Tag: Securities and Exchange Commission

AI Transcripts and Investment Advisers: Embracing Technology While Meeting SEC Requirements

AI Transcripts in Investment Advisory

There has been a boom recently regarding investment advisers’ use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) to transcribe client and internal meetings. Among other applications, AI features such as Zoom AI Companion, Microsoft Copilot, Jump, and Otter.ai (collectively, “AI Meeting Assistants”) can assist with drafting, transcribing, summarizing and prompting action items based on conversation content in the respective application. For instance, Zoom AI Companion and Microsoft Copilot can draft communications, generate transcriptions of conversations, identify points of agreement and disagreement of a discussion and summarize action items.

Overview of SEC Recordkeeping Requirements for AI Transcripts

As of now, there are no specific artificial intelligence regulations pertaining to the use of AI transcripts or the recordkeeping obligations that would follow. However, there are several SEC recordkeeping provisions that may be implicated by use of the AI capabilities offered by the AI Meeting Assistants. Rule 204-2 requires investment advisers to maintain certain records “relating to [their] investment advisory business” including “written communications sent by such investment adviser relating to” such enumerated subjects as: (i) any recommendation made or proposed to be made and any advice given or proposed to be given; (ii) any receipt, disbursement or delivery of funds or securities; (iii) the placing or execution of any order to purchase or sell any security; and (iv) predecessor performance and the performance or rate of return of any or all managed accounts, portfolios, or securities recommendations (subject to certain exceptions).

Every registered investment adviser is required to keep true, accurate and current books and records. The approach at this juncture would be to adopt these AI Meeting Assistant transcripts into the firm’s books and records. Once translated into written form, the SEC could consider the transcripts and summaries to be written communications regarding investment advice. Such transcripts and summaries should be kept in their original form, together with notes (if any) as to any corresponding inaccuracies produced by the AI content. Registered investment advisers are fiduciaries and should not utilize any information in conjunction with providing client services or communications that it does not reasonably believe is accurate. Thus, if the firm was to use the content of AI transcripts and/or summaries in conjunction with client services or communications that was incorrect, the onus would remain on the firm to demonstrate as to how it reasonably relied upon the content. It is inconsequential whether these transcripts and summaries make it into your CRM software or are maintained in the AI Meeting Assistants program. Regardless of whether the content is a meeting summary or list of action items, the transmission would likely constitute a communication for purposes of Rule 204-2 due to implicating an already established recordkeeping requirement.

Implementing Effective AI Strategies in Investment Advisory

  • A firm must eliminate or neutralize the effect of conflicts of interest associated with the firm’s use of artificial intelligence in investor interactions that place the firm’s or its associated person’s interest ahead of investors’ interests.
  • A firm that has any investor interaction using covered technology (AI) to have written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the proposed rules.
  • Adopt AI Meeting Assistant transcripts into books and records.
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For more on AI, visit the NLR Artificial Intelligence section

SEC Enforcement Director Highlights Increased Penalties for Violations of Whistleblower Rule

Recently, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increased enforcement efforts around the whistleblower protection rule Rule 21F-17(a) which prohibits companies from impeding the ability of individuals to blow the whistle on potential securities law violations to the Commission. Most notably, the rule prohibits overly broad non-disclosure agreements and other employment agreements which restrict whistleblowing.

In remarks delivered November 6 at Securities Enforcement Forum D.C. 2024, Sanjay Wadhwa, the SEC’s Acting Director of the Division of Enforcement noted the importance of these enforcement efforts and highlighted the increased penalties levied by the Commission in Rule 21F-17(a) cases.

“The SEC’s whistleblower program plays a critical role in our ability to effectively detect wrongdoing, protect investors and the marketplace, and hold violators accountable.” Wadhwa said. “But that program only works if whistleblowers have unfettered ability to share with the SEC information about possible securities law violations. However, all too often we have seen, for example, confidentiality agreements and employment agreements by various advisory firms and public companies that impede that ability, including by limiting customers’ ability to voluntarily contact the SEC or by requiring employees to waive the right to a monetary award for participating in a government investigation. So this past fiscal year, and the year prior, the Commission brought a series of enforcement actions to address widespread violations.”

“There was a similar series of actions addressing this issue some years back,” Wadhwa continued. “And I think for a while there was better compliance, but then things slipped and we’re back here. So, this time around the Commission authorized what I view to be fittingly robust remedies, including the largest penalty on record for a standalone violation of the whistleblower protection rule. It is my hope that these enforcement actions will have a significant deterrent effect and will lead to greater and sustained proactive compliance.”

The record penalty referenced by Wadhwa was an $18 million penalty levied against J.P. Morgan in January. According to the SEC, J.P. Morgan regularly had retail clients sign confidential release agreements which did not permit clients to voluntarily contact the SEC.

In enforcing Rule 21F-17(a), the SEC has found illegal language in severance or separation agreements, employee contracts, settlement agreements and compliance manuals. Language in the various types of contracts found to violate Rule 21F-17(a) has included requiring the prior consent of the company before disclosing confidential information to regulators, preventing the employee from initiating contact with regulators, requiring the employee to waive their right to awards from whistleblowing award programs, including a “non-disparagement clause” that specifically included the SEC as a party the employee could not “disparage” the company to, and requiring the employee to inform the company soon after reporting information to the SEC.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section.

The Murky Waters of Wash Trading Digital Assets – DOJ Charges 18 Individuals and Entities

The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts recently unsealed what it described as the “first-ever criminal charges against financial services firms for market manipulation and ‘wash trading’ in the cryptocurrency industry.” The SEC also filed parallel civil charges alleging violations of Securities for the same alleged schemes.

The government has charged eighteen individuals and companies, including four cryptocurrency market makers, with engaging in illegal market manipulation through “wash trading” digital assets. According to the DOJ and SEC filings, although these individuals purported to offer “market making services,” they were actually engaged in offering “market-manipulations-as-a-service” by engaging in artificial trading of digital assets to give the false appearance that there was an active (and heavily traded) market for those tokens.

How this case came to the DOJ’s attention is as novel as the legal theory behind the charging documents. According to DOJ spokespeople, the investigation started with a tip from the SEC about one of the companies at issue. Further investigations into that company—along with the help of cooperating witnesses—led authorities to set up a sham crypto firm, NextFundAI, and create a token associated with the firm. Posing as NextFundAI, the government communicated with the defendants—market makers who allegedly offered to trade and manipulate the price of NextFundAI’s token by wash trading, or trading the token back-and-forth between crypto wallets they controlled.

While there may be rules against wash trading in traditional securities markets (see, e.g., 26 U.S. Code § 1091), the rules are as clear in the digital asset space. Indeed, the regulatory vacuum facing the digital asset industry makes it difficult for those in the industry to avoid eventual regulatory action, and what many have referred to as “regulation by enforcement.” This is particularly true where the technological realities of digital assets do not fit squarely within the existing legal framework. There may be disagreement about the purpose or intent behind a cryptocurrency transaction where one individual is transferring cryptocurrency between wallets that person or entity controls. But there may not be a misrepresentation or fraudulent act inherent in this type of transaction. Indeed, the transaction itself (including the wallet address of the sender and recipient) is likely immediately and accurately recorded on the public blockchain. So, according to the government, the “fraud” is the intent behind the trades – to manipulate the market by artificially generating trade volume to signal interest and activity in the token.

The government’s allegations are also interesting because in addition to the wire fraud charges (18 U.S.C. § 1343), which generally do not require proof that the digital asset at issue is a security, the government has charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit market manipulation (18 U.S.C. § 371), which requires the government to prove that the token at issue is a security. This charge is significant because it will require the DOJ to prove at trial that the tokens at issue are securities.

Although several individuals involved have already pleaded guilty, there are several defendants who appear to be testing the government’s novel theory in court. We anticipate that this will be the first of many similar investigations and enforcement actions in the digital asset space.

©1994-2024 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Digital Assets, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

SEC Brings Multiple Enforcement Actions Relating to Beneficial Ownership and Other Reporting Obligations

On September 25, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) announced that it had instituted and settled enforcement actions under Section 13(d), Section 13(g) and Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as amended, the Exchange Act). The actions involved 21 individuals and entities that allegedly had failed to timely file Schedule 13D or 13G to report beneficial ownership of greater than 5% of the registered equity securities outstanding and/or amendments to such reports, and/or to timely file Form 3, 4 or 5 to report ownership of, and transactions in, registered equity securities by executive officers, directors and greater-than-10% beneficial owners (collectively, insiders). As part of the settlements, individual respondents agreed to pay civil monetary penalties ranging from $10,000 to $200,000, and entities agreed to pay civil penalties ranging from $40,000 to $750,000. As part of the same set of settlements, the SEC also instituted and settled two enforcement actions against public companies for allegedly causing certain of their insiders’ Form 3, 4 or 5 filing failures or for failing to report such filing delinquencies. Just a week earlier, the SEC had announced the institution and settlement of enforcement actions under Section 13(f) and Section 13(h) of the Exchange Act against 11 institutional investment managers that allegedly had failed on a timely basis to file one or more quarterly Form 13F reports and/or periodic Form 13H reports.

The Bottom Line

The foregoing actions are part of an SEC enforcement initiative aimed at ensuring compliance with ownership disclosure and other reporting rules. Insofar as the beneficial ownership and insider actions are concerned, the most recent set of settlements suggest a possible willingness on the SEC’s part to bring enforcement actions even for minor and technical violations. Insofar as the institutional investor enforcement actions, the recent “sweep” appears to mark the first such broad action by the SEC. Notably, for two of the sanctioned institutional investment managers that were based outside the US and where the managers self-reported their errors to the SEC, no monetary penalties were assessed. A third institutional investment manager did not pay a monetary penalty for its Form 13H filing delinquency, which had been self-reported to the agency. Further, the SEC’s public announcement of the settlements indicated that the SEC staff used data analytics to identify the delinquent filings. The SEC has occasionally used various technological solutions to search for late filings and other violations of law in the vast EDGAR database, and as artificial intelligence and similar applications become more widespread and economical, we expect the SEC to make greater use of automated techniques in the future as part of its ongoing filing review process.

The Full Story

5% Beneficial Owners, Insiders and Public Company Issuers

Under Section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13d-2(a) promulgated thereunder, any person who acquired beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a public company’s stock must, within 10 calendar days of the relevant acquisition,[1] file an initial set of disclosures on Schedule 13D with the SEC. The beneficial owner must then file updates with the SEC to report any material changes to its position or other facts disclosed in prior filings. Certain investors (mostly passive ones) are eligible to file a simplified set of disclosures on Schedule 13G. The deadline to file a Schedule 13G was also within 10 calendar days of acquiring more than 5% beneficial ownership, but certain institutional investors were permitted to defer disclosing their passive holdings on Schedule 13G until 45 days after the end of the calendar year.[2]

Under Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 16a-3 promulgated thereunder, officers and directors of public companies, and any beneficial owners of greater than 10% of stock in a public company, were (and currently are) required to file initial statements of holdings on Form 3 either within 10 calendar days of becoming an insider or on or before the effective date of the initial registration of the stock. Such insiders are then obligated to keep this information current by reporting subsequent transactions on Forms 4 and 5 (in most instances, within two business days of any change). In addition, Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Item 405 of Regulation S-K promulgated thereunder require issuers to disclose information regarding delinquent Section 16(a) filings by insiders in their annual reports.

Here, the SEC alleged that 14 persons, who were obligated to file Forms 3/4/5, failed to timely file or update such reports required under Section 16(a), that two public companies caused some of those late filings and/or did not disclose the late filings when required, and that 18 persons who were obligated to file and/or amend Schedules 13D/13G failed to do so timely as required under Sections 13(d) and (g). In most of the non-issuer settlements, there appear to have been repeated failures over multiple issuers, sometimes over several years. However, not all persons settling with the SEC had failures that were repeated or otherwise egregious. Each of two of the matters that settled for $25,000 or less alleged only a few violations (and one of those included two alleged Schedule 13D violations that arguably are supported by a compliance and disclosure interpretation but not by the actual wording of Section 13 and its implementing rules). By contrast, among the 11 beneficial ownership settlements that the SEC announced nearly a year ago, none were below $66,000. This suggests that the SEC may once again be bringing less serious enforcement actions and pursuing even minor infractions.

Institutional Investment Managers

Under Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13f-1 promulgated thereunder, entities with investment discretion over at least $100 million worth of specified US publicly-traded securities (and certain securities exercisable for or convertible into such securities) (institutional investment managers) are required to file quarterly Form 13F reports detailing their ownership of such securities regardless of the percentages owned. Reports can omit certain de minimis positions, though the de minimis level is set quite low so relatively few positions are typically excluded from Form 13F on this basis. The $100 million threshold was originally set in 1975, is not indexed for inflation and has not been adjusted since. Each report for a calendar quarter must be filed no later than 45 calendar days after the end of the preceding quarter.

Under Section 13(h) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13h-1 promulgated thereunder, persons who trade US publicly-traded securities equal to or exceeding two million shares or $20 million during any calendar day, or 20 million shares or $200 million during any calendar month (collectively, large traders) are required to file required Form 13H reports with the SEC. Unlike the beneficial ownership reports and Form 13F, Form 13H reports are confidential and viewable only by the SEC. While the specific reporting thresholds for Form 13F and Form 13H are different, most (but not all) large traders will also be institutional investment managers. But most institutional investment managers will not necessarily be large traders.

The SEC alleged that nine institutional investment managers failed to timely file required Form 13F reports—often over a long period of years. Those nine firms (not including one which was part of the beneficial owner settlements discussed above but had also not filed Form 13F for a number of years) agreed to pay in aggregate more than $3.4 million to settle those cases. Notably, two additional settling parties (both institutional investment managers located outside the US) were not assessed penalties relating to their delinquent Form 13F’s because they self-reported their failure to report directly to the SEC.

Two of the parties settling Form 13F failures also were charged with failing to timely file required Form 13H reports. Because both of these parties self-reported their Form 13H filing failures, neither was assessed a penalty relating to Section 13(h).

[1] The deadlines described here were in effect during the relevant periods in the settled actions. Effective on and after February 5, 2024, the initial Schedule 13D must be filed within five business days of the relevant acquisition.

[2] The deadlines described here were in effect during the relevant periods in the settled actions. Effective on and after September 30, 2024, the filing deadline for an initial Schedule 13G (other than for certain institutional investors) is within 5 business days of the relevant acquisition; certain institutional investors are permitted to delay their initial filing of Schedule 13G to 45 calendar days after the end of relevant calendar quarter.

Copyright © 2024, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.
For more on SEC Enforcement Actions, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

SEC Revises Tick Size, Access Fees and Round-Lot Definition and Takes Steps to Disseminate Odd-Lot and Other Better Priced Orders

On September 18, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission) adopted amendments to Rule 612 (Tick Sizes) and Rule 610 (Access Fees) under Regulation NMS under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Regulation NMS).1 The SEC also added and amended definitions and other rules under Regulation NMS to address round-lot and odd-lot sizing and dissemination. We address each category of revisions below and highlight at the outset that the SEC did not adopt the controversial provision that would have prevented market centers from executing orders at prices less than the current or revised tick sizes. That is, the minimum tick size continues to address only the minimum price increment at which a market center can publish a quotation for a security. This is significant, as adopting such a prohibition would have prevented broker-dealers and other market centers from providing price improvement at prices finer than the quotation tick sizes.

The SEC also took a measured approach to other aspects of the rule. As explained more fully below, the Commission adopted only one additional minimum quotation size (rather than the three proposed), narrowed the scope of securities that might be subject to the smaller minimum quotation size, reduced the frequency with which primary listing exchanges must calculate tick sizes and round-lot sizes, and expanded the amount of data to be evaluated for these calculations from one month’s worth to three months’ worth.

Tick Sizes/Minimum Pricing Increments

Rule 612 of Regulation NMS regulates the price increments (that is, the “tick size”) at which a market center can display a quotation and at which a broker-dealer can accept, rank, or display orders or indications of interest in NMS stocks. Currently, for NMS stocks priced at or above $1.00 per share, broker-dealers and market centers can accept orders or quote in one-penny ($0.01) price increments and at a much smaller increment ($0.0001) for NMS stocks priced less than $1.00 per share.

The SEC and other market participants had observed that many stocks were “tick constrained” — that is, bids, offers, and other orders in those stocks might regularly allow for quotation spreads narrower than $0.01, but the penny spread requirement of Rule 612 constrained such narrower quoting. Determining the “right” quote size for a security can be complicated: on the one hand, a narrower spread reduces transaction costs for investors. On the other hand, too narrow a quotation spread allows other market participants to “step ahead” of a quotation — that is, obtain better priority — by entering an order that is priced only slightly better. Obtaining priority by quoting for an economically insignificantly better price disincentivizes those offering liquidity or price improvement to the market. Stated simply, a market participant has little incentive to expose its order to the market if another participant can easily get better priority over that order at an insignificant cost. Accordingly, the Commission sought to balance the two competing concerns of spread size and fear of stepping ahead.

Tick sizes are also relevant in the competition between exchange and non-exchange trading venues. Due to their market structure, exchanges generally execute orders at the prices they quote, but cannot execute at prices within the quoted spread. Narrower spreads provide better opportunities for exchanges to execute at the higher bids or lower offers represented by those narrower spreads. In short, narrower spreads allow exchange venues to be more competitive with off-exchange venues.

In December 2022, the SEC proposed to add three minimum tick sizes for NMS stocks priced $1.00 or more: one-tenth of a cent ($0.001), two-tenths of a cent ($0.002), and five-tenths (or one-half) of a cent ($0.005). Public comment suggested that this proposal was too complicated and the smaller price increment of $0.001 might also have been too small, thereby facilitating stepping ahead.

The adopted rule provides for only one new tick size for certain NMS stocks priced at or above $1.00 per share: $0.005. This half-penny minimum quotation size will apply for those NMS stocks priced at or above $1 that have a “time-weighted average quoted spread” (a metric defined in the rule) of $0.015 during a three-month Evaluation Period (as described in the table below) occurring twice a year.[1] “Time-weighted average quoted spread” seeks to estimate tick constraint and identify those securities that are quoted on average at close to a one-cent spread. Specifically, under the revised rule, primary listing exchanges must calculate the time-weighted average spread over the months of January, February, and March and July, August, and September. The results of the first (Q1) calculation determines which securities are subject to the half-penny tick size for the business days between May 1 and October 31 of that year. The results of the second (Q3) calculation determines which securities are subject to the half-penny tick size for the business days between November 1 of that year and April 30 of the following year.

The following chart shows the applicable tick sizes and calculations:

The SEC’s policy rationale for adopting these amendments is that they relax existing restrictions on tick sizes, which should reduce transaction costs and provide for better price discovery for certain NMS stocks. Additionally, smaller tick sizes for NMS stocks that merit them should improve liquidity, competition, and price efficiency.

Access Fees

Securities exchanges generally charge access fees to those who take liquidity and rebate a portion of that access fee to those who provide liquidity. As the SEC explains, “the predominant exchange fee structure is maker-taker, in which an exchange charges a fee to liquidity takers and pays a rebate to liquidity providers, and the rebate is typically funded through the access fee.”3 Rule 610(c) of Regulation NMS limits the fee that an exchange can charge for accessing protected quotations4 pursuant to Rule 611 of Regulation NMS. Currently, the access fee is capped at 30 cents per 100 shares (or “30 mils” per share) for NMS securities priced at or above $1. The access fee is capped at 0.3% of the quotation price for NMS stocks priced below $1.

With a smaller minimum quotation size, the SEC took the opportunity to revise the access fee cap, which some market participants believed had been set too high. Like the tick size changes, the access fee amendment ultimately adopted was modified from what was originally proposed. Originally, the SEC proposed to reduce access fee caps (a) from 30 mils to 10 mils per share for NMS stocks priced at or over $1 that would have been assigned a tick size larger than $0.001 and (b) to 5 mils per share for NMS stocks priced at or over $1 that would have been assigned a $0.001 tick size. For protected quotations in NMS stocks priced under $1.00 per share, the Commission originally proposed to reduce the 0.3% fee cap to 0.05% of the quotation price.

Ultimately, the Commission adopted a more simplified reduction in access fee caps. Because it added only one tick size to Rule 612, the SEC adopted only one reduction in access fee caps, from 30 mils to 10 mils per share for protected quotations in NMS stocks priced $1.00 or more. For such quotations priced less than $1.00, the Commission reduced the access fee cap from 0.3% to 0.1% of the quotation price per share. In addition, the SEC adopted (as proposed) new Rule 612(d), requiring all exchange fees charged and all rebates paid for order execution to be determinable at the time of execution. Currently, such exchange fees are subject to complex fee schedules that apply tiered and other discounts at month-end. As a result, market participants would not necessarily know intra-month whether their broker might access a higher tier later in the month, which would adjust the fee charged for the subject order. The new rule ends this uncertainty.

Setting the revised access fee cap at 10 mils per share was somewhat controversial, with Commissioners Peirce and Uyeda questioning the manner in which 10 mils was determined, whether another rate should have been used (15 mils? 5 mils? 12 mils?) and whether the Commission should be in the rate-setting business at all. The Commissioners ultimately voted in favor of the proposal based upon a pledge (discussed below) that the SEC staff will, by May 2029, “conduct a review and study the effects of the amendments in the national market system.”5

Required Staff Review and Study

The Adopting Release requires that the Commission staff conduct a “review and study” by May 2029 of the effects of the amendments on the national market system. The details of such study are not clearly defined, but the Adopting Release provides that:

[s]uch a review and study might include, but would not be limited to, an investigation of: (i) general market quality and trading activity in reaction to the implementation of the variable tick size, (ii) the reaction of quoted spreads to the implementation of the amended access fee cap, and (iii) changes to where market participants direct order flow, e.g., to exchange versus off-exchange venues, following the implementation of the amendments.6

Compliance Dates and Timelines

The amendments described above become effective 60 days after the publication of the SEC’s Adopting Release in the Federal Register. The date by which exchanges, broker-dealers, and other market participants must comply with the rule amendments is generally in November 2025 but, in some instances, in May 2026, as described more fully below. Specifically, the Compliance Date:

  • for the tick size amendments (half-penny quoting for “tick-constrained” stocks) of Rule 612 is “the first business day of November 2025,” or November 3, 2025.
  • for the 10 mils per share access fee cap amendment of Rule 610 and the new requirement under Rule 612(d) that exchange fees be known at time of execution in each case, is also November 3, 2025.
  • for the new round-lot definition (100 shares, 40 shares, 10 shares, or 1 share) is November 3, 2025.
  • for the dissemination of “odd-lot information,” including the new BOLO data element, is six months later, to allow broker-dealers and others to program systems accordingly. These changes will take effect on “the first business day of May 2026,” or May 1, 2026.

Closing Thoughts

The tick size and access fee amendments, and the other provisions adopted, appear to reflect negotiated concessions and a reasonable approach to addressing tick-constrained securities while avoiding the complex framework originally proposed. The decision not to prevent executions at prices within the minimum quotation size is appropriate and preserves the ability of market participants to provide price improvement to investors. While there can be some lingering debate about the appropriate level to which to reduce the access fee cap and whether 10 mils is an appropriate level, the net cumulative effect of these amendments appears reasonable. The planned “review and study” of the effect of the amendments may come too late if conducted towards the outer limit of “by May 2029,” but the overall effect of the amendments should serve to narrow spreads and increase quotation transparency through sub-penny quoting, reduced round-lot sizes, and the inclusion of odd-lot information.

1 Release No. 34-101070, Regulation NMS: Minimum Pricing Increments, Access Fees, and Transparency of Better Priced Orders, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 18, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/34-101070.pdf (the “Adopting Release”).
2 The SEC modified of these requirements in the final rule. For example, the SEC had originally proposed smaller tick sizes for stocks with a time-weighted average quoted spread of $0.04 (rather than $0.015). The proposal also sought to evaluate tick-sizes 4 times per year rather than twice a year and based on monthly data rather than quarterly data.
3 Adopting Release at 15.
4 A protected quotation is defined in Rule 600(b)(82) of Regulation NMS as “a protected bid or protected offer.” 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(82). A protected bid or protected offer is defined as “a quotation in an NMS stock that: (i) is displayed by an automated trading center; (ii) is disseminated pursuant to an effective national market system plan; and (iii) is an automated quotation that is the best bid or best offer of a national securities exchange, or the best bid or best offer of a national securities association.” 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(81)
5 Adopting Release at 288.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
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For more news on Rule 612 and Rule 610 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

Selection of Gov. Walz as VP Candidate Implicates SEC Pay-To-Play Rule

Kamala Harris’ selection of Tim Walz as running mate for her presidential campaign has implications under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 206(4)-5 under the Investment Advisers Act (SEC Pay-to-Play Rule). In particular, certain political contributions to vice presidential candidate Tim Walz, who serves as Chair of the Minnesota State Board of Investment (SBI), and other actions by investment advisers and certain of their personnel could trigger a two-year “time-out” that would prevent an investment adviser from collecting fees from any of the statewide retirement systems or other investment programs or state cash accounts managed by the SBI. As a result, all investment advisers should consider reviewing their existing policies and procedures relating to pay-to-play and political contributions, and they should remind employees of these policies in connection with the 2024 election cycle.

A few key takeaways in this regard

  • The SEC Pay-to-Play Rule prohibits investment advisers, including exempt advisers and exempt reporting advisers,1 from receiving compensation for providing advisory services to a government entity client for two years after the investment adviser or certain personnel, including executive officers and employees soliciting government entities,2 has made a contribution to an “official”3 of the government entity.
    • Governor Walz is an “official” of the SBI under the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule because he serves on the board of the SBI.
    • An investment adviser was recently fined by the SEC for violations of the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule following a contribution by a covered associate to a candidate who served as a member of the SBI.4
  • As a result of Governor Walz’s role with regard to the SBI, any contributions by a covered adviser (or any PAC controlled by the adviser) or any contributions by its covered associates above the de minimis amount of US$3505 to the Harris/Walz campaign will trigger a two-year “time-out.” This may have implications for investment advisers that are not currently seeking to do business with the SBI but may in the future, as the “time out” period applies for the entirety of the two-year period, even if Governor Walz ceases to be an “official” of the SBI after the election.
  • Contributions by family members of covered associates and contributions to super PACs or multicandidate PACs (so long as contributions are not earmarked for the benefit of the Harris/Walz campaign) generally are not restricted under the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule, if not done in a manner designed to circumvent the rule.
  • In addition to the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule, financial services firms should be mindful of other restrictions under Municipal Securities Rule Making Board Rule G-37, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulation 23.451, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Rule 2030, and SEC Rule 15Fh-6.
  • Similar concerns were implicated when then-Governor Mike Pence of Indiana was the Republican vice presidential nominee in 20166; however, former President Donald Trump and current U.S. Senator J.D. Vance (R-OH) are not “officials” for purposes of the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule or other applicable pay-to-play rules, and contributions to the Trump/Vance campaign will not be restricted under these rules.

In addition to the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule and other federal pay-to-play rules noted above, many states and localities have also adopted pay-to-play rules that are applicable to persons who contract with their governmental agencies. Campaign contributions to other candidates may trigger disclosure obligations or certain restrictions under such rules. As political contributions can lead to unintended violations of the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule or other applicable pay-to-play rules, advisers should assess whether any of these rules present a business risk in the 2024 election cycle and take appropriate steps to protect themselves.

From a compliance standpoint, some investment advisers have implemented pre-clearance procedures for all employees, which can permit an investment adviser’s compliance team to confirm that political contributions by employees will not lead to unintended consequences. Compliance teams may also consider periodic checks of publicly available campaign contribution data to confirm contributions by employees are being disclosed pursuant to applicable internal policies.

Should you have any questions regarding the content of this alert, please do not hesitate to contact one of the authors or our other lawyers.

Footnotes

1 The rule applies to “covered advisers,” a term that includes investment advisers registered or required to be registered with the SEC, “foreign private advisers” not registered in reliance on Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act, and “exempt reporting advisers.”

2 The rule applies to “covered associates,” which are defined for this purpose as: (i) any general partner, managing member, executive officer, or other individual with a similar status or function; (ii) any employee who solicits a government entity for the investment adviser and any person who supervises, directly or indirectly, such employee; and (iii) any political action committee (PAC) controlled by the investment adviser or by any person described in parts (i) or (ii).

3 An “official” means any individual (including any election committee of the individual) who was, at the time of a contribution, a candidate (whether or not successful) for elective office or holds the office of a government entity, if the office (i) is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of an investment adviser by a government entity; or (ii) has authority to appoint any person who is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of an investment adviser by a government entity.

4 Wayzata Investment Partners LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 6590 (Apr. 15, 2024).

5 Under the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule, covered associates (but not covered advisers) are permitted to make a de minimis contribution up to a US$350 amount in an election in which they are able to vote without triggering the two-year “time-out.”

6 Clifford J. Alexander, Ruth E. Delaney & Sonia R. Gioseffi, Impact of Pay-to-Play Rules in the 2016 Election Cycle, K&L GATES (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.klgates.com/Impact-of-Pay-to-Play-Rules-in-the-2016-Election-Cycle-08-18-2016.

Copyright 2024 K & L Gates
by: Ruth E. Delaney, Richard F. Kerr of K&L Gates
For more news on the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

Federal Agencies Have Placed a Heightened Priority on Whistleblowers and Speedy Cooperation

As new areas of the law emerge, driven in part by technology and the free flow of information, federal agencies are becoming more aggressive with a tried and true carrot-and-stick approach to law and regulatory enforcement.

In a recent PLI panel on government enforcement priorities in May 2024, Brent Wible, Chief Counselor, Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (DOJ or Department); Daniel Gitner, Chief of the Criminal Division, US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY or the Office); and Antonia Apps, Director of the New York Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) shared their thoughts, priorities and practices in 2024 enforcement and beyond.

All of the government lawyers stressed that the DOJ and enforcement agencies are open and are actively encouraging whistleblowers with new incentives and programs. To that end, Mr. Gitner from the SDNY stated very directly that corporations need to understand that there is a “need for speed” in corporate self-disclosures. Otherwise, whistleblowers will be closing the door to the benefits of corporate self-disclosures. Put differently, enforcement agencies do not want a corporation to complete lengthy internal investigations before reporting.

A uniform theme and stance taken by all is that whistleblowers are valuable, and bounties will be paid in cash or in deferred prosecution agreements or possibly both. Whistleblowers must be protected. Internal and external whistleblowers should be encouraged.
This article focuses on three whistleblower initiatives—(i) the SEC’s Whistleblower Program, (ii) the SDNY Whistleblower Pilot Program and (iii) DOJ’s Pilot Whistleblower Program for voluntary self-disclosure—and how those programs may impact a corporation’s response to whistleblowers, internal investigations, and disclosures.

SEC 21F WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM

Since its inception more than a decade ago, the SEC’s Whistleblower Program is widely viewed as successfully incentivizing whistleblower reports of violations of the securities laws. In its 2023 fiscal year, the SEC received more than 18,000 tips from whistleblowers and issued the most awards to whistleblowers ever in one year, totaling nearly US$600 million. That year, the Commission also issued its largest ever award of US$279 million to a single whistleblower.1

What is the SEC’s Whistleblower Program?

Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, requires the SEC to pay awards to whistleblowers who provide information to the SEC about violations of federal securities laws.2 Accordingly, the SEC has issued a series of rulemakings implementing Section 21F to create its whistleblower program. To qualify as a whistleblower, an individual must voluntarily provide the SEC with original information in writing about a possible violation of federal securities law that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.3 To qualify for an award, this information must lead to a successful enforcement action with monetary sanctions totaling more than US$1 million.4

“Original” information means that it cannot be found in publicly available sources and is not already known by the Commission, but is instead the product of the whistleblower’s independent knowledge or analysis.5 A submission is “voluntary” if the whistleblower provides it to the SEC before receiving a regulatory request or demand for information relating to the same subject matter. Therefore, a submission of information that is made in response to a request, inquiry, or demand by the SEC, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a self-regulatory organization (such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority), or a separate federal or state governmental body does not qualify as a voluntary submission.6 Additionally, a submission that is required under a legal or contractual duty to the Commission is not considered voluntary and is thus ineligible for an award.7

The SEC’s whistleblower rules also include anti-retaliation protections intended to ensure that the incentives provided to whistleblowers for reporting are not outweighed by a fear of reprisal from their employer. Under Rule 21F-17, companies are prohibited from interfering with or impeding a whistleblower’s communications to the SEC about a possible violation of the securities laws, including through enforcement or threatened enforcement of a confidentiality agreement that may be read to prevent whistleblower communications with the SEC.8

The SEC is taking violations of Rule 21F-17 seriously and has increased enforcement activity in this area over the last two years. The Commission brought a number of actions, with significant civil penalties, focused on corporate agreements containing confidentiality language that, according to the SEC, does not provide an express exception for whistleblower communications. The enforcement actions extend to different types of companies, including publicly traded companies, privately held companies, broker-dealers and investment advisers, and to a variety of forms of agreements with employees and customers alike.9

For example, a gaming company paid US$35 million to settle claims that it had violated the whistleblower protection rule by requiring former employees to execute separation agreements that obligated them to notify the company of any request for information received from the Commission, in addition to compliance failures regarding workplace complaints.10 In January 2024, the SEC settled the largest ever standalone Rule 21F-17 case, imposing US$18 million in civil penalties against a dually registered investment adviser and broker dealer for allegedly requiring clients to sign a confidential release agreement—without expressly allowing for direct communications to regulators regarding potential securities law violations—in order to receive certain credit or settlement payments.11 In another case involving US$10 million in civil penalties, the Commission charged a registered investment adviser with a standalone violation of Rule 21F-17 based on employment agreements that contained a confidentiality clause prohibiting external disclosure of confidential company information, without a carve-out for voluntary communications with the SEC concerning possible violations of the securities laws.12 As recently stated by the co-chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit, “Investors, whether retail or otherwise, must be free to report complaints to the SEC without any interference. Those drafting or using confidentiality agreements need to ensure that they do not include provisions that impede potential whistleblowers.”13

SDNY WHISTLEBLOWER PILOT PROGRAM

In February 2024, the SDNY launched a whistleblower pilot program. The purpose of the program is to encourage early and voluntary self-disclosure of criminal conduct by individual participants.14 The program is applicable to disclosures of conduct committed by public or private companies, exchanges, financial institutions, investment advisers, or investment funds involving fraud or corporate control failure or affecting market integrity, or criminal conduct involving state or local bribery or fraud relating to federal, state, or local funds.15 In exchange for a qualifying self-disclosure, the Office will enter into a non-prosecution agreement with the whistleblower.16

Given that a non-prosecution agreement is promised, the SDNY has identified factors to determine whether a whistleblower qualifies for a discretionary non prosecution agreement. The most salient include: whether and to what extent the misconduct is unknown to either SDNY or the DOJ; whether the information is disclosed voluntarily to SDNY and not in response to an inquiry or obligation to report misconduct; whether the whistleblower provides substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of culpable individuals, and in the investigation and prosecution of the disclosed conduct; whether the whistleblower truthfully and completely discloses all criminal conduct they participated in and are aware of; whether the whistleblower is a chief executive officer or chief financial officer of a public or private company, who is not eligible for the pilot program; and the adequacy of noncriminal sanctions, such as remedies imposed by civil regulators.

Mr. Gitner said the defense bar is coming around to a non-prosecution carrot for individuals involved in wrongdoing within the corporation. Mr. Gitner said that SDNY seeks early discussions, and the pilot program seems to be driving toward that goal.

DOJ PILOT PROGRAM ON VOLUNTARY SELF-DISCLOSURES FOR INDIVIDUALS

In March 2024, the DOJ announced an upcoming program to reward whistleblowers who report corporate crimes. The new program seeks to bolster existing whistleblower programs established by the SEC (discussed above), the Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC), the Internal Revenue Service, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.17 Accordingly, the program will offer rewards to whistleblowers who provide information on misconduct that is not under the jurisdiction of those agencies. In particular, the Department is interested in criminal abuses of the US financial system, foreign corruption cases outside of the SEC’s jurisdiction, and domestic corruption cases. In order to qualify, an individual must provide original, nonpublic, and truthful information that assists the Department in uncovering “significant corporate or financial misconduct” and is previously unknown to the agency.18 Like the SEC and CFTC, the Department does not plan to provide awards for information that is submitted under a preexisting duty or in response to an inquiry.19 Access to the program is only available where existing programs or qui tam actions do not exist. Additionally, the whistleblower in this program cannot be involved in the criminal activity itself. After compensation to victims, the whistleblower will receive a portion of the resulting forfeiture as a reward.20

Interestingly, however, it appears the Department may be moving away from offering monetary awards to whistleblowers. In April 2024, the Department introduced a pilot program that tracks with the SDNY and offers mandatory non prosecution agreements to individuals who provide information on corporate misconduct.21 Under the program, an individual must voluntarily self-disclose original information to the Criminal Division about criminal misconduct that is not previously known to the Department. The information must be “truthful and complete,” meaning it must include all known information relating to the misconduct, including the individual’s own culpability. In particular, the Department seeks information on violations by financial institutions; violations related to market integrity committed by financial institutions, investment advisers, investment funds, or public or private companies; foreign corruption and bribery violations by public or private companies; violations relating to health care fraud or illegal health care kickbacks; fraud or deception against the United States in connection with federally funded contracting; and bribery or kickbacks to domestic public officials by public or private companies. The whistleblower also cannot be a chief executive officer, chief financial officer, or those equivalents of a public or private company; or an elected or appointed foreign government or domestic government official; nor can the whistleblower have a previous felony conviction or a conviction of any kind involving fraud or dishonesty. Irrespective of this program, the Department still has the discretion of offering a non-prosecutorial agreement to individuals who may not meet the above criteria in full, subject to Justice Manual and Criminal Division procedures.22

TAKEAWAYS

The takeaways here for corporate in-house legal departments are:

  • Federal agencies are incentivizing whistleblowers with cash and non-prosecution agreements. It is clear that wrongdoers and witnesses now more than ever have several whistleblower programs from which to choose. As a result, corporations must become more vigilant at detecting wrongdoing and effectively utilizing internal reporting systems. Careful consideration of an early self-disclosure to the appropriate agency may also be warranted. Internal investigations will take a heightened priority to aid the c-suite and board on disclosure decisions.
  • Not only is protecting whistleblowers a priority but encouraging whistleblowers through heightened compliance programs, updated hotlines or other internal reporting programs should be considered. You may also wish to consider offering financial incentives for timely reporting to the corporation’s internal reporting program. All of which will benefit the company in any government disclosure.
  • The enforcement risk for companies under the SEC’s whistleblower rules is real and potentially significant, including with respect to day-to-day business activities (such as entering into client or employee confidentiality agreements) that may not otherwise be recognized as creating regulatory exposure. Companies may wish to revisit their standard contracts and compliance materials to ensure that any confidentiality provisions align with Rule 21F-17.

We acknowledge the contributions to this publication from our summer associate Minu Nagashunmugam.

1 https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/enforcement-results-fy23.

2 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 2.

3 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 2.

4 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 3.

5https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 5.

6 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 5.

7 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 5.

8 https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf, p. 28.

9 The SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower has stated that violations of Rule 21F-17 may be triggered by “internal policies, procedures, and guidance, such as codes of conduct, compliance manuals, training materials, and other such documents.” SEC, Whistleblower Protections (last updated July 1, 2024) https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/whistleblower-program/whistleblower-protections#anti-retaliation.

10 https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/sec-biggest-whistleblower-penalty-signals-broad-protection-focus?context=search&index=11

11 In re JP Morgan Sec. LLC, File No. 3-21829 (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2024/34-99344.pdf.

12 In re D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P., File No. 3-21775 (Sept. 29, 2023), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2013/34-70396.pdf.

13 SEC Press Release (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-7.

14 https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/sdny_wb_policy_effective_2-13-24.pdf

15 https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/sdny_wb_policy_effective_2-13-24.pdf

16 https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-05/sdny_wb_policy_effective_2-13-24.pdf

17 https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-nicole-m-argentieri-delivers-keynote-speech-american

18 https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-monaco-delivers-keynote-remarks-american-bar-associations

19 https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1347991/dl?inline

20https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-monaco-delivers-keynote-remarks-american-bar-associations

21https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1347991/dl?inline

22 https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1347991/dl?inline

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Copyright 2024 K & L Gates
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section

The SEC Continues Its War On Crime Victims

More than a decade ago, I expressed concern when the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Koss Corporation and one its CEO, Mr. Koss, with filing materially false financial statements after the corporation had discovered that it had been the victim of employee embezzlement. In the post, I decried the SEC’s decision to punish the victims of crime:

The SEC’s decision to prosecute this case is troubling. Surely, neither Koss Corporation nor Mr. Koss intended or wanted to be the victim of a criminal embezzlement. It is also hard to see how the shareholders’ benefited from the company incurring the legal costs associated with defending and settling the SEC investigation. While the SEC did force the return of bonus compensation, the injunctive relief ordering the company and Mr. Koss not to do this again strikes me as silly. Does it really make sense for the court to order a company not to be the victim of a theft?

I was therefore heartened by the recent statement by Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda on the SEC’s recent settlement of administrative proceeding against R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co.:

Also concerning is the Commission’s decision to stretch the law to punish a company that was the victim of a cyberattack. While an enforcement action may be warranted in some circumstances, distorting a statutory provision to form the basis for such an action inappropriately amplifies a company’s harm from a cyberattack.

According to the SEC’s press release, R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co. “cooperated throughout the investigation, including by reporting the cybersecurity incident to staff prior to filing a disclosure of the incident, by providing meaningful cooperation that helped expedite the staff’s investigation, and by voluntarily adopting new cybersecurity technology and controls”. Nonetheless, the SEC thought a just resolution required payment of a $2.125 million civil penalty for transfer to the U.S. Treasury. I remain unconvinced that the expropriation of millions of dollars from a crime victim to the U.S. Treasury protects, much less helps, the shareholders of R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co.

© 2010-2024 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
For more news on SEC Punishing Crime Victims, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

Understanding the Enhanced Regulation S-P Requirements

On May 16, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted amendments to Regulation S-P, the regulation that governs the treatment of nonpublic personal information about consumers by certain financial institutions. The amendments apply to broker-dealers, investment companies, and registered investment advisers (collectively, “covered institutions”) and are designed to modernize and enhance the protection of consumer financial information. Regulation S-P continues to require covered institutions to implement written polices and procedures to safeguard customer records and information (the “safeguards rule”), properly dispose of consumer information to protect against unauthorized use (the “disposal rule”), and implementation of a privacy policy notice containing an opt out option. Registered investment advisers with over $1.5 billion in assets under management will have until November 16, 2025 (18 months) to comply, those entities with less will have until May 16, 2026 (24 months) to comply.

Incident Response Program

Covered institutions will have to implement an Incident Response Program (the “Program”) to their written policies and procedures if they have not already done so. The Program must be designed to detect, respond to, and recover customer information from unauthorized third parties. The nature and scope of the incident must be documented with further steps taken to prevent additional unauthorized use. Covered institutions will also be responsible for adopting procedures regarding the oversight of third-party service providers that are receiving, maintaining, processing, or accessing their client’s data. The safeguard rule and disposal rule require that nonpublic personal information received from a third-party about their customers should be treated the same as if it were your own client.

Customer Notification Requirement

The amendments require covered institutions to notify affected individuals whose sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization. The amendments require a covered institution to provide the notice as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days, after becoming aware that unauthorized access to or use of customer information has occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurred. The notices must include details about the incident, the breached data, and how affected individuals can respond to the breach to protect themselves. A covered institution is not required to provide the notification if it determines that the sensitive customer information has not been, and is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience. To the extent a covered institution will have a notification obligation under both the final amendments and a similar state law, a covered institution may be able to provide one notice to satisfy notification obligations under both the final amendments and the state law, provided that the notice includes all information required under both the final amendments and the state law, which may reduce the number of notices an individual receives.

Recordkeeping

Covered institutions will have to make and maintain the following in their books and records:

  • Written policies and procedures required to be adopted and implemented pursuant to the Safeguards Rule, including the incident response program;
  • Written documentation of any detected unauthorized access to or use of customer information, as well as any response to and recovery from such unauthorized access to or use of customer information required by the incident response program;
  • Written documentation of any investigation and determination made regarding whether notification to customers is required, including the basis for any determination made and any written documentation from the United States Attorney General related to a delay in notice, as well as a copy of any notice transmitted following such determination;
  • Written policies and procedures required as part of service provider oversight;
  • Written documentation of any contract entered into pursuant to the service provider oversight requirements; and
  • Written policies and procedures required to be adopted and implemented for the Disposal Rule.

Registered investment advisers will be required to preserve these records for five years, the first two in an easily accessible place.

COPYRIGHT © 2024, STARK & STARK
For more news on SEC Amended Regulations, visit the NLR Securities & SEC section.

SEC Stays Climate Disclosure Regulations in Response to Consolidated Eighth Circuit Challenges

On April 4, the SEC issued an order staying the implementation of the recently finalized climate disclosure rules (Final Rules) in response to the consolidated legal challenges in the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The SEC has discretion to stay its rules pending judicial review and the SEC stated that a stay would “allow the court of appeals to focus on deciding the merits [of the cases].” However, this voluntary stay should not be taken as a sign that the SEC intends to abandon the Final Rules, as the SEC said it will “continue vigorously defending the Final Rules’ validity in court and looks forward to expeditious resolution of the litigation.”

The Final Rules have faced a slew of legal challenges since adoption and the SEC also noted that the stay avoids potential uncertainty if registrants were to become subject to the Final Rules during the pendency of the legal challenges.

©2024 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
For more news on the SEC Climate Disclosure Regulations, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.