Tag: Title IX

In Rare Summer Opinion, Supreme Court Follows Sixth Circuit’s Lead

In Department of Education v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court issued a rare August opinion to maintain two preliminary injunctions that block the Department of Education’s new rule.  That rule expands Title IX to prevent sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination.  State coalitions brought challenges; district courts in Louisiana and Kentucky enjoined the rule during the litigation; the Fifth and Sixth Circuits denied the government’s requests to stay the injunctions, nor would the Supreme Court intercede for the government.

All the Justices agreed that aspects of the rule warranted interim relief, most centrally the “provision that newly defines sex discrimination” to include sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination.  But because the district courts enjoined the entirety of the rule, the scope of relief proved divisive.  A narrow majority agreed to leave the broad injunctions in place, while four Justices in dissent argued to sever the suspect aspects of the rule and allow the remainder of the rule to take effect.  With emphasis on the “emergency posture,” the majority explained that the government had not carried its burden “on its severability argument.”

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent proposed limiting the injunctions to just the three challenged aspects of the rule.  The dissent focused on the “traditional” limits on courts’ power to fashion “equitable remedies.”  That Justice Gorsuch joined Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson should come as no surprise.  Justice Gorsuch has harped on limiting equitable remedies to party-specific relief (e.g. Labrador v. Poe); cast doubt on severability doctrine (Barr v. AAPC (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part)); and, of course, authored the landmark Bostock v. Clayton County decision that interpreted Title VII to protect against sex discrimination in much the same way the Department wishes to interpret Title IX.

This decision is an unreliable forecast of the Court’s view of what Title IX sex discrimination encompasses.  The Court unanimously agreed to table the debate over the Department’s new definition of sex discrimination while the lower courts proceed “with appropriate dispatch.”  The case concerned the status of the rest of the rule as that litigation continues.

A truer tell on the merits is the Sixth Circuit panel’s order denying the government’s stay request.  The panel found it “likely” “that the Rule’s definition of sex discrimination exceeds the Department’s authority.”  Preliminarily at least, the court thought it unlikely that Title IX—last amended in 1972—addresses sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination.  The Sixth Circuit has been reluctant “to export Title VII’s expansive meaning of sex discrimination to other settings”—and so it was here.

If “past is not always prologue,” still sometimes it is.  The Sixth Circuit panel divided on the injunction’s scope just like the Supreme Court.  Chief Judge Sutton and Judge Batchelder formed the majority, finding that the three “central provisions of the Rule . . . appear to touch every substantive provision.”  Saddling school administrators with new regulatory requirements on the eve of the new schoolyear tipped the equities toward enjoining the full rule.  Judge Mathis dissented because the injunction disturbed provisions of the rule “that Plaintiffs have not challenged.”

For now, the Department’s new rule yields to the old one.  That rule, too, is being litigated in the Sixth Circuit because guidance documents say the Department will interpret Title IX the same way Bostock interpreted Title VII.  See Tennessee v. Dep’t of Educ. and this coverage at the Notice & Comment blog.  To close out with some Supreme Court trivia—this marks its first mid-summer opinion since Alabama Association of Realtors v. DHHS in 2021, where the Court ended the Biden Administration’s Covid-era moratorium on evictions.  Before that may be the Court’s September 2012 decision Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission involving a challenge to West Virginia’s congressional districts.

© Copyright 2024 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more news on SCOTUS Decision in Department of Education v. Louisiana, visit the NLR Public Education Services section.

For Title IX and Athletics Professionals in Higher Education, One Less Moving Part

Year after year, the issue of sexual misconduct in violation of Title IX on college campuses continues to confront higher education leaders.  The topic is one on which innumerable individuals and special interest groups have strong opinions and agendas.  Athletics, commonly called the “front porch” to universities, can often be at the center of the Title IX storm.  Among other high-profile issues, there have been reports of college athletes transferring to other schools and returning to competition even after being expelled, convicted or otherwise disciplined for sexual misconduct.

In response, in April 2020, the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) expanded its sexual violence policy to require that all incoming, current and transfer college athletes disclose annually to their school whether they have been subject to an investigation, discipline through a Title IX proceeding, or a criminal conviction for sexual, interpersonal or other acts of violence. Failure to accurately and fully disclose, could result in penalties for the athlete, including a loss of athletics eligibility.

It was recently reported that in October 2020 the NCAA quietly made the controversial decision to delay implementation of this policy until the 2022-2023 academic year.

This means that, until the fall of 2022, athletes might not face penalties if they do not disclose past accusations or discipline, and schools will not be required to create processes to track such misconduct.  The NCAA stated that the decision to delay implementation was based on challenges related to the pandemic and the new Title IX federal regulations that went into effect in August 2020.  Layered on top of these justifications is the speculation that President-elect Biden may at some point roll back or amend the new regulations.  Advocates for victims of campus assault have reacted to the NCAA decision with disappointment.

Though all of this, institutions of higher learning must remain steadfast in their concurrent commitments to both an environment free from sexual misconduct, and equitable, reliable processes for all.  While patience can be difficult, there is undoubtedly wisdom in allowing time to build a good process that fulfills these mutually beneficial commitments.  Colleges and universities are well advised to use the time to develop robust and equitable processes surrounding the reporting of misconduct.

©2020 Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

High School Female Athletes Fail to Score on Class Certification

The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii recently denied female student-athletes’ motion for class certification under Title IX even though it rejected the defendants’ attacks on mootness and standing as well as Rule 23(a)’s requirements for commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Instead, the court found that the proposed class failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement that joinder would be impracticable.

The underlying case centered on Title IX allegations by female athletes at James Campbell High against defendants Hawaii State Department of Education and the Oahu Interscholastic Association. The athletes claimed that the defendants violated Title IX by failing to take remedial actions to meet Title IX’s anti-discrimination provisions and failed to provide Campbell female athletes with equivalent, athletic-participation opportunities. The athletes’ motion proposed the following class: “All present and future James Campbell High School female students and potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or were deterred from participating in athletics at Campbell.” The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ records showed 366 Campbell female student-athletes in the 2018–2019 school year alone.

The court first addressed the issue of mootness after the defendants argued that two of the named plaintiffs had already graduated. The court found, however, that those athletes’ claims fit under the “inherently transitory” exception to mootness, given the necessarily finite duration of a high school student’s time as a student-athlete and the potential for repetition of the claims from similarly situated students.

The court next addressed the defendants’ argument that the named plaintiff — a ninth-grade water polo player — did not have standing because the water polo season had not yet begun at the time the motion was filed, and thus she had yet to experience the alleged discriminatory conduct. The court found that the defendants’ argument was erroneously narrow-focused and that the ninth-grade athletes had allegedly experienced discriminatory events generally suffered by the female student-athlete populations, which would apply even if a particular student’s athletic season had not yet started. Specifically, those student-athletes are forced to make plans around a discriminatory sports schedule or are exposed to a lack of publicity for female athletics programs, which are the types of harm that Title IX was implemented to prevent and remedy.

The court then turned its focus to Rule 23(a)’s requirements. While the court found that the athletes satisfied the commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements, the court’s decision ultimately depended on the athletes’ inability to satisfy the numerosity requirement. Although the defendants did not appear to challenge numerosity, including that the class exceeded 300 members, the court found that the athletes had failed to demonstrate that joinder was impracticable and that the future members of the proposed class were reasonably identifiable. The court observed that the proposed class members were limited to the female population from a single high school and were geographically tied to one area of Hawaii and identifiable through school and athletic records. Thus, the court held that joinder of the current students within the class in a single lawsuit was not impracticable. The court also found that, with regard to the future and potential students, those subgroups were not reasonably identifiable and, thus, would not be considered in any numerosity determination.

As uncommon as it may be for a class of more than 300 members to fail the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a), any case can offer distinct circumstances that allow a court to reject an otherwise presumed, accepted argument. The unique geographic facts here were sufficient for this court to reject certification. Ultimately, the facts always matter.

A.B. v. Haw. State Dep’t of Educ., Civ. No. 1:18-cv-00477 (D. Haw. Dec. 31, 2019).

©2011-2020 Carlton Fields, P.A.

For more on Title IX issues, see the National Law Review Public Education & Services section.

State Legislators React to Proposed Federal Title IX Regulations with State Law Proposals

While college, universities and educational professionals await the Department of Education’s (DOE) proposed new Title IX regulations, which will dictate a revised process by which allegations of sexual misconduct must be handled, the state legislatures in Missouri and Arizona are currently considering legislation that would adopt many of Secretary DeVos’s anticipated regulatory modifications.

The proposed Missouri legislation, contained in Senate Bill 259 offered by Senator Gary Romine and House Bill 573 introduced by Representative Dean Dohrman, would allow students involved in Title IX complaints to appeal findings outside of the university system to the Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, considered a “neutral and independent hearing officer for the state.”

The key elements of the proposed Missouri bill are:

  • All state universities would be required to expedite hearings for students if the investigation and resolution of the complaint deprives their education.
  • Those accused would be provided with the identities of the parties and known witnesses and would have the opportunity to cross-examine parties and witnesses.
  • Denial of appropriate due process in a Title IX complaint would be considered a “breach of contract between the student and the university,” potentially resulting in a $250,000 fine for the institution.
  • If someone is found to have made a false complaint, the accused has the right to seek actual and punitive damages.

The House version of the bill would also “ensure that all parties use the terms ‘complainant’ and ‘respondent’ and refrain from using the term ‘survivor’ or any other term that presumes guilt before an actual finding of guilt.”

Senator Romine commented on his reason for introducing the proposed legislation by stating, “The problem is that a lot of times the accused does not have a proper recourse through the system, and we want to make sure that if there isn’t a proper recourse, that the institution that’s supposed to be upholding Title IX is held accountable for it.”

Representative Dohrman commented on his reasons for introducing the House bill in a press release, stating “due process is vital in both civil and criminal proceedings and Title IX proceedings are no different. I have filed this bill to… protect all students by making sure both the accuser and the accused are in a just proceeding.”

In addition to the proposed legislation in Missouri, Arizona State Representative Anthony Kern has introduced House Bill 2242, the “Campus Individual Rights Act, which is a similar statutory modification to Title IX for students in Arizona. Senator Kern’s proposed legislation would amend existing state law and would provide that an Arizona community college district or university may not prohibit the following:

  • An accused student and an alleged victim from having a legal representative at  disciplinary proceeding
  • The legal representative for the accused student and the alleged victim from having full participation in the disciplinary proceeding

In addition, the bill requires the parties to the disciplinary proceeding to make a good faith effort to exchange any evidence which either party intends to use in the proceeding, without authorizing either party the right to participate in formal discovery. In addition, Senator Kern’s proposed legislation would prohibit a school employee from acting as an adjudicator, hearing officer or appellate officer if that individual has previously served as:

  • An advocate or counselor for an accused student or alleged victim,
  •  An investigator,
  • An administrator presenting arguments and evidence on behalf of the educational institution, or
  • An advisor to a person described in 1-4 above.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2019
Read more Education Legal News on the National Law Review’s Public Education & Services Type of law page.

Education Secretary Signals Shift in Title IX Policy for Dealing with Sexual Misconduct Allegations

On September 7, 2017, Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos announced a marked policy shift in how the Department of Education will approach Title IX enforcement with regard to sexual misconduct. DeVos indicated that the Department plans to withdraw the controversial Dear Colleague Letters issued during the Obama administration. Instead, the Department will issue formal regulations that will establish a new Title IX framework for educational institutions investigating and responding to sexual misconduct allegations. The full text of Secretary DeVos’s speech can be found here.

Title IX has been a dominant topic in higher education since 2011, when the Obama Administration issued the “Dear Colleague Letter” explaining that a failure to adequately address sexual misconduct on campus constituted discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs under Title IX.[1] Among other things, the Dear Colleague Letter set forth how schools should respond to sexual misconduct, dictated specific procedures schools must follow to investigate and adjudicate such misconduct, and established various other requirements such as climate surveys, standards of proof, and survivor sensitivity. The Letter made clear that a failure to meet these expectations, and the expanded guidance issued by the Department in 2014, could result in a loss of federal funding, and thus had a swift and substantial impact on the way educational institutions responded to reports of sexual assault or harassment.

In a speech at the George Mason University School of Law on September 7, 2017, Secretary DeVos said that schools will still be required to address sexual misconduct. However, she announced the Department would be rescinding the Dear Colleague Letters and instead regulate through actual regulations, subject to notice and comment. Secretary DeVos lamented that “for too long, rather than engage the public on controversial issues, the Department’s Office for Civil Rights has issued letters from the desks of un-elected and un-accountable political appointees.” She made it clear that “the era of ‘rule by letter’ is over.” DeVos emphasized the Department’s ongoing commitment to protecting victims of sexual violence. But she also clearly signaled that the Department will pay more attention to the due process rights of the accused, including questioning the “preponderance of the evidence” standard that the Department required all schools to use in adjudicating sexual misconduct cases. DeVos promised to work more closely with educational institutions, rather than operating “through intimidation and coercion.” And she said the Department would be open to exploring alternative methods of enforcing Title IX, including the possibility of voluntary regional centers where outside professionals would be available to handle Title IX investigations and adjudications.

DeVos did not indicate exactly what the new Department rules might entail, or when they will come into effect, nor has there been an official withdrawal of the Dear Colleague Letter yet. DeVos did indicate, however, that the Department will base the new rules on public feedback and will take into account the views of educational institutions, professionals, and individual students. In her closing remarks, DeVos noted that the Department of Education’s “interest is in exploring all alternatives that would help schools meet their Title IX obligations and protect all students. [The Department] welcome[s] input and look[s] forward to hearing more ideas.”[2]

Schools should take advantage of the Secretary’s call for comments, as the Department moves towards the development and implementation of a different and hopefully clearer set of rules governing the enforcement of Title IX. However, schools should also anticipate a period of uncertainty until final rules are issued. Moreover, schools should be aware of the continuing (and possibly conflicting) state law obligations that have been put into place following the Dear Colleague Letter. For example, many states including Connecticut and New York have passed legislation mandating use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in evaluating sexual misconduct on college campuses. We anticipate further, more detailed guidance in the next few weeks as the Department of Education works to implement Secretary DeVos’s policy announcements.

[1] 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.; 34 C.F.R. Part 106.

[2] Secretary DeVos Prepared Remarks on Title IX Enforcement, available here.

 This post was written by Benjamin Daniels, Aaron Bayer, & Dana M. Stepnowsky of Wiggin and Dana LLP., © 1998-2017

Fourth Circuit Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Transgender Student

Schools across the country have found themselves at the forefront of the societal debate on the appropriate manner in which to address issues surrounding accommodation of transgendered persons. Conflicting regulatory rulings, contemplated state legislation, and in the case of North Carolina, state prohibitions on accommodation have led to a patchwork of inconsistencies and doubt in relation to a school district’s legal duties.

On Tuesday, April 19, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of a transgender student, Gavin, who was born female and wished to use the boys’ restroom at his rural Virginia high school. The ruling, G.G. v Gloucester County Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056 (4th Cir., Apr. 19, 2016), is significant, as it marks the first time that a federal appellate court has ruled that Title IX extends to protect the rights of transgender students to use the bathroom that corresponds with the student’s gender identity.

Gavin had previously been granted approval by administration to use the boys’ restroom and did so for a short period of time until the school board adopted a policy prohibiting him from using the bathroom of the gender with which he identifies. Instead, according to board policy, Gavin was required to use the restroom of his biological gender or a separate, unisex restroom. Gavin filed a lawsuit claiming that the school board impermissibly discriminated against him in violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.

In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the Department of Education (“DOE”) regulations implementing Title IX. Those regulations permit schools to provide “separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex,” so long as the facilities are comparable. The question the Court faced in light of this regulatory guidance was how to apply the “separate but equal” mandate to transgender individuals.

The DOE argued that the regulation should be interpreted to mean that schools generally must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity; the Gloucester school board argued for an interpretation that defined students consistent with their biological sex. The Court recognized that the plain language of the regulation clearly permits schools to provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities for its male and female students. By implication, the regulation also permits schools to exclude males from the female facilities, and vice versa. Although the regulation is silent as to how a school should determine whether a transgender individual is a male or female for the purpose of access to sex-segregated restrooms, the Court concluded it is susceptible to two interpretations – determining maleness or femaleness is either a matter exclusively of biology, or it is a matter of gender identity.

The Court agreed that public restrooms, locker rooms, and showers historically have been separate on the basis of sex, and that individuals have a legitimate and important interest in bodily privacy. Nonetheless, the Court stated that these safety concerns or privacy interests should be addressed by the DOE or Congress, and not the Court. Thus, the Court held that it was required to afford deference to the DOE’s interpretation. In so doing, the Court held that an individual’s sex should be determined by reference to the student’s gender identity, i.e., consistent with DOE interpretation.

The Fourth Circuit only addressed the student’s claims with respect to Title IX and whether Title IX extends to gender identity. The case has been remanded back to the district court to decide whether the school board violated Title IX and the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment. However, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling only has precedential value in that circuit (encompassing Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina), which means those states are now required to follow the DOE’s interpretation of Title IX – that schools generally must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity.

What Does This Mean for Your District?

Although not binding in the Seventh Circuit, which encompasses Wisconsin, the Fourth Circuit’s decision is instructive as to how Wisconsin school districts should address restroom, locker room, and shower concerns under Title IX. Additionally, the DOE has been aggressive in its efforts to ensure that transgender students can use bathrooms in public schools that correspond with their gender identities. In November 2015, the DOE Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) issued a letter of findings to a Chicago-area school district demanding that the school district give unfettered locker room access to a transgender student for the facilities of the gender in which the student identified. The OCR gave the school district only 30 days to resolve the matter or risk forfeiting Title IX funding. The school district reached a settlement with OCR prior to having its federal funding rescinded.

School districts should begin the process (if they have not done so already) of developing policies to set the parameters and processes the district will follow when a transgender student seeks guidance and clarity. A district should further ensure that its non-discrimination policy is comprehensive in scope as to all protected classes of students. District policies should address how the district will ascertain the student’s gender identity; what proof, if any, a district will require; the manner in which a student should be addressed and allowed to change his/her name; student dress codes; student records; physical education class; school-sponsored and WIAA-sanctioned sports; and of course, restroom, locker room, and shower facilities.

If your district has a prior policy in place regarding transgender students and gender identity, your district should consider revising the policy to ensure it does not run afoul of Title IX. Ultimately, school districts should be prepared to respond to a request from a student seeking direction as to school processes and procedures. Now is the time to prepare for the inevitable and ensure the district has laid the framework to quickly and fairly respond.

Article By Christine V. Hamiel of von Briesen & Roper, S.C.

©2016 von Briesen & Roper, s.c