Tag: Tariffs

As Three Recent Settlements Demonstrate, Whistleblowers Are the Key to Enforcement of Section 301 Tariffs

The Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-made goods—at the time, known as the Trump Tariffs, although President Biden has embraced them as well—were put in place in 2018. Only recently, more than five years later, have enforcement efforts begun to show up publicly. And, as is often the case, whistleblowers are the tip of the enforcement spear. In particular, over the course of two weeks at the end of 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced settlements of three qui tam cases, brought under the False Claims Act, that alleged evasion of Section 301 tariffs. These are the first such settlements to be made public, but likely signal the beginning of a wave of settlements or litigation in the coming years.

Starting in July of 2018, and pursuant to Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301 through 310, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420), titled “Relief from Unfair Trade Practices,” and often collectively referred to as “Section 301,” the United States imposed additional tariffs on a wide range of products manufactured in China. The Section 301 tariffs were rolled out in tranches, but they fairly quickly covered a majority of all Chinese-made products imported into the United States. The Section 301 tariffs imposed an additional 25% customs duty on those products.

As is always the case when high tariffs are imposed on imported goods, the Section 301 tariffs were met with a mix of responses by importers. In some cases, importers simply paid the additional 25% duties. In some cases, the importers found new sources, outside of China, for the products they wished to import. And in many cases, the importers started cheating—evading the tariffs either by lying to Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) about what was being imported, or engaging to transshipping schemes to make it appear that the products were actually made in some country other than China.

Evasion of customs duties violates the False Claims Act, a federal law that, among other things, outlaws the making of false statements to avoid payment of money owed to the government. Evasion of customs duties will almost always involve such false statements because when goods are imported into the United States, the importer must provide CBP with a completed form, called an Entry Summary (also known as a Form 7501), in which the importer provides information about the nature, quantity, value, and country-of-origin of the goods being imported. To avoid or reduce the payment of duties, the importer will almost always lie on the Entry Summary about one or more of those, thus exposing the importer to liability under the False Claims Act.

The False Claims Act has a qui tam provision, which means that a private person or company may bring a lawsuit in the name of the government against the importer that has evaded payment of duties. If the qui tam lawsuit is successful, most of the money goes to the government. But the person or company that brought the lawsuit typically referred to as a whistleblower or, more technically, as the “relator”—gets an award that is between 15% and 30% of the amount recovered for the government.

When a qui tam case is first filed, it is put “under seal” by the court, meaning that it is secret and not available to the public. The case stays under seal, often for multiple years, as DOJ investigates the claims made in the case. But once DOJ decides to pursue a case, the seal is lifted, and the case becomes public. Often, this happens almost simultaneously with the announcement of a settlement of the case.

That is what happened with three cases that became public in late 2023. The first announcement came on November 29, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia announced a $1.9 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel Chinapacificarbide Inc. v. King Kong Tools, LLC. In that case, the whistleblower that had brought the qui tam lawsuit was a competitor company which alleged that King Kong Tools was manufacturing cutting tools in a factory in China, shipping them to Germany, and then importing them from Germany into the United States, claiming falsely that the tools were made in Germany. The whistleblowing company received an award of $286,861.

The second such announcement came on December 5, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas announced a $2.5 million settlement in a case captioned United States ex rel. Reznicek et al. v. Dallco Marketing, Inc. In that case, the whistleblowers were two individuals who alleged that the defendants evaded the Section 301 tariffs by underreporting the value of the products they were importing from China into the United States. The whistleblowers received an award of $500,000.

The third such announcement case on December 13, 2023, when the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas announced a settlement of $798,334 in a case captioned United States ex rel. Edwards v. Homestar North America LLC. Like the Dallco Marketing case, the Homestar case was also brought by an individual who alleged that the importer had lied to the government about the value of the goods being imported from China into the United States, in order to avoid payment of Section 301 tariffs. The whistleblower received an award of $151,683.

Accordingly, over the course of just two weeks in late 2023, three Section 301 settlements were publicly announced in quick succession. And notably, all three were whistleblower qui tam cases. This demonstrates the key role that whistleblowers play in the enforcement of customs tariffs and duties. No doubt, many other such cases remain under seal, and will start to become public as DOJ concludes its investigations. And because the Section 301 tariffs remain in place to this day, additional qui tam cases will almost certainly continue to be brought by both individual whistleblowers and competing companies seeking to level the playing field. Accordingly, these three settlements are likely just the early signs of a wave of Section 301 cases that will crest in the coming years.

© 2024 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more news on Whistleblowers and Section 301 Tariffs, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.

World Trade Organization Approves U.S. Tariffs on European Union Goods to Counteract Civil Aviation Subsidies

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has approved U.S. duties on $7.5 billion in products from the European Union (EU) after ruling that the EU had unfairly subsidized the production of large civil aircraft, such as those produced by Airbus. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) will enforce 10 percent duties on imports of certain aircraft and 25 percent duties on imports of other goods (including agricultural products, apparel, machinery, and other products) beginning October 18, 2019.

The EU plans to impose retaliatory tariffs on $20 billion of U.S. exports in response to subsidies allegedly provided to American plane manufacturer Boeing. However, the EU will have to wait for WTO approval in separate proceedings. The United States and the EU have been involved in WTO dispute settlement proceedings regarding subsidies for large civil aircraft since 2004.

Duties of 10 percent apply to imports of passenger and cargo aircraft from France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom (where the majority of Airbus production is based), provided that they have an unladen weight exceeding 30,000 kg.1

Duties of 25 percent apply to imports of other products from all EU member states (or a subset of these member states, depending on the product category). These products include certain cheeses, pork, coffee, seafood, fruit, dairy spreads, wine, whisky, apparel, bedding, optical instruments, appliances, tools, folding knives, and magnets.

Military aircraft, civil helicopters, and parts or components of civil aircraft are not subject to the duties.2

1 Examples of subject aircraft over 30,000 kg are regional jets capable of seating more than 100 passengers (such as the Airbus A220) and any larger aircraft (including long-haul, wide-body jets). Smaller aircraft, including recreational aircraft, private jets, most turboprop aircraft, and most regional jets with a capacity of fewer than 100 passenger, have an unladen weight of less than 30,000 kg and are excluded.

2 Airbus has production facilities in the United States, that rely on components imported from the EU. Additionally, some EU companies produce certain components of military aircraft for export to the United States.

©2019 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. All Rights Reserved

For more on international trade, see the National Law Review Antitrust & Trade Regulation or Global law pages.

U.S. Announces Possible Retaliatory Tariffs on European Union for Airbus Subsidies

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced in a Federal Register notice published July 5 that the agency is considering increasing duties on certain goods from the European Union (EU). This move is connected to a long-running World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute involving EU subsidies for Airbus, the aircraft manufacturing company.

The USTR has invited public comments on the proposed list and will hold a public hearing on Aug. 5, 2019.

Requests to appear at the hearing are due to the USTR by July 24, and written comments are due by Aug. 5. The public comment and hearing process will provide importers of goods from the EU, as well as domestic producers that compete with EU producers, the opportunity to be heard with regard to the products that may be subject to tariffs.

In April 2019, the USTR published a preliminary list of goods from the EU that could be targeted with tariffs, which included aircraft, motorcycles and wine. The July 5 list contains additional products, including whiskey, coffee, olives, pasta, cheese, pork, and metals, among other items. The goods on both lists are collectively worth about $25 billion of imports per year.

The tariffs stem from a WTO case filed by the United States in 2004, which was resolved by the WTO Appellate Body in 2011. In that case, European Communities and Certain member States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (DS316), the Appellate Body found that certain EU subsidies for Airbus failed to comply with the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).

The EU made certain changes to its subsidy regime in response to the Appellate Body’s decision, but the U.S. later asked the WTO to determine that the EU had not fully complied with the decision. That request led to another Appellate Body decision published in May 2018, in which the Appellate Body agreed with the U.S. that the EU was still not in compliance with the SCM Agreement.

The WTO is expected to determine the amount of retaliatory tariffs the United States can impose sometime this summer, and the April and July 2019 tariffs proposed by the USTR are likely being prepared in anticipation of the WTO decision.

 

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more from the Office of the US Trade Representative see the National Law Review page on Antitrust & Trade Regulation.

Trade Trouble – East, West, and South, But North is Settled For Now!

Agriculture Secretary Perdue recently stated the trade damages to be addressed in a new round of farm aid is $15 to $20 billion! The general press is replete with stories about how, as these tariffs continue, companies are making sourcing changes that will be hard to reverse. So, what is the latest news?

First, there is trade with China. It seems clear that unless there is a breakthrough at the G-20 meeting in Tokyo, or shortly thereafter, the anecdotal headaches we hear about will get far more costly. The American Chamber of Commerce in China and the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai conducted a survey before List 3 was announced. Even at that point, American companies operating in China acknowledged higher production costs, decreased demand for products, reduced staffing, reduced profits, increased inspections at importation, increased bureaucratic oversight and regulatory scrutiny, slower approval of licenses and permits, higher product rejections, and increasing plans to relocate (but not back to the U.S.).

On a point one can consider only marginally helpful, those with goods on List 3 now have until June 14th to file their entries. To be clear, the goods still must have left China before May 10, and the entry filed no later than June 14th for the 10% to apply. Otherwise, you pay the 25%.

On a somewhat more positive note, if you found the May 21, 2019 Federal Register notice, it published the submission by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to the Office of Management and Budget of a request for expedited approval of a form to be used for List 3 exclusion requests. In that notice, USTR stated it expected the window to open for List 3 exclusion requests around June 30, 2019, which is 10 days after the Tokyo G-20 meeting. If they have not already done so, companies would be wise to start the data gathering process. Among the information to be submitted are product details, whether the product or one comparable can be purchased in the U.S. or other sources outside China, the value and quantity of the product imported in 2017, 2018 and Q1 2019 distinguished by sourcing from China, other third countries and domestically, the degree of severe economic harm caused by the tariffs, and whether or not the applicant submitted any exclusion requests regarding products on List 1 or 2. Those who have prepared exclusion requests for goods on Lists 1 and 2 will instantly recognize the data requirements.

Complicating U.S.-China relations further, on May 15, 2019, a Presidential Document was issued entitled Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain. It forms the framework permitting the Administration to name companies barred from doing business with U.S. entities on national security grounds. On May 21, 2019, the Bureau of Industry and Security published a Federal Register notice adding Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and various affiliates (68 in total) to the Entity List on the ground there is reasonable cause to believe that Huawei “has been involved with activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” A May 22, 2019 Federal Register notice reversed that position and issued a Temporary General License effective between May 20, 2019 and August 19, 2019 for these same entities. See Supplement 7 to 15 CFR part 744.

Underscoring that tit-for-tat is very real, China announced on June 1, 2019 the creation of its own “unreliable” entities list. The initial rollout of this new policy took the form of a press briefing. That coverage made clear the criteria which China will rely upon is typically opaque: “foreign enterprises, organizations and individuals could land on this list because they do not obey market rules, violate contracts and block or cut off supply for non-commercial reasons, severely damage the legitimate interests of Chinese companies” or “pose a threat or potential threat to national security.” Almost immediately thereafter, it was announced that FedEx is under investigation in China for misdelivering some packages for Huawei (including returning them to sender or improperly routing them to the U.S.). China stated the purpose of the “unreliable entities list” was to “protect international economic and trade rules and the multilateral trading system, to oppose unilateralism and trade protectionism, and to safeguard China’s national security, social and publish interests,” according to a Ministry of Commerce spokesman.

Then there is the issue of China’s supply of rare earth minerals. China’s official press points out it is only a matter of time before China rolls out a plan to severely limit its exports of these metals which are used to make a variety of electronic products or accessories (including lithium batteries) along with items for U.S. military purposes such as to manufacture night vision goggles, precision-guided weapons and communications/GPS equipment. The latest numbers show that 52% of these metals are found in China and Russia (neither is exactly a friend to the U.S. right now), whereas 18% can be found in Brazil, but only about 1% in the U.S.

Add to this the announcement on May 30th, there will be tariffs imposed on “all goods imported from Mexico.” Even a few days later the most basic questions remain unanswered. Does this statement literally mean all goods from Mexico? What about American products returned which are duty free because unchanged? How about American products used to assemble the final product in Mexico but qualifying for duty free on the American components in the final product? [For you trade nerds – think 9801 and 9802.] What about goods which are of not of Mexican origin? Or are NAFTA qualifying?

Right now, all we have is the timeline – 5% on June 10%, 10% on July 1, 15% on August 1, 20% on September 1 and 25 % on October 1. Every indication right now is these tariffs will be imposed. Then the question becomes: are there grounds on which the tariffs would be removed? The only answer we have right now is if Mexico does “enough” to satisfy President Trump that all reasonable action was taken to stem the tide of migration, the tariffs would be removed. However, the determination as whether “enough” has been done is solely within the discretion of the President in the current proposal.

Having declared in February 2019 the migration situation at the U.S. southern border to be a matter of national security, President Trump has chosen now to invoke IEEPA to support the current action. IEEPA is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, see 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. It authorizes the President to act in the national security interest of the country if dealing with “any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States.”

 Article 302 of NAFTA as currently enacted provides: “… no Party may increase any existing customs duty, or adopt any customs duty, on an originating good.” In other words, the imposition of this additional tariff on NAFTA-qualifying goods violates NAFTA and presents yet another reason why a precisely-worded policy is needed and a claim is possible. Can we also expect a World Trade Organization claim, assuming the bilateral discussions between the two countries do not diffuse the situation?

How does any of this help hardworking American business owners (of any size and in any industry) to keep their companies operating and profitable? This situation makes us all wonder how long it will take for the American public to wake up and realize China and Mexico are not paying these tariffs?

 

© 2019 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP
This post was written by Susan Kohn Ross of Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP.
Read more on Trade on our Antitrust and Trade Regulation Page.

U.S. Increases Tariffs On Chinese Imports

The president announced this week that special Section 301 tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports (List 3) will increase from 10% to 25%. The Office of United States Trade Representative (USTR) issued the official notice of the tariff increase May 8. The rate increase is effective on May 10, 2019.

List 3 is composed of about 6,000 different Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) codes and $200 billion worth of imports; comparatively, the previously imposed List 1 and List 2 collectively cover approximately 1,000 HTSUS codes and $50 billion worth of imports from China.

This rate increase will have a massive effect on almost all industries that rely on imports from China, including agriculture, automotive, electronics, textiles, and energy, just to name a few.

Two other things of particular note from the notice:

(1) increased tariffs will be applied to goods entered for consumption (or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption) on or after 12:01 a.m. Eastern time on May 10, 2019, and exported from China on or after May 10, 2019, so goods that were on the water prior to May 10 will not be affected.

(2) USTR indicates that it will promulgate a product exclusion process in the near future so importers, purchasers, trade associations and other interested parties can request that certain products be excluded from the tariff. Domestic producers will also have the opportunity to object to such exclusion applications.

 

© 2019 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
You can learn more about trade and tariffs on the National Law Review Global Page.

US Trade Representative Publishes List of Chinese Products Subject to Retaliatory Tariffs

The Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) published a list of 1,300 Chinese products, valued at $50 billion, on which it intends to impose an additional 25 percent tariff in retaliation for the “harm to the US economy” resulting from certain Chinese industrial policies.  USTR also announced a public comment period to enable interested parties to request that products be removed from the list. In response to this April 3 announcement, China announced its own retaliatory import tariffs on 106 US products.

In Depth

On April 3, the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) published a list of 1,300 Chinese products, valued at $50 billion, on which it intends to impose a 25 percent tariff on top of any existing US tariff in retaliation for the “harm to the US economy” resulting from certain Chinese industrial policies. The full US retaliation list, available here, includes products from the chapters listed in Annex I below.

In conjunction with its list, USTR announced a public comment period to enable interested parties to request that products be removed from, or added to, the list. Comments must be filed by May 11, 2018. The agency will also hold a public hearing on May 15, 2018, for parties wishing to comment further on the list. USTR has not set a specific deadline for implementing the new tariffs, but said it will provide “final options” to President Trump after the comment and hearing process conclude.

In addition to the proposed retaliatory tariffs, President Trump has also directed the Secretary of the Treasury to develop new restrictions on inbound Chinese investments aimed at preventing Chinese-controlled companies and funds from acquiring US firms with sensitive technologies. The US Treasury Department has until May 21, 2018, to develop these restrictions, which will be in addition to the restrictions already imposed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).

In response to the administration’s April 3 announcement, China announced its own retaliatory import tariffs on 106 US products. Its retaliation products, listed below in Annex II, will face 25 percent tariffs should the Trump administration move forward with its announced tariffs.

After China issued its retaliatory tariff list, President Trump directed USTR on April 5 to assemble an additional $100 billion worth of retaliatory tariffs against Chinese goods on the grounds that China had unfairly retaliated against American farmers and manufacturers rather than addressing its own “misconduct.” The specific additional tariffs, once announced by USTR, will be subject to a review and public comment period similar to the one now underway for USTR’s initial $50 billion list.

McDermott is actively engaged in this issue and can assist Firm clients and contacts affected by the announcement, including with the preparation of comments and other advocacy efforts to influence products on the list. Please contact any of the authors to seek assistance or learn more.

This post includes contributions from Leon Liu from  China Law Offices.

Annex I

HTS Chapters Represented on the USTR Retaliatory List*

HTS Chapter Product
28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes
29 Organic chemicals
30 Pharmaceutical products
38 Miscellaneous chemical products
40 Rubber and articles thereof
72 Iron and steel
73 Articles of iron or steel
76 Aluminum and articles thereof
83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles
86 Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds
87 Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof
89 Ships, boats and floating structures
90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments, and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof
91 Clocks and watches and parts thereof
93 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof
94 Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated sign illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings

 

* Not all products contained in each chapter are represented.  For the complete list, visit: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/301FRN.pdf

 

Annex II

Unofficial Translation of China’s Retaliation List

No. Product HTS Code
1. Yellow soybean 12019010
2. Black soybean 12019020
3.

 

 Corn 10059000
4. Cornflour 11022000
5. Uncombed cotton 52010000
6. Cotton linters 14042000
7. Sorghum 10079000
8. Brewing or distilling dregs and waste 23033000
9.

 

 Other durum wheat 10011900
10. Other wheat and mixed wheat 10019900
11. Whole and half head fresh and cold beef 02011000
12. Fresh and cold beef with bones 02012000
13. Fresh and cold boneless beef 02013000
14. Frozen beef with bones 02021000
15. Frozen boneless beef 02022000
16. Frozen boneless meat 02023000
17. Other frozen beef chops 02062900
18. Dried cranberries 20089300
19. Frozen orange juice 20091100
20. Non-frozen orange juice 20091200
21. Whiskies 22083000
22. Unstemmed flue-cured tobacco 24011010
23. Other unstemmed tobacco 24011090
24. Flue-cured tobacco partially or totally removed 24012010
25. Partially or totally deterred tobacco stems 24012090
26. Tobacco waste 24013000
27. Tobacco cigars 24021000
28. Tobacco cigarettes 24022000
29. Cigars and cigarettes, tobacco substitutes 24029000
30. Hookah tobacco 24031100
31. Other tobacco for smoking 24031900
32. Reconstituted tobacco 24039100
33. Other tobacco and tobacco substitute products 24039900
34. SUVs with discharge capacity of 2.5L to 3L 87032362
35. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2500ml, but not exceeding 3000ml for SUVs (4 wheel drive) 87034052
36. Vehicles with discharge capacity of 1.5L to 2L 87032342
37. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 1000ml, but not exceeding 1500ml for SUVs (4 wheel drive) 87034032
38. Passenger cars with discharge capacity 1.5L to 2L, 9 seats or less 87032343
39. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 1000ml, but not exceeding 1500ml for 9 passenger cars and below 87034033
40. Passenger cars with discharge capacity of 3L to 4L, 9 seats or less 87032413
41. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 3000ml, but not exceeding 4000ml for 9 passenger cars and below 87034063
42. Off-road vehicles with discharge capacity of 2L to 2.5L 87032352
43. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2000ml, but not exceeding 2500ml for off-road vehicles 87034042
44. Passenger cars with discharge capacity of 2L to 2.5L, 9 seats or less 87032353
45. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2000ml, but not exceeding 2500ml for 9 passenger cars and below 87034043
46. Off-road vehicles with discharge capacity of 3L to 4L 87032412
47. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 3000ml, but not exceeding 4000ml for off-road vehicles 87034062
48. Diesel-powered off-road vehicles with discharge capacity of 2.5L to 3L 87033312
49. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2500ml, but not exceeding 3000ml for diesel-powered off-road vehicles 87035052
50. Passenger cars with discharge capacity of 2.5L to 3L, 9 seats or less 87032363
51. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2500ml, but not exceeding 3000ml for 9 passenger cars and below 87034053
52. Off-road vehicles with discharge capacity of less than 4L 87032422
53. Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement not exceeding 4000ml for off-road vehicles 87034072
54. Other vehicles which are equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor and can be charged by plugging in an external power source 87034090
55. Other vehicles that are equipped with a compression ignition type internal combustion engine (diesel or semi-diesel) and a drive motor, other than vehicles that can be charged by plugging in an external power source 87035090
56. Other vehicles which are equipped with an ignition reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor and can be charged by plugging in an external power source 87036000
57. Other vehicles that are equipped with a compression-ignition reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source 87037000
58. Other vehicles that only drive the motor 87038000
59. Other vehicles 87039000
60. Other gasoline trucks of less than 5 tons 87043100
61. Transmissions and parts for motor vehicles not classified 87084099
62. Liquefied Propane 27111200
63. Primary Shaped Polycarbonate 39074000
64. Supported catalysts with noble metals and their compounds as actives 38151200
65. Diagnostic or experimental reagents attached to backings, except for goods of tariff lines 32.02, 32.06 38220010
66. Chemical products and preparations for the chemical industry and related industries, not elsewhere specified 38249999
67. Products containing PFOS and its salts, perfluorooctanyl sulfonamide or perfluorooctane sulfonyl chloride in note 3 of this chapter 38248700
68. Items listed in note 3 of this chapter containing four, five, six, seven or octabromodiphenyl ethers 38248800
69. Contains 1,2,3,4,5,6-HCH (6,6,6) (ISO), including lindane (ISO, INN) 38248500
70. Primarily made of dimethyl (5-ethyl-2-methyl-2oxo-1,3,2-dioxaphosphorin-5-yl)methylphosphonate and double [(5-b Mixtures and products of 2-methyl-2-oxo-1,3,2-dioxaphosphorin-5-yl)methyl] methylphosphonate (FRC-1) 38249100
71. Containing pentachlorobenzene (ISO) or hexachlorobenzene (ISO) 38248600
72. Containing aldrin (ISO), toxaphene (ISO), chlordane (ISO), chlordecone (ISO), DDT (ISO) [Diptrix (INN), 1,1,1-trichloro-2 ,2-Bis(4-chlorophenyl)ethane], Dieldrin (ISO, INN), Endosulfan (ISO), Endrin (ISO), Heptachlor (ISO) or Mirex (ISO). 38248400
73. Other carrier catalysts 38151900
74. Other polyesters 39079999
75. Reaction initiators, accelerators not elsewhere specified 38159000
76. Polyethylene with a primary shape specific gravity of less than 0.94 39011000
77. Acrylonitrile 29261000
78. Lubricants (without petroleum or oil extracted from bituminous minerals) 34039900
79. Diagnostic or experimental formulation reagents, whether or not attached to backings, other than those of heading 32.02, 32.06 38220090
80. Lubricant additives for oils not containing petroleum or extracted from bituminous minerals 38112900
81. Primary Shaped Epoxy Resin 39073000
82. Polyethylene Terephthalate Plate Film Foil Strips 39206200
83. Other self-adhesive plastic plates, sheets, films and other materials 39199090
84. Other plastic non-foam plastic sheets 39209990
85. Other plastic products 39269090
86. Other primary vinyl polymers 39019090
87. Other ethylene-α-olefin copolymers, specific gravity less than 0.94 39014090
88. Other primary shapes of acrylic polymers 39069090
89. Other primary shapes of pure polyvinyl chloride 39041090
90. Polysiloxane in primary shape 39100000
91. Other primary polysulphides, polysulfones and other tariff numbers as set forth in note 3 to chapter 39 are not listed. 39119000
92. Plastic plates, sheets, films, foils and strips, not elsewhere specified 39219090
93. 1,2-Dichloroethane (ISO) 29031500
94. Halogenated butyl rubber sheets, strips 40023990
95. Other heterocyclic compounds 29349990
96. Adhesives based on other rubber or plastics 35069190
97. Polyamide-6,6 slices 39081011
98. Other primary-shaped polyethers 39072090
99. Primary Shaped, Unplasticized Cellulose Acetate 39121100

100.

Aromatic polyamides and their copolymers

39089010

101.

Semi-aromatic polyamides and their copolymers

39089020

102.

Other polyamides of primary shape

39089090

103.

Other vinyl polymer plates, sheets, strips

39201090

104.

Non-ionic organic surfactants

34021300

105.

Lubricants (containing oil or oil extracted from bituminous minerals and less than 70% by weight)

34031900

106.

Aircraft and other aircraft with an empty weight of more than 15,000kg but not exceeding 45,000kg

88024010
© 2018 McDermott Will & Emery.