FTC Staff Issue Report on Multi-Level Marketing Income Disclosure Statements

Staff reviewed income disclosure statements in February 2023 that were publicly available on the websites of a wide array of MLMs, from large household names to smaller, less well-known companies, according to FTC attorneys. “These statements are sometimes provided to consumers who are considering joining MLMs, and often purport to show information about income that recruits could expect to receive.”

According to the report, FTC staff found a number of issues with the statements they reviewed, including that most omit key information when calculating the earnings amounts they present. Specifically, the report notes that most of the reviewed statements do not include participants with low or no earnings in their display of earnings amounts and also don’t account for the expenses faced by participants, which can outstrip the income they make. The report notes that these omissions are often not plainly disclosed in the income statements.

The report also notes that most statements emphasize the high earnings of a small group of participants, and many entirely omit or only inconspicuously disclose key information about the limited earnings made by most participants. In addition, the staff report notes that most of the disclosure statements staff reviewed present earnings information in a potentially confusing way, “like giving average earnings amounts for groups that could have very different actual incomes, or using annual income figures that aren’t based on what an actual group of participants made for the year.”

The report also notes based on staff’s analysis of data in the income disclosure statements, including information included in fine print, that many participants in those MLMs received no payments from the MLMs, and the vast majority received $1,000 or less per year—that is, less than $84 per month, on average.

“The FTC staff report documents an analysis of 70 publicly available income disclosure statements from a wide range of MLMs — big and well-known to smaller companies. The report found that these income disclosure statements showed most participants made $1,000 or less per year — that’s less than $84 dollars per month. And that may not account for expenses. In at least 17 MLMs, most participants didn’t make any money at all.”

As referenced above, the staff report documents (and provides numerous examples of) how most of the publicly available MLM income disclosure statements used all the following tactics:
  • Emphasizing the high dollar amounts made by a relatively small number of MLM participants.
  • Leaving out or downplaying important facts, like the percentage of participants who made no money.
  • Presenting income data in potentially confusing ways.
  • Ignoring expenses incurred by participants — even though expenses can, and in some MLMs often do, outstrip income.

Understanding How U.S. Export Controls Affect Manufacturers’ Hiring Practices

The U.S. government has adjusted export control regulations in an effort to protect U.S. national security interests. The revisions primarily affect export of electronic computing items and semiconductors to prevent foreign powers from obtaining critical technologies that may threaten national security. As manufacturers are facing increased demand for their products and critical labor shortages, they may find themselves seeking to hire foreign national talent and navigating U.S. export control and immigration and anti-discrimination laws.

Export Control Laws in United States

The primary export control laws in the United States are the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Under these regulations, U.S. Persons working for U.S. companies can access export-controlled items without authorization from the U.S. government. U.S. Persons include: U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, Lawful permanent residents, Refugees, and Asylees. Employers might need authorization from the appropriate federal agency to “export” (in lay terms, share or release) export-controlled items to workers who are not U.S. Persons, which the regulations call foreign persons. Employers apply for such authorization from either the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Department of Commerce, depending on the item.

The release of technical data or technology to a foreign person that occurs within the United States is “deemed” to be an export to the foreign person’s “home country.” Whether an export license is required for a particular release may depend on both the nature of export controls applicable to the technology or technical data (including whether it is subject to the ITAR or EAR) and the citizenship of the foreign person.

Recent revisions to the EAR cover controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), computer commodities that contain such ICs, and certain semiconductor manufacturing items, among other controls. These revisions particularly affect semiconductor and chip manufacturers and exporters.

Intersection With Immigration and Anti-Discrimination Laws

The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 prohibit discrimination based on protected characteristics.

The INA prohibits discrimination based on national origin or citizenship, among other characteristics. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race and national origin, which typically includes discrimination based on citizenship or immigration status. Furthermore, the INA prohibits “unfair documentary practices,” which are identified as instances where employers request more or different documents than those necessary to verify employment eligibility or request such documents with the intent to discriminate based on national origin or citizenship.

The intersection of export control laws, immigration, and anti-discrimination laws can create a confusing landscape for employers, particularly manufacturers or exporters of export-controlled items. Manufacturers and exporters, like all employers, must collect identity and employment authorization documentation to ensure I-9 compliance. At the same time, however, they must collect information relating to a U.S. Person in connection with export compliance assessments. To address these areas of exposure for employers, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division released an employer fact sheet to provide guidance for employers that includes best practices to avoid discrimination.

Implications

To ensure compliance under these rules, employers should separate the I-9 employment authorization documentation process from the export control U.S. Person or foreign person identification process. Employers should implement or revisit internal procedures and provide updated training to employees.

The export rule revisions highlight the challenges for employers in avoiding discrimination when complying with export control laws. Manufacturers and exporters should review their compliance practices regarding U.S. export control, immigration, and anti-discrimination laws with experienced counsel. Employers should implement policies and procedures reasonably tailored to address export control compliance requirements while not engaging in discrimination on the basis of citizenship or national origin.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024

by: Maurice G. Jenkins , Kimberly M. Bennett of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more news on Export Control Laws, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.

Third Time’s a Charm? SEC & CFTC Finalize Amendments to Form PF

On February 8, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) jointly adopted amendments to Form PF, the confidential reporting form for certain registered investment advisers to private funds. Form PF’s dual purpose is to assist the SEC’s and CFTC’s regulatory oversight of private fund advisers (who may be both SEC-registered investment advisers and also registered with the CFTC as commodity pool operators or commodity trading advisers) and investor protection efforts, as well as help the Financial Stability Oversight Council monitor systemic risk. In addition, the SEC entered into a memorandum of understanding with the CFTC to facilitate data sharing between the two agencies regarding information submitted on Form PF.

Continued Spotlight on Private Funds

The continued focus on private funds and private fund advisers is a recurring theme. The SEC recently adopted controversial and sweeping new rules governing many activities of private funds and private fund advisers. The SEC’s Division of Examinations also continues to highlight private funds in its annual examination priorities. Form PF is similarly no stranger to recent revisions and expansions in its scope. First, in May 2023, the SEC adopted requirements for certain advisers to hedge funds and private equity funds to provide current reporting of key events (within 72 hours). Second, in July 2023, the SEC finalized amendments to Form PF for large liquidity fund advisers to align their reporting requirements with those of money market funds. And last week, this third set of amendments to Form PF, briefly discussed below.

SEC Commissioner Peirce, in dissent:

“Boundless curiosity is wonderful in a small child; it is a less attractive trait in regulatory agencies…. Systemic risk involves the forest — trying to monitor the state of every individual tree at every given moment in time is a distraction and trades off the mistaken belief that we have the capacity to draw meaning from limitless amounts of discrete and often disparate information. Unbridled curiosity seems to be driving this decision rather than demonstrated need.”

Additional Reporting by Large Hedge Fund Advisers on Qualifying Hedge Funds

These amendments will, among other things, expand the reporting requirements for large hedge fund advisers with regard to “qualifying hedge funds” (i.e., hedge funds with a net asset value of at least $500 million). The amendments will require additional disclosures in the following categories:

  • Investment exposures, borrowing and counterparty exposures, currency exposures, country and industry exposures;
  • Market factor effects;
  • Central clearing counterparty reporting;
  • Risk metrics;
  • Investment performance by strategy;
  • Portfolio, financing, and investor liquidity; and
  • Turnover.

While the final amendments increase the amount of fund-level information the Commission will receive with regard to individual qualifying hedge funds, at the same time, the Commission has eliminated the aggregate reporting requirements in Section 2a of Form PF (noting, in its view, that such aggregate information can be misleading).

Enhanced Reporting by All Hedge Funds

The amendments will require more detailed reporting on Form PF regarding:

  • Hedge fund investment strategies (while digital assets are now an available strategy to select from, the SEC opted not to adopt its proposed definition of digital assets, instead noting that if a strategy can be classified as both a digital asset strategy and another strategy, the adviser should report the strategy as the non-digital asset strategy);
  • Counterparty exposures (including borrowing and financing arrangements); and
  • Trading and clearing mechanisms.

Other Amendments That Apply to All Form PF Filers

  • General Instructions. Form PF filers will be required to report separately each component fund of a master-feeder arrangement and parallel fund structure (rather than in the aggregate as permitted under the existing Form PF), other than a disregarded feeder fund (e.g., where a feeder fund invests all its assets in a single master fund, US treasury bills, and/or “cash and cash equivalents”). In addition, the amendments revise how filers will report private fund investments in other private funds, “trading vehicles” (a newly defined term), and other funds that are not private funds. For example, Form PF will now require an adviser to include the value of a reporting fund’s investments in other private funds when responding to questions on Form PF, including determining filing obligations and reporting thresholds (unless otherwise directed by the Form).
  • All Private Funds. Form PF filers reporting information about their private funds will report additional and/or new information regarding, for example: type of private fund; identifying information about master-feeder arrangements, internal and external private funds, and parallel fund structures; withdrawal/redemption rights; reporting of gross and net asset values; inflows/outflows; base currency; borrowings and types of creditors; fair value hierarchy; beneficial ownership; and fund performance.

Final Thoughts

With the recent and significant regulatory spotlight on investment advisers to private funds and private funds themselves, we encourage advisers to consider the interrelationships between new data reporting requirements on Form PF and the myriad of new regulations and disclosure obligations being imposed on investment advisers more generally (including private fund advisers).

The effective date and compliance date for new final amendments to Form PF is 12 months following the date of publication in the Federal Register.

Robert Bourret also contributed to this article.

International Trade, Enforcement & Compliance Recent Developments Update (January 17, 2024)

One of the most consistent messages coming from the U.S. government is that multinational companies need to take control of their supply chains. Forced labor, human trafficking, supply chain transparency, OFAC sanctions, even conflict minerals — all are areas in which the best defense against potential violations is strong compliance and due diligence to ensure that companies properly manage their supply chains, rights down to the last supplier. Today’s mix of enforcement actions and guidance from the U.S. government underscores the importance of doing so.

EXPORT CONTROLS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The Department of Commerce has stated that it has the authority to put companies on the Entity List (requiring special licensing and restrictions) solely for human rights violations. Does your company conduct full due diligence on its suppliers and sub-suppliers to ensure that they are operating in accordance with U.S. forced labor and human trafficking laws?

FORCED LABOR/UFLPA

The Department of Homeland Security continues to add Chinese and other companies to the Uyghur Forced Labor and Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List. Does your organization specifically screen against the UFLPA Entity List, as well as have in place UFLPA compliance and due diligence measures?

FORCED LABOR/UFLPA

The U.S. government has issued a pointed six-agency set of compliance guidelines regarding “the Risks and Considerations for Businesses and Individuals with Exposure to Entities Engaged in Forced Labor and other Human Rights Abuses linked to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” Does your organization maintain a compliance policy, vendor code of conduct, supply chain transparency and due diligence procedures, and other measures designed to ensure your supply chain is free of forced labor, human trafficking, or goods sourced from forced labor in the Xingjian Autonomous Region?

CUSTOMS PENALTY FOR ERRONEOUS USE OF FIRST SALE RULE

Due to the imposition of special Section 301 tariffs on most goods from Customs, many companies have begun to use the first sale rule, which allows the reporting of a lower value where there is a bona fide sale to a middleman. Improper application of the rule, however, can be the basis for substantial penalties, as an apparel company that paid a $1.3 million settlement with the DOJ found out. If your company uses the first sale rule, do you regularly review pricing and relevant circumstances to ensure you are meeting all the requirements for all entries?

EXPORT CONTROLS

Pledging “a new era of trilateral partnership,” the U.S., Japan, and South Korea governments have announced expanded collaboration to fight illegal exports of dual-use products, including high-tech products that might be shipped to China in violation of U.S. export controls. Has your organization performed a recent classification review to confirm it is aware of any restrictions that might adhere to the export of any of its products to sensitive countries, governments, or users?

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Is Coming… Are You Ready? CBP Issues Hints at the Wave of Enforcement To Come

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.

What to Know

  • US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued some guidance relating to its enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) prior to June 21, 2022, the effective date of the rebuttable presumption.
  • The new guidance imposes tighter timelines and a higher burden of evidence on importers to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor. If CBP does not make a decision within specific timeframes, goods will automatically be deemed excluded.
  • CBP is expected to issue additional technical guidance at the end of May or early June. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is also expected to issue guidance closer to June 21, 2022.
  • CBP is scheduled to host informational webinars detailing their UFLPA guidance in the coming weeks.

What’s New: Tighter Timelines  

While US importers were eagerly anticipating the issuance of technical guidance regarding implementation of the UFLPA from CBP last week, which is now expected this week, CBP did post a new guidance document summarizing the UFLPA and forced labor Withhold Release Orders (WRO) enforcement mechanisms. Specifically, CBP’s authority to detain merchandise under the UFLPA will be pursuant to 19 CFR § 151.16, which provides for a much different timeline for the detention of merchandise than the WRO process. Under this process, if Customs does not make a timely decision regarding admissibility, goods are automatically excluded.

UFLPA Timeline Enforcement under 19 CFR § 151.16

Number of Days

Actions

5 Days from Presentation for Examination

CBP must decide whether to release or detail merchandise

  • If the merchandise is not released, it is detained
5 Days after Decision to Release or Detain

CBP will issue a notice to importer advising them of:

  • The initiation of detention
  • Date merchandise examined
  • Reason for detention
  • Anticipated length of detention
  • Nature of tests and inquiries to be conducted
  • Information to accelerate disposition
  Upon written request, CBP must provide importer with testing procedures, methodologies used, and testing results
Within 30 Days of Examination

CBP will make a final determination as to the admissibility of merchandise

  • If CBP does not make a determination within the 30-day period, the merchandise will be deemed excluded
  • This means any submission to rebut the presumption should be made before this 30 day period
Within 180 Days of CBP Determination/Exclusion Importers may protest CBP’s final determination
Within 30 Days After Protest Submitted The protest is deemed denied if CBP does not grant or deny the protest within 30 days
Within 180 Days after the Date the Protest is Denied

The importer may commence a court action contesting the denied protest (28 U.S.C. § 1581(a))

  • In a court action, CBP must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an admissibility decision has been reached for good cause
  • Customs can decide to grant the protest after the deemed denial but before a court case is filed

This is a much shorter timeline than the WRO process. Importantly, a company contesting CBP’s detention of merchandise pursuant to the UFLPA would be required to submit documentation to rebut the presumption within the 30-day period that CBP is assessing admissibility, whereas the WRO process permits 90 days. Like the WRO process, the importer may also file a protest 180 days after CBP makes its final determination regarding the exclusion.

CBP Listening Session: A Higher Burden of Evidence 

On Tuesday, May 24, 2022, CBP provided information regarding the publication of guidance and enforcement of the UFLPA:

  • CBP Publication of Guidance. CBP’s guidance regarding its enforcement of the rebuttable presumption and the UFLPA is scheduled to be published the week of May 30.
  • DHS Publication of Guidance. DHS guidance will be published on or about June 21, 2022, which will include information relating to supply chain due diligence, importer guidance, and the entity lists.
  • Clear and Convincing Evidence Required to Rebut the Presumption that Merchandise was Produced with Forced Labor. It was confirmed that the UFLPA will have a much higher burden of evidence required to rebut the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor than that of a WRO. Any exception to the rebuttable presumption must be reported to Congress, and thus the level of evidence that will be required to overcome the rebuttable presumption is very high. As a practical matter, it appears that very few detained entries will be released. Importers are advised to start conducting due diligence on supply chains in order to ensure that they will be able to obtain documentation should merchandise be detained once the rebuttable presumption goes into effect. Importantly, products that are subject to an existing WRO from Xinjiang will now be enforced under the UFLPA process instead of the WRO process.
  • Evidence Required if Merchandise is Detained. The forthcoming guidance will set forth information regarding how an importer may meet the exception to the rebuttable presumption and to demonstrate that merchandise was not produced with forced labor, by meeting the following three criteria:
    • Demonstrate compliance with the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force/DHS strategy;
    • Demonstrate compliance with CBP’s guidance and any inquiries that CBP raises; and
    • Provide clear and convincing evidence that the supply chain in question is free of forced labor.
  • Binding Rulings. Importers may apply for a binding ruling to confirm or request an exception to the rebuttable presumption under the UFLPA. Although CBP is still finalizing the process for importers to apply for a binding ruling, importers would be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that merchandise is not produced with forced labor. If the ruling is granted, it applies to future shipments for the specific supply chain in question.
  • Known Importer Letters and Detention Notices. Going forward, CBP will not issue Known Importer letters, and CBP will notify importers that merchandise is subject to the UFLPA through the issuance of detention notices.
  • Detention of Merchandise. If goods are detained by CBP because they are suspected of having a nexus to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), importers may either provide clear and convincing evidence that merchandise was not produced with forced labor or export the products. If detained products that fall under the UFLPA are comingled with other products that are not subject to the UFLPA, importers may request the segregation of the merchandise that is not subject to the UFLPA.
  • Chain of CBP Review for Importer Submissions Relating to Detained Merchandise. Chain of CBP review for the request of an exception to the rebuttable presumption has not been finalized yet. However, importers will be required to submit evidence that rebuts the presumption that merchandise was produced with forced labor to the applicable CBP Port Director. For the moment, the CBP Commissioner is the final individual who can ultimately make an exception to the rebuttable presumption, but CBP is deciding if it will delegate this responsibility to any additional persons.

Upcoming CBP Informational Webinars

CBP will be holding three webinar sessions, all covering the same material, to discuss and review its guidance relating to the UFLPA. The dates of the webinars and the registration links are listed below.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

Europol: More Than Half of Counterfeits Originate in China

On March 7, 2022, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) jointly released the Intellectual Property Crime Threat Assessment 2022. Per the Assessment, China (including Hong Kong) was the main source of counterfeits based on number of counterfeits and by value of the counterfeits seized at the EU external borders.  Almost 76% of the fake goods detained were for trademark infringement; design infringement was the second most reported at 23% while copyright was third with 15%.

China and Turkey remain the main countries of origins for counterfeit clothing, shoes, bags, watches, and jewelry seized at the EU’s border. These goods are mostly ordered online and discovered as part of postal shipments or on passengers entering the EU.

Similarly, China is the country of origin for most of the seized counterfeit electrical/electronic and computer equipment, mobile phones and accessories. With respect to mobile phones, the Assessment states,

…the visual appearance of the counterfeit devices is very convincing, closely mimicking the external characteristics of the original phones. However, typically some features and software characteristics are missing and the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is often fake.  The use of cheap and substandard electric components, which can be found in fake batteries, headphones or chargers, pose safety risks.

“China and Turkey were among the most frequently reported non-EU countries of origin for counterfeit food and drink seized at the EU’s external border.” Similarly, counterfeit perfumes and cosmetic products often originate from China and Turkey.

In addition to ready-to-use IPR-infringing goods, product components, such as aroma compounds, fixatives and solvents, are increasingly being seized. These components are used to create the final counterfeit products in the EU.

More worrisome, China and Turkey were the main origin of counterfeit pharmaceutical products.

Toys round out the top 10 counterfeits with China also being main point of origin.

The full Assessment is available here: IP_Crime_Threat_Assessment_2022_FullR_en.

© 2022 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Same As It Ever Was: FDA Reiterates That CBD Cannot Be Included in Food or Dietary Supplements

While we enter a new season this week, the same cannot be said for the FDA which, on November 16, reiterated that its approach to regulating the cannabidiol (CBD) industry will be “the same as it ever was”—a regulatory minefield. Grail Sipes, acting Deputy Center Director for Regulatory Policy at the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, emphasized the agency’s position that it needs additional CBD research and safety data before the agency will consider CBD for uses beyond prescription drugs, including usage as a food additive or dietary supplement. This, she said, is because “clear answers to many important questions are still lacking, such as what adverse reactions may be associated with CBD from hemp-derived products and what risks are associated with the long term use of these products.”

So why should industry stakeholders care about the FDA’s opinion anyway? Wasn’t hemp-derived CBD legalized at the federal level by the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, also known as the Farm Bill?

Yes, but as we discussed in a previous blog post, the FDA and FTC have overlapping enforcement authority over CBD marketing, with the FDA having primary authority over labeling. The FDA has previously issued guidance stating that CBD can be used as an ingredient in cosmetics so long as it does not cause the product to be “adulterated or misbranded.” However, a product containing CBD cannot be marketed as a drug absent FDA approval—a lengthy and costly process. Companies marketing CBD products must therefore ensure compliance with the FDA’s labeling requirements and guidance regarding CBD products.

The FDA has not been shy to issue warning letters to CBD companies that fail to heed the agency’s labeling requirements and guidance. Starting in April 2019, the FDA (together with the FTC) began issuing warning letters to companies marketing CBD products as treatments and cures for a variety of diseases and illnesses. Those agencies continued to issue warning letters for marketing and labeling violations throughout 2019, largely for improper health-based claims about CBD products (those letters are described in more detail here and here). The most recent iteration came in 2021 when the agencies issued two warning letters to companies selling over-the-counter (OTC) drugs for pain relief that contained CBD. Sipes made clear the FDA will continue to monitor the CBD marketplace and issue warning letters to companies making improper health claims in her November 16 comments.

Given these comments, we can expect the cat-and-mouse game between federal regulators and CBD companies that push the marketing envelope to continue. To mitigate the risk of falling within the FDA’s crosshairs, CBD companies must ensure compliance with the various state and federal regulations governing the labeling and advertising of their products. We provided several marketing dos and don’ts in a previous blog post. But given the FDA’s unchanging position, the biggest takeaway remains the same: don’t make claims that a CBD product “can prevent, treat, or cure” or a disease.

Article By Rachel L. Sodée and J. Hunter Robinson of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

For more news on biotech, food, and drug law, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2021 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

U.S.-China Trade Deal Shows Potential for Improved U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China

A result of negotiating techniques from Donald Trump’s book “The Art of the Deal” or a result of strategies from the ancient Chinese military strategy treatise “The Art of War”?

Who knows, but on January 15, 2020, the United States (“U.S.”) and China signed Phase One of the Economic and Trade Agreement between the U.S. and China (the “Agreement”).  The Agreement, which is set to go into force on February 14, 2020, attempts to end or at least ease the trade war tensions between the world’s two economic behemoths.  The Agreement, amongst other issues, addresses protection and enforcement of U.S. intellectual Property (“IP”) rights in China.  While the Agreement does not resolve all IP protection and enforcement concerns faced by U.S. businesses in China, it is certainly a step in the right direction.

The importance of IP in establishing a fair and balanced bilateral economic and trade relationship is evident in the fact that the entire first two chapters of the Agreement are dedicated to IP protection and enforcement in China.  The Agreement addresses numerous areas of IP, including trade secrets, pharmaceutical related IP, patents, piracy and counterfeiting, trademarks, technology transfer, and other related topics.

The Agreement puts much of the responsibility on China to revamp its laws and develop new policies and procedures to implement the provisions of the Agreement and to address the long-standing concerns that have existed with regard to protection and enforcement of U.S. IP in China.

Discussed below are some of the areas under the Agreement where China has agreed to implement new laws and procedures to protect U.S. intellectual property.  In return, the U.S. has agreed to affirm that it already has equivalent or similar protection and enforcement mechanisms in place.

Trade Secrets

  • The definition of trade secret is expanded to include confidential business information.
  • The scope of acts that constitutes trade secret misappropriation is broadened to include electronic intrusions, breaches or inducement of a breach of duty not to disclose, and other unauthorized disclosures or uses.
  • Implements burden-shifting in civil proceedings, shifting to the accused party where the holder of a trade secret has produced evidence of a reasonable indication of trade secret misappropriation by the accused party.
  • Adopts provisional measures to prevent the use of misappropriated trade secrets.
  • Eliminates the requirement that the holder of a trade secret establishes actual losses prior to initiation of a criminal investigation for misappropriation.
  • Provides for the application of criminal procedures and penalties to address willful trade secret misappropriation through theft, fraud, physical or electronic intrusion for an unlawful purpose.
  • Prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of undisclosed information, trade secrets, or confidential business information by government personnel involved in government proceedings in which such information is submitted and provides criminal, civil, and administrative penalties for such unauthorized disclosure.

Pharmaceutical-Related Intellectual Property

  • Permits pharmaceutical patent applicants to rely on supplemental data to satisfy relevant requirements for patentability, during patent examination proceedings, patent review proceedings, and judicial proceedings.
  • Provides (a) a system to provide notice to a patent holder, licensee, or holder of marketing approval, that a person is seeking to market that product during the term of an applicable patent claiming the approved product or its approved method of use; (b) adequate time and opportunity for such a patent holder to timely seek available remedies; and (c) procedures for judicial or administrative proceedings and expeditious remedies, for resolution of disputes concerning the validity or infringement of an applicable patent claiming an approved pharmaceutical product.
  • With regard to pharmaceutical-related patents on new products and methods of use, provides an extension of the patent term, due to unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result of the marketing approval process, of up to five years, and may limit the resulting effective patent term to no more than 14 years from the date of marketing approval in China.

Patents

  • Provides patent term extensions to compensate for unreasonable delays that occur in granting the patent or during pharmaceutical product marketing approvals. For this provision, an unreasonable delay shall at least include a delay in the issuance of the patent of more than four years from the date of filing, or three years after a request for examination of the application, whichever is later.

Piracy and Counterfeiting on E-Commerce Platforms

  • Provides enforcement procedures that permit effective and expeditious action by right holders against infringement that occurs in the online environment, including an effective notice and takedown system to address infringement.
  • Provides that e-commerce platforms may have their operating licenses revoked for repeated failures to curb the sale of counterfeit or pirated goods.

Geographical Indications

  • Provides that when determining whether a term is generic in China, how consumers understand the term in China will be taken in to account.

Manufacture and Export of Pirated and Counterfeit Goods

  • Provides effective and expeditious enforcement action against the related products of counterfeit medicines and biologics, including active pharmaceutical ingredients, bulk chemicals, and biological substances.
  • Sharing with the U.S. the registration information of pharmaceutical raw material sites that have been inspected and that comply with the requirements of Chinese laws and regulations; and publishing data on enforcement measures, including seizures, revocations of business licenses, fines, and other actions taken by the National Medical Products Administration, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, or any successor entity.
  • Significantly increasing the number of enforcement actions and publishing data online on the measurable impact of these actions each quarter.
  • Seizing and destroying counterfeit or pirated goods, including the materials and implements used in the manufacture or creation of such pirated or counterfeit goods.
  • Requiring a counterfeiter to pay right holders the profits from infringement or damages adequate to compensate for the injury from the infringement.
  • Increase the number of trained personnel to inspect for counterfeit and pirated goods.
  • Ensure that all government agencies and all entities that the government owns or controls install and use only licensed software.

Trademarks

  • Provide for criminal enforcement if there is “reasonable suspicion” based on articulable facts that a criminal violation of an intellectual property right has occurred.
  • Provide civil and criminal penalties sufficient to deter future intellectual property theft or infringements. 

Implementation

  • Within 30 working days after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, China will present an action plan to strengthen intellectual property protection and shall include measures that China will take to implement its obligations and the date by which each measure will go into effect.

Technology Transfer

  • Provides that U.S. businesses are able to operate openly and freely in China without any force or pressure to transfer key technology as a requirement for operating in China.

What does this all mean?  Well it’s hard to tell really at this point as the Agreement does not actually implement any new laws or regulations, but rather is a bunch of promises between China and the U.S.  Until China implements new laws or regulations to fulfill its promises we can really only speculate on its true impact.  Of course, implementation of new laws or regulations is only effective if there is suitable enforcement to back it up.  However, most would agree that if China does fulfill its obligations we can expect to see stronger economic and trade relations between the U.S. and China, in particular giving U.S. businesses greater confidence and predictability in protecting and enforcing their IP rights in China.


© 2020 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

For more on international trade negotiations, see the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation law section.

Can U.S. Companies Insure Against A Trade War?

The recent trade deal between the U.S. and China was welcome news for U.S. companies with investments in China.  The tenuous relationship between the countries, however, continues to cause substantial uncertainty for U.S. investors.  Their concerns are not unique to China—the Trump Administration has taken an aggressive trade stance even with nations usually considered friendly, including Brazil, Argentina, and France.

A growing number of companies are turning to political risk insurance to protect their foreign investments.  Such policies typically cover a variety of commercial losses stemming from political events, including expropriation, political violence, or currency conversion restrictions.

Are political risk policies a valuable tool in a company’s arsenal for mitigating the uncertainties of doing business in China or other countries embroiled in a trade war with the United States?  The answer depends, in large part, on the specific wording of the policy at issue.  There is no standard political risk policy form, and jurisprudence on such policies is extremely limited.  Potential policyholders must evaluate their needs carefully and be strategic during policy placement to ensure they are maximizing potential coverage.  For example:

Expropriation:  Political risk policies may cover losses stemming not only from a government’s outright nationalization or expropriation of a policyholder’s assets, but also from more subtle forms of unlawful discrimination against foreign entities.  The bounds of such coverage, however, are not always clear.  Many policies exclude incidental damages arising from lawful or legitimate acts of governance, which may give rise to disputes between policyholders and insurers as to the nature and motivation of a particular governmental act.

For example, the Chinese Government imposed tariffs and restrictions on U.S. companies doing business in China throughout 2019.  A policyholder seeking coverage for losses suffered due to these measures would argue that the restrictions were retaliatory acts in response to the U.S.-China trade war, meaning that its damages arose from covered acts of discrimination in violation of international law.  An insurer seeking to limit its coverage obligations may argue that China imposed these restrictions based on its view that the companies had violated market rules or otherwise damaged the interests of Chinese companies for noncommercial reasons—in other words, that these were legitimate act of governance taken in the public interest.

Given the lack of case law on the intended scope of expropriation coverage and the fact-intensive nature of disputes over the legitimacy of a particular governmental act, companies should seek to include the broadest possible definition of “expropriation” in their policy and to clarify the bounds of any exclusions.

Political Violence:  In addition to coverage for expropriation and related governmental acts, political risk policies also may provide coverage for losses stemming from physical damage to property due to protests, riots, or other acts of violence intended to achieve a political objective.  While U.S. investors may not commonly associate trade wars with physical violence, recent protests and riots over economic issues in countries such as Chile and Ecuador demonstrate the potential for severe economic turmoil (a common result of any trade war) to cause such violence.  As a result, U.S. companies with warehouses, offices, or other property in countries facing aggressive trade restrictions by the U.S., or in any nation suffering from substantial economic uncertainty, may find such coverage appealing.

The potential benefit of political violence coverage may depend, in large part, on how a policy proposes to determine the value of any damaged property or resulting financial losses.  Potential policyholders should ensure, for example, that a loss is valued pursuant to objective accounting standards and/or by a neutral third-party, as opposed to the insurer, who may have an interest in minimizing its liability.

Currency Inconvertibility:  A third component of political risk insurance is currency inconvertibility coverage—i.e., coverage for losses arising from a policyholder’s inability to convert currency due to exchange restrictions posed by a foreign government.  For example, such coverage might apply if a policyholder is unable to obtain repayment of a loan to a Chinese entity because of new restrictions by the Chinese Government on conversion of local currency to U.S. dollars or the transfer of funds to U.S. banks.  U.S. companies with investments in countries facing particularly extreme economic instability, such as Venezuela, may benefit most from such coverage, as those countries are most at risk for collapse of their currency exchange system.

As with political violence coverage, a policy’s proposed standards for valuing a currency inconvertibility loss are once again crucial to maximizing a policyholder’s protection.  Policies often calculate the value of a policyholder’s loss using the foreign country’s exchange rate on the date of loss.  In such scenarios, policyholders may benefit from defining the “date of loss” as occurring the first time the policyholder is unable to convert currency, as opposed to after a waiting period has occurred or after the insured has made multiple conversion attempts.  This may minimize the risk that the value of a covered loss decreases if the exchange rate in the country plummets while the insured fulfills other conditions for coverage.

Political risk policies likely cannot insulate U.S. companies from the full impact of a global trade war or other politically-inspired disruptions.  However, U.S. businesses can maximize the benefits of such coverage through careful policy drafting and strategic evaluation of their individual risk profile.


© 2020 Gilbert LLP

ARTICLE BY Emily P. Grim of Gilbert LLP.
More on recent US trade negotiations on the National Law Review Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation page.

Brexit – Here We Go Again

The new Prime Minister of the UK, Boris Johnson, has taken up office following his decisive (66% : 34%) victory in the contest among Conservative Party members who were presented with a choice between him and the Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt. He promised during the campaign to take the UK out of the EU by 31 October (when the extension to the Article 50 Brexit process expires) “do or die”. In his first speech as PM, he again underlined his determination that the UK should leave the EU by 31 October. He said that his intention was that this should be with a new deal – “no deal” was a remote possibility which would only happen if the EU refused to negotiate. But it was right to intensify preparations for “no deal”, which could be lubricated by retaining the £39 billion financial settlement previously agreed with the EU.

So the starting gun for the next phase of Brexit has fired.

What Does the Campaign Tell Us About the Approach to Brexit?

The Conservative leadership election campaign happened in two parts. The first, among MPs, whittled the long list of candidates down to two. Perhaps conscious of the broad spread of opinion among Conservative MPs, both final candidates took a nuanced line during that phase, stressing their desire to leave the EU with a (revised) deal. In the second phase, which involved selection between the two by the broader membership of the Conservative Party (roughly 160,000 people), the tone hardened notably. Polling suggests that a majority of the Conservative Party membership puts delivering Brexit ahead of the economy, the survival of the union of the UK and even the survival of the Conservative Party itself (polling after Theresa May’s European Parliament elections suggests that two thirds of party members voted for another party in those elections, with nearly 60% voting for Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party). Only averting the prospect of a Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Government is apparently a higher priority for Conservative Party members. Responding to this sentiment, the position of both candidates became harder through the second phase of the campaign. While both favoured leaving with a deal, both were clear that the threat of a “no deal” exit must be real in order to stimulate further negotiations with the EU. Both, therefore, also favoured ramping up “no deal” preparations. In the end, the main difference between the two candidates was that Jeremy Hunt could countenance a “short” further delay to Brexit if that was necessary to secure a deal from the EU, whereas Boris Johnson promised that the UK would leave the EU on 31 October “come what may, do or die”. Significantly, in one of the last public hustings during the campaign, Boris Johnson also ruled out making changes to the Irish border backstop in the Withdrawal Agreement. His approach to how to deliver Brexit could be summarised as: deliver on citizens’ rights straight away, have a “standstill” on trade (not clear how this differs from the transitional period in the Withdrawal Agreement – it would certainly involve zero tariffs on both sides, but unclear whether it would involve regulatory alignment (see trade negotiations section below), still less continued jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice), resolve the Irish border through a comprehensive trade agreement and create “constructive ambiguity” about whether/when the UK would accept the €39 billion exit settlement in the Withdrawal Agreement – presumably making it contingent on the trade agreement. Boris Johnson called for optimism and determination to secure this outcome.

What Do the Key Ministerial Appointments Tell Us About Brexit?

In appointing his Cabinet, Boris Johnson has made far-reaching changes which shift the profile of government decisively towards pro-Brexit. All ministers were required to subscribe to keeping the possibility of “no deal” Brexit open. The principal portfolios concerning Brexit are all held by people who are either comfortable with, or even favour, a “no deal” Brexit. This looks like – and is no doubt intended to be seen in Brussels as – a government fully committed to a “no deal” Brexit, if necessary. Perhaps the most interesting appointment was, however, not of a minister at all, but of Dominic Cummings, campaign director for Vote Leave in the 2016 referendum, as a senior adviser. Taken together, this looks like a team both strongly committed to delivering Brexit and ready for a public campaign (election or referendum), if necessary.

What Happens Next?

The new Prime Minister effectively has more than five weeks’ respite from Parliamentary scrutiny, as Parliament starts its summer recess and returns on 3 September. This gives him time to consolidate his team, articulate his strategy (including boosting preparations for a “no deal” Brexit), and explore the possibilities for further negotiation with the EU. But even within his own party, on both pro-Leave and pro-Remain sides, he is, in effect, on probation.

The Parliamentary arithmetic has not changed significantly from that faced by Theresa May, but by carrying out such a substantial eviction of Mrs May’s ministers, Boris Johnson is likely to have increased the number of opponents to his Brexit policies on the Conservative back benches. They now also have an important figurehead in former Chancellor Philip Hammond. The Prime Minister has no majority without the support of the 10 Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) MPs. And, within the Conservative Party, the hard Brexit supporting European Research Group (ERG) is now balanced by an anti “no deal” faction bolstered by ministers who resigned because they could not support his approach to Brexit or were sacked by him. Technically, the government’s majority, including the 10 DUP MPs, is down to two (three including one MP under criminal investigation). A by-election on 1 August is likely to reduce that by one. If the PM tries to push through a deal based on the existing Withdrawal Agreement (with changes to the accompanying Political Declaration about the future relationship, to which the EU has said it is open), he risks losing the DUP and some ERG from his majority. If his policy becomes “no deal”, he risks losing the more pro-European faction. In either case, he lacks a majority to deliver the result. The two big questions are whether Parliament (which has a substantial anti “no deal” majority) can find a way to erect a legal barrier to a “no deal” Brexit and, if not, how many Conservative MPs would really vote against their own party in a confidence vote to force either a change of direction or a fresh election – several have already indicated that they would do so if necessary. All of which points to the same Parliamentary deadlock Theresa May faced returning in September. So, unless the PM can come up with a renegotiated deal which the DUP and ERG would accept, the only way out of the deadlock would be to go back to the people. Mr Johnson’s strong opposition to a further referendum would make that a politically difficult choice. Current polling suggests that an election before Brexit is delivered would be a high risk strategy for the Conservatives.

As one influential commentator put it, the strategy may be to try for a new deal and see if the EU blinks. If they do not, go for “no deal” and see if Parliament blinks. If it does not, hold an election or referendum – an election is probably higher risk, but can be done more quickly and does not involve going back on strongly expressed views of the Brexiteers, including Mr Johnson.

What About the Europeans?

The debate about Brexit over the Conservative Party leadership campaign has been an entirely Brit-on-Brit affair, with reference to the EU position, but no engagement with it. European leaders’ reactions to Boris Johnson becoming Prime Minister have been polite, but also uncompromising, showing no willingness to re-open the Withdrawal Agreement. Michel Barnier looked forward to working with the Johnson Government to facilitate the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement – signalling that negotiation is possible about the accompanying Political Declaration on the future relationship, and possibly other complementary accords, but not the Withdrawal Agreement itself. If the EU sticks to this position – and the EU team follows the UK Parliamentary arithmetic closely, so they know how much resistance there will be to “no deal” – the prospects for finding an agreed way forward look slim.

So “No Deal”, Then?

In April, we assessed the possibility of a “no deal” Brexit as very low. It has clearly now increased and, with a Cabinet committed to “no deal” if there is not a new deal, there are a number of ways in which it could come about. But Parliament’s majority against “no deal” remains, and there remain a number of obstacles to “no deal” in Parliament and in the economic analysis of the impact of “no deal” Brexit if the UK and EU are not able to agree on tariff-free trade using GATT XXIV. While some form of political process – such as an election – looks more likely than moving straight to “no deal” if the EU talks fail to yield a result, companies should certainly now put in place “no deal” contingency arrangements.

Free Trade Agreements

There are three interlinked free trade agreements (FTAs) in play: EU-US, EU-UK and UK-US. During the leadership campaign Boris Johnson spoke about making very rapid progress on the UK-US FTA (at one stage suggesting having a limited agreement in place by 31 October), but also about finding the long-term solution to the Irish border issue in the UK-EU FTA. In practice, it is likely that the UK-EU FTA has to come before the UK-US FTA, not least because the more the UK aligns to US regulatory standards through a UK-US FTA, the harder the solution to the Irish border issue will be – nowhere more so than in agriculture. The UK-EU FTA also has a unique character, in that the two parties start from a position of zero tariffs and complete regulatory alignment and the negotiation will, therefore, be about how far and in what respects to diverge. Both the EU-US and UK-US FTAs will have to address some highly charged political issues (agriculture, public procurement (in particular healthcare) and climate change); it could be argued that the UK would secure a better result on these issues by allowing the EU to find a politically workable way forward with the US first.

In an illustration of the complex interaction in the trade policy approach, the UK government has not been able to roll-over the EU-Canada FTA (CETA) into a bilateral UK-Canada FTA. This is because the Canadian government has analysed the impact for Canadian businesses of the UK moving to the interim “no deal” tariff policy published by the UK earlier this year – 87% of imported goods would be tariff-free to prevent harm to consumers – and concluded that the impact would be small. UK exporters to Canada would, however, face full Canadian WTO tariffs, rendering trade in some sectors unviable.

However the order of negotiations takes place, the three FTAs are effectively interlinked, and it will be important to ensure, for example, that something desirable in the UK-US FTA is not rendered more difficult to achieve by something agreed within the UK-EU FTA.

 

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more Brexit developments, see the National Law Review Global page.