The Court has decided two important cases today, United States v. Zubaydah, upholding the government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege and rejecting the al Qaeda terrorist leader’s discovery request for information concerning his torture by the CIA, and Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C., allowing the intervention of the Kentucky attorney general to assume the defense of the state’s abortion law after the official who had been defending the law decided not to seek further review. Both cases are, at root, about significant issues of public interest and policy—the torture of terrorists and restrictive abortion policies—but neither opinion resolves any such question. Indeed, the lessons learned from each of these cases are essentially procedural, and though the outcomes are determined by significant margins, the alliances of Justices on the multiple opinions published are also instructive.

Zubaydah has been among the most closely watched cases on the Court’s docket. Full disclosure: I am a board member of the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, which has advocated for the closing of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, where Zubaydah is detained, and for the rejection of privilege claims as to non-classified information concerning torture. Though I am not surprised by the outcome in the case, it is contrary to what many human rights organizations have been advocating. The admixtures of Justices also provide interesting insights as to how they approach matters of privilege and national security.

In what likely will be one of the last majority opinions written by retiring Justice Stephen Breyer, and subject to various concurrences by Justices Thomas, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the government’s assertion of state secrets privilege to deny Zubaydah’s attempt to subpoena two CIA contractors from whom he sought to obtain information for use in litigation in Poland concerning his torture at an alleged “black site” in that country. The state secrets privilege allows the government to bar the disclosure of information that, were it revealed, would harm national security. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6–7 (1953). While the Ninth Circuit had accepted much of the government’s claim, it concluded that the privilege did not cover information about the location of the detention site, which the court believed had already been publicly disclosed. Indeed, it is clear from the record in the case that there has been substantial public discussion of such a detention site in Poland. However, although the government has concluded that the “enhanced interrogation” to which Zubaydah had been subjected constituted torture, the fact of its location in Poland has never been formally confirmed by the United States. The state secrets privilege permits the government to prevent disclosure of information when that disclosure would harm national security interests, such as “the risk of revealing covert operatives, organizational structure and functions, and intelligence-gathering sources, methods, and capabilities.” Here, Justice Breyer, in a textbook case displaying the essential role that he has played on the Court in pragmatically fashioning majorities to form consensus opinions in controversial cases, accepted the view that verifying the existence, or non-existence, of a CIA black site in Poland, falls within the state secrets privilege because confirmation or denial of the site’s existence and location, even if such information has already been made public through unofficial sources, would harm relations among foreign intelligence services vital to U.S. interests. The majority also noted that the locational information is not essential to the case that Zubaydah is attempting to make, but it also rejected the remand to consider issues of Zubaydah’s treatment that Justices Kagan, concurring, and Justice Gorsuch (interestingly, joined by Justice Sotomayor), dissenting, would have allowed. In a case where there is virtually no disagreement among the Justices as to what the law is, the decision comes down to a procedural formulation that Justice Breyer loosely compares to applying exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act. In any event, the majority held that, as an objective matter, the government’s assertions of privilege and national security risk satisfied its burden of responding to the demand for information.

Notwithstanding the great public interest that surrounds the debate and litigation concerning the efforts of various state legislatures to restrict abortion and to obtain the reversal or narrowing of Roe v. Wade, the Court’s 8-1 majority (only Justice Sotomayor dissented) held only that the Court would not adopt an arbitrary claims-processing rule barring a non-party intervener from taking over an appeal, especially under the conditions presented here. Having first concluded that neither a jurisdictional requirement nor a mandatory claims-processing rule barred consideration of the attorney general’s motion, the Court concluded that no statute or rule restricts the jurisdiction of a court of appeals or provides a general standard to apply in deciding whether intervention on appeal should be allowed. The one passing reference to intervention made in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure only concerns the review of agency action. Accordingly, with “respondents cit[ing] no provision that deprives a court of appeals of jurisdiction in the way they suggest, and no such supporting language can be found in 28 U. S. C. §2107, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4, or any other provision of law. . . [the] Court refuses to adopt what would essentially be a categorical claims-processing rule barring consideration of the attorney general’s motion. When a non-party enters into an agreement to be bound by a judgment in accordance with the agreement’s terms, it is hard to see why the non-party should be precluded from seeking intervention on appeal if the agreement preserves that opportunity. Here, the attorney general reserved ‘all rights, claims, and defenses . . . in any appeals arising out of this action.’ That easily covers the right to seek rehearing en banc and the right to file a petition for a writ of certiorari.”

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, like the cheese, stands alone. She argues that every case should have a certain end point, and one should be applied here. One wonders if she would entertain a similar opinion in a case like this but where the plaintiffs are appealing. In any event, all of the other Justices are unified by the absence of any textual limitation on their jurisdiction to entertain a motion to intervene on appeal and the reasonable justification made for it by the state attorney general. Where Justice Alito found a constitutional basis for this conclusion and Justice Kagan would only have relied upon statutory interpretation, the vast majority of the Court agreed on the procedural regime adopted irrespective of the fact that there likely would be considerable disagreement about the constitutionality of the statute at issue in the underlying litigation.

The post Broad Majority Decisions in Terrorist Torture and Abortion Law Cases Resolve Important State Secrets and Intervention Procedural Issues: SCOTUS Today appeared first on The National Law Forum.

A hotly contested ruling in a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) class action case will soon be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.  The Ninth Circuit in Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, Case No. 17-17244, recently granted the parties’ Joint Motion to Stay the Mandate, seeking to stay the Ninth Circuit’s mandate pending TransUnion’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.  The Motion to Stay comes soon after the court denied TransUnion’s Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc regarding the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2020).

In Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit held for the first time that every class member in a class action lawsuit needs “standing” to recover damages at the final judgment stage.  The 8,185 member class alleged that TransUnion, knowing that its practice was unlawful, violated the FCRA by incorrectly placing terrorist alerts on the front page of consumers’ credit reports and later sending the consumers misleading and incomplete disclosures about the alerts and how to remove them.  The court held that each class member was required to, and did, have standing, even though the credit reports of over 75% of the class were not actually disclosed to a third party because TransUnion’s alleged violation of the consumers’ statutory rights under the FCRA, by itself, constituted a concrete injury.  The Ninth Circuit also found that the jury’s punitive damages award of 6.45 times the statutory damages award was unconstitutional, and reduced it to 4 times the statutory damages award.  The Ramirez decision is discussed in more detail here.

In its Petition for Rehearing, TransUnion claimed that the dissent had the correct view, and the majority’s decision “not only conflicts with Supreme Court teachings, but puts the Ninth Circuit on the wrong side of a lopsided circuit split.”  TransUnion argued that the class of consumers did not have standing for their FCRA claims unless their credit reports were disclosed to a third party.  TransUnion further alleged that the class should have been decertified because Ramirez, the named plaintiff, “was radically atypical of the class he purported to represent” since there was no evidence that any other class member’s credit report was disseminated.  Finally, TransUnion disputed the court’s punitive damages award because a reduction to 4 times the statutory damages award was not enough.  According to TransUnion, the Supreme Court requires, at a maximum, a punitive damages award “equal to compensatory damages . . . when compensatory damages are substantial.”

TransUnion concluded its Petition for Rehearing by stating:

It is no exaggeration to say that, for many class members, the first indication that they were injured at all will be when they receive a $4,925.10 check in the mail. That absurd result is the product of ignoring basic requirements of Article III, Rule 23, and due process.

As of the date this article is published, TransUnion has not yet filed its petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, but we will continue to monitor the case for updates.

The post TransUnion to Seek Supreme Court Review After Ninth Circuit Finds Class Members Had Standing and Partially Upholds Punitive Damages Award appeared first on The National Law Forum.

President Donald Trump signed a third Executive Order (EO) related to immigration on Jan. 27, 2017.  The stated purpose of this EO is to protect the United States from terrorism stemming from foreign nationals of other countries by limiting entry and visas to certain individuals, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” In practice, it will block admission to the United States for at least 90 days for nationals of seven countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) who hold nonimmigrant visas, such as H-1Bs and L-1s, and green card holders.

Suspension of Visa Issuance

The text of this EO calls for the suspension of issuance of visas to nationals of certain countries where concerns of terrorism arise. The Secretary of Homeland Security, consulting with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, is tasked with the duty to submit a report to President Trump, in 30 days, regarding the review of information necessary for visa adjudications to verify individual identity and a list of countries that are of concern.

To alleviate the burden of investigation by the agencies, and to ensure that review is thoroughly completed with the resources needed, President Trump proclaims in the Executive Order that any immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States shall be suspended for 90 days by persons who are nationals of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. This 90 day entry ban excludes those traveling to the United States on diplomatic visas, NATO visas, C-2 visas for travel to the United Nations, and G-1, G-2, and G-4 visas, but includes those entering the United States on L-1, H-1B, and most work visas.

The definition of “national” typically refers to a person born in that country, who may or may not be a citizen of the country. In some cases, it can also refer to the children of such individuals born in other countries to parents who in turn were born in one of the listed countries.  Because of the broad way in which the Order appears to reference “nationals,” in the process of enforcement of the Order, it has been interpreted to include all those fitting the definitions outlined above.

Once the report is received by the Secretary of State regarding the information needed to continue adjudication of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, information shall be requested of all foreign governments that have not supplied such information within 60 days of notification. After the 60 day period has ended, the Secretary of Homeland Security, consulting the Secretary of State, is required to submit to President Trump a list of countries recommended to be put on a list that would prohibit the entry of foreign nationals from the countries that do not supply the required information. The list of countries would exclude its nationals who travel for the same categories as mentioned above. The Executive Order includes language that gives the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State the discretion to add additional countries to this list for President Trump’s review. In addition, visas may also be issued on a case-by-case basis to nationals even if their countries are on the list. Four reports, each submitted within 30 days of the Order to President Trump, are required to document the progress.

Implementing New Standards for Screening Those Seeking Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visas

The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the FBI are tasked with implanting a program that will develop and change the uniform screening standard and procedure at the U.S. consulate, including the following:

• Establishing a database of identity documents to ensure they are not used by multiple applicants;
• Application forms with amended questions aimed at identifying fraudulent answers and malicious intent;
• Questions to evaluate whether the applicant will be a positively contributing member of society;
• Process to assess whether the applicant has the intent to commit criminal or terrorist acts in the United States.

Suspensions for the Fiscal Year 2017

President Trump, through this Executive Order, is temporarily suspending the following until further review and notice:

• Suspension of the U.S. Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) for 120 days. During this period, a review will be conducted to determine and change the adjudications procedure. Refugee applicants already in the process may be admitted upon the initiation and completion of the revised procedures. Refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution (if the religion is a minority religion in the country of nationality) will be made a priority once USRAP is continued;
• Suspension of Syrian refugees until further determination;
• Suspension of refugee entry until admissions are permissible, and at that time, such numbers shall not exceed 50,000 per fiscal year; and
• Suspension of the visa interview waiver program for anyone seeking a nonimmigrant visa.

The Executive Order includes a provision that would allow the admission of refugees on a case-by-case basis, if it is in the national interest, or when the person is already in transit and denying admission would cause undue hardship. A report must be submitted by the Secretary of State on claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution within 100 days of the Order, and a second report within 200 days of the Order. The Order also includes a provision to assist state and local jurisdictions with their involvement in the resettlement process.

Other Provisions

The Executive Order includes other provisions related to the entry of foreign nationals into the United States. These include the following:

• Expedited completion of the biometric entry-exit tracking system. Three reports shall be submitted within the first year of the Order, and a report shall be submitted every 180 days until the system is completed and operational;
• Review and Change of Visa Validity Reciprocity.  The Secretary of State is required to review all nonimmigrant visa reciprocity agreements, including all categories, duration of time, and fees. If the foreign country does not treat the U.S. national in a reciprocal manner, the Secretary of State will adjust the conditions to match;
• Reports for Transparency. The Secretary of Homeland Security will publish a report for public viewing, every 180 days, a list of foreign nationals who have been charged, convicted, or removed from the United States based on terrorism-related activity; the number of foreign nationals radicalized after entry into the United States; information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based violence against women; and any other relevant information.

The post Summary of Executive Order: Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals appeared first on The National Law Forum.

As part of Cuba’s removal from designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, BIS amended the EAR to remove references in the text associating Cuba with terrorism. It also removes anti-terrorism (AT) license requirements from Cuba. Finally, BIS amended the EAR to remove Cuba from Country Group E:1, although Cuba remains on the Country Group E:2 list.

These amendments to the EAR affect certain license requirements and exceptions that apply to exports to Cuba. Specifically, the EAR apply to items that contain more than a de minimis amount of U.S.-origin content. For exports to most countries, that de minimis amount is 25 percent, but for exports to countries on the Country Group E:1 list, that de minimis amount is 10 percent. Exports of most items to Cuba are now also subject to the 25 percent de minimis rule. Yet, foreign-made items destined for Cuba that incorporate certain U.S.-origin 600 series content continue to be subject to the EAR regardless of level of U.S.-origin content.

Additionally, Cuba’s removal from the Country Group E:1 list makes exports to the country eligible for four new license exceptions including:

• License Exception Servicing and Replacement of Parts and Equipment (RPL);
• License Exception Governments, International Organizations, International Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Space Station (GOV);
• License Exception Baggage (BAG); and
• License Exception Aircraft, Vessels and Spacecraft (AVS).

Despite these changes, it is important to remember that Cuba is still subject to a comprehensive embargo. Licenses are still required to export or reexport to Cuba any item subject to the EAR unless authorized by a license exception. Those who would like to export items authorized by license exceptions may only use license exceptions listed in 15 CFR 746.2(a).

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Earlier this year, two of the U.S. military’s Central Command social media websites on YouTube and Twitter were similarly attacked and compromised. There, organization profile images were replaced by those of ISIS supporters on the official Twitter page, and two ISIS propaganda videos were uploaded to the Central Command YouTube account. Over the past several years, SEA has initiated similar attacks on the Twitter accounts of the BBC, The New York Times, 60 Minutes and the Associated Press.

Business Concerns

While the U.S. government reported that none of the internal systems were compromised and that there was no loss of classified information, the attacks have certified the anxiety of many business leaders over the potential vulnerability of their own companies, and highlight the concerns regarding the lack of knowledge or ability to prevent such attacks. Recent surveys have confirmed that risks associated with social media, whether through external portal access or internal sabotage, are among the top concerns facing businesses in 2015.

Without question, social media has become a crucial advertising vehicle for thousands of businesses around the world. The number of Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and other social media users continues to grow at an exponential rate, allowing businesses access to many new customers and clients every day. The ability to maintain control over these new electronic profiles, however, has become increasingly difficult as the perpetrators become more skilled and the targets more prized. In one particularly publicized account in 2013, social media hackers changed the Twitter account name of a premiere fast-food company to that of its chief competitor and posted multiple offensive tweets. Thereafter, damage control was all that could be done.

Businesses in 2015 have become enthralled by virtually unlimited access to customers and business partners via online platforms. Unfortunately, many have focused on the potential profits arising from such undertakings without sufficient consideration for the problems that too frequently arise from the use of such platforms. Social media has become the soft underbelly of many growing businesses eager for success but unaware of its vulnerabilities. In addition to direct attacks, courthouses nationwide have been flooded by lawsuits tied to the use and regulation of social media sites. The governance of employee use of social media, ownership of content and retention of information gathered through social media are generating more litigation every day. While increased exposure may be the incentive, preventative medicine will likely prove integral to long-term success.

Such “preventative medicine” includes not only the appropriate policies and procedures on access to and use of social media, but also an understanding of the vulnerabilities created by using these online platforms.  Most importantly, organizations must train their employees on these issues. Defending itself from perils arising out of social media starts at the first line of defense – the user.

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