Tag: Securities Law

Changes to Conditions of SEC Rule 10b5-1 Obligations

New amendments to insider-trading regulations are about to go into effect. SEC Rule 10b5-1 has long provided an affirmative defense to insiders who trade under a written plan adopted in good faith and who lack material nonpublic information (MNPI).

Over the years, pundits have noticed that trades under Rule 10b5-1 plans have been unusually profitable, suggesting that some insiders might have misused these plans. As a result, in December 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced amendments and new disclosure requirements to address perceived abuses. Below are the significant provisions that go into effect on February 27, 2023.

New Good-Faith Requirements

Companies have always had to act in good faith when they adopt a Rule 10b5-1 plan. The new amendments extend that obligation, requiring insiders to continue to act in good faith throughout the duration of the plan. See 17 C.F.R. § 10b5-1(c)(1)(ii)(A). This means that insiders not only need to act in good faith when creating a plan but also have an obligation to avoid opportunistic trades or timing disclosures that coincide with trades under the plan.

While this is a heightened requirement, it is not clear who will bear the burden of pleading good faith during any ensuing litigation. The regulation is framed as an affirmative defense, but at least one court had previously interpreted the old regulation as placing the burden on the plaintiff to plead facts specifying that a plan was not entered into in good faith or was part of a plan to evade the regulations. [1] It is not clear how courts will interpret the new regulation and whether they will require a pleading of scienter or bad faith for this new obligation.

Director and Officer Certifications

Directors and officers must now certify that (1) they are unaware of any material nonpublic information about the security or issuer and (2) they are adopting the plan in good faith and not as a part of a plan or scheme to evade the regulations.

Cooling-Off Periods

The amendments impose various “cooling-off periods” for trades under Rule 10b5-1 plans, which could vary based on the identity of the trader. These “cooling-off periods” start when a company adopts a new plan or modifies a plan to alter the sale or purchase price, the ranges, the amount of securities sold or purchased, or the time of the trades.

Directors or officers cannot trade under a plan until the later of (a) 90 days after the plan’s adoption or after certain modifications or (b) two business days after filing a Form 10–Q or Form 10–K [2] that discloses the financial results of a quarter in which the plan was adopted or modified (subject to no more than 120 days). Anyone else (non-officers or non-directors) faces a 30-day cooling-off period after any adoption or modification of a plan. [3]

Multiple or Overlapping Plans

A Rule 10b5-1 defense will not be available to anyone who enters multiple or overlapping plans at the same time. This prohibition includes three exceptions:

First, a series of separate contracts with different broker-dealers acting on behalf of a non-issuer may be treated as a single plan if the plans, taken together, meet the regulation’s other conditions.

Second, a non-issuer may enter into one subsequent plan for the purchase or sale of any security of the issuer on the open market. But trading cannot begin until after all trades under the earlier starting plan are completed or expired, pending the effective cooling-off period.

Third, eligible sell-to-cover transactions will not be considered outstanding or additional plans under this section. The SEC defines an eligible sell-to-cover transaction as a contract, instruction, or plan that “authorizes an agent to sell only such securities as are necessary to satisfy tax withholding obligations arising exclusively from the vesting of a compensatory award, such as restricted stock or stock appreciation rights, and the insider does not otherwise exercise control over the timing of such sales.”

Single-Trade Plans

The final condition imposed by the amendment is the addition of § 10b5-1(c)(1)(ii)(E), which limits the affirmative defense for non-issuers to one single-trade plan designed to affect the open-market purchase or sale of the total amount of securities as a single transaction during a twelve-month period. As with the prior condition, this regulation does exclude eligible sell-to-cover transactions.

Takeaways

Companies, directors, and officers who intend to use a Rule 10b5-1 plan to insulate themselves from accusations of insider trading need to revisit their plans. They need to ensure that the plan articulates a cooling-off period and that the plan includes the director-officer certification. Participants in the plan need to ensure they are conducting themselves in good faith, that they are not joining multiple competing plans during the same period, and that they are abiding by the new restrictions on single-trade plans. Rule 10b5-1 is a powerful tool to insulate insiders from liability, and it is imperative to align these plans with the new regulations.

Copyright © 2023 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

For more Financial, Securities & Banking legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

ENDNOTES

[1] Arkansas Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 28 F.4th 343, 356 n.4 (2d Cir. 2022).

[2] Foreign issuers, Form 20-F or Form 6-K.

[3] The SEC did not impose cooling-off periods on issuers but has suggested that it is investigating whether such a period is appropriate.

Was This The Least Transparent Report In SEC History?

Professor Alexander I. Platt at the University of Kansas School of Law has just released a draft of a forthcoming paper that takes the Securities and Exchange Commission to task for the lack of transparency in its whistleblower program, Going Dark(er): The SEC Whistleblower Program’s FY 2022 Report Is The Least Transparent In Agency History.  As Professor Platt notes in a footnote, I have been complaining about the whistleblower’s lack of transparency since at least 2016.  See Five Propositions Concerning The SEC Whistleblower Program.  Last summer, I observed that “There is certainly no dearth of irony in a federal agency dedicated to full disclosure cloaking in secrecy a billion dollar awards program”.

Professor Platt offers four possible reasons for the SEC’s lack of transparency: (1) resource constraints; (2) lack of respect for public participation and accountability; (3) data problems; and/or (4) an intent to bury something controversial or embarrassing.  My concern is, and has been, that whatever the reason(s), the SEC’s lack of transparency creates an ideal substrate for fraud.  Unless the SEC drops its cloak of secrecy and exposes its whistleblower program to public scrutiny, it is highly likely that the next article will be about how the whistleblower program was used and abused.

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more SEC and securities legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2010-2023 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Are Loans Securities?

We have been following a case that has been winding its way through New York federal courts for some time that players in the syndicated loan market have described as everything from “a potential game changer” to an “existential threat” to the syndicated loan market.

The case in question is Kirschner v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., which is before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In this case, the Court will consider an appeal of a 2020 decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York which held that the syndicated term loan in question was not a security. Significantly, this ruling indicated that because syndicated term loans are not securities, they are therefore not subject to securities laws and regulations.

The consequence of a determination that syndicated loans are securities would be significant. It would mean, among other things, that the syndicated loan market would have to comply with various state and federal securities laws. This would significantly change the cost of these transactions as well as the means by which syndication and loan trading take place. The Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) filed an amicus brief in this case in May of this year, which we covered here. The LSTA argued in its brief, among other things, that beyond the increased cost, regulating syndicated loans as securities would fundamentally change other aspects of the syndicated loan market. Specifically, the LSTA pointed to the importance of a borrower’s ability to have veto rights and other control in determining which entities will hold its debt. The LSTA also noted the importance of quick access to funding on flexible terms specific to the borrower in question – something we know is at the heart of so many fund finance transactions – which would be greatly compromised within a securities regulatory regime. The LSTA brief also discusses potential negative impacts on the CLO market.

Those in favor of a change in regulation point to features such as nonbank lender participation in the market, the fact that the test to determine whether a loan is a security may be outdated, and the overall size of the syndicated loan market – at $1.4 trillion – which could be a risk to the larger global financial system potentially warranting more stringent regulation.

Most experts believe that the Second Circuit will not overturn the decision issued in the lower court, but the issue in question is significant enough that market players should keep an eye on this one. Oral arguments will take place early next year. We will continue to watch as this case develops and update you here.

Article By Leah Edelboim of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2022 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Dead Canary in the LBRY

In a case watched by companies that offered and sold digital assets1 Federal District Court Judge Paul Barbadoro recently granted summary judgment for the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) against LBRY, Inc.2 This case is seen by some as a canary in the coalmine in that the decision supports the SEC’s view espoused by SEC Chairman Gary Gensler that nearly all digital assets are securities that were offered and sold in violation of the securities laws.3 For FinTech companies hoping to avoid SEC enforcement actions, the LBRY decision strongly suggests that all companies offering digital assets could be viewed by courts as satisfying the Howey test for investment contract securities.4

LBRY is a company that promised to use blockchain technology to allow users to share videos and images without the need for third-party intermediaries like YouTube or Facebook. LBRY offered and sold LBRY Credits, called LBC tokens, that would compensate participants of their blockchain network and would be spent by LBRY users on things like publishing content, tipping content creators, and purchasing paywall content. At launch, LBRY had pre-mined 400 million LBC for itself, and approximately 600 million LBC would be available in the future to compensate miners. LBRY spent about half of the 400 million LBC tokens on various endeavors, such as direct sales and using the tokens to incentivize software developers and software testers.

Judge Barbadoro concluded as a matter of law (i.e., that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise) that the LBC tokens were securities under Section 5 of the Securities Act. Applying the Howey test, Judge Barbadoro noted the only prong of the Howey test that was disputed in the case was: Did investors buy LBC tokens “with an expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party”? Judge Barbadoro answered resoundingly, “Yes.”

Most important to his conclusion that investors purchased LBC tokens with the expectations of profits solely through the efforts of the promoter (i.e., LBRY) were: the many statements made by LBRY employees and community representatives about the price of LBC and trading volume of LBC; and many statements that LBRY made about the development of its content platform, including how the platform would yield long-term value to LBC holders. Critically, however, Judge Barbadoro found that even if LBRY had made none of these statements, the LBC token would still constitute a security because “any reasonable investor who was familiar with the company’s business model would have understood the connection” between LBC value growth and LBRY’s efforts to grow the use of its network. Even if LBRY had never said a word about the LBC token, Judge Barbadoro found that the LBC token would constitute a security because LBRY retained hundreds of millions of LBC tokens for themselves, thus signaling to investors that it was committed to working to improve the value of the token.

Judge Barbadoro flatly rejected LBRY’s defense that the LBC token cannot be a security because the token has utility.5 The judge noted, “Nothing in the case law suggests that a token with both consumptive and speculative uses cannot be sold as an investment contract.” Likewise, Judge Barbadoro was unmoved by LBRY’s argument that it had no “fair notice” that the SEC would treat digital assets as unregistered securities simply because this was the first time the SEC had brought an enforcement action against an issuer of digital currency.6

In sum, if Judge Barbadoro’s reasoning is applied more broadly to the thousands of digital assets that have emerged over the last several years—including companies that tout the so called “utility” of their tokens—they will all likely be deemed digital asset securities that were offered and sold without a registration or an exemption from registration.

The LBRY decision is yet another case in which a court has concluded a digital asset is a security. Developers of digital assets must proceed with a high degree of caution. The SEC continues to display a high degree of willingness to initiate investigations and enforcement actions against issuers of digital assets that are viewed as securities under the Howey and Reeves tests, investment companies, or security-based swaps.

For more Securities Law and Digital Assets news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright ©2022 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

FOOTNOTES

1 The SEC defines “digital assets” as intangible “asset[s] that [are] issued and transferred using distributed ledger or blockchain technology.” Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading, Division of Corporation Finance, Division of Investment Management, and Division of Trading and Markets, SEC (Nov. 16, 2018), available here.

2 SEC v. LBRY, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-00260-PB (D.N.H. filed Mar. 29, 2021), available here. A copy of the complaint against LBRY can be found here.

3 See, e.g., Gary Gensler, Speech – “A ‘New’ New Era: Prepared Remarks Before the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Annual Meeting” (May 11, 2022) (“My predecessor Jay Clayton said it, and I will reiterate it: Without prejudging any one token, most crypto tokens are investment contracts under the Supreme Court’s Howey Test.”), available here. Section 5(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) provides that, unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to sell securities in interstate commerce. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act provides a similar prohibition against offers to sell or offers to buy securities unless a registration statement has been filed.

4 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). This case did not address when digital assets could be deemed debt securities under the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1990), or when digital assets could be deemed an investment company under the Investment Company Acy of 1940. See, e.g., In the Matter of Blockfi Lending, Feb. 14, 2022, available here. This case also does not address when a digital asset is a security-based swap. See, e.g., In the Matter of Plutus Financial, Inc., (July 13, 2020), available here.

5 The argument a digital asset is not a security because it has “utility” is a favorite argument of critics of the SEC’s enforcement actions against issuers of digital assets. Unfortunately, the “utility” argument appears to be of little merit when the digital asset is offered and sold to raise capital.

6 This is an argument that has been made by a number of defendants in SEC enforcement actions involving digital asset securities.

SEC Awards $825,000 to Whistleblower

On October 11, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a $825,000 whistleblower award issued to an individual who voluntarily provided the agency with original information about securities fraud.

The SEC Whistleblower Program offers monetary awards to qualified whistleblowers whose disclosures contribute to the success of enforcement actions. SEC whistleblower awards are for 10-30% of the funds collected by the government in the relevant enforcement action.

According to the SEC award order, the whistleblower “expeditiously provided detailed information that prompted the opening of the investigation.” Furthermore, the whistleblower “thereafter met with Commission staff in person and provided additional information after submitting the initial TCR.”

In addition to monetary awards, the SEC Whistleblower Program offers anti-retaliation protections to whistleblowers, including confidentiality. Thus, the SEC does not disclose any information that could identify a whistleblower.

Since the whistleblower program was established in 2010, the SEC has awarded more than $1.3 billion to over 280 individual whistleblowers. In August 2021, SEC Chair Gary Gensler stated that the program “has greatly aided the Commission’s work to protect investors” and noted that “the SEC has used whistleblower information to obtain sanctions of over $5 billion from securities law violators” and “return over $1.3 billion to harmed investors.”

Article By Mary Jane Wilmoth of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto. Geoff Schweller also contributed to this article.

For more criminal law and business crimes legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2022. All Rights Reserved.

Draft SEC Five-Year Strategic Plan Emphasizes Importance of Climate Disclosures

Recently, the SEC issued its five-year strategic plan for public comment.  This strategic plan covers a wide variety of topics, ranging from adapting to new technology to plans for increasing internal SEC workforce diversity.  Significantly, this draft strategic plan stated that “the SEC must update its disclosure framework,” and highlighted three areas in which it should do so: “issuers’ climate risks, cybersecurity hygiene policies, and their most important asset: their people.”

The SEC has already undertaken steps to enact these proposed updates to its disclosure requirements for public companies.  Notably, this past March it proposed draft climate disclosure rules, which provoked a significant response from the public–including widespread criticism from many companies (as well as praise from environmental organizations).  The fact that the SEC chose to highlight these rules in its (draft) five-year strategic plan indicates the depth of the commitment it has made to these draft climate disclosures, and further suggests that the final form of the climate disclosures is unlikely to be significantly altered in substance from what the SEC has already proposed.  This statement reinforces the commitment of Chairman Gensler’s SEC and the Biden Administration to financial disclosures as a method to combat climate change.

“The markets have begun to embrace the necessity of providing a greater level of disclosure to investors. From time to time, the SEC must update its disclosure framework to reflect investor demand. Today, investors increasingly seek information related to, among other things, issuers’ climate risks, cybersecurity hygiene policies, and their most important asset: their people. In order to catch up to that reality, the agency should continue to update the disclosure framework to address these areas of investor demand, as well as continue to take concrete steps to modernize the systems that support the disclosure framework, to make public disclosures easier to access and analyze and thus more decision-useful to investors. . . . Across the agency, the SEC must continually reassess its risks, including in new areas such as climate risk, and document necessary controls.”

Article By Jacob H. Hupart of Mintz

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

SEC Proposes to Clear-Up Clearing Agencies’ Governance to Mitigate Directors’ Potential Conflicts of Interest

Clearing agencies registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will have to make governance changes to their boards of directors under a new rule proposed by the SEC on August 8, 2022.

The SEC proposed the new rule1 to mitigate the conflicts of interests inherent in clearing agency relationships. The rule follows episodes of market volatility in 2021 that included large fluctuations surrounding COVID-19 and the meme stock craze.

The new rule would amend Section 17Ad-25 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to require additional management and governance requirements for clearing agencies that register with the SEC. The proposed rules provide specific new governance requirements on clearing board composition, independent directors, nominating committees and risk management committees. The rule also requires the board to oversee relationships with critical service providers and includes a board obligation to consider various stakeholder views and inputs.

Rationale

The SEC’s rationale for proposing Rule 17Ad-25, titled Clearing Agency Governance and Conflicts of Interest, is to reduce the risk that conflicts of interest inherent in various clearing agency relationships substantially harm the security-based swaps or larger financial market. The SEC is proposing this rule to mitigate conflicts of interest, promote the fair representation of owners and participants in the governance of a clearing agency, identify responsibilities of the board, and increase transparency into clearing agency governance.

The SEC noted that those episodes of increased market volatility revealed certain vulnerabilities in the US securities market and the essential role clearing agencies play in managing the risk if securities transactions fail to clear.

The SEC observed three potential sets of conflicts of interest that the proposed rule attempts to address.

  1. The proposed rule addresses the different perspectives the various stakeholders involved in clearing agencies might have. In particular, a clearing agency owner’s potential interest in protecting the equity and continued operation of the clearing agency diverges from a participant’s potential interest in avoiding the allocation of losses from another defaulting participant. For instance, in the event of a loss, clearing agency participants might prefer to limit access to clearing, while owners may choose to expand the scope of products offered to collect fees.

  2. Larger clearing agency participants’ priorities may diverge significantly from the interests of smaller clearing agency participants. In particular, when a small number of dominant participants exercise control over a registered clearing agency concerning services provided by that clearing agency, those participants might promote margin requirements that are not commensurate with the risks they take, thereby indirectly limiting competition and increasing profit margins for themselves. In other words, a registered clearing agency dominated by a small number of large participants might make decisions designed to provide them with a competitive advantage.

  3. Certain participants may exert undue influence to limit access to the clearing agency based on their own interests, and thus could limit the benefits of the clearing agency to indirect participants.

Rule Requirements

The proposed rule would impose these seven requirements:

  1. define independence in the context of a director serving on the board of a registered clearing agency and require that a majority of directors on the board be independent, unless a majority of the voting rights distributed to shareholders of record are directly or indirectly held by participants of the registered clearing agency, in which case at least 34 percent of the board must be independent directors;

  2. establish requirements for a nominating committee, including with respect to the composition of the nominating committee, fitness standards for serving on the board, and documenting the process for evaluating board nominees;

  3. establish requirements for the function, composition, and reconstitution of the risk management committee;

  4. require policies and procedures that identify, mitigate or eliminate, and document the identification and mitigation or elimination of conflicts of interest;

  5. require policies and procedures that obligate directors to report potential conflicts promptly;

  6. require policies and procedures for the board to oversee relationships with service providers for critical services; and

  7. require policies and procedures to solicit, consider, and document the registered clearing agency’s consideration of the views of its participants and other relevant stakeholders regarding its governance and operations.

The proposing release will be published on SEC.gov and in the Federal Register. The public comment period will remain open for 60 days following publication of the proposing release on the SEC’s website or 30 days following publication of the proposing release in the Federal Register, whichever period is longer.

FOOTNOTES

1 https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/34-95431.pdf

Article By Susan Light of Katten. Jacob C. Setton, an associate in the Financial Markets and Funds practice and candidate for admission to the New York State bar, also contributed to this advisory.

For more SEC and securities legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

5 Keys to SEC Compliance Success

The best way to avoid the scrutiny from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that can lead to significant legal liability is to strictly comply with all of the agency’s rules and regulations. Unfortunately, given the complexity of these regulations and the constantly changing legal landscape of securities laws, such as the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, this is much easier said than done.

Here are five keys to SEC compliance.

1. Identify Your Particular Needs

It should be an obvious first step, but many compliance attorneys treat all clients the same and offer a one-size-fits-all approach to complying with the regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). While this might not be a terrible approach – so long as it is all-encompassing, it will keep your company in line with the SEC across the board – it can saddle your firm with concerns and extraneous internal rules that have no bearing on how you conduct business.

A great example is a cryptocurrency. The SEC is, belatedly, beginning to issue rules and regulations for financial firms that focus on and trade in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. If your brokerage firm is not buying or selling securities in crypto-assets and has no plans to do so soon, then implementing compliance measures for cryptocurrency regulations has no benefit to your company. Those measures will, however, make the regulated securities professionals who work for your firm jump through pointless hoops in the ordinary course of their business.

Adopting a compliance strategy that more precisely meets your company’s needs will let your workers perform to their full capacity while still insulating your firm from legal liability or SEC scrutiny. It will just have to be updated if you choose to expand into new forms of securities trading.

2. Craft an All-Encompassing Compliance Strategy

Based on your firm’s precise regulatory needs, the next key to success is to come up with a compliance strategy that takes into account all of the SEC’s rules that could impact your company. Given the breadth of the SEC’s jurisdiction and the sheer number of regulations that it has put forth, this can take a while.

Once your firm’s legal requirements have been ascertained, the next step is to come up with ways that you can satisfy them during the day-to-day business activities at your firm. This is another reason why every compliance strategy should be tailored to your business – a compliance technique that works well and is easy for one firm may be onerous and inconvenient for another one.

As Dr. Nick Oberheiden, founding partner of the SEC compliance law firm Oberheiden P.C., often tells clients, “All SEC compliance measures should protect the securities firm from SEC liability. However, those measures should also be judged by how burdensome they are on the firm that is employing them. The least inconvenient method to adequately insulate your firm from liability is the best. Learning about a brokerage firm and understanding its strengths and weaknesses and its capabilities help compliance lawyers craft the best solutions for their clients. Unfortunately, one of the most common complaints that securities professionals have about attorneys is that they do not listen to their particular concerns. We strive to do better.”

3. Train, Train, and Retrain Your Workers

No compliance strategy is effective if it is not implemented. Training your employees and workers in the intricacies of the compliance strategy, explaining why it is important for them to follow it strictly, and describing the penalties for noncompliance is the next key to success.

Even here, though, it is not a matter of simply giving your employees a handbook of rules, policies, and procedures to memorize. Just like how the compliance strategy should be tailored to your firm, so too should the instruction materials be tailored to each type of worker at your company. While it can help to train non-regulated administrative staff how to detect the signs of financial misconduct or fraud, there is no reason to bog them down in the details of SEC regulations that only pertain to traders – doing so can overload them with irrelevant information and make them lose sight of what they need to know.

It is also important to remember that training is not a one-time ordeal. New hires must be onboarded and taught the rules of internal compliance. Existing workers should be retrained to keep them apprised of any updates and to ensure that they remember their roles in the compliance protocol.

4. Keep Your Compliance Strategy Updated

Keeping your compliance strategy updated is also essential when it comes to compliance inspections. An out-of-date compliance protocol may still cover many of the bases for SEC compliance. However, there will be gaps in the compliance requirements that you will be unaware of, giving you a false sense of security.

The compliance strategy should not just be updated to account for new SEC regulations, though: It should also get updated whenever your brokerage firm branches out into new types of trading or adds a new kind of financial service to its portfolio. With that new line of business will likely come new SEC regulations to abide by.

5. Audit Yourself Regularly

Even if you have a good compliance program or plan, have trained workers to follow it, and keep the protocols updated, you are still moving forward blindly if you do not regularly conduct internal audits of your company to make sure that those compliance rules are working. Many compliance programs and strategies check off all of the boxes, only to lead to an SEC investigation that finds problems because a single worker did not actually understand how to correctly perform a job task.

These situations of compliance issues are incredibly frustrating. They can also be detected, identified, and corrected through a compliance strategy that includes internal auditing by outside counsel or an SEC compliance attorney with prior experience investigating securities fraud.

Article By Dr. Nick Oberheiden of Oberheiden P.C.

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Oberheiden P.C. © 2022

SEC Commissioner Signals Need to Fulfill Mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Develop “Minimum Standards” for Lawyers Practicing Before the Commission

In remarks on March 5, 2022, on PLI’s Corporate Governance webcast, Commissioner Allison Herren Lee of the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that 20 years after its enactment, it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and establish minimum standards for lawyers practicing before the Commission.1  Commissioner Lee, who announced that she will not seek a second term when her current one ends this month, took issue with what she called the “goal-directed reasoning” of some securities lawyers—that is, focusing primarily on the outcome sought by executives, rather than the impact on investors and the market as a whole.  Such lawyering, Commissioner Lee observed, has a host of negative consequences, including encouraging non-disclosure of material information, harming investors and market integrity, and stymying deterrence.  The solution, Commissioner Lee opined, is to fulfill the mandate of Section 307, which empowered the Commission to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers.”2

Over the last 20 years, the Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before the Commission.  There are good reasons for the Commission’s inaction, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, the fact-specific nature of materiality determinations, and the traditionally state-law basis for the regulation of attorney conduct.  Commissioner Lee, moreover, did not propose specific new rules and recognized that the task was difficult and should be informed by the views of the securities bar and other stakeholders.  Nor did she say that action by the Commission was imminent; it is unclear whether the Commission has authority to promulgate new rules under Section 307 given a 180-day sunset under the statute that occurred in 2003.  Indeed, neither Commissioner Lee nor any of the other SEC commissioners have issued statements on this topic since the PLI webcast.  SEC Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal has, however, indicated an increased emphasis on gatekeeper accountability in order to restore public trust in the market.3  Nonetheless, given the Commission’s existing authority to impose discipline under its Rules of Practice, practitioners should be mindful of the potential for increased scrutiny moving forward.

Background

In the wake of corporate accounting scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, and other companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets.”4  The Act was aimed at “combating fraud, improving the reliability of financial reporting, and restoring investor confidence,”5 including by empowering the SEC with increased regulatory authority and enforcement power.6  To that end, the Act includes provisions to fortify auditor independence, promote corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures, and enhance corporate fraud accountability.7

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed just six months after the collapse of Enron in December 2001, and neither the House nor Senate bills originally contained professional responsibility language.8  Hours before the Senate passed its version of the Act, however, the Senate amended the bill to include language that would eventually become Section 307.9  Around the same time, 40 law professors sent a letter to the SEC requesting the inclusion of a professional conduct rule governing corporate lawyers practicing before the Commission.10  The letter picked up on a 1996 article by Professor Richard Painter, then of the University of Illinois College of Law, which recommended corporate fraud disclosure obligations for attorneys similar to those imposed on accountants by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.11  Senator John Edwards, one of the sponsors of the Senate floor amendment of the bill, emphasized the importance of including professional conduct rules for attorneys in such a significant piece of legislation, stating that “[o]ne of the problems we have seen occurring with this sort of crisis in corporate misconduct is that some lawyers have forgotten their responsibility” is to the companies and shareholders they represent, not corporate executives.12

In its final form, Section 307 imposed a professional responsibility requirement for attorneys that represent issuers appearing before the Commission.  Specifically, Section 307 directed the Commission, within 180 days of enactment of the law, to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,”13 and, at minimum, promulgate “a rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the issuer or any agent thereof to appropriate officers within the issuer and, thereafter, to the highest authority within the issuer, if the initial report does not result in an appropriate response.”14

Since the enactment of Section 307, however, the Commission has promulgated only one rule pursuant to its authority, commonly known as the “up-the-ladder” rule.15  The up-the-ladder rule imposes a duty on attorneys representing an issuer before the Commission to report evidence of material violations of the securities laws.  When an attorney learns of evidence of a material violation, the attorney has a duty to report it to the issuer’s chief legal officer (“CLO”) and/or the CEO.16  If the attorney believes the CLO or CEO did not take appropriate action within a reasonable time to address the violation, the attorney has a duty to report the evidence to the audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or the full board of directors until the attorney receives “an appropriate response.”17  Alternatively, attorneys can satisfy their duty by reporting the violation to a qualified legal compliance committee.18  To date, the SEC has never brought a case alleging a violation of the up-the-ladder rule.

Commissioner Lee’s Remarks

In her remarks, Commissioner Lee stated that it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 and consider whether the Commission should adopt and enforce minimum standards for lawyers who practice before the Commission.  Commissioner Lee criticized “goal-directed reasoning” employed by sophisticated counsel in securities matters, and cited as an example Bandera Master Fund v. Boardwalk Pipeline,19 a recent decision in which the Delaware Court of Chancery rebuked the attorneys involved for their efforts to satisfy the aims of a general partner instead of their duty to the partnership-client as a whole.  The Court, specifically, stated that counsel “knowingly made unrealistic and counterfactual assumptions, knowingly relied on an artificial factual predicate, and consistently engaged in goal-directed reasoning to get to the result that [the general partner] wanted.”20  Bandera and cases like it, according to Commissioner Lee, are emblematic of a “race to the bottom” caused by pressure on securities lawyers to compete with each other for clients, while failing to give due consideration to the potential impact on investors, market integrity, and the public interest.

In Commissioner Lee’s view, “goal-directed” lawyering not only falls short of ethical standards but causes harm to the market and reduces deterrence.  Commissioner Lee expressed concern that, in an effort to give management the answer it wants, lawyers may downplay or obscure material information.21  Although recognizing that materiality determinations are fact-intensive, Commissioner Lee said that should not provide blanket cover for legal advice aimed at concealing material information from the public.  Non-disclosure has a host of negative consequences, including distorting market-moving information, interfering with price discovery, misallocating capital, impairing investor decision-making, and eroding confidence in the financial markets and regulatory system.  Further, such lawyering diminishes deterrence by creating a legal cover for inadequate disclosure, making it more difficult for regulators to hold responsible individuals accountable.  This type of legal counsel, in Commissioner Lee’s view, “is merely rent-seeking masquerading as legal advice, while providing a shield against liability.”

Commissioner Lee stated that the existing framework governing professional conduct is not adequate to hold lawyers accountable for such “reckless” advice.  According to Commissioner Lee, state bars—the principal source for lawyer discipline nationwide—are not up to the task because they lack resources, expertise in securities matters, and the ability to impose adequate monetary sanctions.  Additionally, Commissioner Lee noted that state law standards focused mostly on the behavior of individual lawyers, assigning few responsibilities to the firm for quality assurance.  Indeed, state law standards are mostly drafted in a “one-size-fits-all fashion” according to Commissioner Lee, and do not take into account the different issues faced at large firms that represent public companies, which are quite different from a solo practitioner handling personal injury or estate law matters.  Likewise, although the SEC has the power under Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice to suspend or bar attorneys whose conduct falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,” there has been little effort to define or enforce that standard.22  Nor has the SEC rigorously enforced standards of attorney conduct under the one rule it has issued under Section 307, the “up-the-ladder” rule.

Commissioner Lee stated that it was time for the Commission to fulfill its mandate under Section 307.  Although not proposing any specific rules, Commissioner Lee offered the following concepts as a starting point:

  • Greater detail on lawyers’ obligations to a corporate client, including how advice must reflect “the interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather than the executives who hire them”;
  • Requirements of “competence and expertise” (as an example, disclosure lawyers should not opine on materiality “without sufficient focus or understanding of the views of ‘reasonable’ investors”);
  • Continuing education for securities lawyers advising public companies (similar to requirements set by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board for minimum hours of qualifying continuing professional education for audit firm personnel);
  • Oversight at the firm level (similar to quality-control measures implemented at audit firms);
  • Emphasis on the need for independence in rendering advice (similar to substantive and disclosure requirements implemented in Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X for auditors);
  • Obligations to investigate red flags and ensure accurate predicates for legal opinions (similar to the obligations that an auditor must perform to certify to the accuracy of their client’s financial statements); and
  • Retention of contemporaneous records to support the reasonableness of legal advice.

Commissioner Lee noted that the content of any specific rules or standards will require “careful thought,” as well as assistance from the securities bar, experts on professional responsibility, and other interested parties and market participants.  She invited input from the legal community and other stakeholders and noted that she appreciated the complexity of the task and concerns of the American Bar Association and others regarding protection of the attorney-client privilege.  Indeed, outside auditors are generally regarded as “public watchdogs” and such communications between the corporation and an auditor are not entitled to the affirmative attorney-client privilege afforded to legal counsel.  Accordingly, regulating the legal profession using a similar framework to that applied to the accounting profession has sparked more controversy.  Nonetheless, in Commissioner Lee’s view, those concerns should be weighed against “the costs of there being few, if any, consequences for contrived or tortured advice.”

Implications

The Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it in the 20 years since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Commissioner Lee’s call for minimum standards, however, potentially signals increased scrutiny by the SEC with respect to lawyers who “practice before the Commission.”  As Commissioner Lee noted, that means “counsel involved in the formulation and review of issuers’ public disclosure, including those who address the many legal questions that often arise in that context.”23  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee cautioned that she did “not intend with these comments to address the conduct of attorneys serving as litigators or otherwise representing their client(s) in an advocacy role in an adversarial proceeding or other similar context, such as in an enforcement investigation.”24

Although framing her call for standards in terms of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is not clear that the Commission will—or even can—promulgate any further rules under that authority.  Commissioner Lee did not state that she was speaking on behalf of the Commission or indicate that the Commission would be taking concrete, imminent steps to adopt such standards.  The Commission has not put its imprimatur on the remarks by incorporating them into a formal release or statement of policy.  Moreover, the text of Section 307 appears to foreclose the possibility of further rulemaking, as it provides that the Commission shall issue any such rules “[n]ot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this act,” i.e., January 27, 2003.  Consistent with that constraint, the SEC proposed the up-the-ladder requirements on November 21, 2002, in Release No. 33-8150, and the rule became final on January 29, 2003.25  But the SEC has not issued any other rule under Section 307 to date.

Even if official action under Section 307 may not be forthcoming, Commissioner Lee’s call for action should not be discounted.  Setting aside the up-the-ladder requirements, the SEC has authority under Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice to censure or bar a lawyer from appearing or practicing before the Commission if found, among other things, “[t]o be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged and unethical or improper professional conduct.”26  Commissioner Lee cited prior SEC guidance to indicate that Rule 102(e) may apply to attorney conduct that falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,”27 a standard that has been left undefined to date.28  In practice, the SEC “will hold attorneys who practice before it to the standards to which they are already subject, including state bar rules.”29  At a minimum, then, Commissioner Lee’s objective of greater accountability may be achieved through a more aggressive application of Rule 102(e), which, as she noted, has generally only been applied as a follow-on penalty for primary violations of the securities laws by lawyers.

Commissioner Lee’s term expires on June 5, and she has announced that she intends to step down from the Commission once a successor has been confirmed.30  Should the Commission nonetheless take up her call to action in the future, it will be no easy task to adopt clear standards that can be implemented in a predictable manner.  In particular, Commissioner Lee’s focus on the role of lawyers in advising issuers on determinations of materiality and disclosure does not lend itself well to oversight or enforcement.  The well-established standard for materiality—whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”—is far from clear-cut.31  The Supreme Court, moreover, long has recognized that materiality “depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”32  As such, and as evidenced by the sundry cases concerning disclosure issues reversed on appeal, disagreement between litigants—as well as jurists—on matters of materiality and disclosure are par for the course.  If that is so, how can a lawyer’s advice on such matters (which will inevitably turn on the facts and the lawyer’s judgment and experience) be subject to oversight in any objective sense?

Even if lawyers’ materiality advice could be evaluated under objective standards, there are other difficulties.  First and foremost is that oversight of legal advice implicates the attorney-client privilege and the underlying benefit of candid advice from securities disclosure and corporate counsel.  As the Supreme Court has observed, the attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”33  Aside from situations in which the client has voluntarily waived privilege (as sometimes occurs in SEC investigations) or where another exception to the privilege applies, it is unclear how the SEC could evaluate legal advice without invading privilege.  Such attempts could have led to an increase in corporate wrongdoing as corporate executives could be more reluctant to seek expert legal advice.  In addition, it is unclear how regulators assessing materiality advice would—or could—balance an assessment of whether a lawyer has given the “correct” advice with a lawyer’s ethical obligations of zealous representation of the client.34  The divide between overreaching “goal-directed” reasoning and permissible zealous advocacy for the client is often murky, and reasonable minds can differ depending on the circumstances.  Moreover, it is already well-accepted that a corporate lawyer’s obligation is to the corporation as its client, not to any individual officer or director.35  That obligation carries with it ethical duties to “proceed as is reasonably necessary for the best interest” of the corporation, including when the lawyer is aware of violations of the law or other misconduct by senior management.36  In that sense, Commissioner Lee’s proposal could be viewed as a call for the SEC to take on enforcement of existing ethical rules, rather than for the development of novel “minimum standards.”

Ultimately, there are good reasons for the Commission’s reluctance to date to formally adopt minimum standards of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, and the fact-specific nature of materiality inquiries.  The manipulation of facts and bad reasoning targeted by Commissioner Lee are not only the exception, and difficult if not impossible to eliminate completely, but are largely covered by existing rules and practices.  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee’s call for lawyers to strive for higher legal and ethical standards in their counsel should be welcomed.  Sound legal advice is not only important for issuer clients, but also for the financial well-being of investors, the integrity of the markets, and public confidence in the regulatory system and capital markets.  Enhancements in ethical standards for the legal profession could also lead to reputational benefits and greater integrity in the profession.  It remains to be seen whether Commissioner Lee’s remarks will serve as an aspirational goal for securities lawyers, or translate into concrete action by the Commission.

1 Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, Send Lawyers, Guns and Money: (Over-) Zealous Representation by Corporate Lawyers Remarks at PLI’s Corporate Governance – A Master Class 2022 (Mar. 4, 2022), [hereinafter “Commissioner Lee Remarks”].

2 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

3 Gurbir Grewal, Director, Division of Enforcement, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2021 (Oct. 13, 2021).

4 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 432 (2014).

5 Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2006).

6 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2002).

7 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).

8 Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 461, 464 (2003).

9 Id.

10 Id. at 468-69.

11 See generally Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996).

12 Wheeler, supra note 8, at 465 (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)).

13 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

14 Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003).

15 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.

16 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).

17 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(3), (b)(4).

18 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).

19 Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, No. CV 2018-0372-JTL, 2021 WL 5267734, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2021).  In Bandera, plaintiffs brought suit against a general partner for breach of a partnership agreement stemming from the general partner’s exercise of a call right without satisfying two requisite preconditions.  The court held for the plaintiffs and found the general partner had engaged in willful misconduct.  Id. at *51.  Contributing to the misconduct was the general partner’s outside counsel, who drafted an opinion letter justifying the general partner’s exercise of the call right.  Id.  Throughout the drafting process, the court found, that the outside counsel manipulated the facts in order to achieve the general partner’s desired conclusion.  Id. at *18-*47.

20 Id. at *51.

21 Commissioner Lee specifically cited, among other matters, environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) disclosures.  The Commission is currently considering additional climate change-related disclosures to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X.  See Jason Halper et al., SEC Proposes Climate-Related Changes to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Mar. 23, 2022); see also Paul Kiernan, SEC Proposes More Disclosure Requirements for ESG Funds, The Wall Street Journal (May 25, 2022, 6:26 pm ET).

22 Rule 102(e) states, in relevant part:

(1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter:

(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or

(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or

(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.

17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1).

23 Commissioner Lee Remarks, supra note 1.

24 Id.

25 Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8150 (Nov. 21, 2002); Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003); see also 2 Legal Malpractice § 14:114 (2022 ed.).

26 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).  The Rules of Practice generally “govern proceedings before the Commission under the statutes that it administers.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.100.  The SEC has the authority to administer and enforce such rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. See Comment to Rule 100, SEC Rules of Practice (July 2003).

27 In the Matter of William R. Carter Charles J. Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 28, 1981) (“elemental notions of fairness dictate that the Commission should not establish new rules of conduct and impose them retroactively upon professionals who acted at the time without reason to believe that their conduct was unethical or improper.  At the same time, however, we perceive no unfairness whatsoever in holding those professionals who practice before us to generally recognized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms had previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed by the Commission.  To do so upsets no justifiable expectations, since the professional is already subject to those norms.”).

28 In the past, the Commission has sought to discipline lawyers for violating securities laws with scienter, rendering misleading opinions used in disclosures and engaged in otherwise liable conduct, but not for giving negligent legal advice to issuers. See In the Matter of Scott G. Monson, Release No. 28323 (June 30, 2008) (collecting cases).

29 In the Matter of Steven Altman, Esq., Release No. 63306 (Nov. 10, 2010).

30 Statement of Planned Departure from the Commission (Mar. 15, 2022).

31 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).

32 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).

33 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).

34 Rule 1.3: Diligence, American Bar Association, (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); Rule 1.3 Diligence – Comment 1, American Bar Association,  (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).

35 See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.

36 Rule 1.13: Organization As Client, American Bar Association, cmt. 2  (last visited April 19, 2022).

Article By Jason M. Halper, William P. Mills, Erica Hogan, Adam Magid, James Orth, and Jayshree Balakrishnan of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

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