Tag: SEC

Exclusive Study Analyzes 2014 IPOs – Initial Public Offerings

Proskauer Rose LLP, Law Firm

Proskauer’s Global Capital Markets Group has just released its second annual IPO Study, the group’s analysis of U.S.-listed initial public offerings in 2014 and identification of year-over-year comparisons and trends. As with last year’s first edition, it yields a number of noteworthy observations and insights.

The study examines data from 119 U.S.-listed 2014 IPOs with a minimum deal size of $50 million, and also includes separate industry sections on health care; technology, media and telecommunications; energy & power; financial services; industrials; and consumer/retail. This edition expands on last year’s to include an appendix focusing on foreign private issuers, as 2014 experienced a meaningful return of IPO issuers from Europe and Asia. It also makes year-over-year comparisons of extensive data about deal structures and terms, SEC comments and timing, financial profiles, accounting disclosures, corporate governance and deal expenses.

Underlying the study is the proprietary IPO database that we created for the first edition and have subsequently expanded and enhanced, a valuable resource for sponsors and companies considering an IPO as well as for IPO market participants and their advisors.

Download Proskauer’s 2015 IPO Study

ARTICLE BY

Frank Lopez
Proskauer Rose LLP

Advisory Committee’s Recommendations: Positive Sign for South Florida Companies

Bilzin_logo300 dpi

We previously discussed the SEC’s decision to allow businesses to solicit accredited investors and what this could mean for the growth of companies inFlorida. Now, the SEC is weighing whether the definition of ‘accredited investor’ needs to be amended in the context of continuing to guarantee the health of start-up and other companies and their impact on our economy.

On March 4, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies approved its written recommendations regarding changes to the SEC’s definition of “accredited investor.”  Every four years starting in 2014, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to review the definition of “accredited investor,” as it applies to natural persons, to determine whether it should be modified for the protection of investors, in the public interest and in light of the economy. Since the SEC amended its private placement rules in 2013 to allow companies to engage in general solicitation of investors and advertise their private placement offerings, there has been increased focus on whether the SEC should change the definition of “accredited investor.”

Any changes to the definition could have dramatic effects on the private securities markets and the general economy by significantly increasing or decreasing the number of persons who qualify to invest in the private securities markets. To put this in context, more than $1 trillion was raised in private placements in 2013, as compared to $1.3 trillion raised in public offerings in the same year. As noted in the Advisory Committee’s recommendations, since a majority of net new jobs in the United States is generated by companies less than five years old, their ability to raise capital in the private securities markets is critical to the well-being of the United States.

Many proponents for increasing the dollar thresholds for an individual to qualify as an accredited investor argue that such increases are necessary to prevent fraud against investors who may be unable to fend for themselves. However, the Advisory Committee notes that the connection between fraud and the accredited investor thresholds is tenuous at best. In fact, the Advisory Committee found that there is no substantial evidence that the current definition of accredited investor contributes to fraud or that it has resulted in greater exposure to victims of fraud. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee found that there is substantial evidence that the current system works and is critical to supporting privately held businesses and smaller public companies (i.e., those with less than $250 million in public market capitalization). Consistent with these findings, the Advisory Committee’s first recommendation to the SEC is that the SEC’s primary goal in reviewing the definition of accredited investor should be to “do no harm” to the private offering ecosystem and, accordingly, any changes to the definition should expand (and not contract) the pool of accredited investors. As an example, the Advisory Committee recommends including within the definition investors who meet a sophistication test, regardless of income or net worth.

Second, the Advisory Committee recommends that the SEC should, on a going forward basis, periodically adjust the dollar thresholds in the definition for inflation according to the consumer price index. As its final substantive recommendation, the Advisory Committee suggests that the SEC should focus on enhancing its enforcement efforts and increasing investor education, rather than attempting to protect investors by raising the accredited investor thresholds or excluding certain types of assets from the net worth calculation.

The Advisory Committee was established in 2011 to advise the SEC on its rules, regulations and policies with regard to its mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets and facilitating capital formation, as they relate to (1) capital raising by privately held businesses and smaller public companies, (2) trading in the securities of privately held businesses and smaller public companies and (3) public reporting and corporate governance requirements of privately held businesses and smaller public companies.

While the SEC is not bound to follow any of the Advisory Committee’s recommendations, the SEC gives significant weight to the views and recommendations made by the Advisory Committee when considering new rulemaking initiatives. The Advisory Committee’s recommendations are a positive sign for companies in South Florida as they continue to grow their operations and break ground on new projects.

ARTICLE BY

David T. Schubauer
OF
Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

Goodyear Pays for Sins of Subsidiaries in $16 Million Settlement

Proskauer Rose LLP, Law Firm

Following recent trends, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission brought an administrative proceeding against a U.S. issuer for the corrupt activities of its foreign subsidiaries. Earlier this week, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company agreed to pay the SEC over $16 million to settle charges that it violated the accounting provisions of theForeign Corrupt Practices Act by failing to prevent or detect over $3 million in bribes paid by its Angolan and Kenyan subsidiaries. Goodyear also must report its compliance remediation efforts to the SEC annually for the next three years.

The SEC’s Charges

According to the SEC’s cease and desist order, between 2007 and 2011, Goodyear’s downstream subsidiaries in Kenya andAngola bribed employees of both private and government-owned companies to obtain business. The subsidiaries also bribed police, tax authorities and other local officials, though the SEC’s order did not allege the purposes of those payments. The bribes “were falsely recorded as legitimate business expenses in the books and records of the subsidiaries, which were consolidated into Goodyear’s books and records.”

The SEC found that “Goodyear did not prevent or detect these improper payments because it failed to implement adequate FCPA compliance controls at its subsidiaries” and, for the Kenyan subsidiary, “because it failed to conduct adequate [pre-acquisition] due diligence.” Goodyear was not alleged to have any involvement with or knowledge of its subsidiaries’ illicit conduct. Nonetheless, comments by Scott Friestad, Associate Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, displayed the SEC’s willingness to hold parent companies responsible for failing to adequately supervise their subsidiaries: “Public companies must keep accurate accounting records, and Goodyear’s lax compliance controls enabled a routine of corrupt payments by African subsidiaries that were hidden in their books.”

Lessons Learned

  1. Benefits of self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation: Although Goodyear had to disgorge over $14 million in profits from its Kenyan and Angolan operations, and over $2 million in prejudgment interest, it avoided a civil penalty. This relatively favorable outcome likely is due to Goodyear’s timely self-disclosure to the SEC after receiving information about the bribes (through internal whistleblower mechanisms), its substantial cooperation with the SEC during the course of the investigation, and its extensive remediation efforts. Those efforts included divesting one subsidiary and preparing to divest the other, disciplining employees, and enhancing its anti-corruption compliance program. The settlement bolsters repeated assertions by law enforcement and regulatory officials that companies who self-disclose and cooperate will be rewarded with leniency.

  2. Buyers (and parents) beware: Parent companies may be on the hook for their subsidiaries’ misconduct, even when the parent company does not participate in or know about the illicit activities. Indeed, the SEC was careful to note that the Kenyan subsidiary’s corrupt activities may have begun prior to Goodyear’s acquisition, and could have been identified through adequate pre-acquisition due diligence. Pre- and even post-acquisition anti-corruption due diligence has become mandatory for companies that seek to acquire entities in high-risk foreign jurisdictions. And after the transaction is consummated, parents who are subject to the FCPA’s accounting provisions must ensure that their subsidiaries maintain robust internal controls and accurate books and records, regardless of whether they too are issuers.

  3. FCPA charges may include commercial bribery: According to the SEC’s order, both of Goodyear’s subsidiaries paid bribes not only to employees of government-owned entities, but also to employees of private companies. This settlement should serve as a reminder that although the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions only extend to the bribery of foreign government officials, the accounting provisions may be used to prosecute commercial bribery.

  4. Expect more FCPA enforcement actions in administrative proceedings: Companies facing a civil FCPA enforcement action by the SEC must remain cognizant of the likelihood that the proceedings will play out on the administrative stage. Defendants in administrative forums face truncated deadlines, an absence of judicial scrutiny and limited appellate rights, and cannot avail themselves of the protections in the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure. The SEC likely will continue to seek home-court advantage, whenever possible.

ARTICLE BY

Sigal P. Mandelker
Rochelle H Emert
Phillip J. Caraballo-Garrison
Proskauer Rose LLP

A Primer on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan logo

The conduct of your employees can implicate statutes other than the familiar federal and state fair employment laws, and an unwary employer can find itself subject to stiff fines and unwelcomed publicity by ignoring its compliance obligations under those statutes. For example, does your company conduct business abroad, and, if so, are you familiar with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)? If you are an entity traded on an American exchange, incorporated under the laws of the United States, or acting while in the territory of the United States, or you are an individual who is an officer, director, employee, agent, or shareholder of such a company, are a citizen of the United States, or are a person acting in the United States, you are subject to liability under the FCPA. The FCPA prohibits giving or attempting to give anything of value to a foreign official in order to influence any act or decision of the foreign official in his or her official capacity or to secure any other improper advantage in order to obtain or retain business. The phrase “anything of value” has a very broad definition and includes even charitable contributions or gifts to family members of foreign officials, and bribes come in all shapes and sizes, often making them difficult to detect.

In recent years, the Securities and Exchange Commission(“SEC”) and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have increased their focus on FCPA compliance, including securing a record $772 million fine against one company last year. Those agencies have also been increasingly targeting (or, at least, stated their intentions to increasingly target) individual actors, in addition to the increased enforcement against companies. This means that you and your employees are at risk under the FCPA in the event of a suspected or actual violation.

A robust FCPA compliance program can be a strong defense or prevention against FCPA issues. Compliance programs should be individually and narrowly developed and tailored to a company’s needs and risks. While there is no guaranteed checklist for an effective compliance program given the unique nature of companies, some hallmarks of an effective FCPA compliance program are:

  • A commitment from senior management and a clearly articulated policy against corruption;

  • Well-established and -disseminated codes of conduct and compliance policies and procedures;

  • Sufficient oversight, autonomy, authority, and resources for the program;

  • Risk assessment, resource allocation, and due diligence proportional to the type of activity or business opportunity, the particular country and industry sector, potential business partners, level and amount of government involvement, governing regulation and oversight of the activity, and exposure to customs and immigration in conducting the business;

  • Training and continuing advice throughout the company that clearly communicates, in the local language where appropriate, the policies and procedures, case studies, and practical advice for real-life scenarios individuals will encounter in their specific roles;

  • Disciplinary measures that are well publicized and clearly applicable to all levels of the organization;

  • Effective due diligence, review, and monitoring of transactions and dealings with third parties and vendors, as they are among the most common means through which violations take place;

  • Mechanisms that facilitate and encourage confidential reporting, such as hotlines or ombudspersons, and that properly document and evaluate actual and possible FCPA issues; and

  • Periodic testing, review, audit, and analysis of the effectiveness of the program to ensure it is the best program in place for your organization.

However, as employers with strong anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies know, even the best written and most well-intentioned policies cannot guarantee insulation from liability or from investigation by the government of suspected/potential violations. In the event a company discovers a violation by its employees, the DOJ and SEC encourage self-reporting and cooperation by entities and individuals, and cooperation can facilitate and expedite any potential investigation by government authorities and possibly result in non-prosecution agreements and reduced penalties.

Conversely, failing to disclose known violations can result in harsher penalties, thus providing incentive to identify and self-report violations. For its part, the government has created incentives to increase the chances that if a company will not report violations, its employees will. The Dodd-Frank Act established a whistleblower program that rewards whistleblowers between 10-30% of total recovery when the recovery exceeds $1 million, giving financial incentive for individual employees to come forward with reports of FCPA violations. Another important consideration when developing FCPA compliance measures and programs is to ensure that the compliance program is independent of and given due weight in relation to business decisions. All too often, FCPA issues are not timely discovered when compliance programs are not properly implemented because of a perceived business cost, and companies and employees face crippling fines and punishment as a result.

In any event, companies that are navigating these waters would be wise to consult with experienced legal counsel familiar with the FCPA and the government agencies charged with its enforcement, both when developing any compliance program and when dealing with a suspected violation.

ARTICLE BY

Radha Kulkarni
OF
Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan LLP

SEC Charges Chilean Citizens With Insider Trading Concerning Tender Offer for Chilean

Katten Muchin Law Firm

The Securities and Exchange Commission recently filed suit in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that defendants, Juan Cruz Bilbao Hormaeche and Thomas Andres Hurtado Rourke, both Chilean citizens, illegally traded on material non-public information that Abbott Laboratories was interested in purchasing CFR Pharmaceuticals, S.A., a pharmaceutical company headquartered in Chile.

According to the complaint, on March 10, 2014, CFR’s Board of Directors met to consider Abbott’s offer to purchase CFR; Bilbao, then a member of the board, participated by telephone. After the meeting, between March 12, 2014 and May 7, 2014, Bilbao allegedly directed his business associate, Hurtado, to place trades purchasing more than $14 million in American Depository Shares (ADSs) of CFR in a US brokerage account maintained in the name of a British Virgin Islands company for the benefit of Bilbao. The SEC further alleges that based on knowledge of confidential information, Hurtado purchased 35,000 ADSs of CFR for $707,710. On May 16, 2014, Abbott announced a definitive agreement to acquire CFR, and on September 23, 2014, Abbott completed the tender offer. According to the SEC, Bilbao tendered his ADSs to Abbott on or before September 23, 2014, and saw a profit of more than $10.1 million. The SEC further alleges Hurtado tendered his ADSs to Abbott for a profit of about $495,000.

The SEC sued defendants for illegally trading on insider information. The SEC alleges that the nexus to the United States is the initial purchase of the ADSs through US-based brokerage accounts. The SEC seeks an order freezing defendants’ assets, an order requiring defendants to repatriate funds obtained from the alleged illegal activities, a final judgment that defendants violated the securities laws, and an order directing defendants to disgorge any illegal gains and to pay civil penalties.

Complaint, SEC v. Hormaeche, No. 14-cv-10036-RJS (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2014).

ARTICLE BY

Emily Stern
Zachary D. Denver
OF
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

SEC Sanctions Operator of Unregistered Virtual Currency Exchanges

Katten Muchin Law Firm

On December 8, the Securities and Exchange Commission sanctioned a computer programmer for operating two online exchanges that traded securities using virtual currencies without registering them as broker-dealers or stock exchanges. The programmer, Ethan Burnside, operated the two exchanges through his company, BTC Trading Corp., from August 2012 to October 2013. Account holders were able to purchase securities in virtual currency businesses using bitcoins on BTC Virtual Stock Exchange and using litecoins on LTC-Global Virtual Stock Exchange. The exchanges were not registered as broker-dealers but solicited the public to open accounts and trade securities. The exchanges also were not registered as stock exchanges but enlisted issuers to offer securities to the public for purchase and sale. Burnside also offered shares in LTC-Global Virtual Stock Exchange itself, as well as interests in a separate Litecoin mining venture, LTC-Mining, in exchange for virtual currencies. The SEC charged Burnside with willful violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Burnside and BTC Trading Corp. with willful violations of Sections 5 and 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Burnside cooperated with the SEC’s investigation and settled, paying more than $68,000 in profits plus interest and a penalty. The SEC also barred Burnside from the securities industry.

The action may indicate that the SEC is taking a closer look at decentralized platforms for trading virtual currency using cryptocurrency technology, but the SEC has neither confirmed nor denied such speculation. In recent months, the SEC has reportedly sent voluntary information requests to companies and online “crypto-equity exchanges” offering equity and related interests denominated in virtual currency and websites offering digital tokens for programming platforms. A discussion of the SEC’s voluntary information sweep is available here.

Click here to read the SEC Press Release and here to read the SEC order.

ARTICLE BY

Evan L. Greebel
Kathleen H. Moriarty
Michael M. Rosensaft
Claudia Callaway
Robert Loewy
Gregory E. Xethalis
OF
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

What ERISA Plans Should Know about Money Market Reform

Drinker Biddle Law Firm

Most U.S. money market funds will begin restructuring their operations beginning in 2014 and throughout 2015 and 2016 as a result of the SEC’s adoption of wide ranging changes to the rules regulating these funds.  Since many plan participants invest in money market funds, ERISA plan sponsors, recordkeepers and investment consultants and other advisers will need to plan for operational, contractual, disclosure and other changes in connection with these new rules.

Floating and Stable NAV Funds

One of the biggest rule changes involves how money market funds will be allowed to value their shares.  Currently, money market funds generally offer shares at a stable net asset value (“NAV’) of $1.00.  Under the SEC’s new money market rules, only government and “retail” money market funds can offer their shares at a stable NAV.  Government money market funds are those funds that hold at least 99.5% of their investments in government securities, cash or repurchase agreements collateralized by government securities.  Money market funds that don’t qualify to offer shares at a stable NAV because of the nature of their shareholder base (i.e., institutional money market funds) will have to float their NAVs, meaning the share price will fluctuate from day to day.

Retail money market funds are funds that restrict investors only to beneficial owners that are natural persons.  A beneficial owner is any person who has direct or indirect, sole or shared voting and/or investment power.  Under the new rules, retail money market funds will be required to reasonably conclude that beneficial owners of intermediaries are natural persons.  The SEC stated that tax-advantaged savings accounts and trusts, such as (i) participant-directed defined contribution plans; (ii) individual retirement accounts; (iii) simplified employee pension arrangements, and other similar types of arrangements, would qualify for the natural person test.  On the other hand, defined benefit plans, endowments and small businesses are not considered “natural persons” and would not be eligible to invest in a retail money market fund.

It is widely expected that the SEC’s new money market rules will result in many changes in fund offerings.  For example:

  • Money market funds that currently have both institutional and natural persons as holders may spin off the institutional holders into separate floating NAV funds;

  • Some institutional funds may decide to liquidate or merge with other funds;

  • Some advisers may begin offering new money fund-“like” products that only hold short term securities (60 days or less maturity) and therefore value fund holdings at amortized cost; and

  • Some prime money market funds may change their investment strategies to operate as a government money market fund in order to steer clear of the floating NAV and liquidity fee and gate rules (discussed below).

Effect on ERISA Plans.  The SEC provided examples of how funds could satisfy the natural person definition with intermediaries, including through: contractual arrangements, periodic certifications and representations or other verification methods.  Accordingly, ERISA service providers who hold fund shares in omnibus accounts may expect to be contacted by retail money market funds to provide these certifications or representations and/or to enter into new agreements with funds for this purpose.

ERISA plan sponsors and investment consultants and advisers will also need to be alert to potential changes to existing money market funds currently offered in plans to which they provide services and/or new fund offerings that may be appealing to and/or better serve the best interests of participants.

Liquidity Fees and Redemption Gates

All money market funds, except government money market funds, will be subject to the SEC’s new rules with respect to the imposition of liquidity (or redemption) fees and redemption gates during periods when a money market fund’s weekly liquid assets dip below certain thresholds.  Under these new rules a fund board may impose up to a 2% liquidity fee and a gate on fund redemptions if weekly liquid assets fall below 30% of total assets.  The fund board must impose a 1% liquidity fee if weekly liquid assets fall below 10% of total assets, unless the board decides otherwise.  Of course, if 10% of a money market fund’s assets are below 10% of a fund’s total assets, it would be unlikely that a board would not impose liquidity fees and redemption gates.  The redemption gates can last no longer than 10 days and cannot be imposed more than once in a 90-day period.

Effect on ERISA Plans.  The liquidity fee and gate requirements will usually only be triggered in times of extreme market stress.  But they are features that many ERISA participants and ERISA service providers will not find appealing.  For that reason, there may be more demand from participants for government money market funds, which may, but are not required to, comply with the fee and gate rules.  It is not expected that government money market funds will opt to become subject to these fee and gate rules.

The liquidity fee and redemption gate rules will require recordkeepers to make technical changes in their operations.  These operational changes could be expensive and time consuming to implement especially for smaller plans.  In particular, it should be noted that liquidity fees may vary in amount depending on a fund board’s determination and redemption gates may vary in the amount of days and will need to be removed quickly upon notice by a fund board.  Additionally, there may be contractual impediments to implementation of liquidity fees and gates, which are discussed below.

Many commenters on the proposed money market rules raised questions with the SEC regarding possible conflicts caused by the application of the fee and gate rules to funds in ERISA and other tax-exempt plans.  Specifically, commenters mentioned the following issues with the fee and/or gate rules:

  • possible violations of certain minimum distribution rules that could be interfered with by the gate rule;

  • potential taxation as a result of the inability to process certain mandatory refunds on a timely basis;

  • delays in plan conversions or rollovers;

  • possible conflicts with the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) qualified default investment (“QDIA”) rules; and

  • conflicts with plan fiduciaries’ duties regarding maintenance of adequate liquidity in their plans.

The SEC’s response generally was that these concerns either were unlikely to materialize or could be mitigated by ERISA plan sponsors or service providers.  For example, with respect to QDIAs, the SEC suggested that a plan sponsor or service provider could (i) loan funds to a plan for operating expenses to avoid the effects of a gate, or (ii) pay a liquidity fee on behalf of a redeeming participant.  In connection with rollovers or conversions, the SEC likewise pointed out that if the liquidity fee caused a hardship on a participant, then the ERISA fiduciary or its affiliate could simply pay the liquidity fee; failing that, the SEC suggested that the fiduciary consider a government money market fund for investment purposes, which is not required to comply with the fee and gate rules.

The SEC continues to work with the DOL on these and other ERISA-and tax exempt specific issues but thus far has not provided any relief from its fee and gate rules for these types of plans and accounts.  Thus, ERISA fiduciaries and plan sponsors may need to consider money market fund offerings in their plans in light of these issues.

Contractual Issues

As noted above, the “natural person” requirements for retail money market funds will require these funds to ascertain information regarding beneficial ownership of fund shares from ERISA intermediaries.  Retail money market funds may ask ERISA intermediaries to make representations about their customers through revised service agreements containing representations about the nature of the intermediaries’ customers.  These funds may also use periodic certifications or questionnaires to obtain this information.

In addition, many existing contracts between money market funds and intermediaries have restrictions in them regarding the imposition of redemption fees and may restrict a fund’s right to delay effecting redemptions thereby putting them in conflict with the new liquidity fee and redemption gate rules.  Recordkeepers who contract with retail or institutional money market funds may therefore be asked by these funds to amend or otherwise revise their servicing agreements with the funds to provide for liquidity fees and redemption gates.

Pricing Changes

The new money market rules will require all floating NAV money market funds to price their shares to four decimal places (e.g., $1.0000).  Recordkeepers will need to adjust their systems to accommodate the four-decimal place pricing system.

Disclosure and Education/Training

ERISA service providers will need to train and educate their personnel on the new money market rules and fund options so that they can answer participants’ questions.  ERISA service providers will need to develop disclosure for ERISA participants that clearly describes the risks and differences in money market funds and new fund options.

Compliance Dates

The new money market rules take effect in various stages over the next two years.  Importantly, the floating NAV, decimal pricing, and liquidity fee and gate rules become effective on October 14, 2016.  That said, the mutual fund industry appears to be moving quickly to prepare to comply, and it is probable that investment advisers to money market funds will begin to make some changes, for example, creating new funds and separating retail and institutional shareholders into different funds well ahead of the 2016 compliance date.  Therefore, ERISA service providers will need to be alert to the possibility that their operations may need to be adjusted as these changes occur.

The SEC’s new money market rules will usher in many changes to money market funds over the next 18-24 months that will affect ERISA and tax-exempt participants who invest in these vehicles and ERISA service providers.  ERISA service providers should begin preparing for these changes by assessing their systems, as applicable, to evaluate whether they can comply with the new rules and, if not, what other investment options might be available to address participants’ short-term investment needs.  ERISA service providers may also want to consider whether non-government money market funds or other short-term liquidity vehicles should be offered to ERISA participants in light of the new fee and gate rules.

ARTICLE BY

Diana E. McCarthy
OF
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Litigation Heating Up

Barnes Thornburg

The past few months have been busy for courts and the SEC dealing with securities whistleblowers. The Supreme Court’s potentially landmark decision in Lawson v. FMR LLC back in March already seems like almost ancient history.  In that decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection provision (18 U.S.C. §1514A) protected not simply employees of public companies but also employees of private contractors and subcontractors, like law firms, accounting firms, and the like, who worked for public companies. (And according to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, it might even extend to housekeepers and gardeners of employees of public companies).

Since then, a lot has happened in the world of whistleblowers. Much of the activity has focused on Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions, rather than Sarbanes-Oxley. This may be because Dodd-Frank has greater financial incentives for plaintiffs, or because some courts have concluded that it does not require an employee to report first to an enforcement agency. The following are some interesting developments:

What is a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank?

This seemingly straightforward question has generated a number of opinions from courts and the SEC. The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower-protection provision, enacted in 2010, focuses on a potentially different “whistleblower” population than Sarbanes-Oxley does. Sarbanes-Oxley’s provision focuses particularly on whistleblower disclosures regarding certain enumerated activities (securities fraud, bank fraud, mail or wire fraud, or any violation of an SEC rule or regulation), and it protects those who disclose to a person with supervisory authority over the employee, or to the SEC, or to Congress.

On the other hand, Dodd-Frank’s provision (15 U.S.C. §78u-6 or Section 21F) defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6).  It then prohibits, and provides a private cause of action for, adverse employment actions against a whistleblower for acts done by him or her in “provid[ing] information to the Commission,” “initiat[ing], testif[ing] in, or assist[ing] in” any investigation or action of the Commission, or in making disclosures required or protected under Sarbanes-Oxley, the Exchange Act or the Commission’s rules.  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(h)(1). A textual reading of these provisions suggests that a “whistleblower” has to provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.  If the whistleblower does so, an employer cannot discriminate against the whistleblower for engaging in those protected actions.

However, after the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC promulgated rules explicating its interpretation of Section 21F. Some of these rules might require providing information to the SEC, but others could be construed more broadly to encompass those who simply report internally or report to some other entity.  Compare Rule 21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3), 17 C.F.R. §240.21F-2(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(3). The SEC’s comments to these rules also said that they apply to “individuals who report to persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission.”

Therefore, one issue beginning to percolate up to the appellate courts is whether Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions consider someone who reports alleged misconduct to their employers or other entities, but not the SEC, to be a “whistleblower.” The only circuit court to have squarely addressed the issue (the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC) concluded that Dodd-Frank’s provision only applies to those who actually provide information to the SEC.

In doing so, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the “plain language and structure” of the statutory text, concluding that it unambiguously required the employee to provide information to the SEC.  Several district courts, including in Colorado, Florida and the Northern District of California, have concurred with this analysis.

More, however, have concluded that Dodd-Frank is ambiguous on this point and therefore have given Chevrondeference to the SEC’s interpretation as set forth in its own regulations. District courts, including in the Southern District of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Tennessee and Connecticut, have adopted this view. The SEC has also weighed in, arguing (in an amicus brief to the Second Circuit) that whistleblowers should be entitled to protection regardless of whether they disclose to their employers or the SEC.  The agency said that Asadi was wrongly decided and, under its view, employees that report internally should get the same protections that those who report to the SEC receive. The Second Circuit’s decision in that case (Liu v. Siemens AG) did not address this issue at all.

Finally, last week, the Eighth Circuit also decided not to take on this question. It opted not to hear an interlocutory appeal, in Bussing v. COR Securities Holdings Inc., in which an employee at a securities clearing firm provided information about possible FINRA violations to her employer and to FINRA, rather than the SEC, and was allegedly fired for it. The district court concluded that the fact that she failed to report to the SEC did not exclude her from the whistleblower protections under Dodd-Frank. It reasoned that Congress did not intend, in enacting Dodd-Frank, to encourage employees to circumvent internal reporting channels in order to obtain the protections of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection.  In doing so, however, the district court did not conclude that the statute was ambiguous and rely on the SEC’s interpretation.

A related question is what must an employee report to be a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank. Thus far, if a whistleblower reports something other than a violation of the securities laws, that is not protected. So, for example, an alleged TILA violation or an alleged violation of certain banking laws have been found to be not protected.

These issues will take time to shake out. While more courts thus far have adopted, or ruled consistently with, the SEC’s interpretation, as the Florida district court stated, “[t]he fact that numerous courts have interpreted the same statutory language differently does not render the statute ambiguous.”

Does Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection apply extraterritorially?

In August, the Second Circuit decided Liu. Rather than focus on who can be a whistleblower, the Court concluded that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions do not apply to conduct occurring exclusively extraterritorially. In Liu, a former Siemens employee alleged that he was terminated for reporting alleged violations of the FCPA at a Siemens subsidiary in China.  The Second Circuit relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank case in reaching its decision. In Morrison, the Court reaffirmed the presumption that federal statutes do not apply extraterritorially absent clear direction from Congress.

The Second Circuit in Liu, despite Liu’s argument that other Dodd-Frank provisions applied extraterritorially and SEC regulations interpreting the whistleblower provisions at least suggested that the bounty provisions applied extraterritorially, disag
reed. The court concluded that it need not defer to the SEC’s interpretation of who can be a whistleblower because it believed that Section 21F was not ambiguous.  It also concluded that the anti-retaliation provisions would be more burdensome if applied outside the country than the bounty provisions, so it did not feel the need to construe the two different aspects of the whistleblower provisions identically.  And finally, the SEC , in its amicus brief, did not address either the extraterritorial reach of the provisions or Morrison, so the Second Circuit apparently felt no need to defer to the agency’s view on extraterritoriality.

Liu involved facts that occurred entirely extraterritorially. He was a foreign worker employed abroad by a foreign corporation, where the alleged wrongdoing, the alleged disclosures, and the alleged discrimination all occurred abroad. Whether adding some domestic connection changes this result remains for future courts to consider.

The SEC’s Use Of The Anti-Retaliation Provision In An Enforcement Action

In June, the SEC filed, and settled, its first Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation enforcement action. The Commission filed an action against Paradigm Capital Management, Inc., and its principal Candace Weir, asserting that they retaliated against a Paradigm employee who reported certain principal transactions, prohibited under the Investment Advisers Act, to the SEC. Notably, that alleged retaliation did not include terminating the whistleblower’s employment or diminishing his compensation; it did, however, include removing him as the firm’s head trader, reconfiguring his job responsibilities and stripping him of supervisory responsibility. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, both respondents agreed to cease and desist from committing any future Exchange Act violations, retain an independent compliance consultant, and pay $2.2 million in fines and penalties.  This matter marks the first time the Commission has asserted Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions in an enforcement action, rather than a private party doing so in civil litigation.

The SEC Announces Several Interesting Dodd-Frank Bounties

Under Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers who provide the SEC with “high-quality,” “original” information that leads to an enforcement action netting over $1 million in sanctions can receive an award of 10-30 percent of the amount collected. The SEC recently awarded bounties to whistleblowers in circumstances suggesting the agency wants to encourage a broad range of whistleblowers with credible, inside information.

In July, the agency awarded more than $400,000 to a whistleblower who appears not to have provided his information to the SEC voluntarily.  Instead, the whistleblower had attempted to encourage his employer to correct various compliance issues internally. Those efforts apparently resulted in a third-party apprising an SRO of the employer’s issues and the whistleblower’s efforts to correct them. The SEC’s subsequent follow-up on the SRO’s inquiry resulted in the enforcement action. Even though the “whistleblower” did not initiate communication with the SEC about these compliance issues, for his efforts, the agency nonetheless awarded him a bounty.

Then, just recently, the SEC announced its first whistleblower award to a company employee who performed audit and compliance functions. The agency awarded the compliance staffer more than $300,000 after the employee first reported wrongdoing internally, and then, when the company failed to take remedial action after 120 days, reported the activity to the SEC. Compliance personnel, unlike most employees, generally have a waiting period before they can report out, unless they have a reasonable basis to believe investors or the company have a substantial risk of harm.

With a statute as sprawling as Dodd-Frank, and potentially significant bounty awards at stake, opinions interpreting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions are bound to proliferate. Check back soon for further developments.

 
ARTICLE BY

Brian E. Casey
 
OF 
Barnes & Thornburg LLP

North Carolina General Assembly Fails to Jump Start Our Businesses with Crowdfunding Legislation

Poyner Spruill Law firm

Crowdfunding is a relatively new capital raising tool, which was generally used in the past as a financing method for such ventures as films and music recordings.  To date, crowdfunding has not been a popular method for offering and selling securities because offering a share of financial returns or profits from business activities would subject the transaction to federal and state securities laws, requiring certain registrations with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and state securities regulators. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding (October 23, 2013).

In 2012, Congress passed the JOBS Act (Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act).  The JOBS Act, among other things, added a new section, 4(a)(6), to the Securities Act of 1933, creating a new exemption for certain crowdfunding offerings from SEC and state law registration requirements.  However, before the law can become effective the SEC must promulgate and implement rules regulating the exemption.  For further information on the JOBS Act, please see The JOBS Act—An Overview and Some Recent Developments, written by Michael E. Slipsky and David R. Krosner.

As of this summer, the SEC has proposed rules for crowdfunding, but those rules are not final. A dozen states are making an effort to join Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Alabama, Maine, Washington, Wisconsin, and Indiana by developing their own regulations allowing crowdfunding within the states. States are growing frustrated and tired of waiting for the SEC to adopt federal regulations.  See Posting of Bill Meagher to TheDeal.com, States make own crowdfunding rules, rather than wait for SEC (May 5, 2014, 15:03 EST).

In response to the federal delay, Representative Tom Murry of Wake County sponsored state legislation attempting to allow and regulate crowdfunding in North Carolina, filing House Bill 680, the JOBS Act, on April 9, 2013.  House Bill 680 did not pass the Senate and was not eligible for consideration in the 2014 short session.  For that reason, in June the House added the crowdfunding provisions, titled, “Jump-Start Our Business Start-Ups Act,” to the 32 page fifth edition of Senate Bill 734, Regulatory Reform Act of 2014. 

When compromise discussions between the House and Senate on Senate Bill 734 stalled, the Senate added to House Bill 1224 various provisions regarding modifications to the local government sales and use tax rate as well as other provisions including the crowdfunding provisions.  House Bill 1224 had been filed at the beginning of the short session as a bill modifying the Job Maintenance and Capital Development Fund.  The House rejected the Senate’s modifications of House Bill 1224.  As a result, the House and Senate appointed a conference committee, and the committee made its report on July 31, 2014.  The Proposed Conference Committee Substitute was passed by the Senate, however it failed in the House. 

The final version of House Bill 1224, the Proposed Conference Committee Substitute, would have allowed North Carolina residents to invest up to only $2,000 per purchaser – unless the purchaser is an accredited investor as defined by rule 501 of SEC regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 – in new in-state ventures through the crowdfunding mechanism.  It would have allowed most companies to raise up to $1 million in capital through unregistered securities without a financial audit and up to $2 million in capital if the issuer has undergone and made available to each prospective investor and the Secretary of State the documentation resulting from a financial audit.  Essentially companies would have been able to sell securities directly to the North Carolina public without having to incur the expense of conducting a registered securities offering.  The NC Secretary of State would have been tasked with the regulation of these types of transactions and would have collected quarterly reports.  See Posting of Mark Binker to WRAL TechWire, Crowdfunding bill clears N.C. Senate Committee,  (July 16, 2014 14:08 EST).

The General Assembly has adjourned sine die.  Although crowdfunding provision had an opportunity to become law during the 2014 short session in either Senate Bill 734 or the Proposed Conference Committee Substitute of House Bill 1224, the General Assembly did not pass the crowdfunding provision.  House Bill 1224 failed in the House and the compromise finally reached for Senate Bill 734 in the ratified bill excluded the crowdfunding provision.  There is a possibility the crowdfunding provision could again be considered before the 2015 session, scheduled for late January, if three-fifths of all members of the Senate and three-fifths of all members of the House vote to do so, as provided in Section 11(2) of Article II of the North Carolina Constitution.  However, the more likely scenario for the General Assembly to return would be for a “special session” by call of the Governor.  As provided in Section 5(7) of Article 3 of North Carolina Constitution, “[t]he Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, by and with the advice of the Council of State, convene the General Assembly in extra session by his proclamation, stating therein the purpose or purposes for which they are thus convened.”

ARTICLE BY

Jillian DeCamp
 
OF 
Poyner Spruill LLP

Quarterly Whistleblower Award Update – August 21, 2014

Drinker Biddle Law Firm

Since our last quarterly update, the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower (“OWB”) has issued four denial orders and three award orders. Here are some lessons learned from this activity:

  • The SEC Will Not Award Whistleblowers Who Provide Frivolous Information. The SEC determined that a claimant (who submitted “tips” relating to almost every single Notice of Covered Action”) was ineligible for awards because he/she “has knowingly and willfully made false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements and representations to the Commission over a course of years and continues to do so.” Under Rule 21F-8, persons are not eligible for an award if they “knowingly and willfully make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, or use any false writing or document knowing that it contains any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry with intent to mislead or otherwise hinder the Commission or another authority.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(7). The OWB found that a number of passages submitted by the claimant were patently false or fictitious and that the person had the requisite intent because of the (1) incredible nature of the statements, (2) continued submissions that lack any factual nexus to the overall actions, and (3) refusal to withdraw unsupported claims at the request of the OWB. (May 12, 2104.)

  • The SEC Will Enforce the Time Frames Set Forth in the Statue. The OWB denied two awards because the claimants did not submit an award claim within the 90-day period established by Rule 21F-10(b). The claimants argued that OWB should waive the 90-day period due to extraordinary circumstances. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(a). The OWB determined that neither a lack of awareness that the information that the whistleblower had shared would lead to a successful enforcement action nor the lack of awareness that the Commission posted Notices of Covered Actions on its website constitutes an extraordinary circumstance to waive the timing requirement. See SEC Release No. 72178 (May 16, 2014) and SEC Release No. 72659 (July 23, 2014).

  • Whistleblowers are Not Eligible for an Award Unless the Information Leads to a Successful Enforcement Action. The OWB denied an award to a claimant because the provided information did not lead to a “successful enforcement by the Commission of a federal court or administrative action, as required by Rules 21F-3(a)(3) and 21F-4(c) of the Exchange Act.” OWB also noted that the claimant did not submit information in the form and manner required by Rules 21F-2(a)(2), 21F-8(a), and 21F-9(a) & (b) of the Exchange Act. See In the Matter of Harbinger Capital Partners, LLC, File No. 3-14928 (July 4, 2014).

The OWB Can Be Persuaded to Change Its Preliminary Determination. Although the OWB initially denied the whistleblower’s award claim on the basis that the information did not appear to have been voluntarily submitted within Rule 21F-4(a)(ii) because it was submitted in response to a prior inquiry conducted bya self-regulatory organization (“SRO”). In a Final Determination issued on July 31, 2014, however, the OWB determined that claimant was entitled to more than $400,000. OWB noted that a submission is voluntary if it is provided before a request, inquiry, or demand for information by the SEC in connection with an investigation by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, any self-regulatory organization, Congress, the federal government, or any state Attorney General.

On the basis of the unique circumstances of this case, the OWB decided to waive the voluntary requirement of Rule 21F-4(a) for this claimant. The SEC noted that the claimant “worked aggressively … to bring the securities law violations to the attention of appropriate personnel,” the SRO inquiry originated from information that in part described claimant’s role, claimant believed that the company had provided the SRO with all the materials that claimant developed during his/her own internal efforts, and claimant promptly reporting to the SEC that the company’s internal efforts as a result of the SRO inquiry would not protect investors from future harm. Sean McKessy, chief of the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, remarked that “[t]he whistleblower did everything feasible to correct the issue internally. When it became apparent that the company would not address the issue, the whistleblower came to the SEC in a final effort to correct the fraud and prevent investors from being harmed. This award recognizes the significance of the information that the whistleblower provided us and the balanced efforts made by the whistleblower to protect investors and report the violation internally.”See SEC Release No. 72727 (July 31, 2014); SEC Press Release, “SEC Announces Award for Whistleblower Who Reported Fraud to SEC After Company Failed to Address Issue Internally,” (July 31, 2014).

  • SEC Continues to Make Awards to Qualified Claimants. On June 3, 2014, the SEC awarded two claimants 15% each for a total of 30% percent of the monetary sanctions collected in the covered action. See SEC Release No. 72301 (June 3, 2014). On July 22, 2014, the SEC awarded three claimants 15%, 10%, and 5% respectively (for a total of 30%) of the monetary sanctions collected in the Covered Action. See SEC Release No. 72652 (July 22, 2014).

ARTICLE BY

William L. Carr
Daniel E. Brewer
 
OF
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP