Tag: taxi

A group of California taxicab companies sued Uber in federal court in San Francisco for falsely advertising the safety of Uber rides and for disparaging the safety of taxi rides. Uber moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Lanham Actclaim, contending that the safety-related statements were non-actionable puffery and were not disseminated in a commercial context. Uber also moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ California unfair competition law (“UCL”) claim for lack of standing, and moved to strike plaintiffs’ request for restitution under the UCL and California’s false advertising law (“FAL”).

Declining to put the brakes on the lawsuit in its entirety, the court granted in part and denied in part Uber’s motion. L.A. Taxi Cooperative, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2015 WL 4397706 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2015).

The court agreed that some of Uber’s statements were non-actionable puffery. For example, Uber’s claim that it was “GOING THE DISTANCE TO PUT PEOPLE FIRST” was “clearly the type of ‘exaggerated advertising’ slogans upon which consumers would not reasonably rely.” It would be impossible to measure whether or how Uber was fulfilling this promise. Likewise, Uber’s statement “BACKGROUND CHECKS YOU CAN TRUST” was puffery because it made no specific claim about Uber’s services. The court therefore dismissed plaintiffs’ claims as to these non-actionable statements.

On the other hand, the court did not agree that Uber was merely puffing when it claimed it was “setting the strictest safety standard possible,” that its safety is “already best in class,” that its “three-step screening” background check process adheres to a “comprehensive and new industry standard,” or when Uber compared its background check process to the taxi industry’s background check process. These statements were not puffery because “[a] reasonable consumer reading these statements in the context of Uber’s advertising campaign could conclude that an Uber ride is objectively and measurably safer than a ride provided by a taxi . . . .”

The court also rejected Uber’s argument that, because certain advertising claims were preceded by phrases like “Uber is committed to” or “Uber works hard to” – for example, “We are committed to improving the already best in class safety and accountability of the Uber platform . . .” – that the advertising claims were merely aspirational and therefore non-actionable. The challenged statements did more than assert that Uber was committed to safety, the court found; they included statements regarding the objective safety and accountability of Uber’s service. A reasonable consumer might rely on such statements, so the court denied Uber’s motion to dismiss in this regard.

The court found that certain advertising statements Uber made to the media were non-commercial speech and therefore not actionable under the Lanham Act or California state law. These statements were made in response to journalists’ inquiries, and were “inextricably intertwined” with the journalists’ independent – and largely critical – coverage of Uber’s safety record, which was a matter of public concern. Accordingly, the court granted Uber’s motion and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims relating to these non-actionable statements.

But the court did find Uber’s statements on ride receipts to be commercial speech. Following a completed ride, Uber emails its customers a receipt that includes a $1.00 “Safe Rides Fee.” Uber explains to customers who click on a link in the receipt that the fee was intended “to ensure the safest possible platform for Uber riders,” that Uber would put the fee towards its “continued efforts to ensure the safest possible platform,” and that “you’ll see this as a separate line item on every uberX receipt.” Uber contended that such statements related to a past transaction, rather than a prospective transaction that Uber sought to induce, and therefore did not amount to commercial speech. The court disagreed, finding that “the complaint adequately allege[d] that the statements relating to the ‘Safe Rides Fee’ [were] made for the purpose of influencing consumers to use Uber’s services again.”

On the California UCL claim, the court found that the taxicab plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege that they relied on Uber’s allegedly false or misleading advertising. In dismissing this claim, the court explained that it was declining to join the minority of California federal courts that have permitted UCL claims to proceed where the plaintiff pled potential consumers’ reliance rather than the plaintiff’s own reliance.

Finally, the court found that plaintiffs did not have a viable claim for restitution under California’s UCL and FAL because that remedy is limited to “money or property that defendants took directly from [a] plaintiff” or “in which [a plaintiff] has a vested interest,” and the complaint failed to allege that plaintiffs had an ownership interest in Uber’s profits that they sought to disgorge.