Tag: supreme court

Antitrust Law Post Antonin Scalia

gavel scales of justice blueWith the untimely passing of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, perhaps the best known and most controversial Justice on the Court, commentators, including this one, have been called upon to assess his legacy – both immediate and long term – in various areas of the law.

Justice Scalia was not known primarily as an antitrust judge and scholar. Indeed, in his confirmation hearing for the Court, he joked about what he saw as the incoherent nature of much of antitrust analysis. What he was best known for, of course, is his method of analysis of statutes and the Constitution: a literal textualism with respect to statutes and a reliance on “originalism” with respect to the Constitution.

Probably his most influential antitrust opinion was the 2004 decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP which limited antitrust plaintiffs’ ability to hold a company with monopoly power liable for failing to cooperate with rivals.

Taking a literalist view of the Sherman Act, Justice Scalia wrote that there was a good reason why Section 2 claims required a showing of anti-competitive conduct, not just a monopoly.

The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system,” he wrote. “The opportunity to charge monopoly prices — at least for a short period — is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk-taking that produces innovation and economic growth.

Thus, Justice Scalia fashioned a majority in holding that the competitive conduct of a monopolist that had earned its hegemony was not inherently suspect. This has come to be a dominant view generally in the antitrust field, but critics have argued that the decision entrenches power and judicial liberals who might succeed Justice Scalia could take a more restrictive, less literal view of the law.

In 1991, Justice Scalia led a majority in Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising Inc., a case in which a competitor had claimed that an advertising rival and a municipality had conspired in passing an ordinance favoring the incumbent. In ruling against the plaintiff, Justice Scalia wrote that there was no “conspiracy exception” to Parker v. Brown, the 1943 Supreme Court case that established antitrust immunity for anti-competitive restraints imposed by state governments. On the other hand, in the recent North Carolina Dentists litigation with the FTC, Justice Scalia joined a majority that held the state action exemption did not apply to certain guild behavior where there was no active supervision by the state – again, a literalist approach.

Justice Scalia was influential in limiting class actions, enforcing arbitration agreements and requiring strict rules of pleading plausible causes of action. Cases like the antitrust actions in AT&T v. Concepcion and American Express v. Italian Colors, backing enforcement of arbitration agreements that blocked class treatment of claims, and the now often-cited cases of Twombley and Iqbal with respect to pleading currently rule the entry gate for large-case litigation, particularly antitrust.

For all of his conservative rulings, Justice Scalia was not a results-oriented judge determined to put antitrust plaintiffs in their place, I think that he would have argued that he was strictly neutral on the merits and didn’t care whether business prevailed or whether the class action plaintiffs prevailed. Whether, the conservative majority that adopted his methods will continue to hold, or whether some of these methods will be superseded by a more-elastic interpretive mode of judging will be at the forefront of the confirmation hearing of the next Justice.

Article By Stuart M. Gerson of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

©2016 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

Supreme Court Stays Clean Power Plan

On February 9, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision staying implementation of the Clean Power Plan until the D.C. Circuit rules on challenges to the Plan. The Court left open the possibility that it would review the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate decision.

The decision delays President Obama’s Climate Action Plan. The Clean Power Plan is its key climate change rule. It requires states and utilities to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by generating less electricity from coal, and more from lower carbon-emitting sources like natural gas, or zero-carbon sources like solar and wind. The Plan has an ambitious goal: to reduce CO2 emissions 32% below 2005 levels by 2030.

Some relevant background: On January 21, 2016, the D.C. Circuit refused to stay the Clean Power Plan while litigation is pending before it. Opponents of the rule, including 29 states and state agencies and several industry and trade groups, appealed that decision to the Supreme Court.

The stay will be in place at least until the D.C. Circuit rules on the pending challenges, likely late this year. Briefing deadlines are in April, and oral argument is scheduled in early June. The Supreme Court’s stay order will also remain in effect if the Court decides to review the D.C. Circuit’s decision, which it is expected to do, regardless of the outcome.

What are the implications of the stay? In the short term, the September 6, 2016 deadline for states to either submit their state plans or request a two-year extension will be postponed.

The Supreme Court’s action was unusual. The 5-4 vote suggests that the Court was persuaded that the significant challenges to the rule and the economic consequences of implementing it outweighed EPA’s interests in addressing climate change this year.

Article By Jane E. Montgomery & Amy Antoniolli of Schiff Hardin LLP

© 2016 Schiff Hardin LLP

U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Review Obama Immigration Action Case

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed today to hear a case challenging President Barack Obama’s executive action on immigration. The Supreme Court will decide whether President Obama can proceed with plans to defer deportation and provide work authorization to millions of individuals currently in the United States without lawful status.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Texas et al. v. U.S. et al. today and indicated that it will take up an additional issue on whether the Obama administration’s action violates a constitutional clause that requires the president to faithfully execute the law (i.e., the Take Care Clause in Article II of the Constitution). The Court will hear arguments this April and a decision is likely to be issued this June, before the end of the Court’s current session.

In November 2014, the Obama Administration issued new policies allowing certain undocumented immigrants to apply for deferred action and work authorization allowing them to remain and work legally in the United States.  These programs were to apply to certain individuals brought to the U.S. when they were under the age of sixteen (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), and also to undocumented individuals who are parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent resident children (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents).  Twenty six states filed suit to stop these policies from being implemented in December 2014. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction in February 2015, and, on November 9, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction. The Obama administration petitioned the Supreme Court on November 20, 2015 seeking immediate review of the Fifth Circuit’s decision

Article By Cynthia Liao of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

Supreme Court Rules TCPA Class Action Not Mooted by Unaccepted Settlement Offer to Named Plaintiff

Today the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that a company’s unaccepted offer of complete relief to a named plaintiff in a putative class action does not moot the plaintiff’s case. Before the ruling, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, there was disagreement among the Courts of Appeals over whether an unaccepted offer can moot a plaintiff’s claim, thereby depriving federal courts of Article III jurisdiction. While not specific to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), this issue is common to cases involving statutes like the TCPA because damages are statutorily set and thus easily calculated. Under this ruling, a company facing a TCPA class action lawsuit cannot moot the case by offering complete relief to the named plaintiff before class certification.

Background on the Case

In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, the U.S. Navy hired a nationwide advertising and marketing communications agency to execute a multimedia recruiting campaign that involved text messages. The marketing agency then hired a vendor to generate a list of cellular telephone numbers geared towards the Navy’s target audience who had consented to receive solicitations by text message. Under this campaign, the vendor sent text messages to over 100,000 recipients. One of those recipients was the named plaintiff, who alleged that he had not consented to receive the text message, and that the advertising agency violated the TCPA by sending the message (and perhaps others like it).

Before the deadline to file class certification, the advertising agency filed an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The agency offered the named plaintiff complete relief – including his costs and $1,503 per text message that he could show he received. Note that the maximum the plaintiff could recover under the TCPA is $1,500 per text message plus the costs of filing suit. The plaintiff did not accept the settlement offer and allowed the Rule 68 submission to lapse after the time, 14 days, specified in the Rule.

The take-away from this important Supreme Court decision is that an unaccepted settlement offer has no force. Like other unaccepted contract offers, it creates no lasting right or obligation. Because plaintiff’s individual claim was not made moot by the expired settlement offer, the claim retained its vitality during the time to determine whether the case could proceed on behalf of the class.

Article By Robert V. Spake, Jr. of Polsinelli PC

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

Supreme Court Poised to Strike Down Union Agency Fees for Public Employees?

The U.S. Supreme Court, in argument on Jan. 11, from all accounts appears poised to strike down its prior decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and conclude that mandatory agency fees paid by public employees to unions that represent them are unconstitutional.Classroom Supreme Court teachers decision

​In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, the petitioners contend that mandatory fair share dues to cover the cost of collective bargaining and other representational activities violate the free-speech rights of nonunion workers.  Chief Justice John Roberts summarized the issue similarly: “The problem that’s before us is whether or not individuals can be compelled to support political views that they disagree with.”

The case, which poses a significant threat to the funding of public employee unions in the 20 states that allow so-called fair share fees, has generated substantial interest and coverage. The SCOTUS Blog is an excellent stepping off point to review coverage of the case.

Court watchers are suggesting that Friedrichs will overturn Abood not only because of the tone of the questioning during argument but in large part because of the Court’s 2014 decision in Harris v. Quinn in which the Court’s 5-4 majority wrote of Abood and its “questionable foundations.”

Article By Gerald F. Lutkus of Barnes & Thornburg LLP
© 2015 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Testing Waters: Supreme Court Agrees To Hear Army Corps’ Clean Water Act Determinations Challenge

On Friday, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to the Eighth Circuit’s April 2015 ruling that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (“Army Corps”) jurisdictional determinations are final agency actions subject to judicial review. The Eighth Circuit’s decision is contrary to a July 2014 Fifth Circuit ruling and thus created a circuit split. The Supreme Court’s decision could resolve that split and settle the question of whether parties may challenge Army Corps’ jurisdictional determinations.

Many types of development projects may impact “waters of the U.S.” under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Such activities might therefore be subject to the Army Corps’ requirements for permitting and implementation of mitigation measures. Whether “waters of the U.S.” may be impacted by a project is often far from clear, so project developers and property owners frequently request jurisdictional determinations from the Army Corps before proceeding with a project. The Army Corps’ long-standing position is that its jurisdictional determinations are not judicially reviewable final decisions since a party is not required to act or refrain from acting based solely on the decision. Rather, the Army Corps has taken the position that a party’s rights are not affected until a party is either denied a permit or subject to enforcement proceedings for acting without a permit. Developers and property owners have long struggled with this position, since a party must either go through the time intensive and costly permitting process before being able to seek review of the underlying jurisdictional decision, or choose to act without a permit and then possibly be subject to enforcement proceedings.

The Fifth Circuit Decision

In Belle Co. LLC et al. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), the Army Corps had issued a jurisdictional determination that a portion of the property in question was a “water of the U.S.”

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Court decided that the Army Corps’ jurisdictional determinations are not final agency actions subject to judicial review, but are simply “notifications” regarding a property’s classification. The Fifth Circuit explained that for an agency action to be final it must: 1) be the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking”, and 2) the action must be a vehicle “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” The Fifth Circuit ruled that although jurisdictional determinations are the consummation of agency action, they do not determine legal rights or consequences, these decisions merely serve as a “notice.” Agreeing with the Army Corps’ position, the Court reasoned that the jurisdictional determination did not force the companies to refrain from acting on the property, and did not impose a penalty scheme for continuing with the project.

The Eighth Circuit Decision

The more recent Eighth Circuit decision, Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), dealt with the Hawkes Company’s plan to mine peat. The Army Corps determined there were “waters of the U.S.” on the proposed mining site so the company would need a CWA permit before it could start mining. At the first stage of judicial review, the District Court denied Hawkes’ challenge, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s view that the determination was not a final agency action. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Army Corps’ jurisdictional determinations are judicially reviewable final agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Eighth Circuit held that the Fifth Circuit had misapplied the law in ruling otherwise.

The Eighth Circuit noted that without judicial review the Hawkes Company had no choice other than “to incur substantial compliance costs (the permitting process), forego what they assert is lawful use of their property, or risk substantial enforcement penalties.” These options adversely affected the property and business interests of the company. The Court reasoned: “the prohibitive costs, risk, and delay of these alternatives to immediate judicial review evidence a transparently obvious litigation strategy: by leaving [property owners] with no immediate judicial review and no adequate alternative remedy, the Corps will achieve the result its local officers desire . . . without having to test whether its expansive assertion of jurisdiction” would ultimately be upheld in the courts. The Eighth Circuit found the jurisdictional determination process analogous to the administrative order process at issue in the 2012 Supreme Court decision in Sackett. There the Court ruled “[t]here is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the opportunity for judicial review – even judicial review of the question whether the regulated party is within the [federal agency’s] jurisdiction.” Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).

The Eighth Circuit found the Army Corps’ contention that Hawkes had adequate alternative remedies – either seeking a permit or acting without one and then challenging any compliance action that resulted – was untenable and failed to consider that Hawkes could never recover the time it lost or expense it incurred in taking either action.

Practical Implications of a Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court’s upcoming decision could have important practical implications for project developers and property owners. The Army Corps’ long-term position has left the regulated community with few pre-permitting or enforcement options. The Eighth Circuit decision, and the Supreme Court’s decision to review this issue, provide some hope to developers and property owners that they may soon be able to seek judicial review of jurisdictional determinations before going through the permitting process.

Article By Sarah A. Slack & Amanda K. Beggs of Foley & Lardner LLP

© 2015 Foley & Lardner LLP

Supreme Court Rejects States’ Request for 30 Day Filing Extension on DACA, DAPA

On Tuesday, December 1, the U.S. Supreme Court handed the Obama administration a “small procedural victory” and refused the request of Texas and other states for a 30-day extension to file briefs in support of the lawsuit blocking the Obama administration’s immigration executive action on DACA and DAPA. Instead, the Court accepted the Justice Department’s eight day extension request. The Supreme Court will likely decide in January whether or not to hear the case this term. If the Supreme Court hears the case during the current term, the decision would likely be published in June, providing quite the fan-flaming event during the 2016 presidential election.

The lawsuit itself is related to President Obama’s executive action expanding the Deferred Action for Children and creating Deferred Action for Parents (of U.S. Citizen or permanent resident children).

On Monday, over 220 organizations filed in favor of lifting the injunction on the executive action. These groups focused on the tangible benefits of expanding DACA and implementing DAPA and left the legal arguments to the Department of Justice.

Article By Immigration Practice at Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
©1994-2015 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Supreme Court to Decide Whether Government can Freeze a Defendant’s Lawful Assets Pre-Conviction

Whether the government can freeze all of a defendant’s assets before trial, even where those assets are not tainted by any connection to alleged federal offenses, thereby preventing a defendant from paying for his own defense, will be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Luis v. United States, No. 14-419.

The federal Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”) requires that defendants convicted of crimes committed by “fraud or deceit” compensate victims for the full amount of the victims’ losses. Often, however, by the time there is a conviction, criminal defendants do not have any assets to satisfy those judgments. Seeking to address this problem, the United States has invoked the Fraud Injunction Act to freeze legitimate assets pre-conviction to pay a later judgment.

The Fraud Injunction Act statute authorizes a “restraining order” against assets when a person is “alienating or disposing of property, or intends to alienate or dispose of property” that is “obtained from” or “traceable to” certain federal offenses. In such cases, the statute permits a court to prohibit the use of tainted property “or property of equivalent value” before trial to ensure that sufficient assets are available to satisfy any judgment.

In 2012, the federal government charged Sila Luis with conspiracy to commit Medicare fraud – a scheme allegedly amounting to over $45 million, stemming from claims for home health services that were neither medically necessary nor actually performed. Using the Fraud Injunction Act, the federal government asked the district court to freeze all of Luis’s assets, including those that were not even allegedly obtained through fraud, totaling approximately $15 million. The district court agreed to impose the freeze. .

Luis then requested that the district court release her untainted assets so she may retain her lawyer. The district court denied the request, explaining that, because the government could locate “only a fraction of the assets” Medicare had paid Luis’s companies, her “untainted” assets also could be frozen. The district court likened Luis’s situation to that of a bank robber indicted for stealing $100,000; That is, if the robber has already spent the allegedly stolen money which he could not use to hire his preferred lawyer in any case, he also should not be able to spend a different $100,000 he “just happens” to have to hire the lawyer he wants.

Luis appealed the district court’s decision, arguing she was being deprived of her Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and her Sixth Amendment right to counsel of her choosing. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Atlanta, upheld the district court’s denial of her request to release her legitimate assets, stating that Luis’s arguments were foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kaley v. United States (2014) and other decisions.

In Kaley, the Supreme Court held that when the government, following a grand jury indictment, restrains tainted assets needed to retain a lawyer, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not require a pretrial hearing at which the defendant can challenge a grand jury’s finding of probable cause.

Luis asked the Supreme Court to review the case. The Court agreed to do so and recently heard argument. A decision is expected by next June.

Article By Ramsay C. McCullough of Jackson Lewis P.C.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2015

Is the SCOTUS Rule of Reason Unreasonable?

“Not too hard, not too soft,” says the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  The majority tries to reach middle ground by rejecting both the FTC’s argument that any reverse payment in settlement of a patent claim is presumptively unlawful and Actavis’ argument that any settlement within the scope of the patent is permissible, but is the court’s new “rule of reason” approach really “just right?” Let’s see how this plays out in a simple scenario using a product whose success everyone loves to hate—the Snuggie.

Meet Peter.  He has a pug with whom he likes to spend his evenings, wrapped up in a Snuggie, watching movies and sharing popcorn.  Peter was quite dismayed, though, to see his poor little pug shivering and cold without a Snuggie of his own.  So, Peter invented the Puggie.  He used special fibers formulated specifically to maintain heat while resisting odors because no one likes a smelly dog blanket.  Peter even obtained a patent on his Puggie and began producing more to sell around his neighborhood, the Franklin Terrace Community.  Once word spread of Peter’s success, however, several of Peter’s neighbors began producing competing products—the Pug Pelt, the Schnauzzie, and so on–which boasted the same odor-resistant properties as Peter’s Puggie.

Outraged, Peter publicly accused his competitors of patent infringement and demanded that they stop producing their “piddly dog pelts.” But they refused, claiming their fibers were different.  Knowing how costly an extensive fiber dispute could be, Peter offered his competitors $1,000 to stop producing their competing pelts for a period of two years.  The other pelt producers agreed, took the money, and stopped production immediately.  The Franklin Terrace Community, however, was not pleased.  Peter had not only run off the competition, but he had also bumped the Puggie price up afterward, making a killing during the chilly winter as the sole pelt producer.  Community members petitioned the homeowners’ board for some guidance on whether Peter’s payment constituted an unfair trade practice.  Peter opposed the petition and claimed that he had the right to pay whatever amount he deemed fit to protect his patent.

The board found the community’s argument that any “reverse settlement” payment by a patent holder is presumptively unlawful to be too harsh.  Peter’s assertion, however, that any payment is immune from attack so long as it remains within the scope of the patent was believed to be too soft.  Peter complained that the money and time he would have to commit to an extensive patent lawsuit over his odor-resistant fibers would put him out of business, but the board believed that his willingness to drop a grand to keep his competitors at bay was a much more accurate representation of Peter’s confidence in his patent.  Specifically, the board found Peter’s payment of $1,000 to be a “strong indicator of power.”  In an effort to come up with a more “middle of the road” approach, the board created the “rule of reason” to determine the legality of reverse settlement payments.  No real guidance was provided, though, on how to apply the new rule—just not too hard, not too soft.

Without any elaboration on how this new “rule of reason” is to be applied in antitrust lawsuits, did the board cause more confusion than clarity?  And, how large must a reverse settlement payment be to stand as an “indicator of power” and “lack of confidence” in the patent?  If Peter’s patent was iron-clad and his competitors were infringing, should he have had the right to pay any amount he deemed fit to protect his patent, or was $1,000 too much for some piddly pooch pelts?  Does this unfairly prohibit Peter from settling litigation that he may see as too costly or damaging?  Or, does the need to protect consumers from the Puggie monopoly Peter created outweigh Peter’s patent rights?

It is hard to say exactly what effect the Supreme Court’s “rule of reason” decision in FTC v. Actavis will have on future antitrust litigation.  We are likely to see an increase in the number of antitrust suits that are tried as opposed to settled. What do you make of this amorphous, middle-of-the-road approach?

ARTICLE BY Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices
© Copyright 2002-2015 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

The Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Marriage: Employer Next Steps

What should employers be thinking about in the benefits arena now that the US Supreme Court has ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that all states must issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and fully recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed out of state?

We suggest that employers consider whether the following plan design changes, health plan amendments, and/or administrative modifications are necessary:

  • Review employee benefit plans’ definition of “spouse” and consider whether the Court’s decision will affect the application of the definition (e.g., if the plan refers to “spouse” by reference to state laws affected or superseded by the Obergefell decision). Qualified pension and 401(k) plans generally conformed their definitions of spouse to include same-sex spouses post-Windsor to comply with Internal Revenue Code provisions that protect spousal rights in such plans, but health and welfare plans may not have been so conformed.

  • Communicate any changes in the definition of spouse or eligibility for benefits to employees and beneficiaries, as applicable.

  • Update plan administration and tax reporting to ensure that employees are not treated as receiving imputed income under state tax law for any same-sex spouses who are covered by their employer-sponsored health and welfare plans (to the extent that coverage for opposite-sex spouses would otherwise be excluded from income).

  • If an employer currently covers unmarried domestic partners under its benefit plans, it may want to consider whether to eliminate coverage for such domestic partners on a prospective basis (and therefore only allow legally recognized spouses to have coverage). Employers that make that type of change also will need to determine the timing and communication of such a change.

  • Employers with benefit plans that treat same-sex spouses differently than opposite-sex spouses should consider whether to maintain that distinction. Even though nothing in Obergefell expressly compels employers to provide the same benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex spouses, and self-insured Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) health and welfare plans are not subject to state and municipal sexual orientation discrimination prohibitions, we believe these types of plan designs are likely to be challenged.

ARTICLE BY Andy R. Anderson & Lindsay M. Goodman of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Copyright © 2015 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.