Tag: shareholders

How Changing Beneficial Ownership Reporting May Impact Activism

The SEC in February proposed amendments to Regulation 13D-G to modernize beneficial ownership reporting requirements. Adoption of the amendments as proposed will accelerate the timing – and expand the scope – of knowledge of certain activist activities. The deadline for comments on the proposed rules was April 11 and final rules are expected to be released later this year.

The current reporting timeline creates an asymmetry of information between beneficial owners on the one hand and other stockholders and issuers on the other. The SEC proposal is seeking to eliminate this asymmetry and address other concerns surrounding current beneficial ownership reporting. The accelerated beneficial ownership reporting deadlines will result in greater transparency in stock ownership, allowing market participants to receive material information in a timely manner and potentially alleviating the market manipulation and abusive tactics used by some investors.

The shortened filing deadlines should benefit a company’s overall shareholder engagement activities. The investor relations team at a company will have a more accurate and up-to-date picture of its institutional investor base throughout the year, which should result in more timely outreach to such shareholders.

INVESTOR ACCUMULATION OF SHARES BEFORE DISCLOSURE

Although issuers will likely view the proposed rules as beneficial, many commentators have predicted a negative impact on shareholder activism. Under the current reporting requirements, certain activist investors may benefit by having both additional time to accumulate shares before disclosing such activities and potentially more flexibility in strategizing with other investors.

Many commentators have argued that the proposed shorter timeline for beneficial ownership reporting will negatively impact an activist shareholder’s ability to accumulate shares of an issuer at a potentially lower price than if market participants had more timely knowledge of such activity and intent. In many cases a company’s stock price is impacted once an investor files a Schedule 13D with clear activist intent. This can even occur in some cases once a Schedule 13G is filed by a known activist investor without current activist intent.

If the shorter reporting deadlines reduce such investors’ profit, it is expected that an investor’s incentive to accumulate stock in order to initiate change at a company will also be reduced. Activists instead may be encouraged to engage more with management. In other words, the shorter reporting period may deter short-term activists and encourage more long-term focused activism.

TIMING OF ISSUER RESPONSE

The shorter reporting deadlines are also expected to result in management having earlier notice of any takeover attempt and to give a company the opportunity to react more quickly to any such attempt. There is potential for this to lead to increased use of low-threshold poison pills. But the SEC stated in the proposed rules release that it believes the risk of abundant reactionary low-threshold poison pills is overstated due to scrutiny of such poison pills from courts and academia, limitations imposed by state law and the unlikelihood that the beneficial ownership would trigger the low-threshold poison pills.

Companies that have low-threshold poison pills – such as one designed to protect a company’s net operating losses – may want to review them to confirm that the proposed rules would not be expected to have any impact. For example, such poison pills may link the definition of beneficial ownership to the SEC rules, including Schedule 13D and 13G filings.

‘GROUP’ REPORTING

Another proposed change expected to affect shareholder activism is the expanded definition of ‘group’ for the purposes of reporting under Schedule 13D. The current rules require an explicit agreement between two or more persons to establish a group for purposes of the beneficial ownership reporting thresholds.

Commentators believe that under the current rules, certain investors seeking change at a company may share the fact that they are accumulating shares of a company with other shareholders or activists, which can then act on this information before the general public is aware; in other words, before public disclosure in and market reaction to the Schedule 13D filing. This activity may result in near-term gains for the select few involved before uninformed shareholders can react.

Under the SEC’s proposed amended Rule 13d-5, persons who share information with another regarding an upcoming Schedule 13D filing are deemed to have formed a group within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) regardless of whether an explicit agreement is in place, and such concerted action will trigger reporting requirements. This proposed change is expected to benefit companies and shareholders overall by preventing certain investors from acting in concert on information not known to a company and its other shareholders.

The full impact of the proposed rule changes on shareholder activism cannot be accurately predicted, but we believe that at a minimum, issuers will find it beneficial to have more regularly updated information on their institutional investor base for, among other things, their shareholder engagement efforts.

Article By Alexandra Clark Layfield and Rachel Solino of  Jones Walker LLP

For more Securities and SEC news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Jones Walker LLP

Data Breaches Will Cost Yahoo and Verizon Long After Sale

data breach Yahoo VerizonFive Things You (and Your M&A Diligence Team) Should Know

Recently it was announced that Verizon would pay $350 million less than it had been prepared to pay previously for Yahoo as a result of data breaches that affected over 1.5 billion users, pending Yahoo shareholder approval. Verizon Chief Executive Lowell McAdam led the negotiations for the price reduction. Yahoo took two years, until September of 2016, to disclose a 2014 data breach that Yahoo has said affected at least 500 million users, while Verizon Communications was in the process of acquiring Yahoo. In December of 2016, Yahoo further disclosed that it had recently discovered a breach of around 1 billion Yahoo user accounts that likely took place in 2013.

While some may be thinking that the $350 million price reduction has effectively settled the matter, unfortunately, this is far from the case. These data breaches will likely continue to cost both Verizon and Yahoo for years to come.  Merger and acquisition events that are complicated by pre-existing data breaches will likely face at least four categories of on-going liabilities.  The cost of each of these events will be difficult to estimate during the deal process, even if the breach event is disclosed during initial diligence. First, the breach event will probably render integration of the systems of the target and acquirer difficult, as the full extent of the security issues is often difficult to assess and may evolve through time. According to Verizon executives, Yahoo’s data breaches created integration issues that had not been previously understood.  The eventual monetary cost of this issue remains unknown.

Second, where the target is subject to the authority of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), an SEC investigation and penalties if applicable, is likely, along with related shareholder lawsuits. As we wrote previously, The SEC is currently investigating if Yahoo should have reported the two massive data breaches it experienced earlier to investors, according to individuals with knowledge. Under the current agreement, Yahoo will bear sole liability for shareholder lawsuits and any penalties that result from the SEC investigation.

Third, there will likely be additional private party actions due to the breach. Exactly what these liabilities will be will depend on the data subject to exfiltration as a result of the breach.  In Yahoo’s case, Verizon and Yahoo have agreed to equally share in costs and liabilities created by lawsuits from customers and partners.  Multiple private party lawsuits have already been filed against Yahoo alleging negligence.

Fourth, other government investigations, such as by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), could result in additional costs, both monetary and reputational. The FBI is currently investing the Yahoo breaches.  Verizon and Yahoo will share the costs of the FBI investigation and other potential third party investigations.

Fifth, depending on the scope of the breach, there would likely be on-going remediation costs after the deal closes. According to a knowledgeable source, as of February 2017, Yahoo had sent notifications to a “mostly final” list of users, indicating that some remaining remediation activities may yet occur.

As we have seen, merger and acquisition events involving a target with a pre-existing data breach issues create difficult to assess costs and liabilities that will survive the closing of the transaction.

ARTICLE BY Cynthia J. Larose & Brian H. Lam of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.

©1994-2017 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Email Notice Without Consent Is Not Notice

Allen Matkins Law Firm

The California General Corporation Law unequivocally authorizes the giving of notice of stockholder meetings by electronic transmission.  Section 601(b) provides “Notice of a shareholders’ meeting or any report shall be given personally, by electronic transmission by the corporation . . .”.  The statute further provides that notice is deemed to have been given when sent by electronic transmission by the corporation.  Nonetheless, sending notice by email may not be valid because the statute provides that notice by electronic transmission is valid only if it complies with Section 20 of the Corporations Code.

Section 20 imposes two general conditions and one specific condition to the giving of notice by electronic transmission.  First, the recipient must have provided an unrevoked consent to the use of those means of transmission for communications under or pursuant to the Corporations Code.  Since the term “electronic transmission by the corporation” includes several different means of transmission, the consent must be to the form of transmission (e.g., facsimile or email).  Second, the electronic transmission must create “a record that is capable of retention, retrieval, and review, and that may thereafter be rendered into clearly legible tangible form”.  Finally, if the recipient is an individual shareholder who is a natural person, the consent to the transmission must be preceded by, or include, a clear written statement to the recipient as to:

  • any right of the recipient to have the record provided or made available on paper or in non-electronic form,

  • whether the consent applies only to that transmission, to specified categories of communications, or to all communications from the corporation, and

  • the procedures the recipient must use to withdraw consent.

Nearly two decades ago, I wrote about the Corporations Code move into Cyberspace, The California Corporations Code Enters Cyberspace: 1995 Legislation Tackles New On-Line Technologies, 18 CEB California Business Law Reporter 5 (1996).

More On The SEC’s Backwards Rule Proposal

In this February post, I argued that the SEC got it backwards when it proposed new rules requiring disclosure of whether hedging transactions by directors, officers and others are permitted.  My point was that directors and officers don’t need the company’s permission to engage in these transactions.  The relevant disclosure is whether the company prohibits hedging transactions that would otherwise be permitted.  The SEC’s proposed rules misleadingly imply that permission is required.

Recently, I was reading an account of the interactions between the first American consul to Japan, Townsend Harris, and Governor Okada of Shimoda, Japan.  The Japanese government was concerned that the Americans would survey the coast of Japan and pressed Harris to prohibit any surveying by American vessels.  The following record illustrates how the want of permission might be argued into a prohibition:

The Japanese: There is not article in the treaty which prohibits surveying.

Harris: There is no article which prohibits it.

Moriyama [a member of the Governor’s staff]:  Not to permit it means that we refuse it.

Dai Nihon Komonjo, Bakumatsu Gaikoku Kankei Monjo, XV, 63.

If this seems a bit of obscure history, John Wayne actually played Townsend Harris in the 1958 film, The Barbarian and the Geisha, directed by John Huston.

By Keith Paul Bishop

Of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

United Kingdom: A Reminder About Careful Drafting of Confidentiality Clauses for Shareholders

Katten Muchin Law Firm

The recent decision by the High Court of England and Wales (Chancery Division) in Richmond Pharmacology Limited (Company) v. Chester Overseas Limited, et al. underscores the need to carefully draft confidentiality clauses and to incorporate specific exceptions where these exceptions are reasonably foreseeable in the future. The case involved a shareholders agreement which contained a standard confidentiality clause requiring the parties to treat as strictly confidential all commercially sensitive information concerning the company subject to certain prescribed exceptions. One of the exceptions allowed disclosure to a professional advisor provided that the advisor agrees to be bound by a similar confidentiality obligation. Unsurprisingly, however, there was no specific exception allowing disclosures to a potential third-party buyer. Under the terms of the clause as drafted, the shareholder was required to obtain consent to make the disclosures. 

Over time Chester Overseas Limited decided to sell its shares and engaged a corporate finance advisor (Advisor) to assist in facilitating the sale. After the initial discussions regarding a management buy-out fell through, the Advisor sought to generate interest from third parties. In doing so, the Advisor took care to obtain nondisclosure agreements from certain of these potential buyers prior to disclosing the sensitive information. 

In its decision, the High Court stated that while the shareholder was entitled to disclose the information to its Advisor pursuant to the professional advisor exception, it was not authorized to disclose the confidential information to third parties.   

While the High Court’s decision regarding the confidentiality clause may not come as a surprise, it does reinforce the need to carefully consider a client’s position in future transactions governed under English law.   

The High Court’s decision is available here.

ARTICLE BY

Neil Robson
 
OF 
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

Retroactive Tax Planning Re: U.S. Shareholders of Foreign Corporations

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Converting Subpart F Income into Qualified Dividends

U.S. shareholders of foreign corporations are generally not subject to tax on the earnings of such corporations until the earnings are repatriated to the shareholders in the form of a dividend.  Moreover, when a foreign corporation is resident in a jurisdiction with which the United States has a comprehensive income tax treaty, the dividends distributed to its individual U.S. shareholders are eligible for reduced qualified dividend tax rates (currently taxed at a maximum federal income tax rate of 20 percent).

tax planning

Where a foreign corporation is classified as a “controlled foreign corporation” (“CFC”) for an uninterrupted period of 30 days or more during any taxable year, however, its U.S. shareholders must include in income their pro rata share of the Subpart F income of the CFC for that taxable year, whether or not such earnings are distributed.  A CFC is a foreign corporation, more than 50 percent of which is owned (by vote or value), directly or indirectly, by “U.S. shareholders.”  A U.S. shareholder, for the purpose of the CFC rules, is a U.S. person who owns, directly, indirectly or constructively, at least ten percent of the combined voting power with respect to the foreign corporation.

In addition to the inability to defer taxation on its share of a CFC’s subpart F income, one of the pitfalls of a U.S. shareholder owning stock in a CFC is that subpart F income is treated as ordinary income to the U.S. shareholder (currently taxed at a maximum federal income tax rate of 39.6 percent), regardless of whether the CFC is resident in a jurisdiction that has an income tax treaty with the United States.  Therefore, the U.S. shareholder would not be able to repatriate its profits at qualified dividend rates.

Among other things, subpart F income generally includes passive investment income (e.g., interest, dividends, rents and royalties) and net gain from the sale of property that gives rise to passive investment income.  Gain on the sale of stock in a foreign corporation, for example, falls within this category.  Consequently, when a CFC sells stock of a lower-tier corporation, the U.S. shareholders of the CFC will have to include their share of the gain from the sale as subpart F income, which will be taxed immediately at ordinary income rates.

Check-the-Box Elections

Pursuant to the “check-the-box” entity classification rules, a business entity that is not treated as a per se corporation is an “eligible entity” that may elect its classification for federal income tax purposes.  An eligible entity with two or more members may elect to be classified as either a corporation or a partnership. An eligible entity with only one member may elect to be classified as either a corporation or a disregarded entity.

Generally, the effective date of a check-the-box election cannot be more than 75 days prior to the date on which the election is filed.  However, Rev. Proc. 2009-41 provides that if certain requirements are met, an eligible entity may file a late classification election within 3 years and 75 days of the requested effective date of the election.  These requirements may be met if:

  1. The entity failed to obtain its requested classification solely because the election was not timely filed
  2. The entity has not yet filed a tax return for the first year in which the election was intended
  3. The entity has reasonable cause for failure to make a timely election

The conversion from a corporation into a partnership or disregarded entity pursuant to a check-the-box election results in a deemed liquidation of the corporation on the day immediately preceding the effective date of the election.  Distributions of property in liquidation of the corporation generally are treated as taxable events, as if the shareholders sold their stock back to the corporation in exchange for the corporation’s assets.  As a result, the corporation shareholders would recognize gain on the liquidating distributions to the extent the fair market value of the corporation’s assets exceeds the basis of the shareholders’ shares.  In addition, subject to limited exceptions, the corporation generally would recognize gain on the liquidating distribution of any appreciated property.

Converting Subpart F Income into Qualified Dividends

A CFC that elects to convert from a corporation into a partnership or disregarded entity generally would recognize Subpart F income on the deemed liquidation, to the extent it holds property that gives rise to passive investment income (such as stock in subsidiary corporations).  The subpart F income inclusion rules only apply, however, when the foreign corporation has been a CFC for a period of 30 uninterrupted days in the given taxable year.  Where the election is made effective as of January 2, the liquidation of the foreign corporation would be deemed to occur on January 1 of that year.  Because the foreign corporation would be deemed to have been liquidated on January 1, it would not have been a CFC for 30 days during the year of liquidation.  As a result, subpart F income would not be triggered on the deemed liquidation of the foreign corporation.

In addition, as a result of the check-the-box election, a U.S. shareholder of the foreign corporation would recognize gain on the deemed liquidation as if the shareholder sold its stock back to the corporation in exchange for the corporation’s assets.  Section 1248(a) provides, however, that when a U.S. person sells or exchanges its shares in a foreign corporation that was a CFC during the 5-year period prior to disposition, the gain from the sale is recharacterized as a dividend to the extent of the allocable share of the earnings and profits of the foreign corporation.  To the extent the foreign corporation is resident in a country with which the U.S. has an income tax treaty, its individual U.S. shareholders would be eligible for the reduced qualified dividend income tax rate on such dividend.

This may be illustrated by the following example:

A, a U.S. individual, is the sole shareholder of X, a foreign corporation resident in a country with which the United States has a comprehensive income tax treaty.  X owns 40 percent of the shares of Y, another foreign corporation.  In October 2013, X sells all of its shares of Y.  X is a CFC and the net gain from the sale of the Y shares constitutes subpart F income.  As a result, the gain would have to be included in A’s gross income as ordinary income.  Instead, X files a retroactive check-the-box election pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2009-41 to be treated as a disregarded entity as of January 2, 2013.  The election results in a deemed liquidation of X on January 1, 2013.  Because X has not been a CFC for a period of 30 uninterrupted days in 2013, however, subpart F income is not triggered on the deemed liquidation of X.  In addition, the gain recognized by A on the deemed liquidation of X is recharacterized as a dividend and subject to tax at the reduced rates applicable to qualified dividend income.

As a result, the combination of Section 1248(a) and the retroactive check-the-box rules allows individual U.S. shareholders of a CFC to convert gain that would be realized upon the sale of the CFC’s assets from subpart F income (taxed as ordinary income at rates up to 39.6 percent) to qualified dividend income (currently taxed at 20 percent).  Following the deemed liquidation of the foreign corporation, because all of the assets would be deemed to have been distributed to the shareholders in complete liquidation of the corporation, and the shareholders would recognize gain on the receipt of the assets, the basis of the assets would be stepped up to fair market value, reducing or eliminating gain recognized upon the subsequent sale of the assets of the former CFC.

Article By:

Jeffrey L. Rubinger
Nadia E. Kruler
Joshua Kaplan
Of:
Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP