP may grow louder as the parties get closer to a final agreement.  Finally, political sways – a backlash against NSA monitoring of European communications as well as elections in the U.S. and EU in 2014 – may adversely affect the ongoing negotiations.

TTIP proponents remain optimistic, however, confident that a deal can be completed by the end of 2014.  We will keep an eye on developments and report on how nimbly these negotiators can manage the myriad concerns to achieve a useful partnership for the economies on both sides of the Atlantic.

Article by:

Reid Whitten

Of:

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

New Export Control Changes Affect Naval Warfare and Ground Vehicles

Morgan Lewis

 

Second phase of the Export Control Reform Initiative allows certain U.S. industries to fall into categories that may make them more attractive to foreign buyers.

On January 6, the Obama administration reached another important milestone of the president’s Export Control Reform (ECR) Initiative, with the second phase of revised export control lists and regulations taking effect.[1] These second phase changes significantly affect naval warfare, ground vehicle, and other industries as they present an opportunity for manufacturers and exporters to reclassify certain items under a more flexible and beneficial regulatory system.

The New Rules

The new lists and regulations continue the process of fundamentally updating the United States’ export control regimes and include revisions to U.S. Munitions List (USML) Categories VI (Vessels of War and Special Naval Equipment), VII (Tanks and Military Vehicles), XIII (Auxiliary Military Equipment), and XX (Submersible Vessels). The revisions transition many less sensitive items from the U.S. Department of State’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) USML to the more flexible Department of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Commerce Control List (CCL).

The new USML controls in these four categories are no longer broad and generic controls that capture everything. They are now detailed, enumerated lists that impose controls based on the sensitivity of an item.

Category VI (Vessels of War and Special Naval Equipment)

“Surface vessels of war” remain in USML Category VI and are now positively defined in new ITAR section 121.15 as the following: battleships, aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, cruisers, corvettes, littoral combat ships, mine sweepers, mine hunters, mine countermeasure ships, dock landing ships, amphibious assault ships, or cutters. Less sensitive items—such as generic parts, components, accessories, or attachments—are now subject to the more flexible authorities of the EAR and will transition to the CCL under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 8A609.

The key to determining whether an item will transition from USML Category VI to the CCL under ECCN 8A609 or another ECCN in the CCL will depend on the application of the new ITAR and EAR definitions of “specially designed.” The revised USML Category VI does not contain controls on all general parts, components, accessories, and attachments specifically designed or modified for a defense article, regardless of their significance to maintaining a military advantage for the United States. Rather, it now contains a positive list of specific types of parts, components, accessories, and attachments that continue to warrant control on the USML. All other parts, components, accessories, and attachments are subject to the new “600 series” controls in Category 8 of the CCL.

Category VII (Tanks and Military Vehicles)

The revision narrows the types of ground vehicles controlled on the USML to only those that warrant control. Changes include the removal of most unarmored and unarmed military vehicles, trucks, trailers, and trains (unless specially designed as firing platforms for weapons above .50 caliber) and armored vehicles (either unarmed or with inoperable weapons) manufactured before 1956. Engines are now covered in revised USML Category XIX.

A significant aspect of the revised USML Category VII is that it does not contain controls on all generic parts, components, accessories, and attachments that are specifically designed or modified for a defense article, regardless of their significance to maintaining a military advantage for the United States. Rather, it contains a positive list of specific types of parts, components, accessories, and attachments that continue to warrant control on the USML. All other parts, components, accessories, and attachments are subject to the new 600 series controls in Category 0 of the CCL.

USML Categories XIII (Auxiliary Military Equipment) and XX (Submersible Vessel) also have been revised similarly. Category XIII continues to control certain cameras and encryption/information security items. Category XX will now control all submersible vessels in a single category, including submarines, as they have been moved from Category VI.

Definition of “Specially Designed”

The definition has a two-part approach. Part one “catches” things that are “specially designed,” and part two releases many types of items from the definition of “specially designed” so that they become not “specially designed.” Assuming an item is caught by part one, the exporter should focus on part two of the definition, i.e., the six separate “releases.”

Under part two, there are six possible ways an item can be released from being specially designed. For example, a part, component, accessory, attachment, or software is not considered to be specially designed if it is, regardless of form or fit, “a fastener (e.g., screws, bolts, nuts, nut plates, studs, inserts, clips, rivets, pins), washer, spacer, insulator, grommet, bushing, spring, wire, or solder.”

Also under part two, a part, component, accessory, attachment, or software is not deemed to be specially designed if it has the same function and performance capabilities and the same or equivalent form and fit as a commodity or software used in or with an item that (i) is or was in production (i.e., not in development) and (ii) is either not enumerated on the CCL or USML or is described in an ECCN controlled only for antiterrorism reasons.

Therefore, exporters and manufacturers should review the new definition of “specially designed” to ascertain if any items pending sale are released from the definition.

Implications

These changes will significantly affect exporters and manufacturers of naval warfare, ground vehicles, and other items as these items may no longer fall under ITAR jurisdiction, making the products more attractive to foreign buyers. Exporters and manufacturers will no longer need a manufacturing license agreement document for foreign manufacture of CCL items. Additionally, because there is no concept of “defense service” under the EAR, providing services related to CCL products will not require any technical assistance agreement documents. Items that become classified as EAR99 generally do not require a license to be exported or reexported to most destinations, and there is no annual registration fee paid to the Commerce Department, unlike under the ITAR. Furthermore, there is no “brokering” registration or licensing under the EAR.

In addition, many of the items moved to the CCL are now eligible for export without specific licenses under EAR license exceptions. One such EAR license exception is strategic trade authorization (STA), which is used when the item is intended for the ultimate end use by the governments of 36 U.S. allies and partners (although such exports carry with them additional compliance requirements). Failure to comply with STA requirements may result in an unlicensed export, opening up the exporter to significant penalties and fines.

On July 1, 2014, five more USML categories are scheduled to transition to the CCL in the third phase of ECR:

  • Category IV (Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs, and Mines)
  • Category V (Explosives and Energetic Materials, Propellants, Incendiary Agents, and Their Constituents)
  • Category IX (Military Training Equipment)
  • Category X (Personal Protective Equipment)
  • Category XVI (Nuclear Weapons Related Articles)

Marynell DeVaughn also contributed to this article.

[1]. For more information on the first phase that occurred in October 2013, view our November 14, 2013 LawFlash, “Export Control Changes Affecting Aircraft Industry Take Effect,” available here. 

Article by:

Of:

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Update on Government Shutdown's Impact on Trade

Katten Muchin

The ongoing federal government shutdown is impacting a wide variety of import and export trade activities. While the situation remains fluid as each agency executes its contingency plans, below is a summary of the current impact on trade.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP): The majority of CBP employees are exempt from the furlough as being deemed essential to the country’s security. Most of those exemptions are related to the agency’s ongoing revenue collections. Currently, ports are maintaining their normal hours of service. CBP also seems to be accepting and processing protests, although with some delays. However, CBP appears to have stopped processing ruling requests or responding to any court documents due to the shutdown. Among the CBP personnel not exempted from furlough are technicians and program managers. As a result, certain additional CBP activities, such as bonds and licensing and processing FDA refusals, may also be impacted.

Food and Drug Administration (FDA): FDA continues to perform entry review and to address high-risk recalls, civil and criminal investigations, and other critical public health issues. However, FDA has furloughed personnel as well, resulting in entry review delays. The agency is giving priority to perishable entries, defined as merchandise expiring within 30 days, and to any lifesaving medical product. The agency has generally ceased routine establishment inspections, monitoring of imports, notification programs such as those involving food contact substances and import formula, and its laboratory research activities.

International Trade Commission (ITC): ITC has shut down its investigative activities, including antidumping and countervailing injury investigations and reviews, and intellectual property rights infringement investigations and ancillary proceedings. The schedules and deadlines for all investigative and pre-institution activities are being tolled and all hearings and conferences have been postponed. In addition, ITC’s website is down, so information such as the online Harmonized Tariff Schedule is not available.

International Trade Administration (ITA): ITA’s website—including the online steel licensing system—is down. The agency recommends sending an email to steel.license@trade.gov for manual processing of license requests for shipments that do not have a steel license. Enforcement and Compliance (formerly, Import Administration) intends to uniformly toll all administrative deadlines related to the administration of US antidumping and countervailing duty laws for the duration of the shutdown. These include deadlines for preliminary and final determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations and administrative reviews and deadlines for all actions by parties to these proceedings.

Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS): BIS is no longer accepting advisory opinion requests, classification requests (CCATS), encryption reviews, encryption registrations or export license applications. Similarly, BIS will not issue any final determinations. The SNAP-R application on BIS’s website is not available and will not reopen until the shutdown ends. All pending export license applications, commodity classification requests, encryption reviews, encryption registrations and advisory opinion requests will be held without action by BIS until the shutdown ends. Applicants may request emergency processing of export license applications for national security reasons.

Department of Agriculture (USDA): USDA’s website is down. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is operating in the ports, but personnel will not be available for the renewal and authorization of notifications or permits.

Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (ATTTB): ATTTB has halted its regulatory functions, noncriminal investigative activities and audit functions. But it will ensure that all tax remittances are processed because these functions have been deemed necessary for safety and protection of property.

As Congress continues to debate the necessary appropriations to fund the government’s operations, the trade community should expect further impact on trade operations.

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Non-Compete Agreements Aren’t for Everyone: The Necessity of Proving a “Legitimate Business Interest”

Womble Carlyle

It is a longstanding tenet of North Carolina law:  A company must have a legitimate business interest to justify using non-competes in its employment agreements.

Employers often focus on specific language describing the scope of their non-competes – should it be six months, one year or two years?  Should it be citywide, statewide, or is a larger territory reasonable?  And although the scope of a non-compete is critical, two recent North Carolina court decisions emphasize that you can’t use a non-compete in just any situation.  There must be a legitimate business interest which merits its use.

What qualifies as a legitimate business interest?

In Pinehurst Surgical Clinic, P.A. v. DiMichele, the NC Court of Appeals enforced an employment agreement prohibiting the defendant physician from practicing medicine in competition with the plaintiff surgical clinic for two years within a 35-mile radius of its Pinehurst facility.

In reversing the trial court’s finding of no irreparable harm, and remanding the case with instructions to grant the PI, the Court focused on several key findings which demonstrated the employer had strong, legitimate and protectable business interests to justify the use of non-competes:

  • In its more than 60 years of existence, the clinic had invested many resources “cultivating relationships with patients, employees, and various entities in the region in which it does business.”
  • The clinic annually spent significant sums “to develop and maintain a loyal patient base and goodwill in the community.”
  • The clinic provided the physician with “extensive confidential information regarding all aspects of plaintiff’s medical practice and business affairs.”
  • The clinic also provided the physician with an extensive patient base and the support necessary to maintain a successful medical practice, reputation and goodwill in the community.

In contrast – and reaching a different result – in Phelps Staffing, LLC v. C.T. Phelps, Inc., the Court of Appeals found that a staffing company failed to establish a legitimate business interest supporting its use of non-competes.   A number of factors undermined the staffing company’s case:

  • The employees at issue were “general laborers”;
  • The employees did not have access to trade secrets or proprietary information; and
  • The staffing company admitted that the primary purpose of the non-compete was to prevent competition from other temporary staffing companies.

The Court had little trouble affirming the trial court’s finding that the non-compete was “merely an attempt to stifle lawful competition between businesses and that it unfairly hinders the ability of plaintiff’s former employees to earn a living.”

These North Carolina cases are in sync with the national trend.  For example, in Gastroenterology Consultants of the North Shore v. Mick S. Meiselman, an Illinois appellate court invalidated a physician’s non-compete because the former employer failed to show a legitimate protectable interest.  The evidence showed that the doctor had been practicing in the relevant territory for about 10 years before his employment with the practice, the practice did not introduce the doctor to his patients or his physician-referral sources, the practice did not advertise, promote or market the doctor’s practice, and the doctor maintained his own office and telephone number.  The practice merely provided some administrative support for the doctor.  As a result, the practice lacked a legitimate interest to justify the non-compete.

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Department of Energy Approves Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Export Authorization for Freeport LNG – A Win for LNG Exports?

Bracewell & Giuliani Logo

The Department of Energy recently authorized Freeport LNG Expansion, L.P. (“FLEX”) to export LNG to non-Free Trade Agreement countries. Importantly, this is the first order on LNG exports issued by the DOE since it collected comments on its two-part LNG Export Study and likely represents the analysis DOE will use in reviewing the queue of pending LNG export applications.

FLEX proposes to export 1.4 Bcf/day from the Freeport LNG terminal, which is situated on the Gulf Coast in Texas. After filing its export application, FLEX secured long-term contracts with three entities for 88 percent of the requested export capacity; most of the gas for export would be sourced from Texas, and in particular, the Eagle Ford Shale.

By way of background, as the domestic natural gas markets shifted to favoring LNG exports in recent years, numerous applications were filed with the DOE for authorization to export LNG. In response to this onslaught, DOE commissioned a two-part study, consisting of (1) an Energy Information Administration study on the effects on increased natural gas exports on domestic energy markets; and (2) a NERA Economic Consulting study on the macroeconomic imports of LNG exports (together, the “LNG Export Study”). The NERA study has recently been the subject of substantial debate as DOE noted that it received over 188,000 comments and 2,700 reply comments, though DOE admits the majority of such comments were nearly identical form letters. Substantive and unique comments numbered nearly 800, with 11 different economic studies prepared by commenters.

In general, the FLEX order is a positive development for LNG exporters for two main reasons:  (1) DOE found the LNG Export Study to be sufficiently reliable and supportive of LNG exports; and (2) DOE strongly suggested that it would let market forces govern LNG exports (while being closely monitored by DOE). The FLEX order tracks with and builds upon DOE’s last order granting authorization for LNG exports to non-FTA countries, Sabine Pass, issued nearly two years ago. In approving the application as “not inconsistent with the public interest,” DOE considered the same public interest factors relied upon in its earlier Sabine Pass order, namely, the economic impacts, international impacts, and security of natural gas supply. DOE continued to consider the factors identified in its now-expired 1984 policy guidelines, including whether the arrangement is consistent with DOE’s policy of promoting market competition.

While at first glance the FLEX order appears to represent a big win for the LNG export industry, there are several conclusions worth attention. Arguably, the order is a broad endorsement of free-market principles as DOE determined the competitive market to be the proper mechanism for allocating a scare resource like natural gas. However, although DOE did not state it would impose limits or caps on LNG exports, DOE did indicate that it will take a “measured approach” in reviewing other pending LNG export applications. “Specifically, DOE/FE will assess the cumulative impacts of each succeeding request for export authorization on the public interest with due regard to the effect on domestic natural gas supply and demand fundamentals.” This approach suggests lower-queued applications may face a higher hurdle due to the cumulative impacts of the preceding applications and possibly suggests that DOE has a “cap” in mind. Third, DOE confirmed that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission will conduct the environmental review, subject to independent review by DOE. Fourth, DOE found that the net economic benefits to the U.S. from LNG exports outweigh potential harms. Fifth, DOE continued to caution LNG export applicants that it will monitor the market and the impact of LNG exports and “may issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders . . . as it may find necessary . . . .” Such statements continue to inject some uncertainty into the contracting process. Finally, DOE suggested that local and regional benefits in terms of employment and income may be important in deciding whether to grant specific applications. Moreover, with respect to FLEX project, DOE noted that no one challenged the data provided by applicant in this regard.

A significant issue raised by commenters on the LNG Export Study was to what extent LNG exports would raise natural gas prices, how natural gas production would react to increased demand, and whether the net economic benefits accruing from LNG exports would outweigh negative impacts for higher domestic natural gas prices. As discussed in the FLEX order, DOE is clearly concerned about these issues, but it found arguments persuasive that the U.S. had a substantial oversupply of natural gas that would mitigate the preceding concerns. DOE cautioned that it would closely monitor the domestic natural gas markets and reiterated its authority to revise or rescind LNG export authorizations should the public interest require it. DOE did not indicate what market conditions would trigger such action, but changes in the domestic natural gas oversupply condition could be pivotal in subsequent approvals of LNG export applications or in rescinding/amending already issued export authorizations.

DOE imposed numerous conditions on the export authorization, including a requirement that FLEX must file publicly with DOE (a) all executed long-term contracts associated with the long-term export of LNG; and (b) all executed long-term contracts associated with the long-term supply of natural gas to the terminal. DOE noted that commercially sensitive provisions may be redacted. DOE also reduced the duration of FLEX’s requested 25-year export authorization and approved only a 20-year authorization.

Overall, our sense is that the FLEX order is a step in the right direction for the LNG exports industry and is a sign that, after a two-year study period, DOE once again will begin its process of issuing non-FTA export authorizations. As previously rumored, we expect that those projects that are further along in the development process (e.g., those that have completed FERC’s pre-filing process and have commercial arrangements in place for a sizable portion of the terminal capacity) will receive priority processing regardless of the project’s place in DOE’s queue. As a result, less developed projects will face greater uncertainty, especially if DOE has a “cap” in mind. Further, project sponsors should continue to include provisions in their contracts that address the possibility that DOE would modify or revoke a non-FTA authorization in the event of changes to the current domestic natural gas oversupply condition.

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U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Expands Reconciliation Opportunities

DrinkerBiddle

In the May 13, 2013 Federal Register, United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announced the expansion of its Reconciliation Prototype program to include post-importation duty preference claims under the U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, and the U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement.  CBP announced this expansion will take effect for post-importation duty preference claims filed on or after August 12, 2013.

The expansion will enable importers to file post-entry duty preference claims under the above-referenced free trade agreements (FTAs) where they are unable to confirm qualification at the time of entry.  Using the Reconciliation program, importers will electronically flag as-yet-unqualified imports at the time of entry.  Presuming the requisite supporting information becomes available within 12 months of the date of entry, importers can then file a Reconciliation entry to make their duty preference claim and receive corresponding duty refunds.  Importers who are not yet part of the Reconciliation program, but would like to take advantage of these expanded opportunities, must apply to participate by submitting the requisite application to CBP Headquarters.

CBP has been utilizing the Reconciliation Prototype program since 1998 as part of its National Customs Automation Program Reconciliation provides importers an automated mechanism to identify at the time of entry certain undeterminable information (that does not affect admissibility), and provide that information at a later date through an entry-by-entry or aggregate filing. Importers identify this provisional information by placing an electronic “flag” at the time the entry summary is filed.  Prior to expansion to allow for various post-entry FTA claims, importers could only flag information relating to: 1) value issues other than claims based on manufacturing defects; 2) classification issues, on a limited basis; 3) issues concerning value aspects of entries filed under heading 9802, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS); and 4) issues concerning merchandise entered under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The expansion of the Reconciliation program to these additional FTAs is consistent with the original opportunities to file post-entry NAFTA claims, as well as previous expansion of the Reconciliation program to include the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement and the Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. As importers have experienced with Reconciliation for NAFTA, allowing for post-importation duty claims under these new trade agreements allows for a streamlined mechanism for filing post-entry refund claims, and allows importers to file potentially thousands of post-entry claims under a single Reconciliation entry and receive a single duty refund check from CBP in response.

Importers may elect not to file their post-entry duty preference claims via the Reconciliation prototype, and expansion of the program does not prohibit importers from continuing to file post-entry claims using traditional processes in accordance with 19 U.S.C § 1520(d).However, once an importer flags an entry summary indicating that it may pursue post-importation duty preference claims via the Reconciliation process, the importer locks itself into the process and waives its rights to file a traditional paper filing pursuant to 19 U.S.C.§ 1520(d). If, after having flagged the entry, an importer fails to file a post-entry Reconciliation claim under one of the approved FTAs, the importer will not be assessed liquidated damages for a late file or no file Reconciliation (which can happen for post-entry valuation adjustments that are flagged but not reconciled). Rather, the flagged FTA entry will simply liquidate at the end of the 12-month period as entered, i.e., with the payment of duties and fees.

Reconciliation can be an effective trade compliance and risk management tool. Among other things, it allows importers to streamline multiple post-entry FTA claims, and can also serve as a compliance vehicle to flag undetermined or provisional values at the time of entry – providing an automated method to make entry corrections or adjustments once the relevant information has been finally determined. The extension of the Reconciliation Prototype to these additional FTAs provides importers with additional tools to manage their duty preference programs.

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Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) New Chairwoman Ramirez Says Health Care Continues To Be Top Priority

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In remarks made this week at the International Competition Network annual conference, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Edith Ramirez stated that health care will continue to be a top priority for the FTC.   Referring to health care and hospital mergers in particular, she said that the Commission will “guard[] against what we consider to be consolidation that may end up having adverse consequences for consumers.”  The Chairwoman’s comments indicate that the recent leadership change at the FTC from former Chairman Jon Leibowitz to Chairwoman Ramirez has not altered the Commission’s priorities.

Recent months have seen a flurry of FTC activity in the courts related to health care.  For example, two FTC cases came before the U.S. Supreme Court this term — the FTC’s challenge to Phoebe Putney’s acquisition of Palmyra Park Hospital in Georgia and the FTC’s challenge to “pay-for-delay” patent infringement litigation settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.

In February, the Supreme Court ruled that the state action doctrine did not immunize Phoebe Putney’s hospital transaction from federal antitrust scrutiny, and the FTC has subsequently filed renewed motions in federal district court to stop further integration of the two hospitals even as it prepares for a full administrative hearing on the merits that will begin in August.

A decision on the “pay-for-delay” case is expected in June.  The Supreme Court’s ruling may have a large impact on further FTC efforts against what it perceives as anticompetitive efforts to delay generic drug entry.

Health care clients considering acquisitions are advised to consult antitrust counsel early in the transaction process.  Given the FTC and DOJ’s close scrutiny of health care transactions, early advocacy before the antitrust agencies is often critical to a deal closing on schedule.

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Office of Foreign Assets Control: Understanding the Federal Agency

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Simi Z. Botic and D. Michael Crites of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP regarding  the climate surrounding our nation’s safety has drastically changed since 9/11: 

Since September 11, 2001, the climate surrounding our nation’s safety has drastically changed. In an effort to promote United States foreign policy and national security goals, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has responded to the changing political environment. Although OFAC is not a recent development, the agency certainly operates with the present security sensitivities in mind.

OFAC operates within the U.S. Department of the Treasury, administering and enforcing economic and trade sanctions. Blocking necessary assets exemplifies one trade sanction often imposed by OFAC. In particular, sanctions are enforced against targeted foreign countries, terrorist regimes, drug traffickers, distributers of weapons of mass destruction, and other individuals, organizations, government entities, and companies that threaten the security or economy of the United States.

By enforcing the necessary economic and trade sanctions, OFAC restricts prohibited transactions. OFAC defines a prohibited transaction as a “trade or financial transaction and other dealing in which U.S. persons may not engage unless authorized by OFAC or expressly exempted by statute.” OFAC is largely responsible for investigating the “prohibited transactions” of individuals, organizations, and companies who operate in foreign nations. OFAC also has the ability to grant exemptions for prohibited transactions on a case-by-case basis.

Administrative subpoenas, vital OFAC investigation tools, allow OFAC to order individuals or entities to keep full and complete records regarding any transaction engaged in, and to furnish these records at any time requested. Both the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 5 U.S.C. § 5, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2), grant OFAC the authority to issue administrative subpoenas.

Adam J. Szubin is the current director of OFAC. In his capacity as director, Mr. Szubin is authorized by 31 CFR § 501.602 to hold hearings, administer oaths, examine witnesses, take depositions, require testimony, and demand the production of any books, documents, or relevant papers relating to the matter of investigation. Once OFAC has issued an administrative subpoena, the addressee is required to respond in writing within thirty calendar days from the date of issuance. The response should be directed to the named Enforcement Investigations Officer, located at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Office of Enforcement, 1500 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.

Should an addressee fail to respond to an administrative subpoena, civil penalties may be imposed. If information is falsified or withheld, the addressees could receive criminal fines and imprisonment. OFAC is authorized to penalize a party up to $50,000 for failure to maintain records. Therefore, should you find yourself the recipient of an OFAC administrative subpoena, it is imperative that you do not delay in responding. Typically, OFAC requests detailed information about payments or transactions, along with documentation to support such information. The subpoena response should be drafted by your attorney. The addressee of the letter should not have direct communication with OFAC. Counsel for the addressee should also follow up with the individual OFAC officer to make sure that all necessary paperwork was received.

Lastly, entities are encouraged to make voluntary disclosures when there has been an OFAC violation. Once a subpoena has been issued, disclosures are no longer considered voluntary. If information is turned over in response to an administrative subpoena, it may then be referred to other law enforcement agencies for possible criminal investigation and prosecution. Therefore, if there is a possible violation of OFAC, it is in your best interest to consult with counsel about the proper steps to take moving forward.

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