Tag: SEC

AI Transcripts and Investment Advisers: Embracing Technology While Meeting SEC Requirements

AI Transcripts in Investment Advisory

There has been a boom recently regarding investment advisers’ use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) to transcribe client and internal meetings. Among other applications, AI features such as Zoom AI Companion, Microsoft Copilot, Jump, and Otter.ai (collectively, “AI Meeting Assistants”) can assist with drafting, transcribing, summarizing and prompting action items based on conversation content in the respective application. For instance, Zoom AI Companion and Microsoft Copilot can draft communications, generate transcriptions of conversations, identify points of agreement and disagreement of a discussion and summarize action items.

Overview of SEC Recordkeeping Requirements for AI Transcripts

As of now, there are no specific artificial intelligence regulations pertaining to the use of AI transcripts or the recordkeeping obligations that would follow. However, there are several SEC recordkeeping provisions that may be implicated by use of the AI capabilities offered by the AI Meeting Assistants. Rule 204-2 requires investment advisers to maintain certain records “relating to [their] investment advisory business” including “written communications sent by such investment adviser relating to” such enumerated subjects as: (i) any recommendation made or proposed to be made and any advice given or proposed to be given; (ii) any receipt, disbursement or delivery of funds or securities; (iii) the placing or execution of any order to purchase or sell any security; and (iv) predecessor performance and the performance or rate of return of any or all managed accounts, portfolios, or securities recommendations (subject to certain exceptions).

Every registered investment adviser is required to keep true, accurate and current books and records. The approach at this juncture would be to adopt these AI Meeting Assistant transcripts into the firm’s books and records. Once translated into written form, the SEC could consider the transcripts and summaries to be written communications regarding investment advice. Such transcripts and summaries should be kept in their original form, together with notes (if any) as to any corresponding inaccuracies produced by the AI content. Registered investment advisers are fiduciaries and should not utilize any information in conjunction with providing client services or communications that it does not reasonably believe is accurate. Thus, if the firm was to use the content of AI transcripts and/or summaries in conjunction with client services or communications that was incorrect, the onus would remain on the firm to demonstrate as to how it reasonably relied upon the content. It is inconsequential whether these transcripts and summaries make it into your CRM software or are maintained in the AI Meeting Assistants program. Regardless of whether the content is a meeting summary or list of action items, the transmission would likely constitute a communication for purposes of Rule 204-2 due to implicating an already established recordkeeping requirement.

Implementing Effective AI Strategies in Investment Advisory

  • A firm must eliminate or neutralize the effect of conflicts of interest associated with the firm’s use of artificial intelligence in investor interactions that place the firm’s or its associated person’s interest ahead of investors’ interests.
  • A firm that has any investor interaction using covered technology (AI) to have written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the proposed rules.
  • Adopt AI Meeting Assistant transcripts into books and records.
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For more on AI, visit the NLR Artificial Intelligence section

SEC Enforcement Director Highlights Increased Penalties for Violations of Whistleblower Rule

Recently, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increased enforcement efforts around the whistleblower protection rule Rule 21F-17(a) which prohibits companies from impeding the ability of individuals to blow the whistle on potential securities law violations to the Commission. Most notably, the rule prohibits overly broad non-disclosure agreements and other employment agreements which restrict whistleblowing.

In remarks delivered November 6 at Securities Enforcement Forum D.C. 2024, Sanjay Wadhwa, the SEC’s Acting Director of the Division of Enforcement noted the importance of these enforcement efforts and highlighted the increased penalties levied by the Commission in Rule 21F-17(a) cases.

“The SEC’s whistleblower program plays a critical role in our ability to effectively detect wrongdoing, protect investors and the marketplace, and hold violators accountable.” Wadhwa said. “But that program only works if whistleblowers have unfettered ability to share with the SEC information about possible securities law violations. However, all too often we have seen, for example, confidentiality agreements and employment agreements by various advisory firms and public companies that impede that ability, including by limiting customers’ ability to voluntarily contact the SEC or by requiring employees to waive the right to a monetary award for participating in a government investigation. So this past fiscal year, and the year prior, the Commission brought a series of enforcement actions to address widespread violations.”

“There was a similar series of actions addressing this issue some years back,” Wadhwa continued. “And I think for a while there was better compliance, but then things slipped and we’re back here. So, this time around the Commission authorized what I view to be fittingly robust remedies, including the largest penalty on record for a standalone violation of the whistleblower protection rule. It is my hope that these enforcement actions will have a significant deterrent effect and will lead to greater and sustained proactive compliance.”

The record penalty referenced by Wadhwa was an $18 million penalty levied against J.P. Morgan in January. According to the SEC, J.P. Morgan regularly had retail clients sign confidential release agreements which did not permit clients to voluntarily contact the SEC.

In enforcing Rule 21F-17(a), the SEC has found illegal language in severance or separation agreements, employee contracts, settlement agreements and compliance manuals. Language in the various types of contracts found to violate Rule 21F-17(a) has included requiring the prior consent of the company before disclosing confidential information to regulators, preventing the employee from initiating contact with regulators, requiring the employee to waive their right to awards from whistleblowing award programs, including a “non-disparagement clause” that specifically included the SEC as a party the employee could not “disparage” the company to, and requiring the employee to inform the company soon after reporting information to the SEC.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section.

The Murky Waters of Wash Trading Digital Assets – DOJ Charges 18 Individuals and Entities

The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts recently unsealed what it described as the “first-ever criminal charges against financial services firms for market manipulation and ‘wash trading’ in the cryptocurrency industry.” The SEC also filed parallel civil charges alleging violations of Securities for the same alleged schemes.

The government has charged eighteen individuals and companies, including four cryptocurrency market makers, with engaging in illegal market manipulation through “wash trading” digital assets. According to the DOJ and SEC filings, although these individuals purported to offer “market making services,” they were actually engaged in offering “market-manipulations-as-a-service” by engaging in artificial trading of digital assets to give the false appearance that there was an active (and heavily traded) market for those tokens.

How this case came to the DOJ’s attention is as novel as the legal theory behind the charging documents. According to DOJ spokespeople, the investigation started with a tip from the SEC about one of the companies at issue. Further investigations into that company—along with the help of cooperating witnesses—led authorities to set up a sham crypto firm, NextFundAI, and create a token associated with the firm. Posing as NextFundAI, the government communicated with the defendants—market makers who allegedly offered to trade and manipulate the price of NextFundAI’s token by wash trading, or trading the token back-and-forth between crypto wallets they controlled.

While there may be rules against wash trading in traditional securities markets (see, e.g., 26 U.S. Code § 1091), the rules are as clear in the digital asset space. Indeed, the regulatory vacuum facing the digital asset industry makes it difficult for those in the industry to avoid eventual regulatory action, and what many have referred to as “regulation by enforcement.” This is particularly true where the technological realities of digital assets do not fit squarely within the existing legal framework. There may be disagreement about the purpose or intent behind a cryptocurrency transaction where one individual is transferring cryptocurrency between wallets that person or entity controls. But there may not be a misrepresentation or fraudulent act inherent in this type of transaction. Indeed, the transaction itself (including the wallet address of the sender and recipient) is likely immediately and accurately recorded on the public blockchain. So, according to the government, the “fraud” is the intent behind the trades – to manipulate the market by artificially generating trade volume to signal interest and activity in the token.

The government’s allegations are also interesting because in addition to the wire fraud charges (18 U.S.C. § 1343), which generally do not require proof that the digital asset at issue is a security, the government has charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit market manipulation (18 U.S.C. § 371), which requires the government to prove that the token at issue is a security. This charge is significant because it will require the DOJ to prove at trial that the tokens at issue are securities.

Although several individuals involved have already pleaded guilty, there are several defendants who appear to be testing the government’s novel theory in court. We anticipate that this will be the first of many similar investigations and enforcement actions in the digital asset space.

©1994-2024 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Digital Assets, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

SEC Brings Multiple Enforcement Actions Relating to Beneficial Ownership and Other Reporting Obligations

On September 25, 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) announced that it had instituted and settled enforcement actions under Section 13(d), Section 13(g) and Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as amended, the Exchange Act). The actions involved 21 individuals and entities that allegedly had failed to timely file Schedule 13D or 13G to report beneficial ownership of greater than 5% of the registered equity securities outstanding and/or amendments to such reports, and/or to timely file Form 3, 4 or 5 to report ownership of, and transactions in, registered equity securities by executive officers, directors and greater-than-10% beneficial owners (collectively, insiders). As part of the settlements, individual respondents agreed to pay civil monetary penalties ranging from $10,000 to $200,000, and entities agreed to pay civil penalties ranging from $40,000 to $750,000. As part of the same set of settlements, the SEC also instituted and settled two enforcement actions against public companies for allegedly causing certain of their insiders’ Form 3, 4 or 5 filing failures or for failing to report such filing delinquencies. Just a week earlier, the SEC had announced the institution and settlement of enforcement actions under Section 13(f) and Section 13(h) of the Exchange Act against 11 institutional investment managers that allegedly had failed on a timely basis to file one or more quarterly Form 13F reports and/or periodic Form 13H reports.

The Bottom Line

The foregoing actions are part of an SEC enforcement initiative aimed at ensuring compliance with ownership disclosure and other reporting rules. Insofar as the beneficial ownership and insider actions are concerned, the most recent set of settlements suggest a possible willingness on the SEC’s part to bring enforcement actions even for minor and technical violations. Insofar as the institutional investor enforcement actions, the recent “sweep” appears to mark the first such broad action by the SEC. Notably, for two of the sanctioned institutional investment managers that were based outside the US and where the managers self-reported their errors to the SEC, no monetary penalties were assessed. A third institutional investment manager did not pay a monetary penalty for its Form 13H filing delinquency, which had been self-reported to the agency. Further, the SEC’s public announcement of the settlements indicated that the SEC staff used data analytics to identify the delinquent filings. The SEC has occasionally used various technological solutions to search for late filings and other violations of law in the vast EDGAR database, and as artificial intelligence and similar applications become more widespread and economical, we expect the SEC to make greater use of automated techniques in the future as part of its ongoing filing review process.

The Full Story

5% Beneficial Owners, Insiders and Public Company Issuers

Under Section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13d-2(a) promulgated thereunder, any person who acquired beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a public company’s stock must, within 10 calendar days of the relevant acquisition,[1] file an initial set of disclosures on Schedule 13D with the SEC. The beneficial owner must then file updates with the SEC to report any material changes to its position or other facts disclosed in prior filings. Certain investors (mostly passive ones) are eligible to file a simplified set of disclosures on Schedule 13G. The deadline to file a Schedule 13G was also within 10 calendar days of acquiring more than 5% beneficial ownership, but certain institutional investors were permitted to defer disclosing their passive holdings on Schedule 13G until 45 days after the end of the calendar year.[2]

Under Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 16a-3 promulgated thereunder, officers and directors of public companies, and any beneficial owners of greater than 10% of stock in a public company, were (and currently are) required to file initial statements of holdings on Form 3 either within 10 calendar days of becoming an insider or on or before the effective date of the initial registration of the stock. Such insiders are then obligated to keep this information current by reporting subsequent transactions on Forms 4 and 5 (in most instances, within two business days of any change). In addition, Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Item 405 of Regulation S-K promulgated thereunder require issuers to disclose information regarding delinquent Section 16(a) filings by insiders in their annual reports.

Here, the SEC alleged that 14 persons, who were obligated to file Forms 3/4/5, failed to timely file or update such reports required under Section 16(a), that two public companies caused some of those late filings and/or did not disclose the late filings when required, and that 18 persons who were obligated to file and/or amend Schedules 13D/13G failed to do so timely as required under Sections 13(d) and (g). In most of the non-issuer settlements, there appear to have been repeated failures over multiple issuers, sometimes over several years. However, not all persons settling with the SEC had failures that were repeated or otherwise egregious. Each of two of the matters that settled for $25,000 or less alleged only a few violations (and one of those included two alleged Schedule 13D violations that arguably are supported by a compliance and disclosure interpretation but not by the actual wording of Section 13 and its implementing rules). By contrast, among the 11 beneficial ownership settlements that the SEC announced nearly a year ago, none were below $66,000. This suggests that the SEC may once again be bringing less serious enforcement actions and pursuing even minor infractions.

Institutional Investment Managers

Under Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13f-1 promulgated thereunder, entities with investment discretion over at least $100 million worth of specified US publicly-traded securities (and certain securities exercisable for or convertible into such securities) (institutional investment managers) are required to file quarterly Form 13F reports detailing their ownership of such securities regardless of the percentages owned. Reports can omit certain de minimis positions, though the de minimis level is set quite low so relatively few positions are typically excluded from Form 13F on this basis. The $100 million threshold was originally set in 1975, is not indexed for inflation and has not been adjusted since. Each report for a calendar quarter must be filed no later than 45 calendar days after the end of the preceding quarter.

Under Section 13(h) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13h-1 promulgated thereunder, persons who trade US publicly-traded securities equal to or exceeding two million shares or $20 million during any calendar day, or 20 million shares or $200 million during any calendar month (collectively, large traders) are required to file required Form 13H reports with the SEC. Unlike the beneficial ownership reports and Form 13F, Form 13H reports are confidential and viewable only by the SEC. While the specific reporting thresholds for Form 13F and Form 13H are different, most (but not all) large traders will also be institutional investment managers. But most institutional investment managers will not necessarily be large traders.

The SEC alleged that nine institutional investment managers failed to timely file required Form 13F reports—often over a long period of years. Those nine firms (not including one which was part of the beneficial owner settlements discussed above but had also not filed Form 13F for a number of years) agreed to pay in aggregate more than $3.4 million to settle those cases. Notably, two additional settling parties (both institutional investment managers located outside the US) were not assessed penalties relating to their delinquent Form 13F’s because they self-reported their failure to report directly to the SEC.

Two of the parties settling Form 13F failures also were charged with failing to timely file required Form 13H reports. Because both of these parties self-reported their Form 13H filing failures, neither was assessed a penalty relating to Section 13(h).

[1] The deadlines described here were in effect during the relevant periods in the settled actions. Effective on and after February 5, 2024, the initial Schedule 13D must be filed within five business days of the relevant acquisition.

[2] The deadlines described here were in effect during the relevant periods in the settled actions. Effective on and after September 30, 2024, the filing deadline for an initial Schedule 13G (other than for certain institutional investors) is within 5 business days of the relevant acquisition; certain institutional investors are permitted to delay their initial filing of Schedule 13G to 45 calendar days after the end of relevant calendar quarter.

Copyright © 2024, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.
For more on SEC Enforcement Actions, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

SEC Revises Tick Size, Access Fees and Round-Lot Definition and Takes Steps to Disseminate Odd-Lot and Other Better Priced Orders

On September 18, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission) adopted amendments to Rule 612 (Tick Sizes) and Rule 610 (Access Fees) under Regulation NMS under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Regulation NMS).1 The SEC also added and amended definitions and other rules under Regulation NMS to address round-lot and odd-lot sizing and dissemination. We address each category of revisions below and highlight at the outset that the SEC did not adopt the controversial provision that would have prevented market centers from executing orders at prices less than the current or revised tick sizes. That is, the minimum tick size continues to address only the minimum price increment at which a market center can publish a quotation for a security. This is significant, as adopting such a prohibition would have prevented broker-dealers and other market centers from providing price improvement at prices finer than the quotation tick sizes.

The SEC also took a measured approach to other aspects of the rule. As explained more fully below, the Commission adopted only one additional minimum quotation size (rather than the three proposed), narrowed the scope of securities that might be subject to the smaller minimum quotation size, reduced the frequency with which primary listing exchanges must calculate tick sizes and round-lot sizes, and expanded the amount of data to be evaluated for these calculations from one month’s worth to three months’ worth.

Tick Sizes/Minimum Pricing Increments

Rule 612 of Regulation NMS regulates the price increments (that is, the “tick size”) at which a market center can display a quotation and at which a broker-dealer can accept, rank, or display orders or indications of interest in NMS stocks. Currently, for NMS stocks priced at or above $1.00 per share, broker-dealers and market centers can accept orders or quote in one-penny ($0.01) price increments and at a much smaller increment ($0.0001) for NMS stocks priced less than $1.00 per share.

The SEC and other market participants had observed that many stocks were “tick constrained” — that is, bids, offers, and other orders in those stocks might regularly allow for quotation spreads narrower than $0.01, but the penny spread requirement of Rule 612 constrained such narrower quoting. Determining the “right” quote size for a security can be complicated: on the one hand, a narrower spread reduces transaction costs for investors. On the other hand, too narrow a quotation spread allows other market participants to “step ahead” of a quotation — that is, obtain better priority — by entering an order that is priced only slightly better. Obtaining priority by quoting for an economically insignificantly better price disincentivizes those offering liquidity or price improvement to the market. Stated simply, a market participant has little incentive to expose its order to the market if another participant can easily get better priority over that order at an insignificant cost. Accordingly, the Commission sought to balance the two competing concerns of spread size and fear of stepping ahead.

Tick sizes are also relevant in the competition between exchange and non-exchange trading venues. Due to their market structure, exchanges generally execute orders at the prices they quote, but cannot execute at prices within the quoted spread. Narrower spreads provide better opportunities for exchanges to execute at the higher bids or lower offers represented by those narrower spreads. In short, narrower spreads allow exchange venues to be more competitive with off-exchange venues.

In December 2022, the SEC proposed to add three minimum tick sizes for NMS stocks priced $1.00 or more: one-tenth of a cent ($0.001), two-tenths of a cent ($0.002), and five-tenths (or one-half) of a cent ($0.005). Public comment suggested that this proposal was too complicated and the smaller price increment of $0.001 might also have been too small, thereby facilitating stepping ahead.

The adopted rule provides for only one new tick size for certain NMS stocks priced at or above $1.00 per share: $0.005. This half-penny minimum quotation size will apply for those NMS stocks priced at or above $1 that have a “time-weighted average quoted spread” (a metric defined in the rule) of $0.015 during a three-month Evaluation Period (as described in the table below) occurring twice a year.[1] “Time-weighted average quoted spread” seeks to estimate tick constraint and identify those securities that are quoted on average at close to a one-cent spread. Specifically, under the revised rule, primary listing exchanges must calculate the time-weighted average spread over the months of January, February, and March and July, August, and September. The results of the first (Q1) calculation determines which securities are subject to the half-penny tick size for the business days between May 1 and October 31 of that year. The results of the second (Q3) calculation determines which securities are subject to the half-penny tick size for the business days between November 1 of that year and April 30 of the following year.

The following chart shows the applicable tick sizes and calculations:

The SEC’s policy rationale for adopting these amendments is that they relax existing restrictions on tick sizes, which should reduce transaction costs and provide for better price discovery for certain NMS stocks. Additionally, smaller tick sizes for NMS stocks that merit them should improve liquidity, competition, and price efficiency.

Access Fees

Securities exchanges generally charge access fees to those who take liquidity and rebate a portion of that access fee to those who provide liquidity. As the SEC explains, “the predominant exchange fee structure is maker-taker, in which an exchange charges a fee to liquidity takers and pays a rebate to liquidity providers, and the rebate is typically funded through the access fee.”3 Rule 610(c) of Regulation NMS limits the fee that an exchange can charge for accessing protected quotations4 pursuant to Rule 611 of Regulation NMS. Currently, the access fee is capped at 30 cents per 100 shares (or “30 mils” per share) for NMS securities priced at or above $1. The access fee is capped at 0.3% of the quotation price for NMS stocks priced below $1.

With a smaller minimum quotation size, the SEC took the opportunity to revise the access fee cap, which some market participants believed had been set too high. Like the tick size changes, the access fee amendment ultimately adopted was modified from what was originally proposed. Originally, the SEC proposed to reduce access fee caps (a) from 30 mils to 10 mils per share for NMS stocks priced at or over $1 that would have been assigned a tick size larger than $0.001 and (b) to 5 mils per share for NMS stocks priced at or over $1 that would have been assigned a $0.001 tick size. For protected quotations in NMS stocks priced under $1.00 per share, the Commission originally proposed to reduce the 0.3% fee cap to 0.05% of the quotation price.

Ultimately, the Commission adopted a more simplified reduction in access fee caps. Because it added only one tick size to Rule 612, the SEC adopted only one reduction in access fee caps, from 30 mils to 10 mils per share for protected quotations in NMS stocks priced $1.00 or more. For such quotations priced less than $1.00, the Commission reduced the access fee cap from 0.3% to 0.1% of the quotation price per share. In addition, the SEC adopted (as proposed) new Rule 612(d), requiring all exchange fees charged and all rebates paid for order execution to be determinable at the time of execution. Currently, such exchange fees are subject to complex fee schedules that apply tiered and other discounts at month-end. As a result, market participants would not necessarily know intra-month whether their broker might access a higher tier later in the month, which would adjust the fee charged for the subject order. The new rule ends this uncertainty.

Setting the revised access fee cap at 10 mils per share was somewhat controversial, with Commissioners Peirce and Uyeda questioning the manner in which 10 mils was determined, whether another rate should have been used (15 mils? 5 mils? 12 mils?) and whether the Commission should be in the rate-setting business at all. The Commissioners ultimately voted in favor of the proposal based upon a pledge (discussed below) that the SEC staff will, by May 2029, “conduct a review and study the effects of the amendments in the national market system.”5

Required Staff Review and Study

The Adopting Release requires that the Commission staff conduct a “review and study” by May 2029 of the effects of the amendments on the national market system. The details of such study are not clearly defined, but the Adopting Release provides that:

[s]uch a review and study might include, but would not be limited to, an investigation of: (i) general market quality and trading activity in reaction to the implementation of the variable tick size, (ii) the reaction of quoted spreads to the implementation of the amended access fee cap, and (iii) changes to where market participants direct order flow, e.g., to exchange versus off-exchange venues, following the implementation of the amendments.6

Compliance Dates and Timelines

The amendments described above become effective 60 days after the publication of the SEC’s Adopting Release in the Federal Register. The date by which exchanges, broker-dealers, and other market participants must comply with the rule amendments is generally in November 2025 but, in some instances, in May 2026, as described more fully below. Specifically, the Compliance Date:

  • for the tick size amendments (half-penny quoting for “tick-constrained” stocks) of Rule 612 is “the first business day of November 2025,” or November 3, 2025.
  • for the 10 mils per share access fee cap amendment of Rule 610 and the new requirement under Rule 612(d) that exchange fees be known at time of execution in each case, is also November 3, 2025.
  • for the new round-lot definition (100 shares, 40 shares, 10 shares, or 1 share) is November 3, 2025.
  • for the dissemination of “odd-lot information,” including the new BOLO data element, is six months later, to allow broker-dealers and others to program systems accordingly. These changes will take effect on “the first business day of May 2026,” or May 1, 2026.

Closing Thoughts

The tick size and access fee amendments, and the other provisions adopted, appear to reflect negotiated concessions and a reasonable approach to addressing tick-constrained securities while avoiding the complex framework originally proposed. The decision not to prevent executions at prices within the minimum quotation size is appropriate and preserves the ability of market participants to provide price improvement to investors. While there can be some lingering debate about the appropriate level to which to reduce the access fee cap and whether 10 mils is an appropriate level, the net cumulative effect of these amendments appears reasonable. The planned “review and study” of the effect of the amendments may come too late if conducted towards the outer limit of “by May 2029,” but the overall effect of the amendments should serve to narrow spreads and increase quotation transparency through sub-penny quoting, reduced round-lot sizes, and the inclusion of odd-lot information.

1 Release No. 34-101070, Regulation NMS: Minimum Pricing Increments, Access Fees, and Transparency of Better Priced Orders, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 18, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/34-101070.pdf (the “Adopting Release”).
2 The SEC modified of these requirements in the final rule. For example, the SEC had originally proposed smaller tick sizes for stocks with a time-weighted average quoted spread of $0.04 (rather than $0.015). The proposal also sought to evaluate tick-sizes 4 times per year rather than twice a year and based on monthly data rather than quarterly data.
3 Adopting Release at 15.
4 A protected quotation is defined in Rule 600(b)(82) of Regulation NMS as “a protected bid or protected offer.” 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(82). A protected bid or protected offer is defined as “a quotation in an NMS stock that: (i) is displayed by an automated trading center; (ii) is disseminated pursuant to an effective national market system plan; and (iii) is an automated quotation that is the best bid or best offer of a national securities exchange, or the best bid or best offer of a national securities association.” 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(81)
5 Adopting Release at 288.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
©2024 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
For more news on Rule 612 and Rule 610 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

End of Summer Pool Party: CFTC Approves Final Rule Amending 4.7 Regulatory Relief for CPOs and CTAs

On 12 September 2024, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) published a Final Rule impacting registered commodity pool operators (CPOs) and commodity trading advisors (CTAs) relying on the regulatory relief provided under CFTC Regulation 4.7. “Registration light,” as Regulation 4.7 is sometimes known, provides reduced disclosure, reporting and recordkeeping obligations for CPOs and CTAs that limit sales activities to “qualified eligible persons” (QEPs).

The Final Rule amends Regulation 4.7 by:

  • Updating the QEP definition by increasing the financial thresholds in the “Portfolio Requirement” to account for inflation; and
  • Codifying certain CFTC no-action letters allowing CPOs of Funds of Funds to opt to deliver monthly account statements within 45 days of month-end.

For most asset managers, however, the most significant update is that the CFTC declined to adopt the proposed minimum disclosure requirements. Under existing Regulation 4.7, CPOs and CTAs are exempt from certain disclosure requirements when offering pools solely to QEPs. Without those exemptions, dually-registered managers would be burdened with duplicate or conflicting disclosure requirements under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) rules. The Proposed Rule would have rescinded or narrowed certain of these exemptions. Commenters almost unanimously opposed the disclosure-related amendments, and the CFTC ultimately decided to take additional time to consider the concerns and potential alternatives.

The Final Rule doubled the Portfolio Requirement for the Securities Portfolio Test and the Initial Margin and Premium test to US$4,000,000 and US$400,000, respectively. Despite the increased suitability standards for QEPs, the Final Rule will not impact most private funds relying on Rule 506 of Regulation D, as those amounts are still less than the “Qualified Purchaser” threshold under the SEC’s rules.

Copyright 2024 K & L Gates
For more news on CFTC Final Rule, visit the NLR Antitrust Trade Regulation section.

SEC Enforcement Takes Broad View of Anti-Whistleblower Rule in Latest Action Targeting Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealer

On 4 September 2024, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that it settled charges against affiliated investment-advisers and a broker-dealer over the use of restrictive language in confidentiality agreements, in violation of Rule 21F-17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The firms agreed to pay a combined $240,000 in civil penalties to settle the charges. The enforcement action is the latest in the SEC’s ongoing focus on confidentiality provisions in release agreements; an emphasis that has increasingly focused on investment advisers and broker-dealers.

Rule 21F-17(a) prohibits companies from impeding an individual’s ability to communicate with the SEC regarding possible violations of the US securities laws. The SEC has read the Rule broadly and objected to what it views as restrictive language in the confidentiality provisions of a variety of agreements. In January 2024, for example, the SEC announced a $18 million civil penalty against a dual registered investment adviser and broker-dealer based on a confidentiality provision in release agreements with retail clients that the SEC interpreted as not permitting affirmative reporting.

The agreements at issue in today’s settlement similarly included language the SEC viewed as limiting an individuals’ ability to report. The SEC viewed these agreements as permitting a response to a Commission inquiry only if the “inquiry [was] not resulting from or attributable to any actions taken by [client].” The SEC also took issue with language that it viewed as requiring clients to certify both they had not made previous reports and that they would refrain from future reporting.

The Order makes clear that the SEC is aggressively enforcing Rule 21F-17(a), interpreting carveouts in confidentiality provisions narrowly and focusing instead on a client’s “reasonable impression” after reviewing the agreement. Firms should take a second look at the confidentiality provisions in their agreements, using the SEC’s strict standard, to ensure that they measure up.

Copyright 2024 K & L Gates
For more news on SEC Enforcement, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

The Five Largest SEC Whistleblower Awards from the First Half of 2024

In the first half of 2024, the SEC Whistleblower Program awarded over $18 million to whistleblowers who aided in the agency’s enforcement efforts. Below are the top five awards from the first half of 2024.

Since its inception in 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Whistleblower Program has made significant strides, granting over $1.9 billion in whistleblower awards. In the first half of 2024, over $18 million was awarded to individuals who voluntarily provided original information that led to a successful enforcement action, a testament to the program’s effectiveness.

Under the SEC Whistleblower Program, qualified whistleblowers can receive 10-30% of the funds collected from a successful enforcement action based on their tip. The SEC does not disclose identifying information about award recipients, ensuring their protection and the program’s integrity.

Following are the top five whistleblower awards of the first half 2024:

1. $3.6 Million

On June 17, the SEC granted two claimants a total of $3.6 million, with the first receiving $2,400,000 and the second receiving $1,200,000.

The SEC acknowledged the significant contribution of the first Claimant whose disclosure “caused the staff to open the investigation” and “provided ongoing assistance by participating in interviews and providing documents, which saved Commission resources by helping the staff obtain information in an efficient manner.”

Claimant Two “provided information that caused the staff to inquire concerning different conduct as part of a current investigation” and “provided ongoing assistance by participating in interviews and providing documents, which helped to expedite the staff’s investigation,” according to the award order.

The award document noted that Claimant Two received a reduced reward for reporting information to the commission months after the staff had opened its investigation. Furthermore, it was noted that Claimant One provided a higher level of assistance than Claimant Two and that Claimant One’s information ultimately formed the basis of more charges in the Covered Action.

2. $3.4 Million.

On May 31, the SEC granted a payment of $3.4 million to a single Claimant. Five others filed for an award for the Covered Action but were denied.

According to the SEC, “Claimant voluntarily provided original information that significantly contributed to the success of the Covered Action,” underscoring whistleblowers’ crucial role in enforcing securities regulations.
“Enforcement staff opened the Covered Action investigation based on a referral from staff in the Division of Examinations, and not because of information submitted by any of the claimants.” the agency states.

However, it notes that the whistleblower “met with Enforcement staff” and “provided new, helpful information that substantially advanced the investigation.

The SEC further explains that the awarded whistleblower suffered hardship as a result of blowing the whistle and that there were “high law enforcement interests in this matter.”

Two of the Claimants were denied because they did not have personal knowledge of the investigation’s opening. One Claimant was denied because their tip was primarily publicly available information, and another was denied because their information did not lead to the success of the Covered Action.

3. $2.5 MILLION

On June 20, the SEC awarded $2.5 million to Joint Claimants.

According to the SEC, “the record demonstrates that Joint Claimants voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the Covered Action.”

The Joint Claimants “alerted Commission staff to the conduct, prompting an examination to be commenced that resulted in a referral to staff in the Division of Enforcement and the opening of an investigation,” the SEC explains in the award order.

They also “provided significant additional information and assistance during the course of the examination and investigation, including communicating with Commission staff multiple times, which helped to save staff time and resources.”

4. $2.4 Million

On April 3, the SEC granted two claimants a combined award of $2,400,000. The first Claimant received $2 million, and the second received $400,000.

According to the SEC, “Claimant 1 qualifies as a whistleblower and Claimant 1 voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that caused Enforcement staff to open an investigation that led to the successful enforcement of the Covered Action.”

However, in 2022, Claimant 2 was originally denied as the SEC claimed that their disclosure was made by a general counsel on behalf of an entity owned by Claimant 2 and not on behalf of Claimant 2 as an individual.

Following the SEC’s 2022 denial, the Claimant filed a petition for review of their denial in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The SEC then sought a remand in the case and requested further information from the Claimant.

The Claimant provided “a new declaration from the entity’s general counsel that expressly states that the general counsel represented Claimant 2 in Claimant 2’s personal capacity throughout the process of providing information regarding the Company to the SEC.”

The SEC thus determined that Claimant 2 did qualify as a whistleblower and had “voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that significantly contributed to the success of the Covered Action.”

This marked the first time the SEC awarded a whistleblower who appealed an award denial before a federal appeals court.

5. $2.4 Million

On April 25, an individual Claimant was awarded $2.4 million after voluntarily providing original information to the Commission.

According to the SEC, “after internally reporting concerns, Claimant submitted a tip to the Commission that prompted the opening of the investigation and thereafter provided continuing assistance to the staff.”

Brooke Burkhart and Avery Hudson also contributed to this article.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section

What is Market Manipulation?

The financial market is supposed to be a place where investors put their hard-earned money to work. Market manipulation disrupts the playing field, undermining the integrity of financial systems and causing a great deal of harm to investors. Between 2020 and 2022, the United States recovered $2.7 billion from market manipulation incidents.

What Does Market Manipulation Mean?

The stock market thrives on constant movement as part of a healthy financial ecosystem. However, when someone artificially exploits the supply and demand for securities, the stock market sees a shift in the pricing and value of certain stocks. Market manipulation is an attempt to take advantage of those shifts with insider information, or create false ups and downs to turn a profit. A simple example might be spreading misinformation about a stock in order to cause its price to rise or fall.

How Market Manipulation Works

Market manipulation disrupts the natural flow of supply and demand in a security. For example, a person may attempt to manipulate the stock market in their favor by engaging in a series of transactions designed to make it look like there is a flurry of activity around their stock. This illusion prompts others to buy into such stock, convinced that the company is on the rise because of this artificial energy. This way, the person who began the market manipulation ends up in a better position.

Who Manipulates Stocks?

The stock market is manipulated by any number of bad actors. Investors, company leadership, and anyone who buys and sells securities may attempt to partake in market manipulation.

Why is Market Manipulation Illegal?

If the stock market naturally ebbs and flows, and people are always seeking to profit from it, why is market manipulation illegal?

The answer lies in the importance of honest trading practices and consumer trust. Market manipulation is a method of misleading investors, usually by spreading false information or artificially adjusting prices. Just as you should not sell someone a house by claiming that it has six stories when it is really a shack, similarly you should not manipulate security prices to scam investors.

Who Investigates Market Manipulation?

The US Department of Justice’s Market Integrity and Major Frauds Division (MIMF) investigates claims of securities fraud and market manipulation. The MIMF Division prosecutors can bring criminal charges as well as civil claims for damages against those accused of market manipulation. They utilize data analysis tools and traditional law enforcement techniques to identify and prosecute instances of securities fraud, manipulation, spoofing, insider trading, and more.

How Big Players Manipulate the Stock Market

While more smaller and highly liquid stocks or widely traded securities, are most susceptible to market manipulation, major players can influence the stock market in significant ways. Large financial institutions like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley have a massive hold on how the overall market moves. The 2008 financial crisis is a reminder of how securitization and risky trading of mortgage-backed securities played such a role and led to a ripple effect throughout the market.

Market Manipulation Examples

Stock market manipulation is only limited by the bounds of human ingenuity. Unfortunately, there are a number of ways scam artists attempt to manipulate the market. We have outlined common market manipulation schemes that have emerged over the years:

CRYPTOCURRENCY MARKET MANIPULATION

Although cryptocurrency is less regulated than other investments, it can still be subject to market manipulation. The legal classification of crypto assets as securities is still debatable. However, an August 2023 ruling in Manhattan federal court stated that all cryptocurrencies should be considered securities, regardless of the context in which they are sold. The SEC guidelines on the subject, meanwhile, have hinged on whether or not the particular blockchain is sufficiently decentralized.

The ICO, or Initial Coin Offering, is usually the area where cryptocurrency market manipulation occurs. Crypto is particularly vulnerable to the spread of misinformation on social media, the use of celebrities to artificially inflate an ICO’s value, and pump-and-dump schemes.

HEDGE FUNDS MARKET MANIPULATION

The 2021 GameStop scenario highlighted the upper hand hedge funds often have in the market. In this case, a group of individuals met online and attempted to manipulate the market. Retail investors on Reddit collectively purchased the stock in large quantities after being concerned about the alleged short selling by hedge funds that could devalue GameStop. This surge in buying pressure forced hedge funds to buy back their shares for more money to cover their short sales. However, in the long run, many hedge fund managers profited from the massively increased prices.

FUTURES MARKET MANIPULATION

Attempting to create monopoly power, or “cornering the market” is the primary method of futures market manipulation. This strategy involves a major player artificially creating scarcity in the market by buying up available assets, along with a large stake in a futures contract for delivery at a later date. This is followed by the player refusing to sell at anything except their own price, creating a squeeze on investors who need to buy contracts to fulfill their delivery obligations. Because the futures market hinges upon upcoming deliverables, it forces short sellers to buy contracts at inflated prices from the dominant player.

CROSS-MARKET MANIPULATION

Cross-market manipulation has become more prevalent in recent years, as technology allows trades to happen in real-time and with a higher frequency. Cross-market manipulation is the effort to trade in one venue with the goal of affecting the price of the same security or financial instrument in another market. Cross-market manipulation is also known as inter-trading venue manipulation.

CHURNING MARKET MANIPULATION

Churning is an illegal practice designed to create the illusion of activity and generate commission fees. It involves an excessive amount of trading in a brokerage account solely to generate commissions for the broker from each sale, and not for the client’s benefit.

WHAT IS SPOOFING MARKET MANIPULATION?

Order spoofing, or spoofing, is a method of market manipulation designed to generate interest in a security. One or more players place multiple buy or sell orders on a stock to adjust its price, only to cancel them once other traders accordingly adjust their activities. Thus, the bids are “spoofs,” and therefore, never meant to be followed through.

WHAT IS COORDINATED PRICE MANIPULATION IN THE STOCK MARKET?

Coordinated price manipulation involves agreements between competitors to artificially inflate or deflate stock market prices. For instance, short selling, while legal on its own as a strategy, can cross the line into market manipulation by generating fear around securities to unnaturally lower its price.

WHAT IS LAYERING MARKET MANIPULATION?

Layering is a form of spoofing that involves placing a series of orders designed to be eventually canceled. However, in layering market manipulation efforts, the bids are all placed at different price points, setting the market price somewhere in the middle of the fake trades. This way, the manipulator achieves a better understanding of the market price based on their fake activity, and can trade on the other side of the market to turn in a profit while canceling extraneous offers.

FRONT-RUNNING MARKET MANIPULATION

Front running is often done by an individual broker who has insider information about a future development that will impact stock price. For example, a broker who is ordered to sell a large amount of stock instead goes to their own account before executing the trade and dumps their stock in the same company, now knowing the market price is predicted to plummet. Here, the broker has “run out in front” of natural market fluctuations to illegally sell their stock.

SHORT SELLING MARKET MANIPULATION

Short selling can become market manipulation in the event of cross-market manipulation or coordinated price manipulation.

Naked short selling is the illegal practice of selling shares in an asset before acquiring them, or ensuring that they can in fact be purchased or acquired. The goal here is the same as in usual shorting; however, in short selling, shares must be borrowed before they can be offered to other investors.

PUMP-AND-DUMP SCHEMES

Pump-and-dump schemes typically involve spreading misinformation about a stock in order to “pump up” a frenzy of orders and investments. The perpetrators then “dump” their stocks at the new and artificially inflated price point. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) warns that microcap securities are particularly vulnerable to pump-and-dump schemes because of limited publicly available information.

How Do You Tell if a Stock is Being Manipulated?

Opportunities for market manipulation have become more widespread with mobile trading apps, AI algorithms and bot activity enabling trading to happen in the blink of an eye from anywhere. Traders must examine stock market activity more thoroughly, keeping an eye out for possible warning signs of market manipulation:

  • Unlikely performance compared to company indexes: The stock market cannot tell the full picture of a company’s well-being. It is better to compare market prices against other metrics like revenue, growth potential, and capitalization. When a company’s stock prices remain low even as other signs point to growth, it may be a sign that artificial market activity is at play.
  • Fake news on social media: The spread of bot-led accounts designed to appear like genuine human activity on social media points toward the potential for misinformation. False information often plays a key role in market manipulation and price-adjusting efforts.
  • Flurries of activity: Churning, spoofing, and layering all involve sudden onsets of orders not related to genuine developments. A sudden rush can indicate that a stock is being manipulated. Likewise, a large volume of activity without matching price action can be a warning sign of wash trading.

How Do You Stop Market Manipulation?

Here are some tips to protect yourself from stock market manipulators:

  • Understand your risk appetite and ensure you have an exit strategy for your investments
  • Verify claims that seem too good to be true
  • Avoid excessively large bids or “limited time offers”
  • Review your account activity on a regular basis and report any suspicious activity in your account

SEC MARKET MANIPULATION

The SEC runs the Office of the Whistleblower, which allows whistleblowers to come forward to anonymously report market manipulation. The SEC Office of the Whistleblower has awarded over $1 billion to whistleblowers who have shared information leading to a recovery after a stock market manipulation scheme.

CFTC MARKET MANIPULATION

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) relies heavily on tips and whistleblower information to ensure fair trading practices in the commodity and futures markets. The CFTC Whistleblower Program offers rewards for information as well as protection against retaliation.

How Do You Prove Market Manipulation?

A whistleblower attorney can be your strongest ally to help you gather proof of market manipulation, including:

  • Proof of intent to defraud: Emails, text messages, social media posts, and sworn testimonies to private conversations
  • Refutation of legitimate business purposes: Internal memos, monthly reports, notes from meetings, staff emails, etc. to show that the suspicious activity was not in pursuit of legitimate business purposes
  • Records of trades, monthly account statements, canceled checks, wire transfers, stock transfers, and more: All of these documents can help present a bigger financial picture to illustrate the motive to manipulate market prices

What Are the Consequences of Market Manipulation?

Market manipulation undermines fair and stable markets, and erodes investors’ trust in financial systems. When investors fear manipulation, they may become less confident and willing to invest in diverse portfolios. Market manipulation also creates an uneven playing field, hurting fair competition when scam artists profit at the expense of investors who may lose savings and watch their assets dissolve.

Rewards for Reporting Market Manipulation

You may qualify as a protected whistleblower under the following statutes:

How Are Whistleblowers Protected After Reporting Market Manipulation?

Whistleblowers can anonymously report suspected market manipulation through the SEC Whistleblower Program and have their identity redacted even from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Whistleblowers who have been retaliated against by their employers can sue for the following actions:

  • Reinstatement to former seniority level
  • Payment of double back pay, with interest
  • Payment of front pay, in cases where reinstatement is not possible
  • Attorney fees and legal costs
  • Additional damages

Biggest Market Manipulation Cases

New market manipulation cases are constantly coming to light, as whistleblowers step forward to reveal wrongdoings in the stock market. Some of the biggest market manipulation settlements include:

  • $1.186 billion against Glencore International AG: The CFTC ordered Glencore to pay $1.186 billion to settle accusations that the energy and commodities trading firm strategically manipulated at least four US-based S&P Global Platts physical oil benchmarks from 2007 to 2018.
  • $920 million from JP Morgan for spoofing: The 2020 settlement ordered JP Morgan Chase to pay $920.2 million to settle allegations of at least eight years of spoofing in precious metals and US Treasury futures contracts.
  • $249 million from Morgan Stanley and former executive Pawan Passi: In 2024, the SEC charged Morgan Stanley and its former executive Pawan Passi for executing block trades and acting on insider information. The firm agreed to pay $249 million to settle allegations of multi-year wrongdoing.

What is the SEC Doing about Market Manipulation?

The SEC relies on tips from whistleblowers to take out insider trading rings, spoofing attempts, pump-and-dump schemes, and other kinds of market manipulation attempts. If you have information about such tactics, you may be able to take part in the SEC Whistleblower Program. A whistleblower lawyer with Tycko & Zavareei LLP can help make sure your claim is as strong as possible before you bring it to the SEC. Remember, information once reported is no longer eligible for a reward.

Market Manipulation: FAQs

IS MARKET MANIPULATION ILLEGAL?

Yes. While everyone wants to “get ahead” on the stock market, manipulating the market is an illegal activity that can result in criminal penalties like jail time, as well as the imposition of civil fines and damages.

WHAT IS A REAL-LIFE EXAMPLE OF MARKET MANIPULATION?

One of the most notorious examples of market manipulation is the 2001 Enron scandal. When the energy company was found to have altered and misrepresented financial statements to inflate its stock price, it went bankrupt and multiple executives were indicted for the fraud.

WHO DOES MARKET MANIPULATION HURT?

Market manipulation hurts investors who lose money on investments that are either illegitimate or inaccurately represented. At the same time, its negative impact may also be felt throughout the economy, the 2008-2009 Great Recession being a case in point.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARKET ABUSE AND MARKET MANIPULATION?

Market manipulation is a specific tactic within the larger issue of market abuse. Market manipulation focuses on artificially controlling prices to secure unearned profit, whereas market abuse encompasses various schemes with the aim of disadvantaging investors for personal gain.

© 2024 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more news on Market Manipulation, visit the NLR Criminal Law & Business Crimes section.

The SEC Continues Its War On Crime Victims

More than a decade ago, I expressed concern when the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Koss Corporation and one its CEO, Mr. Koss, with filing materially false financial statements after the corporation had discovered that it had been the victim of employee embezzlement. In the post, I decried the SEC’s decision to punish the victims of crime:

The SEC’s decision to prosecute this case is troubling. Surely, neither Koss Corporation nor Mr. Koss intended or wanted to be the victim of a criminal embezzlement. It is also hard to see how the shareholders’ benefited from the company incurring the legal costs associated with defending and settling the SEC investigation. While the SEC did force the return of bonus compensation, the injunctive relief ordering the company and Mr. Koss not to do this again strikes me as silly. Does it really make sense for the court to order a company not to be the victim of a theft?

I was therefore heartened by the recent statement by Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda on the SEC’s recent settlement of administrative proceeding against R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co.:

Also concerning is the Commission’s decision to stretch the law to punish a company that was the victim of a cyberattack. While an enforcement action may be warranted in some circumstances, distorting a statutory provision to form the basis for such an action inappropriately amplifies a company’s harm from a cyberattack.

According to the SEC’s press release, R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co. “cooperated throughout the investigation, including by reporting the cybersecurity incident to staff prior to filing a disclosure of the incident, by providing meaningful cooperation that helped expedite the staff’s investigation, and by voluntarily adopting new cybersecurity technology and controls”. Nonetheless, the SEC thought a just resolution required payment of a $2.125 million civil penalty for transfer to the U.S. Treasury. I remain unconvinced that the expropriation of millions of dollars from a crime victim to the U.S. Treasury protects, much less helps, the shareholders of R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Co.

© 2010-2024 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP
For more news on SEC Punishing Crime Victims, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.